SIIA Papers No 6 European Intelligence Cooperation: Drivers, Interests and Institutions Bjrn Fgersten

Bjrn Fgersten ISSN 1654-0700 ISBN 91-7183-711-6 Printed by Hallvigs Reklam AB 2008

Table of contents Introduction 13 Explaining Intelligence Cooperation 15 Conceptualizing Cooperation 15 An Analytical Framework 17 State Interests 16 Drivers 23 Enablers 25 Barriers 28 Applying the Model 32 European Intelligence Cooperation in Support of Internal Security 36 Overview 36 Case Study in the Counter Terrorism Field How Europol Became a Player

41 European Intelligence Cooperation in Support of External Security 54 Overview 54 Case Study How the Joint Situation Center Became the Hub of Strategic Intelligence 58 Conclusions 66 Drivers, Interests and Institutions 66 Implications for Theory and Practice 68 European Intelligence Post Lisbon 70

Abstract This paper analyzes why current European intelligence structures have developed along different trajectories and at different speeds in the internal and external security domain, respectively. It propo ses an analytical framework based on concepts from the rational and historical branches of the new institutional literature. It argues that states establish and develop multilateral intelligence coopera tion based on four core interests: intelligence gains, policy gains, autonomy costs, and vulnerability costs. While a cost/benefit analysis of these interests explains cooperative choices at a specific point in time, it offers an incomplete picture of institutional development over time. The paper thus continues by suggesting how and why the balance between these contradictory interests changes due to different

drivers, barriers and enablers. The findings suggest that factors such as institutional design and bureaucratic interests to a large extent determine the success of cooperation. The paper concludes by discussing implications of these results for policymakers in the intelligence field as well as for students of international relations. About the Author Bjrn Fgersten is a guest researcher at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and a Phd candidate at the Department of Political Science, Lund University. He was previously a Research Fellow at Harvard University s Kennedy School of Government. The author invites correspondance at bjorn.fagersten@ui.se About the Author

Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Riksbankens Jubileumsfond that funded part of this project through its European Foreign and Security Policy Studies Programme. He would also like to thank the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Belfer Center at Harvard s Kennedy School of government for providing stimulating and inspiring working environments. Anette Ahrnens, Ole Elgstrm, Jakob Gustavsson, Sofia Jerneck, Steven Miller, Mark Rhinard, Maria Strmvik, Jan Teorell and Steven Walt have offered valuable help and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Mark Rhinard deserves additional credit for being a dedicated editor of this publication. The author is grateful for the help and encouragement of others; at the same time, he takes full responsibility for the final product.

Preface

Preface The SIIA working paper series fulfils a core mission of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs: to produce and publicize top-quality scholarly research with relevance to academics and policymakers alike. That mission, along with the aims of enhancing the quality of Swedish political debate and informing the Swedish public of international affairs issues, has characterized the institute s activities since its founding in 1938. Bjrn Fgersten s study on international intelligence cooperation, with a special focus on European Union efforts, is an impressive contribution towards those goals. He builds a model to explain when states are more or less likely to cooperate on intelligence issues in principle. He applies the model to actual European intelligence cooperation efforts to assess the model s utility in practice. The author concludes that the model has relevance for explaining today s intelligence cooperation patterns, and he encourages policymakers to focus on how a handful of key drivers and obstacles intervene to alter the costs/benefit calculation that predicts the success of cooperation. This paper was written while the author was in residence at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in 2008 and compliments the institute s broader research agenda on European Union matters.

Part of that agenda focuses on the European drive toward greater internal security cooperation, and includes research projects focused on understanding European cooperation in this sensitive area. If the EU is to work together to make the European public safer, policymakers will need to appreciate the fundamental opportunities and constraints to cooperation that Bjrn Fgersten illuminates with clarity in this paper. Gunnar Sjstedt, PhD Research Director Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm Mark Rhinard, PhD Europe Research Program Coordinator Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm

Executive Summary Ten years have passed since embryonic forums for intelligence coo peration were agreed within the European Union. Those forums, such as Europol, the Joint Situation Centre and the Intelligence Di rectorate of the Military Staff have since then developed along dif ferent trajectories and with varying degrees of success. This paper investigates why states would seek multilateral cooperation in such a sensitive area as intelligence and what factors determinate its tra jectory and success. The paper provides insights on: A model explaining intelligence cooperation. A central propo sition of this paper is that multilateral intelligence cooperation can be explained by focusing on a few key factors. Intelligence cooperation, as explained in this working paper, occurs when a balance is reached between four kinds of state interests: achieving intelligence and policy gains while avoiding autonomy and vulnerability costs. Over time, cooperation will

progress depending on how this balance changes as the result of different drivers. Drivers of cooperation discussed in this paper include threat balancing, intelligence power balancing and cooperative momentum. However, the configuration of state interests does not offer a full explanation of the development of international intelligence cooperation. As intermediate variables, this paper discusses the impact of enabling factors such as trust and institutional design as well as of barriers to cooperation such as bureaucratic resistance and institutional resilience. EU internal intelligence cooperation. The first case studied in this paper is European intelligence cooperation in support of internal security. Empirical focus is on cooperation within the EU (such as Europol) as well as on cooperation taking place outside of the EU (such as the Club of Bern and the Counter Terrorism Group). Special attention is given to the development of Europol s role within the counter terrorism field. The conclusion is that cooperation in this field has been driven by some member states perception of internal and external threats that need to be balanced against. Cooperation has, however, been hard to Summary

achieve due to a lack of enabling factors as well as barriers such as strong bureaucratic resistance. The intelligence agencies and security services of Europe have, for example, preferred to use their own informal networks outside of the EU and have been reluctant to share intelligence with Europol. EU external intelligence cooperation. The second case examined in this paper is European intelligence cooperation in support of external security. Such cooperation takes place within the Joint Situation Centre of the Council Secretariat, the Intelligence Directorate of the EU Military Staff, and within the EU Satellite Centre. Special attention is given to the process by which the Joint Situation Centre became the hub of strategic intelligence. The conclusion from this case is that cooperation was driven mainly by cooperative momentum effects such as spillover from more general CFSP and ESDP initiatives. This case also illustrates the importance of institutional design for enabling cooperation, such as the delegation of leadership to institutional entrepreneurs within the Council Secretariat.

There were also fewer barriers to cooperation within the external security field. National bureaucrats (unlike their colleagues in the internal security field) shared the ambitions of their political masters. Implications for scholars. For students of intelligence, often sceptical of the prospects for multilateral intelligence cooperation, this paper demonstrates that meaningful cooperation not only takes place but has the possibility to function well. It recommends a more pluralistic set of theories than is usually applied within this field. The analytical framework employed in this paper builds on new institutional theory, an example of using complementary approaches to improve our understanding. For students of security and European integration, this paper challenges the popular argument that the barrier between internal and external security is rapidly dissolving. From an intelligence perspective, this barrier seems alive and enduring, not only in actual arrangements but also in the mindsets of practitioners and policymakers. Scholars within the European Studies field will find that concepts such as institutional entrepreneurship and spillover effects are relevant in a high politics area such as

intelligence, something that intergovernmentalist explanations of European integration have long doubted. Implications for policy makers. The message to policymakers contained in this paper is that although explaining cooperation may be easy, achieving success requires thoughtfulness and patience. Barriers and enablers at the bureaucratic and institutional level often intervene between the cooperation ambitions of governments and successful outcomes. Policymakers hoping to build efficient multilateral arrangements for intelligence cooperation must understand the complex mix of bureaucratic and institutional factors that shape cooperation, and strive to overcome them. In the case of the EU, this paper offers advice concerning the intelligence function of the planned External Action Service (e.g. consider excluding an intelligence function) and future counter terrorism policies (e.g. focus on functional goals rather than symbolic goals). Finally, the paper outlines the merits of a European Intelligence Academy to establish trust, confidence and skills for the next generation of European intelligence officials. Introduction

Introduction In 1999, the European Union took its first steps towards becoming an intelligence actor. Ten years later, intelligence is now shared between European states within numerous forums and through a variety of means. That development, however, has been unsteady and uneven. Some intelligence sharing takes place within the EU framework, while some cooperation takes place outside of it. Some areas of intelligence have been subject to rapid cooperation and reached unforeseen levels, whereas progress in other areas still lags. Analyzing and explaining the trajectory and scope of European intelligence cooperation is the aim of this paper. Intelligence cooperation, as a concept, is oxymoronic. Intelligence activities are traditionally thought to be at the heart of national security and prerequisites for state sovereignty. The prospects for international integration or even cooperation in this field therefore seem modest. The development of European intelligence cooperation thus challenges general assumptions about international cooperation and intelligence cooperation itself. The risks that come with such an arrangement are substantial: one s sources and methods may be compromised due to leaks; one s strengths and weaknesses will inevitably be known to others, the information shared may have unintended consequences and/or reach unintended recipients. All of these risks increase in a multilateral setting which is never stronger than its weakest link. Yet cooperation still takes place. This confronts us with the central question of this study: How can we explain the development of multilateral forms of cooperation in such a sensitive area as intelligence? This general conundrum contains several interesting questions:

What are the main state interests behind such a development? How does the form of the cooperation impact the success and future development of the same? What role do supranational actors within their respective intelligence communities play in this development? These are all questions that this paper will try to address. The empirical focus is cooperation taking place between European countries, either within the European Union, or within informal networks or intelligence clubs .

