Small States and Climate Change

Original Article

Small states and international politics: Climatechange, the Maldives and Tuvalu

Kevin Jaschiknuances public affairs, Neue Grünstraße 17/18, Berlin 10179, Germany.E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract This article examines whether small states – against all (Realist) odds – canhave influence on the international political agenda. A theoretical framework is developedgrounded in agenda-setting theory and the literature on strategic framing, foreign policyanalysis and advocacy networks, resulting in a process-oriented, constructivist approachto international agenda setting. This is used to address three propositions: firstly, smallstates do have influence on the international agenda; secondly, they generate this influ-ence through strategic framing, and last, they enhance their influence through alliancesand advocacy networks. The theoretical framework is applied using two case studies: thesmall island states of the Maldives and Tuvalu in their fight against climate change.International Politics (2014) 51, 272–293. doi:10.1057/ip.2014.5

Keywords: small states; strategic framing; agenda-setting; Maldives; Tuvalu; climatechange

Introduction

In 2002, one of the smallest countries on earth dared to challenge the world’s mostpowerful one: the tiny, low-lying Pacific island nation of Tuvalu – facing thepotential threat of disappearance due to climate change and rising sea levels –

proclaimed to sue the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)for being the main contributor to global warming and for not ratifying theKyoto Protocol, which intends to reduce industrialized countries’ greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions. Apart from the legal intentions, the main reason for thisannouncement (which was eventually not put into practice) was to draw attention tothe tremendous threat that Tuvalu and other small island developing states (SIDS)are facing in times of climate change and, in doing so, push the topic higher on theglobal agenda.

© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics Vol. 51, 2, 272–293www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/

This incident raises various questions: How do apparently powerless countriesmake use of the international arena to influence the international political agenda? Dotheir efforts yield results? If so, why?

These questions are particularly relevant in a world of large and small, strong andweak nation-states, where Realism as the traditional theory of International Relations(still) has many supporters. They are also important because occurrences of globalscope, for example concerning international security, the world economy or theenvironment, do have an impact on small states and their peoples, who, taken together,account for a considerable part of the world population. Having influence on theinternational agenda could be seen as a step towards more global democracy, a worldwhere also minority actors have a say. This article wants to answer the above questionsby examining the case of vulnerable SIDS threatened by the impacts of climate change.

It is an example of several extremes: Firstly, the possible ramifications some SIDSare facing – physical disappearance from earth through inundation, or, at an earlierstage already, a state of inhabitability – are unprecedented in the history of nation-states and basically of mankind. The only analogy that comes to mind is that ofmythical Atlantis. Secondly, the countries most in danger are those least responsiblefor the problem, as their own GHG emissions are negligible on a global scale. Themain culprits in the global north face, albeit potentially severe, nonetheless much lessdramatic consequences. It is therefore an extreme example of negative externalities.Thirdly, the discrepancy between the states in question (the victims and the causers)could not be bigger: On the one side some of the world’s smallest countries, bothin terms of population and territory, such as Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands and theMaldives; on the other side the largest and most powerful ones, particularly the UnitedStates, the European Union and its member states and, increasingly, also largedeveloping countries such as China – states that determine the fate of the world toa large extent. Lastly, as the industrialized world generates energy, produces goods,and moves from A to B largely by means of climate-affecting fossil fuels, the topic ofclimate change goes to the core of what we conventionally understand by ‘developed’human life. Changing this behavioral pattern requires a true paradigm shift.

This combination of extremes turns the chosen example into a least-likely case:It is rather unlikely that under these conditions SIDS can be successful in position-ing the topic of climate change and the existential threat they deal with very high upon the international political agenda. Showing that they do have a certain influence,however, would seriously undermine the Realist notion of hard power as the onlydeterminant of global influence.

Literature Review

Research on small (island) states initially looked into security and economic issues(Keohane, 1969; Katzenstein, 1985; Sutton and Payne, 1993) and had a particular

Small states and international politicals

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focus on development opportunities and threats (Lockhart et al (eds.), 1993;Briguglio, 1995; more recent: Douglas (ed.), 2006). As awareness of globalwarming grew, scholars started analyzing the social and environmental conse-quences for vulnerable SIDS (Lewis, 1990; Pernetta, 1992; more recent: Barnettand Campbell, 2010). Others pointed to possible international law implicationsshould rising sea levels render low-lying island states uninhabitable (Menefee,1991; Gillespie, 2003; Hestetune, 2010). According to Barnett and Adger (2003),who emphasized the possible sovereignty loss of atoll nations, the process withinthe United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)should result in new, norms-based international agenda-setting and decision-makinginstitutions.

Literature on small states in combination with international agenda setting,however, is scarce. When four SIDS joined the UN in 1999/2000, raising theirnumber to 34, Grant (2000) assumed that this group of states would gain largerimpact on the international agenda. Ashe et al (1999) and Betzold (2010) analyzedthe influence of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) within the UNFCCC.They concluded that SIDS were able to ‘punch beyond their weight’, hencesupporting Habeeb’s (1988) and Zartman and Rubin’s (2000) positive views of thechances of less powerful states in asymmetrical negotiations. Closest to the study inhand with regard to the research idea (at an early stage of the UNFCCC processthough), Shibuya (1996) described how Vanuatu tried to influence the agendaconcerning global warming.

An Integrated Approach for International Politics

As literature on international agenda setting in general, and with a focus on smallstates in particular, is scarce, for the purpose of this study it is necessary to developan integrated theoretical framework for international agenda setting based on agenda-setting theory as overall framework, filled in with elements from strategic framing,foreign policy analysis and advocacy networks. The result is a process-oriented,constructivist approach to international agenda setting, which can be used forempirical testing. The article thus contributes to theory building and analyticgeneralization.

