Social and Economic Change in Brazil, 1980-2000- The Incomplete Transformation Revisited

7/31/2019 Social and Economic Change in Brazil, 1980-2000- The Incomplete Transformation Revisited

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KLEIN, Herbert S. & LUNA, Francisco Vidal. Social and Economic change inBrazil, 1980-2000: the incomplete tranformation revisited. Publicada verso emportugus: Reflexes en torno a 500 aos de Histria de Brasil . Gonzles, Elda;Moreno, Alfredo & Sevilha, Rosario, org. Madrid, Editorial Atriel, 2001.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN BRAZIL, 1980-2000: THE INCOMPLETETRANSFORMATION REVISITED .

Herbert S. KleinFrancisco Vidal Luna

Since 1940, Brazil has undergone a profound social and economictransformation, going from a predominantly rural and agricultural society to one that wasprimarily urban and industrialized. It has now emerged as the eight largest economy inthe word (World Bank, 2000, table ). In this massive transformation there has beenprofound change for all members of the society. Yet for all this reformation, there stillremain major divisions within the society between classes and regions in terms of access to wealth and change. Despite continual advances toward a more egalitariansociety everywhere, the wealthiest classes and regions still retain a major share of thesocieties wealth and Brazil to this day is still the most unequal society within the modernindustrial world in terms of resource distribution. According to the latest World Banksurvey, no industrial or developing country ranks with Brazil in terms of unequaldistribution - with a Gini Coefficient (the standard measure of unequal distribution of income) being a very high .60 in 1996 - a figure modestly exceeded by only three other countries in the world - Swaziland, The Central African Republic and Sierra Leone. Few countries rich or poor could show lower estimates of wealth holding by the poorest10% of the population - which held less than 1% of the nations wealth - or as much asthe top 20% , which held 64% of these resources - again a figure only these few Africancountries could reach (Word Bank Report, 2000 table 2.8).

The aim of our paper is to determine if this pattern of unequal distribution ischanging within Brazil as the country finally establishes universal primary education,begins to reach advanced world indices of well-being of its population, and opens andmodernizes its economy. In the complex social and economic history of the past twentyyears, is the gap between the richest and the poorest sectors and classes declining,does it remain constant or is it increasing? In 1980 one of us was part of a group of scholars which tried to analyze this question from the period from the 1940s to the early


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1980s (Bacha & Klein, 1986). In this study, we wish to take up these same questions of incomplete change in the most recent period from 1980 to the present day, to see howmuch in fact has changed. We are especially interested in both regional and classdistributions and whether the famous duality of Belindia still exist - a Southeasternsector with a level of life equal to Belgium and a northeast with a standard of living closeto that of India. Has the gap increased, declined, or remained the same?

To begin to analyze this question, we must first look at the profound changes inthe Brazilian economy which has occurred in the last quarter century. The generalconsensus today is that the 1980s and 1990s were lost years in relation to the longterm patterns of growth for Brazil. Growth was slow if not stagnant in this period,despite some very profound changes in the economy. Periods of hyper inflation werefollowed by those of stabilization and often recession, the economy went from one inwhich state enterprises dominated industrial production in a highly protected market, toan open economy in which private interests, many of them multi-nationals, dominatedproduction.

Like the other countries in Latin America, Brazil grew rapidly in the first years of the decade of the 1970s (for the basic changes over time see graphs 1). In the contextof a strong expansion in the international economy and the abundance of financialresources from the first world, many countries in the so-called third world lived in astate of economic euphoria. These developing economics grew quickly, but at the costof increasing dependence on attracting large quantities of low cost foreign capital. Theresult was an expanding foreign debt for most of these countries, and an unbalancedsituation in their foreign accounts which in turn were financed with the entrance of moreforeign capital with floating interest rates. In these years such a charge on the localeconomy remained at acceptable levels. But the two petroleum crises of 1973 and1979, combined with the rise of interest rates in the United States profoundly changedthis equation. By the second half of this decade, inflationary pressures in the internalmarket and increasing problems in funding the external debt forced the developingcountries to find internal solutions to correct their growing economic imbalances.

