SIEP - ABC Guide to Temporary Pipework Ver 02[1]

8/10/2019 SIEP - ABC Guide to Temporary Pipework Ver 02[1]

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ABC Guide toTemporary Pipework

ABC Guide toTemporary Pipework

Drilling and Well ServicesDrilling and Well Services

Practices to implement EP 2006-5393Shell Global Standard for Temporary Pipework

Practices to implement EP 2006-5393Shell Global Standard for Temporary Pipework


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1

Drilling and Well Services

ABC Guide to Temporary Pipework

Ver. 2.0

Basics for Common Understanding

Pipework connected by Hammer Unions is used in chemicalprocess plants, the mining industry, on dredging vessels andin the oil industry. It is an old design (early 1950s) createdby the Well Equipment COmpany (WECO) which wasaquired by FMC.

Female / Male Unions

The identification of the Female and Male parts of aHammer type union is shown in the picture below.

The union parts are called out using a Nominal pipe size, aFIG designation and a code e.g.1502.

For example: 2 FIG 1502

The 2 is close to the inside diameter. The meaning of FIGhas been lost in the depths of time but is probably an abbre-viation of figure - meaning drawing, and 1502 is a code forthe working pressure rating - 15 referring to 15,000 psi.But over time the addition of larger diameter pipework andH2S pipework has led to the designation becoming corrupted- so beware.

Female UnionMale Union

Wing Nut


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2 ABC Guide to Temporary Pipework

Drilling and Well Services Ver. 2.0

The meaning of "Temporary"

"Temporary," in the context of pipework and flowline equip-ment, applies to any pipework and flowline equipment which

can be installed or changed-out without recourse to structur-al and process engineering.

["Permanent" pipework and flowline equipment (e.g. spool-pieces connected between the production wing valve and theproduction manifold) are designed, constructed and installedsubject to requirements of structural and process engineer-ing codes and reviews. Without these formal checks beingrequired for temporary pipework, the ABC Guide indicatesthe minimum precautions to be taken when working withtemporary pipework used in Drilling and Well Services oper-ations.]

Temporary Pipework is commonly referred to as Chicksanor Flowline Equipment.


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Contents

Introduction 5What is Temporary Pipework 5

Equipment Involved 7Background Information 9

Pressure 9Stored Energy 11Dynamic Loading 11

Vibration 11Bending Forces 12

Shock Loading 13Hazardous Fluids 13

Operational Hazards 14Loss of Containment 14

Leaks - Erosion 14 H2S 15 Catastrophic Failure 16

Historic Incidents 17Pipework Connections and Interfaces 20

Mismatches 20Mismatching the Same-Size 20 Mismatching Pipe Pressure Ratings 22 Mismatching Wing Nuts 23 Mismatching Components 23

Mismatching Non-Detachable and DetachableComponents 23

Flexible Pipes 26

Hazard Identi fication and Mitigation 28Mitigation Methods 28

Check lists 28 No-Go areas 30 Restraints 30


Drilling and Well ServicesVer. 2.0


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Avoiding Injury 38Hammering Unions 38Gauges 39

Completing the Connection Interface Diagram 40Walking the Lines 43

Example walkthrough 43

Awareness of Safety Initiatives 45FMC Technologies Ltd 45




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IntroductionThis ABC Guide to Temporary Pipework is designed as a practicalguide to create an awareness of the issues faced when using tempo-

rary pipework in the field.This guide covers:

Flowline equipment.Pressures and types of fluids involved.Operational hazards.Pipework connections and interfaces.Hazard identification and mitigation.

Operational guidelines.This guide should be read and understood by all involved in tempo-rary pipework operations. The guide should also be re-read prior tothe commencement of each temporary pipework operation and alsoreferred to during each step of that operation.

If the correct procedure is unclear at any stage of the operation :Stop and Ask.

What is Temporary PipeworkTemporary pipework consists of the conduits and equipment fordirecting fluids (liquids or gasses):

From a pump to a wellhead. A high pressure point to a lower pressure point.Fluids directed to outlets ending with plugs on which sensorsare mounted.

Usually one source

will be the well (theWellhead or XmasTree). Occasionally,temporary pipeworkmay be required fortransfer of fluidsbetween vessels.

5

TemporaryPipework

PermanentPipework

To temporary pipework system

Pipework part of original design(e.g. productionfacilities)



Ver. 2.0

F igure 1 - Temporary P ipework / Permanent

P ipework.


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Temporary pipework is piping and flowline equipment that ismobilised and assembled for the purpose of carrying out the follow-ing operations :

General Pumping Operations (transfer of fluids, mud/brine

mixing operations, (reverse) circulating well fluids, etc.Pressure Testing of Surface Lines and Equipment (includingwellhead, BOP, X-mas tree, flow lines, etc).Pressure Testing of Downhole Equipment (casing, packers,tubing, plugs, valves, accessories).Cementing.Well Killing.Well Stimulation.

Nitrogen Pumping.Well Clean-up.Well Testing.Under Balanced Drilling operations.Managed Pressure Drilling Operations.

Temporary pipework can be both hard and flexible pipe.



F igure 2 - T y pical Temporary P ipework Set-ups


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Equipment InvolvedPipework runs (straights), pup joints, elbows.Strainers, pots, plug valves, check valves.

T-pieces.Laterals (Y-pieces).Swivel joints.Treating Loops.Crossovers.High Pressure Hoses.Flanges & Blinds.

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Ver. 2.0

Chiksan (Swivel) Joint

Treating loop

Tee

Typical Coflexip Line

Pipework

F igure 3 - Some typic al equipment inv olved


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The pipework connections referred to in the guide are known as:

Hammer-type connections.Hub-type connections.Flange connections.Pipe body to pipe body (welded).

In summary, Temporary Pipework (chicksan, flowline equipment)comprises such fittings as straights or pup joints, T -pieces,elbows, crosses, crossovers, blinds, plugs, swivel joints and plug,loops and check valves. A combination of such equipment is oftenreferred to as steel hose.



