Shaking out: The future of the US Navy's surface combatant ... · PDF fileFollowing a number of fatal collisions involving capital warships on routine patrols, the US Navy (USN) appears

© 2017 IHS. No portion of this report may be reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without prior written

consent, with the exception of any internal client distribution as may be permitted in the license agreement between client and IHS. Content reproduced or redistributed with IHS permission must display IHS legal notices and attributions of authorship. The

information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are the

opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or

omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein.

Page 1 of 13

Shaking out: The future of the US Navy's surface combatant fleet

[Content preview – Subscribe to Jane’s Defence Weekly for full article]

The US Navy’s surface-combatant fleet is facing a tumultuous time. Although on the cusp

of benefitting from some of its most promising programmes, the navy is facing an internal

and external crisis. Michael Fabey reports on how the navy will try to get back on course

Following a number of fatal collisions involving capital warships on routine patrols, the US Navy

(USN) appears to be in a state of crisis. Perhaps more worryingly, those mishaps involved ballistic

missile defence (BMD) ships in the Western Pacific just as North Korea began to dial up its missile

threat.

At the same time several programmes at various stages of completion hold the promise of

increased capability for the USN. The DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer programme is going

through final testing and work on its combat system; development of the Flight III Arleigh-Burke

destroyer is progressing, with deliveries remaining on schedule and at or below cost projections;

the service’s Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) are gaining operational praise as they run through

block production; and requirements have been set for successor guided-missile frigates. Thus,

under normal circumstances the USN surface fleet would seem to be on a safe, sound, and

successful course.

The guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), the USN's most technologically advanced surface ship, pictured on 8 December 2016, underway in formation with the Littoral Combat Ship USS Independence (LCS 2) on the final leg of a three-month journey to its new homeport in San Diego. (US Navy)

1651238






Page 2 of 13

However, politically and publicly the USN’s surface-ship community and its leadership are facing

some of the roughest seas the fleet has weathered in decades. This is primarily the result of the

spate of mishaps and accidents that have plagued vessel operations: there have been four since

the middle of the decade, which represents a third of all major surface-ship accidents over the last

10 years.

The USN has always battled concerns over cost, relevancy, and programmatic stewardship, much

like every military branch, but this is the first time the service’s ability to conduct fundamental

seagoing operations has ever been brought into question. The USN has never before had to prove

that it could handle basic seamanship.

However, the accidents have done more than put the USN’s prestige and reliability on the line:

they have taken much-needed surface ships offline.

USS Fitzgerald collided with a Philippine-flagged merchant cargo ship off the Japanese coast on 17 June. The USN later confirmed that seven missing sailors were found dead in flooded berthing compartments inside the ship. (US Navy)

1704243

The surface ships in question are the guided-missile destroyers equipped with upgraded Aegis

combat systems that can better accommodate BMD missions. These ships are conducting “very

high-end missions to go out and detect, track, and then shoot these ballistic missiles down out of

the sky”, Admiral John Richardson, USN Chief of Naval Operations, told sailors and officers during

a 15 November visit to Kitsap Naval Base in Washington state. “It’s getting very sophisticated,” he

added.

BMD ships are a commodity that is very much in demand, given the development, deployment,

and proliferation of advanced ballistic missiles. As of mid-2017 US combatant commanders said






Page 3 of 13

they required 77 BMD ships worldwide, but the USN was only deploying 34. In the Western Pacific

– where the United States arguably faces its biggest BMD challenge with expanding Chinese

capabilities and the emerging North Korean missile threat – the USN's 7th Fleet has controlled just

10–14 of those specially equipped destroyers and cruisers at any one time, with 11 based in

Yokosuka, Japan. Due to maintenance, training, and repositioning schedules, only a third of those

ships were truly operational at any given moment.

