Social Capital and Poverty of the Wage-labour Class

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Social Capital and Poverty of the Wage-Labour Class: Problems with the Social Capital TheoryAuthor(s): Raju J. DasSource: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar.,2004), pp. 27-45Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of

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S o c i a l c a p i t a l a n d p o v e r t y o f t h ewage-labour l a s s : problems w i t h t h es o c i a l c a p i t a l t h e o r y

Raju J DasSocial capital, understood as norms of reciprocity and associational life, is supposedto provide a bottom-up approach to poverty alleviation world-wide. The WorldBank says that social capital is a necessary condition for long-term development andthat social capital is the capital of the poor. This paper will argue that much of theliteratureis too sanguine of the benefits of social capital for the poor. It is, of course,important to look at the extent to which social capital can help the poor. But how theconditions of the poor people can also affect their social capital is equally importantto examine, and this has often been neglected by many scholars who have been busyto prove that social capital is a new paradigm of development. Based on qualitativeinterviews in two rural areas in Orissa, eastern India, this paper seeks to examinewhether and to what extent poor people of the daily wage labour class benefit fromtheir social capital. It then goes on to unpack the mechanisms in which the economic-political conditions under which poor people live and the spatiality of these conditionsaffect the production of social capital. By seeking to unpack the dialectical relationbetween social capital and poverty, the paper aims at problematizing the overlyoptimistic claims about social capital. It shows that it is untenable to posit socialcapital as an independent variable and poverty as a dependent variable because theeconomic-political conditions of poor people have an enormous constraining effecton social capital itself and its supposed material benefits for the poor.key words social capital wage labourers poverty insecurity IndiaUniversityof Dundee, Departmentof Geography,Dundee DD1 4HNemail:[email protected] manuscript received 9 September 2003

IntroductionSocial capital is said to provide a bottom-upapproach to poverty alleviation (Woolcock 1998).The World Bank says that social capital is necessaryfor long-term development and that it is the capitalof the poor (World Bank 2001, 129). This paperargues that much of the literature on social capitalis too sanguine of its benefits for the poor. It is, ofcourse, important to look at the extent to whichsocial capital - norms of reciprocity and networks/associations - can help the poor. But how theconditions of the poor can affect social capital isequally important to examine. This has often beenneglected by social capitalists. Based on qualitative

interviews in two villages in eastern India andfocusing on poor daily wage labourers, thispaper examines not only the extent to which wagelabourers benefit from their social capital but alsothe mechanisms in which their economic-politicalconditions affect their social capital. The main aimof the paper is to problematizethe overly optimisticclaims about social capital, especially the 'com-munitarian' social capital of RobertPutnam (1993),the person most responsible for popularizing theconcept.In the first of the following sections, I will brieflyreview the literature on social capital and povertyto set the context for my own study. The next twosections deal with the empirical material on social

TransInst BrGeogrNS 29 27-45 2004ISSN 0020-2754 ? Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers) 2004


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28capital. The second section discusses the norms andpractice of reciprocity among wage labour families,i.e. their 'bonding social capital'. The third sectionexamines their associational life, a form of 'bridgingsocial capital'. In the concluding section, I return tothe literature on social capital and link it to theempirical discussion in the paper.The empirical context of the paper is the OrissaState of India. India's political economy, and thepolitical economy of the conditions of poor labour-ing men and women in particular,are significantlyconditioned by, on the one hand, the structuralpower and strategic actions of India's proprietaryelites (urban capitalists, large landowners andtop level government actors)and, on the other,by theactions of the labouring masses of Indian society(Bardhan1998;Das 1998). But this characterizationof India's political economy would be found want-ing, at least on geographical grounds. For there isa significant amount of regional (especially, inter-state) variation in India's political economy andespecially in the extent to which spaces of empow-erment for the poorer strata are opened up withinthe formal democratic set-up. Corbridge andHarriss(2000)provide an excellent typology of whatcan be called India's regional political economy. Intype 1, there are States such as West Bengal, wherelower castes and lower classes are more stronglyrepresented in the political regimes. In type 2, thereare States where middle castes/classes dominateState-level governance, but lower classes havereceived some government benefits as well (e.g.Andhra Pradesh).In type 3, there are two sub-types.In the first sub-type, there are States in whichupper-caste/class dominance has been challengedby middle castes/classes (e.g. Bihar).In the secondsub-type, there are States in which upper castes/classes dominate the political regimes, and lowerclasses have little space for empowerment. Orissa,according to Corbridge and Harriss, most probablyfalls in this sub-type of India's regional politicaleconomy.' Orissa is indeed a part of India's vastcontiguous poverty belt, where the poor are notonly economically poor (Das 2002) but are alsopolitically much less empowered than the poorelsewhere. If this is the situation, it would be inter-esting to see how the poor live their lives there, howthey use, for example, their 'social capital' to makeends meet, and how Orissa's political economy(especially formal democratic set-up in a conditionof mass poverty, clientilism, etc.) might be anobstacle to the poor labouring people trying to

RajuJDasdevelop an associational life and more generally'civil society', which can play a crucial role in their(future) political empowerment (see Corbridge andHarriss 2000, 224).The empirical material from Orissa comes from71 in-depth qualitative interactive interviews andseven focus-group discussions with wage labourersand others (e.g. politicians) in two village-clusters(Gram Panchayats) in the State (Figure 1). Localhistory of working-class political solidarity was themajorcriterion used to select the village clusters. InChasakhanda GramPanchayatof Jajpurdistrict, thelevel of working-classpolitical solidarity is very lowas compared to Remuna of Balasore district, whichis partly indicated by a very weak electoralpresenceof the Leftpartiesthere (Table1). Both at the level ofState Assembly constituency of which Chasakhandais a part and at the level of Chasakhanda GramPanchayat tself, political power lies in the hands ofcentre/centre-right politicians, although there arepockets of working-class solidarity within the GramPanchayat.Remuna GramPanchayathas a traditionof peasants/workers movement organized by one ofthe Leftparties [CommunistPartyof India (Marxist),or CPM].The area is a part of an Assembly constit-uency which has elected a Left politician to theState'sLegislativeAssembly. Indeed, he is a residentof Remuna Gram Panchayat. The elected Headof Remuna Gram Panchayatwas also from CPMduring the time of the interviews. Remuna alsohas a greater number of civic organizations perthousand population than Chasakhanda. Remuna,like Chasakhanda, is also a rural area where peopledepend mostly on unirrigated farming. But unlikein Chasakhanda, some people in Remuna workin nearby factories as well. In terms of economicdevelopment, it is a relatively better off area thanChasakhanda, as indicated by the differentialagricultural productivity. The fieldwork was con-ducted with the help of two RAs from December2001 to April 2002 and from 6 December 2002 to10 January 2003. The majority of the respondentscame from the class of daily wage earners.2Theselectionof respondents from this class was done toensure that they represented different segments(e.g. workers in agriculture and outside of agricul-ture). In addition, landowners as well as politiciansfrom different political parties and governmentofficials from different geographical scales (village,village clusters, Development Block) who are inday-to-day interaction with wage labourers wereinterviewed. Among the politiciansand government


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Social capitaland poverty of the wage-labourclass

Figure 1 Study sites

Table I The study areas: Remuna and Chasakhanda Gram Panchyats, eastern IndiaRemuna Chasakhanda