Hammer-type Union Graylok Hub-type Connection

Welded Connection

Flange Connection

F igure 4 - Temporary P ipework Conne ctions


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Background Information As previously described, Temporary Pipework Operations involvesthe transport of fluids under pressure from one point to another.Due to the typical pressures and flow rates involved, TemporaryPipework Systems contain a lot of stored energy which can causevibration, bending forces and shock loading on the system. The flu-ids being flowed can be hazardous or corrosive and can thereforealso attack the integrity or strength of the system. It is thereforevitally important that all equipment used in a Temporary PipeworkOperation set up is:

Mechanically sound and has been properly inspected prior touse.

Of suitable material, particularly where seals are concerned;this applies both to working pressure rating and to the fluidtype being flowed (e.g Sour Service).Made up correctly at all connections and unions as per therecommendations of the operational design.Secured with the proper restraints attached to the properanchor points in the system.

In order to better understand these requirements we will now look

at some of the physical factors that Temporary Pipework set-upshave to cope with.

PressurePressure is the term for measur-ing the force per unit area, theunits typically used for measur-ing pressure are pounds persquare inch, which is abbreviatedp.s.i.

A familiar example is the airpressure in a tyre, which is typi-cally around 30 p.s.i. for a car.What this means is that a forceof 30 pounds is exerted on eachand every square inch of theinside of the tyre, There are a lotof square inches on the inside

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Ver. 2.0

Units of Pressure

Pounds per square inch (orpounds-force per square inch)is still the most widely usedoilfield unit for pressure.

Other common units are theSI (or metric) unit which is thePascal (Pa), the Atmosphere(atm), and the Bar (bar).

The Pascal is a very smallunit, 1 Pa being only about1/7000 th p.s.i. 1 Atm and 1 Barare approximately 15 p.s.i.


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surface of a tyre, and because of this, the force exerted on that tyreis very large. Every square inch is pushed on with a force of 30pounds.

In Temporary Pipework Operations, low pressure is often used for

values of around 300 p.s.i. (that is TEN times that of a car tyre)and the operational pressure may be above 10,000 p.s.i. That is10,000 lbs exerted on every square inch of the inside of piping,unions, swivel joints, crossovers etc in the system.

Thinking about the forces involved, it should be clear why it is vitalto ensure there are no weak points in the system. Any improperuse of equipment such as mismatching pressure ratings or usingpoorly conditioned equipment can have devastating consequences.



F igure 5 - Relative Pressure Comparison


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Stored EnergyStored energy is the capacityof a volume of pressuredfluid to do work if allowed to

expand. An example of thiswork would be a volume of pressurised gas expandingand pushing a piston. Thegreater the stored energy of the fluid, the greater theforce with which the pistonwould be pushed and thegreater the amount of work

that piston could perform.The danger associated withStored Energy in TemporaryPipework is that the StoredEnergy is typically verylarge and any weak point inthe system will allow thisenergy to expand with poten-tially catastrophic results

Dynamic LoadingWhen pipe bursts the strain on any restraint when it snaps tight torestrain the pipe is called the dynamic loading by process engi-neers. The rule-of-thumb used to work out this dynamic loading istwice that due to the static force on the pipe arising from internalpressure.

Vibration

Vibration can be a significant risk to pipework integrity, leading tomechanical failure, fluid release, and potentially serious safetyimplications. Common areas of vibration in Temporary Pipeworkare

Long pipe runs .Piping appenditures such as gauges.Equipment such as valves, chokes, etc.Pumps.

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Ver. 2.0

Yield strength

Yield Strength is the stress amaterial can withstand withoutpermanent deformation. Typicalminimum yield strengths forpipework range from 75,000 to115,000 psi

It is interesting to compareTemporary pipework with theguidelines for artillery safetyregarding the use of cannons inhistorical re-enactments. The

guidelines state that: The boreshould be lined with steel tubingwith a minimum wall thickness of 3/8 and yield strength of 85,000psi or greater.

A liner equivalent to pipework iswhat a cannon requires to safelycontain and direct the stored ener-gy which propelled 8lb cannonballs in the American Civil War!


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Common causes of Vibration

Excessive Pulsation (from pumps for example).Mechanical Natural Frequencies.Inadequate Supports and/or Support Structure.

Common effects of Vibration

Loosening of Bolts.Compromising of Mechanical Joints (backing-off of WingNuts).Movement or slackening of Tie Downs and Restraints.

Bending ForcesTemporary Pipework is commonly subjected to bending forces dueto fluid velocity and internal pressure of the pipe. Bending forceoccurs at junctions or bends in the pipework where it effectivelytries to straighten out the bend.



F igure 7 - Bend is being straightened due to bending forces

F igure 6 - Vibration in Temporary Pipework

Bending force attempts to straighten out thecorner bend and forces the pipe outwardsstraining the connections


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Such bending forces are then transferred along the pipework andresult in additional strain on connections. Improperly made-up con-nections (e.g. worn or mismatched components, wrong pressure rat-ing etc) not able to cope with this increased load can fail cata-strophically.

Shock Loading A significant change in the flowrate, or pressure, during an opera-tion (such as the emergency closure of a valve) causes a suddenextra load or jolt on the system. This is temporary increase of loadon the system usually imposes increased pressure, vibration, andbending forces on the system. During this period of Shock Loading,any sub-standard part of the system (inferior pipe, worn connec-tions, mismatched connections, wrong pressure rated equipment)can fail with potentially disastrous consequences. It is important toconsider that failure due to Shock Loading may occur when there isalready an emergency event of some kind already taking place (e.g.an emergency shut -in).

Hazardous FluidsWhile there are many physical factors (such as pressure, tempera-ture and flowrates) that must be considered when dealing withtemporary pipework, chemical factors such as hazardous fluidsmust also be taken into account. Many fluids involved in opera-tions (such as brines or acids) are corrosive to temporary pipeworkand will weaken pipework over a period of time. It is importantthat all pipework and connections used have been properly main-tained, inspected and certified before use. Standard Service compo-nents must not be used on Sour Service wells (wells whereHydrogen Sulphide, H 2S, is present) as this will cause stress corro-sion cracking, and pitting in the metal as well as destroying anyelastomer seals in Unions etc. Both of these factors will lead to pre-mature failure under pressure of components in the system.

