SIGMUND FREUD'S PROGRAMME FOR A SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

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SIGMUND FREUD'S PROGRAMME FORA SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

David Livingstone Smith

Sigmund Freud is best known as the creator of psychoanalysis. It is less widely appreciatedthat Freud's creation of psychoanalysis arose from his work in what is now called `cognitivescience' (Erdelyi 1985). Kitcher (1992) describes Freud as `the first interdisciplinarycognitive scientist (p. 5). Glymour (1991) states that à big part of cognitive science is prettymuch what you would expect to get if Sigmund Freud had had a computer' (p. 44) and goeson to say that:

...Freud's writings contain a philosophy of mind, and indeed a philosophy of mind that addressesmany of the issues about the mental that nowadays concern philosophers and ought to concernpsychologists. Freud's thinking about the issues in the philosophy of mind is better than much ofwhat goes on in contemporary philosophy, and it is sometimes as good as the best... Even whenFreud had the wrong answer to a question, or refused to give an answer, he knew what the questionwas and what was at stake in it. And when he was deeply wrong it was often for reasons that stillmake parts of cognitive psychology wrong. (p. 46)

Freud is more widely regarded as a theorist of the unconscious than as a theorist ofconsciousness. In fact, Freud believed that any theory of unconscious mental states mustaddress the problem of consciousness. Freud did just that, and his subtle and complextheorizing about consciousness is all too often neglected both inside and outsidepsychoanalysis. In particular, the new and rapidly growing academic discipline of `consciousness studies' has neglected Freud's seminal contributions, many of which anticipateor even go beyond contemporary theorizing.1

In the present paper I will trace out some of the fundamental features of Freud's cognitivescience of consciousness, with special emphasis on those aspects of it that dovetail withcontemporary concerns in cognitive science, consciousness studies and the philosophy ofmind. In order to do this I will contextualize Freud's theory of consciousness within the moregeneral framework of the history of ideas and his overarching theory of the mental apparatus.2 In the final part of the paper I will illustrate the continuing utility of Freud's approach bydescribing how it addresses an unresolved problem in consciousness studies: the widespreadintuition that our inner lives conform precisely to folk psychological principles.

I hope that the non-psychoanalytic reader will come away from this discussion with anenhanced appreciation of Freud's standing as a pioneer of cognitive science, and that thepsychoanalytic reader will come away with an appreciation of the complex

DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH PhD is a philosopher and psychotherapist. He is the author of HiddenConversations (Tavistock/Routledge, 1991; Rebus, 1999), Approaching Psychoanalysis (Kamac, 1999)and Freud's Philosophy of the Unconscious (Kluwer, in press) as well as over 60 papers and bookchapters on psychoanalysis and related subjects. Address for correspondence: 8 Brenchley Gardens,London, SE23 3QS. Email: [email protected]

British Journal of Psychotherapy, Vol 15(4), 1999© The author

DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH 413

philosophical and psychological underpinnings of familiar clinical and theoretical concepts.

Freud's Cognitive Science in Historical Context

Sigmund Freud was trained in neurology at the University of Vienna and published anumber of strictly neuroscientific works. One of his specialist interests was aphasiology, thestudy of speech disorders, and his book On Aphasia (1891) was for many years regarded as aclassic on this subject (Greenberg 1997). Aphasiology played a special role in the history ofneuroscience. The work of Broca and Wernike with aphasic patients led to the criticaldiscovery of the cerebral localization of language functions (Young 1970). Aphasiology soonbecame an interdisciplinary nexus, drawing on the work of neurologists, linguists,psychologists and philosophers. Freud's concern with aphasia led him to consider therelationship between body and mind, a concern that was at least in part provoked by hisencounter with the writings of the British neuroscientist, John Hughlings Jackson.

