DEFINING ‘RITUALS’

Jan A.M. Snoek

Defining the term ‘rituals’ is a notoriously problematic task. Thenumber of definitions proposed is endless, and no one seems to likethe definitions proposed by anyone else. Much of the problem iscaused by a structural misconception of what the task is, based ona generally naive conception of what a definition should be. To bespecific, it seems that almost everyone who has proposed a definitionof ‘ritual’ assumes that it has to be of the classical form: ‘Somethingis a ritual if and only if it has all of the characteristics A, B, andC’, where the number of characteristics, as well as which ones arechosen, is variable from one definition to another. However, analy-sis of an arbitrary selection of the available definitions soon revealsthat a characteristic regarded as obligatory by one scholar is rejectedby another, usually because the material with which the first one isfamiliar happens to be homogeneous with respect to this particularcharacteristic, whereas the material with which the second scholarworks shows one or more examples that lack it. In fact, looking atthe wide range of phenomena, that scholars have become inclinedto call ‘rituals’ over the last few decades, it seems highly unlikely tome that—with perhaps one or two exceptions—there is any char-acteristic that really occurs in all of them. And those that do aresurely not specific to ‘rituals’ alone. This phenomenon sometimesleads scholars to the decision either not to define ‘ritual’ explicitly(forgetting that they do have some idea of what a ‘ritual’ is any-way), or to argue against the use of the term altogether.1 Neitherattitude will help us any further, however. Yet some more advancedknowledge of modern classification theory may.

1 See, e.g., Goody 1977.

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Fuzzy Sets and Polythetic Classes

The collection of all ‘rituals’ is a class of phenomena. But there arenot only the traditional, Aristotelian, classes, which are based ononly discrete characteristics, such as the presence of feathers, orhaving eight legs. There are also so-called ‘fuzzy sets’ and ‘polytheticclasses’.

A )*++, %'- is a class of objects with a continuum of grades of mem-bership. Such a set is characterized by a membership (characteristic)function which assigns to each object a grade of membership rangingbetween zero and one.2

F*++, %'-% usually arise because one or more of the characteristicsinvolved are continuous. “For example, the class of green objects is afuzzy set. So are the classes of objects characterized by such com-monly used adjectives as large, small, substantial, significant, impor-tant, serious, simple, accurate, approximate, etc.”3

A second kind of fuzzy sets are the polythetic classes.4 Thesealso have a fuzzy border, though not because they would be basedon a continuous characteristic, but because they are based on char-acteristics that may or may not be present. Polythetic classes areopposed to monothetic classes. A class is monothetic if and only if(A) each member of the class has all the characteristics defining theclass as a whole, and (B) each of those characteristics is possessedby all of those members. A class is polythetic if and only if (A)each member of the class has a large but unspecified number of aset of characteristics occurring in the class as a whole, (B) each ofthose characteristics is possessed by a large number of those mem-

2 L.A. Zadeh, “Fuzzy Sets”, Information and Control 8 (1965), 338–353, here 338(my emphasis). Hereinafter, both the expression ‘)*++, %'-’ and actual fuzzy char-acteristics will be written in small capitals. On fuzzy sets see also Snoek 1987, 28.

3 R.E. Bellman and L.A. Zadeh, “Decision-making in a Fuzzy Environment”,Management Science 17 (1970), B141–B164, here B141. Emphasis in the original.

4 Zadeh’s definition of fuzzy sets includes polythetic classes. For example, in apolythetic class, based on a defining set of, say, 20 characteristics, members withonly 10 of those would get a membership grade of 0.50, while members with 15of the defining characteristics would get a membership grade of 0.75. But usuallythe term ‘fuzzy set’ is restricted to classes, based on continuous characteristics alone.I will conform to that habit since the methods for constructing fuzzy sets and poly-thetic classes (and classical Aristotelian classes) are very di.erent. On polytheticclasses see Snoek 1987, 29–31. Hereinafter, both the expression ‘polythetic class’and actual polythetic characteristics will be written in boldface.

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bers, and (if fully polythetic) (C) no one of those characteristics ispossessed by every member of the class.