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Ver. 2.0


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Operational Hazards

Loss of ContainmentLeaks - ErosionErosion takes place in flow systems where turbulence occurs, typi-cally in pipe bends (e.g. elbows), tube constrictions (e.g. chokes orvalves), and other structures that alter flow direction such as later-als or tees. Specific erosion points within these components canvary depending on the fluid velocity and size of any suspended par-ticles. With typically sized sand grains, the erosion point in a bendis usually past the mid-point of the bend and it is for this reasonthat wall thickness is measured at the 80-90 degree point.

Erosion can lead to leakage a rapid failure and it is thereforeimportant that the layout is designed, where possible, to minimisebends and constrictions and that such areas are inspected regular-ly.Intrusion into the flow path can cause vortices to be created andshed. The local fluid speed within the vortex can be much greaterthan the average fluid speed in the pipe. Local pipe erosion, in anarea as small as 1/2 inch square, can arise where the vortex makescontact with the equipment or pipe wall.

Since the pipe thickness can be otherwise within operational limits,workshop personnel should be vigilant when making visual inspec-tions.



F igure 8 - Er osion point in a short radius bend

Erosion point80o


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H2SWhen H 2S is present, the system is known as Sour and Sour Serviceequipment must be used. For working pressure above 6000 psi, SourService equipment has a significantly lower rated cold working pres-sure than than the equivalent Standard Service equipment and it istherefore important to avoid mixing Standard and Sour Service

equipment in the same operation .

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Ver. 2.0

F igure 9 - Erosion of common equipment

Predicted erosion ratesfor standard elbow,plugged tee and long-radius elbow.

Areas shown in red andyellow have maximumerosion

Standard elbow(r/D=1.5)

Pluggedtee

Long-raduis elbow(r/D=5.0)

FlowFlow

Flow

Maximum

erosionMaximumerosion

Maximumerosion


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Catastrophic FailureWhen flow lines fail; whether it is due to excess pressure, faultyconnections, worn components, damage to the piping connection, orother reasons; the results can be devastating and catastrophic toboth equipment and personnel. The metal components that werepreviously being subjected to up to 15,000 p.s.i. of internal pressureare suddenly and instantly forced to relieve their stored energy. Insuch a failure there could be hundreds or even thousands of poundsof iron pipe flailing around. In that scenario, there is a high likeli-hood of severe personal injury or death. As we will cover later,restraint systems can help reduce this risk of damage or injury butthey cannot eliminate it fully. Preventing the failure from occur-ring in the first place is the only truly safe method.

Energy ReleaseThe following sequence of pictures were taken from a Schlumbergerdemonstration video showing the failure of a 15,000 p.s.i. unre-strained line. In this catastrophic failure the energy release occursin a very short period of time - a fraction of a second in fact, andthe damage and risk to personnel would have been severe.



Test manikins

15,000psi line

Line ruptures

Piece of loopf lies outward

Pup joint f lies off andlands 200 yards away Test manikins

destroyed

F igure 10 - Demonstration of energy involved in Catastrophic Failure


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Historic Incidents

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Ver. 2.0

Equipment Operation Event CauseChicksan Pressure

TestingChiksan elbow partedat swivel at 4800 psi

Snap Rings andBall Plugs were

missingHammerUnion

PressureTesting

WECO union pressuresensor connection on rigfloor ripped off.

Mismatchbetween standard2 1502 WECOUnion and rigs2 1002 WECOunion

Hammer

Union /Chiksanconnection

Making

up pipe

A 2 inch WECO union

with a swivel connec-tion made up hammertight, becameunscrewed while tubing(onto which the unionwas connected) wasbeing made up. Theswivel assembly fell 10metres on to a floor-

man resulting in severeinjury leading to death.

Hammer tight

right hand con-nection is notreliable whenrotated in thismanner. Suchconnections mustalways besnubbed andattached to a

safety sling.

HammerUnion PlugEnd

Well Test Female hammer unionplug end dislodged froma side outlet of a sandfilter, with a pressure of 3,500 psi, while theinjured party was oper-ating a valve. Thisresulted in multipleinjuries leading todeath.

Mismatch in con-nection between602 female and1502 hammerwingnut.


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Equipment Operation Event Cause

HammerUnion Seal

Well Clean-upOperation

Vapour release fromconnection

During operation, flow-ing temperature wentbelow minus 20 deg C (-4 deg F) of the rating of the seal. (This is thesame failure that causedthe Challenger disaster!)

HammerUnion

Clean-up of Wellheadand BOPprior topressuretesting.

While circulatingthrough a standpipemanifold, a sectionof chiksan line wasblown from its con-nection on the drainline manifold. Mudescaped onto rigfloor and overdrilling equipment.

Mismatch in connectionbetween 2 1502 ham-mer lock fitting on thechicksan and a 2 1002male fitting on thestandpipe. The pressureat the time of failurewas approximately 2900psi

HammerUnions

and SwivelJoints

General Multiple failure of Hammer unions due

to poor make-up.

Hammer lugs tend todeform and thereby

reduce the efficiency of hammer blowsFlexibleHose

In Service 2 flexible hose ter-minated in a 1502chicksanmale/female connec-tions failed in serv-ice.

There was evidence of corrosion, splitting andcracking, (manufactur-ing defect - slight overswaging), no routineinspections, hose assem-bly over 2 years old.

HammerUnion

EquipmentTestingIncidentoccurredduring waterflow testthrough aMud Line

Cellar Bit.

Shortly after pump-ing started, a 2 602hammer union on thepump stand pipe sep-arated. An AssistantDriller was struckand fatally injured bythe male half while

reading a gauge.

Mismatch of 2 602female and 1502 male.Higher than expectedpressures due to mis-alignment of the rig floormanifold. Assistantdriller was in line of fire.


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Ver. 2.0

Equipment Operation Event Cause

Flexible Hose Pressure Venting

During pressureventing after transfer

of bulk chemicals, a4 flexible hose waslowered over side of vessel into the sea toprevent dust cloudsduring venting. Itwas kept submergedby using an old valveand ballast chain on

the outboard end andhad a 4m length of rope to aid recovery.