Any explanatory model of multilateral intelligence cooperation must explain institutional development over time, and not simply institutional creation or change at a given point. The following section presents a model designed to achieve this. The subsequent sections apply that explanatory framework and examine multilateral intelligence cooperation as it has developed within Europe since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. A comparison will be made between intelligence cooperation in areas of both internal and external security. The last chapter will offer conclusions and implications concerning both the study of intelligence cooperation in general and the practice of multilateral intelligence cooperation in Europe. The purpose of this paper is thus twofold. First, it aims to present a model which explains the development of intelligence cooperation irrespective of whether such cooperation relates to internal or external security questions. If successful, such a model may contribute to theoretical synergies between internal and external security approaches, as well as provide a useful tool for cross-boundary comparisons. Second, the paper aims to explain why the European states have chosen to establish a variety of forums for intelligence cooperation and why cooperation functions with varying degrees of success. Explaining Intelligence Cooperation

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Explaining Intelligence Cooperation To build a model of the development of multilateral intelligence cooperation, a good place to start is to define central concepts. Starting with intelligence, this is a concept with many meanings. Intelligence can refer to a product, i.e. some form of analyzed information; it can refer to an activity, i.e. the means by which this information is collected and analyzed; or it can refer to an organization, i.e. the agencies involved in the collection and analysis of information. Most definitions of intelligence include one or more of the dimensions above. In this paper intelligence will refer to the direction, collection, analysis and dissemination of publicly available and secret information with the goal of reducing decision-makers uncertainty about a security

problem.1 Focusing on the actors that are involved in this process, we can then define intelligence cooperation as explicit coordination in pursuit of mutual gains between actors performing intelligence tasks.2 Conceptualizing Cooperation Using these definitions, we can move on to our the development of intelligence cooperation to measure it in a meaningful way. To preserve generalizability, this study will focus on two of cooperation: scope and density. object of explanation and assess how parsimony and encourage central dimensions

1 James Walsh defines intelligence as the collection and analysis of publicly ava ilable and secret information with the goal of reducing policymakers uncertainty about a foreign policy problem James. I. Walsh, Defection and Hierarchy in International

Intelligence Sharing, Journal of Public Policy 2 , no. 02 (2007). Although inspir ed by this definition, this study will also view actors involved in the direction and dissemination of intelligence as intelligence-actors. Furthermore it views intelligence as con nected to security, but not by definition external security as in Walsh s definition. 2 Coordination in this context refers to actors adjusting their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, see Robert O. Keohane, After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy (Princeton University Press, 1984). For b ehavior to be considered cooperation it must be an explicit (as opposed to tacit), goal-ori ented act of policy coordination, aimed at mutual gains. 1

Increased intelligence cooperation Number of tasks and issue areas Density of cooperation Scope is the number of tasks and areas subject to cooperation. Translated into the world of intelligence, this would mean whether crucial tasks such as direction/tasking, collection, analysis and dissemination are performed within joint structures and whether this cooperation relates to counterterrorism, espionage, counterespionage, etc. Density relates to the meaning and significance a cooperative forum has for the involved actors. Low density could imply voluntary coordination where states occasionally share information about unilateral action. The relevant forum may be one of many choices if the states choose to cooperate. Cooperation with high density implies regular interaction with joint commitments within the chosen areas of cooperation. The forum will be the natural venue for cooperation and states will turn to it (almost by knee-jerk reaction) when facing new challenges in the field. The combination of scope and density provide us with a way to measure the development of multilateral intelligence cooperation, the explanatory focus of this paper. Increased cooperation is thus defined as any movement towards higher density of cooperation or towards increasing scope of cooperation. Naturally, as indicated by the arrow above, increased cooperation can also involve both of these dimensions.

Explaining Intelligence Cooperation 1

An Analytical Framework The argument intelligence figure below part of this and suggest how it can be put into practice. Barriers Bureaucratic Resistance Institutional Resilience State Interests Cooperative Drivers Intelligence Gains Outcome Threat Balancing Policy Gains Increased/decreased vs Intelligence Balancing intelligence Pres. Autonomy cooperation Coop. Momentum Min. Vulnerability Enablers Trust of this paper is that any development of multilateral cooperation can be explained by a few key factors. The outlines those factors and their relationships. The remaining chapter will discuss the content of this model

Institutional Design State Interests Studies of intelligence, in general, and intelligence cooperation, in particular, mostly consist of historical cases where specific state interests and dilemmas are illuminated. The results of these studies are often presented in the form of cost/benefit or threats/possibilities tables. While these often highly specific listings are of value in an intelligence context they hardly lend themselves to more 1

general social scientific modeling. A better way to conceptualize this discussion is to develop a framework where specific state motives can be grouped into more general categories. The great majority of state interests3 at play can then be summarized as a simple tradeoff: achieving gains (intelligence and policy) without too many costs (ceding autonomy and compromising sources). Intelligence gains A central motivation of any state entering into intelligence cooperation is to increase its intelligence capacity. This could, for example, mean access to currently unavailable sources, methods, technologies or information. No state is totally self sufficient in all intelligence areas be it satellite technology or well cultivated human networks in isolated tribal areas. Hence states will consider liaison arrangements with foreign agencies. The reduction of operational costs can also be seen as intelligence gains that are possible to attain through cooperation. Specialization allows cooperating states to reach more cost-efficient solutions together. An example is when

states pool intelligence resources which save costs at the national level. In the case of Europe, from an efficiency perspective it is better to have one analyst in Brussels watching Darfur than to have one in every one of the 27 capitals of the EU. A state may also seek to use partners in order to validate their own intelligence, i.e. using cooperation as a quality assurance process. Finally, cooperation can serve as a way to ask other countries to do what you are unable or 3 This study distinguishes between interests and preferences. Interests relates to deep

rooted opinions, such as the desirability of attaining intelligence and policy g ains or avoiding autonomy costs and vulnerability. Preferences relate to the rank orderi ng of specific policy options. Examples are whether actor A wants to increase or decre ase intelligence cooperation with actor B. In the explanatory framework presented in this paper, states have contending interests that induce preferences regarding cooper ative outcomes. This interest/preference division resembles typologies chosen by other scholars. Jon Elster, for example, distinguishes between motivations and preferences, see Jon Elster, Preference Formation in Transitional Justice, in Preferences and situa tions: points of intersection between historical and rational choice institutionalism, ed. Ira. Katznelson and Barry. R. Weingast (Russell Sage Foundation, 2005)., others have discussed fundamental preferences in relation to strategic preferences, see for example Peter Hall, Preference Formation as a Political Process, in Preferences and situations: points of intersection between historical and rational choice institutionalism, ed. Ira. Katznelson and Barry R. Weingast (Russell Sage Foundation, 2005). Explaining Intelligence Cooperation 1