In this context, not only classes but also characteristics are regardedas either monothetic or polythetic. A monothetic (set of ) charac-teristic(s) is present in all the members of a class. If the class is mono-thetic, this set defines the class in that combination. These characteristicsmay occur separately also in surrounding classes but if the class ismonothetic, then not in that particular combination.5 Polytheticcharacteristics, on the other hand, are not present in all membersof a polythetic class, but each occurs in a majority of them.6 If theclass is fully polythetic, the set of these characteristics defines theclass. These characteristics may occur separately also in surround-ing classes but if the class is fully polythetic, then not in that par-ticular combination.7 In formal terms: in a polythetic class, thepresence of a polythetic characteristic8 is less than (or equal to) onefor the class as a whole—but either one (present) or zero (absent)for each member of the class—whereas in a #)--. ,"(, the value ofthe membership-function based on a fuzzy characteristic9 is less than(or equal to) one for each member of the class.

There are two cases in which the use of #)--. ,"(, and/or poly-thetic classes has advantages. Firstly, it may be fully arbitrary, ifnot entirely impossible, to draw a border around a particular class,even if it would be theoretically desirable. Secondly, there may betheoretical reasons for regarding the #)--. ,"( or polythetic classas the true class in which one is interested—for example, if onewould like to study not the core of such a class of phenomena butrather precisely the more exotic forms composing its periphery, orthe overlapping of two classes (e.g. rituals and plays). However, there

5 Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary, e.g., defines a coin as (1) a piece ofmetal (2) with a distinctive stamp and (3) of a fixed value and (4) weight, (5) issuedby a government and (6) used as money. According to this definition, coins forma monothetic class, defined by a set of six monothetic characteristics. Obviously,none of these characteristics is restricted to coins. But all of them together do definecoins.

6 For example, according to Kertzer (1988, 9), “Ritual action . . . is often enactedat certain places and times that are themselves endowed with special symbolic mean-ing”. As the word ‘often’ shows, this characteristic is polythetic. Were the word‘often’ not present, the claim would have been that this characteristic is monothetic.

7 Compare R. Geesink, Scala Millettiearum (Leiden 1984), 3.8 For rituals, e.g., often taking place at specific places and/or times.9 For rituals, e.g., (/ ,/0" !"&'"" #/'0*+$-"!.

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are also disadvantages to the use of ()*++, %'-% and) polytheticclasses. For example, if a phenomenon is identified as a memberof a monothetic class, then it is certain that all characteristics notused in the identification process but part of the definition of theclass are also possessed by that item. For a polythetic class thisdoes not hold. Also, members of a polythetic class do not in allcases possess any specific features that could justify the formulationof general propositions about them.10

Definitions from the Literature

As noted above, actual definitions of ‘ritual’ found in the scholarlyliterature are usually formulated as monothetic, non-fuzzy, traditionalAristotelian classes. But do the characteristics used in such definitionsreally warrant such formulations? They do not. Four classical exam-ples of definitions of ‘ritual’ will su.ce to make this clear:

By “ritual” I mean /0'%1023'4 )&0$"5 behaviour for occasions notgiven over to technical routine, having reference to belief inmystical beings and powers.11

Ritual is a culturally constructed system of SYMBOLIC COMMUNICATION.It is constituted of /"--'0#'4 and &04'0'4 sequences of words andacts, often expressed in multiple media, 67&%' 1&#-'#- "#4"00"#8'$'#- "0' 17"0"1-'02+'4 2# 9"0,2#8 4'80'' 3, )&0$"52-,(1&#9'#-2&#"52-,), STEREOTYPE (RIGIDITY), 1&#4'#%"-2&# ()*%2&#),"#4 REDUNDANCY (REPETITION). Ritual in its constitutive features is per-formative . . .12

10 Rodney Needham, in section IV of his well-known article, “PolytheticClassification: Convergence and Consequences” (Man 10 (1975), 349–369, esp.357 :.), strongly argued against the usefulness of polythetic definitions of terms insocial anthropology, as opposed to the natural sciences (in fact, biology). I do notagree with his presentation of the facts. On the one hand, his assumption that bio-logical data would always be hard evidence is naive. On the other, it does notbring us one step further to dispense deliberately with polythetic definitions for thehumanities and instead contrive a monothetically defined, formal theoretical termi-nology for application “to classes of social facts that are extensively polythetic” (366).Ten years later, commenting on “Wittgenstein and Ritual”, Needham adopted amuch more positive view of the usefulness of polythetic classification for the definitionof ‘ritual’ (Needham 1985; see the abstract of this article in the bibliography). RonaldGrimes, too, advocates a “family characteristics” approach (1990, 13–15). Althoughhe does not mention it, this is in fact Wittgenstein’s terminology for what are nowgenerally called ‘polythetic characteristics’.

