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ne orld,RivalTeori

Thestudjof internationalelationsssupposedo tell us howtheworldworks.It'sa tallorder, ndeven hebest heoriesfallshort.Butthey anpunctureillusions ndstripaway hesimplisticrandnames-suchas "neocons" r "lib-eralhawks" thatdominateforeignpoliy debates.Even n a radicallychangingworld, he classic heories avea lot tosaqy. By Jack Snyder

he U.S.governmenthas enduredsev-eral painful rounds of scrutinyas ittries to figureout what went wrongon Sept. 11, 2001. The intelligencecommunityfaces radicalrestructuring;he militaryhas made a sharppivot to face a new enemy;and avast new federalagencyhas blossomed o coordinatehomelandsecurity.But did Septem-ber 11 signala failureof theory onpar with the failures of intelligenceandpolicy?Familiar heories abouthow the world works still dominateacademic debate. Instead of radicalchange,academiahasadjusted xist-ing theories to meet new realities.Has this approachsucceeded?Doesinternational relations theory stillhavesomething o tellpolicymakers?Six years ago, political scien-tist Stephen M. Walt published amuch-cited survey of the field inthese pages ("One World, ManyTheories," Spring 1998). Hesketched out three dominantJackSnyderstheRobert ndReneeBelferprofessor of international relations atColumbiaUniversity.

approaches:realism, liberalism, and an updatedform of idealism called "constructivism." Waltargued that these theories shape both public dis-course and policy analysis. Realism focuses onthe shifting distribution of power among states.Liberalismhighlightsthe risingnumber of democ-racies and the turbulence of democratic transi-

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One World, Rival Theories

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.......... .......... ...............From .moay mo nmaonanSons\iqnrpestAiasmTheorytto Practicetions. Idealism illuminates the changingnorms ofsovereignty,human rights, and international jus-tice, as well as the increased potency of religiousideas in politics.The influence of these intellectual constructsextends farbeyonduniversity lassroomsand tenurecommittees.Policymakers ndpubliccommentatorsinvoke elementsof all these theorieswhen articulat-ing solutions to global securitydilemmas.PresidentGeorgeW.Bushpromisesto fightterrorby spread-ing liberaldemocracy o the Middle East andclaimsthat skeptics"who call themselves realists'....havelostcontactwith a fundamental eality" hat "Amer-ica is always more secure when freedom is on themarch."Striking more eclectic one,National Secu-rity Advisor CondoleezzaRice, a former StanfordUniversity olitical cienceprofessor, xplains hat thenew Bushdoctrine s an amalgamof pragmatic eal-ism and Wilsonian iberaltheory.Duringthe recentpresidential campaign, Sen. John Kerry soundedremarkablyimilar:"Our oreignpolicyhasachievedgreatness,"he said, "only when it has combinedrealismand idealism."

Internationalrelationstheory also shapes andinforms the thinkingof the publicintellectualswhotranslateanddisseminate cademic deas.During hesummer of 2004, for example, two influentialframers of neoconservative thought, columnistCharlesKrauthammer nd political scientist Fran-cis Fukuyama, collided over the implications ofthese conceptual paradigms or U.S. policy in Iraq.Backing he Bush administration'sMiddle Eastpol-icy,Krauthammer rguedfor an assertiveamalgamof liberalism and realism,which he called "demo-cratic realism."Fukuyamaclaimed that Krautham-mer'sfaith in the use of force and the feasibilityofdemocraticchange in Iraqblindshim to the war'slack of legitimacy,a failing that "hurts both therealistpartof ouragenda, by diminishingour actu-al power, and the idealist portion of it, by under-cutting our appeal as the embodiment of certainideas and values."