In the Brazilian case, despite these universal pressures, the government tried tofurther its plan of forced industrialization through import substitution, by an ambitiousinvestment plan known as the Second National Development Plan ( or Plano Nacionalde Desenvolvimento II -II-PND). The aim of this plan was to complement Brazilianindustrialization by developing those sectors still dependent on imports and alsoeliminating the bottlenecks in the economic infrastructure. The plan envisioned a fullyintegrated industrial park with a strong potential for growth. The plan had a partialsuccess, but required large inputs of capital with increasing dependence on foreignresources to finance the negative trade balances and to pay off the elevated foreigndebt. In turn oil prices, especially in an importing country such as Brazil, helped to fuelinflationary pressures with prices going from around 25% per annum at the beginning of the decade to 85% per annum by 1980. In spite of the turbulence of this decade, Gross


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184% in 1984, nor was the government capable of balancing the state budget despiteincreasing taxes and cutting current spending and public investments. Much of thisbourgeoning debt was caused by the interest payment on the debt due to the necessityto pay ever higher interest rates both to attract capital and to counter inflationarypressures. The public deficit grew principally from these loans rather than the usualcosts of government operations. A runaway inflation, and increasing internal debtoccurred in the context of the re-democratization of the country, with the first civilelection in years being held in 1984. The elected government finally took office inMarch of 1985 after 21 years of military government. Such a government was forced tomeet the pent up demands for social change, and it was politically impossible tomaintain for more time the recessive economic policies, especially in relation to therestrictions on salaries.

During the period of the military regimes the country had grown, a complexindustrial park had been established and the State had become the principal player inthe national economy, primarily through its state enterprises. But by the end of thisperiod the economic situation was critical, with the economy burdened by both a largeinternal and external debt and on the point of entering hyper-inflation. The nation wasexperiencing ever greater unemployment, declining salaries, increased worsening of income distribution and unbalanced growth in the differing regions of the country.

For many years there has existed a debate with respect to the character of inflation in Brazil, whether it was tied to demand or supply issues or to structuralproblems of the economy itself. In the early 1980s it was argued that there was aninertia to Brazilian inflation fed by a generalized indexation of prices. Given theinefficiency of traditional instruments and policies to control the growing inflationarycrisis - which reached 13% per month - the Sarney government decided to try a newheterodox (or non-recessionary) plan which froze prices at current levels but which metworker demands for increases in real salaries. The so-called Plano Cruzado initiallywas therefore quite successful. In the manner in which it was implanted it provided animportant re-distributive component which increased popular income and resulted inincreased internal consumption and led to a rapid growth of the economy. But the lackof new capital flows, the high costs of repayment of the foreign debt and the newpressures of expanding consumption in the closed Brazilian market eventually led tonew inflationary pressures along with a major deterioration in the external tradebalance. At the beginning of 1987, confronted with these external difficulties and theclosure of international financial markets to the countries of Latin America, Brazil wasforced to declare a moratorium on the repayment of the international debt.

But in spite of the profound economic crisis which marked the last years of theSarney government, this period had the lowest unemployment rate for any period from1980-1999 and the national economy grew at an average rate of 4.4%, per annum -quite a different story from the first half of the decade when the economy stagnated.

Although it was generally thought that the entire decade of the 1980s was an economic


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and social loss, the country did grow in this second half of the decade and did improvemany social indices. It also was a period of democratic consolidation which led to theConstitution of 1988.

The first half of the 1990s however produced another profound crisis in both thepolitical and economic life of the country, but also some rather fundamental changes indirection. The Collor government for the first time brought a neo-liberal position intopower in Brasilia. While the moral discourse of the new government hid one of Brazilsmost corrupt administrations, and the government adopted one of the moreeconomically irrational and authoritarian plans to stop inflation, it did seriously implantthe idea of a fundamental change in the national political economy. Collors antiinflationary measures were profoundly recessive (the GNP falling by 4.2% in 1990), withquite negative social consequences in terms of rising unemployment and fallingsalaries, which accompanied the decline of government investment. Despite all their authoritarian confiscations these policies were incapable of controlling the inflationaryprocesses. Inflation was halted for only a few months and then returned to its highestlevels ever, reaching more than 20% per month by the end of 1990. At the same time,with little serious discussion or preparation, the economy was opened to theinternational market. Nor was the government interested in reducing the shock to thenational economy of this brusk opening up to foreign manufactures.