11 V.W. Turner 1967, 19.12 Tambiah 1979, 119.

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[I define] ritual as SYMBOLIC behavior that is socially STANDARDIZED

and repetitive. . . .R$()*+ *-($.% /*, * #.'0*+ 1)*+$(2 (. $(. I(#.++.3, /$&/+2 ,(')-()'"!, STANDARDIZED ,"1)"%-", and is oftenenacted at certain places and times THAT ARE THEMSELVES ENDOWED

WITH SPECIAL SYMBOLIC MEANING. Ritual action is REPETITIVE and,therefore, OFTEN REDUNDANT, but (/"," 4"'2 #*-(.', ,"'4" *, $05.'-(*%( 0"*%, .# -/*%%"+$%& "0.($.%, &)$!$%& -.&%$($.%, and orga-nizing social groups.13

[Rappaport takes] the term ‘ritual’ to denote the performance of 0.'".' +",, INVARIANT ,"1)"%-", .# #.'0*+ *-(, *%! )(("'*%-", %.("%($'"+2 "%-.!"! 62 (/" 5"'#.'0"',.14

I have indicated here which characteristics I regard15 as polythetic,#)772, or BOTH, and, as can be seen at once, these are by far themajority. The four definitions given here are by no means excep-tions in this respect. Sometimes, though certainly not always, theauthors themselves already indicate the polythetic or fuzzy nature ofthe characteristics they use—for example, by the use of such wordsas ‘often’ for polythetic, or ‘in varying degree’, ‘more or less’, or‘highly’ for #)772 characteristics. This indicates the solution to theproblem, namely to accept explicitly that (almost all) the character-istics of the class of phenomena usually called ‘rituals’ in fact areeither polythetic or #)772 or even BOTH. Once this is accepted, thetask is no longer to search for the few essential characteristics of ‘rit-uals’, which unambiguously distinguish between them and everythingelse, but rather to sum up as large as possible a collection of charac-teristics which are typical for most rituals, or at least for those beingconsidered in a particular project.16 Before demonstrating how thiscould look, however, it is first necessary to decide which conceptshould be indicated with the term to be defined.

13 Kertzer 1988, 9.14 Rappaport 1999, 24.15 Which characteristic one regards as polythetic or fuzzy depends on which phe-

nomena one is or is not willing to exclude from, or include in, the class of rituals.Thus, this choice is, at least partly, unavoidably a subjective one.

16 On di8erent projects requiring di8erent definitions, see M. Introvigne: “Religionas Claim: Social and Legal Controversies”, J.G. Platvoet and A.L. Molendijk (eds),The Pragmatics of Defining Religion. Contexts, Concepts and Contests (Numen Book Series84; Leiden, Boston, Köln, 1999), 41–72.

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Concepts and Terms

Each definition does two things: on the one hand, it describes a con-cept, and, on the other, it gives that concept a name, which is tosay, it links it to a particular term. Let us ponder a bit the ques-tion of why one should choose particular terms for particular con-cepts. The main rule here is to avoid as much as possible the useof one term for more than one concept, and the use of more thanone term for the same concept. The reason is simply to avoid ambi-guity and to use the available terms economically.

The concepts referred to by the term ‘ritual’ and such relatedterms as ‘ceremony’ and ‘rite’ have changed over time; for exam-ple: ‘ceremony’ from ritual behavior to secular ritual behavior andback again; ‘ritual’ from prescript to ceremony; ‘rite’ from a build-ing block of a ceremony to ceremony itself, etc.17 Over time, moreand more terms came to be used for more than one concept, whereasmore and more concepts came to be indicated by more than oneterm.18 The result is that today in this field, any scholar may useabout any term he or she likes for any concept. That does not con-tribute to the transfer of information. One of the first scholars whotried to argue against this abuse of language and for an economi-cal and unambiguous use of terms was Melford Spiro. In 1971 hepleaded for the use of three terms for three concepts only, whichhe gave as follows:

[T]he rite is the minimal significant unit of ritual behavior. . . .A ceremony is the smallest configuration of rites constituting a mean-

ingful ritual whole, andceremonial is the total configuration of ceremonies performed dur-

ing any ritual occasion.19

Note that these are only relative definitions, indicating the mutualdistinctions between the related concepts concerned, not absoluteones that specify what each term in itself refers to. In 1987 I extendedthis list of terms and concepts as follows:

17 On this development see Asad 1988; Boudewijnse 1995; Bremmer 1998;Stausberg 2002.

18 See the article by Platvoet in this volume for an analysis of this phenomenon.19 M.E. Spiro, Buddhism and Society. A Great Tradition and its Burmese Vicissitudes

(London 1971), 199. My modification of the lay-out.

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ritual: the prescription/script (written or not)rite: the smallest building-block of a ceremony (e.g. exchang-

ing rings at a wedding)ceremony: a group of rites (e.g. a church wedding)ceremonial: a group of ceremonies (e.g. all of the wedding, includ-

ing reception and dinner)Rite: the total cult of a tradition (e.g. the Russian Orthodox

Rite)ritual: a ‘role’ or ‘part’ played in a ceremonial (e.g. bride or

priest)20

Because, in my opinion, six concepts are needed to describe rituals,while (in English) only five terms are available,21 I choose to use theterm ‘ritual’ for two concepts. Since these two are very di-erent, itwill hardly ever be unclear which one is meant, since that will emergefrom the context. Note also that I propose to use the terms ‘ritual’and ‘ceremony’ for the script and the action, respectively. So I wouldprefer to avoid the use of the word ‘ritual’ in the way it is mostcommonly used today.22 Also, I would strongly plead against usingthe word ‘rite’ as a synonym of ‘ceremony’. Since there is no otherword which indicates a building block of a ceremony, that habitmakes it strangely necessary to speak of the rites constituting a rite!

A second issue which has to be dealt with here is that of theextension of what we have included under the term ‘rituals’ sincethe 1970s. This process of extending the scope of this term has ledsome scholars to the conviction that it has become so all-embracingthat it no longer makes any sense to use it at all: because it simplyincludes anything and everything. Therefore, they plead to make a

20 Snoek 1987, 58–60. It is interesting to see that The Random House College Dictionary,used by Grimes (Grimes 2000), seems to use these terms more or less as I definedthem, but that Grimes, not making these distinctions, regards the dictionary’sdefinitions as being marred by a “frustrating circularity” (260).

21 Not in all languages is it necessary to use one term twice. For example, Dutchmakes the distinction between rituaal (the script) and ritueel (the action, ceremony),the latter of which could be used for the last concept in my list.

22 This is not an arbitrary choice; it is the consequence of the methodologicalguideline formulated above regarding the preference for a one-to-one relationshipbetween terms and concepts. Since the term ‘ceremony’ was never used to refer toany other concept than what I propose here, it would be unacceptable to proposeto use it di-erently. The term ‘ritual’, however, was surely used not only as a syn-onym of ‘ceremony’ but also to refer to other concepts and thus may be proposedto be restricted to one or more of those. I do not have the illusion that the schol-arly world will be eager to follow this proposal, but from a methodological pointof view it remains preferable.

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distinction between what we used to call ‘rituals’ in the first half ofthe twentieth century (and ‘ceremony’ in the nineteenth), on the onehand, and those phenomena we have come to include under theterm in the last few decades, on the other. As Catherine Bell says:

The comparison of ritual to all sorts of dramatic spectacles or struc-tured improvisation e)ectively demonstrates shared features and simi-lar processes. At the same time, such comparisons often . . . fail toaccount for the way in which most cultures see important distinctionsbetween ritual and other types of activities.23

And Ronald Grimes expresses the same uneasiness with the currentsituation, reminding us that “[g]enerally, priests think they are engagedin ritual; generally, physicians deny that they are”.24 He then pro-poses to call the traditional ceremonies ‘rites’ and the other ones‘ritualizations’ (idem). Obviously, I do not appreciate that choice ofterms, the first one for the reason explained above, and the secondone because the term used here to refer to a product, instinctivelyrather refers to the process of creating such a product. So I seeGrimes’ proposal as introducing only further confusion. Nevertheless,I agree that we should keep in mind the desirability to have twoterms which distinguish between the two sets of phenomena.