Indeed,when realism, liberalism,and idealismenter the policymaking arena and public debate,they can sometimes become intellectual windowdressing or simplisticworldviews.Properlyunder-

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stood, however,theirpolicy implicationsaresubtleandmultifaceted.Realism nstillsa pragmaticappre-ciation of the role of power but also warns thatstateswill suffer f they overreach.Liberalismhigh-lights the cooperative potential of mature democ-racies, especially when working together througheffectiveinstitutions,but it also notes democracies'tendency to crusade against tyrannies and thepropensityof emergingdemocracies o collapseintoviolent ethnic turmoil. Idealism stresses that a con-sensus on valuesmust underpinany stablepoliticalorder,yet it also recognizesthat forgingsuch a con-sensus oftenrequiresan ideologicalstrugglewith thepotential for conflict.Eachtheoryoffersa filterfor looking at a com-plicated picture. As such, they help explain theassumptionsbehindpoliticalrhetoricabout foreignpolicy. Even more important,the theories act as apowerfulcheck on each other.Deployedeffectively,theyreveal heweaknessesn argumentshat canleadto misguidedpolicies.IS REALISM STILL REALISTIC?At realism's core is the belief that internationalaffairs is a strugglefor power amongself-interestedstates. Although some of realism'sleading lights,notably the late Universityof Chicago political sci-entist Hans J. Morgenthau, are deeply pessimisticabout human nature, it is not a theory of despair.Clearsightedtatescanmitigate he causesof war byfindingways to reducethe dangerthey pose to eachother.Nor is real-ism necessarily amoral; its advo-cates emphasize that a ruthlesspragmatismaboutpower can actu-ally yield a morepeacefulworld, ifnot an ideal one.In liberaldemocracies,realismis the theorythat everyoneloves tohate. Developed largely by Euro-pean 6migr6sat the end of WorldWar II, realism claimed to be anantidote to the naive belief that internationalinsti-tutions and law alone can preserve peace, a mis-conception that this new generation of scholarsbelieved had paved the way to war. In recentdecades, the realist approach has been most fullyarticulatedby U.S. theorists, but it still has broadappealoutside the United States as well. The influ-ential writer and editor Josef Joffe articulatelycomments on Germany'sstrong realist traditions.

(Mindful of the overwhelming importanceof U.S.power to Europe'sdevelopment,Joffe once calledthe United States"Europe'spacifier.")China'scur-rent foreign policy is groundedin realist ideas thatdate back millennia.As China modernizes ts econ-omy and enters international institutions such asthe World TradeOrganization,it behavesin a waythat realistsunderstandwell:developing ts militaryslowly butsurelyas its economicpower grows, andavoiding a confrontation with superiorU.S. forces.Realismgetssomethingsrightaboutthepost-9/11world. The continuedcentralityof militarystrengthandthepersistence f conflict,even n thisageof glob-al economicinterdependence, oesnot surprisereal-ists. Thetheory'smostobvioussuccess s its ability oexplainthe UnitedStates'forcefulmilitaryresponseto the September11 terroristattacks. When a stategrowsvastlymorepowerful hananyopponent,real-ists expect that it will eventuallyuse that power toexpandits sphereof domination,whetherfor securi-ty, wealth, or other motives. The United Statesemployed tsmilitarypowerin what some deemedanimperial ashionin largepartbecause t could.It is harderfor the normallystate-centric ealiststo explain why the world's only superpowerannounced a war againstal Qaeda, a nonstate ter-roristorganization.How can realisttheoryaccountfor the importanceof powerfulandviolent individ-uals in a world of states?Realistspoint out that thecentral battles in the "war on terror" have beenfought against wo states(AfghanistanndIraq),and

thatstates,not theUnited Nations or HumanRightsWatch,have led the fight against terrorism.Evenif realistsacknowledgethe importanceofnonstateactors as a challengeto theirassumptions,the theorystill has important hingsto sayaboutthebehaviorand motivations of thesegroups.The real-ist scholarRobertA. Pape,for example,has arguedthat suicide terrorism can be a rational, realisticstrategy for the leadership of national liberation

In iberalemocracies,ealisms the heoryhateveryoneoves ohate. tclaimso beanantidote

tothenaive eliefhatnternationalnstitutionsand awalone anpreserveeace.