1. Total population (2001) 10 669 90642. Scheduled castes and tribesaas a %of total population 28.5 43.33. Economic development (paddy yield in quintal per hectare) 26.9 184. No. of civic associationsb including self-help groupsc per 1000 population 3.01 1.825. No. of civic associations excluding self-help groups per 1000 population 0.85 0.486. Votes polled by Left parties (%)in the local (i.e. Panchayat)elections 22.28 12.97Notes: aPresence of these groups occupying the bottom strata of Indian society is often used as a proxy for poverty. bTheseinclude registered clubs, voluntary associations, youth clubs, women's associations, libraries and labour unions. These data arefor the Block level (several GramPanchayatsmake a Block). CThese are groups of women who collectively save some moneyevery month and receive loans from the government to engage in small business; they are also sometimes engaged in otherself-empowering activitiesSource: Block Development office of Remuna and Chasakhanda

officials interviewed, several of those whom the (state officials, politicians and poor labourers). Theyworkers mentioned as especially helpful or espe- were selected one by one as the research proceededcially corrupt and exploitative were interviewed. and as the understanding of causal group was builtThe vast majority of the respondents were those up (see Sayer 2000, 20). My aim was to interview awho actually interacted with one another causally small number of individuals about a large number

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30of properties/issuesrelatedto social capitalto unpackthe causal mechanisms linking social capitaland the economic-political conditions under whichwage-earners live. Groups of wage labourers wereinvited for focus group discussions in specific placessuch as community centres, schools and places ofworship where they normally meet. An averageinterview lasted for about 40 minutes. Duringthe interviews, a series of questions based on thesocial capital-and-poverty literature was used tofacilitate discussions. Interviews were conductedin Oriya language. The author translated themajority of the transcripts; a few were translatedby a professional translator,whose translationswererandomlycheckedby the author.

Literature on social capital and poverty:a brief reviewSocial capital refers to norms of reciprocity andnetworks/associationswhich canpromotecooperativeactions and which can be used as social resourcesfor mutual benefit (Putnam1993,1672000;Woolcock2000).3I will deal with reciprocity and associationsin turn.

Reciprocity is of two types: specific (also knownas balanced) and generalized (Putnam 1993, 172).Specificreciprocityrefers to a simultaneousexchangeof items of equivalentvalue (e.g.workmatesexchang-ing holiday gifts). Generalized reciprocity, which isof interest here, refers to 'a continuing relationshipof exchange that is at any given time unrequited orimbalanced' (Putnam 1993, 172). Each individualact of generalized reciprocity (henceforward reci-procity) is usually characterized by a combinationof short-term altruism and long-term self-interest:'Ihelp you out now in the (possibly vague, uncertainand uncalculating) expectation that you will helpme out in the future'(Taylor n Putnam1993,172).Thenorm of reciprocity serves to reconcile self-interestand solidarity. This norm is a highly productiveform of social capital, Putnam says. Reciprocity isat the heart of self-help associations that helppeople address economic insecurities. As a part ofthe reciprocity network, people exchange labour,capital and consumption goods (Putnam 1993).The second component of social capital is thenetworks of civic engagement - networks ofinterpersonalcommunication and exchange- amongpeople of equal socio-economic status (Putnam1993,172-6). These are also known as horizontal associa-tions (as opposed to vertical associations exempli-

RajuJDasfied by patron-client relations). Networks of civicengagement such as neighbourhood associations,cooperatives, sports clubs and mass-based partiesrepresent horizontal interaction. Based on his Italystudy, Putnam suggests that these networks fosternorms of reciprocity among members, facilitatethe flow of information about trustworthiness ofmembers, increase the potential costs of defectionand help members cooperate for mutual benefit(Putnam 1993, 173-4). He says that areas withmore social capital have greater levels of economicdevelopment. The geographical work on inter-firmrelations and new industrial spaces in developedand less-developed countries also makes use of con-cepts of trust, embeddedness and networks, whichare all part of the social capital concept (Molina-Morales et al. 2002; Buck 2000; Pinch and Henry1999; Christerson and Lever-Tracy 1997; McDadeand Malecki 1997; Gertler 1995). This work, likesocial capital research generally, rightly suggeststhat 'economy and society are incorrigibly inter-twined' (Thriftand Olds 1996, 314; see also Biggartand Castanias 2001). But both Putnam's work oninterpersonal relations and geographical work oninter-firmrelationstend to neglect or pay lip servicenot only to issues of class but also to the relatedissues of economic redistribution, i.e. poverty andcognate issues. In this paper I investigate thereforethe relation between social capital and poverty ofthe wage-earning class.Since the publication of Putnam's 1993 book,there has developed a specific literature on socialcapital and poverty, in which a typology of socialcapital has been developed. In this typology, thereare different types of social capital in relation to thepoor people: bonding, bridging and linking socialcapital (WorldBank 2001;Gittel and Vidal 1998).4

'Bonding social capital' refers to strong tiesconnecting family members, neighbours and closefriends sharing similar demographic characteristics(World Bank 2001, 128). Norms of reciprocity andmutual help tend to be strong among people withstrong ties. On the other hand, weak ties amongmembers of civic organizations, including clubsand voluntaryassociations,constitute'bridgingsocialcapital' (Gittel and Vidal 1998). Bridging socialcapital refers to horizontal connections, i.e. connec-tions to people with 'broadly comparable economicstatus and politicalpower', but with different demo-graphic, ethnic and geographical backgrounds. Thisform of social capital of the poor is produced atleast in part by their associational life (e.g. clubs


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32and, more powerfully, constrain the production ofsocial capital, thereby limiting any possible causalrole of social capital in poverty alleviation thatmany social capitalists assign to it.On the one hand, the conditions under whichworking class people live can contribute to theproduction of social capital. Portes identifies foursources of social capital. One of them is 'boundedsolidarity' (Portes and Landholt 2000, 534). Thissolidarity is based on an emergent sentiment ofwe-ness among members of the working class (andother groups) who face similar difficult situations.It is a sentiment based on moral imperative ratherthan rational calculations of costs and benefits(Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993, 1327-8; Callinicos1988, 199-203).

If sufficientlystrong, this emergent sentiment willleadto theobservance f normsof mutual upport e.g.exchangeof gifts], appropriable y individualsas aresource n their own pursuits.(Portesand Sensen-brenner 993,1325)While the conditions under which the workingclass people live can contribute to social capital,there are other conditions which can constrain it.A major issue underlying the class characterof thestock and nature of social resource in the form ofsocial capital is the fact that the working class isexcluded from, and relatively deprived of, materialresources (especially, means of production). Giventheir class position, workers have limited materialresources to share among themselves. And, withoutresources, nformal rules of sharing in a place andover space are difficult to sustain for long (in theiractive form).6Further,self-help and mutual aid arebased on an expectationof certaindegree of security:that when one is in difficulty, one expects that one'srelations with others will act as an insurance andthat one can get help. Yet, a fundamental aspect ofthe working-class life is insecurity, not justexclusion from material resources. Because it hasbeen separatedfrom means of production, its accessto means of subsistence, generally, depends onsecuring wage work, which, however, is notguaranteed. One never knows how one is going toget through to the end of the week. The insecurityofthe working class can undermine the conditions forreproduction of norms of self-help and reciprocity,which presuppose a sense of security.Thus class/poverty can contribute to socialcapital, but it can undermine its production. In myempirical discussion I will broaden out the con-

RajuJDasstraining forces on social capital to include not onlythe economic conditions of daily wage earners butalso their political conditions. I will show thateconomic and political conditions in which they livehave an enormous effect on social capital and limitany beneficial role. The constraining role of theseconditions can be much more powerful than theirenabling role.