How to Create a Definition of ‘Rituals’

In this section, the intention is not to propose a generally applicabledefinition of the term ‘ritual(s)’ but to show how one could proceedif one wanted to construct a definition of this term for the purposeof a specific project (which, in my opinion, is very wise to do).

The first step is to make a collection of characteristics that maybe used. These can usually be found in the existing literature.25 Inthe case of ‘ritual(s)’, one might think of the following.

23 Bell 1997, 76.24 R.L. Grimes, Deeply into the Bone; Re-Inventing Rites of Passage (Life Passages 1;

Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2000), 26.25 A list of definitions of ‘ritual’ from which such characteristics can be drawn,

is given in Platvoet 1995, 42–45. This list gives definitions, e.g., by A. van Gennep,É. Durkheim, R. Firth, E. Leach, S.F. Nadel, J. Goody, C. Geertz, V.W. Turner,J.W. Fernandez, R. Bocock, R. Delattre, S.J. Tambiah, J. van Baal, W.E.A. vanBeek, R.L. Grimes, J.G. Platvoet, Th.P. van Baaren, B. Kapferer, J.S. La Fontaine,

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Rituals are:

* culturally constructed; traditionally sanctioned* behavior; praxis; performance; bodily actions and/or speech acts* having its performers as its own audience26

* marked o- from the routine of everyday life; framed; liminal;anti-structure

* taking place at specific places and/or times* collective; public* multi-medial* creating/organizing society/social groups* creating change/transition* purposeful (for the participants)* repeated* STANDARDIZED; REHEARSED

* RELIGIOUS; SACRED; TRANSCENDENT

* RIGID; STEREOTYPED; STABLE

* REDUNDANT; REPETITIVE

* SYMBOLIC; MEANINGFUL (FOR THE PARTICIPANTS)* COMMUNICATIVE

* NOT INSTRUMENTAL

* .'",/'$0"!; 1*2$%& * ,/'$.(* #3'4*+($5"!); /3%2"%($3%*+* ,(6+$5"!* ,(')/()'"!; .*(("'%"!; 3'!"'"!; ,"7)"%/"!; ')+"-&32"'%"!* /1*%%"+$%& "43($3%* &)$!$%& /3&%$($3%.

While this list does not pretend completeness, it does give a fareshare of the characteristics usually found in definitions of ‘ritual(s)’.As can be seen from my use of bold and italics, only four of thecharacteristics are classical Aristotelian ones, whereas most of themare (at least in my opinion) either polythetic or #)556 or BOTH.

F. Staal, E.M. Zuesse, D.I. Kertzer and D. Parkin. Lists of characteristics of ritu-als are also given in, e.g., Bird 1980, 387–393; Kertzer 1988, 9–12; Grimes 1990(in the section entitled “Qualities of Ritual”), 13–15; McLeod 1990, 92–94; and M. Housemann, “Was ist ein Ritual?”, J.-H. Martin et al. (eds), Altäre. Kunst zumNiederknien (Düsseldorf, 2001), 48–51.

26 Which should not be taken to exclude the possibility that the audience is largerthan the group of performers.

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However, a definition based on the four Aristotelian characteristicsalone will not do, because the collection of all ‘culturally constructed,traditionally sanctioned, framed performances, having its performersas its own audience’ would not distinguish what we normally regardas ‘ritual’ from much of what we would rather regard as ‘play’. Soat least some of the other characteristics are also necessary. Therefore,the class of rituals must be defined as a polythetic—though, becauseit has also four monothetic characteristics, not a fully polythetic—class.

The second step in the process would be to decide on the pur-pose for which we want to construct our definition, since the use ofa term is influenced by the aim and context of the text in which itis used.27 In this example, I choose as my aim to give a definitionof ‘ritual(s)’ that is useful for comparing certain forms of culturalbehavior and for stimulating theorizing about them. The context Ichoose will be restricted to the Western academic enterprise as prac-ticed in the humanities and social sciences. Once more, I wish topoint out that when I proceed here now to construct an exampleof a definition of ‘ritual(s)’, that definition is not the aim of this arti-cle; it also is by far not the only possible or useful definition of thatterm. It serves only to illustrate the process I wish to advocate forconstructing such definitions. The same holds for the names I willpropose to give to the concepts defined: these are not the only pos-sible ones, they just serve as an example for what one could choose(though, obviously, I choose those which I personally prefer).