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movements seeking to expel democratic powersthat occupy their homelands. Other scholarsapplystandard theories of conflict in anarchyto explainethnic conflict in collapsed states. Insights frompolitical realism-a profound and wide-rangingintellectual tradition rooted in the enduring phi-losophy of Thucydides,Niccol6 Machiavelli, andThomas Hobbes-are hardly rendered obsoletebecause some nonstate groups are now able toresort to violence.Post-9/11 developments seem to undercut oneof realism's core concepts: the balance of power.Standard realist doctrine predicts that weakerstateswill ally to protect themselvesfrom strongerones and thereby form and reform a balance ofpower. So, when Germanyunified in the late 19th

centuryand becameEurope's eading militaryandindustrial power, Russia and France (and later,Britain)soon aligned to counter its power. Yet nocombination of states or other powers can chal-lenge the United States militarily, and no balanc-ing coalition is imminent. Realists are scramblingto find a way to fill this hole in the center of theirtheory. Some theorists speculate that the UnitedStates'geographicdistance and its relativelybenignintentions have tempered the balancing instinct.Second-tier powers tend to worry more abouttheir immediate neighbors and even see the Unit-ed Statesas a helpful source of stability in regionssuch as EastAsia. Other scholars insist that armedresistance by U.S. foes in Iraq, Afghanistan, andelsewhere, and foot-dragging by its formal alliesactually constitute the beginnings of balancingagainstU.S. hegemony.The United States' strainedrelations with Europe offer ambiguous evidence:Frenchand Germanopposition to recentU.S. poli-cies could be seen as classic balancing,but they donot resist U.S. dominance militarily.Instead,thesestates have tried to undermine U.S. moral legiti-macy and constrain the superpower in a web of

multilateral institutions and treaty regimes-notwhat standard realist theory predicts.These conceptual difficultiesnotwithstanding,realism is alive, well, and creatively reassessinghow its root principles relate to the post-9/11world. Despite changing configurationsof power,realists remain steadfast in stressing that policymust be based on positions of real strength,not oneither empty bravado or hopeful illusions about aworld without conflict. In the run-upto the recentIraqwar, severalprominent realists signed a pub-lic lettercriticizingwhat they perceivedas an exer-cise in American hubris. And in the continuingaftermath of that war, many prominent thinkerscalled for a returnto realism.A group of scholarsand public intellectuals (myself included) evenformed the Coalition for a Realis-tic Foreign Policy, which calls fora more modest and prudentapproach. Its statement of princi-ples arguesthat "the move towardempiremust be halted mmediately."The coalition, though politicallydiverse, s largely nspiredbyrealisttheory.Itsmembershipof seeming-ly odd bedfellows-including for-mer DemocraticSen.GaryHartandScottMcConnell, he executiveedi-tor of the AmericanConservativemagazine-illus-tratesthe powerof internationalrelationstheorytocut through often ephemeral political labels andcarrydebate to the underlyingassumptions.

THE DIVIDED HOUSE OF LIBERALISMThe liberal school of international elationstheory,whose most famous proponents were Germanphilosopher Immanuel Kant and U.S. PresidentWoodrowWilson,contends thatrealismhas a stunt-ed visionthatcannotaccount orprogressnrelationsbetween nations. Liberals foresee a slow but inex-orable journeyaway from the anarchic world therealists envision, as trade and finance forge tiesbetween nations, and democratic norms spread.Becauseelected eadersare accountable o thepeople(who bearthe burdensof war), liberalsexpectthatdemocracieswillnot attackeachotherand willregardeachother's egimesas legitimate ndnonthreatening.Many liberals also believe that the rule of law andtransparencyf democratic rocessesmake teasier osustain internationalcooperation, especiallywhenthesepractices reenshrinednmultilateralnstitutions.

