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SMALL WARS and BIG ARMIES

Richard J. Campbell

29 Feb. 2012

“In no class of warfare is a well organized and well served intelligence Department more essential than in against guerrillas”

COL C. E. Callwell, Small Wars, 1896

Last year the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas announced the

revision of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (COIN). When it was announced, I asked myself two

questions: Is a revision needed and how should be organized? That was in November, 2011.

Since then I have kept up with the progress of the revision and I’m concerned because it is

apparent to me that the revision is having problems. I say this because of the products that

have been produced related to the revision and because of the products that haven’t been

produced. Whether or not a revision is needed, what is the process, and my concerns about the

revision will be addressed one at a time. However, before I begin please allow me to introduce

myself.

My name is Richard J. Campbell and I am the Training Developer at the Counterinsurgency

Training Center-Afghanistan (CTC-A). I was offered this position after I wrote a book about

training for irregular warfare. CTC-A is a part of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-

A) and is located next to the ruins of the Taj Beg Palace just outside of Kabul. CTC-A has been

responsible for the COIN Leaders Course (CLC), District Stability Framework (DSF) Course,

AFPAK Hands and Ministerial Advisor (MAC) training, and basic and intermediate COIN training

in each of the regions of Afghanistan. The international staff is from nine different countries and

has trained roughly 60,000 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Coalition Forces in the

last year. In that same time, the Chief of Training position has been held by an Australian, US

Army, USMC, and British officer. Since the inception of CTC-A there has been an international

and multi-service influence on COIN.

For the reader that likes the bottom line up front; yes FM 3-24 should be revised because of

new research and new manuals that have been published since the last revision along with

NATO’s growing interest in more effective COIN doctrine. Off hand, I can think of three dozen

or more new reports, articles, and manuals that should have a significant impact on the content

of a revised FM 3-24. I have included a list of those documents in APPENDIX A. The list is by

no means complete. I am sure there are many new documents I missed.

If a revised FM 3-24 were published tomorrow there are perhaps three dozen or more countries

that would be directly affected the day it was released. The impact that a revised COIN manual

will have on NATO and other countries, both immediate and delayed, has to be considered.

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Why? Because to me, it is in conceivable or naïve to think that the U.S. will be involved in any

future COIN conflict by itself. It will be a mid-to-large-scale operation not unilateral; bound to be

fought in a coalition context. COIN doctrine for the U.S. can no longer be written in a vacuum.

To successfully put COIN in a box, there has to be input from other countries. Therefore, a

commonality between doctrines is the only sensible solution and that common doctrine must

include practical procedures for Soldiers’ of many nations. There is no other way to do it; other

countries must be considered and must be involved.

How should FM 3-24 be organized? There is only one way the COIN FM should be structured.

It should be arranged in a logical sequence with other proven learning techniques like vignettes

and have annexes that contain guidance about advising / mentoring. The underlying theme

should be support, assistance, building capacity, and capabilities in HN and HN security forces,

so they teach and train their own forces. We are not the counterinsurgents, they are. This

supports COIN operations within Security Assistance as defined in U.S. Code Title 22 (SA) and

U.S. Code Title 10 (SC). A logical sequence means, describe how the U.S. and maybe NATO

get involved in COIN, start to finish. For example, first the President, State Department, and

Host Nation (HN), and other country officials and foreign diplomats get involved. Then Security

Cooperation, Security Assistance, Internal Defense and Development, Foreign Internal

Defense, Humanitarian Assistance, and Stability Operations come into play. All this is

discussed before a single troop hits the ground. JP 3-24 does a good job of setting the stage

for COIN in the Executive Summary Commander’s Overview section.

In the revised FM 3-24, setting the stage should be upfront and should be a concise piece of no

more than half a dozen pages. This section should have references that lead readers to source

information. A brief explanation and the official definitions for insurgency and counterinsurgency

should be next, chapter one. After that, in a logical order, sections on shape, clear, hold, build,

and transition. The last section or appendices and annexes should contain the “how to teach”

and train HN. All the tactics, TTPs, and references for shape, clear, hold, build, transition, and

COIN enablers should be included in this area. This should not be the “how to” take charge and

solve everything section. Advising, mentoring, and coaching, and by, with, and through the HN

all have to be included. Dependency issues have to be addressed in the first phases of COIN.

