33

Justyna Gotkowska

SITTING ON THE FENCESWEdISh dEfENcE PoLIcy ANd thE BALtIc SEA REGIoN

NUMBER 33WARSAWAPRIL 2013

SITTING ON THE FENCESWEdISh dEfENcE PoLIcy ANd thE BALtIc SEA REgIoN

Justyna gotkowska

© copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / centre for Eastern Studies

content editorsolaf osica, Anna Kwiatkowska-drożdż

EditorAnna Łabuszewska

co-operationKatarzyna Kazimierska

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figures: Wojciech Mańkowski

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ISBN 978-83-62936-23-6

Contents

KEy PoINtS /5

INtRodUctIoN /8

I. fRoM NEUtRALIty to NoN-ALIgNMENt /10

II. fRoM dEfENdINg tERRItoRy to ExPEdItIoNARy MISSIoNS /14

III. SWEdEN dEcLARES SoLIdARIty /17

IV. SWEdEN’S dEfENcE PoLIcy IN cRISIS /20

V. SWEdEN’S dILEMMAS /26

VI. SWEdISh dEfENcE PoLIcy ANd thE BALtIc SEA REgIoN /32

APPENdIcES /36

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Key Points

• FromSweden’spointofviewof,thepost-ColdWarstrategictimeout in Europe is coming to an end. The internationalenvironmentisrevertingtoaconditioninwhichtheuseofforceamongstates,includingcountriesintheBalticSeare-gion, isno longeran improbable scenario.Swedenbelievesthatcrisesorconflictsthatcoulddirectlyorindirectlyaffectthecountrymightpotentiallyoccur inNorthernEurope inthefuture.

Thisperceptionstemsfrom:(1)risinguncertainty inNorth-ernEurope(theBalticSeaandHighNorthregions)wherenewpossibilities are emerging for extraction and transportationofenergyresources,maritime transportandfishing; (2) thereformsandmodernisationofRussia’sArmedForces,andtheloweringofthecountry’sthresholdfortheuseofforceinitsimmediateneighbourhood.

• Inthiscontext,thetransformationsofSweden’sdefencepol-icyoverthelasttwentyyearshavebecomeaproblemforthecountry.Swedenhasmovedfromneutrality,i.e.non-involve-mentonanysideofarmedinterstateconflicts, tonon-align-ment,wherebyitremainsoutsidemilitaryalliancesandfreelydecidesitspoliciesduringwartime.Thosechanges,combinedwiththeintegrationintheregionandSweden’saccessiontotheEUin1995,aswellasthecountry’slimitedcapabilitiestodefenditsownterritory,haveresultedintheneedforSwedentoseekanewformulaforitsmilitarysecurity.

The2009unilateraldeclarationofsolidaritywiththeNor-dicandEUstates,whichalsospeltoutSweden’sexpectationofsolidarityfromthosecountriesintheeventofanaturaldisaster or armed attack affecting Sweden, is politicallyandmilitarily only an illusory solution to Sweden’s secu-ritydilemma.

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• TherealchoicethatSwedenfacesisbetweenmaintainingthestatusofanon-alignedstateandconsiderably increasing itsdefencespendingontheonehand,andjoiningNATOontheother;eventhoughotherproposals,suchasevolutionofNor-dicorSwedish-Finnishco-operationtowardsamilitaryalli-ance,havealsobeenraisedinpublicdebateinSweden.

Noneofthesolutionsproposedissimpleorpracticableforthecurrentconservative-liberalgovernment.InthecomingyearsSwedenwillprobablyremainoutsideNATO,makesomead-justmentstoitsmilitaryreformsandslightlyincreaseitsde-fencespending(whichcurrentlystandsataround1.1%ofGDP,orUS$6.2billion).ThecountrywillcontinuetodevelopNordicco-operation(evenifsomelimitationsareplacedonthis),andwillworkclosertogetherwithNATO.

• ThechangesinSweden’sdefencediscourseandpolicymaybeconducive to strengthening security in theBaltic Sea region.Closer political andmilitary co-operation in the regionmayserve as a preventative and deterrent measure, and enableafasterandbetterco-ordinatedresponseintheeventofacrisis.

Politically, Sweden’s perception of the geopolitical changesintheBalticSeaandtheHighNorthregionsmaystrengthenthose voiceswithin NATO (and evenwithin the EU)whichhavebeenwarningabout thegrowing instabilityandpossi-bilityofcrisesintheperipheriesofNATOandtheEU.FormatssuchastheNorthernGroupofferopportunitiesforenhancedregionalsecurityco-operation.

In themilitarydimension,Swedenwill seek to improve theinteroperabilitybetweenitsArmedForcesandNATO,forex-ample by participating in theNATO Response ForcewithintheConnectedForcesInitiative.Co-operationmayalsoextendtosafeguardingenergyandcyber-security,aswellasthese-curityofcriticalinfrastructuresinthoseareas.

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• TheNordicstatesareSweden’smainpartnersformilitaryco--operationwithregardtobothtraining&exercisesaswellasarmamentandmilitaryequipment co-operation.Toa lesserextent, the changes in Swedish discoursewill contribute tothedevelopmentofbilateraldefenceco-operationwithcoun-triesoutsidethisgroup.PolandisnotoneofSweden’sprior-itypartnersformilitaryco-operation,andisseenbySwedenmainlyasaNATOmemberintheregion.

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introduction

Sweden’s defence policy has undergone profound changes overthe lasttwentyyears.Fortwocenturies,orsincetheendoftheNapoleonicwars,Swedenpursuedapolicyofneutrality,thatis,non-involvementinarmedinterstateconflicts.Italsomaintaineda considerable capacity todefendcountry’s territory.As the se-curity environment changed – after the break-up of the SovietUnion,theaccessionofCentralEuropeancountriestotheEUandNATO,andSweden’sownaccessiontotheEUin1995–thecoun-trygraduallystartedtotransformitsdefencepolicy.Inthe1990sitgaveupneutralityanddeclared itselfanon-alignedstate, i.e.one thatremainedoutsidemilitaryalliancesandfreelydecidedits policies in wartime. Sweden started to perceive the tradi-tionalthreatstostatesecurityasnolongerbeingrelevant,whilethechallengesposedbyglobalphenomenasuchas terrorismorcrisesinfailedstatesgainedmoreprominence.Adaptingtothisnewsituation,Swedenreformeditsarmedforcestomakethemcompatiblewithitspolicyofactiveparticipationininternationalcrisismanagement.TheresultwasthattheSwedishmilitary’sca-pabilitytodefenditsnationalterritory,whichpreviouslyconsti-tutedoneof thepillarsofSweden’sneutralityandsecurity,hasbeendiminished.

Nowadays,theSwedishgovernmentperceivesthatthepost-ColdWarstrategictimeoutiscomingtoanend,andthesecurityen-vironment is reverting to a condition inwhich theuse of forceamongcountriesinEuropeisnolongeranimprobablescenario.Notingthedecliningstabilityofitsregion,Swedenadoptedadoc-trineof‘solidarity’withtheNordicandEUstatesin2009,whichalsoexpressedanexpectationofassistancefromthosecountriesifSwedencameunderthreat.TheSwedishgovernmentdeclaredthatthesecurityofSwedenandtheregionwouldbebuiltupinsolidarityandinterdependencewiththestatesnamedinthedec-laration(ineffect,meaningNATO).However,recentstatementsbyNATOrepresentativeshavecalledthelegitimacyofthispolicy

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intoquestionand,togetherwithrecentanalyseswhichhavere-vealedtheSwedishArmedForces’limitedcapabilitytodefendthecountryresultedinSwedenhavingtoseekanewformulaforitsmilitarysecurity.

The doctrine of neutrality, to which Sweden adhered until theearly1990s,hasbecomeanelementofnationalidentitysodeeplyheldby thepublicandsectionsof thepoliticalclass that itnowlimitsSweden’sroomformanoeuvrewithregardtoitspotentialaccessiontoNATO.Consideringtheneedtoconsolidatepublicfi-nances,whichmayputsomelimitsonincreasingdefencespend-ing in thecomingyears,Swedennowfacesa seriouschallenge:howcanitguaranteethemilitarysecurityofthestateinadete-rioratingregionalsecurityenvironment?AndwhatconsequencescouldthechangesinSweden’sdefencediscourseandpolicyhaveforsecurityandco-operationintheBalticSearegion?

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i. From neutrality to non-alignment

Datingbackto 1812,Swedishneutralitymeantneutralityduringwartime: itwas not stipulated in international agreements, butstemmed from the government’s unilateral declaration, as wellasitsconsistentforeignandsecuritypolicyinwartime(inotherwords,itwasdifferentfromtheconstantneutralityofAustriaorSwitzerland,andmorecloselyresembledtheneutralityofFinlandorIreland)1.TheprimaryobjectivewastoprotectSwedenfrombe-comingentangledinwaroperations.Indeed,itsdeclaredneutral-ityhasensuredpeaceforSwedenforthelasttwocenturies,andinadditionhasbecomeoneofthedefiningelementsofSwedishna-tionalidentity.However,thedoctrineofneutralityhasalsobeentreatedasaninstrumentofSweden’sbroadersecuritypolicy.Suc-cessiveSwedishgovernmentsbasedtheirpoliciesontherhetoricofneutralitywhilepragmaticallyadaptingtothechallengesposedbytheworldaroundthem.Theywerepronetomakecompromisesthatseriouslydentedthedoctrineofneutrality,butwereeffectiveinkeepingSwedenawayfromwartheatres2.DuringWorldWarII,SwedenmanagedtoavoidGermanoccupationatthepriceofpoliti-calandeconomicconcessionstotheThirdReich3.

1 Neutralstatesmakeacommitmentthatduringwartimetheywillnotallowanypassageoftroops,armsorfoodtransportsviatheirlandterritory;anyuseoftheirairspacebymilitaryaircraftofthestatesatwarforpassage,observationoftroopsmovementsormilitaryoperationsintheirairspace;theestablishmentofoperatingbasesintheirterritorialwatersbythestatesatwar, or the use of their ports by such states’warships. SeeRemigiuszBierzanek,JanuszSymonides,Prawomiędzynarodowepubliczne,Warsaw2005,p.436-440.

2 DanielaSchüngel,SchwedensSicherheitspolitikimWandel.Zwischenmil-itärischerAllianzfreiheit,NATOundESVP,HSFK-Report14/2005,HessischeStiftungFriedens-undKonfliktforschung,FrankfurtamMain2005,p.4-6.

3 Swedensuppliedhigh-qualityironoretotheThirdReich,covering40%ofGermanindustry’sneedsduringWorldWarII.Italsopermittedthetrans-portofWehrmachttroopsviaitsterritory(around17,000Wehrmachtsol-dierscrossedSwedenduringtheinitialphaseofOperationBarbarossa,andlater Swedenwould allowGerman soldiers on leave to cross its territoryontheirwayfromNorwaytoGermany).SeeTonyJudt,Powojnie.HistoriaEuropyodroku1945,Poznań2010,p.108.

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during the cold War, sweden also declared itself to be a neu-tral state.Theaimwas toavoid involvement inapossiblecon-frontationbetweenNATOandtheWarsawPact,andtoimprovestabilityinNorthernEuropebymaintainingtheso-calledNordicbalance4.Whiledeclaringthatitpossessedsufficientcapacitytodefendthecountry independently, theSwedishMinistryofDe-fenceneverthelesscovertlyadmittedthatthechancesofavoidinginvolvementinwaroperationsinEuropewereslim,andthatintheeventofwar,theonlywaytoavoidaSovietoccupationwouldbe to quickly obtain assistance from theWest. Therefore, suc-cessive Swedish governments covertly co-operated with NATOmemberstates,inordertoensureassistanceforSwedenfromtheAlliance’sair forces ifneeded5.Moreover, itsstatusasaneutralstateallowedSwedentopositionitselfasanimpartialmediatorinconflictsandcrisestheworldover,anditsactivepolicieswithintheUnitedNations strengthened its internationalposition.TheSweden’spolicyofneutralityappliedtoclassicarmedinterstateconflictsbutnottoUNpeaceoperations.

the end of the cold War changed the fundamental circum-stances of sweden’s defence policy.Thegeopoliticalchangesinthe region and the integration of Central European stateswiththeEUandNATO,aswellasSweden’sownaccessiontotheEu-ropeanUnionin1995hadaconsiderableimpactonthecountry’ssecuritypolicy.Swedenfoundthetraditionalsecuritythreatstoitsowncountryandtheregiontonolongerberelevant.Itadoptedabroaddefinitionofnationalsecurityinwhichthefocuswason

4 The ‘Nordic balance’ during theColdWarwas intended to ensure stabil-ityandsecurityforNorthernEurope,withDenmarkandNorwayasNATOmemberswho,nevertheless,pursuedstrictpolicieswithregardtothees-tablishmentofNATOmilitarybasesandstorageofnuclearweaponsintheirterritory during peace,with Sweden as a neutral state andwith FinlandconnectedwiththeSovietUnionbythe1948Finnish-Soviettreaty.

5 Asdemonstratedbya 1994reportof the so-calledNeutralityCommissionap-pointedbytheSwedishparliamenttoexaminetheneutralitypolicyduringtheColdWar.SeeOlofSantesson,Neutralitetspolitikenipraktiken,inKungl Krigs-vetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift,issue1,Stockholm2012,p.157-160.

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challengesposedbyglobalphenomenasuchasterrorismorcrisesin failed states. Inaccordancewith thisdefinition,sweden be-cameactive in international crisis management.Arelativelysmallandperipheralcountry,Swedenhasbeenusingthisactiv-itytobuildupanimageofitselfasastatewithamuchstrongerpositionandinfluence(bothintheEUandglobally)thanthesizeoftheSwedishstate,economyorpopulationwouldsuggest.Sincethe 1990s, Sweden has pursued this crisis management policywithin the frameworkprovidedbyNATO,and lateralsoby theEU,whichlargelyreplacedthecountry’soriginalpracticeofpar-ticipatinginUNmissions.SwedenjoinedNATO’sPartnershipforPeaceprogrammein1994.IttookpartinNATO’sIFORandSFORoperations in theBalkans in the 1990s.Currently it is stillpar-ticipatinginNATO’sKFORoperationinKosovoandinISAFinAf-ghanistan.ItwasalsoactivelyinvolvedintheUnifiedProtectoroperationinLibyain2011.FromSweden’spointofview,itisNATOthatoffersthemostdevelopedcommandstructuresandcapabili-tiestocarryoutmilitarycrisismanagementoperations.

The endof theColdWar alsomarked thebeginning ofsweden’s shift away from the policy of neutrality.In1992theSwedishpar-liamentadoptedadoctrineofnon-alignment,underwhichSwedenwouldstayoutofmilitaryalliances,andwhichmadeneutralityintheeventofwarjustoneoftheoptionsavailabletotheSwedishgov-ernment. Further evolutionofSweden’spolicywas influencedbytheprogressofpoliticalandeconomicintegrationinEuropeandintheregion,andthedebatesonthe‘solidarityclause’andthe‘defenceclause’,firstmentionedduringworkontheEUconstitutionaltrea-ty,andultimatelyembodiedintheTreatyofLisbon6.Thenotionof‘neutrality’graduallydisappearedfromtherhetoricoftheSwedishgovernmentandofficialdocuments,andthe2004securitystrategy

6 Althoughunderthe ‘defenceclause’ (Art.42(7)) theprovisionsonaidandassistancebyallmeans in thecountries’power in theeventof anarmedaggressiononanyMemberStateoftheEU“shallnotprejudicethespecificcharacterofthesecurityanddefencepolicyofcertainMemberStates”,thatis,includingSweden.

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stated:“ItishardtoimaginethatSwedenwouldstayneutralintheeventofanarmedattackagainstanotherEUmemberstate”7.

TheactivitiesofRussiaintheNordic-Balticregion(theresumptionof strategic bomberflights in theHighNorth, cyber-attacks andprotestsovertheremovaloftheBronzeSoldiermonumentinEs-tonia)triggeredaprocessofre-evaluations of sweden’s security policy. However, the psychological breakthrough occurred onlywiththerussian-georgian war of 2008,whichcameasashocktoSweden.Thecountrystartedtoattachagreatersignificancetothechangestakingplaceinitsneighbourhood(so-callednärområdet),especiallyintheregionsoftheBalticSeaandtheHighNorthin-cludingtheBarentsSeaandtheArctic.IntheBalticSearegion,thevolumeofenergyresourcetransportsisincreasing(NordStream,LNG,oil),andthereispotentialfordestabilisationinEstoniaandLatvia,duetothesestates’largeRussian-speakingminorities,andthroughouttheregionduetopossibleRussianreactionstothede-velopmentofNATO’smissiledefencesystem.IntheHighNorth,ontheotherhand,newpossibilitiesareopeningupfortheextractionand transportation of energy resources, for maritime transportandforfishing.Inthiscontext,theriseofRussia’spowerambitions,thereformoftheRussianArmedForces,theloweringofthethresh-oldfortheuseofforcebyRussiaandthemodernisationofRussia’smilitarypotentialintheKaliningradoblast(airandmissiledefencesystems,aprospectivemissilesystem)andintheKolaPeninsulaareasourceofconcern.Sweden’s2009securitystrategynotesthatwhileadirectarmedattackagainstSwedenorothercountriesintheregionisunlikely,onecannotruleouttheemergenceofcrisesinthefutureinwhichmilitarymeasuresmaybeusedeitherintheregion,oragainstSwedendirectly8.

7 GunilaHerolf,SwedenandESDP, inKlausBrummer(ed.),TheNorthandESDP.TheBalticStates,Denmark,FinlandandSweden,BertelsmannStif-tung,GuterslohJune2007.

8 Swedish government, Regeringens proposition 2008/2009:140, Ett an-vändbart försvar, 19 March 2009, http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/12/29/57/853ca644.pdf

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ii. From deFending territory to exPeditionary missions

Theshiftfromneutralitytonon-alignment,combinedwithapol-icyofactiveinternationalinvolvement,wasaccompaniedbyre-formsaimedattransformingtheSwedishArmedForcesintoanexpeditionaryforce.Asaresultofthis,however,theSwedishmil-itary’scapabilitiestodefenditsterritorywerediminished.

during the cold War, whileSwedenremainedneutral,thecoun-tryhadtobuild up capabilities to independently defend its ter-ritory againstpotentialarmedaggression.IntheeventofawarinEurope,WarsawPactforceswouldhavegainedmostbyquicklyseizingSwedishterritoryandmovingitsarmiestonorthernandsouthernNorway.TheSwedishArmedForcesthereforehadtobestrongenoughtodefendSweden’sneutrality(inreality,pendingthe arrival of assistance fromNATO). This requiredmaintain-ing largearmedforcesanduniversalconscription,considerabledefence capabilities, and independence from external suppliesof armament andmilitary equipment. Sweden also applied theconcept of so-called total defence,which involved civilian bod-iesindefenceofthecountry.WhileSwedendidparticipateinUNoperationsduringtheColdWar,thesewereverylow-priorityincomparisonwithdefendingthecountry,fromthepointofviewofthedevelopmentofthearmedforces.

after the end of the cold War, Sweden stuckwith the armedforcesmodel focusedondefending its territoryuntil theendofthe1990s,as,accordingtoitsanalysts,futuredevelopmentsinthepost-SovietareaandtheBalticstatesseemeduncertain.Butafter1999,whentheCentralEuropeancountriesbecameNATOmem-bers, theBaltic stateswereon theirway towardsaccessionandbothgroupsofstateswerenegotiatingtheiraccessiontotheEu-ropeanUnion,Swedendeclaredastrategictimeout.Itstartedtoreducethesizeofitsarmedforces,madecutsindefencespendingandlaunched military reforms.Thefirstphaseofthosereforms

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tookplaceintheyears2000–2004,andwereaimedprimarilyatreducingtroopnumbers.ImplementingtheobjectiveslaiddownintheDefenceDecisionof20049,theSwedishMinistryofDefencestarted the second phase of transformation,which lasted from2005 to2009,andwereclearlyaimedat transforming theSwe-dishArmedForcesinlinewiththeexpeditionary force model.Thesereformswereaimedatgivingthearmedforcescapabilitytocarryout tasks in internationaloperations,whiledefencetaskswereregardedasbeingofsecondaryimportance.TheEU’sNor-dicBattleGroup(NBG)createdatthattime,ofwhichSwedenhasbeentheframeworknationsince2008,providedaninstrument(andablueprint) for the transformation10.Apart fromreducingthenumberoftroops, thetransformationwasalsoaimedatex-panding theSwedishArmedForces’ capability to participate inmilitaryco-operation,andthustoenhancetheirinteroperabilityinEU,NATOandUNmissions.SwedenalsostartedtostepupitsinvolvementintrainingandexerciseswithinNATOandtheEU,aswellasinbilateralandmultilateralformats11.

the russian-georgian war of august 2008 prompted swe-dish politicians to revise their thinking about the strate-gic timeout. In the 2009DefenceDecision12, the Swedish gov-ernment put the task of safeguarding territorial integrity and

9 DefenceDecision (Försvarsbeslut):a securitystrategyadoptedby theSwe-dishgovernmentandparliamenteveryfourtofiveyears,theprovisionsofwhichconstituteguidelinesfortheimplementationofsecurityanddefencepoliciesandreformofthearmedforces.

10 TheNBGisdeployedonaregularbasis;ithaditsfirsttourofdutyin2008,thenin2011,andisplannedtobeondutyagainin2015.TheSwedishcontri-butiontotheNBGconsistof1600troops(ofatotalof2200).TheNBGalsoincludesFinland,Estonia,IrelandandNorway.

11 SpeechbyGeneralSverkerGöranson,theSupremeCommanderoftheSwe-dishArmedForces,attheNationalDefenceAcademyinBeijing,20May2012,http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/upload/dokumentfiler/tal/2012/120320%20NDU%20Peking.pdf

12 Swedish government, Regeringens proposition 2008/2009:140, Ett an-vändbart försvar, 19 March 2009, http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/12/29/57/853ca644.pdf

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political sovereigntyonaparwithparticipation incrisisman-agementoperations.Traditionalthreatsandnewtypesofchal-lenges(suchascyber-security)weregivenmoreprominenceinthe broad definition of national security, and Sweden’s neigh-bourhood (närområdet)wasmade themain frameof reference.ThegovernmentalsoobligatedtheArmedForcestoresumede-fenceplanning,whichhadbeenabandonedseveralyearsbefore13.Atthesametime,however,thepreviousplansforthetransfor-mationof themilitarydidnotundergoanymajoradjustments.Areformprogramwasproposedfortheyears2010–2014,whoseprovisionsincludedtheprofessionalisationoftheArmedForcesasofJuly2010.Thesechanges,introducedinthedirectaftermathof theRussian-Georgianwar,concernedsupplyingmorearma-mentandmilitaryequipment to several reserveunits, and thereintroductionasof2013offourregionalcommands(dissolvedinthe1990s),whosetaskwastocarryoutjointoperationsandco--ordinate military and civilian activities in the individual re-gionsofSweden.

13 KarinEnström,Smonteradenedförsvaret,Dalarnas Tidningar,23January2013, http://www.dt.se/opinion/kronikor/1.5508508-s-monterade-ned-for-svaret

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iii. sWeden declares solidarity

Theconsequenceof increased intraregional links, the transfor-mationoftheSwedishmilitaryintoanexpeditionaryforce,andthe perceived deterioration of regional security led to the revi-sionofSweden’ssecuritypolicyanditsbreakwiththetraditionofnon-involvementand independence in itsdefencepolicy.ThetextoftheDefenceDecisionfor2010-2014adoptedinMarch2009includeda‘declaration of solidarity’. InthatdocumentSwedenunilaterallydeclaredthatitwouldnotremainpassiveintheeventofa“disasterorarmedaggression”affectingoneoftheEUmem-bersoraNordicstate(i.e.NorwayorIceland),andthatitexpectedthosecountriestodothesame.ThedeclarationfurtherstipulatedthattheSwedishArmedForceshadtobepreparedtogiveandre-ceivemilitaryassistance.TheSwedishgovernmentdeclaredthatSweden’s securitywould be founded on solidarity and interde-pendencewiththecountriesmentioned(de factomeaningNATO),andthatanarmedattackagainstonecountryintheregionwouldinfactmeanitsneighboursbecominginvolvedintheconflict.

sweden’s declaration was both an expression of geopolitical necessity and an attempt to solve the problem of ensuring the country’s security in the face of perceived rising instability in the region. Ontheonehand,the‘declarationofsolidarity’(orinfact‘non-passivity’)amountedtorecognitionoftheactualstateofaffairs.ItisunlikelythatpoliticalconsiderationswouldallowSwedentoadoptaneutralpositionintheeventofanarmedattackon anotherNordic or EU country. Likewise, itwould behardlypossibleforSwedentostandasideinsuchacaseduetomilitaryconsiderations.InthescenariosofpossiblecrisesandconflictsinNorthernEuropewhichSwedishanalystshadconsidered(suchasaconflictbetweentheBalticStatesandRussia)14,NATO’sactions

14 Karlis Neretnieks, Military-Strategic Options, in Bo Hugemark (ed.),FriendsinNeed.TowardsaSwedishStrategyofSolidaritywithherNeigh-bours,Stockholm2012,p.175-220.

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intheregionwouldrequireSwedentomakeavailableitsairspace,territorialwatersorland.Ontheotherhand,theexpectationofsolidarityfromtheotherNordicandEUstateswasequallyimpor-tantfortheSwedishgovernment,becausethetransformationofitsmilitaryintoanexpeditionaryforceanditsgrowinginvolve-mentinforeignoperationshadresultedinSweden’sdiminishedcapabilitiestodefenditsterritory.

sweden’s adoption of the ‘declaration of solidarity’ coincided with a stepping-up of military co-operation with the nordic states and nato in northern europe.

Exercises by individual branches of the armed forces have be-comeanimportantelementofthenordic defence co-operation (NORDEFCO) launched in 2009. This particularly concerns theairforces:exerciseshavetakenplaceintheHighNorth(involv-ing Sweden, Norway and Finland); exerciseswill take place insouthernSwedenandnorthernDenmark(involvingSwedenandDenmark,asagreedinNovember2012)15;andSwedenalsoplansto participate (togetherwith Finland) in cooperationwithNor-wayinNATO’sIcelandicAirPolicingandSurveillancemission16.ThoseactivitiesareaimedatincreasingSweden’sinteroperabilitywithitsneighbours(NATOmembers)whoshareitsunderstand-ingofsecuritychallenges,andtostrengthentheregion’sdefencecapabilitiesandthepotential‘Nordicsolidarity’intheeventofanexternalthreat.

15 NORDEFCO,Cross-bordercooperation,27December2012,www.nordefco.org16 SwedenandFinlandagreedtoparticipate,inco-operationwithNorway,

in the surveillance of Iceland’s air space, but not in policing it; that is,theywill not intercept aircraft violating Icelandic air space. In SwedenandFinland,thedecisionisreferredtoasthedevelopmentoftheNordicairforceexerciseprogrammeandaspartofNordicco-operation,ratherthanparticipationinaNATOmission,andconsequentlytheSwedishandFinnishfighteraircraftwillprobablybeunarmed.This‘exercise’issched-uledforthefirstquarterof2014.

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Swedenhasalsostartedtostepupitsinvolvement in nato ex-ercises and operations.While thedevelopmentofmilitaryco-operation (in thebeginning involving theSwedishArmyalone)had originally been aimed at improving interoperability withaview to takingpart in foreignoperations, after2009regionalcollaboration increasingly became the point of reference. TheSwedishArmedForcesstartedto takepartmore frequently inPartnershipforPeaceandNATOexercisesintheregion,forex-ample,inLoyalArrowinSwedenin2009,NRFBrilliantMari-nerin2010,BalticRegionalTrainingEventintheBalticStatesin2011and2012,andtheCMXcrisismanagementexercisesin2011and2012.TheSwedishNavyandAirForcealsostartedtotakepartinEUandNATOoperations:theNavyjoinedtheoperationintheHornofAfricain2009,andtheAirForcetookpartintheoperationinLibyain2011.Co-operationwithNATOwasseenasawaytodevelopinteroperabilitywiththeforcesofNATOmem-bersandtheNATOcommandstructures.Swedentreatedthisasaninvestmentin‘jointdefencecapabilities’.Itwasalsoexpect-edtoraisepoliticalcapitalforSwedenwithinNATOandintheUnitedStates,andinthiswaygainadditionalguaranteesforthecountry’s security despite Swedennot being aNATOmember.Because of its active involvement in co-operationwithNATO,Swedenevenstartedtobedubbed“NATO’spartnernumberone”or“Allytwenty-nine”17.

17 Ann-SofieDahl, Partner number one orNATO ally twenty-nine. SwedenandNATOpost-Libya,ResearchPaperNo.82,NATODefenseCollege,Sep-tember2012,http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1

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iV. sWeden’s deFence Policy in crisis

nevertheless, the ‘declaration of solidarity’ began to be per-ceived in sweden as an illusory solution to the problem of ensuring military security. InthecontextofthereformoftheRussianArmedForcesandRussia’sespionageactivitiesinNorth-ernEurope,Swedishanalystsstartedtolookintothedefenceca-pabilitiesoftheSwedishArmedForces,itsabilitytogiveandre-ceivemilitaryassistance,andthepoliticalcredibilityofthepolicyof solidarity. Their conclusions reveal an ambivalent picture ofthemilitary.TheauditoftheArmedForces’abilitytoaccomplishtheir tasks,whichwascarriedout in2012byanalysts fromtheRoyalSwedishAcademyofWarSciences,presentsadualpicture18.

The transformation into an expeditionary force capable of re-sponding flexibly to various kinds of challenges in crisisman-agementoperations,whichhasbeenunderwayforseveralyears,isgenerallyregardedtohavebeenasuccess.sweden currently possesses a military force that can be deployed on foreign missions, and has both high-quality armament and military equipment and well-trained troops. This was demonstratedbySweden’sparticipationinforeignmissions:itsArmyhasbeendeployedinAfghanistanaspartofNATO’sISAF,itsNavyintheHornofAfricaaspartoftheEU’sAtalantaoperation,anditsAirForceinLibyaaspartofNATO’sUnifiedProtectoroperation.Theanalystsconcludedthatthedirectionofchange,towardsasmall-er and technologicallymore advancemilitary,was in principlecorrect,inthecontextofthetransformationsoftheneighbouringcountries’armedforces.

18 BjörnAnderson(ed.),Kanviförsvaraoss? (Canwedefendourselves?),Re-portpreparedaspartoftheproject‘SecurityofSwedenbeyond2014’carriedoutbytheRoyalAcademyofWarSciences(KKrVA),Stockholm2012;Kar-lisNeretnieks,Military-StrategicOptions, inBoHugemark (ed.), FriendsinNeed. Towards a Swedish Strategy of Solidaritywith herNeighbours,Stockholm2012,p.175-220.

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Atthesametime,however,seriousdoubts have been expressed about the swedish armed Forces’ ability to fulfil tasks re-lated to defending sweden’s territory and carry out effec-tive operations in the event of crises or conflicts in the re-gion. Firstly, research by the Royal Academy ofWar Sciences19showed thatwhile theSwedishArmedForceswereprepared toco-operatewithNATOincaseoflow-intensitycrises,theywouldfacemounting problems as the crises escalated, for instance ifSwedishterritoryweretobeusedtoestablishbasesforaNATOoperationtosupporttheBalticstates,andSwedenfacedtheriskof a pre-emptive strike from Russia aimed at creating politicalpressureand/ordestroyingmilitaryinfrastructures.InthecaseoftheArmy,theproblemsincludetheabsenceofmedium-rangeair (andmissile) defence systems, and difficultieswith deploy-ingalargernumberofadequatelytrainedpersonnel.TheuseoftheNavy (forexample, toescort largerunits)wouldbe limited,asSwedishcorvetteslacksystemsofairdefence.TheoperationsoftheAirForce,Sweden’sbiggestasset,wouldbelimitedbytheabsenceoflong-rangeairtosurfacemissiles(andtheneedtotakeoverthetasksofmedium-rangeland-basedairdefencesystems).EventhoughSwedenhasbeenworkingtogetherwithNATO,co--operationandco-ordinationbetweentheSwedishArmedForcesandNATOforcesonSwedishterritoryandbeyondcouldalsoposeproblems.Besides,theSwedishArmedForceshavetoofewunitstodefendthecountry’sterritoryindependentlyoveranextendedperiodoftime,anddonothaveallthenecessaryarmamentandmilitaryequipment.Intheeventofanisolatedpre-emptivestrikeagainstSwedishterritory(suchasononeof themajorcities,orastrategicallyimportantregionsuchasGotland),designedtoim-pairSweden’sandNATO’smilitarypotentialintheregion,Swe-denwouldnotbeabletodefenditselfoveranextendedperiodoftime, andwouldhave to relyonexternal assistance. InDecem-ber2012,GeneralSverkerGöranson,SupremeCommanderoftheSwedishArmedForces,confirmedasmuchwhenhesaidthatin

19 BjörnAnderson(ed.),op. cit.

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theeventofalimitedarmedattack,Swedenwouldbeabletode-fenditselfforaweek,andeventhatonlyasof2019,whenallthebranchesoftheArmedForcesbecomefullyoperationalafterthecurrentreform20.

the causes of this state of affairs include excessive cuts to the size of the armed Forces over the last ten years (seeAppendix1), and the recent abolition of universal conscription and the professionalisation of the military, whichcurrentlyresultsinpersonnelshortages. Inaccordancewiththestatedobjectivesoftherecentreform,Sweden’sArmyistoachievethefullnumberoftroopsandthetargetleveloftrainingonlyin2019.Meanwhile,a report by Sweden’s Riksrevisionen, the national audit office,showsthattheSwedishAirForceandNavyarestrugglingwithlong-termstructuralproblemswithmanning theirunits, espe-ciallythecombatunits21.Furthermore,theArmedForcesareun-derfinancedwhich,accordingtotheSupremeCommander,mayin future even result in Sweden giving up one of the branchesof itsArmedForces22.Afteraperiodofdecliningmilitaryspen-ding,Swedenstartedtoexpanditsdefencebudgetin2009.Mili-taryspending isexpected toslightly increase inabsolute termsinthecomingyears(currentlyitstandsataroundUS$6.2billion;see Appendix 2). However, given Sweden’s projected econo-mic growth, the proportion of GDP earmarked for defencewillde facto decrease to around 1%23. The slight expansion of the

20 MikaelHolmström,Försvarmedtidsgräns,Svenska Dagbladet,30December2012,http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/forsvar-med-tidsgrans_7789308.svd;MikaelHolmström,Detärnågotheltexceptionellt,Svenska Dagbladet,25 January 2013, http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/det-ar-nagot-helt-ex-ceptionellt_7858986.svd

21 Riksrevisionen, Bemanningen av marines och flygvapnets stående in-satsförband, RIR 2012:18, November 2012, http://www.riksrevisionen.se/PageFiles/16556/Anpassad_12_18_Bemanningen%20av%20marinens%20och%20flygvapnets%20st%C3%A5ende%20insatsf%C3%B6rband.pdf

22 Seefootnote20.23 PeterNordlund,JanneÅkerström,Försvarsutgifteribudgetkrisensspår–

enförsvarsekonomiskomvärldsanalys,FOIReport,October2012,p.55–56,http://www.foi.se/Documents/foir3508.pdf

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defencebudgetwillprobablybe insufficient to cover theneces-saryexpensesafter2015.Themilitarywillhavetodealnotonlywiththeshortagesofarmamentandmilitaryequipment,includ-ingtheland-basedairdefencesystems,artillerysystems,airde-fence systems for the corvettes and ammunition for the JAS-39fighteraircraft.TheSwedishArmedForceswillalsofaceconsid-erableinvestmentneedsinthe2015–2018planningperiodandwillrequirearound30billionSwedishkronor,i.e.around€3.5billion,of additional financing over the period in question. In January2013theSwedishgovernmentdecidedtopurchase60newmulti--role JAS-39E/F fighter aircraft. That purchase will consumemost of the investment budget in the coming years, while theArmedForcesalsoneedtoreplacetheirfleetoftransportaircraft(currentlytheC-130E)andsubmarines,replace/upgradetheirin-fantryfightingvehicles,andpurchaseUAVs24.

Thosereports,inconjunctionwiththestatementbyNATO’sSec-retaryGeneral,whosaidinNovember2012thattheAlliancewasnotresponsibleforthesecurityofcountriesthatwerenotitsmem-bers25,gaverisetothe most heated discussions since the end of the cold War among analysts, the military and politicians, who have been arguing about sweden’s defence policy and the direction of the military reform.TheNATOSecretaryGen-eral’sstatementunderminedtheSwedishgovernment’srhetoricthatthereexisteda ‘solidarity’withSweden(supposedlyonthepartofNATO).TheNorwegiandefenceministermadeastatementinasimilartone,makingitclearthatNorwaywouldbeunlikelytograntmilitaryassistancetoSwedenintheeventofaconflict,becauseitsprimaryobjectivewastodefenditsownterritory,and

24 GerardO’Dwyer,NorwayBucksTrendasNeighborsCurbSpending,Defense News,24October2012,http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121024/DE-FREG01/310240001/Norway-Bucks-Trend-Neighbors-Curb-Spending

25 InterviewwithAndersFoghRasmussenduringhisvisittoSweden,Sverigekan interäknamedstödfrånNato,6November2012,http://www.svt.se/nyheter/sverige/nato-syrien-storsta-utmaning

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becauseNATOwas itsmainmilitaryalliance26.ThedebatewasfurtherheatedupbyreportsthatSweden’sinternalsecurityser-viceswereinvestigating,attherequestoftheprosecutor’soffice,whethertheSupremeCommanderhadnotcommittedanoffencebymakingastatementaboutSweden’sdefencecapabilities,andinthiswayrevealinginformationthatcouldcompromisethecoun-try’ssecurity.Inearly2013thepressjoinedthedebate,whichcre-atedheightenedmediainterestindefenceissuesthathadhadnoprecedentinmanyyears.

Those discussions are of major significance – in 2014 Swedenwill hold parliamentary elections, and in 2015 the governmentandparliamentaretoadoptanewDefenceDecisionfortheyears2015–2018, which may influence future military and politicaltransformations.Astrongpolarisationoverdefencepolicyissuesissymptomatichere.Ontheonehand,analysts,themilitaryandsomepoliticians(fromthesmallerLiberalandChristianDemo-cratpartiesthatarepartoftheconservative-liberalgovernment)havebeenpointingtotheconsequencesoftheArmedForces’un-derfinancing, calling for considerably higher defence spendingandadjustmentstothemilitaryreform(includingthepurchaseofmedium-rangeairandmissiledefencesystem),andurgingthestartofaseriousdebateaboutpossibleaccessiontoNATO.Theyhavealsobeenpointingtothegrowingthreatposedbyanincreas-inglyunstableandeverbetter-armedRussia.Ontheotherhand,the largestcoalitionparty(theModerates)andits leader,PrimeMinisterFredrikReinfeldt,whobearinmindtheconsolidationofpublicfinancesandtheparliamentaryelectioncampaignin2014,havebeenrefusingtoconsiderincreasingdefencespendingattheexpenseofotherobjectives(suchaswelfare).TheModerates(aswellastheoppositionSocialDemocrats)areawareofthedisqui-etingtrendsinRussianpoliticsandthecountry’sgrowingdefence

26 InterviewwithAnne-GreteStrøm-Erichsen,OsäkertomNorgeställeruppomSverigeangrips,SverigesRadio,24February2013,http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=5453467

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spending,butrecentlyhavebeenplayingdowntheirdirect im-pactonSweden’smilitarysecurity.The temperatureof thedis-cussioniswellillustratedbyheadlinesinSweden’smajorpapers,oneofwhichread“Swedenneedsamilitaryputsch”27.

27 Sverigebehöverenmilitärkupp,Expressen,15January2013,http://www.ex-pressen.se/ledare/sverige-behover-en-militarkupp-1/

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V. sWeden’s dilemmas

sweden thus faces a major challenge of how to shape its de-fence policy in a deteriorating regional security setting.Sev-eralsolutionsarebeingdebated,allofwhichinvolvepoliticalandsocialproblemsstemminglargelyfromSwedishidentityandhis-tory.Themostimportantdilemmaconcernsthechoicebetweenremaininganon-alignedstateandjoiningNATO,althoughotherproposalshavealsobeenraised.

(1) remaining outside nato isoneoptionwhichneverthelesswouldleadtoincreasedmilitaryspendinganddefencecapabili-ties,inlinewiththereasoningthatnon-involvementinmilitaryalliances entails an obligation to putmore effort into ensuringone’sownsecurity.However,thelargestcoalitionparty,theMode-rates,isunwillingtoincreasethedefencebudgetconsiderably,asitsprioritynowis tomaintainbudgetarydiscipline,even if thesmallercoalitionpartners(theLiberalsandtheChristianDemo-crats)supportincreasingdefencespending.Theoppositionisalsosplit on the issue– theSocialDemocratshavenot ruledout in-creasedspending,whiletheGreensarecriticalofit28.

(2) Joining nato: in terms of Sweden’s domestic politics, thiswouldbeaverydifficultprocess,andcarryingitoutwhilecon-formingwith Swedish political culturewould require buildinga political consensus of amajority of parliamentary parties, aswell as amassive public campaign. Sweden’smajor parties aresplitontheissue,andeventhosethatareinfavourofNATOmem-bership(includingtheModerates)havenopoliticalwilltoraisethisunpopular issuewith thepublic.AdvocatesofmembershiparguethatSwedenwouldgainadditionalguaranteesofsecurityand could expect assistance from its allies. On the other hand,

28 SwedishGovernmentSplitOverDefenceSpending,SwedishRadio,18Janu-ary2013,http://www.defencetalk.com/swedish-government-split-over-de-fence-spending-46387/#.UP-dEuHI4Ui.twitter

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opponents(includingtheSocialDemocrats)believethatmember-shipwouldleadtorisingtensionsandagreaterriskofcrisesintheBalticSearegionandtheHighNorth29.TheyalsoarguethatevenifSwedenoptedforNATOmembership,itwouldstillneedto increasedefencespending inorder toberegardedasarelia-blememberoftheAlliance.ThenegativeattitudeoftheSwedishpublic isalsoan important factor inthemembershipdebate. Ina2012survey,47%ofSwedesfavouredstayingoutofNATO,with30%backingaccession30.TheSwedishpeoplestillwidelybelievethat non-alignment is the best guarantee of security, and thatmembershipinNATOwouldentailexcessivefinancialandpoliti-calcommitments.ThisshowshowtheconceptofneutralityhasbecomeadefiningelementoftheSwedishnationalidentity,andhas turned fromaneffectivepolicy instrument intoabrakeonmajorchange.SwedenshouldthereforenotbeexpectedtofileanapplicationformembershipinNATOintheimmediatefuture.

Still,thefactthatNATOhasbeenlookingfornewanddiversifiedformulas for co-operationwith itsmost active partners,whichcouldbeappliedaftertheperiodofintensiveco-operationontheAfghanistanmission is over, offers some opportunities for fur-ther rapprochement between Sweden (as well as Finland) andtheAlliance.ThiswouldprobablygiveSwedenbroaderopportu-nitiestoinfluencetheshapeofthefutureoperationsinwhichitwouldchoosetoparticipate,aswellasmoreopportunitiesforex-changeofinformationandco-ordinationwithregardtothenewchallenges such as cyber-security, energy security, combatingterrorismandtheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestruction.

29 Sven Hirdman,Medlemskap i Nato skulle öka spanningar, Svenska Dag-bladet, 16 January 2013, http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/medlem-skap-i-nato-skulle-oka-spanningar_7827228.svd

30 23%ofrespondentshadnoopinionontheissue.SeeSwedishCivilContin-genciesAgency (MSB),Delredovisning–Opinioner2012,Stockholm2012,p.22,https://www.msb.se/Upload/Nyheter_press/Pressmeddelanden/Opi-nioner2012_Delredovisning.pdf

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However,suchcloserco-operationwouldnotextendtoactivitiesunderArticle5oftheNorthAtlanticTreaty31.

(3) Further development of nordic defence co-operation32 aimed at establishing a military alliance: thisoptionisbackedbylargenumbersoftheSwedishpublic.Co-operationwithintheframeworkofNORDEFCOisthefirstandmostnaturaloptionforthedevelopmentofregionalmilitaryco-operation,notonlyfromthe point of view of Sweden, but also for Finland and Norway(albeitlesssoforDenmark).Thestrategicproximity,inboththeregionalandtheglobaldimension,stronglyunderpinnedbytheeconomicandcultural context,providesabasis for suchco-op-eration.Still,theproposalmadeinthe2009Stoltenbergreport33,foralltheNordicstatestoadoptamutualdeclarationofsolidar-ityasaconditionthatmilitaryco-operationbefurtherdeveloped,hasbeenrejectedbyalltheNordicstates.Becausetheirmilitarypotentialisrelativelysmallincomparisonwiththepotentialsofother regional players, theNordic states are unwilling to limittheir co-operation options to their neighbours alone. DenmarkandNorway,beingNATOmembers,haveruledoutthepossibil-ityofNordic co-operationbecoming ‘independent’ and forminganalternative toNATO in theregion.This is supposed to serveas theNordic formatforthe ‘pooling&sharing’projects,whichneverthelessshouldnotimposeanylimitationsonsovereignde-cision-making.Sofar,SwedenandFinlandhaveadoptedthesameposition,recognisingthesignificantrolethatNATOplaysinen-suringsecurityinNorthernEurope.However,itispossiblethatinordertomakeupfortheshortagesof itsowndefencebudgetandmilitarycapabilities,Swedenwillcomeupwithproposalsfor

31 Seefootnote17.32 Formore information onNORDEFCO, see Justyna Gotkowska, Smart de-

fenceNordicstyle,CEWeekly,19September2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2012-09-19/smart-defence-nordic-style

33 JustynaGotkowska,OlafOsica(ed.),Closingthegap?Militaryco-operationfromtheBalticSeatotheBlackSea,OSWReport,p.23,10December2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Closing_the_gap_net.pdf

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closerregionalco-operationaimedatintegratingthedefenceca-pabilitiesoftheNordicstates.InajointarticlepublishedinJanu-ary2013,Sweden’sministersforforeignaffairsanddefence,CarlBildtandKarinEnström,statedthat“jointlypossessingandus-ing capabilities and resources, i.e. so-called pooling& sharing,is the cornerstone of Sweden’s vision ofNordic co-operation”34.This proposal goes further than even themost advancedNOR-DEFCOprojectshavedoneso far, suchas the jointuseof trans-portaircraft(NORTAT).Still,giventherelativelyhigherdefencespendingoftheotherNordiccountries,andthepossibleimplica-tionsoftheuseofjointcapabilitieswithinNATO,thefeasibilityofSweden’sproposalsshouldbetreatedwithcaution.

(4) Inthecontextdescribedabove,proposalshavealsobeenputforward in Sweden to establish a swedish-Finnish military alliance basedon thenon-aligned statusofbothcountries.Re-sponding to those proposals, the Finnish minister of defence(fromapartyrepresentingtheSwedishminority)saidthatclos-erNordicco-operationwasaratherdistantvision,whichwouldmoreoverrequireadequatetreatiestobeconcluded.Andconsid-eringNorway’sandDenmark’smembershipinNATO,suchtrea-tiescouldonlyinvolveSwedenandFinland35.However,thePrimeMinisterofFinlandexpressedaclearlynegativepositionontheconceptofNordicorSwedish-Finnishmilitaryalliances36. Suchstatements are not the only indications that a Swedish-Finnishmilitary alliance is unlikely tomaterialise. The Finns are cau-tiousaboutmilitaryallianceswithSwedenforhistoricalreasons,which include Sweden’s passive policy during Finland’sWar of

34 CarlBildt,KarinEnström,FörsvarsmaterielkanägasgemensamtiNorden,Dagens Nyheter,13January2013,http://www.dn.se/debatt/forsvarsmateriel-kan-agas-gemensamt-i-norden

35 Finnish Broadcasting CompanyYLE, Finnish-Swedish defence pact issueraised,13January2013,http://yle.fi/uutiset/finnish-swedish_defense_pact_issue_raised/6449010

36 FinnishBroadcastingCompanyYLE,PMKatainen: ‘No’ toNordicdefencepact,14January2013,http://yle.fi/uutiset/pm_katainen_no_to_nordic_de-fence_pact/6450309

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Independence in 1917–1918, and the fact that Sweden refused tooffer military assistance to Finland during the Finnish-SovietWinterWarof1939–1940.Eventhoughthetwocountrieshadco--operatedmilitarilyinthe1930s,andSwedenhadbeendiscussingandsendingsignalsofsolidaritywithFinland in theevent thatitsneighbourcameunderattack(regardingthisasan‘extended’defenceofSweden’sownterritory)37.

(5)SwedencouldalsoconsideremulatingtheexampleofFinland38and strengthening bilateral military co-operation with the united states. However,allthedilemmasinvolvedincloserco--operationwithNATOwouldequallyapplytoclosercollaborationwiththeUS.

on the other hand, sweden is not considering the option of developing closer co-operation within the european union.EventhoughtheEUhasadoptedthe‘defenceclause’,forSwedenthe EU is not andwill not be amilitary alliance. The develop-mentof(civiland)militarycapabilitieswithintheEUisaimedatparticipationinforeignoperations,andnotatcollectivedefence.FromthepointofviewofSweden,withNATOinplace,thereisnoneedtodevelopEUcommandstructuressimilartoNATO’sortocreateamilitaryallianceexcludingtheUnitedStates.

none of the proposed solutions to sweden’s security dilem-mas is simple or easily practicable for the current ruling coa-lition. considering the circumstances discussed above, it is unlikely that a thorough change of sweden’s defence policy will be possible in the medium term. ThereportsoftheSwedish

37 JacobWestberg,Finsktochsvensktförsvarssamarbeteundermellankrigs-tiden,inFredrikDoeser,MagnusPeterssonandJacobWestberg(ed.),Nor-denmellanstormakterochfredsförbund,Stockholm2012,p.95-117.

38 Mainlyintheareaofarmamentandmilitaryequipmentco-operation.SeetherecentFinnishordersforUS-madestate-of-the-artweapons:AGM-158JASSMair-to-surfaceguidedmissileswitharangeofc.370kmfortheAirForce(F-18combataircraft),andtheM57ATACMSsurface-to-surfacemis-sileswitharangeofc.300kmfortheArmy.

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DefenceCommission,onthebasisofwhichthegovernmentwillissue the new Defence Decision for 2015–2018, will be howeverof considerable importance. TheCommission,which started itsworkin2012,istaskedwithassessingtheevolutionoftheinterna-tionalsecurityenvironmentandthethreatsandchallengesthatitposesforSweden.Itwillmakeproposalstothegovernmentcon-cerningchanges to thedefencepolicyandreformof theArmedForces,whilebuildingbroadinter-partyconsensusontheissue.InthecomingyearsSwedenwillprobablyremainoutsideNATO,make someadjustments to itsmilitary reformand increasede-fence spending (in absolute terms), provided that there is sus-tainedpressuretodosofromtheanalystcommunity,backedbysomemediaandpoliticalparties.Besidesthat,itwillcontinuetobeinvolvedinthedevelopmentofNordicco-operation(whichwillnonetheless be subject to the limitations discussed above) andseekdeeperco-operationwithNATO.

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Vi. sWedish deFence Policy and the Baltic sea region

For sweden’s partners in the region, the absence of a major change in swedish defence policy that would lead towards membership in nato means continued uncertainty about what the country will do in the event of an actual crisis or conflict in the region.Will theSwedishgovernmentshow‘solidarity’ and offer assistance, should any such scenarioma-terialise?Orwillthepublic’sdeeplyrootedtendencynottogetinvolved in the problems of Sweden’s neighbours prevail overaformallydeclared‘solidarity’?WillSweden’s‘solidarity’meanmerelynon-passivity,orwillitcomeintheformofmilitaryas-sistance?And ifmilitary assistance is offered,will it be effec-tive inpractice,asSwedenstilldoesnotparticipate inNATO’sdefenceplanning?39.FortheSwedesthemselves,continuationofthecurrentdefencepolicywillleadtoquestionsaboutwhetherornottheycancountonNATOifinneed. ThisisnottosaythatthedebatesunderwayinSwedenareofnoconsequenceforthecountry’spartnersintheregion.the changes in sweden’s de-fence discourse and policy may be conducive to strengthen-ing security in the Baltic sea region, even though they are less likely to lead to closer bilateral defence co-operation be-tween Poland and sweden.

regional formats of political and military co-operation of-fer possibilities for working together with sweden.Itshouldbenotedinthiscontextthatbilateral,multilateralandregionalmilitaryco-operation,eitherwithinoroutsideNATO,isbecom-ingan increasingly important instrument in safeguarding the

39 BoLjung,TomasMalmöf,KarlisNeretnieksandMikeWinnerstig(publ.),TheSecurityandDefensibilityoftheBalticStates.AComprehensiveAnaly-sisofaSecurityComplex in theMaking,FOIReport,October2012,p. 59,http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_3471.pdf

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security interests of individual NATO member states. Mean-whileNorthernEurope,includingtheBalticSeaarea,istheonlyregioninPoland’sneighbourhoodwhosecountriessharesimilarassessmentsof currentchallengesand threats.Closerpoliticalandmilitaryco-operationintheregioncouldserveasa‘preven-tative’and‘deterrent’measure,andenablefasterandmoreco--ordinatedreactionsintheeventofcrises.

in the political dimension, Sweden’sperceptionofthegeopo-liticalchangestakingplaceintheBalticSeaandHighNorthre-gions could strengthen thosevoices inNATO (andeven in theEU)whichpointtothegrowinginstabilityandlikelihoodofcri-ses in theperipheriesofNATOand theEU.ForNATOand theEU,Swedenisan‘impartial’playerinregionalsecurityissues,unlikeNorway,whichhasitsowninterestsintheHighNorth,and Finland, which traditionally has always been concernedaboutitsneighbourRussia.ThefactthatSwedenisnotaNATOmemberpartlyexcludesStockholmfromdebatesaboutNATO’sdefencepolicy.However, this limitationmightbeovercomebyextending the security policy discussions to formats that doincludeSweden(andFinland),suchasthemeetingsofdefenceministersoftheso-calledNorthernGroup,whichbringstogeth-ertheNordicstates,theBalticstates,Poland,GermanyandtheUnitedKingdom.

in the military dimension, Swedenwillbeinterestedinseek-ingnewformsofmilitaryco-operationwithNATOintheregion.TheSwedesareawareoftheneedtoensuretheirArmedForc-es’ interoperabilitywithNATObeyond theperiodof intensiveco-operation on foreign missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo andLibya.Theyhavealsobeenpromotingtheconceptofnew-typepartnerships between NATO and partner countries. Further-more, they are awareof thegrowing importanceof theNATOResponse Force (NRF) inmaintaining interoperability and co-operationamongtheNATOmemberswithintheframeworkoftheConnected Forces Initiative,which is also open to partner

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countries40.Forthisreason,theSwedishgovernmentiscurrent-lyconsideringparticipationintheNRF,anideathatwillprob-ably alsohave thebacking of the largest oppositionparty, theSocialDemocrats,whichwouldensureSweden’sinvolvementintheNRFinthefuture41.Itisnotinconceivablethatinthelongerterm,thedialogueonsecurityoftheNordic-Balticregioncouldbeunderpinnedbymilitaryco-operationwithinonerotationoftheNATOResponseForce.

We should also keep the so-called new security challenges inmind(concerningcyber-andenergysecurity).TheSwedishlead-ershiprealisesthatattacksagainstcriticalinfrastructures(suchasenergyorITinfrastructures),whichmayormaynotbeaccompa-niedbytheuseofmilitarymeans,arebecomingastapleelementoffuturecrisisandconflictscenarios,includinginNorthernEurope.Especially ifoneconsidersthecurrentandplanneddevelopmentofinfrastructuresfortheextraction,transportationandsupplyofenergyresourcesintheregion.Forpoliticalandfinancialreasons,NATOwillnotbethemainorganisationinchargeofdealingwiththenewchallengesorensuringcyber-orenergysecurity,combat-ingterrorismorpreventingtheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestructioninthememberstates.Nevertheless,NATOmayfacili-tate informationexchange, training,exercisesandco-ordinationamong itsmembers.NATO also sees opportunities for co-opera-tionwithpartnercountriesinthoseareas,andtheNATOfacilitiesintheregion(theCyberDefenceCentreofExcellence inTallinn,Estonia,andtheEnergySecurityCentreofExcellenceinVilnius,

40 AndersFoghRasmussen,addressatsecurityconferenceinSälen,Sweden,NATOandSweden:StrongPartnersinsupportoftheUnitedNations,14Jan-uary 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_93824.htm. SeealsoGuillaumeLasconjarias,TheNRF:fromaKeyDriverofTransformationtoaLaboratoryoftheConnectedForcesInitiative,ResearchPaperNo.88,NATO Defense College, January 2013, http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1

41 EwaStenberg,RegeringenöppnarförattgåmediNatosinsatsstyrka,Da-gens Nyheter, 15 January 2013, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/regerin-gen-oppnar-for-att-ga-med-i-natos-insatsstyrka

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Lithuania)couldbeusedforcloserco-operationamongcountriesintheregion,includingNATOmembersaswellasthenon-membersSwedenandFinland42.

Asregardsbilateralmilitaryco-operation(outsidetheframeworkofNATO), theNordic statesareSweden’smainpartners forde-fenceco-operation–thisappliesbothtoexercisesandtraining,andtoarmamentandmilitaryequipmentco-operation–becauseof the geographical proximity, linguistic and cultural similari-ties,aswellassomesimilaritieswithregardtothearmamentandmilitaryequipmentheld.ForthesereasonsPoland is not among sweden’s priority co-operation partners, and is regarded pri-marily as a nato member in the region.SwedenandPolandare involved in some co-operation projects concerningmilitaryexercises(suchasthesubmarinerescueexercisesheldbythetwocountries’Navies),andcouldtrytoextendsuchco-operationtotheAirForces(forexample,byincludingaPolishcomponentintheSwedish-Danishexercise43).FromSweden’spointofview,bi-lateralco-operationwithitsnon-Nordicpartnerscouldtaketheformofaneconomicallyjustifiedcollaborationonoperation,ser-vicingandupgradesofarmamentandmilitaryequipment(wherethecountriesconcernedpossess thesamesystems),andrelatedtrainingandexercises.However,Swedenwouldhavetoseebene-fitsfromsuchco-operation,intheformofsavingsfortheSwedishArmedForces,and/ornewordersfortheSwedisharmsindustry,whichwouldinrealityrequirePolandtopurchaseSwedish-madearmamentandmilitaryequipment.Thisisofcoursedoesnotruleoutpossibilitiesfordeeperbilateralco-operationwithintheEuro-peanUnion,forexampleonciviliancrisismanagementwithintheframeworkoftheCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy,especiallywithregardtotheEuropeanUnion’seasternneighbourhood.

42 Ioanna-NikolettaZyga,EmergingSecurityChallenges:AGlueforNATOandPartners?,ResearchPaperNo.85,NATODefenseCollege,November2012,http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1

43 Seefootnote15.

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aPPendices

appendix 1

size of the swedish armed Forces (operational component/permanent units excluding the home guard) in 1997–201044

44 QuotedfromtheIISS,TheMilitaryBalancefor1997-2010.

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

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size of the swedish armed Forces with the home guard in 201145

SwedishArmy

7000troops(permanentunits)15,100troops(permanentunits+contractunits*)*Soldiers of the contract units have civilian jobs, and are mobilised under temporary contracts when necessary.

Navy 3100troops(permanentunitsonly)

AirForce 3400troops(permanentunitsonly)

HomeGuard

22,000troops****Only a small proportion of Home Guard soldiers work for the military on a permanent basis. The remainder are volunteers with civilian jobs

Several thousand troops serving in the command and logisticsstructuresshouldbeaddedtotheabove.

45 Quoted fromFörsvarsmakten och Fickformat 2011. Stockholm2011. p. 19,http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/upload/dokumentfiler/publikationer/fm_i_fickformat_2011_web.pdf

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appendix 2

sweden’s military spending in 1989–2011 (us$ billion, according to siPri)

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

US$ billion

1989

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

5

6

7

8

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Sweden’s military spending in 1989–2011

year military spending in us$ billion, according to siPri

1989 7.2391990 7.3751991 6.9471992 6.7511993 6.7311994 6.7161995 6.7311996 6.8191997 6.4781998 6.6631999 6.9162000 7.1672001 6.6992002 6.5212003 6.4732004 6.0922005 6.1722006 6.0752007 6.2352008 5.5452009 5.4382010 5.8862011 5.960