The Brazilian economy, which would reach one of the highest levels of industrialintegration among the emerging economies, had a major state component within it,which included tariff protection and actual production by state owned industrialenterprises. The economy was closed, with a low coefficient of importation, and atechnology which was adopted to this level of growth. The complexity and the successof this process of state intervention, whose origins go back to the 1940s, created forcesopposed to the neo-liberal program of opening up of the economy, the privatization of state enterprises and an overall reduction of the role of the state in the economy. To

justify this neo-liberal program, critiques of the Brazilian state model pointed to theexperience of the Asian Tigers. But the history of these countries was different. Theybegan with much less complex industrial structures, had higher levels of businessconcentration, more modern technologies and early integration into internationalmarkets. Moreover their process of growth showed few facets of a liberal policy as thegreat entrepreneurial groups were powerfully supported by the State, not throughparticipation in production as in Brazil, but in the coordination of the process of industrial growth and international competition.

In spite of the resistence of the traditional industrial forces, the process of globalization continued even after the impeachment of President Collor. But the firstissue of importance faced by the new government was the crisis of inflation. In October of 1992, hen the new government was named, prices were increasing at 25% per month. In 1993, the future President of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was namedas Finance Minister and he carried out a new plan of stabilization, the fourth since the


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Plan Cruzado of 1986. This new plan, called the Plano Real (Real Plan), finallysucceeded in controlling inflation. Taking advantage of a favorable world economy andbenefitting from the experience of the failed previous plans, the Real Plan attempted aninnovation from previous stabilization plans. Indexation was ended after a period of common price variation and adjustment, and inflation continued to de-accelerate evenwithout government control of prices. The major opening of the economy and the over-valuing of the national money, which served to anchor the program. were fundamentalin the initial success of the plan. Even a devaluation of over 50% of the nationalcurrency in 1999 did not change the price stability and the year 2000 ended with anannual inflation rate of just 5%; a result not obtained in more than fifty years.

The Real Plan furthered the liberal economic model begun by the Collor government. There were major reforms of the State, including the deregulation of theeconomy, the privatization of the state industrial companies, changes in the relations of labor and new rules for social security. Protection for national industry was removedand these industries had to compete on the international market to survive. Nationalproducers were obliged to modernize to survive such competition. The results wereimmediate: a part of the economy was in fact modernized, but another part of theproductive sector simply disappeared in the face of international competition especiallyin a period when the national currency was over-values and thus favorable to imports.There also occurred a change in ownership of industry with the increasing participationof multi-nationals in local production and also a greater dependency on external inputs(components, capital goods and technology). Unemployment increased and theeconomy stagnated. for industrial production. The defenders of the plan called it aprocess of creative destruction. But there were strong crit ics of these variousprograms, especially to the to the over-valuation of the national currency (see Sayad,2000, Batista, Jr. 2000, Tavares, 1999). The need to attract foreign capital necessary tofinance these imbalances led to artificially high interest rates being maintained for several years, all of which created additional pressures on the international commercialbalance of the country. These high interest rates both augmented the external debt andpromoted the growth of the internal debt as well. The level of economic activitystagnated, unemployment increased and the social crisis became more acute.

The success of this policy, at high social costs, needed time to have positiveeffects and a favorable international climate, with the arrival of abundant foreign capitalat low interest rates. But the Asian crisis (1997) and the later Russian one (1988)showed the risks of this policy. The reaction of the government to the Asian cris was toaccelerate reforms, a major fiscal adjustments and high interest rates to attractspeculative foreign capital to protect the foreign reserves. Real interest rates rose toover 30% per annum. But the Russian crisis showed the impossibility of continuing thisprogram. There was a flight of national capital, an explosive loss of reserves, and onlythe aid of the IMF and a devaluation of 50% avoided a greater crisis. The governmentwas forced to abandon the anchor of the over-valued exchange rate, the most debatedpart of the Real Plan. Critics had suggested, from the beginning of the Plan, the


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necessity of a controlled de-valuation of the real , fearing that an international crisiscould provoke a flight of national reserves and force the government into anuncontrolled devaluation in the middle of an external crisis. In fact, the government wasforced to adopt an uncontrolled devaluation. The magnitude of the crisis whichoccurred and its risks for other emerging economics explains the rapid and effectiveintervention and aid of the IMF.