Liberalismas uch powerfulresencehattheentire .S.oliticalpectrum,romneoconservativesohumanightsdvocates,assumestaslargelyelf-evident.

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Liberalism as sucha powerfulpresence hat theentire U.S. political spectrum,from neoconserva-tives to humanrightsadvocates,assumes t as large-ly self-evident.Outside he UnitedStates,aswell, theliberalview that only electedgovernmentsarelegit-imate andpoliticallyreliablehas takenhold. So it isno surprisehat liberal hemesareconstantlynvokedas a responseto today's securitydilemmas. But thelast severalyearshave also produceda fiercetug-of-war between disparatestrains of liberal thought.Supporters nd criticsof the Bushadministration,nparticular,have emphasizedverydifferentelementsof the liberalcanon.For its part, the Bush administrationhighlightsdemocracypromotionwhile largely urning ts backon the international institutions that most liberaltheorists champion. The U.S. National SecurityStrategyof September2002, famous for its supportof preventivewar, also dwells on the need to pro-mote democracyas a means of fighting terrorismand promoting peace. The Millennium Challengeprogramallocatespart of U.S. foreign aid accord-ingto how well countries mprove heirperformance

on several measures of democratization and therule of law. TheWhite House's steadfast upport orpromoting democracy in the Middle East-evenwith turmoil n Iraqandrisinganti-Americanismnthe Arab world-demonstrates liberalism'semo-tional and rhetoricalpower.Inmany respects, iberalism's laim to be a wisepolicy guidehasplentyof hard data behind t. Dur-ing the last two decades,the propositionthat dem-ocratic institutionsand valueshelpstatescooperatewith each otheris amongthe most intensivelystud-ied in all of internationalrelations,and it has heldup reasonablywell. Indeed,the belief that democ-racies never fight wars against each other is theclosestthingwe have to an iron lawin social science.But the theory has some very importantcorol-laries,which the Bushadministration lossesover asit drawsuponthe democracy-promotionlementofliberal thought. ColumbiaUniversity political sci-entist Michael W. Doyle's articles on democraticpeacewarnedthat, thoughdemocraciesneverfighteachother, heyareproneto launchmessianic trug-gles againstwarlike authoritarian egimes o "make

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the world safe for democracy." It was preciselyAmericandemocracy'sendency o oscillatebetweenself-righteouscrusadingand jadedisolationismthatpromptedearlyCold Warrealists' allfora more cal-culated,prudentforeignpolicy.Countries ransitioningo democracy,withweakpolitical nstitutions,aremorelikelythan otherstatesto get into internationaland civil wars.Inthe last 15years, wars or large-scale civil violence followedexperimentswith masselectoraldemocracy n coun-triesincludingArmenia,Burundi,Ethiopia,Indone-sia, Russia,and the formerYugoslavia.In part,thisviolence is caused by ethnic groups' competing

demands for national self-determination,often aproblem n new,multiethnicdemocracies.Morefun-damental,emergingdemocraciesoftenhave nascentpolitical institutions that cannot channel populardemandsnconstructive irections rcredibly nforcecompromises among rival groups. In this setting,democratic accountabilityworks imperfectly,andnationalistpoliticianscan hijackpublicdebate.Theviolence hat isvexing heexperimentwithdemocracyinIraq sjust he latestchapterna turbulenttory hatbeganwith the FrenchRevolution.Contemporaryiberal heoryalsopointsout thatthe rising democratictide creates the presumptionthat all nations ought to enjoy the benefitsof self-determination.Those leftout mayundertakeviolentcampaigns to secure democratic rights. Some ofthesemovementsdirecttheirstrugglesagainstdem-ocraticor semidemocraticstates that they consideroccupyingpowers-such as in Algeria n the 1950s,or Chechnya,Palestine,and the Tamilregionof SriLankatoday.Violencemay also be directedat dem-ocraticsupportersof oppressiveregimes,much likethe U.S. backingof the governmentsof Saudi Ara-bia and Egypt.Democraticregimesmakeattractivetargetsfor terrorist violence by national liberationmovementspreciselybecausethey are accountableto a cost-consciouselectorate.