That is at the Presidential, State Department, and diplomatic levels, so Soldiers are not set-up

for failure later on.

Why a logical sequence? Because that is how COIN happens in real life. A logical sequence

supports learning, understanding, and application. The separate parts and pieces and concepts

in COIN are complex enough. The conceptualization of COIN as a whole is even harder. The

FM must include proven teaching and learning methods to facilitate learning, understanding,

and application.

My first concern about the revision is COIN specific words, terms, definitions, and their use.

Many of these need to be standardized and better defined, not only for the benefit of U.S.

forces, but for the benefit of Coalition Forces and HN partners. An analysis of COIN doctrine,

conducted by CTC-A, shows that certain key words, terms, and definitions in COIN today are

not clear. The inconsistencies in doctrine are illustrated in APPENDIX B. The complete

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analysis can be found on the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

web site. The paper is titled in the following manner. Subject: FM 3-24 Revision Pre Analysis

conducted by CTC-A (1/23/2012 8:47:01 AM).

The commonalities and differences between past and present U.S. Army and USMC doctrine

and international and U.S. doctrine must also be addressed. This is my second concern. There

are lots of similarities, but there are also lots of inconsistencies in past and present and U.S.

and international doctrine. Choice pearls of wisdom can be found during a thorough review and

misconceptions, folklore, and inaccuracies can be dispelled. A brief comparison of past and

present COIN doctrine published between 1940 and 2012 is presented in APPENDIX C.

Concern number three is the target audience for the revision? This is a difficult question to

answer and may take time to research and coordinate with “Big Army” before it is solved.

Research and doctrine supports the idea of a range of COIN training that is tailored towards a

unit mission. For instance, units that do not leave the wire will need COIN training that focuses

on inside the wire COIN. Their exposure to HN and locals will be limited, but those encounters

are still very important. Whereas, a unit conducting VSO / ALP operations that stay outside of

the wire will require a more advanced level and understanding of COIN. Tier level training as

doctrine recommends, in my opinion, is the answer. The quotes from recent COIN doctrine that

support this statement are listed in APPENDIX D.

Any decision about the target audience should be based on research, data, and a thorough

analysis of the intent. To assist with this, data collected by CTC-A is included in APPENDIX E.

The numbers and characteristics displayed in the slides represent a 90-day snapshot of the

COIN Leaders Course. Perhaps this data will help.

My fourth concern is related to standardization and intent. One key example of common

doctrine is an intelligence / information collection format. None exists currently in COIN

doctrine. Therefore, my suggestion is that the ASCOPE analysis is also taught as a collection

format and added to FM 3-24, and all echelons of training doctrine. This will enable soldiers

from the U.S. and other contributing nations, to start collecting information in a targeted manner

from their arrival in the operational environment. A standardized collection format for COIN will

also facilitate analysis and fusion, and enhance the use of data-mining search engines /

databases such as CIDNE and Nexus 7. Knowledge and understanding of the civil

considerations, as they are called in U.S. doctrine, is paramount and cannot be overstated or

underestimated. The lack of a standardized collection format is a complaint that is heard quite

often and so far the issue has not been officially addressed. The suggestion for ASCOPE to be

used as a collection format as well as a method of analysis is detailed in APPENDIX F.

Lessons learned have to be incorporated in the revision too, not only from U.S. forces, but from

other countries. Currently there are discussions of drawdown and transition; this is the right

time to schedule a COIN conference in Afghanistan for the purpose of the FM revision. If not,

we are wasting an opportunity to reap the benefits of COIN knowledge from many other

countries. The planned schedule is two more VTCs, a conference in May, and completed draft

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in July 2012. Instead, I would suggest a few more VTCs, an international COIN conference in

July at CTC-A, before Ramazan, and a final draft in Sept. 2012. July would provide individuals

with time to request orders for travel. The conference could be hosted by the U.S. Army

Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell, the parent organization for the COIN center, and could include

international speakers and guests from contributing nations. I believe the time line for the

revision is self imposed by the COIN center and could be modified for such an event. The end

result would be a much better product, done right the first time, instead of a rushed product, and

potential near term rewrite.