USS Fitzgerald , pictured here before its collision with a merchant cargo ship in June 2017. The ship is pictured leaving Dry Dock 4 out of Yokosuka, Japan, to move to a new position. (US Navy)

1717356

One of those Western Pacific BMD-equipped destroyers, USS Fitzgerald , collided on 17 June with

a merchant cargo ship off the Japanese coast, while another, USS John S McCain , collided with

an oil tanker near the eastern entrance of the Strait of Malacca on 20 August. “The loss of two of

these ships is not insignificant,” Thomas Karako, a senior fellow in the International Security

programme at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Jane’s .

Ahead of these incidents the USN already had no deployable BMD ships to spare, according to

Robert Haddick, author of Fire on the Water: China, America and the Future of the Pacific .

[Continued in full version…]






Page 4 of 13

The AMDR is characterised as an advanced, high-power active-array radar that can simultaneously support long-range, exo-atmospheric detection, tracking, and discrimination of ballistic missiles as well as area and self-defence against air and surface threats. The next generation of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers will be equipped with AMDRs, making them more efficient BMD vessels. (Raytheon)

1454294

Under review

Due to their scarcity BMD ships are in high demand. However, that high operational tempo – as

well as disparate bridge-control configurations and a general lack of basic training – has led not

only to the McCain and Fitzgerald collisions but also to the other recent surface-ship mishaps,

according to the USN Comprehensive Review that was released in November. Additionally, a 29

November report on a 9 May collision between the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain

and a South Korean fishing boat made similar findings.

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS John S McCain (DDG 56) departs Singapore on the heavy-lift transport MV Treasure on 11 October 2017 following its collision with an oil tanker the previous August. (US Navy)

1717355






Page 5 of 13

The review also called for the USN to re-evaluate its surface-ship BMD operations and urged the

service to do a better job of integrating its various navigation set-ups on bridges throughout the

fleet. The need for BMD operations has placed additional burdens on the fleet, while confusion

concerning different bridge-control systems has also created problems in ship navigation, the

report said.

“Increased BMD and presence missions [as well as additional] tasking to support exercises and

experimentation exceeded the capacity that can be reasonably generated from Japan-based

ships,” the review stated.

En route to Yokosuka for repairs, the guided missile destroyer USS John S McCain (DDG 56) departs Subic Bay in the Philippines on 28 November on board heavy-lift transport vessel MV Treasure following its collision with an oil tanker near the Strait of Malacca on 20 August. (US Navy)

1717354

According to the report, the resources available from Japan-based ships were adequate to meet

the operational demands in the Western Pacific before 2015, but since then operational demand

has increased substantially. The report recommended that the USN should evaluate overall BMD

capacity within the fleet.

The need for BMD and other operations kept ships at sea, even when they should have been in

port for maintenance and crew-training. The report highlighted that, despite these issues, there

was a 'can do' attitude that drove sailors and surface warfare officers (SWOs) to treat every task

like a priority and get their ships out to sea – ready or not – to execute missions.






Page 6 of 13

As a result, the report noted that some modern integrated bridge system installations were

deferred, which meant some destroyers and cruisers had different bridge-control systems and set-

ups, making it impossible for sailors from one ship to work on another and to be able to expect

familiar equipment or layouts. Such confusion was noted as a factor in at least one of the recent

collisions.

Whatever the reasons for the accidents, they could not have come at a worse time – especially in

the Western Pacific, where USN patrols have been squaring off against more aggressive Chinese

forces in recent years. Looking partly to reassure allies, the USN has had three carrier strike

groups (CSGs) converge on the Western Pacific – for the first time in that ocean region in about a

decade – for a set of exercises and drills.

Three F/A-18E Super Hornets fly in formation over the aircraft carriers USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), USS Nimitz (CVN 68), and their strike groups, along with ships from the Republic of Korea Navy, as they transit the Western Pacific. (US Navy/Lt Aaron B Hicks)

1711845

Those drills have provided the USN with a unique opportunity to aggregate a major naval force,

Rear Admiral Gregory Harris, commander of CSG 11, told Jane’s aboard its anchor ship, USS

Nimitz . Normally, he noted, a CSG enters an area of responsibility and some of the smaller

surface ships assigned to a group will leave the main force to perform solo tasks and missions. He

said that often a CSG will focus on disaggregating the force: steaming together as a group and

then peeling off ships for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, smaller

exercises, and to work with allies and partner navies and coastguards.