Bonding social capital of poor wagelabourers in OrissaStock and benefits of bonding social capitalFor several months in a year, labouring families,whose main source of income is daily casual labour,are short of food. Therefore, the informal exchangeof food on a reciprocalbasis (or,informalinterest-freeborrowing and lending of food) is widely practisedand is an important aspect of Putnam's generalizedreciprocity.For,SND and NSM, who are daily wagelabourers (unless otherwise noted, the respondentsare daily wage labourers), the norm/practice ofreciprocity is crucial to their survival.

SND:Myfamilydid not haveanything o eat for lunchtoday.Weasked a neighbour f ours for some rice.Hegaveus somerice... Thisperson s alsoa poor personlike us.NSM: f I don'thaverice,I canborrow or a weekandsurvive.

Perhapsnext to food, medical emergency, includingdeath crisis, is the most important area where a lotof reciprocity is observed. Ill-health in rural areasmeans the need fortransportationo hospitalslocatedin towns. Italso entailsexpenditureon medicines,etc.KRJ:We help each other. If somebody needs medicalemergency help, we take him to the hospital in ourrickshaw or trolley [some labourers own and pulltrolleys or rickshaws on hire:author].

If the nature of medical emergency is very serious,help at the larger social-spatial scale (e.g. communitylevel) is mobilized, not just from a few neighbours.As Musi, a poor writer who lives on contributionsfrom friends, neighbours and relatives, added:Musi: I was very sick on October 12. Villagers [who aremainly low-caste labourers] took me to the hospital[which is 5-6 hours by bus]. They contributedfrom Rs.5to Rs.10 or Rs.50 each. They collected Rs14000-15 000.I didn'thavemoneyto buyanordinarymedicine.Theyhelped me without expecting anything in return. Theyare also helping others ... Sometimesthey are helping bycutting down their own food expenditure.


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Social capitaland poverty of the wage-labourclassAs these quotes and others below suggest, thereare strong norms of reciprocity in both the studyareas. People help each other in both monetary andnon-monetary terms.How class/economic and political conditions affectnorms/practice of reciprocityWhere are these norms coming from? Interviewssuggest that the fact that everyone depends onwage work and that everyone is poor, or at leastnot well-off, sustains a norm of reciprocity amongthe labouring families. This is evident from thefollowing quotes.

KLM:Those who are daily labourers trust me and I trustthem. When he is in difficulty I will help him a little.... There is sharing among us. If I borrow somethingfrom him today, I will return in two days or tomorrow.Otherwise, he will be in difficulty.... We fifty or solabourers [in our hamlet] help each other. But thosewho are of higher status, they don't interact with usand we don't interact with them.AKP: I share my food with other labourers. Because Ithink I have experienced deprivation (abhaba)before.We were poor. We have worked very hard. Ourmother used to feed us boiled matharanga aga (a wildspinach-like plant). I even pay for medicines whenpeople are in hospitals. I have even donated blood. Ithink if I need blood this person will give blood forme in future.SNS (a labour organizer, who belongs to a Left party):Because labourers are all one class, within that class,there is a relationship, there is giving and taking, thereis mutual help and sympathy.

It is quite clear that class solidarity growing outof common class position is an important factorunderlying reciprocity. Some labourers have a classconsciousness. That is, they are conscious of thefact that they are a class which is excluded from theownership of means of production and whose liveli-hood therefore depends on wage work. Reciprocityis partly based on this consciousness and theempathy it generates.Labourers' class position, the fact that they dependon wage work for their livelihood, is one thing.Consequences of their class position are another.Insecurity and poverty are major consequences oflabourers' class. Everyone knows that he/she willbe without work and without food for many daysin a year. But no one knows which days they will orwill not get wage work and therefore will or will nothave food to eat. This insecurity seems to sustain

33the norm and practice of reciprocity. Each act ofhelping implies a 'guarantee' that the person whohelps will need and get help in future. Helpingis based on an expectation of return help. As arespondent, STR, a labour organizer in a politicallyconscious hamlet of Chasakhanda said: 'Peoplefeel "if I help someone, I will get help in future"'. Itis the combination of insecurity and poverty thatunderlies the norm and practice of reciprocityamong labourers.

Although I had expected that class would be amuch stronger basis for reciprocity, this is not whatI found. Between class and consequences of class,the latter are more important factors underlyingnorms of reciprocity. There is a reason for this. Theextent to which labourers are conscious of theirclass position is limited, although this conscious-ness is stronger in Remuna than in Chasakhanda.Labourers are more conscious of the consequencesof their class position, i.e. their poverty and insecu-rity, than of their class position itself. The role ofclass and consequences of class in sustainingreciprocity cannot be seen in abstraction from thespatiality of class. To a large extent, norms of reci-procity exist also because of the feeling that labourerslive together in a village. And neighbourliness(which signifies spatiality of class) and class-basednorms of reciprocity exist together. Class andlocation both influence norms of reciprocity. AsKRJ from Chasakhanda said: 'Our neighbours arelike us. They depend on wage work. We help eachother in times of need'. A respondent in a focusgroup discussion in the politically active Remunashared KRJ's view:

We are neighbours, my house is next to his. Suppose Ihave things [to eat] today. You don't. I give you today.Tomorrow you give me. Why is this feeling there?Because we all belong to one category of people. TodayI am in want, there is no guarantee that tomorrow thatperson will not be in want. He will surely be in want.So good relations exist. Because if I depend on himtoday, tomorrow he will need help from me. Because ofthis, good relations exist.

A participant in a focus group with CPM membersin Remuna reinforced this view:People belonging to the same economic category livein the same neighbourhood. They are fully awareof each other's difficulties. A lender today might turn aborrower tomorrow. This awareness of each other'svulnerability helps develop a relationship of coopera-tion and trust.


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34There is evidence from qualitative interviews thatclass consciousness alone or in combination withneighbourliness underlies reciprocity to a muchgreater extent in Remuna than in Chasakhanda.Indeed, a much greater number of respondents fromRemuna than from Chasakhanda indicated thatclass solidarity alone or in combination with neigh-bourliness influences reciprocity. But while classand class-related aspects of labourers' lives canpromote reciprocity, these can also undermine that.There are at least three different aspects of the classcharacter of labouring families that actually under-mine the practice of reciprocity and its effectivityfor relief from poverty. Firstly, poor labourers havevery limited ability to help their neighbours of the sameclass. A member of a focus group in Remuna said:

There is solidarity among the poor class people.Suppose I am sick today, our wage-earning folks willsurely help me. But they don't have the means, wealth.They will do whatever they can.

This is supported by KLM from Chasakhandawhen he said:Often we have to borrow. Instead of eating three timesa day, we eat two times and save a little so we canreturn the money we have borrowed.... I am in want,how shall I help you? ... You see, I am getting Rs30 aday, and he is getting Rs30 a day. His wage is notenough for his family. Mine is not enough for myfamily. We don't have any surplus to help each other.

Not only do poor people have limited ability tohelp each other. It is also the case that poor people,especially, very poor people, cannot get much helpfrom their poor neighbours who might be only slightlybetter off (or from other people, for that matter).