Nor is it clearto contemporary iberal scholarsthat nascentdemocracyand economic iberalism analways cohabitate. Freetrade and the multifacetedglobalization that advanceddemocraciespromoteoften buffet transitional societies. World markets'penetrationof societies that run on patronageandprotectionismcan disruptsocial relationsandspurstrifebetweenpotentialwinnersandlosers.Inothercases, universal free trade can make separatismlook attractive, as small regions such as Aceh inIndonesia can lay claim to lucrative naturalresources.Sofar, he trade-fueled oom in Chinahascreated incentives for improvedrelationswith theadvanced democracies, but it hasalso set the stage for a possibleshowdown between the relativelywealthy coastal entrepreneurs nd

the still impoverishedruralmasses.While aggressivelyadvocatingthe virtuesof democracy, he Bushadministration has shown littlepatience for these complexities inliberalthought-or for liberalism'semphasis on the importance ofinternational nstitutions.Farfrom

tryingto assureotherpowersthat the United Stateswould adhere to a constitutional order, Bush"unsigned"heInternationalCriminalCourtstatute,rejectedthe Kyoto environmentalagreement,dic-tated take-it-or-leave-it arms control changes toRussia, and invaded Iraq despite opposition at theUnitedNations and amongclose allies.Recent iberal heoryoffersa thoughtful hallengeto the administration's olicychoices.ShortlybeforeSeptember11, political scientistG. John Ikenberrystudiedattemptsto establish nternationalorderbythe victors of hegemonicstrugglesin 1815, 1919,1945, and 1989. He argued hateven themostpow-erfulvictorneededto gainthewillingcooperationofthe vanquishedand other weak statesby offeringamutuallyattractivebargain,codified in an interna-tional constitutionalorder. Democraticvictors, hefound, have the best chance of creatinga workingconstitutionalorder,suchas the BrettonWoodssys-tem after World WarIi, because theirtransparencyand legalismmake theirpromisescredible.Does the Bush administration'sresistance toinstitution building refute Ikenberry'sversion ofliberal theory? Some realists say it does, and thatrecent events demonstratethat internationalinsti-tutions cannot constrain a hegemonic power if itspreferences change. But international institutions

Whileggressivelydvocatinghevirtuesfdemocracy,heBushdministrationas hownlittle atienceor iberalism'smphasisn heimportancef nternationalnstitutions.

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The Leading BrandsTheories:

Core Beliefs

KeyActors inInternationalRelationsMainInstruments

Theory'sIntellectual BlindSpots

What the TheoryExplainsAboutthe Post-9/IIWorldWhatthe TheoryFailsto ExplainAbout thePost-9/I IWorld

RealismSelf-interestedtatesompetefor owerndecurity

States,hichehaveimilarlyregardlessf heirypefgovernment

Militaryowerndtatediplomacy

Doesn'tccountor rogressandhangennternationalrelationsrunderstandinghatlegitimacyan easourcefmilitaryower

WhyheUnitedtatesrespondedggressivelyoterroristttacks;henabilityfinternationalnstitutionsorestrainilitaryuperiority

Theailuref mallerowersomilitarilyalanceheUnitedStates;hemportancefnon-state ctorsuch salQaeda;the ntense.S.ocusndemocratization

LiberalismSpreadfdemocracy,globalconomicies, ndinternationalrganizationsillstrengtheneace

States,nternationalnstitutions,and ommercialnterests

Internationalnstitutionsndglobalommerce

Failsounderstandhatdemocraticegimesurvivenlyif heyafeguardilitaryowerandecurity;omeiberalsorgetthatransitionsodemocracyare ometimesiolent