When, in the past, I constructed a definition of the term ‘reli-gions’,28 it turned out to be most practical first to define the adjec-tive (‘religious’), and only then the substantive (‘religions’), since thescope of the adjective is wider than that of the substantive (for exam-ple: Freemasonry defines itself as religious, though not as a religion).Expecting that to be the case here again (namely, that we may

27 For example, for a program for a section “Studies of Religions” in a univer-sity, one would typically want a broad scope for the term ‘religions’, whereas if onehas to plead in court against a request of a ‘sect’ (which has been convicted morethan once for illegal behavior) for legal recognition as a religion, one might wantto use the same term with a narrower scope. See Introvigne, “Religion as claim”.

28 J.A.M. Snoek, “Defining ‘Religions’ as the Domain of Study of the EmpiricalSciences of Religions”, J.G. Platvoet and A.L. Molendijk (eds), The Pragmatics ofDefining Religion. Contexts, Concepts and Contests (Numen Book Series 84; Leiden, Boston,Köln, 1999), 313–333.

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encounter ritual behavior also outside rituals), I will now first definethe adjective (‘ritual’ in ‘ritual behavior’), and only then the sub-stantive (‘rituals’). So ritual behavior could be defined as follows:

Ritual behavior is a particular mode of behavior, distinguished from com-mon behavior. Its performers are (at least part of ) its own audience.In general, all human actions can be part of ritual behavior, includ-ing speech acts. However, in each particular case the large major-ity of these will be traditionally sanctioned as proper ritual actions.Most ritual behavior takes place at specific places and/or at specifictimes. Most ritual behavior is -.'" formally stylized, structured, andstandardized than most common behavior. Most ritual behavior is/*,"! .% a script. Most ritual behavior is (. ,.-" "0("%( purpose-ful and symbolically meaningful for its participants. At least thoseplaying an *1($2" part consider themselves to be participating in non-common behavior.

In this definition, I have indicated again the terms—included inten-tionally—which qualify a certain characteristic as being either poly-thetic and/or #)334. As a result, all of the now following definitions,which are directly or indirectly based on this definition of ritualbehavior, inherit this polythetic and fuzzy nature.

Having defined ritual behavior, it is now possible to define behav-ior that is similar, but yet not quite identical to it, as follows:

Common behavior, which shows similarities with ritual behavior, maybe referred to as ritual-like behavior.

Surely, it is often fruitful to study such behavior as if it were ritualbehavior; but under the aforementioned definition of ritual behav-ior, it would not be that.

Starting from this definition of ritual behavior, the next step is todefine some substantives:

A rite is the performance of an indivisible unit of ritual behavior.

A ceremony (or ritual) is a sequence of one or more rites, together framedby transitions from common to ritual, and from ritual to commonbehavior. These transitions are clearly recognizable for the participants;they may range from instantaneous to longer, more-or-less standard-ized processes.

The key words here are ‘performance’ and ‘framing’, respectively.The fact that both of these are introduced in this context withoutany qualification, which would indicate that they are seen as poly-thetic or fuzzy, means that if either one of these is lacking, thesedefinitions would not allow the behavior concerned to be called a

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‘ceremony’ (or ‘ritual’). It would be ‘ritual-like behavior’ at best. Ifthe definition just formulated is accepted as applying to the term‘ceremony’ rather than ‘ritual’, then it is possible to define ‘ritual’unambiguously again, namely:

A ritual is a prescription (written or otherwise) for a particular ceremony.

But if we instead follow the current habit of using ‘ritual’ as a syn-onym of ‘ceremony’,29 we would have to call this, for example, ascript for a ritual (the qualification being necessary to distinguish itfrom, say, a script for a play). So, again, my aim here is not to pro-pose any particular definitions so much as to point out how suchdefinitions can be constructed in such a way as to create useful termsfor scholarly language.

29 There are some exceptions to this rule. For example, according to Turner,“Ceremony indicates, ritual transforms” (V.W. Turner 1982a, 80). But that hardlyhelps to solve the current general terminological confusion.