To summarize, FM 3-24 should be revised because of numerous new manuals and research

published since the last revision and because of a growing necessity for effective COIN doctrine

worldwide. How should it be organized? In a way that promotes learning, understanding, and

application. To improve the manual certain COIN specific words, terms, and definitions should

be standardized and past and present COIN doctrine should be reviewed thoroughly for a

comprehensive revision. The designated target audience is another concern. It should be

identified. My last concerns are the standardization of important tactics, techniques, and

procedures, like information collection, and the synchronization of COIN TTPs with training

doctrine.

Any comments will be welcomed and appreciated.

Richard “Joe” Campbell NTM-A / CTC-A Training Developer International Roaming: +001 503 709-06784 - Afghan Cell: 0798109892 NIPR: richard.j.campbell@afghan.swa.army.mil Shohna ba Shohna -- Shoulder to Shoulder" Check out our websites at: http://www.ntm-a.com/ https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/CTCA/Pages/index.aspx

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APPENDIX A

Pertinent Military Concept Papers, Manuals, or Doctrine

JP 2-01 Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations (Jan 2012)

AJP-3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (Feb. 2011)

AJP-3.15 (A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering-Improvised Explosive Devices (Mar. 2011)

National Strategy for Counterterrorism (June 2011)

JP 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Nov. 2011)

JP 3-07 Stability Operations (Sep. 2011)

JP 3-0 Joint Operations (Aug. 2011)

JP 3-03 Joint Interdiction (Oct. 2011)

JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (Aug. 2011)

JP 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations (Jun. 2011)

JP 3-05 Special Operations (Apr. 2011)

JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (Aug 2011)

JP 3-07 Stability Operations (Sep. 2011)

ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations (2011)

Personnel Recovery, JAPCC (Jan 2011)

Joint Operating Concept, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats (May 2010)

JP 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense (Jul. 2010)

TC 2-50.5 Intelligence Officer’s Handbook (Jan. 2010)

National Security Strategy (May 2010)

JP 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense (Jul. 2010)

AJP-3.4 (A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (2010)

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Germany, Preliminary Basics, COIN (2010)

Doctrine for COIN at the Tactical Level, France (2010)

AJP-3.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (Jan. 2009)

JP 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (Jun 2009)

JP 3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (Mar. 2009)

JP 3-26 Counterterrorism (Nov. 2009)

JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations (2009)

JP 3-06 Joint Urban Operations (Nov. 2009)

British Army FM vol. 1 part 10 Countering Insurgency (2009)

JDP 3-40 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (UK Nov. 2009)

FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency (2009)

Australian Army, LWD 3-0-1, COIN (2009)

Australian Army, LWP-G 0-2-6, Counterinsurgency Junior Leaders Handbook (2009)

Canada, Counter-Insurgency Operations (2008)

Pertinent Journal Articles, Reports, or Books

Assessing Freedom of Movement, Connable, Campbell, Loidolt & Fisher, RAND (2012)

Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police, JCOA (2012)

Occasional paper, Counterinsurgency Scorecard, Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to the

Insurgencies of the Past 30 years, Paul, RAND (2011)

Relative to the Insurgencies of the Past 30 Years, Christopher Paul, RAND (2011)

Building Partner Country Capacity for Stability Operations, Marquis, Moroney, Beck, Eaton,

Hiromoto, Howell, Lewis Lynch, Neumann, Thurston, RAND (2011)

Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional Family, A military Perspective on Coalition Challenges During

Stability Operations, Glenn, RAND (2011)

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Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations, Marquis,

Moroney, Beck, Eaton, Hiromoto, Howell, Lewis Lynch, Neumann, Thurston, RAND (2010)

How Insurgencies End, Connable, and Libicki, RAND (2010)

Military Capacities for Hybrid War Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and

Gaza, Johnson, RAND (2010)

Stabilization From the Bottom Up, Jones, RAND (2010)

Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies, part 1 & part 2,

Paul, Clarke & Grill, RAND (2010)

Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970

and 2003-2006. Long, RAND (2008)

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APPENDIX B

The intent of the analysis of U.S. and NATO COIN doctrine was to see if specific keys words

and terms and meanings were adequately explained. The results indicated that they were not.

Examples were; “insurgency”, “COIN”, “stability”, “partnering”, “information”, and “intelligence”.

The second intent was to determine whether or not important terms or concepts were used

consistently, again they were not. The selected concepts were not well embedded in doctrine.