The devaluation of January 1999 was crucial in effecting a recovery of thenational economy and resulted in the return to positive growth rates after several yearsof stagnation. The opening up of the national economy did lead to a modernization of national industry, but its competitive capacity depended on a devaluation of the nationalcurrency. The recuperation of the competitive power permitted a gradual reduction of the internal interest rates. Given these falling rates and a reasonable exchange rate,the economy once again began to grow, investments increased, and the trade balancemoved toward equilibrium. The new perspectives of growth, the continued stability of prices, and the balancing of government accounts, created a favorable climate for foreign investment. Foreign capital was attracted into new productive investments, or bought already producing units through privatization or the purchase of privatenationally owned enterprises. Foreign capital increased its relative participation both inthe productive as well as financial sectors.

The social consequences of these policies of the 1990s were twofold. On theone hand the Plan Real resulted in an immediate gain in the buying power of themajority of the population through the elimination of inflation. The breaking of theinflationary cycle of the Real plan was immediate in terms of the popular classes,allowing them to increase their consumption of basic goods from food to simpleconsumer durables (Lavinas:1998). Thus for the poorest groups in the society, healthand standard of living improved greatly with the end of inflation in both the short andlong terms. But at the same time, employment, which initially grew considerably, later passed through a period of stagnation and even decline, causing unemployment toincrease greatly resulting in the expansion of the informal market with its lowproductivity and poor paying jobs and reducing the importance of the formal and moreproductive employment sector.

Thus depending on how one evaluates these developments, one can also arguethat the decade of the 1990s was also a lost decade in terms economic growth, at leastin the short term. Like the decade of the 1980s, growth was low and irregular. In 10years from 1970 to 1979 the economy grew by more than 100%. In the 20 yearsbetween 1981 and 2000 the growth was only 50%, while the population grew at 42%.On the other hand the country did change profoundly in this period. Not only was itdemocratized, but the economy was also changed in its basic structure. Importsubstitution was abandoned, the industrial park modernized and the economy wasopened up to world currents in a profound way. The government role in production wasreplaced by multi-national corporations, and in the private sector as well as important


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earliest stages of a very profound period of change. To begin with, there is littlequestion that the so-called globalization and privatization processes , however beneficial in the long run, were accomplished at the at the cost of jobs for Brazilian

workers. It has recently been suggested that over half a million jobs were lost inprivatization of the public sector - or 44% of the labor force within the 490 stateenterprises studied (12/15/00 Folha de So Paulo 15 dezembro 2000, p.B11). Another large number of jobs were lost to mechanization and other productivity changes withinthe now internationally competitive private sector: factors which explain the increase inunemployment . In a society with an inefficient social security, this has led to a major

increase in the informal sector and the profusion of the poorest quality service jobs.Industrial employment itself actually fell from 19.2% in 1980 to 11.5% of the work forcein 1999, a figure equal to what it had been in 1950. (Pochmann, 2000)

All of these complex economic policies and developments are fundamental inexplaining the fact that income distribution in Brazil, without question the worst in Latin

America and the most unequal of any advanced industrial society has changed little inthese twenty years. The top 1% still controls more resources than the bottom 50% of the population and has done so for the last half century if not before that as well (seegraph 3). Well over a third of the population remains poor from 1980 to the present withonly modest change over time (Rocha,2000, p.6). The Gini index of distribution showsBrazil at .60 - a level double that of most modern societies.


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Not only has there been little change by class, but there has been little change byregion during this period. The gap between the richest and poorest remainspracticably unaltered from the first years of the 1970s when the income per capital of those living in the Northeast was just 25% of the per capita income of those living in theSoutheast. It slowly narrowed in the 1980s to 33% (Oliveira e Silva & Medina, 1999)but since 1995 had been declining again and so reversing the previous trend (see graph1 above). Another aspect which shows the disparities in the distribution of income is the

comparison of the distributive profiles within these two regions. The numbers for thepoorest metropolitan regions show a worse pattern of distribution than the richestmetropolitan districts, as can be seen in the Lorenz curve for the distribution of wealth in1996 ( see graph 4).