Jackson was a mind-body dualist. He was both a methodological dualist (that is, hebelieved that it is practically useful to regard mind and body as entirely separate domains),and also an ontological dualist (that is, he believed that mind and body are in their essencedifferent things). In the nineteenth century it was common for scientists to mix psychologicalwith neuroscientific language. For instance, they might describe ideas as stored in nervecells. Jackson (1887) went against this trend. He argued that psychological andneuroscientific vocabularies should be sharply segregated, opposing the then prevalenttendency to mix the two forms of discourse, and yoked these methodological strictures toform an ontological dualism that he called the Doctrine of Concomitance. The Doctrine ofConcomitance was a theory of psychophysical parallelism, claiming that mind and brain werecoordinated with, yet remained entirely separate from, one another.

Jackson's parallelism was a form of substance dualism. The theory of substance dualismhad been introduced by Descartes in the seventeenth century. The theory of substancedualism claims that mind and body are made out of different substances.3 The dualistsclaimed that the body is composed of material substance which exists in space and time. Themind, on the other hand, was thought to be composed of immaterial substance existing intime but not in space. In addition to parallelism, there were two other theories of substancedualism prevalent in nineteenth-century neuroscience, philosophy and psychology. Thesewere Cartesian interactionism, which claimed that mind and body influenced one another,and epiphenomenalism, the doctrine introduced by Thomas Henry Huxley, which claimedthat mind existed but was causally redundant.

To many, psychophysical parallelism seemed bizarre. Theological explanations of thebasis for the postulated pre-ordained harmony between mind and brain could no longer beplausibly entertained, and no further explanation was forthcoming. Interactionism wasregarded by many scientists (including Jackson) as having been falsified by the discovery byMeyer and Helmholtz of the law of the conservation of energy, which held that the sum ofenergy in the (physical) universe remains constant. The mounting neuroscientific evidencethat mind is, in some sense, causally dependent on neural wetware, and the growing trendtowards naturalism stimulated by Darwin's thesis of the evolutionary descent of humanbeings undermined both psychophysical

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parallelism and interactionism. As Bradley (1895) lamented, Huxley's (1874)epiphenomenalism thus steadily gained adherents as the century wore on.

Descartes' legacy to psychology included more than his theory of the mind-bodyrelationship. He also argued that the mind is transparent to itself and that we cannot bemistaken about our own mental states. In short, he believed that all mental states areconscious states. It followed from this that introspection is the most appropriate method forpsychological research. Descartes' thesis about the transparency of mind was still widelyadhered to in the nineteenth century. During the closing decades of the nineteenth century,when Freud was receiving his neuroscientific education and developed his first psychologicaltheories, the world of psychology was dominated by Wundt's 'introspectionism', whichequated mind with consciousness, a view that was taken for granted by the majority ofpsychologists, neuroscientists and philosophers. Although historians of depth psychologysuch as Ellenberger (1970) and Whyte (1979) have correctly emphasized the prevalence ofthe idea of the unconscious during the nineteenth century, the meanings given to this termwere actually quite diverse. The unconscious was sometimes treated as a mystical force, anattitude represented by philosophers such as Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, who wrote inhis celebrated Philosophy of the Unconscious that we 'merge into an eternal Unconscious,into a unique, omnipresent, and omniscient all-wise being' (von Hartmann, cited in Brentano1874, p. 108).

The unconscious was also frequently identified with neurophysiological dispositions for (by definition conscious) mental events. Here is an example of the dispositionalist thesisadvanced by Brentano (1874), who was Freud's philosophy teacher at the University ofVienna.

...There are undoubtedly habitual dispositions resulting from previous actions... If we want to admitgenerally that it is certain that these acquired aptitudes and dispositions are tied up with real things (and I, at least, do not hesitate to do so, although there are other metaphysicians, John Stuart Mill, forexample, who would have reservations), we must also grant that they are not mental phenomena,because otherwise, as we shall show, they would be conscious. Psychological reflection informs usonly that they are causes, unknown in themselves, which influence the rise of subsequent mentalphenomena, as well as that they are in themselves unknown effects of previous mental phenomena.In either case psychological reflection can prove in isolated instances that they exist; but it can neverin any way give us knowledge of what they are. (Brentano 1894, p. 60)

Other writers identified the unconscious with dissociated portions of consciousness itself(the dédoublement or desegregation of the French neuropathologists). Here is an account byJames (1890).