JHD (a lady politician): If you have a good relationwith me, I will give you, you will give me ... that's all.... Who cares about very poor people? No one cares.Because they cannot return. No one trusts them. Thoseamong the poor people who are trust-worthy... if theyare working for me, they can return what I give them,then I will help them.NSM: My neighbours will lend me something if theythink I have the ability to return.If someone is extremelypoor and has absolutely nothing, then they won'tlend him anything. They won't give him anything.

And a member of a focus group in Chasakhandaadded:When we ask for some money, people don't trust us.They think we are daily wage workers and live hand tomouth, how will we return the money?

Raju J DasThus the poor labouring families cannot help othersmuch (in spite of strong norms of reciprocity). Norcan they get much help, meaning that those whoneed help most are the ones who are excluded fromthe networks of reciprocity. Apart from the fact thatnot everyone is a part of the network of reciprocity,it is also the case - and this is the third aspect ofhow class constrains the practice of reciprocity -that when people do help each other, the amountof help people give and receive from one anotheris not much.

SKB (a school clerk): A lot of give and take is there(rice, etc.). But when one needs a heavy amount, it isnot possible to get help ... This is also not a permanentsolution. This is temporary help. How many times willone help?If wage labourers are poor, how is the norm ofreciprocity practised at all? As NSM said, 'noteveryone in our village will run out of food at thesame time'. That means that at the communitylevel, on a given day, there will be some surplusof food which can be shared, if there are strongnorms of reciprocity. Some families can have somesurplus above their minimal consumption levelfor a few days. The circulation of rice, etc. in theform of mutual help comes out of this temporary'surplus' which is really a part of labourers' con-sumption fund. This is shared with families nothaving food with the strong expectation that it willbe returned when needed. But this also suggeststhat because of lack of any surplus on a long-termbasis, there is a very weak material basis for thenorm of reciprocity. That is why, when one borrowsbut cannot return as promised, the relationshipsturn bitter. The continuity of the practice of reci-procity is under threat because trust underlyingthat is eroded, often not intentionally.

CHM:If I borrow something from you and can't return,I will procrastinate, relations get bitter. Relations oftrust weaken because of want (abhaba, natana).JVP:Some people borrow but don't return. When thishappens, neighbours are reluctant to help each other.BBS:If someone borrows something from someone else,the borrower does not want to interact with that persontoo long, lest he would have to return what has beenborrowed. He wants to avoid that person. He wants toestablish relationships with other people ...

These views were echoed by a member of a focusgroup in Chasakhanda:


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Social capitaland povertyof the wage-labourclassSuppose,I have two kilogramsof riceandI need onekilogramand would like to keepanotherkilogram ortomorrow. f someoneasks me for a kilogramof rice[and] .. if he can convince me that he will surelyreturnme the ricethenI will give him.... Ifthepersonbreakshispromise, henwe quarrel.Quarrel they do. And often. Thus trust and reci-

procity, the basic ingredients of social capital, cancause limited and temporary relief from absolutepoverty. But the practice of trust and reciprocitycan be constrained and the norms underlying thatpractice weakened by poverty.Spatiality of class understood in terms of neigh-bourliness can also have a constraining effect onreciprocity. Social capital presupposes social inter-action. And 'social interaction usually takes placein a localised spatio-temporalcontext' causing whatCox and Mair call 'local dependence' of people(1988, 312; see Das 2001 on local dependence ofclasses in ruralIndia).With respect to social capital,for example, 'mutual aid [which is an importantaspectof social capital] s with particularneighbours',as Cox and Mair say. It is generally the case thatby being in the particular place - or by being apart of place-based social support networks - thatpeople get help or canhelp others. As one respondent,Purna (a low-caste government official living ina low-caste labourershamlet), said: 'Suppose I don'thave rice to eat, I will get from my neighbours, Iwon't get from outsideof the village' (italics added).One reason for the geographical boundedness ofmutual help is that mutual help presupposes trust,and trust relations take time to develop throughroutinized place-based interactions characterizedbywhat Giddens (1987) calls 'co-presence'.Norms andpractice of reciprocity indeed tend to be spatiallybounded: these tend to happen in limited geo-graphical spaces.7This can potentially make peoplevulnerable. People have access to resources of theplace-based networks of which they are a part, butthese resources are limited not only because of classand its consequences such as poverty. It is alsobecause these networks stretch across geographi-cally limited areas.I am dealing with labouring families as constitut-ing the working class, families who depend ondaily wages for livelihood. This class, however, isfar from being homogeneous.8There are economic-cultural differences within this class. And, thesehave a bearing on the practice of reciprocity. Someof these families have a person with a governmentjob (e.g. clerk) with a salary (e.g. a family where

35parents work as daily labourers but their sonworks in a government office). These working-classfamilies are a bit better off than the families whoare totally dependent on daily wages. These twocategories of working-class families, although oftenthey are of the same caste, do not get along well,and often are not engaged in mutual reciprocity.

KLM: There are some people in our harijana[lowestcaste] community, they have got government jobs, theydon't like us. They don't want even to come to ourhouses.NSM: [T]hose among our Harijan caste who havebecome well-off... hate their own caste people who arepoor. Earlier traditionally even landlords used to havesome sympathy with the poor people. But these people[the richer sections among the harijans]hate us.

There are important occupational-cultural differ-ences within the working class. Some are farmlabourers and others are factory labourers. Thissort of difference is very important in Remuna, butnot in Chasakhanda, because Remuna is close to anindustrial town and Remuna itself has someindustries itself. A senior government official inRemuna, RJS, said:

[Thereare factory workers and agriculturalworkers]. Ifa factory worker takes [someone] for work to a factory,there will be competition between the two types ofworkers. [Some] factory workers get Rs 60-70 a daywhereas agricultural labourers get Rs 50. Factorylabourers wear trousers and shirts but agriculturallabourers wear gamuchha a thin and long cotton towel).[Some] factory labourers get a salary [but agriculturallabourers are daily labourers]. Agricultural labourerswant to work in factories, but factory workers arenot encouraging them. Rarely do factory labourers helpagriculturallabourersfind a job in a factory.

In part because of occupational differences, thereare some income differences within the workingclass. When all are poor and struggling to survive,a little bit of economic difference among them -even the luxury of some people having some foodto eat everyday while others have little or nothing- causes ill-feelings, feelings of jealousy which canundermine norms of reciprocity.

KLM:If I am earning Rs 50 in a place and if I don't callmy neighbour to work there, he gets angry with me....Because we all are in want, there is a feeling of jealousyamong us.

There are also political differences within theworking class, the differences along political party


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36lines. This has several implications. Reciprocity ormutual help is often practised within a groupfollowing a specific party.

FOCO: If during the election I have had a fight withyou, when I go to work I won't call you. I will think'Lethim get help from the party he was following'.SDM: A Congressman [someone of the CongressParty] had got some relief [after the cyclone]. Heshared it all with other Congress people. Others did notget it.

This view is supported by those who are not poordaily wage labourers, as the comments from BNB(a government clerk) and DLD (a governmentclerk-cum-landowner) testify below.

BNB:A Janataparty person will not help a poor personsupporting the Congress party.DLD: People think, 'He belongs to that party. Whyshould I help?'

Thus the practice of reciprocity is often confined togroups defined by common political loyalty. If oneis outside specific groups, one may not get the helpone needs from people who can help.