All this lack of movement is even more evident in the failure of the landownership to change in the rural area. From 1960 to 1985 small property owners (thoseowning less then 10 hectares) increased from 45% to 53% of the total farm ownership


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Even as new losses of real income led to adjustments of salaries on a trimester basis,once again inflation grew and salaries declined. The process created a non-endingspiral - more inflation, new loss of real wages, ever more frequent adjustments, and newincreases in inflation. During the various monetary plans, inflation would be drasticallyreduced, salaries converted into the new currencies, sometimes temporarily protectingreal wages, which in turn led to a betterment in the standard of living of the poorest partof the population. But inflation would quickly return at ever high rates. It was not thelevel of inflation itself which explained this process of wage/inflation spiral - but rather itwas its acceleration which most influenced this process. If it had been a stable inflation,even at a high rate, there could have been contractual readjustments which would have

defended workers again the inflation process (see graph 5)The absolute level of inflation, however, did affect the distribution patterns by

other mechanisms. In the case of Brazil we are dealing with changes in prices whichreached more than 50% per month, or close to 2% per day, virtually a standard level of hyperinflation. In such a situation complex processes are needed to preservepurchasing power. These require access to information and to sophisticated bankingproducts rarely available to the poorest elements of the society. The poor, during thehigh run up of prices, thus paid proportionally a greater inflation tax than the rich.

In a country were the minimum wage is less than $100 per month, almost all

purchases are made with credit. In conditions of high inflation credit slowly dries up andfinally disappears. Those most affected are the popular classes which need credit topurchase all their manufactured goods, even non durables ones. Thus inflation affectsthe poor by reducing their purchasing power and then by reducing and/or eliminatingtheir access to credit. Moreover, while all classes are obviously affected, the rich areless affected in their consumption patterns than the poor.

Thus the fluctuations in the national economy since 1980 have not reduced the


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distance between classes and regions. Although long term post 2000 changes inducedby the opening up the national economy may lead to reductions in inequality, the shortterm changes which have occurred in the last twenty years have had little impact onreducing inequality in income and land ownership. Yet for all the rigidity of the income

distribution figures, Brazil has undergone a profound social change in these past twodecades in terms of health and education, which have dramatically transformed thesociety, as we will see from a more detailed study of these indices. These changes aremost obviously related to such fundamental changes as increasing urbanization,education and sanitation - all of which profoundly influence these basic statistics.

Probably the most profound transformation of the population of Brazil has been theincreasing advance of life expectancy for all Brazilians with a bettering of all health

indices, along with the universalization of primary education, the decline of illiteracy andthe decline of the poorer rural populations. From the 1940s onward these indices havebeen changing for the better, and there has been an even more rapid advance in theseareas in the last decade of the 20 th century. Life expectancy for all Brazilians went from41 years to 68 years of age by 2000 (see table 2), with most of the change coming mostrecently. In the decade of the 1970s (from 1970 to 1980) Brazilians added 8 years toaverage life expectancy and another 6 years were added to the national average in justthe five year period from 1995-2000 (CEPAL 2000, table 8). Moreover the differencesbetween the poorest and the richest regions are declining. This difference went frombeing two thirds the rate of the richest region in the decade of the 1930s to over threequarters in the decade of the 1970s.

This increase in life expectancy has been paralleled by a decline in disease andmortality within the country. The key variable of infant mortality changed quitedramatically in the last few decades. In 1980-85 mortality of children 0-1 years of agewas at 64 per thousand live births. By the quinquenium of 1995-2000 it had dropped to42 per thousand (CEPAL 2000, table 42). Though this ratio was at the high end for most Latin American countries, Brazil was no longer at the very extreme end in this

Tabela 2Expectativa de Vida ao Nascer, por Regio -1930/80

1930/ 40 1940/ 50 1950/ 60 1960/ 70 1970/ 80 Aumento entre as dcadasREGIO (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) A-B B-C C-D D-E

Amazonia 39,8 42,7 51,0 54,2 63,1 2,9 8,3 3,2 8,9Nordeste Setentrional 40,0 43,7 47,8 50,4 55,5 3,7 4,1 2,6 5,1NordesteCentral 34,7 34,0 39,4 44,2 49,0 -0,7 5,4 4,8 4,8Nordeste Meridional 38,3 39,2 44,8 49,7 56,5 0,9 5,6 4,9 6,8Minas 43,0 46,1 51,7 55,4 60,2 3,1 5,6 3,7 4,8Rio de Janeiro 44,5 48,7 56,1 57,0 64,1 4,2 7,4 0,9 7,1So Paulo 42,7 49,4 55,1 58,2 63,9 6,7 5,7 3,1 5,7

Paran 43,9 45,9 53,4 56,6 63,2 2,0 7,5 3,2 6,6Sul 51,0 55,3 60,4 61,9 67,8 4,3 5,1 1,5 5,9Centro-Oeste 46,9 49,8 54,0 57,5 62,6 2,9 4,2 3,5 5,1Brasil 41,2 43,6 50,0 53,4 61,6 2,4 6,4 3,4 8,2

% da pior regio/melhor r 68% 61% 65% 71% 77%

Fonte: Wood & Carvalho, IPEA, 1994, no.27, p. 108 tabela 4.2


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figure.