How far this splitting up of the mind into separate consciousness may exist in each one of us is aproblem. Mr Janet holds that it is only possible where there is abnormal weakness, and consequentlya defect of unifying coordinating power. An hysterical woman abandons part of her consciousnessbecause she is too weak nervously to hold it together. The abandoned part meanwhile may solidifyinto a secondary or subconscious self. (James 1890, p. 210)

The Cartesian doctrine of the untrammelled self-transparency of mind not only licensedintrospection as the cardinal mode of psychological research, but forbade the invocation oftheoretical entities in psychology. Freud's early work both in neuroscience and psychologyconformed to this neo-Cartesian package. On the rare occasions when he spoke of theunconscious, he used the term to denote dissociated


portions of consciousness or neurophysiological dispositions for conscious mental events.Freud wrote comparatively little explicitly about consciousness and seems to have been

dissatisfied with many of his thoughts on this difficult topic. Although he wrote an essayentirely devoted to the subject of consciousness in 1915, it was never published and ispresumed to have been destroyed (Silverstein 1986). Freud's most sustained discussion ofconsciousness dates from early in his career. There have been few published discussions ofthis aspect of Freud's work, and even fewer discussions devoted specifically to the subject ofFreud's theory of consciousness (Natsoulas 1984, 1985, 1989a, 1989b, 1991).

It was not until March 1895 that Freud became concerned with several problems arisingfrom his psychotherapeutic work which led him to seriously reconsider the problems ofconsciousness and the unconscious:

Even when... the patients themselves accept the thought that they thought this or that, they often add:`But I can't remember having thought it'. It is easy to come to terms with them by telling them thatthe thoughts were unconscious. But how is this state of affairs to be fitted into our psychologicalviews? Are we to disregard this withholding of recognition on the part of patients when, now that thework is finished, there is no longer any motive for their doing so? Or are we to suppose that we arereally dealing with thoughts which never came about, which merely had a possibility of existing...? Itis clearly impossible to say anything about this - that is, about the state which the pathogenic materialwas in before the analysis - until we have arrived at a thorough clarification of our basicpsychological views, especially on the nature of consciousness. It remains, I think, a fact deservingserious consideration that in our analyses we can follow a train of thought from the conscious intothe unconscious... that we can trace it from there for some distance through consciousness oncemore and that we can see it terminate in the unconscious again, without this alternation of `psychicalillumination' making any change in the train of thought itself, in its logical consistency and in theinterconnection between its various parts. (Breuer & Freud 1895, p. 300)

The Project for a Scientific Psychology

Freud's worries issued in the writing of a document now called the Project for a ScientificPsychology (Freud 1950), upon which he began working in late March or early April 1895.Freud never completed the Project and never intended it for publication.

The Project for a Scientific Psychology was a watershed in Freud's thinking. It presentsan elaborate functional model of the nervous system, and is widely acknowledged as thefountainhead for much of his subsequent psychoanalytic thinking. In fact, Freud proposes a `connectionist' model of mind. Connectionism is an approach to mind that models mentalprocesses using an array of very simple processors arranged in an interconnecting network.Connectionism is now the most widely deployed strategy for modelling mental processes.Freud's model in the Project not only anticipated the general features of contemporaryconnectionism; it even deployed specific mechanisms (such as `Hebbian learning') invokedby cognitive scientists today.

In the opening paragraph of the Project, Freud announces his abandonment of substancedualism. Freud abandoned the doctrine of dualism in favour of materialism, the view thatmind is identical to brain:


According to Gallese a special class of neurones, which he calls 'mirror neurones', producethis effect. Gallese believes this mechanism to lie behind language acquisition (Sutherland1998).