Examples included; “oil spot”, “irregular warfare”, or “irregular activity”, “information collection”,

“information and intelligence”, “stability operations”, and “information collection and partnering”.

The third goal was to see whether or not the selected vocabulary was linked effectively to select

U.S. training doctrine, e.g., common tasks, warrior tasks, and the universal task list. The

selected words and terms were not cross referenced with COIN doctrine. The fourth goal was

to determine whether, or not there were redundancies, or gaps. There were no redundancies,

but there did seem to be gaps in COIN doctrine and the selected words, terms, concepts, and

the definitions.

Fig 1: Key Word Usage

AJP-3.4.4 JP 3-24 FM 3-24 FM 3-24.2

Insurgency: 287 507 322 307

COIN: 40 129 123 223

Information: 130 346 271 230

Intelligence: 110 387 398 196

Partnering: 7 0 *0 **2

Partnership: 0 0 2 9

Stability: ***36 24 17 49

* Host Nation Partners 5 times; ** Host Nation Partners 3 times; *** Instability 18 times

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Fig 2 : Key Words Defined

Insurgency: Defined Defined Defined Defined

COIN: Defined *Defined *Defined *Defined

Information: Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined

Intelligence: Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined

Partnering: Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined

Partnership: Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined

Stability: Not defined Not defined Not defined Defined

* Joint Definition

AJP-3.4.4 JP 3-24 FM 3-24 FM 3-24.2

Fig 3 : Key Term Usage

Oil Spot: *Once Not used Not used **Once

Irregular Warfare: Not used 9 3 3

Irregular Activities: 19 Not used Not used Not used

Info Collection: 0 Once Once Twice

Info and Intelligence: ***Once @ Not well defined 3 Not used

Stability 0perations: @@ 0 23 20 67

Info Collection & Partnering: Not used Not used Not used Not used

* ”Consists of two phases” AJP 3.4.4; ** This type of operation was used successfully in Algeria and Indochina by the French, who called it tache d’huile; in Malaysia by the British, who referred to it as "The Briggs Plan; and in Tal Afar by the Americans, who named it "clear-hold-build.“; ***”the successful collection and management and analysis of information to produce intelligence is complex” AJP 3.4.4; @ “During COIN operations actionable intelligence is often based on information gathered from people.” JP 3-24 ; @@ Stability Activities (Used but not defined) AJP 3.4.4

AJP-3.4.4 JP 3-24 FM 3-24 FM 3-24.2

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Fig 4 : Key Terms Defined

AJP-3.4.4 JP 3-24 FM 3-24 FM 3-24.2

Oil Spot: Defined Not defined Not used Defined

Irregular Warfare: Not used Defined Not defined Defined

Irregular Activities: Defined Not defined Not used Not defined

Info Collection: Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined

Info & Intelligence: Not defined *Not defined **Not defined ***Not defined

Stability 0perations: Defined Not defined Defined Defined

Info Collection & Partnering: @ Not defined Not well defined Not well defined

* Information Operations and Intelligence Operations were in Glossary of JP 3-24 ** Information Environment and Information Operations were in the Glossary of FM 3-24*** Information Engagement and Information Warfare were in the Glossary of FM 3-24.2@ Not used but Information Activities and Intelligence Operations were in glossary of AJP 3.4.4

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APPENDIX C

A review of fourteen international COIN manuals published between 1940 and 20111 was

conducted and three basic research questions pertaining to information collection were asked.

The answers that were discovered indicate that COIN doctrine can be improved by better

defining and then standardizing the process of information collection. Correcting this shortfall

would improve Command and Control (C2), situational awareness (SA), and the commander’s

Common Operating Picture (COP). The questions and answers are listed in Fig 1, 2, and 3.

International doctrine (COIN as well as conventional) is clear that the collection, processing, and

dissemination of information is vital to the underlying mission. True of every environment, but

especially within the human terrain of COIN, real understanding cannot be over estimated. This

understanding must be arrived at as quickly as possible but will then be added to and refined

over the passage of time. This understanding is vital in driving the type of and location of

operations, driving KLEs and shuras, helping to understand who and where the enemy forces

are, and understanding the core grievances and root causes of the insurgency from within the

population. All soldiers2 therefore have to be aware of this and know how to do it. Below is a

non-exhaustive list of examples of the information that needs to be collected:

a. information on security, the military, policing, organized groups, and the

insurgency;

b. enemies, adversaries, and supporters of the state;

c. cultural, social, and religion;

d. transportation, industrial activities, agriculture, economy, infrastructure, and other

financial assets;

e. natural resources, topography, the climate, and the environment;

f. information technologies, media, how order and justice are maintained, politics,

the government, and key players;

g. the countries problems, capabilities, aspirations, and current conditions.