Whypreadingemocracyasbecomeuchnntegralartfcurrent.S.nternationalecu-ritytrategy

WhyheUnitedtatesasfailedoworkiththeremoc-racieshroughnternationalorganizations

Idealism(Constructivism)Internationaloliticssshapedbypersuasivedeas,ollectivevalues,ulture,ndocialidentities

Promotersfnewdeas,transnationalctivistetworks,and ongovernmentalorganizations

Ideasnd alues

Does otxplainhichowerstructuresndocialonditionsalloworhangesn alues

Thencreasingolefpolemicsaboutalues;hemportanceftransnationaloliticaletworks(whethererroristsrhumanrightsdvocates)

Whyumanightsbusescontinue,espitentenseactivismor umanitariannormsnd ffortsorinternationalustice

can nonetheless help coordinate outcomes thatare in the long-term mutual interest of both thehegemon and the weaker states. Ikenberrydid notcontend that hegemonic democracies are immunefrom mistakes. States can act in defiance of theincentivesestablishedby theirposition in the inter-national system, but they will suffer the conse-quences and probably learn to correct course. Inresponse to Bush'sunilateralist stance, Ikenberrywrote that the incentives for the United States totake the lead in establishing a multilateral consti-

tutionalorderremainpowerful.Sooner or later, hependulum will swing back.

IDEALISM'S NEW CLOTHINGIdealism,the belief that foreignpolicy is and shouldbe guided by ethicaland legal standards,also has along pedigree.BeforeWorld WarII forced the Unit-ed States to acknowledgea less pristine reality,Sec-retaryof StateHenry Stimsondenigratedespionageon the grounds that "gentlemendo not read each


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other'smail."During he ColdWar, uchnaive de-alismacquired badname n theKissingerianor-ridorsof powerandamonghardheadedcademics.Recently,a new version of idealism-called con-structivismyitsscholarlydherents-returnedo aprominentplacein debateson internationalela-tions heory.Constructivism,hichholds hatsocialrealitys createdhroughdebateaboutvalues,oftenechoesthe themes hathumanrightsand interna-tional usticeactivistsound.Recent vents eem ovindicate the theory'sresurgence; theory thatemphasizesheroleof ideologies,dentities, ersua-sion,and ransnationaletworksshighly elevantounderstandinghepost-9/11world.Themostprominentoicesnthedevelopmentfconstructivisttheory have been American,butEurope'sole s significant. uropean hilosophicalcurrentselped stablishonstructivistheory,nd heEuropeanournal fInternationalelationssoneoftheprincipalutletsorconstructivist ork.Perhapsmost important,Europe's ncreasingly egalisticapproacho internationalelations,eflectedntheprocess of forming theEuropeanUnionout of acollection of sovereignstates,providesertile oilfor idealistand construc-tivistconceptionsf inter-nationalpolitics.Whereas ealists wellon the balanceof powerand iberals n thepowerof internationalradeanddemocracy,onstructivistsbelieve hatdebates boutideasare the fundamen-tal building blocks ofinternationalife.Individ-uals and groupsbecomepowerfulf theycan con-vinceothers o adopt heirideas. People's under-standingof their interestsdependson the ideasthey hold. Constructivists indabsurdthe idea of some identifiableand immutable"national interest," which some realists cherish.Especially in liberal societies, there is overlapbetween constructivist and liberalapproaches,butthe two are distinct. Constructivists contend thattheir theory is deeper than realism and liberalismbecause it explains the origins of the forces thatdrive those competing theories.