The activation of verbal residues is thus primarily an activation of the motor impulses ofthe kind that, under different circumstances, produce speech which then generate afferentsignals up the sensory input channels to impinge upon the consciousness module. This can beinterpreted as a thesis about thought as sub-vocal speech such as that later proposed by thebehaviourists. Alternatively, Freud can be construed as claiming only that efferent speechimpulses trigger an afferent feedback process irrespective of whether or not they affect thevocal apparatus. In either case, Freud proposes an essentially kinaesthetic theory of consciousthought (SheetsJohnstone 1998).

Within the purview of this model it is therefore incorrect to say that thought becomesconscious. Thought activates motor impulses that provide sensory feedback that, in turn, leadto conscious experiences. In Natsoulas' (1984, 1985) terminology, perceptual consciousnessis ìntrinsic' whereas thought consciousness is 'derived'. This causal relationship betweenthought and consciousness speaks to the third of Freud's explanatory tasks: we are notdirectly aware of the neurophysiological basis of thought because conscious thought is thecausal output of the cognitive processing system. We are therefore not directly aware of theneurophysiological character of thought for the same reason that I, while writing this paper,cannot access the electronic events occurring inside my computer by means of looking at thetext as it appears on the monitor.

Consciousness and Folk Psychology

The question of the scientific status of so-called 'folk psychology' has been central to thephilosophy of mind for a number of years. The term 'folk psychology' was introduced byDaniel Dennett (1981) to denote everyday, commonsense psychological discourse. Folkpsychology is the psychology that we learn at our mother's knee. It is:

...The pre-scientific commonsense framework that all normally socialized humans deploy in order tocomprehend, predict, explain and manipulate the behaviour of humans and the higher animals. Thisframework includes concepts sueh as belief desire, pain, pleasure, love, hate, joy, fear, suspicion,memory, recognition, anger, sympathy, intention and so forth. It embodies our baselineunderstanding of the cognitive, affective and purposeful nature of persons. Considered as a whole, itconstitutes our conception of what a person is. (Churchland 1994, p. 308)

Folk psychology gives us a way of talking about and making sense of ourselves and otherpeople. Although folk psychology naturally seems to us to be self-evidently true, manyphilosophers argue that it is a kind of empirical theory.

The implication is that the relevant framework [of folk psychology] is speeulative, systematic, andcorrigible, that it embodies generalized information, and that it permits explanation and prediction inthe fashion of any theoretical framework. (Churchland 1994, p. 308)

Considered as a theory, folk psychology is no more self-evidently true than any otherempirical theory of mind. Once we accept that folk psychology is a theory, the question arisesas to whether or not it is a good theory. Some philosophers (e.g. Jerry


Fodor) regard it as an excellent theory. Others, such as Paul Churchland, regard it as a badtheory that should be eliminated from serious attempts to understand the mind. Many otherphilosophers situate themselves on the grey area in between these extreme views.

Paul Churchland (1989), a writer who is very critical of psychoanalysis, includes mentalillness, creative imagination, memory and sleep in his list of phenomena which folkpsychology is unable to explain. He might also have included parapraxes and symptomaticacts. The failures of folk psychology seem to provide the points of departure forpsychoanalysis. We would therefore expect Sigmund Freud to have something to say aboutthe status of folk psychology in scientific theorizing about the mind.

Although philosophers trace back the debate over folk psychology to the work of Sellarsin the 1950s (Sellars 1956), in fact Sigmund Freud was well aware of the theoreticity of folkpsychology and took quite a radical stance towards it. In addition to this, he implicitly offeredan ingenious theory explaining why folk psychology seems to be true that is closelyintegrated with his views on consciousness and language. Freud believed that folkpsychology was highly treacherous in scientific discourse, although unlike writers likeChurchland he did not believe that it can be entirely eliminated. Freud's creation of thelanguage of metapsychology seems to have been inspired by his wish to discover analternative to folk psychological descriptions of the mind.