prohibited to do at home. By outsourcing controversial tasks such as covert operations and interrogation of suspects, agencies may circumvent the national control and oversight mechanisms that oversee their work. The examples above can be termed output-gains because they relate to the actual output of cooperation. Another form of intelligence gains can be called input-gains. They relate to the gains that states seek by participating in coopera tion, irrespective of the final results. One example of input-gains is the possibility to influence other states by submitting intelligence that confirms a specific view held by one participant. Input-gains increase as the common good grows. In cases where specific intelligence can influence the policy of all other participating states the input-gains are at their highest. Policy gains Although most forms of intelligence cooperation can be explained by the motivation of states to increase their own intelligence capacities, this is not true in all cases. States can be motivated less by functional intelligence

gains and more by what cooperation means to the institution where it takes place, or for the actors who take part in the cooperation. Jennifer Sims argues that preferences of intelligence professionals may be secondary to political or military necessity if the goal of intelligence cooperation is to bolster political or military alliances initiated for non-intelligence reasons. A counter terrorist coordinator may lend credibility to the European Union without playing a decisive role for EU counter terrorism intelligence gathering, for instance. An independent assessment function within the UN headquarters may increase the authority of that organization without carrying any obvious benefits regarding analytical functions. A bilateral intelligence sharing deal may be signed more as a way to strengthen, or even repair, the relation between two countries, but has little to do with the exchange of intelligence. The logic is well known in the national context where much of new policy initiatives If cases where shared intelligence is fabricated or strongly biased it is more relevant to talk about manipulation than influence. Jennifer E. Sims, Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details, ational Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 19, no. 2 (2006): 202. Intern

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seem to be motivated by an urge to lend credibility to a specific actor or institution rather than provide for functional needs. Even though we can assume most actors strive for both intelligence and policy gains, and probably at the same time, it is useful to keep an analytical distinction between the two concepts. Autonomy costs If states can increase their intelligence capacity by establishing cooperation with other states, why is such cooperation not custom in international affairs? The most obvious answer is that states are staunch guardians of their sovereignty, fiercely resisting any attempts to undercut their power. International cooperation often implies dependency on other states or even the shift of sovereign responsibilities to supranational bodies, thus encroaching on essential state prerogatives. Any development that curtails states aut hority thus comes with a cost, hereafter referred to as autonomy costs. There are two main reasons why

autonomy will be used in this text rather than sovereignty. First, sovereignty as a principle, at least in its traditional guise, is assumed to be absolute. In the words of Hugo Grotius: sovereignty is a unity, in itself indivisible . Autonomy is a more elastic concept; we can speak of more or less autonomy. Since the cost of infringements on a state s authority varies between issue areas and over time, autonomy thus appears to be a relevant denominator for such a cost. Second, sovereignty is usually the attribute of states while autonomy, or the lack thereof, can be attributed to any actor in the political realm. Using the term autonomy costs thus permits us to discuss the ceding of authority regardless of the actors or organizations involved. The autonomy costs of intelligence cooperation arise when states accept any development that curtails their authority, either in their

internal or external affairs. This assumption does not presuppose that states have full autonomy before they enter into cooperation, only that it is seen as costly to cede further autonomy. The basic assumption here is that states strive to preserve autonomy in any given situation. David Lake, 2003, The New Sovereignty in International Relations in International Studies Review (2002) 5, 303-323. Ibid Explaining Intelligence Cooperation

Vulnerability costs Apart from minimizing autonomy costs, states are above all interested in avoiding vulnerability. Vulnerability can in this context be defined as a product of the probability and consequences of a disclosure of a country s methods and sources, or the defection by a partner. Vulnerability is at its highest when there is a high probabi lity for disclosure or defection and when such an event would imply considerable consequences. In general, the broader that sensitive information is disseminated, the higher the risk for leaks and disclosure. These can be caused by irresponsible partners or by differences in judicial systems where, for example, the court s right to evidence is ranked higher than the intelligence agencies wish for secrecy in a partner country. It is also hard to ensure that shared information is not passed onto a third party against the will of the originator. Even when information is not leaked it can be used in ways unforeseen by the originator. Israel s use of US satellite imagery in the strike against the Iraqi Osirak reactor in 1981 damaged US-Israeli relations which illustrates the point well. A high level of intelligence interdependence also means that partners will become familiar with each others strengths and weaknesses which could affect a country s strategic situation negatively. Also, new priorities or a regime shift can be a hard loss for a dependent intelligence liaison, as when the US suffered a near total loss of intelligence on Iran following the fall of the Shah. Many of the above mentioned factors are even more problematic in a multilateral context where the quality of the cooperation will be determined by the least dependable member of the group.10 The risk of defection is inherent to any form of cooperation. Any ambition to act

collectively will give rise to certain cooperative pro blems. These can relate to the start of cooperation (who will pay the costs of cooperation and/or provide leadership?) as well as to the cooperative process itself (how will non-participants be prevented from benefiting from the good provided and how will cooperative gains be distributed among the participants?) The two most prevalent collective action problems within the intelligence world are Sims, Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details. Ibid. 10 Ibid.

free-riding and manipulation. The risk of free-riding is especially high when the produced good (in this case intelligence) is hard to exclude from non-cooperating actors (for example actors not submitting their own intelligence to a shared intelligence-pool). The more important the cooperative output becomes, the more tempting it may be to manipulate the common product. This can be done by submitting erroneous intelligence in order to secure support for a preferred policy choice. Thus, the costs related to collective action may inhibit cooperation despite widespread preferences in favor. To some extent these problems can be mitigated by institutions that monitor compliance or by other ways of regulating the behavior of states. The possibility for that will be discussed below. Summary To sum up, the set of state interests discussed above can be seen as a simple trade-off: reaching intelligence and policy gains without ceding autonomy or increasing vulnerability. In most historical cases,

the costs of intelligence cooperation have outweighed the benefits. The status quo of this trade-off is thus non-cooperation. Only where benefits are particularly high, or costs and risks especially low, can we expect states to enter into, or develop further, structured intelligence cooperation. Any change of the status quo, i.e. a development of intelligence cooperation, can be explained by a change in the balance between costs and benefits. If we think in terms of evolutionary rounds (multiple attempts at cooperation), we can imagine three possible outcomes: Benefits > Costs States will only commence, or increase, intelligence cooperation in cases where the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs. This would be the case when states find that because their preferences are altered (they now accept a higher level of vulnerability and are more inclined to seek gains etc) the existing cooperation does not reflect an equilibrium point of their aggregated preferences. Cooperation will be increased until equilibrium is reached, i.e. states will maximize gains until they reach their li mit in terms of autonomy costs and increased vulnerability. Explaining Intelligence Cooperation

Benefits = Costs In situations where the costs and benefits of cooperation are balanced, there is little room for development. The cooperative arrangements already represent the aggregated preference of the involved actors. Benefits < Costs Lastly, if the costs of cooperation outweigh the benefits, states will try to reduce cooperation and/or dismantle existing cooperation until equilibrium is reached. This is, however, more common in a national context, where the awareness of costs may be higher (perhaps due to high profile scandals or misconduct by the institution). International institutions are known as sticky creations that often endure beyond their pareto optimality because of the difficulty of shutting them down. Institutions are seldom disbanded; they are left in the cold. They may, however, take on new roles and re-emerge in a new guise. The discussion above investigated what cooperative development we can expect under different cost/benefit calculations that shape state interests. To understand and explain the evolution of international intelligence cooperation, I now explain how

and why the balance between costs and benefits may shift over time. Drivers The term driver accounts for any factor that sways states towards greater cooperation by making states more inclined to seek intelligence and/or policy gains. The ambition of this paper is to present drivers that could be valid over time and space. The drivers presented here are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary. Theambition is to analyze if, when and how they affect state preferences.11 11 The importance of specifying the causal mechanisms at play when studying poli tical processes has lately been stressed by various writers such as Alexander George a nd Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Mit Press, 2005)., Peter Hall, Systematic process analysis: when and how to use it, European Management Review 3 (2006), Jeffrey Checkel, Tracing Causal Mechanisms, The Intern ational Studies Review 8, no. 2 (2006) and Charles Tilly, Mechanisms in Political

Processes, Annual Review of Political Science 4, no. 1 (2001).