Forconstructivists,nternationalhange esultsfrom the work of intellectual ntrepreneurshoproselytizeew deasand "name ndshame" ctorswhosebehavior eviates romaccepted tandards.Consequently,onstructivistsftenstudy heroleoftransnational ctivistnetworks-such as HumanRightsWatch r the Internationalampaigno BanLandmines-in promotingchange.Suchgroupstypicallyuncover ndpublicizenformation boutviolations of legal or moral standards at leastrhetoricallyupportedby powerfuldemocracies,including"disappearances"uring heArgentinemilitary'srule in the late 1970s, concentrationcamps n Bosnia,andthehugenumberof civiliandeaths rom andmines.Thispublicitys thenusedto pressgovernmentso adopt specificremedies,such astheestablishment f a war crimes ribunalortheadoptionof a landminereaty.Thesemove-mentsoften makepragmatic rguments swell asidealisticones,but theirdistinctivepowercomesfrom heability o highlight eviationsromdeeplyheldnormsof appropriate ehavior.

Progressiveauses receivethe most attentionfromconstructivistcholars,but the theoryalsohelps explainthe dynamicsof illiberal transna-tionalforces,suchas Arabnationalism rIslamistextremism.ProfessorMichaelN. Barnett's 998bookDialogues n ArabPolitics:NegotiationsnRegional Order examineshow the divergencebetween tateborders nd ransnationalrabpolit-ical dentitiesequiresulnerableeaders o contend

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for legitimacy with radicals throughout the Arabworld-a dynamic that often holds moderateshostage to opportunists who take extreme stances.Constructivist thought can also yield broaderinsights about the ideas and values in the currentinternational order. In his 2001 book, Revolutionsin Sovereignty:How Ideas ShapedModern Inter-national Relations, political scientist Daniel Philpottdemonstrates how the religious ideas of the Protes-tant Reformation helped break down the medievalpolitical order and provided a conceptual basis forthe modern system of secular sovereign states. AfterSeptember 11, Philpott focused on the challenge tothe secular international order posed by politicalIslam. "The attacks and the broader resurgence ofpublic religion," he says, ought to lead internation-al relations scholars to "direct far more energy tounderstanding the impetuses behind movementsacross the globe that are reorienting purposes andpolicies." He notes that both liberal human rightsmovements and radical Islamic movements havetransnational structures and principled motivations

that challenge the traditional supremacy of self-interested states in international politics. Becauseconstructivists believe that ideas and values helpedshape the modern state system, they expect intellec-tual constructs to be decisive in transforming it-forgood or ill.When it comes to offering advice, however, con-structivism points in two seemingly incompatibledirections. The insight that political orders arise from

shared understanding highlights the need for dia-logue across cultures about the appropriate rules ofthe game. This prescriptiondovetails with liberalism'semphasis on establishing an agreed internationalconstitutional order. And, yet, the notion of cross-cultural dialogue sits awkwardly with many idealists'view that they already know right and wrong. Forthese idealists, the essential task is to shame rightsabusers and cajole powerful actors into promotingproper values and holding perpetrators accountableto international (generally Western) standards. Aswith realism and liberalism, constructivism can bemany things to many people.

STUMPED BY CHANGENone of the three theoretical traditions has a strongability to explain change-a significant weaknessin such turbulent times. Realists failed to predict theend of the Cold War,for example. Even after it hap-pened, they tended to assume that the new systemwould become multipolar ("back to the future," asthe scholar John J.Mearsheimer put it).

Likewise, the liberal the-ory of democratic peaceis stronger on what hap-pens after states becomedemocratic than in pre-dicting the timing ofdemocratic transitions,let alone prescribing howto make transitions hap-pen peacefully. Con-structivists are good atdescribing changes innorms and ideas, butthey are weak on thematerial and institution-al circumstances neces-sary to support the emer-gence of consensus aboutnew values and ideas.With such uncertainguidance from the theo-retical realm, it is no wonder that policymakers,activists,andpubliccommentators all preyto sim-plistic or wishful thinking about how to effectchange by,say, invadingIraqor setting up an Inter-national CriminalCourt. In lieu of a good theoryof change, the most prudent course is to use theinsightsof each of the threetheoretical raditionsas

a check on the irrational exuberanceof the others.NOVEMBER I DECEMBER 2004 61

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Realists should have to explain whether policiesbased on calculationsof powerhave sufficient egit-imacy to last. Liberals should consider whethernascent democratic institutions can fend off pow-erful interests that oppose them, or how interna-tional institutions can bind a hegemonic powerinclined o go its own way.Idealists hould be askedabout the strategic,institutional,or material con-ditionsin which a set of ideas is likelyto take hold.