Freud's account of how it is that thoughts become conscious has important ramificationsfor his views on folk psychology. Freud took an anti-realist stance towards folk psychologicalentities. That is, he believed that the entities postulated by folk psychology do not correspondto entities deep within the mental apparatus. Freud returns to the topic at many points in hiswritings. Here is a particularly important passage from 1915:

In psychoanalysis there is no choice for us but to assert that mental processes are in themselvesunconscious, and to liken the perception of them by means of consciousness to the perception of theexternal world by means of the sense organs. We can even hope to gain fresh knowledge from thecomparison. The psychoanalytic assumption of unconscious mental activity appears to us, on the onehand, as a further expansion of the primitive animism which caused us to see copies of our ownconsciousness all around us and, on the other hand, as an extension of the corrections undertaken byKant of our views on external perception. Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that ourperceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceivedthough unknowable, so psychoanalysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means ofconsciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object. Like the physical, thepsychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears to us to be. (Freud 1915, p. 171)

Freud's mention of Kant refers to the latter's influential doctrine that ultimate realitycannot be known as such. It is a necessary condition of mental activity that our minds imposea set of categories upon the world. Freud had studied Kant at university, and possessed acopy of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) to which he added his own marginalia. Freudwas not a vulgar Kantian. He was well aware that his psychological scheme could not besubsumed under Kantian metaphysics without a host of undesirable philosophicalconsequences. Freud's materialism and his general realism were at odds with Kantian idealistmetaphysics.


Freud's view of metaphysics was similar in spirit to that of his Viennese contemporaries,the logical positivists. The logical positivists believed that metaphysical propositions wereliterally nonsense. Although logical positivism has been historically linked withbehaviourism, it is interesting to note that a number of the original group came to Viennaspecifically in order to be psychoanalysed. Rudolf Carnap, perhaps the most brilliant of them,was in psychoanalysis for more than 20 years (Neider 1977). Freud was himself a member ofthe Society for Positivist Philosophy, and signed a manifesto in support of Ernst Mach'sdoctrine of the unity of science (Ellenberger 1970).

Like the positivists, Freud took a dim view of metaphysical speculation, and described itas an àbuse of thinking' (e.g. Freud 1873-1939, p. 375). What use, then, did he make ofKant? Freud seemed to use Kant in a way similar to that of the French physicist, André MarieAmpère, whom he mentions in the New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Freud1933). Ampère equated Kant's 'noumena' - the ultimate reality behind all appearances - withthe deep physical structure of physical reality (whereas in Kant's view physical reality itself isa phenomenal mental construction). He thus believed, in contrast to the prevailingphilosophical views of his day, that it was perfectly legitimate to posit the existence ofunobservable theoretical entities lying beneath the observable phenomena of the world.

Freud used a Kantian idiom rather than a Kantian metaphysics to describe the mind. Inhis metapsychology the neurophysiological processes instantiating mental functionscorrespond to Kant's noumena (Freud often described the mental as ìn itself' unconscious).These 'noumenal' mental items can only enter consciousness clothed in the categories ofnatural language, thereby presenting themselves as `phenomena'. To describe the noumenallevel of neurophysiology in terms of the phenomenal level of linguistically enshrined folkpsychology is, according to Freud, like a form of primitive animism. We behave likeprimitive animists if we take conscious reports of mental states as true descriptions of theworkings of the mental apparatus

Freud's theory offers a remarkable explanation of why it is that folk psychologicalaccounts of mental life are so tenacious and why they seem to be confirmed by introspection.If it is true that thought can only become conscious by virtue of being indexed to language,and if it is also the case that folk psychological beliefs are at least in part embodied in our (natural) language(s), it follows that in order for a thought to become conscious it mustappear to conform to folk psychological categories that are enshrined in natural languages.When thoughts become conscious they must, by virtue of becoming conscious, appear to usas folk psychological items. Methodologically, then, introspection is not an appropriatemethod for psychological research other than research into experience of consciousness itself.Introspection can never do more than confirm our folk psychological prejudices with regardto the causal underpinnings of conscious experience and other mental processes outside of orunderpinning subjective experience. Neurally instantiated cognitive processes àre to beinferred like other natural things', i.e. from a third-person perspective. For these reasons it isvery misleading to understand psychoanalysis as an introspectively-based theory andpractice. In fact, psychoanalysis is, like behaviourism, a reaction against the olderintrospectionist approaches to the mind that stemmed from the work of Descartes.