A sudden release of compressed airoccurred when a ventvalve in the engineroom was opened andcaused the vent hose

to whip out of the seaonto the deck of thevessel where a crewman was struck onthe head and fatallyinjured.

There was anuncontrolled

release of pres-sure due to ventsbeing opened inthe wrongsequence.The hose was notadequatelysecured to pre-venting whipping

onto the deck andthe method usedwas not safe orrecommendedpractice.The crew manwas in a danger-ous position andhad apparentlyignored verbalinstructions toclear the areabefore venting.

NPT TapeThreadedFittings

Make-upInspection

On inspection a num-ber of NPT fittingsmade up to severalhose connectionsappeared to not befully made up.

Fittings werefound to be galledand only connect-ed with effective-ly only twothreads. Furtherinvestigation con-firmed that thesefittings were out-side acceptabletolerance stan-dards.


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Pipework Connections and InterfacesIn earlier sections it has been shown how important the quality of pipework connections and interfaces is to the integrity of the system.

Improperly fitted, rated or sized connections repeatedly prove to bethe weak point of the system when exposed to operating conditions.

MismatchesMismatches in Hammer Unions are severe mechanical hazards tothe integrity of the Temporary Pipework System. They are weakpoints that may fail under pressure and can result in serious person-al injury, death and/or property damage.

Such Mismatches occur in 5 main categories:

Mismatching the Same Size.Mismatching the Pressure Ratings.Mismatching of Wing Nuts.Mismatching of Components.Mismatching of Non-Detachable and Detachable Components.

Avoiding these Mismatches is of prime importance in all aspects of Temporary Pipework Operations. To further illustrate this each

Mismatch is covered more fully in the sections below.Mismatching the Same-SizeThese mismatches refer to connecting Hammer Union products hav-ing the same size, but different figure numbers. Improper matchingof this equipment can lead to two very dangerous situations:

1 Two parts of a hammer union with different pressure ratings,and

2 Union threading appearing to be fully made up when in factonly a portion of the threads are made up.

This will lead to a failure under pressure.

For Example :The Wing Half of the 602 can mate up with the female 1002but the common belief that it will hold the lower pressure rat-ing of the two models is incorrect. This is a potentially danger-ous mismatch and must be avoided.




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The Wing Half of the 1002 can mate up with the female 602,but again, the common belief that it will hold the lower pres-sure rating of the two models is incorrect. This is a potential-ly dangerous mismatch and must be avoided.

And most seriouslyThe Wing Half of the 1502 can accept a female 602 or 1002.This connection can appear to make-up and maintain a sig-nificant pressure (up to 3,500 p.s.i). However, once this pres-sure is exceeded, either section can become a projectile andcan cause death, serious injury or equipment damage. Thiswill also release high pressure fluids which are a clear haz-ard to health and the environment. The integrity of theUnion is compromised by the depth of thread engagement of the nut thread with the female union, the threads have thesame pitch so the connection can appear to be secure, but it isnot; such connections will fail.

The following Hammer union mismatches are possible and must beavoided

THE 2 602 AND 2 1002 UNIONS A RE BANNED IN SHEL L .THEY MUST BE IDENTIFIED BY CONTR ACTORS A ND INSTA LL ATIONS

AND SYSTEMATICALLY REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH2 1502 UNIONS.

Size Union Figure Nos

1 1/2 600, 602, 1002

2 402, 602, 1002, 1502

5 400, 1002

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Ver. 2.0

MIS-MATCH! Never connect products with hammer union end connections that are not posi-tively identified as to the manufacturer and that are not identified to have identi-cal union figure number, size and pres-sure rating. Mismatched connectionsmay fail under pressure, which canresult in serious personal injury, deathand/or property damage.

602Female Sub

1502Male Suband Wing Nut


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Use of the Go No-Go GaugeThe Go No-Go Gauge should be used to be sure you have a 1502Female Sub. The gauge wil be No-Go on a 1502 sub but will be aGo on a 602 sub .

Mismatching Pipe Pressure RatingsThis Type of mismatch refers to connecting Hammerlug Unionproducts having different pressure ratings but with end connectionsof the same size and Figure number. This occurs when mixing SourGas pipe with Standard Service pipe or when mixing Unionsattached by pipe threads to pipe of service different to that speci-fied by the Union.Wing union components that cannot be positively identified withregard to manufacturer, size, figure number, pressure rating andtype of service must never be used. Incorrectly identified compo-nents will lead to hazardous assemblies, which can fail under pres-sure and result in serious personal injury, death and/or propertydamage.



2 1502StandardFemale Sub

2 1502Sour ServiceMale Sub

and Wing Nut

MIS-MATCH!Wing union components that cannot be

positively identified with regard to manu-facturer, size, figure number, pressure rat-ing and type of service must never beused. Incorrectly identified componentswill lead to hazardous assemblies, whichcan fail under pressure and result in seri-ous personal injury, death and/or propertydamage.

2 1502 Female - NO-GO 2 602 Female -GO

15,000psiWP

10,000psiWP


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Mismatching Wing NutsThis mismatch occurs when the Wing nut of one Size and Figurenumber is mounted on the male sub of another Size and Figurenumber. There is only a small amount of engagement of the malesub in the wing nut and therefore the connection will not safelyhold typical working pressures.

Mismatching ComponentsMismatching of Components occur when segments and nut of oneFigure number are made up to a detachable male sub with a differ-ent Figure number. This results in a small amount of engagementof the male sub with the segment engaging the wing nut. This willnot hold pressure safely during typical operations.

Mismatching Non-Detachable and Detachable ComponentsThis mismatch is caused by the assembly of non -detachable nuts ondetachable male subs. The detachable wing nuts require a longerthread length to compensate for the segments between the wing

nut and the sub shoulder. Use of a non-detachable wing nut in a

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Ver. 2.0

MIS-MATCH!

2 1502Wing Nut

2 602DetachableMale Sub

Never assemble any combination of malesub, wing nut or segments that are not

positively identified to assure that unionfigure number, size, pressure rating andmanufacturer are identical. Mismatchedcomponents will result in hazardous con-

nections, which may fail under pressure,which can result in serious personalinjury, death and/or property damage.