Balancing threats One driver relates to the fact that states establish and develop intelligence cooperation to manage new or changing security challenges. These challenges could be an effect of terrorist attacks, operations by organized crime or other, more abstract threats. Intelligence coope ration is thus an answer to one or many member states perception of impending threats that are difficult to address unilaterally. This driver is reactive by nature, with an intelligence capacity defined by the perceived threat. How this factor drives cooperation depends on the nature of the threat, as well as who perceives the state is facing new security challenges. When discussing the nature of traditional threats it has been common to distinguish between internal and external threats. Increasingly, this distinction is criticized for being outdated and irrelevant. Academics have argued that today s multifaceted and transboundary threats do not allow for such an over-simplified typology. This study assumes only that states may face new security challenges and will then make it an empirical question whether this challenge is internal or external and whether this

distinction is relevant at all. Another relevant factor is who perceives the state is facing new security challenges. A government will typically seek intelligence gains from cooperation if it perceives a national need thereof. This would also be the case if practitioners within the national security bureaucracy perceive the need for cooperation. If the need for cooperation stems from the public or the media rather than the government, the state may enter cooperation in pursuit of policy gains.12 Consequently, the perception of new security challenges will drive cooperation by increasing the perceived need for intelligence and policy gains. 12 Public demand for intelligence cooperation is quite a rarity in most countrie s. The intelligence business is mostly held out of public insight and knowledge, which attracts few activists or public movements. In the case that they do, the demand is often for tighter control or even the abolishment of certain intelligence agencies rather than calls for enhanced cooperation. Nevertheless, there exist cases where the public deman ds visible efforts, especially after intelligence failures or during periods of inc reased threat. Much the same can be said about (non-executive) political demand for intelligenc e cooperation. Explaining Intelligence Cooperation 2

If new security challenges are the driver behind multilateral intelligence cooperation, we would expect (1) the perception and articulation of a new or changing security challenge to precede change in cooperative behavior, and (2) the nature of the cooperation should correspond to the specific challenges states are facing. Balancing intelligence power The second driver assumes that states cooperate in order to balance the intelligence power of others. Intelligence power is simply the level of intelligence capabilities at the disposal of a specific actor.13 Changes in the international intelligence power balance may put pressure on a specific state or group of states in different ways: 1) If actor B (who is currently cooperating with actor A) increases its intelligence capabilities, actor A may feel the need to balance the relationship to avoid a situation of intelligence dependency. Actor A may also want to increase its own intelligence capacity in order to preserve its status as a relevant cooperative partner to actor B. Or 2) if actor C (an opponent to actor A) increases its intelligence capabilities, actor A may feel the need to balance against this entity in order to avoid that its opponent enjoys an intelligence advantage.1

Thus, in order to reach a higher degree of intelligence autonomy, to remain a relevant partner, or to match an opponent, actor B may choose to increase its intelligence capability by cooperation with other, like-minded actors. With rises in the intelligence power of others, the potential for intelligence gains through cooperation increases. If the urge to balance others is the driver behind increased intelligence cooperation, we would expect (1) cooperation to evolve in times when the prevailing intelligence power balance is conceived as problematic, and (2) that the established intelligence cooperation, to some extent, aims to alter that balance. 13 Michael Herman defines intelligence power as a specific form of state power t hat allows a state to produce more advantageous effects than otherwise would have been the case. See Michael Herman. Intelligence Power in Peace and War. (Cambridge: Cambr idge University Press, 2001) 1 This second scenario can also be analyzed as a security threat (see driver one ), but since there are important differences (intelligence challenges do not necessaril

y imply security threats) such cases are seen as intelligence balancing in this study. 2

Cooperative momentum So far it has been implied that cooperation is generated only by factors external or internal to states. However, there are also mechanisms within the cooperation process itself that generate cooperative momentum. Spillover from other areas of cooperation or pro-integration dynamics, for instance, can occur when intelligence cooperation commences and thus drive cooperation forward. One such mechanism is functional spillover, when solutions in one policy area require additional action in another policy area. In the case of intelligence, it could be reasoned that common policies on internal and external security have accentuated the need for common information to underpin these policies. Spillover effects have been a key explanatory factor in neo-functional integration theory as elaborated by Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg and later Philippe Schmitter.1 Historical institutionalists have also studied mechanisms of self-generating cooperation but, contrary to neo-functionalists, they analyze these tendencies as unintended consequences rather than strategic choice. Using concepts such as positive feedback and increasing returns, historical institutionalists has shown that once a choice is made, actors have strong incentives to continue down the chosen path.1 When doing so, actors sustain and reinforce the trajectory and thus leave other available choices behind. Brian Arthur has specified mechanisms of increasing returns in the economics field, of which some are equally relevant in the area of intelligence. Learning effects implies that as actors master a

new system or as institutions develop, the gains from continued usage will increase. Coordination effects imply that the value for a user of a product or an institution will increase as other actors join in.1 1 Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950 1 957. (Stanford: Stanford University Press; 1958), Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynami cs of European Economic Integration, . (Stanford: Stanford University Press; 1963), Ph ilippe C. Schmitter, Neo-Neo-Functionalism: Dja vu, all over again? In European Integratio n Theory, ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez. (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2003 ) 1 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. (P rinceton: Princeton University Press, 2004) 1 Brian W. Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependency in the Economy. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) Explaining Intelligence Cooperation 2

Anticipated or accidental, self-generating mechanisms drive cooperation by increasing the intelligence gains of further cooperation. If cooperative momentum is the driver of intelligence cooperation, we would expect (1) cooperation to develop gradually, (2) cooperation to be initiated by practitioners, and (3) that new structures for cooperation serve common policies rather than assisting national policies. Enablers While drivers generate demand for cooperation by way of increasing the benefits, enablers help states to contain, manage or mitigate the costs of cooperation. Within the intelligence literature, trust is commonly stressed as a prerequisite for cooperation. Within the field of international relations, scholars have long discussed the way insti tutions may help states manage cooperative impediments. Both of these factors are reviewed below. Trust Just as it is hard to establish intelligence cooperation in the absence of trust, it is difficult to further develop intelligence cooperation if trust does not increase proportionally. A

trusting relationship is one where actor A trusts actor B to manage her interests and expects actor B to do the right thing .1 If perceived vulnerability is a factor restraining intelligence cooperation, then trust building may be an enabler of increased cooperation. What, then, generates trust in a relationship? Aaron Hoffman convincingly argues that a trusting relationship co-exists with the risk of opportunistic behavior. Without risk there would be no need for trust. Trusting someone is a gamble where you expect the trustee not to betray your interest. The behavior of the trustee deems the trusting relationship a failure or success. Trust building is thereby a process with its own

momentum where every successful act of risk-taking on behalf of others generates trust. 1 Aaron M. Hoffman, A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations, Europ ean Journal of International Relations, no. 3 (2002). 2

This process can drive cooperation forward by increasing the levels of vulnerability that the actors are willing to endure in a cooperative venture. If increased intelligence cooperation is enabled by increasing levels of trust between the relevant actors we would expect (1) that such cooperation has increased gradually over time; (2) that such a process has been actively supported by the practitioners and (3) that the increase is not solely based on expansion of tasks, but also on a higher density of cooperation. Institutional design To what extent does the form of cooperative arrangements affect the cooperative outcome? One vital question is how power is distributed between the cooperating states. David Lake has suggested that hierarchical relations can produce better cooperative outcomes than anarchical relations where all states have equal rights and responsibilitie s. 1 Applying this line of thought to intelligence sharing, James Walsh additionally argues for the benefits of hierarchical relations in intelligence relations.20 In the case of multilateral intelligence cooperation, some form of hierarchy may be a precondition for powerful states to take part. Such hierarchical control may contain the autonomy costs involved and

may mitigate the collective action problems discussed above by allowing some states to mo nitor others. At the same time, the lack of control may dissuade weaker actors from taking part owing to the increase in autonomy cost.21 Elements of hierarchy may thus offer net intelligence gains in cases where it empowers actors with high intelligence capabili ties. If increased intelligence cooperation was to be explained by a hierarchical power configuration between the cooperating actors, then we would expect (1) that steps towards hierarchy predated the increase in cooperation and (2) that the increase of cooperation is largely upheld by the actors in the top tier of the hierarchy. 1 David A. Lake, Reflection, Evaluation, Integration, The New Sovereignty in Inte rnational Relations, International Studies Review , no. 3 (2003). 20 Walsh, Defection and Hierarchy in International Intelligence Sharing. 21 Although they can free-ride on the output gains of cooperation (by receiving the disseminated intelligence) they will be cut of from the input gains (the possibility to influ ence/ manipulate other actors). Explaining Intelligence Cooperation 2

Related to institutional design is the issue of organizational autonomy. To what extent are competences or authority delegated to a neutral body or a secretariat and how do such institutional actors influence the level of cooperation? Depending on the perceived relative to the costs of delegating leadership gains of cooperation states will be more or less inclined to empower a secretary general or a supranational institution to take a role in cooperation. The function, or the form, of this delegated leadership depends on the kind of collective action problem faced by the states. The two most prevalent problems inherent in international intelligence cooperation are free-riding and manipulation. The former refers to actors who benefit from cooperation without contributing to it themselves. The latter concerns the risk of one actor who purposefully supplies intelligence only in support of its preferred policy or outcome, thus manipulating the common good for its own benefits. The solution to both of these problems may be some form of neutral oversight body a solution that comes with a rather high cost in terms of national sovereignty. If governments find this price worth paying, there will be a demand for leadership. If there is an available supplier i.e. an actor with skills and reputation strong enough to take on the task leadership may be, formally or informally, delegated to this actor.22 Institutional actors with a certain degree of autonomy may thus enable increased intelligence cooperation by monitoring the behavior of states.