First, however, it is worth getting a better understanding of what the internationalagenda actually is. The main contributors to agenda-setting theory, such asKingdon (2003) and Baumgartner and Jones (1993), focus on domestic govern-mental agendas. Although domestic agenda topics can be relatively clearly spec-ified and assigned to the national government, there is no world government,and the decision-making venues in the international sphere are more diverse:The UN Security Council considers questions of peace and security; the G8/G20the economy; the UNFCCC climate change, and so on. Sometimes venues are not

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274 © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics Vol. 51, 2, 272–293

institutionalized at all. This leads some to claim that there is no such thing asan international agenda (Rothman, 2007). However, one can hardly deny thatissues such as terrorism or the functioning of the financial markets have been onthe international agenda over the last few years. Even if topics are dispersedacross different venues, there is only one world, one set of states, and (at any giventime) one set of political protagonists who do prioritize topics and take partin negotiations, thus forming and following an – albeit amorphous – internationalagenda.

This article mostly follows Kingdon’s agenda-setting approach, adaptingand enhancing it appropriately. In Kingdon’s model, the agenda-setting processcan be divided into three streams that ‘float’ largely separately from eachother: problem recognition, formation of policy proposals and politics (Kingdon,2003). Nevertheless, only the coupling of all of them, the compelling linkageof a problem (to which awareness is usually being raised through indicators,focusing events or powerful symbols) and a viable policy alternative underpolitically favorable conditions, can push a topic up the agenda. The opportunityfor this arises when a policy window opens, either as a ‘problem window’, forexample, through a focusing event such as an accident, or as a ‘political window’,for example, through a new administration. Windows of opportunity typicallyclose quickly, and their exploitation is the responsibility of policy entrepreneurs(ibid.).

Recognizing that an international agenda does exist, its setting can be analyzedalong the same three streams as the domestic process: there are conditions in theworld that can be defined as problems on a global scale (climate change being oneof them); expert communities dedicate their time to developing policy solutions;and the international political sphere can facilitate or hinder that a topic reaches highagenda status – with different actors having different influence.

Within these streams, strategic framing is one of the core tools actors can use topursue their goals, for example, through the purposeful interpretation of problemsand possible solutions ‘intended to mobilize adherents, to garner bystander support,and to demobilize antagonists’ (Snow and Benford, 1988, p. 198). Elements of stra-tegic framing are the linking of ideologically congruent frames (frame bridging), thetapping into existing cultural values (frame amplification), the inclusion of issuesthat are important to the audience (frame extension) (Benford and Snow, 2000),the manipulation of reference points (evaluative framing) and emphasizing variousaspects of a frame (sequential framing) (Mintz and Redd, 2003). Core tasks arediagnostic, prognostic and temporal framing. Diagnostic framing is about theidentification of victims and causality and hence about the (value-based) framing ofsomething as problematic, which fits with the problem stream of agenda setting.Prognostic framing involves a proposed solution to the problem and can be linkedto agenda setting’s policy stream (Benford and Snow, 2000). Rothman (2007)adds temporal framing as a third aspect, referring to the value of an event in terms



of time, that is, whether (negative) effects occur now or in the distant future. Framesthat incorporate these aspects are more likely to become dominant. Two furthercharacteristics are important for their resonance: (1) credibility, referring to questionssuch as: How does the framing resonate with empirical evidence? How trustworthyare the articulators? and (2) salience: How important is the topic for the audience?How tangible/abstract is it? (Benford and Snow, 2000). Framing is especiallyimportant for small states, since the (constructivist) power of the word is the onlypower they have; they are not able to influence others through harder means such aseconomic or even military pressure. Framing therefore has a central role in the threeseparate agenda-setting streams and in connecting them when a policy windowopens. In the international arena, the most important entrepreneurs of framingdirectly attributable to states are political leaders, diplomats and (conference)negotiators.

Framing mainly refers to the operational ‘how’ and ‘who’ of agenda setting. It isembedded into a structure that also reveals a broader ‘how’ and ‘who’. As Figure 1illustrates, small states can try to directly shape the international agenda (as largelyformed by more powerful actors); additionally, several indirect paths are alsoavailable to them: They can approach, or cooperate with, advocacy networks,the global media and (larger) like-minded states – actors that try on their part(alone or jointly) to shape the agenda either directly or by leveraging the broader

Figure 1: Ways for small states to influence the international agenda (author’s own illustration –

rectangles: state actors or their creations; ovals: non-state actors; rhomb: population; full lines: directaction/influence of small states; dashed lines: indirect influence).

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population. The core of advocacy networks form members of the (international) civilsociety, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Their tactics to pressurizestronger actors, for example, governments, comprise constructing strategic framesto produce substantive change. This happens in a timely and dramatic, albeit reliable,manner, often through simple right/wrong framing or the creation of powerfulsymbolic events, carried via the media. When direct lobbying against norm-violatinginstitutions is ineffective, activists also try to leverage more powerful actors, such aslike-minded states. These stronger partners can then exercise pressure on the target(‘boomerang pattern’). The tactics of advocacy networks particularly resonate ifa clear causal story points to deliberate, harmful actions of individuals rather than tostructural problems (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). As another path to shape the agenda,small states can form alliances among each other to jointly lift their internationalweight. Especially when such a coalition is based on common interests and valuestheir (framing) strategies can resemble that of advocacy networks – with thedifference that state alliances have direct access to the tables of decision-making(Larson, 2002; Betzold, 2010).

All these steps of exercising influence (at which framing along the three agenda-setting streams plays a key role) are based in human action rather than structure,hence following the foreign policy analysis approach, which, as an actor-specifictheory, emphasizes the importance of the individual in foreign politics. The approachsuggests that the world is not deterministic, as structural or traditional system-levelexplanations sometimes imply. Instead, it is up to human beings to interpretsituations and to make decisions (Hudson, 2005).

Based on this framework, one can formulate propositions about small states in theagenda-setting process. The main proposition is:

Proposition 1: Small states can and do have influence on the international agenda.

Furthermore, the following sub-propositions can be drawn:

Proposition 2: Lacking traditional means of power, small states mainly usestrategic framing to generate influence.