Bridging social capital of poor wagelabourers in eastern IndiaStockand benefitsof bridgingsocialcapitalAssociations/clubs - labourers' associational life- represent a form of bridging social capital. It issocial capital at a larger social, and often spatial,scale than the norms of reciprocity (or bondingsocial capital). There are a large number of civicorganizations, such as cultural associations, self-help groups, youth clubs, rural development associa-tions, religious associations, in both the villages.These associations, many of which are located inworking-class hamlets and dominated by working-class members, seem to promote relations of trustand cooperation among poor people.

KRJ:There was a lot of conflict between dhoba andkandaraon the one hand and pana castes on the other[these are all 'ex-untouchable' castes]. We [i.e. the lowcaste labourers]established PalleeMangalayuvakasangha(Ruralwelfare youth association).Even when dogs fromdifferent neighbourhoods used to fight among them-selves, that used to divide the neighbourhoods. Becauseof the club, younger people from different hamletssat together. People are no longer quarrelling amongthemselves. When I went and sat there in the club,

RajuJ Daswould my father quarrel with other people there?...Earlier we were not sitting together, we were not doingthings together. Now we are sitting in one place. Theattitude to help each other developed. Earlierhigh castepeople did not interact with harijans.Now they areinteracting with them. Now we are all eating together,sitting together. We gossip together.

Clubs and associations then promote social capitalin the form of trust and cooperative relations. Thelatter in turn can produce tangible benefits.SDJ:Our youth club helps in digging the village pondand tube-wells. It provides help to people in difficulty.It helps students.KLH: The rickshaw puller association gives somemoney to rickshawpullers who are in need.... Supposethe tyre of my rickshaw burst today. Instead of sittingat home, I can fit the tyre, pull my rickshaw and earnsome money.MUSI (about a cultural organization which he leads):We tidy up village roads. Clean ponds. Provide help topeople during medical emergency. We also help peoplewith their daughters' marriage. We have also dug apond.

And the benefit of association is not just material.Lots of people join informal religious associationsfor sociability and spiritual purposes. When askedwhy he is a part of his religious organization, anold wage worker, BBJ, said, 'To worship our deity.To enjoy. We are all poor people. This gives us anopportunity to sit together and enjoy'.As mentioned earlier, Remuna is a part of anarea with a much greater stock of bridging socialcapital than is the case with Chasakhanda. Indeed,Remuna is a part of eastern Orissa, which has along tradition of peasant movement against land-lords. Remuna itself has a strong organization ofthe CPM, a Left party, which is involved not onlyin political organizing but also in providing helpduring distress (e.g. clothes after the super-cyclonethat hit Orissa). Remuna, unlike Chasakhanda, isalso close to an industrial centre and itself has smallindustries. A large number of rural people fromRemuna work in these industries. Thus relationsin the village are reinforced through relationshipsat work, which makes it easier for them to formassociations. But although Remuna has a greatertradition of strong civil society than Chasakhandadoes, the production of bridging social capital isadversely affected by the economic and politicalconditions in which labourers live in both theplaces. It is to these that I now turn.


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Social capitaland povertyof the wage-labourclassHow do class/economic ndpoliticalconditionsaffect abourers' ssociationallife?People need money to run associations. And, moneyis something labourers don't have much of. Theystart fighting over who will contribute how muchto these associations.

CHM: There was a bhagabatahara(a religious associa-tion) for generations. People contributeto the occasionalfeasts. Some families give Rs 50, others give Rs 10 ...Conflicts crop up over who will give how much.This is typical. Apart from money, people have tocontribute labour as well. But daily labourers arebusy with their work. If they don't labour, they don'tget to eat. They leave home at around 8 in the morningand return in the evening very tired. The problemof lack of time is compounded by the fact thatincreasingly they have to travel miles to get work.

GLB: People are too much concerned about theirsurvival (khatilekhaibe).I have five members in myfamily. Will I first take care of them or will I go to aclub or association?TRJ:... Suppose you call me to spend some time forthe club, I first think of wage-work. If I have money forsix months to support my family, if I am needed for theclub or any organization, I can sit and talk, I can givetime for the organization.

Non-labourers agree. As a local politician, JHD,who knows many labourers, said:If everyone has enough to eat, there will be no jealousy.If people have enough to eat, they will say 'let's do thisor that together'. Because of lack of money, people arenot keen on cooperating to do things together. Everyoneis looking after his [or her own] interest.

It is true that associations function as bridgingsocial capital in that it links wage labour families ofdifferent locations/hamlets and different castes, itlinks families that mainly depend on farm wagelabour and families that depend on low level govern-ment jobs and so on. But they are not bridging the'gaps' between these families and richer families.When asked if associations enhance relationshipsbetween the rich and the poor, a wage labourer, CJ,who also does petty business, said: 'The rich evendo not want to interact with us much. They think ifthere is a lot of interaction, we might ask them forhelp'. Wage labourers' poverty keeps their associa-tions away from the rich.As if (class-induced) poverty is not enough toundermine the conditions under which these

37associations can thrive, political factors add to theirproblems. As I said earlier, labourers, like others,are deeply divided along political party lines. Thislimits the amount of social capital that is produced.Purna, a government official living in a low-castelabourers' hamlet, talks about his experience with acultural association.

Purna: When I was the secretary I was supportingone party. The party I was opposing lost. People of thatparty did not like the fact that I was in charge, becauseI was a supporter of the ruling party. Party feelingsentered the association. Its functioning was not affected.Cultural activities continued to happen. Everyone irres-pective of party support contributed. But interactionhasbeen limited only to these activities. There is nothingafter these activities are finished.

And, sometimes, people cannot even sit together. Agovernment clerk remarked:DLD: We have a community house for meeting, etc. Butif people from one party come one day, people fromanother party don't go that day, they come the next day... Sometimes, they will be together, they will worktogether [for wages], go to the shopping area, etc., butwhen it comes to building an association, there aredifferences.

DLD said this about his whole village. But this isno less relevant to labourers of the village.Often village politicians actively weaken theseassociations. As RRD said, they 'target' the villageassociations. Numerous respondents shared thisview.GLB:Cultural associations would enhance trustrelations.But politicians are destroying trust. Poor people can beunited [through cultural associations] but politiciansare dividing them... They will not benefit withoutcreating conflicts. They cannot enter our village withoutdividing us.

A respondent from the landowning class also hadsimilar views:

JGM:Some people had established a youth club. Theyparticipatedin the election. After that the club collapsed.Now there are party feelings among them.

It is clear that poor labouring people trying to buildvoluntary associations are in a dilemma. If theyalign themselves with a specific party, they mightget some (government) money from politiciansand thus address their monetary problem I referredto earlier. But in return, politicians want electoralsupport of the members of that association. And,when an association extends support to politicians


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38of one party, politicians of another party try to putpressure on some members and buy their support,thus creating conflicts within the association. Whenan association is loyal to a specific party or faction,the quality of social capital can be compromised:the association will do things only for the benefitsof one section of the labouring community (e.g. forlabourers supporting a specific political party orleader). On the other hand, when an associationdecides to keep itself away from the influence ofpoliticalparties,and in this sense, remainsapolitical,it is starved of monetary support from politicians.As Musisaid: Otherassociations ndgroups get money[from/through parties] but our cultural associationdid not because we operate on a cross-party basis.Younger people from all parties are with us'.