MIS-MATCH!

2 1502Wing Nut

2 602StandardMale Sub

Never assemble any combination of malesub, wing nut or segments that are not

positively identified to assure that unionfigure number, size, pressure rating andmanufacturer are identical. Mismatchedcomponents will result in hazardous con-nections, which may fail under pressure,which can result in serious personalinjury, death and/or property damage.


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detachable Union results in a lack of thread engagement and aninsufficient engagement between of the male sub shoulder with thewing nut ID.

Mismatching Swivel Joint Components

The TripleStep (TSi) swivel joint, manufactured by FMC, employs astepped ball race design. Differences in the swivel load capacityover traditional nonstepped race designs mean that potentially seri-ous occurrences that could result from mismatching swivel jointcomponents of different designs and/or manufacturers.

Like the FMC 3 TSi swivel joint, the recently introduced SPM 3HD-LR swivel joint employs a stepped ball race feature. FMCs 3TSi swivel joints employ a one ball step in raceway diameterbetween each of the three raceways. SPMs HD-LR swivel has a



MIS-MATCH!

The misapplication of standard, non-detach-able style wing nuts on 2", 3" and 4" Figure602 and 1002 detachable nut connectionswill result in an unsafe connection leadingto separation when under pressure. Failureto avoid this condition may result in death,serious personal injury and severe propertydamage.

2" 1002 non-detachable nut inappropriatelyused in a detachable union assembly. Noticethe resulting lack of thread engagement withthe female sub.

MIS-MATCH!

The misapplication of standard, non-detach-able style wing nuts on 2", 3" and 4" Figure602 and 1002 detachable nut connectionswill result in an unsafe connection leadingto separation when under pressure. Failureto avoid this condition may result in death,serious personal injury and severe propertydamage.

4" 1002 non-detachable nut inappropriatelyassembled to a detached male sub end. Noticethe excessive play between the ID of the nutand male sub OD behind the shoulder.


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step between only two of the raceways. In addition to the steppedrace similarities, the axial spacing between the raceways of the twomodels is very similar.

Because of these similarities, it is physically possible to erroneously

assemble a male race end of a SPM 3 HD-LR component into thefemale race end of an FMC 3 TSi component. This mismatch of components may falsely give the impression of a proper assembly,since the swivel assembly may feel tight and hold pressure. Whilethe resulting assembly may give the false sense of a correct assem-bly and would likely contain pressure, the assembly would not bestructurally sound. This condition would result in a swivel connec-tion that is unsafe and could potentially lead to catastrophic failureof the connection.

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Ver. 2.0

Gap in 3 ball race

No step betweensecond and third race

SPM 3 HD-LR male ball race end

FMC 3 TripleStepfemale ball race end

SPM 3 HD-LR female ball race end

FMC 3 TripleStepmale ball race end

Male race interfereswith female end

Dangerous Mismatch to be Avoided Mismatch Avoided

F igure 11 - Dangers of mismat ching Swivel Joint Component s


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Flexible PipesFlexible pipes or hoses are resistant to bending, including frequent-continuous flexure, however it is impreative that they are handled,stored and maintained correctly.

In general:The preferred installation for a flexible line is with the pipepositioned in a J or U configuration, with the end fittings point-ing up in a vertical position.Do not leave medium to longer lengths of horizontal pipeunsupported.Ensure flexible pipe is not bent over or resting on sharp edges -any vibration will cause damage at such points.

Do not exceed the minimum bending radius of flexible pipe.[As a rule of thumb, the minimum bending radius (MBR) isroughly 12 x the I.D. of the pipe].



d = (2 x MBR - OD)

d is the minimuminside distance between

two surfaces

MBR

F igure 12 - Minimum bending radius of Flexible Pipe.


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Ver. 2.0

F igure 13 - Hose Installing Concept for long spans

12

3

4 5Cable SWL 5.7t

Soft strops withshackles

15mSF4 PN

One shackle connection SWL 6t as cableis not long enough Similar configuration for coflex on both ends

Cable

Chain block Steel sling or softstrop SWL 5t

Deck beam

2

3

4


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Hazard Identification and Mitigation

Mitigation Methods

Check listsPre-Pressure Test Temporary Pipework Walk-the-Lines CheckListThe purpose of the checklist is to ensure that the TemporaryPipework and equipment:

Is hooked-up in compliance with the approved drawings andequipment lists.Can be operated as required by the Programme.

To ensure the adequacy of the ratings of the interfaces andblanked-off outlets.

Checklists are an orderly and sequential collection of best prac-tices for confirming the configuration of temporary pipework forsafe operations. Checking a temporary layout must often be under-taken amid a host of competing job priorities. Routine supervisoryduties can interfere with walking-the lines resulting in failure tocomplete the checklist and confirm the correct configuration of thetemporary pipework. The consequences of disrupted or interruptedchecklists are varied and potentially serious and must be avoided.

The key points are:

1. The Wells Services Supervisor (WSS) and the ContractorServices Supervisor (CSS) are jointly responsible for ensuringthat the Temporary Pipework is hooked-up as required by theapproved P&ID or Process Flow Diagram.

2. Any deviation in the Temporary Pipework hook-up from therequirements of the Standard for Temporary Pipework (EP2006-5393) needs a Dispensation.

3. A confirmation that all temporary pipework has been certi-fied (maintained and tested) according to Contractors proce-dures (endorsed via contract awarded by Shell). Specificallythat no equipment is derated or below the minimum wallthickness allowed.

4. The checks may be carried out Line Section by Line Sectiondetermined by specification (pressure) breaks progressingfrom high pressure to low pressure.




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5. Refer to EP 2006-5393 Appendices for specific hammer unionmismatches and restraint dynamic loads. (Note specifically:both male and female 2 Fig 602 and 2 Fig 1002 unions arebanned in all configurations e.g. vessel outlets, burner boompiping).

6. Where appropriate, record the number of connections inspect-ed (Count) or equipment identification number (Eq. no.) inthe tick column and if NO is ticked, the Reason.