Proposition 3: Small states make use of other actors and institutions, particularlyalliances, advocacy networks and the media, to enhance theirinfluence.

The confirmation of these propositions would strengthen the validity of the model.The independent variable to test the propositions is the behavior of small states in theinternational arena; the dependent variable is their influence on the agenda, assessednot necessarily as tangible policy outcomes (which would be one step further thanagenda setting) but mainly as what topics are being discussed and how this happens,both in the international sphere at large as well as in concrete negotiations (forexample, within the UNFCCC).



Agenda Setting and Framing: The Examples of the Maldives andTuvalu1

This empirical part of the paper analyzes the agenda-setting and framing strategies ofthe Maldives and Tuvalu in the international arena concerning climate change. It usesthe framework developed above as a template to draw conclusions on the initialpropositions. Occasions and forums are speeches before the UN and elsewhere,UNFCCC conferences, the global media, and so on. The analysis roughly covers thetime from 2000 till mid-2011, with a focus on the last of those years. FollowingKingdon’s theory, the analysis is split into the problem, policy and political streams.It should be noted, however, that, while the streams provide a way of systematicanalysis, in practice they often overlap or feature the same actors.2

Problem recognition

Being the lowest-lying countries in the world, climate change poses an existentialthreat to Tuvalu and the Maldives. Accordingly, their representatives frame theproblem similarly by dramatically pointing to the consequences of, and responsibilityfor, the problem, which fits with Benford and Snow’s notion of diagnostic framing.

For both countries, climate change is ultimately ‘a matter of life and death’(Nasheed, 2009a; Pita, 2009). By pointing out that ‘it is certain that the climate ischanging and sea levels are rising’ (Nasheed, 2009b), they want to make clear that‘it’s not an Atlantis myth’ (Telito, 2006). Maldivian ex-president Nasheed frequentlyemphasized that ‘the science is clear, you cannot negotiate with the laws of physics,you cannot cut a deal with Mother Nature’ (for example, Nasheed, 2009c). This is anexample of frame bridging: it builds on the credibility of science and its indicators,with the goal to translate it into the message. In addition, this wording provides(prophylactic) counter-framing against deniers of global warming. Since focusingon potential future inundation often obscures the view on more pressing problems,3

SIDS – applying temporal framing to increase salience – stress that climate changecan already be felt ‘on a daily basis’ (Khaleel, 2008): ‘The winds are stronger than itused to be; the rains fall at the wrong time; the dry season is drier than before’, so that‘climatic aberration is more acute than sea level rise’ (Nasheed, 2009d). Aiming fordiagnostic framing, the main cause identified for climate change is that ‘we are livingin a manner that the planet cannot sustain’ (Nasheed, 2009e). As own emissions ofSIDS are insignificant, however, there is ‘an inverse relationship between responsi-bility and vulnerability’ (Khaleel, 2008). ‘Higher-than-normal GHG levels in theatmosphere are a legacy of development in industrialized countries. It is Tuvalu andothers having nothing to do with the causes who are now forced to pay’ (Sopoaga,2001). Although not responsible, SIDS are the ‘frontline states in this battle, as theworld has moved from the Cold War to a Warming War’ (Pita, 2007). ‘If it was

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important for Western countries to defend Poland in the 1930s, it is importantto defend the Maldives now’ (Nasheed, 2009f). This moral, sometimes war-like,language adds to the dramatic effect and can be seen as an attempt of frameamplification: particularly historic analogies tap into existing cultural values andexperiences. The image of being ‘at the front’ is mostly coupled with an extensionof the frame to enhance its salience. By stressing that climate change will ultimatelyhave ‘a catastrophic effect on all countries, not only the most vulnerable’ (Pita, 2010)the problem becomes more tangible for developed countries – the audience ofthe message. As Nasheed put it, ‘if you cannot defend the Maldives today, youcannot defend yourselves tomorrow; we cannot save London, we cannot saveManhattan. So we are all Maldivians’ (Nasheed, 2010a). Furthermore, drawing onvarious problem aspects (sequential framing), both countries emphasize that climatechange is not only an environmental, ‘but also a political, legal, health and humanrights issue, as well as a grave security issue’ (Khaleel, 2008). Threatening to ‘erodedecades of hard-won success’ (Waheed, 2010), it is thus ‘one of the greatestchallenges to achieving the Millennium Development Goals’ (Pita, 2010). Climatechange being ‘the singular most important security issue arising internationally’(Nasheed, 2009d), the ‘unprecedented threat to our nationhood would be aninfringement on our fundamental rights’ (Pita, 2007). This amplification of theframe, resting on cultural values such as human rights, is also reflected in ‘a shiftfrom a purely climate issue to an equity, security, and prosperity issue’ in thenegotiation dynamics since Kyoto.4

The Maldives and Tuvalu thus use several strategic framing types to addressthe problem and to bring the issue closer to the target groups. Ex-president Nasheed,the first democratic leader of the Maldives, was particularly vocal and enjoyedhigh credibility internationally. Speeches of politicians and diplomats, however,might not be sufficient to make the problem tangible. Focusing events and symbolscan generate higher salience. Although potential focusing events exist, for example,the flooding of the Tuvaluan capital Funafuti in 2002, there is a gap betweenthe macro-analysis (the attribution of harmful incidents to global warming ingeneral) and the micro-analysis: there are always other possible explanations in theindividual case.5 Other international topics, for example, terrorism, have the‘advantage’ of clear focusing events emotionally close to the framing targets, sothat political consequences can be directly drawn. Therefore, as a substitute, theMaldives and Tuvalu attempt to create powerful symbols, for which cooperationwith NGOs/advocacy networks and the media can be particularly helpful.

Perhaps the most prominent symbolic event happened in October 2009: theMaldivian government held an underwater meeting in scuba gear with the intentionof ‘impress[ing] upon the world that there is a serious issue over here’ (Nasheed,2009g). As two interviewees stated, ‘from a PR point of view the underwatercabinet was really well covered, it was on the front page of every newspaperworldwide’.6 The event was embedded into the Global Day of Action, organized



by climate change NGO 350.org, with which the Maldives frequently cooperates.In Nasheed’s view, ‘three-five-oh is the most important number in the world’; itrefers to 350 parts per million (ppm) CO2 in the atmosphere, a concentration not tobe exceeded to avoid severe environmental ramifications.

Another symbol of the ‘Warming War’ – especially its David versus Goliathcharacter – was the attempt of Tuvalu to sue the United States (and Australia) beforethe ICJ for their responsibility for climate change and for not having ratified Kyoto,as mentioned at the beginning of the article. Although the claim’s legal chances werealways slim and it has never been realized, the menace alone created considerablemedia resonance. It also prompted lawyers to consider the conditions under whichsuch a case could possibly be successful and hence to reflect on the rather vagueinternational law (Jacobs, 2005).

Furthermore, Tuvalu itself has become a symbol of the fight against climatechange. Owing to its conditions – consisting of tiny islands in the middle of thePacific and being virtually the smallest country on earth – and partly also due tothe often uncompromising attitude of their UNFCCC chief delegate, Australiannative Ian Fry, they draw a lot of attention. This was particularly true during the15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-15, Copenhagen 2009), whereFry temporarily brought the negotiations to a halt by intransigently demandinga comprehensive, legally binding agreement. Environmental activists joined thisdetermination (Greenpeace, 2009) and, according to Fry, the ‘strong voice of civilsociety supportive of our concerns’ was very helpful (Worldwatch Institute, 2010).As put in USA Today, underlining the symbolic role of Tuvalu, ‘nobody's a biggercelebrity than the delegation from tiny Tuvalu. [It] is often held up by the UN andothers as a pre-eminent example of a country at risk from global warming’ (Winter,2009).

In summary, through a combination of strategic framing and the use of strongsymbols – often carried via advocacy networks and the media – the Maldives andTuvalu increase the resonance to their problem, targeting actors within the policyprocess as well as the larger population. Following one interviewee who regularlytakes part in UNFCCC negotiations, ‘the problem framing of AOSIS generally isvery comprehensible and credible; overall everyone agrees with their claims’.7

Another interviewee asserts, ‘they have done really good things making peopleconscious that their existence is at stake’.8 However, for a prominent position onthe international agenda, convincing problem recognition has to be coupled withthe policy and political streams.

Policy proposals

The policy stream deals with policy alternatives developed in the background, forexample, by legal or technical experts. However, in the international arena, policy

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entrepreneurs are typically government members or diplomats who advocate possiblesolutions. As the promotion of proposals takes place in the political realm and candirectly lead into a negotiation process, for example, at the UNFCCC, policy andpolitical streams often overlap.

Apart from framing their problem similarly, as shown in the previous chapter, theMaldives and Tuvalu (and AOSIS states in general) also agree on the overall goal:the world has to sharply reduce GHG emissions to mitigate the effects of climatechange. Temperatures should ‘not increase by more than 1.5°C above pre-industriallevels’ (Ielemia, 2009) and ‘carbon pollution in the atmosphere must return to 350ppm’

9 (Nasheed, 2009h). A second focus is on adaptation, so-called ‘climate-proofing’, as they have to prepare their islands for a tougher future. They use similartemporal framing by stressing that, ‘if we fail to act now, the climate crisis willbecome a catastrophe’ (ibid.) and ‘will be felt everywhere’ (Toafa, 2004). However,the paths to achieving these goals and the way to frame possible solutions, that is,Tuvalu’s and the Maldives’ prognostic framing, differ significantly.

The Maldives stresses the importance of mitigation and adaptation, the responsi-bility of industrialized countries, and the need for higher funds to fight global warming(Nasheed, 2009i). However, in a clear and conscious case of evaluative framing, theytry to alter the reference point of climate change by ‘transform[ing] the narrative awayfrom one of burden sharing and sacrifice towards one of opportunity and incentives’.5

The aim is to increase the salience of the message and to influence the target as wellas NGOs and the media towards a more positive narrative. As former presidentNasheed continuously pointed out, ‘it is not carbon we want but development. It is notcoal we want but electricity. It is not oil we want but transport’ (for example, 2010b).Kyoto, however, ‘is primarily about what countries cannot do, rather than what theycan do. A positive agenda focusing on what we can do provides a better alternative’(Nasheed, 2009j). Consequently – although its own emissions are insignificant – in2009 the Maldives announced to become carbon-neutral by 2020. What started off asa political message quickly turned into a business-oriented narrative.5 Leading byexample, the Maldives wants to prove that ‘carbon-neutral development is not justpossible, it is in the economic self-interest’ (Nasheed, 2010c). This ‘can make a farbigger impact than blaming others for causing the problem’ (Nasheed, 2009k).Bringing the topic closer to the target through frame extension, Nasheed (2009h)stressed that ‘countries that have the foresight to green their economies today will bethe winners of the 21st century. [They] will free themselves from foreign oil andcapitalize on the green economy of the future’. However, while emphasizing theprofit-making opportunities to attract investments from renewable energy companies,the Maldives also underlines that the transformation ‘cannot be done without financialsupport from rich countries. I say to the industrialized world: you have the financesand much of the technology. Please help us go green’ (Nasheed, 2009a).

For Tuvalu, ‘calling on the world collectively is the only way to save us’.10 Theyparticularly emphasize the political and moral responsibility of the industrialized



world to act. Regarding mitigation, ‘we need serious commitments from key GHG-producing countries but also key developing countries to dramatically reducetheir emissions’ (Ielemia, 2009). To achieve this, Tuvalu proposes a global fundfor the development of renewable energy, financed following the polluter paysprinciple, that is, mostly by industrialized countries (Sopoaga, 2006). Tuvalu’smain focus, though, lies on adaptation, as demonstrated by the InternationalBlueprint on Adaptation (UNFCCC, 2007), submitted at COP-13, which took placein Bali/Indonesia in 2007. Here Tuvalu suggested (a) the ‘creation of a burden-sharing mechanism’, financed through a levy on international aviation and maritimetransport, since it is seen as ‘clear that financial resources for adaptation arecompletely inadequate’, and (b) ‘the establishment of an international climateinsurance pool to support the most vulnerable communities after climate-relateddisasters’ (Teii, 2008). The proposal11 – particularly its burden-sharing mechanism –

made it into the scientific (but barely into the political)7 discussion about reorganiz-ing adaptation funding (Müller, 2008). Shortly after the Maldives, Tuvalu alsoannounced to become carbon-neutral by 2020 to ‘show that if we can do it, youindustrialized and big developing countries have the financial might to do it aswell’.10 However, Tuvaluan representatives, unlike their Maldivian colleagues, keepthis message surprisingly low-key in their communication.

Apart from mitigation and adaptation, relocation is a third, albeit drastic,possibility to ‘survive’ climate change. After his election in 2008, PresidentNasheed considered ‘looking for dry land in the doomsday scenario’, that is, buyingforeign land for his people, financed through the country’s tourism revenues(Nasheed, 2009l). Making headlines worldwide, the aim was to ‘bring out the issuefor debate’. However, since relocation does not fit with the positive narrativethe Maldives is now pursuing, it was ‘not a good road to follow in terms ofcommunication’5 and erased from the script. As another interviewee confirmed,‘a focus on relocation would be inept; it would be interpreted as a confession offailure’. Therefore, the topic plays no role in the UNFCCC negotiations.7 Tuvaluanleaders also stress that ‘forcing us to leave cannot be used as a quick-fix solution’(Ielemia, 2008), but in the background the country has been working on potentialrelocation plans, for example, to New Zealand or Australia. The aim is to finda place where they can keep their self-determination and ideally also their statusas sovereign nation. According to one interviewee, ‘relocation is currently not highon the agenda but you need to have a long-term plan B’.10 Although Australiarejected such claims, New Zealand takes 75 Tuvaluans per year (New ZealandMinistry of Foreign Affairs, 2009).

In summary, Tuvalu and the Maldives – while agreeing on the importance of bothmitigation and adaptation – pursue different solutions. Whereas Tuvalu stressesthe ‘[polluters’] moral responsibility to the entire globe’ to act,10 the Maldives tellsa more positive narrative about the opportunities of going green. The dissimilaritymight stem from different capacities that the countries dispose of; the (albeit small)

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Maldives can develop a more sophisticated solution than extremely small Tuvalu.7

Both framings are credible, though: the Maldivian approach seems to stick betterwith other governments, in whose view ‘a more constructive dialogue is useful’.8

However, sharing the same opponent, Tuvalu’s more black/white, but indeedconsistent and intuitively understandable approach is able to get resonance particu-larly from advocacy groups, as already shown in the section on the problem stream.In the following political stream the framing of problems and solutions has to bebundled and enriched with political skills to gain agenda influence.

Politics

Within agenda setting, the political stream has a life of its own but is also crucial forthe opening of windows of opportunity, where problems, policies and politicsconjoin. Therefore, policy entrepreneurs try to influence the factors of this stream,for example, decision-makers and the public mood, in order to open a window andpush agenda items. A difference has to be drawn between the political level,where leaders decide on the overall direction, and the working level, where con-crete measures are being negotiated. The main institutions regarding climatechange are the UNFCCC conferences, but venues such as the (informal) CartagenaDialogue also provide space for action.

The Maldives and Tuvalu can act independently to open windows of opportunityand gain impact on the agenda, but also through alliances, especially AOSIS, andwith the support of advocacy networks. Certain (structural) circumstances, however,they cannot influence at all, such as government changes in powerful countries or theSino-US interaction.

Tuvalu often plays a controversial role internationally, using clear, moral-basedframing. Following a Tuvaluan diplomat: ‘We take it to the highest political level.Our position is not something to appease countries like the USA. We take it becauseof what we are concerned about, our people. It’s not that we are making it up’.Tuvalu’s main reason for joining the UN in 2000 was to get a voice in theinternational arena.10 However, they ‘observe with disappointment the absenceof global leadership’ (Ielemia, 2008), a feeling that became obvious in Copenhagen2009. Tuvalu was one of the few countries not to sign the (rather vague) CopenhagenAccord: ‘We had to stop that. We can’t sign on to this. What are we going to tell ourpeople? It would be a sin’.10 During the COPs, as mentioned previously, Tuvalu’sdelegate Ian Fry represents their positions intransigently. Western governmentsperceive ‘the appearance of Tuvalu often [as] too extreme and not conducive to goalattainment’.7 From an NGO perspective, though (while also doubting Tuvalu’spolitical traction) it is seen as ‘an advantage to have a vocal person like Fry. OtherPacific nations would like to say similar things but are not able to’. Tuvalu’spertinacity, together with the clear position of other AOSIS members, might have had



indirect agenda impact, since log-rolling by larger states would otherwise havebeen even more likely.3

According to all interviewees, the Maldives is seen as ‘very salient and credible onthe political level’. This was mainly due to the constructive, sometimes also bold,attitude of former president Nasheed, a policy entrepreneur demonstrating ‘moral andpolitical leadership’.12 Nasheed cooperated with everyone who favors a low-carbonfuture, aiming at bonding with like-minded states and opening windows ofopportunity for his ideas. He applied different strategies to frame his country’sproblems and policies, as described above, and did not always stick to traditionaldiplomatic conventions: ‘He made clear he is prepared to take big risk withMaldives’ international relations’,5 for example, when being very critical about theposition of the G77,13 particularly ‘telling China that they are not only a developingcountry but also a main emitter’.14 However, Nasheed also tried to win over largercountries by saying that ‘there is no limit to American ingenuity’ in inventing greentechnologies, or ‘if China shows leadership, others will follow’ (Nasheed, 2009a).It can be regarded as a success of AOSIS states and the Maldives in particularthat ‘the G77, especially China and India, have become more constructive sinceCopenhagen’,15 even if possibly only for tactical reasons, as they did not want tobe regarded as ‘the block’ anymore. To achieve this it was ‘important to have a voiceinside the G77’.8 Despite the Maldives’ strength on the political level, though, ‘thereis a gap in terms of what we do constructively within the negotiation processbecause we don’t have really good negotiators’.16

For true agenda influence, ‘you have to be good in politics as well as innegotiations on working level’.8 The Maldives, Tuvalu and other SIDS have severecapacity problems particularly regarding the latter. Following one interviewee,‘you need people who got training in international law and who sit in meetingsand understand every single detail’.5 This is crucial when a window of opportunityopens – for example, through political action – so that fast, knowledgeable reactionis required. Consequently, SIDS formed AOSIS to collectively gain representationat the UNFCCC. ‘The fact that AOSIS exists is the only way these states have a realvoice because none of them individually could pursue these things. AOSIS has justthe capacity to follow basically every line of the discussion’.5 Another intervieweestates that ‘despite limited capacity, AOSIS is very visible and professional and istaken seriously. By focusing on a few topics, they follow a clear agenda’, such asthe claim for ambitious mitigation targets – especially limiting global warmingto 1.5°C – and the recognition of the importance of adaptation and related funding.17

In both areas AOSIS can record some success, since the Copenhagen Accord(UNFCCC, 2009) and the Cancún Agreements (UNFCCC, 2010) emphasizestronger adaptation measures and announce, albeit vaguely, to consider the 1.5°Cgoal in 2015. As one interviewee stresses: ‘The opinions of frontline states suchas Tuvalu and the Maldives enjoy high respect within AOSIS’, so AOSIS’ overallgoals match those of Tuvalu and the Maldives.10 In the discussion about a Kyoto

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succession protocol AOSIS is also recognized as ‘an important player of highreputation’.7 Furthermore, having a louder voice together, island states can claimsome success in the political sphere, for example, the UN General Assembly’sadoption of the resolution on ‘Climate change and its possible security implications’(UN, 2009), introduced by the Pacific SIDS within AOSIS.

Another relevant forum is the so-called Cartagena Dialogue, which grew out ofdisappointment with Copenhagen. It is an informal process, bringing together around30 like-minded countries from all continents dedicated to low-carbon policies.18 Itis the first forum for industrialized and developing countries in the area of climatechange that crosses traditional negotiating groups. Linking actors with similar ideas,it is characterized by cooperation and progressive discussions. Participants feed intothe UNFCCC process but also reflect on broader topics, for example, the future ofthe UN climate system in general. Owing to its goal to become carbon-neutral, theMaldives – which can claim some credit for co-founding the process – plays animportant role in the group.19

Advocacy networks and NGOs support SIDS by providing legal and technicalexpertise and through campaigns (for example, during COPs) and events (forexample, 350.org’s yearly Global Day of Action – ‘the planet’s most widespreadday of political action’ (CNN, 2009)). They focus especially on mitigation andworry that polluting countries, instead of implementing serious mitigation measures,distract SIDS with the promise of adaptation funding.3 Owing to its conditions,climate change is a tricky field for advocacy networks. They can apply some tacticssuch as information and symbolic politics; however, it is difficult to leverage like-minded states for pressuring norm-violators, as the culprits are the most powerfulactors themselves. In addition, climate change is a structural problem rather than onethat can be tied to deliberate, harmful actions of individuals. This distinguishes it, forexample, from human rights, where often smaller states (and concrete individualsin there) are the violators that can be pressured materially or morally by powerfulactors. The ‘boomerang pattern’ is therefore less effective in the field of globalwarming. Hence, networks mainly focus on capacity and network building of theisland communities themselves, for example, through workshops for youths,3 and onindirectly targeting (western) governments by influencing the public mood, forexample, through symbolic events. As seen in the problem stream, this fits with theefforts of SIDS to raise the issue’s salience and can lead to mutually beneficialrelationships, such as the one between the Maldives and 350.org. President Nasheedregularly took part in discussions about the NGO’s strategy and campaigns. Actingas a so-called messenger of the organization, he also prominently participated in theirGlobal Days of Action, creating symbols such as the underwater cabinet.20 Tuvaludoes not have the capacity for permanent cooperation with NGOs and approachesthem informally on an ad hoc basis, for example, the WWF, the Global ForestCoalition, or scientists from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Research.21 Never-theless, as mentioned before, Tuvalu gets strong support from activists particularly



during COPs. Furthermore, legal experts from the Foundation for InternationalEnvironmental Law and Development assist both AOSIS and single member states(Betzold, 2010). Activities of states and NGOs are often transported via the mediato the broader public, as seen in the problem stream. This is crucial to raise the issue’sresonance and to bring it closer to the targets in the industrialized countries. Whilethe Maldives follows a media strategy managed by an International Press Secretary,including regular op-eds and press releases to push key themes,5 Tuvalu – again dueto capacity reasons – lacks a strategy and works with the media on an ad hoc basis.21

In summary, the Maldives, particularly its ex-president, is/was seen as a credibleand constructive actor in the political arena, aiming at creating (and using) windowsof opportunity. Tuvalu’s role is more controversial. AOSIS provides SIDS witha stronger voice internationally and with capacity on the working level to seriouslytake part in negotiations, which otherwise they could hardly do. Furthermore,advocacy networks and the media support them, especially in influencing the publicmood. The following section summarizes the impact of Tuvalu and the Maldives inthe agenda-setting process, relating it to the initial propositions.

Agenda-setting influence and assessment of initial propositions

As shown throughout the paper and stated by all interviewees, the Maldives andTuvalu do have (direct and indirect) influence on the climate change negotiations andon the broader international agenda. The expectation is not that these small states can,against all structural odds, single-handedly push through an effective agreement tostop global warming. Their influence can be seen rather in how the problem isdiscussed and what solutions are considered.

Concretely, the Maldives and Tuvalu (and other SIDS) managed to furtherhighlight the topic of climate change – and the threat to their existence – on thepublic agenda, also by drawing attention from NGOs and the media. Across theglobe, people are aware of their plight. Thus, the UNFCCC conferences shiftedfrom purely environmental discussions to also including security and prosperityissues. The Maldives steers the climate narrative towards opportunities rather thansacrifices, which falls on fertile ground, for example, within the Cartagena Dialogue.Supported by AOSIS, they shifted the G77 out of a hard-line towards a moreconstructive position, and achieved the recognition of adaptation as equallyimportant as mitigation and the mentioning of the 1.5°C limit in the officialdocuments. Furthermore, AOSIS is regarded as a serious partner in discussionsabout a Kyoto succession protocol and the future of the UN climate system ingeneral. The recognition of climate change as a security issue in the UN GeneralAssembly can also be attributed to AOSIS.22 Lastly, potentially influencingproceedings by generating a ‘non-result’, SIDS’ steadfast positions within theUNFCCC might have impeded lukewarm agreements between larger nations.

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These examples confirm the main proposition of this article that small states can anddo have influence on the international agenda.

Confirming the second proposition, strategic framing turned out to be a crucial toolfor gaining influence. Through frame amplification, frame extension and temporalframing, particularly in the problem stream, the Maldives and Tuvalu push theproblem of climate change closer to the targets, thereby increasing the credibility andsalience of their message. This is important in a world where climate change has to‘compete’ with other global topics that often feel closer or more immediate to(western) decision-makers and societies. The outspokenness of Tuvalu is motivatingto NGOs, and the Maldives’ attempt to turn the climate change narrative to oneof opportunities also shows the relevance of framing in the policy stream.

A coalition such as AOSIS strengthens small states’ voice in the political arena: itmakes a difference for other governments and the broader population whether anissue is raised by a single state or by 40 of them. In this context, it is an advantage ofAOSIS – a group of democracies with an intuitively understandable claim – that it isgenerally seen as ‘friendly’. Furthermore, an effective coalition enables small statesto seriously take part in detailed multilateral negotiations, giving them direct accessto the decision-making process, important once a window of opportunity opens.Alone, they would not have the capacity for this. AOSIS’ importance can be seen inthe agenda items just mentioned.

Advocacy networks and the media amplify the voice of small states, especiallyin framing the problem they are facing. In a constructivist process, by tellingconsistent, trustworthy stories and creating powerful symbols and events, networkscan increase the resonance of an issue and hence influence the broader public’sbeliefs. Cooperating with NGOs is a promising way for small states to increase theirradius, as the relationship of the Maldives and 350.org shows. The roles of AOSIS,advocacy networks and the media confirm the third proposition.

The analysis clearly identified Maldivian ex-president Nasheed as an active andrespected policy entrepreneur. Tuvalu’s chief climate negotiator Ian Fry playsa controversial role, but overall Tuvalu – although generally very vocal – does nothave a figure as outstanding as Nasheed used to be. The importance of individualssupports the foreign policy analysis approach, despite existing structural limitations.However, it also shows a certain dependency of small states on very few actors,a potentially dangerous situation, as the coming years now that Nasheed left officemight demonstrate.

The confirmation of all three propositions strengthens the validity of the modeldeveloped at the beginning. With the findings of the analysis, though, it can berefined: actors can be attributed more precisely to the different agenda-settingstreams. It turns out that an alliance is particularly important in the political stream,where it strengthens the voice of small states and provides capacity for detailednegotiations. Owing to their influence on the public mood, advocacy networksand the media are also important in the political stream as well as in the problem



stream, where they play a key role in supporting SIDS in framing the existentialproblem they are facing. Framing as a tool is important across the whole process.

Conclusion

Employing the case examples of the Maldives and Tuvalu in their fight against theimpact of climate change, this article showed how small states use the internationalarena to gain influence on the international political agenda and what the results ofthese efforts are. Based on a model derived from agenda-setting theory in combina-tion with strategic framing theory, foreign policy analysis and literature on advocacynetworks, the article analyzed the efforts of the two countries along Kingdon’s threeagenda-setting streams: problem recognition, policy proposals and politics.

The findings largely confirm the initial propositions that small states can and dohave influence on the agenda, especially through framing of problems and policiesand the support of alliances, advocacy networks and the media, so that they canopen, and make use of, windows of opportunity. They also confirm the claim ofMaldivian ex-president Nasheed (2010a) that ‘we can reach above our height andpunch much harder than we can ever imagine’. Through a constructivist approach, itcould be shown, therefore, that the Realist notion of hard power as the onlydeterminant of influence is not correct. The findings can also be interpreted as anindicator of global democracy, as also seemingly powerless actors can have somesay in international affairs.

The analysis revealed many similarities between the Maldives and Tuvalu,especially regarding problem framing and the overall goal they pursue. It becameclear that both, due to their small size, have capacity limits, which they can partlyovercome through the membership in an alliance. However, there are a numberof differences between them that underline the article’s character of also beinga comparative case study. The focus of their suggested policy solutions differs, withthe Maldives telling a positive narrative about the opportunities that arise whengreening the economy and Tuvalu stressing the responsibilities of the industrializedworld to act. The Maldives is generally seen as a constructive participant in theprocess and Tuvalu as more controversial. Furthermore, they vary in how intenselythey cooperate with NGOs and the media. These differences can be partly explainedby the attitudes of concretely acting individuals, in line with foreign policy analysis.However, they also point to the fact that extremely small Tuvalu has evenconsiderably less capacity to systematically work with climate activists or toparticipate in an expedient process such as the Cartagena Dialogue. Therefore,Tuvalu depends even more on the structures in which it is embedded, such asAOSIS. Moreover, the extreme vulnerability and smallness of Tuvalu possiblyenables them to speak freely. There are hardly any economic or diplomatic ties theyhave to be particularly careful of; there is no reason for overly cautious language.