Theories of international relations claim toexplain the way internationalpolitics works, buteach of the currently prevailingtheories falls wellshort of that goal. One of the principalcontribu-tions that international relationstheory can makeis not predicting the future but providing thevocabularyand conceptualframework o ask hardquestions of those who think that changing theworld is easy. 1H

Want to KnowMore?StephenM. Walt's "InternationalRelations: One World, Many Theories" (FOREIGN OLICY,Spring1998) is a valuablesurveyof the field. For a more recentsurvey,see RobertJervis,"Theo-ries of Warin an Era of LeadingPowerPeace"(AmericanPoliticalScienceReview, March2002).

Important ecentrealistcontributionsncludeJohnJ.Mearsheimer's heTragedyof GreatPowerPolitics (New York:Norton, 2001) and FareedZakaria,From Wealth to Power:The UnusualOri-gins of America's World Role (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1998). Importantrealist-inspiredanalysesof post-9/11 issues include "TheStrategicLogicof SuicideTerrorism" AmericanPolitical ScienceReview,August 2003), by RobertA. Pape;"TheCompulsiveEmpire"(FOREIGNPOLICY,July/August 2003), by Robert Jervis;and "An Unnecessary War " (FOREIGNPOLICY, an-uary/February003), byJohnMearsheimerandStephenWalt. Read about a currenteffort to injectrealism into U.S. foreign policy at the Web site of the Coalitionfor a RealisticForeign Policy.Fora worried ook at the realistresurgence,ee LawrenceE Kaplan,"Springtimeor Realism" TheNewRepublic,June21, 2004).

Recentadditions o the liberalcanon are BruceRussettandJohnR. Oneal'sTriangulatingPeace:Democracy,Interdependence, nd InternationalOrganizations(New York:Norton, 2001) and G.JohnIkenberry'sAfterVictory: nstitutions,StrategicRestraint,and theRebuildingof OrderAfterMajor Wars(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 2001). To read about the dangersof democra-tizationin countries with weak institutions,see EdwardD. Mansfield andJackSnyder,ElectingtoFight: WhyEmergingDemocracies Go to War(Cambridge:MIT Press,2005) and Zakaria'sTheFuture of Freedom:IlliberalDemocracyat Home and Abroad (New York:W.W.Norton & Co.,2003). Charles Krauthammerand FrancisFukuyamatussle over strains of liberalism n a recentexchange.Krauthammermakesthecase forspreadingdemocracyn "DemocraticRealism:AnAmer-ican Foreign Policy for a UnipolarWorld,"an address to the AmericanEnterprise nstitute,andFukuyamarespondsin "The NeoconservativeMoment," (TheNational Interest,Summer2004).Krauthammer'sejoinder,"InDefenseof DemocraticRealism"(TheNational Interest,Fall2004),countersFukuyama's laims.Read more on constructivismn AlexanderWendt,Social Theoryof InternationalPolitics (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999). MargaretE. Keck and KathrynSikkink ook at construc-tivismat workinActivistsBeyondBorders:AdvocacyNetworks n InternationalPolitics(Ithaca:Cor-nellUniversity ress,1998).Morefocusedworks ncludeSikkink'sMixedMessages:U.S.HumanRightsPolicyand LatinAmerica(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2004) and MichaelN. Barnett'sDialoguesin Arab Politics:Negotiationsin RegionalOrder(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1998).

S)For links to relevantWeb sites, access to the FP Archive,and a comprehensivendex of relatedFOREIGNPOLICYarticles, go to www.foreignpolicy.com.62 FOREIGN POLICY

Documents

Snyder (2004)