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Ver. 2.0

Location/Well: Job No. Programme:Supervisors: Date:Reference Drawing No. Reference Equipment List(s):

Line Section:

Dispensations Requested for this line section:

Item/ Description of Check ProcedureYES

Count/Eq No.NO

ReasonN/A

1. Check pressure rating of upstream interface connection and subsequentconnections in the line by reference to banding.2. Check pipework material for suitability for service.3. Check that the number of swivels has been minimised.3. Check/confirm that correct bolts and gaskets are installed at all mechanical

joints and bolt engagement. (Bolts shall extend completely through the nutwith at least one thread exposed at each end. Confirm that bolting has beenmade up to the correct torque with calibrated torque wrenches.)4. Check sealant on screwed connections is as per specification.5. Check/confirm elastomers in hammer unions are compatible withfluids/service.

6a. Confirm that vessel/equipment outlets, not in the flow path and potentiallysubject to being pressured are appropriately blanked. Where the blankingcomprises a male or female hammer union confirm the FIG no. and service iscompatible with the vessel/equipment specification.6. Check for correct flow through filters and strainers, traps, check valves,globe valves and control valves.7. Check that the valve positions are tagged (open/closed) and are correctlylined up for the pressure testing. Where a valve is required to be locked openor closed, ensure that the locking system is sufficiently robust, preventing itfrom being simply overridden. Note those valves the position of which needsto be altered for the first operation.8. Check that all chain wheels and extended spindles required for specifiedvalves have been installed9. Check that orifice flanges have required upstream and downstreamclearances.10. Check that all vents and drains are installed. The drains should be at thelowest points and vents at the highest points. Check for proper slope (e.g.flare lines).11. Check all instrument thermowells installed. Check that welded nipples are

properly installed. Threaded nipples shall be checked for engagement, Checkthat they have not been seal-welded.12. Confirm the setting of pressure pilots, and sizing of pressure reliefs.13. Confirm the safety of electrical instruments.14. Check that all pipe supports, anchor point, clamps and restraints areadequate. (Confirm that expansion allowance has been provided. Confirm thatthere is no excessive bending moment resulting from lack of support oroverloading from tugger lines on the pipework.)15. For items marked No, raise outstanding works list and ensure that it iscompleted prior to pressure testing.

F igure 14 - P re-Pressure Test Temporary Pipework Che ck List


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No-Go areasDuring pressure testing keep at least 2 pipe run lengthsaway from the line under pressure.Keep out of line-of-sight of pressured plugged outlets, instru-

ment connections on vessels and flowline equipment.RestraintsThe system of restraints demonstrated in this Section is providedby WeirSPM.

The WeirSPM system of restraint has sufficient strength to restrainpipework for the loading tabulated in the Temporary PipeworkStandard, Appendix 3 (reproduced below), and has been tested atthe instigation of Shell for restraining pipework rigged up for hightemperature (250 oF) operations.

Note that liquids produce higher dynamic loading than gas at thesame pressure. The reason for this is that loading is proportional tothe density of the fluid being discharged. With gas the discharge tolow pressure takes longer, but the intitial shock is less than thatfrom liquid at the same pressure.

Fibre Rope Restraints (FRRs) are intended to help contain high-pressure piping and components in case of rupture or excessiveimpulse during the pumping process. When flow lines fail, whetherit is due to excess pressure, faulty connections, worn components,damage to the piping connection, or otherwise, the results can bedevastating and catastrophic to both equipment and people. Themetal components that were previously being subjected to up to15,000 p.s.i. of internal pressure are suddenly and instantly forced

to release that stored energy. In a failure there could be hundreds



EP 2006-5393 - 22 - Restricted

APPENDIX 3. DYNAMIC LOADING ON RESTRAINTS PIPEWORKCONNECTION BURST CASE

Dynamic Forces created by Seawater forsystem pressures(Kilo Pounds-Force / Metric Tonnes)

Dynamic Forces created by Gas (N2) forsystem pressures(Kilo Pounds-Force / Metric Tonnes)

NominalPipe OD

(ins)5,000 psi 10,000 psi 15,000 psi 5,000 psi 10,000 psi 15,000 psi

2 21 / 9.55 42 / 19.1 64 / 29.1 17 / 7.7 31 / 14.1 42 / 19.13 41 / 18.6 82 / 37.3 124 / 56.4 33 / 15.0 56 / 26.8 82 / 37.34 68 / 30.9 135 / 61.4 204 / 92.7 55 / 22.0 99 / 45.0 138 / 62.7

Note: Information extracted from Reference [5]

F igure 15 - Extracted table showing Dy namic Loading on Restraints


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or even thousands of pounds of iron pipe flailing about in an unre-strained condition. In that scenario, there is a high likelihood of severe personal injury or death. FRRs reduce, but do not eliminate,that risk.

Installation of individual FRR components as well as the systemitself should be done by trained personnel.

Installation Steps

Install FRR system after entire flow line is setup.Hammering wing nuts can be clumsy with FRR equipmentinstalled.When possible, fill the flow line system with water (no pres-sure) and look for leaks before installing FRR system compo-

nents. After the safety restraint system is installed, check everyconnection, every link, and every FRR component to ensurethat there is a continuous connection from anchor point toanchor point.

After FRR system is installed, make sure:a) All FRR ribs are installed as tight as possible around flow

line components.b) All main line and anchor line spine FRRs are as tight as

possible from anchor point to anchor point. Always keep ALL personnel not essential to the operation awayfrom flow line system while under pressure. This applies even whena safety restraint system is installed.

The following pictures illustrate the jacketed fibre rope flowlinerestraint system supplied by WeirSPM.

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Step by Step Installation



Position the rib beneath the flowline and straddlingthe union assembly. It may be necessary to raise theflowline slightly with a pipe jack to achieve this.

End A

End B

A

B

Keeping end B stationery, bring end A up over the union assembly towards end B

A

B

A

B

Next, bring end A down through the end Bopening.

Continue to pull end A through the end B open-ing and under the union assembly back towards theend A starting point.

1 2

3 4

A

B

A

B

Again, loop end A over the union assemblytowards end B

Draw end A even with B end, ensuring that therib fits snugly around the union assembly.

5 6


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33



Ver. 2.0

Both loop ends are now gathered ready for installingthe spine.

To take up any slack and ensure a more secure con-nection, both loops are rotated together from flat.

Ideally, this rotation should be continue through 270degrees. If there is not enough slack to allow a rotation of 270degrees, then the rotation cand be stopped at 90degrees from flat.

Once this twist loop has been formed, the end of the spine can be fed through it.

The spine can then continue to be pulled throughother installed ribs. Note, it is recommended that allribs are installed before installing the spines.

A

B A

B

A

BA

B

Figure 16 - Recommended f ibre r ope installation method

7 8

9 10

11 12


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Rib Locations

Union connections

FRR Ribs should be installed on EVERY union connection on theflow line (one rib per union). The rib envelope must always straddleboth sides of the union in order to help contain each end of theadjoining pipes/components.

Swivel Assemblies Swivel assemblies should have FRR ribs installed at the two wingunion connections at each end, and also around unsecured swivel

joint connections.



34

Figure 18 - F ibre rope rib installation at a Sw ivel Assembly

F igure 17 - Fibre rope rib installation at a Union Connection


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Flow Line Components

Virtually all flow line components utilise two wing union connec-tions usually male x female. Therefore, most flow line components(check valves, plug valves, etc.) require FRR ribs installed at eachend as shown.

Long Piping Assemblies

Most piping assemblies can be treated like other flow line compo-nents - with one FRR Rib installed on each union connection ateach end. However, on piping assemblies 10 feet or longer, it isrequired that a third FRR rib also be installed midway betweenthe two union connections.

This centre rib will not have the union connection to help prevent itfrom moving, however, field testing has shown that this rib willhelp provide extra support should a failure occur.

35



Ver. 2.0

F igure 19 - F ibre rope rib installation at a F low Line Component

F igure 20 - F ibre rope rib installation on a L ong P iping A ssembly


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Installing Fibre Rope Spines

Installing Fibre Rope Spines on a Flowline System, as shownabove, requires that spines be linked together in a safe manner toprovide the length required between anchor points.

Linking Spines



Lay out Fibre Rope Spines. end to end as shown.(here they have been labelled ends A to D for clarity.

EndA

EndB

C

B

Keeping end B stationery, draw C through theloop of B as shown.

1 2

Continue to pull C back over loop B and theninserted under loop D as this is pulled in the direc-tion of B

3 4

EndC End

D

C

B

D

B

DC

Pull the remainder of C end through until Ddraws close to B end as shown.

5

EndB

EndD

P u l l T i

g h t

While holding B end stationary (using a second person or placing a weight on the A-B fibrerope) keep pulling C end until the B-D con-nection can no longer be tightened. Notice how theB and D ends of the spines have now swapped

places.

F igure 21 - Recommended f ibre r ope spine installation method.


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When linking such Spines, there are a few points to remember:

Never tie knots in Spines, use only the approved linkingmethod (described below).Every spine to spine link must be tight.

Never link Spines and Ribs together. Spines generally havetwice the strength rating of Ribs and therefore such mixedlinking must be avoided. (Ribs may be linked to each otherusing this method if a single Rib is too short to install proper-ly.)Ribs must never be substituted for Spines.

Anchor Points

Anchor points of sufficient structural integrity or mass must beused.

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Ver. 2.0

2 tonne concrete blockused as anchor point

Certify as lifting appliance

Wellhead structure used as tie-down point

F igure 22 - Example Anchor Point s


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Avoiding Injury

Hammering Unions

In order to minimise the risk of injury while hammering unions,the following points must be followed:

The heads of hammers should be made of Copper/Beryllium(CuBe) or similar material that cannot cause sparking.The hammer heads and lugs on the Hammer Union WingNut should be in good condition.

The hammer shaft, if wood, should be in good condition.Preferably the hammer shafts should be made of compositematerialConsideration should be given to using Safety Iron wherepossible.



F igure 23 - Condition of Lugs on Hammer Union Wing Nuts

Acceptable Unacceptable

F igure 24 - WeirSPM Safety Iron

Courtesy ofWeirSPM


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Where hammer unions cannot be avoided then the WeirSPMSafety Hammer should be considered.

GaugesWhen reading gauges onpressured pipework, keepbody out of line of fire of connections.

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Ver. 2.0

F igure 25 - WeirSPM Safety Hammer

Courtesy ofWeirSPM

F igure 26 - Gauge positioned directly above a pressurised

pipe connection

Gauge

Connection

Note: the picture shows aunion with threaded make-up to the pipe body.This is banned in Shell


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Completing the Connection Interface DiagramIn order to mitigate against the safety and operational risks associ-ated with incorrect connections in temporary pipework, a toolbox

has been intoduced to standardise the construction of CompletionInterface Diagrams (CIDs).

The objectives of this toolbox are :To create a consistent standard for representation of tempo-rary pipework connections.To simplify layouts to remove unnecessary or confusing infor-mation.To make identification of critical connections easier.To mitigate against incorrect connections at pipe interfaces

The procedure begins with a layout drawing or P&ID and, with theuse of a MS Word templates or Visio templates (Visio is much easi-er to use), aides the construction of a clear layout design.

A guide to using this toolbox along with a video tutorial have beenprepared and should be reviewed before attempting the construc-tion of the CID for your operation.



C onst r uct ion and I mpl ement at ion of C onnect ion I nt er f ace D iag r ams

S hel l E x p l or at ion and P r od uct ion N ex us C onsul t ing , 2006

P ag e 4

3 . C I D K e y F e at u r e s S o f t w ar e P l at f o r m

Al l e x i st i n g C I D s hav e be e n c r e at e d i n M i c r o so f t W o r d . T he y sho ul d be r e ad abl e and e d i t abl e i n mo st

v e r si o ns o f t hi s so f t w ar e p ac k a g e t hat ar e av ai l abl e . Al l ne w C I D s sho ul d be c r e at e d i n M i c r o so f t W o r d . I t

i s ad v i sabl e , but no t ne c e ssar y , t o use t he mo st r e c e nt v e r si o n o f t hi s so f t w ar e t hat i s av ai l abl e as t hi s

sho ul d mak e t he c r e at i o n and e d i t i n g p r o c e ss mo r e si m p l e .