1 In the meta-analysis of this data we examined 14 COIN doctrine texts in an attempt to correlate information about information /

intelligence collection and find commonalities and themes. A similar approach was used by Connable and Libicki in their Rand

publication titled, How Insurgencies End (2010). In that particular book 89 different insurgency case studies were reviewed and the

outcomes were examined.

2 Soldier, marine, sailor, airman, and every small unit leader, planning staff, and commander

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Fig 1: Are Info & Intel Collecting Recurring Themes?

AJP-3.4.4 (2011) : Intel is an essential pillar of COIN (p 3-22) Understanding the insurgent & the

environment requires emphasis on intel which is an essential precondition for success (p 5-3)

German COIN (2010) : Special importance must be attached to military intel Ops in the info

environment & civil-military Ops (p 11)

French Doctrine (2010) : Intel is at the heart of COIN providing the command with a means of

understanding enemy forces & their environment (p 55) In COIN intel guides the action (p 16)

JP 3-24 (2009) : Intel drives Ops & successful Ops generate additional intel (p xviii)

British FM (2009) : Intel is essential in any Ops but especially so in COIN (p 1-2)

FM 3-24.2 (2009) : COIN force must place counterintelligence Ops intel collecting & intel analyses

as a high priority (p 2-25)

Australian COIN (2009) : In a COIN campaign success or failure will be influenced by the

effectiveness of intel (p 5-1)

Canada COIN (2008) : Info & intel must be exploited in a systematic & thorough manner (p 3-7)

FM 3-24 (2006) : Effective Ops are shaped by timely specific & reliable intel gathered & analyzed at

the lowest possible level & disseminated throughout the force (p 1-23)

FMI 3-07.22 (2004) : The key to success is effective & actionable intel at the local level (p 3-8)

FM 90-8 (1986) : Tactical intel is the key to defeating the guerrilla (p 3-6) Without intel sources the

chances of success (particularly offensive Ops) are limited (p 3-6)

FMFM 8-2 (1967) : Accurate detailed & timely intel is essential for successful Ops against guerrilla

forces (p 27)

FM 31-16 (1963) : Successful counterguerrilla Ops by the brigade & subordinate units require

accurate detailed & timely intel (p 92)

USMC (1940) : In no type of warfare is the latest current info more vital (2-15, p 20)

Figure 1

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Fig 2: What Types of Info & Intel Are Important?

AJP-3.4.4 (2011) : To enable a greater understanding of these conditions … the OE is theoretically

divided into 6 discrete environments: political, human, physical, security, info & economic (p 2-4)

German COIN (2010) : Analyzing the needs of population & its cultural has great importance (p 7)

French COIN (2010) : Adaptation requires the proper identification of the characteristics in the

theater of Ops (political, economic, social, religious & tribal) (p 18)

JP 3-24 (2009) : Understanding an insurgency’s motivations, breadth of activity, support & core

grievances is essential (pg. xi) collection focuses on the populace, insurgents & HN (p V-4)

British COIN (2009) : Understanding of the historical background of the insurgency (p 5-5)

FM 3-24.2 (2009) : Terrain & enemy are still essential considerations, but the societal component

of the COIN environment is considered more closely & throughout the operational process (p A-3)

Australia COIN (2009) : Intel will facilitate an understanding of OE & its key human factors (p 5-18)

Canada COIN (2008) : Intel & assessment must include; Political, military, economic, social,

religion, info, infrastructure, (PMESII) environment, history & culture (p 2-5)

FM 3-24 (2006) : COIN Ops require a detailed understanding of sociocultural factors & civil factors

from 3 perspectives: the population, the insurgent & the counterinsurgent (p VIII-8, Sec. B)

FMI 3-07.22 (2004) : In COIN Ops, civil considerations are prominent in IPB analysis (p 2-6)

FM 90-8 (1986) : Terrain & climate are important factors, the political, sociological & economic

aspects of the environment take on added importance (p 2-2)

FMFM 8-2 (1967) : Detailed intel is required of the: guerilla force, civil population & terrain (p 28-31)

FM 31-16 (1963) : A basic essential of counterguerilla Ops is a thorough understanding of the

target area & society in all its aspects (p 92)

USMC (1940) : Past & present political, economic, classes & distribution of population; psych of

the inhabitants; military geography, general & physical; & the military situation (p 1)

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Fig 3: How to List, Catalog, Classify, Categorize Info & Intel

AJP-3.4.4 (2011) : Actors; 4 categories based on aims methods & relationships including

positive, neutral, negative & hostile (p 2-6) important to list in detail opposing actors (p 5-6)

German COIN (2010) : Changes in public opinion, realignment of forces & preparation of INS

activities is crucial for the planning & implementation of both civilian & military measures (p 11)

French COIN (2010) : Proper characteristics; political, economic, social, religious & tribal (p 18)

JP 3-24 (2009) : 4 groups comprise COIN OE: population, adversaries, friendly elements & neutral

actors … PMESII perspective add depth & clarity (VIII-4)

British COIN (2009) : Human terrain: sociology, political, geography, region, linguistics & Intel

FM 3-24.2 (2009) : Civil considerations: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people &

events, (ASCOPE) (p 1-8)

Australia COIN (2009) : 6 dimensions: political, info actions (IA), military, economic, physical &

human & societal (p 4-3)

Canada COIN (2008) : (PMES-II) context, power structures, influences & motives of insurgency &

how best to pre-empt, dislocate & disrupt insurgency & its goals (p 2-5)

FM 3-24 (2006) : 6 categories into which info is grouped for military Ops (METT-TC) (p 3-3)

FMI 3-07.22 (2004) : METT-TC, mission, enemy, terrain & weather, troops & support, time & civil

considerations, major categories into which relevant info is grouped (p 4-2)

FM 90-8 (1986) : 2 categories of info are important: combat info & intel (p 6-16)

FMFM 8-2 (1967) : Create records & develop / maintain info; civil population & guerilla force (p 32)

FM 31-16 (1963) : List of possible guerrilla targets must be maintained (p 51) personality files on

guerrilla commanders, guerrillas, members, underground & civilian support (p 96)

USMC (1940) : A convenient method is classify the info under the headings in the intel report (p

32) recorded in an orderly fashion preliminary to the preparation of the intel report (2-16 p 32)

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APPENDIX D

Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular ThreatsJoint Operating Concept, v.2.0 (2010)

joint force should adopt a layered/tiered approach to cultural awareness and language skills. Some personnel get all the requisite training/education, some personnel receive additional specialized training, and a third smaller tier receives the most highly specialized .

incentivize and track personnel, both active duty and reserve, with critical IW skills and experience (e.g., trainer advisor billets; interagency assignments; foreign area officers; or civil affairs related specialties such as agricultural planning, water treatment, and public

administration experience). Incentives could include career-level or re-enlistment bonuses, precepts to PME education, promotion, and command selection boards, as well as other career enhancing assignments.

New training techniques and technologies can enhance the ability of the joint force to develop, increase, and maintain the proficiency required to address both irregular and regular threats.

Allied Joint Doctrine for COIN, AJP - 3.4.4 (2011)training and competency required for precision strikes in COIN are more demanding than for traditional warfare.

CI/HUMINT specialists who have not only extensive military training but also a detailed knowledge of the OP environment and its complexities in such areas as the theatre of operations, the relevant societies and cultures, and the opposing groups.

Security sector Support: In the early (and preparatory) stages of a campaign this may demand a high level of investment in security training.

demands very detailed preparation and requires special training for military forces to react spontaneously to ambushes, obstacles, IEDs and attacks with indirect fire assets.

To be effective, advising requires specially trained personnel.

JP 3-24 COIN (2009)Training of forces within the coalition for specific mission standards enhances unified action. The coalition should consider establishing

common training modules or certification training to ensure assigned forces are trained for the missions assigned.

