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Slide 1
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
Centerof Rail
Safety-Critical Excellence
BRIEFING
September 2002
Slide 2
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
USA RAIL SAFETY BRIEFING AGENDA
•Center of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence Overview
•SEAS Interdisciplinary Collaboration
•International University Collaboration
•FRA Safety Rule Making Participation
•Performance-based Rail Safety Enforcement Rule
•Major Risk USA Assessment Projects
•Risk Assessment Tool Set Overview
•Proposed UVA – China Collaboration
Slide 3
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
Center of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence - Overview
•MISSION: Develop and maintain railroad performance-based safety enforcement standards, risk assessment methodologies and tool sets that support global rail industry safety enforcement.
•OBJECTIVES: Provide a Monte Carlo risk assessment systems simulation methodology with web-based tool sets and education that is Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Association of American Railroads (AAR) compliant.
•STRATEGY: Implement a UVA School of Engineering and Applied Science (SEAS) interdisciplinary Rail Center of Safety-Critical Excellence staffed with a permanent research staff, faculty from Electrical and Computer Engineering, Systems Information and Engineering, Civil Engineering, and Cognitive Psychology Laboratory. Establish global university - industry collaboration.
•EXPECTED RESULTS: Global application of performance-based safety standards, risk assessment methodologies, validated & verified tool sets and education.
Slide 4
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
SEAS Interdisciplinary Collaboration
•Center is based on a SEAS interdisciplinary collaboration with the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and industry suppliers:
Electrical and Computer Engineering Department Monte Carlo systems approach to risk assessment Probabilistic advanced safety train control
Systems Information and Engineering Department Historical data mining for validation & verification Human-factors for probabilistic safety behavior
Civil Engineering Department Guideway structures probabilistic behavior models Crash-worthiness / accident severity
Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering Department Maglev levitation safety hazards and performance
Cognitive Measurements Laboratory Probabilistic human-factors for safety measurements
Slide 5
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
International University Collaboration
•Collaboration is underway with the following German technical universities:
Technical University of Braunschweig
Technical University of Dresden
Slide 6
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
FRA Safety Enforcement Rule Making
•Center has participated since 1997 in the preparation of the FRA performance-based safety standard rule making that includes the following:
Railroad Safety Program Plan
Defines the Safety Plan process a railroad operator will follow
Railroad Product Safety Plan
Requires that a Product Safety Plan be written for each system that is deployed by the railroad operator
Product Safety Plan must include:Traffic Flow DensityHuman-factorsQuantified Risk AssessmentExtensive Safety-Critical DocumentationDocumentation Configuration Control & Test PlanOperational Rule Book
Slide 7
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
Performance-based Rail Safety Enforcement Rule
•Performance-based safety standards require the quantification of safety as a societal cost risk versus train miles traveled
•A Product Safety Plan is required for each system that is deployed by a railroad and the following quantification must be demonstrated:
•Risk NEW << Risk Old
Train Miles Traveled
High Degree of Confidence
Compliance to Coverage for all Safety-Critical Devices
Slide 8
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
Major Center USA Risk Assessment Projects
•CSX: Communication-based Traffic Management (CBTM) 126 mile line Unit coal trains and other mixed mode traffic
•New York City Transit (NYCT): Communication-based Train Control (CBTC) 22 mile dual track line with crossovers High performance transit railway operations 60 second headways and 30 second train station dwell time
•Lockheed Martin: Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) Positive Train Control (PTC)
126 mile line with mixed mode operations High speed passenger (110 MPH) trains and freight
•Maglev, Inc: City of Pittsburgh, “Pennsylvania Project” 45 miles dual crossover guideway with 250 MPH planned speeds Passenger & light freight operation
•FRA: Web-based predictive risk assessment methodologies and tool set
Slide 9
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
Risk Assessment Tool Set Overview
•PROOF-OF-SAFETY: RISK VERSUS TRAIN MILES TRAVELED
Subject to: Traffic throughput density Basic principles of safety Assumptions Constraints Operational rule book compliance Track plan infrastructure: track plan, guideway, bridges, crossings Train movement dynamics multi-dimensional model Signaling and control system multi-state probabilistic model Human-factors probabilistic model Train severity mishap model Proof-of-correctness (Hazard-free validation) Proof-of-safety risk (Non-hazard-free verification) Coverage compliance of all processor-based subsystems
Slide 10
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
Axiomatic Safety-Critical Assessment Process (ASCAP) Features
•ASCAP is FRA performance-based standard compliant
•Monte Carlo large-scale train-centric simulation
•Operates on a web-based parallel processing mini-super computer
•ASCAP structure is Unified Modeling Language compliant
•Calculates Events Passed at Danger based on a dynamic train movement model and probabilistic behavior of wayside devices and human-factors – dispatchers, train crews and maintenance-of-way workers
•Events Passed at Danger are an automatic generation of fault trees
•Calculates mishap-pairs: train-to-train collisions, etc. and crash-worthiness severity as societal cost based on history of accidents and/or real-time performance-based simulation
Slide 11
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