It was clear from the interviews that any associa-tion of people is potentially a vote bank. When oneparty thinks a particular association is a potentialvote bank for the opposition, it tries to capture it(or at least some influential members) as soon aspossible as a pre-emptive measure. And, in manyinstances,poorer people are vulnerableto politicians'attempts to co-opt them through bribery or thepromise of wage work on government-sponsoredprojects or support in village and family conflicts.Thereis an additionalissue. As politiciansare seen aspocketing government money meant for the labour-ing families, local-level cultural and social associa-tions can potentially play a counter-surveillantrole vis-a-vis the politicians. These associationsare potentially a threat to politicians of all hues.Controlling an association through patronage, or atleast controlling a few members, is a useful way ofdisorganizing the people. As the secretary of anNGO in Remuna, SKS,said: 'Themore disorganizedthe people are, the better for the politicians. Politi-cians will prevent their organization'.Indeed, because of political party differences, con-flicts arise and mutual trust erodes, which preventpeople from doing things together. Politicians arenot just trying to break associations once they havebeen formed. Indeed, by eroding trust and creatingconflicts, they are undermining the conditions thatshould be conducive to forming associations andengaging in collective activities. There is a near con-sensus among the respondents of different classesand occupations in both the places that politiciansare the majorsource of conflict.

JVP (a retired rural development officer): One politicalparty supports one group, another party supports

RajuJ Dasanother group. As a result difference in opinion(manomalinya)s createdbetweenbrothersn a family,betweenneighbours.GAR anagricultural orker):Theelectionsystemandthe party eelingsarea sourceof conflict n the village.Differentpeopleareattached o differentparties.Thiscreates onflict.BNS (a mill owner):Politicalparty system is evendividing family.Membersof one familyare with dif-ferentpartieshopingthattheywill get somethingromparty eaders,a loan,a job.SNS (a Left politician): Clubs and associations shouldenhance social relationships among people. But wepoliticians are not allowing that to happen. Because bydividing them we get votes... If we unite them, it ispossible that they will support us today en masse, butit is also possible that the whole group will supportsomeone else. Their division ensures support for mefrom some people.... Nowadays, you see 3-4 clubs insmall villages. The reason for that is that people aredivided.... Peopledo cometogetherand do somethingsuch as cleaningof theroad,etc.Butthat s rare.Purna(a governmentworker):Workersare generallypeople in want.... Political party leaders give themmoney, help them getting some benefits from thegovernment. That's how they [workers] are gettingdivided.

Relations between politicians and the poor arevertical relations. The networks of vertical relationsdo not create (much) social capital and are notbeneficial for the poor (although they benefit thenetwork of politicians). Politicians are wellconnected among themselves (and to governmentofficials). Their network is much more powerfulthan those of poor wage labourers. As DeFilippis,who is critical of Putnam's social capital, puts it,'certain social networks are in greater positions ofpower than others' and they can therefore yieldmuch more substantial returns to their members'(2001, 791).

From the empirical to the theoretical:concluding commentsLabouring families help one another in so manyways. Reciprocity extends to food, money and muchmore. These families are also involved in voluntaryassociations through which they are engaged incollective actions for mutual benefit. If social capitalis 'the ability of individuals to secure benefits as aresult of membership in social networks or other


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Social apital ndpoverty f thewage-labourlasssocial structures' (Portes and Landolt 2000, 532),then the networks of reciprocity and voluntaryassociations among rural wage labour families ineastern India are forms of social capital.Following Portes as well as Callinicos, I hadexpected that much of the practice of reciprocity-bonding social capital - or for that matter evenbridging social capital, can be explained in termsof 'bounded solidarity' of the working class, i.e.bounded solidarity based on class consciousness.Workers' solidarity is based on an emergentsentiment of we-ness among working-class peoplewho face similar adverse situation (Portes andSensenbrenner 1993, 1327-8; Callinicos 1988, 199-203). My empirical material shows that classposition is indeed an important factor underlyingreciprocity. Some labourers are conscious of thefact that they are a class which owns little propertyand whose livelihood therefore depends on wagework. A part of what goes on in terms of reciprocityin the study areas is based on this consciousness.And this is particularly true about Remuna, ratherthan Chasakhanda which has a very weak Leftorganization.Then there are consequences of labourers' classposition. One consequence is insecurity and anotheris poverty. No one knows that he/she will getsome wage work tomorrow and have some food toeat. It is the combination of insecurity and povertythat underlies the defensive mechanism of norm/practice of reciprocity among labourers in both theplaces. Indeed, Harvey says, 'Reciprocityexhibitedin working-classneighbourhoods s to a large degreeadefensive device' (1985,120).Workers'social-culturalassociationsalso have a similarlogic. As Cooke'sworkon labour geography in Wales shows, labourers'associations spring 'from the collective response ofordinaryworkers to the needs and suffering of theircommunities, as a means of improving the day-to-day conditions of life' (Cooke 1985, 237).9Given the general theoretical importance of classin critical human geography and social sciences(Smith 2000;Wood 1998;Gibson and Graham 1992;Thrift and Williams 1987)10 and in the light ofspecificconnectionsthat I had hypothesized betweenclass and social capital, I had expected that classwould be a much strongerbasis for reciprocity.Thisis not borne out empirically. The extent to whichlabourers are conscious of their class position islimited, although this consciousness is spatiallyuneven. Labourers are more conscious of the con-sequences of their class position, especially poverty

39and insecurity, than of their actual class position."Because of this, empirically, poverty and insecurityas consequences of class are a stronger foundationfor norms/practice of reciprocity rather than classas such. This points to the fact that 'People...come to realise the force of class in and through theimmediate circumstances they can experience andunderstand directly' (Walker 1985, 187). Poverty,insecurity,etc.are,arguably,some of these conditions.Class and consequences of class are not the onlyfactors that condition the production of socialcapital. To a large extent, norms of reciprocity andassociational life exist also because labourers livetogetherin a village. And neighbourliness-and class-based norms of reciprocity co-exist in particularplaces. Class and location co-influence social capital.

One could argue that neighbourliness is a proxyfor class position. Inboth the areas,as in many otherparts of India, labouring class people and especiallylow-caste labourers, live in separate hamlets fromhigh-caste property-owning families. But to explainnorms of reciprocity based on 'neighbourliness'merely in terms of class and class-related conscious-ness would be reductionist. In reality, and in theminds of the labourers, labourers are more thanlabourers. They are also human beings who live inspecific places in a spatial relationship, in spatialjuxtapositionor 'happenstancearrangementin rela-tion to each other' to use Massey's term (1999, 283).And the fact that they live next to each other, thatthey are neighbours, and they perceivethemselvesas such, partly underlies the norms of reciprocityamong them. Neighbourliness is neither merely aproxy for class, nor is it an independent processunconnected to class.The fact that neighbourliness or location under-lies reciprocity speaks to a wider body of researchin geography and sociology on spatiality of classand other structures of social relations. Spatialstructures are enabling and constraining of socialprocesses. Consider place-based networks as spatialstructures. As Gilbert (1998) says, these are bothenabling and constraining.On the one hand: 'Spatialcontinguity', expressed, for example, in terms ofneighbourhood relations among working-classpeople, 'is a very important base' for (understand-ing) working-class experience (Walker 1985, 187).More specifically, place-based networks of mutualhelp in working-classneighbourhoodscan be import-ant to varying degrees in the day-to-day lives ofworking-class poor people. But on the other hand,place-based networks can be constraining because