During the tri-carrier exercises the USN had the opportunity to see how best to combine such a

large concentration of carrier power and how foreign forces could be integrated into such a mass.

As a bonus the USN also integrated Japanese and South Korean naval and air forces with the

CSGs.


Future force

The USN released a new Force Structure Assessment (FSA) on 15 December 2016 that called for

achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships, replacing a 308-ship force-level goal that the navy






Page 7 of 13

released in March 2015. The service conducts an FSA every few years, as circumstances require.

The actual size of the navy in recent years has been between 270 and 290 ships, the

Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted in a November report.

“The roughly 15% increase in the new 355-ship plan over the previous 308-ship plan can be

viewed as a navy response to, among other things, China’s continuing naval modernisation effort;

resurgent Russian naval activity, particularly in the Mediterranean Sea and the North Atlantic

Ocean; and challenges that the navy has sometimes faced, given the current total number of ships

in the navy, in meeting requests from the various regional US combatant commanders for day-to-

day in-region presence of forward-deployed navy ships,” the CRS reported.

The 355-vessel fleet includes an 18.2 % increase in large surface combatants, such as LCSs,

frigates, cruisers, and destroyers, from 88 vessels to 104 under the 308-ship plan. The only other

ship types slated for a larger increase are attack submarines, with a projected 37.5% increase

from 48 to 66 boats, and expeditionary support base ships, the numbers of which would double

from three to six.

Within that large surface combatant mix, one of the most anticipated sets of vessels are the

upgraded Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and the new DDG 1000 class, the lead ship of which,

USS Zumwalt , is now going through combat system testing.

USS Zumwalt , pictured here in the Atlantic Ocean in December 2015, is progressing through combat system testing. (General Dynamics Bath Iron Works)

1633886

With an estimated full-load displacement of 15,612 tonnes, the DDG 1000 design is roughly 64%

larger than the USN’s 9,500-tonne Aegis cruisers and destroyers, and larger than any navy

destroyer or cruiser since the nuclear-powered cruiser USS Long Beach (CGN 9), which was

procured in fiscal year 1957 (FY 1957). Zumwalt is similar in size to a cruiser and has a futuristic

stealthy design and construction, a power-generation margin for directed-energy weapons, and a

set of 155 mm guns that can fire projectiles out to about 63 n miles. This offers a land-attack






Page 8 of 13

potential that the USN has not had for many years and one that the US Marine Corps (USMC) is

awaiting.

However, there will only be three DDG 1000s in service. The first two ships were procured in FY

2007 and the USN’s FY 2018 budget submission estimates their combined procurement cost at

USD9.1 billion. The third DDG 1000 was procured in FY 2009 and the USN’s 2018 budget

submission estimates its procurement cost at USD3.7 billion.

The first DDG 1000 was commissioned into service on 15 October 2016 and, according to the FY

2018 budget, delivery is scheduled for May 2018, while the delivery for the second ship is now

slated for May 2020 and the third ship by December 2021.

Ralph Johnson (DDG 114) seen during builder's sea trials in the Gulf of Mexico during July. The second restart destroyer from HII is scheduled to be commissioned in March. (Huntington Ingalls Industries )

1704802

About a decade ago the Zumwalt-class ships were supposed to anchor the future of the surface

fleet. However, the USN eventually determined that revamped Arleigh Burke-class ships with a

more-advanced radar would better address BMD needs and so the mainstay of the destroyer fleet

will be the advanced Flight III Arleigh Burke.

DDG 51s are built by General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works in Maine and Huntington Ingalls

Industries’ (HII’s) Ingalls Shipbuilding of Pascagoula, Mississippi. The USN started the DDG 51

programme in the late 1970s, the first ship was procured in FY 1985, and the first destroyer

entered service in 1991. By the end of FY 2016, 62 were in service and another 77 were procured

during FY 2017.

The navy is now shifting to the Flight III DDG 51, which will incorporate the new and more capable

AN/SPY-6(V) AMDR.

Ship construction of the next-generation Arleigh Burkes is going well, according to Michael Petters,

HII's CEO. He told financial investment analysts on 8 November during a quarterly earnings call






Page 9 of 13

that HII engineers saw nothing they would label as “unobtainium” from the standpoint of “How the

heck are we going to build that?"


LCS to frigates

As the USN shores up its destroyer fleet, the service is also ramping up on LCS production and

deployments.

“When we really use [an] LCS to its full potential, we use it like a ninja warrior,” said Rear Admiral

Don Gabrielson, commander of the USN's Task Force 73. “It sneaks in from the shadows, it

attacks from the shadows and then it disappears. It’s gone immediately or before anybody has a

chance to locate it. It gets lost in the clutter of the islands so that it complicates anyone’s ability to

attack it,” he explained.

Rear Adm Gabrielson’s comments were included in a talking points paper that was circulated

internally in the USN by the LCS Program Executive Office (PEO). The PEO paper noted that LCS

deployments thus far to Southeast Asia had demonstrated the value of LCSs in terms of sea

control and distributed lethality: a concept being pushed by the USN to add more power and punch

to a greater number of its surface ships.

A Harpoon Block 1C missile is launched from the Littoral Combat Ship USS Coronado (LCS 4)

during Exercise 'RIMPAC 2016'. (US Navy) 1696636






Page 10 of 13

The USN plans to deploy LCS vessels for surface, anti-submarine, and mine countermeasures

(MCM) operations, switching out different mission-module packages depending on which

operation-specific equipment and personnel the ship may need.

The paper said LCS module development is also on track, noting that the “mature” surface warfare

package was fielded in 2014.

“The next focus is on Longbow Hellfire surface-to-surface missile-module [SSMM] capability,” the

paper said, adding, “Integration testing is going well to support 2018 delivery.”

Although the Hellfire missiles would meet initial LCS requirements, USN SWOs and US combatant

commanders – particularly Admiral Harry Harris, the commander of Pacific Command – have been

pushing for a longer-range weapon: an over-the-horizon (OTH) missile. USS Coronado deployed

to the Western Pacific with a Harpoon missile system for operational testing. The USN has issued

a request for proposals (RFP) for an OTH missile for LCSs and successor frigates.

A Harpoon missile is launched from the missile deck of the Littoral Combat Ship USS Coronado (LCS 4) off the coast of Guam in August. (US Navy)

1699574

For the MCM package all airborne MCM systems – the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System

(ALMDS), the Airborne Mine Neutralisation System (AMNS), and the AN/DVS-1 Coastal Battlefield

Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) MCM system – have achieved initial operational

capability (IOC). Meanwhile, the USN is testing an MCM unmanned surface vehicle (USV) as a

platform for an unmanned influence sweep system (UISS), which will also serve as the platform for

the minehunting sonar that has been operated for 240 hours in the water during contractor testing.

Testing of the Knifefish unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) is also reported to be going well.

The PEO paper stated that 11 LCS vessels have been delivered and 18 more are in construction

or under contract.

There are two LCS variants: one is a steel mono-hull ship built by Lockheed Martin, while the other

is Austal USA’s all-aluminium trimaran. Both have completed initial operational test and evaluation

(IOT&E) and achieved IOC, the PEO noted.






Page 11 of 13

The keel was laid and authenticated on 15 November 2017 for Kansas City (LCS 22) at Austal

USA's yard in Mobile, Alabama.

Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin was awarded a USD22.7 million contract modification during the

same month to start building an LCS variant for Saudi Arabia as part of a Foreign Military Sales

deal.

The USN's minehunting Knifefish UUV is continuing with testing, which is reported to be going well. (General Dynamics Mission Systems)

1693373

The USN will be phasing out LCS production by FY 2020 to build its new guided-missile frigates

(FFG(X)), the design of which may be based on one of the two LCS designs. Either way the

service is committed to a programme of LCSs and frigates that will provide a combined fleet of 52

ships.

The USN has issued a RFP for its FFG(X) and on 17 November it provided prospective bidders

with more details of the requirements for the ship and the programme. While the cost for the new

USN FFG(X) vessels will be an important consideration, the service will put more weight on other

combined ship and programmatic attributes. “Non-price factors, when combined, are considered

significantly more important than the price factor,” USN officials told industry.

The target basic construction cost for FFG(X) is USD495 million, the USN said, which does not

include the cost of non-recurring construction plans and other associated costs for a lead ship,

government-furnished combat or weapon systems, or change orders. The programme office will

consider existing parent designs for a small surface combatant that can be modified to

accommodate FFG(X) requirements. By “mature parent designs” the USN says it means a ship

design that has been through production and been “demonstrated [full scale]” at sea.

The programme office also wants to drive down lifecycle costs and “use common navy systems

across the radar, combat system, C4ISR systems, and launcher elements, while encouraging hull,

mechanical, and electrical system commonality with other USN platforms”.







Page 12 of 13

Righting the fleet

However, even with the future frigates, LCSs, and destroyers slated for the service, there will not

be enough ships to meet the planned future USN’s surface fleet size or fleet requirements. To do

that the service is considering recommissioning ships, increasing their lifespans, or even putting

nuclear power on other vessels besides aircraft carriers and submarines.

“Something in the order of 350 to 360 ships is what we need to meet our responsibilities for the

nation,” Adm Richardson said at Kitsap Naval Base on 15 November. “We’ve got about 280 ships

right now,” he said. “How do we bridge that gap? How do we grow naval power as fast as we can?

We’re looking at every possibility. Recommissioning frigates was something that we just needed to

look at. How much would it cost, and what would be the return on that investment in terms of naval

power, and then how did that compare with other areas where we could spend that money?”, the

admiral asked.

USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) is towed away from the pier at Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka in Japan. Gaps in training have been cited as a likely factor in causing it to collide with a merchant cargo ship off the Japanese coast on 17 June last year. (US Navy)

1717353

He added, “If we build towards a bigger navy, more naval power, are we considering more

nuclear-powered surface ships? Are you going to bring back the nuclear cruisers? We’ll see. We

take a look at that every single time. We start it from the ground up, and we look at every aspect of

the ship. Not just propulsion, but every system. It really comes down to what’s best for the

situation.”

Although increasing the number of ships is a step in the right direction, it is worth noting that

having the full required number of vessels will not mean a thing if USN officers and sailors fail to

properly operate them. To do that Adm Richardson cautioned that sailors and officers need to get

the right training, familiarise themselves with the fundamentals and the equipment on their

particular ships, and be fully aware of their surroundings and their own health.






Page 13 of 13

Citing the Fitzgerald and McCain mishaps, he said, “These people, they just hadn’t done it. They

hadn’t gone through any of the training and qualification. Some of this is very, very fundamental.”

The USN's Comprehensive Review included recommendations for training, qualifications, and

readiness that strike to the core of surface navy operations.

“Some of it is going to change training pipelines, schools, those sorts of things,” Adm Richardson

said. “It’s a very broad and comprehensive programme. I’ve assigned a four-star admiral to run

that programme to make sure we do everything we possibly can to prevent something like that

from happening again,” he noted.


For the full version and more content:

For advertising solutions visit Jane’s Advertising

Jane's Defence Industry and Markets Intelligence Centre

This analysis is taken from Jane’s Defence Industry & Markets Intelligence Centre, which provides

world-leading analysis of commercial, industrial and technological defence developments, budget

and programme forecasts, and insight into new and emerging defence markets around the world.

Jane’s defence industry and markets news and analysis is also available within Jane’s Defence

Weekly. To learn more and to subscribe to Jane’s Defence Weekly online, offline or print visit

http://magazines.ihs.com/

https://ihs.uberflip.com/aerospace-defence-security

http://www.ihs.com/jdim

http://magazines.ihs.com/

Documents

Shaking out: The future of the US Navy's surface combatant ... · PDF fileFollowing a number of fatal collisions involving capital warships on routine patrols, the US Navy (USN) appears