Size of families have also dropped dramatically along with a systematically decliningbirth rate. Moreover this decline cuts across regional and class differences. In generalthe poorer the region and the poorer the family, the larger the total fertility rate. In 1970the poorest quarter of the population in terms of income had a total fertility rate of 7.5,which dropped to 6.1 by 1980; while the richest quarter went from 3.3 to 2.9 children inthis latter year (Wood & Carvalho 1994, , p.180, table 7.2). Thus the poorest quarter

had a greater decline in this rate than the richest part of the population, and this differingrate has persisted through to the census of 2000. This decline was so general, thatthe differences between regions and classes are progressively declining. Moreover thispattern of declining difference is also occurring between the urban and rural areas.

Illiteracy also dropped dramatically in this period, going from a rate of 65% of theadult population (15 years of age and older) in 1900 to just 20% in 1991 (see abovetable 2). It is estimated that this rate dropped to 12% in the 10-69 age category in 2000and would continue to decline in the coming years (Coelho de Souza, 1999:12, tabela5). There is also a continuing decline between regions and between the urban and ruralpopulations as universal primary education finally begins to take hold by the last

decades of the century. Moreover the urban population has been expanding greatly inthis period, to the point that by the census of 20000 it was less than 20% of totalnational population (see graph 6). This and the major improvements in governmentspending for education may account for the fact that between 1976 and 1996 theaverage number of years of school completed went from 3.2 to 5.3 years for the urbanpopulation (which by 2000 represented 81% of the total population of Brazil). Moreover,in this period, womens average years of schooling finally passed that of men, and hadreached 5.4 years to 5.2 years for males by 1996. (Ferreira & Paes de Barros 2000,


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cuadros 3 &4). But it should be remembered, as the latest CEPAL projections havesuggested, that Brazil still has the worst level of illiteracy in South America, estimated tobe even higher rate than that of Bolivia and more than double the rate in neighboringParaguay (CEPAL,2000, table 33).

This decline is clearly due to the progressive expansion of primary education.Between 1980 and 1997 the percentage of children going to primary school rose from80% of the relevant age group of children in the first year to 97% in the latter period.There was also a great improvement in secondary education as well, were the ratioswent from 46% of the children at the relevant ages to 66% in 1997 (Word Bank, 2000,table 2.10)

Nevertheless, despite the declines in illiteracy and the increase in life expectancyand the relative declines of infant mortality and other associated health statistics, Brazilitself still represents in many ways one of the more backward nations even in the regionof the Americas. Many of the basic socio-economic indices still show Brasil asbelonging to the far less developed nations despite the fact that it is estimated by theWord Bank to be the worlds eight largest economy (World Bank, Report2000, table1.1). At the same time, while there appears to be a general lessening of the health andeducational differences between the poorest and the richest regions, and between therichest and poorest classes, the economic variables show persistent inequality atroughly the same levels. This distribution pattern is due to a series of factors embeddedin Brazilian society, but also to the relative stagnation of the Brazilian economy in thelast two decades. So long as growth rates remain below population growth rates - andthe current growth rate of the population revealed by the latest census is 1,6% per annum in this past decade - then the class and regional disparities will change onlymodestly. There is little question, that much change has occurred within Brazil and thatthe Belindia disparity model is less clear cut as it once was. The current socialindicators are signaling a profound change in Brazilian society and a move toward amore universal norm of social indicators regardless of class and region. But incomeand wealth still are very powerful markers of distinction by class and region, and theselast twenty years have seen little change in this extraordinarily unequal distributionalpattern, despite the very profound structural changes which have occurred in theeconomy (Henriques, 2000).


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Charles H. Wood and Jos Alberto M. Carvalho. 1994. A demografia de desigualdadeno Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: IPEA. (English edi CUP, 1988)

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Social and Economic Change in Brazil, 1980-2000- The Incomplete Transformation Revisited