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40'everyday interactions... tend to be highly local-ised' (Gilbert 1998, 600), leading to what Cox andMair (1988) call 'local dependence' of people, asmentioned earlier.Norms and practiceof reciprocityare spatially bounded. This means that people haveaccess to resources of the place-based networks ofwhich they are a part,but these resources are limitednot only because of class, but also because thesenetworks stretchacross geographically limited areas.Not only is class a constraint on the practice ofreciprocity - because people do not have resourcesto exchange, but also space (or more accurately,spatial forms/relations of class).Whether social capital is influenced by class, byconsequences of class or indeed by the spatiality ofclass (i.e. the fact that working-class people are alsoneighbours, whose lives are embedded in spatiallylimited areas), the benefits of social capital for wagelabour families starved of other forms of capitaland especially economic capital, are very limitedin both the villages. The reason for this that I havehighlighted here is, broadly speaking, class. I havesaid that class is more constrainingthan enabling ofsocial capital. This may need further explanation.With respect to bonding social capital, two pointscan be made. Firstly, the working class is excludedfrom, and relatively deprived of, materialresourcesof society. Given their class position, workers havelimited material resources to share among them-selves. And, without resources,informal rules ofsharing in a place and over space are difficult tosustain for long (in their active form). When poorpeople are small property owners, arguably theycan share their tools, information about market orwhatever and thus social capital can play some rolein poverty alleviation. But when poor people arewage workers without property,whose main sourceof income is wage labour, and rarely have anythingto share, the role of social capital is very problem-atic. Indeed, their majorasset is their labour power.That is the major thing that they can potentiallyshare. But (norms of) sharing labour power do notamount to much because labour power has to beapplied to physical property such as land whichthey do not have. Forexample, my discussions withthem indicated that they were very keen on beinginvolved in fishery in village ponds on a collectivebasis. But ponds, generally, do not belong to them.In spite of norms of reciprocity which generatetheir willingness to use their labour power collec-tively, these norms are of little use because they donot own property.12Norms of reciprocity - or the

RajuJ Dasidea that 'the poor have each other' (Woolcock andNarayan 2000) - will not be much help in this sortof context. Bebbington, perhaps the most enthusi-astic social capitalist among geographers, says 'asocial relationship is a resource that can facilitateaccess to other resources' (2002, 801). But, a socialrelationships notnecessarily/automatically resource.Surely, to be a resource, it has to be a social rela-tionship of a particularkind (what kind of resourcecan a social relationship between two poor wageearners be and how useful can it be to alleviatetheir poverty?). As DeFilippis, a geographer whois very criticalof social capital, rightly says, ties thatdefine social capital, or '[c]onnections ... do not, ofthemselves, make the people in any place rich orpoor' (2001, 790).Norms of sharing are not of muchuse without people having things to share.Secondly, and very importantly, mutual help isbased on an expectation of a certain degree ofsecurity:that when one is in difficulty, one expectsthatone's relationswith others will act as a source ofhelp. Yet,a fundamental aspect of the working-classlife is insecurity,not just exclusion from materialresources.Becauseit has been separatedfrom meansof production, its access to means of subsistence,generally, depends on securing wage work, which,however, is not guaranteed. One never knows howone is going to get through to the end of the week.The insecurityof the working class tends to under-mine the conditions for reproduction of norms ofreciprocity, which presuppose a sense of securityunless there are strong countervailing forces (e.g.extra-localsupport). If a person borrows somethingfrom her neighbourpromising to returnit on a givenday, and if she fails to keep her promise becauseshe does not get any wage work, she loses the trustof her neighbour. There are many instances wherepeople have a little bit of food or money to sharebut they are reluctant, not because of lack of trustand empathy, but because they do not knowwhether they themselves are going to eat tomorrow.This conclusion does not sit well with Putnam'sidea that an effective norm of generalized reciprocityrequires that people can be confident that 'trustingwill be requited, not exploited' (1993, 172). ForPutnam, if relations of trust are lacking, then it isbecause individuals are selfish. This amounts toexplaining social norms in terms of psychology,disregarding the material constraints under whichpeople live. Working-class people do practisemutual help. But they do not do this under theconditions of their own choosing.


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Social apital ndpoverty f thewage-labourlassNow consider the constrainingeffects of class andpolitics on bridging social capital. For one thing,establishing and running socio-culturalassociationsrequire that people contributefree labour. But dailylabourers are busy with their work. If they don't

labour, they don't get to eat. They have little timefor associations. They are not members of Putnam'sbowling clubs! Apart from time, people also needmoney to run associations. And, money is some-thing poor labourers don't have much of. Theystart fighting over who will contribute how muchto these associations. Also, lack of funds makesthem vulnerable to attempts of politicians to preyupon them and their organizations. Indeed, civicorganizations of poor wage labourers find it verydifficult to sustain themselves without verticalrelations of patronage vis-a-vis politicians. In otherwords, horizontal connections that Putnam associ-ates with civic organizationstend not to characterizepoor people's lives and their organizations (asopposed to bowling clubs of middle- and capitalist-class Americans, for example). In spite of adverseconditions, when wage labourers do form associa-tions, political parties try to control these and createconflicts between membersto pre-emptany potentialcounter-surveillant role these associations mightplay vis-a-vis corrupt politicians. Politicians alsoseek to control these associations to get votes. For agiven political party, a particular association is apotential vote bank for its opposition, so it tries tocaptureit (orat least some of its influentialmembers).Thus for all these reasons, class and consequencesof class - or more generally, the economic-politicalconditions under which poor people live - are moreconstrainingin the production of social capital thanenabling. This conclusion is supported by some ofthe existing geographical and social science litera-ture as well. For example, Meert says, if a personlacks sufficient purchasing power, it will be difficultfor her to support and participate in associations,and be a part of a network of reciprocal help(2000, 328-9; also Meert et al. 1997). Meert's studyof reciprocity in a village close to Brussels showsthat:

Given widespreadpovertyamong most membersofsocialnetworks,opportunitiesor the poorhouseholdsof Houwaart o swap goods or services... are rare.Infact,mutualexchange mong hesehouseholdsffectivelymeans hereciprocal wappingof poverty. 2000,333)Indeed, recent research in advanced country con-texts shows that work-related time constraints and

41poverty negatively influence civic engagement(Price2002).Moser's (1998) work on reciprocity in poor urbancommunities in four different parts of the worldreaches similar conclusions to mine, Meert's andothers'. She found traditional credit arrangementsinthese places whereby the poor borrow on a short-term basis from neighbours, and nearby relatives,for daily consumption needs such as food, thusindicating the usefulness of social capital. But socialcapitalcanbe quicklyerodeddue to adverseeconomicconditions.

[W]here households have sufficientresources,reci-procity n cashand non-monetary xchangeshas beensustained.... [But]economiccrisis has pushed somehouseholdsbeyondthepointat whichtheycan sustainsuchreciprocity.Moser1998,13)

My study clearly does not support the optimisticclaims such as the one that social capital is thecapital of the poor, especially if it is social capitalin the Putnam sense. Like other geographers suchas Mohan and Mohan, DeFilippis and others, I amthereforeconcernedabout social capitalists'attemptsto privilege social capital over material inequalitiesand class; in short, I think it is impossible 'toseparate social capital from material circumstances'(Mohan and Mohan 2002, 206), i.e. from people'sclass context. This study, along with similar studiessuch as those by Moser and Meert, is expected tocontribute to the growing literature on the critiqueof social capital (Harriss 2002; Fine 2002). It isextremely problematic to treat the existing levelof social capital as an independent variable andpoverty as a dependent variable, or to expect thatsocial capital of the poor is a missing link in long-term development. This is not at all to say thatsocial capital of the poor is of no importance atall. Social capital can be a source of short-term andlimited help. It always has been (Harvey 1973;Polanyi 1944). In this sense there is nothing newabout the social practice hat the currently fashion-able conceptof social capital refers to.Then the question one might ask is: if social capitalis neither new nor a powerful factor in povertyalleviation, why resort to the theory of social capitalat all? I cannot do justice to this important questionin the space of this paper. But very briefly, thereare two answers to this question in the literature.One comes from some social capitalists, especiallythose associated with the most ardent promoter ofsocial capital, the World Bank. Bebbington et al.