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This is slightly different for the Maldives, a country that is more integrated into theglobal economy, one that advanced from the group of LDC, and where climatechange is of high, but not of absolute paramount priority.

The findings of this study suggest some possibilities for further research: theimportance of, and partly dependency on, very few individuals as policy entrepre-neurs for small states could deserve closer attention. The Maldives with and withoutNasheed as its president might constitute a case here. The sometimes extremeconduct of Tuvalu also raises a question: Do microstates act like ‘full-grown’ states,sticking to diplomatic conventions, or do they have the ‘courage born from despair’to speak freely, almost like NGOs? Furthermore, as this study aimed at analyticgeneralization, the integrated model developed for international agenda setting canbe applied to other cases. A possible example for theory testing could be the worldtrade system – a system largely tailored to the needs of powerful states. With smallcountries having difficulties to advocate their preferences (for example, within theWTO), it shows some similarities with climate change. The results of such a projectcould then support, refine or abandon the model developed in this article.

About the Author

Kevin Jaschik works as an advisor at public affairs consultancy nuances public affairsin Berlin. His area of expertise is within the energy and energy efficiency sectors,supporting the German energy transition (‘Energiewende’). From 2005 until 2009, heworked for the consultancy firm McKinsey & Company in Amsterdam with a focuson the transportation sector. Kevin Jaschik holds the title of Diplom-Kaufmann (MBAequivalent) from the University of Göttingen/Germany (2004) and a Master ofScience in International Public Policy from University College London (2011).

Notes

1 The rationale for the choice of the two cases partly followed the logic of replication: both countries aresmall, relatively poor, coral atoll nations. Both are democracies (although the circumstances ofthe resignation of former Maldivian president Nasheed in 2012 bore some markings of a coup) andbelong to the group of SIDS and AOSIS within the UN. With the highest natural points being only2 to 4 meters, they are the world’s lowest lying countries and particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels.Their conditions and the nature of the problem of climate change make them least-likely casesfor influencing the global agenda. However, there are also important differences: With only10 500 inhabitants and a total landmass of 26 km2 across nine atolls, Pacific Tuvalu is evenconsiderably smaller than the Maldives in the Indian Ocean (population: 400 000; territory: 298 km2;26 atolls or 1196 islands). Moreover, Tuvalu has the status of a least developed country (LDC),whereas the Maldives, after a period of steady growth, moved from LDC to middle-income statusin 2010. Tuvalu, therefore, represents an even less likely case, giving the article also the characterof a comparative case study.



2 To gain data about the agenda-setting and framing strategies I conducted semi-structured expertinterviews with representatives from the states concerned as the givers of the message, representativesfrom industrialized countries as the receivers, and activists from climate change NGOs as possiblyintervening third parties. The interviews were complemented by content analyses of UN GeneralAssembly speeches of representatives of the two countries, as well as speeches of former Maldivianpresident Nasheed, who used to be very vocal on the topic of climate change. A search of governmentand NGO websites complemented the analysis.

3 Interview with an activist in the Pacific region of climate change NGO 350.org, on 27 July 2011.4 Interview with two representatives of the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) on 6 July 2011.5 Interview with a climate change advisor of Maldivian ex-president Nasheed, on 22 June 2011.6 Interview with two representatives of the FCO on 6 July 2011; similar in the interview witha representative of the German Federal Ministry of the Environment (BMU) on 12 August 2011.

7 Interview with a representative of the BMU on 12 August 2011.8 Interview with two representatives of the FCO on 6 July 2011.9 The current concentration is already at 394 ppm.10 Interview with a high-ranking diplomat of Tuvalu, on 27 June 2011.11 The proposal was independently compiled by Ian Fry and UN Ambassador Sopoaga; Email exchange

with a climate change negotiator of Tuvalu, on 15 August 2011.12 Interview with a climate change advisor of Maldivian ex-president Nasheed, on 22 June 2011; similar

in the interviews with two representatives of the FCO on 6 July 2011, a representative of the BMUon 12 August 2011and an activist in the Pacific region of climate change NGO 350.org, on 27 July2011.

13 The G77 at the UN is a coalition of 131 developing countries, including China and India (and theMaldives, but not Tuvalu). It emphasizes industrialized countries’ responsibilities, requiring all climatenegotiations to remain within the UNFCCC/Kyoto process.

14 Interview with two representatives of the FCO on 6 July 2011; similar in the interview with a climatechange advisor of Maldivian ex-president Nasheed, on 22 June 2011.

15 Interview with a climate change advisor of Maldivian ex-president Nasheed, on 22 June 2011; similarin the interview with two representatives of the FCO on 6 July 2011.

16 Interview with a climate change advisor of Maldivian ex-president Nasheed, on 22 June 2011;confirmed in the interview with a representative of the BMU on 12 August 2011.

17 Interview with a representative of the BMU on 12 August 2011; similar in the interview with tworepresentatives of the FCO on 6 July 2011.

18 In contrast to the Maldives, Tuvalu does not take part, mainly due to lack of capacity.19 The importance of Cartagena was emphasized in the interviews with a climate change advisor of

Maldivian ex-president Nasheed, with a representative of the BMU and with two representatives of theFCO.

20 Interview with a climate change advisor of Maldivian ex-president Nasheed, on 22 June 2011; similarin the interview with an activist in the Pacific region of climate change NGO 350.org, on 27 July 2011.

21 Email exchange with a climate change negotiator of Tuvalu, on 15 August 2011.22 In July 2011, the UN Security Council also recognized climate change as a potential security issue;

following the interviewee from the BMU, however, this is more due to efforts of larger states, forexample, the United Kingdom.

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Small States and Climate Change