For Freud, then, all cognitive states occur within a neuropsychological system distinct andseparate from the neuropsychological system that generates consciousness, and are thereforeintrinsically unconscious and unintrospectable. Certain of these states are mapped ontonatural language in a manner that preserves their meanings (Millikan 1984) and expressesthese meanings by means of the theoretical entities postulated by folk psychology. Inconventional psychoanalytical terminology, this is described as an unconscious mental statebecoming preconscious. Other unconscious cognitive states, those described by Freud asbelonging to the `repressed unconscious', are prevented from becoming mapped ontolanguage. They nonetheless activate other mental representations, with which they areassociatively linked. This process, which Freud calls `transference' (Ubertragung), explainshow so-called `derivatives' of unconscious ideas are formed. It is the task of thepsychoanalyst to use the patient's free associations and other forms of behaviour as a basis formaking inferences about repressed, unconscious material.

It is important to understand that in Freud's psychological framework the preconsciousderivatives do not represent unconscious mental items in the sense that a word represents anidea. There is no relationship of reference between preconscious derivatives and theircorresponding unconscious ideas. There is an altogether more convoluted causal relationshipbetween the two. This thesis explains why Freud believed that a dream, symptom or trueparapraxis cannot be interpreted in the absence of a rich network of free associations, whichare themselves derivatives of the active unconscious ideas. But Freud also believed that allinterpretations of unconscious mental events are constrained by the folk psychological lexiconof our natural language. A true account of the unconscious operation of the human mind thatis free of `the deficiencies in our description' would `replace the psychological terms byphysiological or chemical ones' (Freud 1920, p. 60). As Freud explained in 1933:

I have tried to translate into the language of our normal thinking what must in fact be a process thatis neither conscious nor unconscious, taking place between quotas of energy in some unimaginablesubstratum. (p. 90)

Interpretations of unconscious mental events (and folk psychological accounts of mentalprocesses generally) are basically figurative. As Freud (1940) put it in his final statement onthe subject:

... We infer a number of processes which are in themselves ùnknowable' and interpolate them inthose that are conscious to us. And if, for instance, we say 'At this point an unconscious memoryintervened', what that means is: 'At this point something occurred of which we are totally unable toform a conception, but which, if it had entered our consciousness, could only have been described insuch and such a way'. (p. 197)

Conclusion

I have attempted to provide the reader with a perspective on some of Sigmund Freud'scontributions to the study of consciousness, showing how certain of his ideas are in accordwith contemporary cognitive-scientific principles and hypotheses (e.g. connectionistmodelling, consciousness modularism, the language of thought hypothesis, the theoreticity offolk psychology) and at times advances them (e.g. Freud's implicit explanation of thecompelling character of folk psychological explanation). Sigmund Freud was clearly anunacknowledged pioneer of cognitive


science and an early contributor to the field of consciousness studies. However, it is not onlythe wider scientific community that has neglected these aspects of Freud's thinking. Theyhave been largely ignored by the psychoanalytic community itself, whose members all toooften place themselves in opposition to neuroscientific and cognitivist efforts to explainmental phenomena. This neglect not only needlessly isolates psychoanalysis from some of themost exciting developments in our attempts to understand ourselves; it is a betrayal of whatPatricia Kitcher (1992) has called `Freud's dream', the creation of a complete interdisciplinaryscience of mind.

Notes

1. The present paper is a condensed presentation of ideas discussed much more fully inFreud's Philosophy of the Unconscious (Smith, in press).

2. Freud's term `mental apparatus' has a remarkably contemporary ring. Manycontemporary cognitive scientists represent the mind as a virtual information processingmachine.

3. `Substance' was defined in the Aristotelian tradition as anything that can supportproperties.

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SIGMUND FREUD'S PROGRAMME FOR A SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS