Sickle Unconventional Threats IAFF005 Lecture 31March05

8/2/2019 Sickle Unconventional Threats IAFF005 Lecture 31March05

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31 March 2005 Peter Sickle, George Washington University,IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS


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1. Overview

2. Concepts

3. History

4. Current Trends

5. Policy Options

6. Cases

7. Looking Ahead


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1. Overview

Beyond War Non-State ActorsIntra-StateTransnational

Challenges to sovereigntyThe weak fighting the

strong Outside the laws and normsof warfare

Challenges for states topractice attrition,containment, deterrence,compellence, or negotiation


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1. Overview

InsurgencyGuerrilla WarfareTerrorism

Transnational CrimeNarco-traffickingPiracyHuman Trafficking


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2. Concepts

Unconventional ThreatsUse of organized violence by one or more non-state parties

InsurgencyEffort by non-state actor(s) to acquire control of territory and/or politicalcontrol through the use of force

Guerrilla WarfareInsurgency by militia organized but covert using force againstgovernment military forces to control territory and/or politicalrepresentation

Terrorism

Non-state individuals and organizations using force (or threat) againstcivilians to pursue political, ideological, or religious goals

Transnational CrimeNon-state individuals and organizations using force (or threat) againstgovernment, corporations and individuals to acquire wealth


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2. ConceptsClausewitz Challenged

Center of Gravity different from those of states; not easily identified Mass irrelevant for covert networks; indistinguishable from civilians Friction states present multiple targets; collective punishment Fog of War concealment and dispersion favor the non-state actor

LegitimacyBattle for Hearts and Minds Enough force? Too much force?Force multiplier the weak overcoming the strong

ResourcesMembershipSafe HavenMoney

Arms


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2. Concepts Advantages to the State

Resources personnel, weapons, funding, intelligence (?)International Law international community of statesSafe Haven

Advantages to the Non-State Actor Asymmetric will/motivationOperational surpriseDispersionConcealment

Access to targets

Advantages Up for GrabsLegitimacy public support or hearts and minds


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2. Concepts

One mans terrorist isanother mans freedomfighter

Terrorists dont want a lotof people dead, they wanta lot of people watching

Terrorists are evildoers


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3. History

RoguesEx. Pirates; Gangs; Highwaymen

Rebellions/RevolutionsEx. American Colonials; French Peasants; Bolsheviks; Maos Communists

Self-Determination/Anti-ColonialismEx. Zealots and Gauls v. Roman Empire; Vietnamese and Algerians v.French; Zionists and Mau Maus v. British; Filipinos v. U.S.

TerrorismEx. IRA (N. Ireland); Hizballah (Lebanon); Al Qaeda (global); AumShinrikyo (Japan); Red Brigades (Italy); Jamaa Islamiyya (Indonesia);Weathermen Underground (U.S.); Red Army Factions (Germany); SenderoLuminoso (Peru)


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3. History

Changes to SystemDistribution of power FailingempiresChanging norms democracyImitation effect successbreeds success

Technological InnovationSmall Arms; effective explosives

Virtual communities; Globaltravel

Mass Media CommunicationsNewspapers; radio; television;internet and 24/7 cable


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3. History

Post WWII

Anti-Colonialism/Self-Determination independence particularlyBritish and French

Algeria, Palestine, Indochina,Burma, Kenya

Widespread surplus of smallarms and fighters withcombat-experience


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3. History

1960s-1970sSocial Revolutionarymovements violent andnon-violent

Rise of religiousfundamentalism (esp. Islamv. secular/corrupt regimes)

Mass media and travel global communities


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3. History

Post Cold War

2nd Wave of Self-Determination

Rise of internet and 24/7news cycle


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4. Current Trends

TerrorismReligious fundamentalism violence is not only justified, but a dutyWMD or CBRNE greater access to knowledge and building blocksGlobal networks shared ideology, training, weapons, safe havensDrop in State Sponsorship rising costs of links to terrorism

Insurgencies Failed StatesIraq foreign fighters, battle for legitimacy, anti-democracyColombia entrenched economic interests overshadow politicsChechnya foreign fighters, battle for survivalNepal pseudo-Maoist revolution, town v. country, democracy (?)

Transnational CrimeNarco-trafficking persistent demand = persistent supplyHumanTrafficking reduced barriers to travel/trade = neo-slaveryPiracy persistent supply = persistent demand


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4. Current Trends

CounterterrorismLocal emergency preparedness, education, law enforcementRegional cooperation, extradition, intelligenceGlobal growing consensus on terrorism and general threat

CounterinsurgenciesIraq protracted war of attritionColombia beginnings of negotiationsChechnya protracted war of attritionNepal containment and compellenceSudan peace (?)

Countering Transnational CrimeNarco-trafficking interdiction, crop destruction, substitute farmingHumanTrafficking international coordinationPiracy private security


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5. Policy Options

AttritionKill and/or capture members IF known who they are and whereDegrade infrastructure seize assets; wipe out safe havens

ContainmentSeparation Ex. Israeli FenceEnclaves Ex. Tamil Tigers, Turkish Kurds

DeterrenceDifficult to clearly communicate specific and credible threats tonetworks

CompellenceCarrots negotiations, recognition, amnesty, political recognitionSticks lethal force, imprisonment, economic sanctions


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5. Policy Options

Attrition ChallengesToo much leads to defeat or Pyrrhic victory; Too little is ineffectiveCollective punishment innocent suffering hurts state legitimacy

Containment ChallengesCeding space can lead to de-facto defeat and encourage further attempts

Allows problem to festerDeterrence Challenges

Hard to anticipate future threat unpredictable/unknown potential enemyToo high a threat lacks credibility; Too low lacks impact

Compellence ChallengesUse of carrots may embolden present and future challengesUse of sticks difficult to discriminate between guilty and innocentNegotiation Dilemma states dont need to when enemy is weak; cantafford to when enemy is strong


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5. Policy Options

Difficult to establish shadow of the futureDifficult to identify enemy (and support)

Difficult to measure success (or progress)

Difficult to employ full power capabilities Asymmetric respect for laws and norms

Asymmetric motivation

Lack of retreat space for one or bothLack of institutional structures

Norms against negotiating with outlaws


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6. Cases

CounterterrorismFailures

Mostly nationalist-separatist terrorism

FLN in Algeria

Lehi/Stern Gang inMandate Palestine


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6. Cases

CounterterrorismSuccesses

Mostly ideologicalterrorism

Aum Shinrikyo

WeathermenUnderground


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6. Cases

CounterterrorismStalemate

Third Way (?) terrorists renounceviolence but maintaingoals and infrastructure

IRA Gamaa Islamiyya


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7. Looking Ahead

Al Qaeda down but not outWMD/CBRNE supply is up, but is demand?

Battle for Hearts and Minds hard power soft power

Media attention increased supply = increased demand?Smart Weapons only as smart as their targets

Diffusion and Learning best practices of insurgency

Rules/Norms of warfare need updated consensus

No negotiation policy depends on vision of victory


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7. Looking Ahead

Strategic AdvantageMinimize opportunity costs; Balance Short-term/Long-term gains

LegitimacyTransparency; Discrimination; Proportionality

Operational CapacityReal-time intelligence; Stealth; Precision Strike

Window of OpportunityTarget identification; Long-distance reach; Diplomatic Access

= GO S.L.O.W.


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Thank You

Questions?

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Sickle Unconventional Threats IAFF005 Lecture 31March05