As soon as an agent is empowered, it may, however, establish an agenda of its own. Or in the words of Terry Moe: Once an agency is created, the political world becomes a different place. Agency bureaucrats are now political actors in their own right [ ]. They are now players whose interests and resources alter the political game .23 Even though the principals of an institution anticipate continued authority, differing preferences and information asymme 22 For more elaborated models of delegated leadership, see Jonas Tallberg, Leade rship and Negotiation in the European Union, Themes in European Governance (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) and Derek Beach, The dynamics o f European integration : why and when EU institutions matter (Basingstoke: Palgrav e Macmillan, 2005). 23 Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bur eaucracy, in Organization Theory: From Chester Bernard to the Present and Beyond, ed. Oliver E Williamsson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 2

try may induce agents to pursue their own interests and not those of the principal i.e. to shirk in the Principal-Agent vocabulary.2 The possibility for opportunistic behavior on the part of an agent increases in times of turmoil when the preferences of the principals are unclear. In short, it can be argued that secretariats and institutional actors to whom power has been delegated may enable cooperation by mitigating the risks of cooperation. However, by pursuing their own agenda such actors may also drive cooperation in a pro-integration direction by enabling greater intelligence gains for the involved actors. If increased cooperation was the effect of institutional entrepreneurs, we would expect (1) that there has been supply of and demand

for delegated leadership in the relevant field and (2) that the cooperation to a large extent builds on propositions, suggestions or solutions suggested by an actor to which some form of power is delegated. Barriers Although the focus of this study is on how and why states increase intelligence cooperation, it is relevant to say something about what restrains intelligence cooperation. Potential barriers can occur at different places in the chain of events that determine how cooperation evolves. First, there are barriers in the preference formulation phase, i.e. the phase when states form a preference on how cooperation should evolve. In the model presented in this paper, these barriers are inherent in key state interests discussed above.2 A second type of barrier to cooperation materializes when a collective preference already exists. These barriers

to implementation thus breach the link between ambitions and actual outcomes. Examples of such barriers are bureaucratic resistance and institutional resilience. States may, of course, use foresight and take these barriers into consideration when deciding on cooperation. However, when not accommo 2 Jonas Tallberg, European governance and supranational institutions : making st ates com ply (London ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2003). 2 Examples are the risks and costs involved that often deter states from pursuin g cooperation in this area. Explaining Intelligence Cooperation

dated for, barriers in the implementation phase may have a direct influence on the success of cooperation.2 Bureaucratic resistance On what grounds would national bureaucrats purposely obstruct state ambitions when it comes to international intelligence cooperation? Two main factors can be traced in the literature on bureaucracy. One is the self interest inherent in any political actor. Political scientists and economists analyze how bureaucratic actors pursue their own rational goals such as increased budget, more power in the decision-making process or personal advancement.2 While this literature has focused on the interests of bureaucracies other scholars have focused on the ideas of bureaucratic actors. Typically, selfimages and roles of bureaucracies have been analyzed as aspects of organizational culture. This paper will make use of both of these traditions.

A useful concept when analyzing interests within bureaucracies is asset specificity as outlined by Peter Gourevitch. Asset specificity describes the situation in which investments, or assets, are deemed to be specific to a certain context and therefore cannot effectively be reallocated. The investments in question can be social, relational, physical or intellectual, but they all have a common functional dimension: Where investments in the specific assets of an institution are high, actors will find the cost of any institutional change that endangers these assets to be quite high; indeed, actors in this situation may be reluctant to run risks of any change at all. [ ] As actors in each society invest in a particular institutional arrangement, they have incentives to protect their investment by opposing change .2 Regarding intelligence cooperation, the vast personal and organiza 2 This explains why Barriers are linked both to State Interests and Cooperative Outcome in the figure on page 15. 2 This is generally labeled bureaucratic politics; good examples can be found in the work of Graham Allison and Morton Halperin. See for example Graham T. Allison, Essenc e of decision : explaining the Cuban missile crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), M. H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 1974). 2 Peter Gourevitch, The Governance Problem in International Relations, in Strategi c Choice and International Relations ed. David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Princeto

n: Princeton University Press, 1999), 144-45.

tional networks that constitute the backbone of much intelligence sharing can be seen as an investment that cannot be easily transferred to another institutional setting. Since networks and working relations takes time to achieve and hardly can be imposed from above, it can also be regarded as a highly context specific investment. Sir Stephen Lander, former Director General of the British Security Service describes how soft issues such as networks and shared experiences influence institutional relationships: Those joint activities generate friendships, trust with sensitive material, mutual respect and confidence [ ] They matter .2 Investments in specific assets thus explain institutional persistence. If the level of specific assets invested in a given institution is high, the involved actors will resist any change that may jeopardize their investments. Beyond self interest, ideas and organizational roles may also induce certain behaviors. Usually this is analyzed under the umbrella of bureaucratic30 or organizational culture. Andrew Brown defines organizational culture as ideas, values and activities that are specific to a given organization and have special relevance to its members . 31 Research in this area has traditionally been conducted by organizational theorists and sociological institutionalists. However, more rationalistic scholars have also studied the impact of ideas and culture on calculating actors.32 As an example, Lawrence Hamlet traces organizational culture to the mission of the organization, shaped in part by its (founding) principals.33 Compared to other 2 Stephen Lander, International intelligence cooperation: an insider s perspective

in Cambridge Review of international affairs 17, no. 3 (2004): 487. 30 The term bureaucratic culture is hereafter used as a generic term to describe aspects of both organizational and professional culture that may have an impact on insti tutional development. 31 Andrew. Brown, Organisational Culture (Pitman, 1995). 32 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Belie fs, In stitutions, and Political Change (Cornell University Press, 1993), Geoffrey Garr ett and Barry Weingast, European Community s Internal Market in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, ed. Judith. Goldstein and Robert. O . Keohane (1993), David M Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (New York: Cambrid ge University Press, 1990). 33 Lawrence Hamlet, Assessing the Impact of Organizational Culture on Internation al Organizations. Unpublished draft. http://www.rhodes.edu/Faculty/LawrenceHamlet/ Research.cfm . Explaining Intelligence Cooperation

forms of organizations, intelligence agencies may be particularly effective environments for the establishment of specific organizational cultures and ideational frameworks. The mobility of the staff is often low, their contacts with other organizational forms tend to be scarce, and the work conducted is seen as vital for national security etc. One can assume that the stronger a certain organizational cul ture grows, the harder it will be for that organization to collaborate not to say integrate culture is built around issues such as secrecy and isolation. with other organizations, especially if this

It may also be relevant to discuss professional culture, i.e. a bond within the vocation rather than within the workplace. In some cases it is reasonable to assume that a professional culture is transnational by nature, as for diplomats or scientists, while for others it is very national in character. In cases of strictly national professional cultures, it can be argued that this

may constitute a barrier to any change requiring increased contact and cooperation with foreign counterparts. In cases where organizational cultures are based on values such as secrecy and organizational exceptionality, it can be argued that this may constitute a barrier to any change requiring increased contact and cooperation with other agencies. In short, aspects of organizational and professional culture may deem an institution more or less amenable to change.3 If bureaucratic resistance functions as a barrier to intelligence cooperation then we could expect this cooperation either (1) to have been abolished after consultation with relevant practitioners or (2) to function poorly due to unwillingness on behalf of the practitioners to support the cooperative arrangement. Institutional resilience State ambitions to increase intelligence cooperation

may also be hindered by institutional resilience. Domestic institutions, in particu lar, are structured in ways that allow various types of veto points .