MARSOF can support COIN operations by providing a foreign military training unit that provides tailored military combat skills training and advisor support for identified foreign forces.

training and competency required for precision strikes in COIN are more demanding than for traditional warfare.6

[16]

APPENDIX E

The statistics on the following charts (Fig 1, 2 & 3) were collected in November and December

2011 and January 2012. The 90-day snapshot of CLC students shows that the largest groups

of attendees were mentors, advisors, special staff, augmented individuals, and BDE staff.

Ranks present, in order of prevalence, were MAJ, civilians, CPTs, LTC, and SSgt. The majority

of CLC participants were mostly assigned to category 1 and 2 units that either rarely traveled off

base in Afghanistan or occasionally traveled off base. COIN training should be tailored to these

categories of units. This is supported in doctrine (Fig 4).

The COIN Leaders course was specifically designed for mid-grade officers and planning staff.

This target audience was viewed as the conduit between the commander and commander’s

intent and the units and individuals that would be accomplishing the commander’s intent. This

group of officers and NCOs were viewed as key individuals who must be knowledgeable about

COIN concepts and planning processes and educated about the COIN enablers and limitations.

140 AARs

Fig 1 : CLC – 90 Day Data

POC Campbell CTC-A

2012 Feb 0798109892

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Fig 2 : 2 CLC – 90 Day Data

POC Campbell CTC-A

2012 Feb 0798109892

140 AARs 248 Students

Fig 3 : CLC – 90 Day Data

POC Campbell CTC-A

2012 Feb 0798109892

[18]

APPENDIX F

To improve the collection of information in a COIN conflict, DoD should formalize and

standardize the application of ASCOPE. ASCOPE should be taught not only as a method of

analysis, but as a collection format. The collection, analysis, display, verification, and

dissemination of intelligence are time consuming processes. The ASCOPE format could reduce

this time. For example, the 5 Ws (who, when, what, where, why, how and how long) should be

utilized for each letter of the ASCOPE. This would greatly improve the quantity and quality of

gathered information. The following is an example of the format and explanation.

FIG 1 : ASCOPE COLLECTION FORMAT

Area

Structures

Capabilities

Organization

People

Events

Who When What Where Why How & How

Long

With the ASCOPE collection format each letter of ASCOPE uses who, when, what, where, why,

how and how long. When the ASCOPE format is used, information about the civil

considerations is preprocessed at the lowest level. Information is categorized into the various

ASCOPE topics during collection. Every patrol report, AAR, BDA, and SITREP that contains

any information about the civil considerations should report the information in the same manner.

The most important information is up front, the person or persons involved, when is next, or the

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time date group, since information in COIN is perishable. Then details about what occurred, or

what was observed, where it happened, why, and how it happened, and how long has it been

occurring are asked. The ASCOPE format is not an algorithm. It does not have to be followed

step by step like a math problem. If there isn’t any information about a certain part or parts of

the format, it can be skipped. Every section of format does not have to be filled out every time it

is used. The format is flexible. The ASCOPE format is next and then some examples of

questions that would be asked while using the format are presented.

A = Area: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?

S = Structure: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?

C = Capability: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?

O = Organization: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?

P = People: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?

E = Event: who, when, what, where, why, how and how long?

A = Areas are localities or physical terrain that have direct impact on the population and its

activities. Examples include tribal regions, police districts, political boundaries, religious

boundaries, territorial boundaries, military boundaries, polling stations, and government centers.

Areas are where the population congregates. (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-12)

Who lives there or uses the area, areas, or physical terrain? Who owns the area? Who

moves through the area? Who will not go through the area? When do they live there?

When did they get there? What are the exact boundaries, limits, or markings, and what

is the direct impact on the population? Where did they come from and where are they

now? Why do they live there, and? Why did they leave the area? How do they secure

the area? How long has the area been used, how long has the population lived there,

how long are they expected to stay, and how long has the area or terrain had a direct

impact on the population?

S = Structures are existing important infrastructure. Examples include hospitals, bridges,

communications towers, power plants, dams, jails, warehouses, schools, television stations,

radio stations, and print plants. For COIN, some cultural structures may be even more vital,

such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and museums. Analysis of these structures

includes determining why they are important with respect to their location, functions,

capabilities, and application. (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-12)

Who uses the structures? Who built the structure? Who owns the structure? Who

provides security for the structure? When are they used? When were they built?

When were they destroyed? What are the locations, functions, capabilities, and

application of the structures? What the structures significance? Where are they in

relations to other structures and areas? Why are the structures important to one group

than another group? Why does a group use them? How long have the structures been

there? How long have they been inoperable?