SIGNIFICANT ASCAP MODELS
•Probabilistic device behavior:
•Rule book compliance/non-compliance
•A.I. blackboard outcomes
•Human-factors safety behaviors and compliance
•Train dynamic movement model – discrete & continuous
•Accident severity societal cost
•Events passed at danger
Slide 12
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
Event Passed at Danger (EPAD) Concept
YARD A
YARD B
Train 1 Train 2
S
CRASH
•Train 1 crew sees red signal as green & proceeds
•Train 1 has generated an EPAD
•Simulation changes from discrete event to continuous
•Based on train crew behavior(s) the trains may stop
•Train 1 crew has violated the rule book compliance
Slide 13
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
MISHAP CONCEPT
Train A Train B
Potential Mishap
Braking Too Late
Switch
Train B should have taken the siding
Discrete Event Simulation
Continuous Simulation
Slide 14
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
Decision Maker Risk Containment Region
Risk
Train Miles Traveled
RiskContainement
Region
Min Coverage
Max Coverage
Societal Cost
Slide 15
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
ASCAP++ Tool SET
ModelLibrary
Model Builder Risk Profile Generation Module
MTTHE TargetAllocation Module
Application-Independent Mishap Simulation EngineModelDatabase
Track Configuration Population
Object Population
Central Office Devices Wayside Devices
Train Consists Maintenance Vehicles On-Board Devices
Create Scheduling and RoutingAlgorithms
Select Train Line-Specific SeverityDatabase
Object/AgentBehavioral State
Statistics
Mishap Logscontaining
MishapIntersection plusLast 6 Passed atDanger Events
for AffectedTrain(s)
Simulation Outputs
Initialize N-Train System
Instantiate Track InfrastructureObjects
Instantiate Stationary and MobileObjects
Instantiate Agents Initiate Scheduling and Routing
Global Simulation Control
Terminate Simulations if Enough Train-Miles have been Accumulated
Schedule and Inject Periodic PreventativeMaintenance
Train N Simulation
Processor-Based Sub-System X
Specify Simulation Control andResults Output Format Parameters
StandardClasses of
Objects andAgents for
ASCAP++InternalFormat
Object Class M Risk Profile Generation
PerformanceMetric Calculation
String Charts Traffic
Throughput Traffic Delays Hazard-free/
Violation-freeOperation
SystemPerformance
Analysis Module
Dynamic Movement Model for Train 1Identifies Next Train/Object Time and
Space Intersection
Train 1 Simulation
Solve Object/Agent ProbabilisticModels to Find Probability of Being in
Each Possible State
Use Monte Carlo Techniques to SelectBehavioral State of Each Object/Agent
Blackboard Intersection OutcomeResolution to Determine Train
Movement Modality
Event Logging
Update Object/Agent BehavioralState Counters
Log any Train Movement Passedat Danger Events
If Required, Continue Using DetailedTrain Movement Model
N
Y
Create Mishap Log Entry Terminate Affected Simulation(s) Replace Affected Objects Repair Known Failed Objects
Terminate Simulation and Clean-up
YPotentialMishap?
Are OtherObject/Agent
Interactions Triggered bySame Train/Object
Intersection?
Y
N
TrueMishap?
Object Class 1 Risk Profile GenerationGenerate Five Risk
Containment Regions
Fault Coverage Failure Rate Preventative Maintenance Corrective Maintenance Human Repair Coverage
Derive Fault Coverage Target fromSelected Operational Risk Profile(s)
Determine Relevant OperationalRisk Profile(s) for
Processor-Based Sub-system 1
Processor-Based Sub-System 1
Ris
k
106 Train Miles
Axiomatic Safety-Critical Assessment Process (ASCAP++) Toolset Overview
N
Random Injection ofDevice Faults
Object Behaviors
Random Injection ofBroken Rail, Landslides,and Geological Hazards
Track Object Behaviors
Random Injection ofHuman Responsiveness,
Compliance, andCoverage Faults
Agent Behaviors
Po
siti
on
Time
Mishap Log Analysis
Examine Next Mishap
Accident ?
Y
Determine Likelihood ofOccurrence
Calculate System Riskwith Confidence Level
Determine Societal Cost
N
Create Hazard Log Entry
Compare withSupplier's Qualitative
Risk Assessments(PHA, FMECA, etc.)
Sev/Hazard Freq Mitigation
Prelimin Hazard Analysis
Derail II/D Use ofdue to TrainOvrspd Speed Enforcmnt
Center of RailroadSafety-Critical Excellence
Revision: 07Date: May 9, 2002
Prepared: E. CutrightApproved: T. Giras
Axiomatic Safety-Critical Assessment Process (ASCAP++) Toolset Overview
Define Stationary Objects
Define Mobile Objects
Define Track Infrastructure Objects,with Associated Geographical
Characteristics (Grade, Elevation,Super-elevation, Curvature)
Agent Population
Train Dispatcher Maintenance of Way Worker Train Crew Train Operator
Define Human Agents
Direct Traffic Control (DTC) Traffic Control System (TCS) Centralized Train Control (CTC) Positive Train Control (PTC) Communication-Based Train
Control (CBTC) Magnetic Levitation (Maglev)
Select Control System Type
Highway GradeCrossings
Switch Machines Track Circuits Active/Passive Beacons Etc.
Track Objects
InterlockingControllers
Signals Wayside Signage Landslide Detectors Etc.
Stationary Objects
Train Consists Maintenance Vehicles Positioning Systems Track Circuit Readers On-Board Displays Etc.
Mobile Objects
Train Dispatcher Maintenance of Way
Worker Train Crew Etc.
Agents
each Control System Type
Project Decision Makers SelectDesired Operational Risk Profiles
Slide 16
School of Engineeringand Applied ScienceCenter of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence
Proposed – China/USA Collaboration
•A China/USA university partnership is proposed that provides FRA compliant risk assessment for the major rail projects in China:
Duplicate a Center of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence in China for: High Speed Rail Maglev Transit Railways
Technology transfer of Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) risk assessment compliant methodologies, tool sets and education to China
Technology transfer would take place with UVA implementing the risk assessment of a major China rail project with Chinese graduate students at UVA
Methodologies and tool sets would be supported via the web as graduate students return to China
Chinese university would have a seat on the UVA Advisory Board to provide technical direction oversight. Likewise, Chinese Center would have a technical Advisory Board with a UVA member