3 It could be argued that both investments in specific assets and the growth of a specific inhouse culture implies that the longer an institution has been in place, the choi ce of reversal or dismantling becomes increasingly problematic and/or unattractive. This could, of course, be true both for national structures, risking to lose competen ce to a common body, as for a central body, fearing its competences being diffused horiz ontally.

Increased cooperation may be halted if any change in the status quo must pass through national veto points. George Tsebelis has showed that an increase in veto players decrease the possibility for policy change.3 In the case of intelligence, cooperation may be questioned and eventually obstructed by parliaments, review boards, and courts depending on the nature of the cooperation. The Hughes-Ryan act of 1974, for instance, requires the US president to authorize covert operations by way of a presidential finding and report these to relevant Congressional committees. Such a process obviously reduces the leeway of intelligence agencies by illuminating their activities and introducing veto points, thus prohibiting or obstructing the ac tivities of intelligence agencies. Another institutional obstacle to intelligence cooperation can be that the prospective partners are legally incompatible. Legal barriers within the United States (imagined and real) were pointed out as one reason for the inadequate intelligence sharing in the time period leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Problematic enough at the national level, such barriers tend

to grow in a multilateral setting. One example is when rules explicitly forbid certain agencies to share information across borders. Another example is when different legal systems and traditions make cooperation cumbersome and unpredictable, as when constitutional and common law systems conflict. All other things being equal, international cooperation will be easier to achieve in an area that has fewer national players with veto power over such developments and where legal frameworks do not prohibit cooperation. If institutional resilience serves as a barrier to intelligence cooperation, then we could expect cooperation to have been (1) hampered by a national or supranational actor with vetorights, or (2) abolished or truncated because of legal obstacles. Applying the Model Thus far this paper has conceptualized the development of multilateral intelligence cooperation and suggested how this development can be explained by the configuration of key state interests. Furthermore it has proposed reasons why and how the balance between 3 George Tsebilis , Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (Princeton New Jersey:

Princeton University Press, 2002) Explaining Intelligence Cooperation 3

these interests change. Last, it has discussed why cooperation does not always materialize, or develop according to plans, even if the relevant states may agree on its importance. The remaining part of this paper will use this model to explain multilateral intelligence cooperation as it has developed within Eu rope since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. A comparison will be made between intelligence cooperation in support of internal and external security respectively. Each chapter will start with an overview of current cooperation. The reason for this is pedagogical as well as analytical. An overview of intelligence cooperation can introduce a field that is not often subject to scholarly inquiry. An overview that focuses on aspects such as mandates, functions, decision making etc can also give hints about the key drivers, enablers and barriers at play. The overview is for each area (internal and external security) followed by a case study of specific developments with relevance for intelligence cooperation. The ambition here is to study not only what factors are at play, but also how they actually influence state interests and how they interact with each other. The focus of these case studies is on the process by which specific mechanisms link causes to effects. This part draws extensively on twenty-five personal interviews of executives and officials from the European intelligence community. The method is inspired by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett s thoughts about process tracing as well as Peter Hall s Systematic

Process Analysis.3 The chosen cases are Europol, and its development into a counter terrorism actor, and the Situation Centre, and its development towards a hub for strategic intelligence. The cases are parallel in time and constitute important processes with considerable consequences for European intelligence cooperation. The expectation is that this study with cross-case comparisons of within-case chronologies will deepen the understanding of multilateral intelligence cooperation in Europe. It will also offer a framework for comparing the role of intelligence within internal and external security respectively. 3 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences and Hall, Systematic process analysis: when and how to use it. 3

European Intelligence Cooperation in Support of Internal Security Within the internal security field, intelligence cooperation mostly concerns criminal and security intelligence. Criminal intelligence concerns law enforcement agencies and their work to stop criminal activity. The ultimate objective of criminal intelligence is to prove something, often after a crime is already committed. Security intelligence (sometimes referred to as domestic intelligence) is done by civilian or police security services whose job it is to alert or inform decision makers about impeding threats to society. Criminal and security intelligence, at least traditionally, deal with domestic, or internal, security problems. The criminal intelligence agencies and the security services of Europe have several forums for cooperation. Some of these are well integrated within the framework of the European Union while others function as freestanding venues. Within the EU, internal security is managed within the third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The following overview will briefly discuss cooperative venues within the JHA-area as well as arrangements outside of the EU which are relevant for the internal security of Europe. Overview Europol The most

important intelligence structure within this policy area is the European Police Office, or Europol. Thoughts of a European Police Office were introduced in the Maastricht Treaty3 much due to the strong advocacy of Germany s Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Member states eventually decided that Europol was to be based on a separate convention rather than a council decision. After a lengthy 3 Title VI, Article K.1 European Intelligence Cooperation in Support of Internal Security 3

process of negotiation and ratification, Europol was declared operational on July 1, 1999.3 The aim of the agency is to facilitate the work and cooperation of national authorities in the area of criminal intelligence and counter terrorism. By drawing together the intelli gence of member states, Europol s output, in Mller-Willes words, is hoped to add up to more than the sum of the input.3 Europol is run by employed staff and officers seconded by the member states. The officers communicate with the member states through national units. The direct exchange between domestic intelligence services within the EU is therefore moderate. As claimed in a WEU Parliamentary Report: Europol is run by the Ministers of Justice, it is not a centre for exchanges between intelligence services . 0 Europol has also hosted the Counter Terrorism Task Force which worked as a liaison office, bringing together national officers from police and intelligence services specializing in the fight against terrorism. 1 The Task Force is now part of Europol s First Response Network which works to assist member states after terrorist attacks. 2 The output of Europol s counter terrorism work has, however, been meager and many have questioned the agency s role as a counter terrorism actor. Indeed, many intelligence and security services

have denied Europol access to intelligence and thus have made its work difficult if not impossible. The Police Chiefs Task Force The Police Chiefs Task Force (PCTF) was founded in April 2000 and works closely with Europol to develop the contacts between heads of law-enforcing agencies within the EU. Although difficult to officially confirm, it is also thought to facilitate information exchange and closer international cooperation between law-enforcement 3 The member states plan to replace the Europol Convention with a Council decision in late 2008. The purpose is to facilitate further amendments of Europol s mandate and function due to new demands and challenges. Council of the European Union, April 5, 2008 3 Bjrn Mller-Wille, For Our Eyes Only?: Shaping an Intelligence Community Within the EU, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, European Union, 2004), 26. 0 WEU, document A/ 1775. 1 The European Commission, 12019/01, (September 20, 2001). 2 Europol, Annual Report 2007.

3

agencies. The PCTF was created at a session of the European Council, but remains outside the formal structures of the Council of the European Union. 3 One interviewee describes it as a rather odd, freestanding creation. At the start, the PCTF received administrative support from the General Secretariat of the Council; today, it relies on a unit within Europol to support its work. Terrorism Working Group Clearly located within the third pillar is the Terrorism Working Group (TWG). It is composed of representatives of national ministries of interior, law enforcement agencies, or security services, depending on the member state. This group meets three to five times per Presidency and deals with internal threat assessments, practical cooperation and coordination among EU bodies. Most of the intelligence shared in this forum relates to operations and arrests that have already taken place. One interviewee describes it as not very impressive: only information sharing, no strategic work, no policy output can be found. Another official with knowledge of its work concludes that the TWG has achieved very little . Once every presidency, the TWG meets with its equivalent body within the second pillar, COTER, and produces a joint report.

The Counter Terrorism Coordinator Following the Madrid bombings in March 2004, member states appointed Gijs de Vries to the new position of EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator. With a highly diverse job description, the chosen coordinator performed many tasks. He tried to reinforce the cooperation between the units in all three pillars, coordinate the work within the Council, oversee implementation and give visibility to 3 House of Lords, After Madrid: the EUs response to terrorism, . Author Interview June 22, 2006. The European Commission, 9791/04, (May 25, 2004). Author interview June 13, 2006 Author interview June 7, 2007, author interview June 17, 2008. European Council Decision, March 25, 2004. European Intelligence Cooperation in Support of Internal Security 3 (London: 2005), 25

EU counter terrorism measures. However, without providing him with a budget, staff, or possibility to propose legislation or enforce implementation 0 the Counter Terrorism Coordinator was left essentially on his own. When Gijs de Vries chose to step down prematurely in March 2007 it took almost six months before member states could agree on his replacement. Disagreements over what the Counter Terrorism Coordinator was supposed to achieve may have prompted de Vries to quit, and led to a delay in appointing his replacement. 1 Since September 19, 2007, Mr Gilles de Kerchove has held the position as EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator. Terrorism Focal Points Another coordinating body is the Terrorism Focal Points (TFP). The Terrorism Focal Points was introduced in the autumn of 2004 to increase cross-pillar coordination of the EU s counter terrorism work. 2 It is not an official Working Group, but an informal gathering of Brussels-based national representatives dealing with counter terrorism issues. 3 On occasion, the member states invite represen tatives from the Commission and the Joint Situation Center (see below) to take part in the meetings of the TFP. G Frustrated by the slow progress

toward operational goals within the EU, five larger EU member states decided in May 2003 to accelerate progress. Following an unsuccessful German attempt to upgrade the Schengen cooperation, France, Italy, Spain, Germany and the UK formed the G5 group. The aim was to work bilaterally on issues Gijs Vries de, EUs Response to Terror, in House of Lords (Brussels: 2004).

0 Daniel Keohane, The EU and Counter-terrorism, in CER publication (London: 2005). 1 Euractive, Euractive, September 19, 2007. 2 Lauri Lugna, Institutional Framework of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Policy Setting, Baltic Security and Defence Review 8 (2006). 3 According to several interviewees, Germany staunchly resisted a more formal fo rum since it perceived that such a development may thwart Europol s role as a focal po int for counterterrorism measures. Author interview June 7, 2007. 3

such as combating terrorism. The cooperation thus follows the logic of Enhanced Cooperation introduced in the Nice Treaty, even though it is pursued outside of the Treaty. In 2006 the G5 became the G6 when Poland was invited into the group. Club of Bern Working outside of formal EU structures, but no doubt in line with the goals of the JHA area, is the supposedly secret Club of Bern. The club was established in the early seventies and brought the heads of national security intelligence together. Today it functions as a forum for discussions and collaboration between officers at all levels of the involved agencies. The members of the club are composed of most EU countries and include Norway and Switzerland. The agenda is broad and covers all kinds of internal security measures, including counter espionage. The Club has, however, no institutional affiliation with the EU. The Counter Terrorism Group Also working outside of EU structures is the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG). Following the attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the member states wanted to step up cooperation between intelligence and security services. Some even suggested moving the Club of Bern into formal EU structures.

One of the effects of these ambitions was the establishment of the CTG which combines counter terrorism focused intelligence and security services of the EU with those of Norway and Switzerland. The membership is thus identical to that of the Club of Bern, but the group only treats issues concerning terrorism. The CTG meets twice every presidency; one meeting with high level participation Sandra Lavenex and William Wallace, Justice and Home Affairs. Towards a European Public Order ? , in Policy-Making In The European Union, ed. Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Mark. A. Pollack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). House of Lords, After Madrid: the EUs response to terrorism. William Shapcott, EUs Response to Terror, in House of Lords (Brussels: 2004). Author interview June 13, 2006. Shapcott, EUs Response to Terror. European Intelligence Cooperation in Support of Internal Security 0

and another one with desk officer level participation. 0 The group focuses on Islamic terrorism and is tasked to improve operational cooperation and prepare common threat assessments. 1 CTG started out feeding intelligence to the EU via national capitals, but since 2004 it channels intelligence directly into the Situation Center of the Council Secretariat (see below). Nevertheless, it is still a freestanding group and not a working group of the Council. Alliance Base Working outside of EU structures and without any connection to EU internal security policy but with some relevance for it is a secret Paris-based counter terrorism cell. In 2002 the French and US intelligence services set up a covert organization named Alliance Base. Bringing together case officers from the US, France, the UK, Germany, Canada and Australia, the cell analyzes the movements of suspected terrorists and plans counter terrorism operations. 2 The Alliance Base functions under the direction of a French general, using French as the working language, and thus downplays US involvement. It is said that the organization was behind many of the recent arrests and operations in Europe since September 11. 3 Case Study How Europol Became a Player in the

Counter Terrorism Field The birth of a policy field Prior to the intergovernmental conference (IGC) of 1991, which later led to the Maastricht Treaty, European

cooperation in the areas of criminal and security intelligence was handled through a variety of forums. The Club of Bern had, since 1971, brought together directors of security and intelligence agencies to handle questions 0 Author interview June 17, 2008. 1 BVD, Annual Report, (National Security Service of Netherlands, 2001), PET, Danish Security Intelligence Service www.pet.dk. 2 Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, Washington Post (November 2, 2005). 3 Ibid. 1

such as terrorism and counter espionage. Compared to the Club of Bern, the Trevi Group functioned more as a broad transgovernmental network. It was created in the aftermath of the 1972 Olympic atrocity in Munich, Germany. The aim of this group was to strengthen police cooperation in areas such as organized crime and terrorism by bringing together EU ministers of justice and ministers of the interior and by establishing standing working groups within these policy fields. Turnbull and Sandholtz argue that these long established venues should be seen primarily as facilitators for the continuation of good bilateral relations rather than as mechanisms to further institutionalization of multilateral cooperation in the EC . By the time the IGC kicked off, however, major events had altered state preferences. The success of the single market had not only paved the way for further integration, but also reflected the elimination of national barriers that had impeded the movement of people and goods. This took place at the same time as the fall of the iron curtain unleashed a flood of immigrants, a dynamic that Western countries feared would trigger new transnational organized crime and mafia problems. While other Western leaders may have been somewhat troubled by this development, for Germany s Chancellor Kohl it meant a domestic political crisis. Provoked by domestic terrorism as well as transnational crime, Kohl had already called for a European FBI in the late 1980s . In the IGC-negotiations, Kohl arrived with ambitious plans for institutionalized cooperation on criminal and security matters. Since those negotiations were focused primarily on European Monetary Union (EMU) and the creation of Kevin O Brien, France, in Europe Confronts Terrorism, ed. Karin von Hippels, (Basin gstoke: Palgrave, 2005), Mller-Wille, For Our Eyes Only?: Shaping an Intelligence Community Within the EU. John D. Occhipinti, The politics of EU police cooperation : toward a European F

BI? (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2003). WEU, A/ 1775. Penelope Turnbull and Wayne Sandholtz, Policing and Immigration: The Creation of New Policy Spaces, in The Institutionalization of Europe, ed. Stone Sweet (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 196. Ibid. Lavenex and Wallace, Justice and Home Affairs. Towards a European Public Order ? , 461. European Intelligence Cooperation in Support of Internal Security 2

a Common Foreign and Security Policy, discussions on Justice and Home Affairs were pushed into the background. With Germany supporting the full integration of JHA into the EU framework, the British government opposing such a development, and France being ambivalent, the outcome was a compromise. Existing networks and committees were formalized and included as a separate, intergovernmental, pillar in the EU structure, but they were left under strict member state control. 0 This new framework included working parties on terrorism, police cooperation and Europol, and was managed by a coordinating committee, the K.4 Committee , composed of senior officials from the interior and justice ministries of the member states. 1 When the Maastricht Treaty eventually entered into force on November 1, 1993, the full spectrum of Trevi activities and structures was institutionalized within the new policy field of Justice and Home Affairs. The establishment of Europol Thoughts about a European police office had been put forth by Chancellor Kohl and also discussed within the Trevi framework in the IGC leading up to the Maastricht agreement. While Kohl favored a real police force with executive police powers, other states like

the UK preferred a less supranational organization. The result was a European police organization, commonly referred to as Europol, tasked with information pooling and joint analysis. 2 The Maastricht Treaty specified police cooperation as an area of common interest for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime, including if necessary certain aspects of customs cooperation, in connection with the organization of a Union-wide system for exchanging information within a European Police Office . 3 Although the Maastricht agreement spelled out Europol s ambitions, there were still obstacles ahead. The sensitive tasks of Europol prompted mem 0 Lavenex and Wallace, Justice and Home Affairs. Towards a European Public Order ? ,

461. 1 The Treaty of Maastricht , art.K4, (1992), Occhipinti, The politics of EU poli ce cooperation : toward a European FBI?, 3 . 2 Occhipinti, The politics of EU police cooperation : toward a European FBI?, 35. 3 The Treaty of Maastricht, art.K.1 3

ber states to insist that before starting operations, the organization needed a clear legal framework for the protection of European citizens civil rights. While this was taking shape, a small branch of Europol was formed under the name of the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU). That body served in a limited capacity until the member states agreed on a legal framework and signed the Europol Convention, which entered into force on October 1, 1998. Europol was finally declared operational in June 1999. The long start-up phase for Europol meant that, when full activities formally commenced in 1999, its mandate had already expanded and exceeded the ambitions originally stated in the Maastricht agreement. Institutional revision Amsterdam to Nice

The framework for JHA cooperation codified in the Maastricht Treaty was complex and heavy by many standards. Two scholars suggest that the framework led to implementation problems of an institutional, procedural and substantive nature. Revisions made by the Amsterdam Treaty streamlined decision making in the JHA area generally, but had little effect on intelligence cooperation specifically. Other initiatives would, however, have a bearing on the effectiveness of intelligence cooperation. First, Europol s mandate was stretched to include terrorism. Already in 1995, when the Europol Convention was adopted, it was stated that Europol should initially work with other crimes such as

trafficking in humans and drugs. Within two years after the Convention had come into force, Europol was requested to start dealing with crimes committed or likely to be committed in the course of terrorist activities . Eager not to lose more time after the lengthy ratification process, particularly since the Amsterdam Treaty mentioned terrorism as a specific crime to be prevented in order to establish an area of freedom, security and justice , the European Roel Janssen, Europol begins operations, Europe (1996). Occhipinti, The politics of EU police cooperation : toward a European FBI?, 39. Turnbull and Sandholtz, Policing and Immigration: The Creation of New Policy Spaces, 217. Europol Convention. The Treaty of Amsterdam, art.K1 (1996) European Intelligence Cooperation in Support of Internal Security

Council in March 1998, decided to investigate the possibilities of letting Europol fight terrorist activities from day one. This development and other EU initiatives in the fight against terrorism were very much promoted by Spain which had long advocated more cooperation in the area. This pressure enabled the Council to decide in December of the same year that, as from the date of taking up its activities in accordance with Article 45(4) of the Europol Convention, Europol shall have the authority to deal with crimes committed or likely to be committed in the course of terrorist activities against life, limb, personal freedom or property. Europol was now charged with the task of fighting terrorism. Such a mandate set high standards for the influx of national security intelligence into the new body. As would later be evident, these standards were hardly ever met. By now

it was also clear that Europol and its mandate were the creation of a few states with strong interests. Other states had been less enthusiastic from the beginning and, in some cases, their attitude would prevail. Important steps were also taken at the European Council in Tampere 1999, such as the establishment of the Police Chiefs Task Force and Eurojust. Already in 1998, at the Council meeting in Vienna, an action plan was agreed upon to guide JHA policy towards the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice . Necessary institutional developments in support of this ambition were then decided upon in the JHA Council meeting in Tampere the following year. The Tampere Council also decided to empower the Commission as a watchdog for JHA programs. By way of a scoreboard, the Commission was to monitor implementation and progress with regards to the goals of the various action plans. 0 The next treaty

revision was agreed upon at the Nice Summit in December 2000. Although it had little direct influence on European intelligence cooperation, it did open up a possibility for new forms of collaboration. The member states had long since discussed the possibility of some states establishing closer cooperation in specific areas. Possibilities for such enhanced cooperation were decided upon in the Treaty of the European Union and were extended to all JHA areas in the Amsterdam treaty. Nevertheless, it took a mi Occhipinti, The politics of EU police cooperation : toward a European FBI?, 140. 0 Ibid., 86.

nimum of eight states to establish enhanced cooperation, and any state had the right to veto such initiatives. In the Nice Treaty, this veto right was abolished, making it possible for member states to engage in closer cooperation in the JHA field while still respecting the single institutional framework of the European Union. Terror and counter terrorism After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, a swiftly-summoned JHA Council took several key decisions to accelerate European intelligence co operation. Just after the attacks in the US, when it became clear that much of the planning had taken place in Europe, Europol director Jrgen Storbeck went public with his demands of EU member states: Simply provide us with what we need for our work: information . Storbeck further noted that if Europol is to do more than simply analyze data, then it must be better equipped . 1 The Europol director did not have to wait long for his calls to be answered. At the JHA Council meeting on September 20, 2001, JHA ministers urged the national police authorities and intelligence services to quickly transmit any relevant information on terrorism to Europol. Furthermore, the Council decided to set up, within Europol, a Counter

Terrorism Task Force (CTTF). The unit would be composed of officers from police and intelligence services who specialized in the fight against terrorism. 2 Their mission was to collect in a timely manner all relevant information and intelligence concerning the current threat and to analyse the collected information and undertake the necessary operational and strategic analysis . 3 The task force was set up for a renewable period of six months. Apart from strengthening Europol, the Council increased the activities of the Police Chiefs Task Force by requesting them to set up a meetings between national counter terrorism heads to improve operational cooperation and coordinate national policies. The Article 36 Committee was also asked to ensure the closest possible coordination between Europol, Pro-Eurojust and the Police Chiefs Task Force . 1 Quoted in Ibid., 149. 2 The European Commission, 3 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 12019/01.

European Intelligence Cooperation in Support of Internal Security

Finally, the Council stressed the value of increased cooperation between intelligence and security services. It was decided that the heads of these services should meet on a regular basis to intensify cooperation. This new group, at that time without any formal connection to the EU, became known as the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG, see above). The decisions taken at the September 20 JHA Council were endorsed the following day by Heads of State who convened for an extraordinary European Council. The Heads of State also adopted a comprehensive EU Action Plan to fight terrorism. This document was later followed by a Road Map , a continuously updated document that enumerated measures and initiatives in the fight against terrorism. Cooperative hazards At the following JHA council meeting, the Europol director was pleased to report member states increased willingness to share information with Europol. In the UK House of Commons, a British official reported that member states of the EU were committed to an increase of intelligence cooperation to combat terrorism and that this commitment was reflected in the Europol Director s recognition of the level of contributions offered by the police and intelligence services . Addressing the European Parliament at the end of the year, the Belgian minister of justice, Antoine Duquesne, praised the increased levels of data shared with Europol and the cooperation between member state intelligence and anti-terrorist services. This positive trend

would, however, be short-lived. Two months later, in February 2002, the same Belgian minister, Mr. Duquesne, questioned the value of Europol in the fight against crime. Europol s Annual Report for 2002 stated that its CT Task Force managed to deliver a number of well received products despite serious gaps in completeness and timeliness of the flow of information and intelligence . 0 In November the same year it was Angela Eagle, Written Answer, ed. House of Commons (2002). Ibid. Occhipinti, The politics of EU police cooperation : toward a European FBI?, 180. Ibid., 193. 0 Europol 2002, Annual Report.

decided that the newly established Counter Terrorism Task Force at Europol was to be dissolved as an independent unit and integrated into the general Europol structure. 1 According to scholar James Aldrich, one of the reasons for this was the reluctance of security services to share intelligence with Europol. 2 Evidence from practitioners support this view. An interviewee involved in EU criminal intelligence work notes, with some criticism, that the security services have another owner perspective on intelligence [than the criminal intelligence agencies] . 3 Even the European Commission, in its 2004 report on EU progress in the JHA area, notes that the in telligence services remain reluctant to accept Europol as a partner. These services had been cooperating for more than thirty years and were not interested in jeopardizing their investments. Madrid and beyond

Following the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004, EU leaders met and agreed on a Declaration on Combating Terrorism , urging member states to strengthen the role of Europol in the fight against terrorism by reinforcing its counter terrorism capacities and reactivating