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C = Capabilities are key functions and services and include, but are not limited to,

administration, safety, emergency services, food distribution, agricultural systems, public works

and utilities, health, public transportation, electricity, economics, and commerce. Sewage,

water, electricity, academic, trash, medical, and security (SWEAT-MS) are the essential

services local authorities must provide. This analysis must include who is officially and

unofficially responsible for these functions and services. (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-12)

Who is officially and unofficially responsible for these functions and services? What

makes them key functions? When are the capabilities available, functional hours, days,

and dates and so on? What are the limitations of the capacities, capabilities, and

limitations of the capabilities? Where are the capabilities? Why are they key functions?

How do the capabilities impact the community or area? How are the capabilities

secured? How are the capabilities paid for? How long has this capacity been

available? Or how long has this function not been available?

O = Organizations can be religious, fraternal, criminal, media, patriotic or service, and

community watch groups. They include media, IGOs, NGOs, merchants, squatters, and other

groups. Counterinsurgents must understand what organizations are important. (JP 3-24, pg.

VIII-12)

Who, belongs to the group? Who doesn’t belong to group? Who funds the group?

When, does the group meet? What, does the group do or what do they represent?

What is the goal of the group? What is the history of the group? Where, does the

group meet and how often? Why, was the group formed? Why does the group stay

together? How, did the group form? How long has the group been formed? How long

have certain people been in the group?

P = People include all nonmilitary personnel in the AOI. Analysts must consider historical,

cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors when examining a given

population. Any affiliations may have tremendous effect on the local population’s support to an

insurgency, including areas where people and insurgents may transit, retreat, evade, or hide. In

addition to sociocultural factors, JIPOE must determine how people communicate, who are key

communicators, and other formal and informal processes used to influence the population. (JP

3-24, pg. VIII-12)

Who are those people? Who is that person? Who is that person related to? What,

does that person do? When, did that person move here? When did that person leave

here? What is that person’s position in the community? What tribe is he from? Where

did he move from or come from? Why is he the head of the community? Why, is he or

she here? How, did he get here? How did he become the head of the community?

How long has he been here? How long has he been gone?

E = Events are routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that significantly affect the

OE. Some examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections, changes in government, key

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leader succession, economic reforms, political reforms, holidays, observances, anniversaries of

key historical events, riots, and trials. Events may spur an increase or decrease in insurgent

attacks. JIPOE must determine when events are occurring and analyze the events for their

political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications. (JP 3-24, pg. VIII-12)

Who, goes to, or attends the events? Who benefits from the event, or who does the

event support? Who arranged the event? Who supports the event? When, does the

event occur, or how often does it occur? Where, does the event take place? What is

the significance of the event? What is the reason for the event? Where are the

boundaries of the event? Where is the event in relationship to other events or activities?

Why, is the event important? Why is the event taking place where it is and when it is?

And how, is the event organized? How is it funded? How is it provided logistical

support? How long has it been a routine? How long does that event or holiday take?

The ASCOPE collection format can easily be incorporated into the SMCT, the Universal Task

List, and into any MOS task list. The ASCOPE mnemonic, as an information collection format,

helps a person, or unit organize a large amount of detailed information. The presorted

information assists the fusion of the intelligence and it saves man hours. The format also

standardizes civil considerations reporting, so every report is in the same format; no matter how

the report is submitted i.e. written, verbal, digits, or PowerPoint. The ASCOPE format

standardizes collection, and incorporates quality control and quality assurance into training.

The format synchronizes collection at the lower levels with information processing at higher

levels.

Observations of commanders in the field in Afghanistan support the idea that an improved

collection process is needed. It has been reported that commanders “appear overwhelmed”

when it comes to detailed knowledge of their Area of Operation (AO) and internal & external,

military and non-military enablers and partners in their battle-space. They simply don’t know

what CF and HN enablers are available, the role of the enablers, who is responsible for them,

and the capabilities of those enablers. Utilization of the ASCOPE format can be the first step

towards improved SA of HN and CF enablers and partners in a battle-space. In particular,

under the “O” for organizations, the “C” for capabilities, and the “P” for people. If the who, when,

what, where, why, how, and how long portions were added it would enhance SA.