M i c r o so f t W o r d has be e n c ho se n o v e r o t he r p ac k a g e s d ue t o i t s al mo st uni v e r sal use o n P C s. By t he e nd

o f t hi s g ui d e , use r s w i l l be f ami l i ar w i t h t he d r aw i n g me t ho d s use d i n t he p ac k a g e and w i l l be c o nf i d e nt

t hat i t and t he y c an p r o d uc e t he d e si r e d r e sul t s i n t e r ms o f ne at , c l e ar and c o nsi st e nt C I D s.

F i g ur e 1 sho w s a c o m p l e t e d C I D f o r W e l l T e st i n g T e m p o r ar y P i p e w o r k . T he k e y f e at ur e s o f t hi s d i a g r am

ar e d e sc r i be d as f o l l o w s;

F i g ur e 1 - W e l l T e st i ng C I D

S he l l E xp lora t ion and Pro

duc t ion

A Too l b o x for t h e Cons t ru

c t ion and

Imp lemen t a t ion o f Conne

c t ion

In t er face D iagrams

Co m p r is i ng p a r t of t he G u

id a nce to t he Te m po r a r y P

i pe wo r k S t a nd a rd

J u ne 2 0 0 6 R e v. 1

Figure 27 - CID to olbox guide


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The completed CID for an operation will be used as a check whenwalking the lines to confirm that it is safe to test.

Alternatively, Piping and Instrument Drawing (P and ID) can beused to show the connections and their interfaces and as referencewhen walking the lines.

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Ver. 2.0

F igure 28 - CID to olbox video tutorial.


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P a n

d I D M a r k e

d - u p s

h o w

i n g

C o n n e c

t i o n

I n t e r f a c e

E X A M P L E :

T o b e u s e d

w h e n

" W a l

k i n g - t

h e - L i n e s

"

p r i o r

t o p r e s s u r e

t e s t

i n g .

A l l b l a n

k e d - o

f f o u

t l e t s o n v e s s e l s

m u s

t b e

i d e n

t i f i e d .

2 " 1 5 0 2

3 " 1 5 0 2

3 " 1 5 0 2

3 " x 2 "

1 5 0 2

X - o v e r

4 " 6 0 2

4 " 6 0 2

F e m a l e -

M a l e

X - O v e r

4 " 6 0 2 x

4 " 2 0 6

4 " 6 0 2

F igure 29 - P & ID showing connections marked-up for Walking - the - lines

E x a m p

l e o f m a r k

i n g

u p

P a n

d I D


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Walking the LinesPrior to pressure testing, the test set up and spread shall be'walked' and checked against the connection schematic (CID) to

confirm that it is safe to test, there being no connection mismatch-es, that the pipework restraint arrangements have been installedas planned, and that suitable pressure test safety precautions -such as valves being in the correct position, air bleed points, andbarriers - are all in place. Items of equipment that cannot be indi-vidually restrained, such as hammer union blanking plugs onprocess equipment outlets shall be specifically identified andchecked for compatibility with the mating union and process equip-ment rating.

Example walkthroughSome things to look out for, in addition to those previously men-tioned, include:

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Ver. 2.0

Insufficient restraints

All connections and long runs of pipework should be suitably restrained

Earthing Point corroded


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Also confirm that the design is not flawed e.g. check-valve reversal!



F igure 30 - Example things to consider during walking the lines

Insufficient/inappropriate support

Pipework and connections must be adequatelysupported

Flange bolts do not fully penetrate nuts

Flange bolts should extend completely throughthe nut with at least one thread exposed

NPT thread showing some corrosion


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Awareness of Safety Initiatives

FMC Technologies Ltd

The following safety initiatives have just been commercialised byFMC.

[No pictures of this equipment have been provided by FMC at thetime of issue of this Guide.]

The initiatives comprise:

1) A lifting device for plug valves.2) A Chiksan Swivel work bench.3) The manufacture of a Truncated 2" FIG 602 female sub.4) A Guided Hammer.

1) The lifting device allows heavy plug valves to be moved aroundand lined up without risk of personal injury/strain.

2) The Chiksan swivel work bench streamlines the redressing andimproves the quality of the maintenance of swivels, the swivelsbeing better supported and more accessible, compared with theirplacement in a vice, for instance. This is a tool for the workshop.

3) The truncation of the 2" FIG 602 female sub is identical to thestep taken by Anson in 2001, cutting 30/1000" off the thread ODand putting a shoulder on the female sub to prevent make-up of the 2" FIG 602 female sub to the 2" FIG 1502 male union. Sincethere is no compromise on the banning of 2" FIG 602 unions, thetruncated 2" FIG 602 subs should not appear on Shell installa-tions, even though their construction prevents mismatch make-up.

4) The Guided Hammer avoids the wing nut make-up on "hammerunions" using a sledge hammer. The wing nut is replaced withone that will accept an FMC jarring device. The wing nut isreplaced with one comprising the nut (lugs removed) with a con-tinuous plate (the nut and plate is a single forging) on the out-side of the nut with 3 holes appearing in the plate where thelugs used to be. The jar consists of a yoke (which is pinned formaking up the connection in one of the holes on the nut) con-

nected to a mandrel on which rides a cylindrical weight. The

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weight, being "Guided" by the mandrel, is slammed/Hammeredagainst the yoke to make the union nut up tight to the female.Since Shell requires that the unions on all pipework be forged orwelded, the wing nuts with lugs cannot be removed and replacedwith this new type of nut. So the introduction of this systemrequires the replacement of all existing pipework with that hav-ing the new nut type.




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SHELL

This document is the property of Shell,and the copyright therein is vested inShell. All rights reserved. Neither thewhole nor any part of this document maybe disclosed to others or reproduced,stored in a retrieval system, or transmittedin any form by any means (electronic,mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise) without prior written consentof the copyright owner.

Documents

SIEP - ABC Guide to Temporary Pipework Ver 02[1]