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42agree that much of the social capital discussion hasbeen 're-treading classical social science themes'and thus 'there is clearly much wheel-reinventiongoing on' in this discussion (2002, 17-18, 36). Butthey argue that social capital promotes conversa-tions across disciplines. And more importantly, itopens up space for development theory and fordevelopment agencies such as the World Bank (orat least some parts of this institution) to engagewith issues of power, participation, empowermentand so on.13On the other hand, scholars critical ofsocial capital argue that social capital is a deeplydepoliticizing and neo-liberal concept and is usedto sell neo-liberalism and manage its costs (Harriss2002; Fine 2001). Fine therefore says that 'The mostappropriate answer to social capital is to reject italtogether' (2002, 14).'4 The literaturefails to under-stand class and capital as social processes (hencethe need to attach 'social' to 'capital'), the effect ofwhich is that '"social" is [merely] the complementto "economic"capital,at most a source of correctionbut not of interrogation and challenge' (2002, 9). Itdoes not take into account issues of power, conflictand class. Many social capitalists, includingGrootaert (1997), Woolcock (1998) and Bebbington,would accept some of these criticisms, but wouldstill get on with the social capital business, treatingit as a central category in development thinkingand indeed as a new theory of international devel-opment. This indicates that, as Fine says,

even dissent withinthe socialcapitalenterprise eemsto strengthenrather than to weaken it.... [S]ocialcapital's eadyaccommodationf opposition epresentsa highly successful form of legitimizing repressivetolerance.undated, 4)Social capital literature 'incorporates and neutra-lises dissent' (Fine 2002, 799). One could thus arguethat the conceptual and empirical issues I haveraised against social capital in this paper could beaccommodated within the social capital literature.One could ask, could I have not provided thesubstantive account I have offered here of (a) normsof reciprocity and (b) social-cultural-political asso-ciations of poor working-class people without usingsocial capital at all? My answer is: yes! Then whyuse social capital?The only thing that social capitalin my view does is that it is an umbrella conceptthat brings different social practicesl5 together(reciprocity, associational life, trust, and so on).16 tdoes indeed thus become a chaotic concept in thecritical realist sense. But social capital is not the

RajuJDasonly chaotic concept we use. 'Service sector' is oneof several chaotic concepts that are widely used ingeography and other social sciences (Sayer 2000,19). As long as we acknowledge that they are andthat therefore we do not assign any unitary causalpower to them across time and space, their use isjustifiable. My use of social capital is (somewhat)justified only on that basis. Clearly, in the light ofthe conceptual issues I have raised (especially theidea that class and consequences of class includingpoverty are enormously constrainingof the produc-tion of social capital, which makes treating socialcapital as an independent variable very problem-atic) and the empirical material on social capitalpresented, I reject some World Bank scholars'contention that social capital offers a new theoryofinternationaldevelopment (Woolcock and Narayan2000). But instead of rejectingthe social capital con-cept altogether, my discursive strategy is to engage(with) the literature critically and in the process toconceptually and empirically demonstrate to socialcapitalists its extremely limited causal power ascompared to that of class.7 I hope that this strategy,if followed by many, will lead to the social capitalobsession withering away on its own. Whether thisis a better strategy than the one that Ben Finesuggests is, of course, subject to debate.

AcknowledgementsThe paper was written with the support of theEconomicand Social ResearchCouncilgrantnumberR000223723. This support is gratefully acknowl-edged. I would also like to thank my two ResearchAssistants in the field, Mr Debadutta Sahu and MrNihar Swain for their help. I am also very thankfulto all the wage labourers and other respondentswho gave their valuable time for the interviews.Finally, I am grateful to the referees and the editorof Transactionsor their very valuable comments ona previous draft of the paper.Notes1 I agree with Corbridgeand Harriss.But I will add thatthere is actually some resistance to the upper-castes/classes' dominance from middle castes/classes in Orissa

(see Mohanty 1990).2 Here I must mention that although class has beendefined in several ways both in the rural context [seePatnaik's (1999, 211-13) labour exploitation criterionof class identification] and in the general literature onclass (see Sheppard and Barnes 1990; Thrift and


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Social capitaland poverty of the wage-labourclassWilliams 1987),I have defined working class in a verysimple way: people whose main source of income issale of labourpower constitutethe working class.Morespecifically, I have focused on daily wage earners.3 This is not the only definition of social capital.But thereis a fair amount of consensus on this (Woolcock 2000).It must be said that the definition of social capitalgivenby Coleman (1988), one of the original contributorsto the social capital debate, is more general than theone used in this paper in that for him social capital isany aspect of social structure that aids human action.4 Linkingsocial capitalrefers to vertical ties between thepoor and people in positions of power and influencein formalorganizations(such as the state) (WorldBank2001). I will not deal with this here.5 This neglect of class in the social capital literatureindeed reflects the neglect of class in the geographyand socialscienceliteratureas such, and particularlyhatliteraturewhich is influenced by post-modernism.6 This applies with greaterforce to low wage economiesof global capitalistperipheryand to working-classpoorcommunities in wealthier countries.7 Concrete practices of mutual help are material prac-tices. Like all material practices, they are place-boundfor the similarreasons that, for example, sale of labourpower tends to occur in geographically constrainingareas (Harvey 1985). If a person needs some food orhas to be taken to hospital, she is more likely to gethelp from her neighbours or villagers than from thoseliving miles away.8 This is as much true about Orissa as elsewhere(Seddon 2002).But unfortunatelythe post-modernizedLefthas takenthis- that(working)classis heterogeneous- to mean that it is not useful to talk about class withany seriousness (see Walker 1985 and Seddon 2002 forcounter-arguments).9 The study of working-class social capital in this paperindirectly sheds some light on what Mike Savage(1996), one of the spatially minded sociologists, callslabourers' socio-cultural lass formation'.Socio-culturalclass formation involves, he says, 'the constructionof dense ties which allows the forging of solidaristicand communal identities over time... Here, classescan draw upon "community", ace-to-facerelationships[that characterize]dense neighbourhoodnetworks' andso on (1996, 68-9). Class relations underlie working-class social capital, and the latter in turn impactsclass formation. While I have shown the first aspectof this relationship, I have not shown how working-class social capital affects class formation, how, thatis, workers' 'friendship..., theirclubs and associations[and so on] ... bring about a commonality of back-ground and attitude which crystallises a social classinto a collectivity' (Scott in Thrift 1987, 26-7). This isworth investigating.10 It must be said, however, that even though theseauthors differ in terms of their conceptualizations of

43class, they are a minority among social scientists whothink class is an importantsocial category for analysis.I have already remarked about the general neglectof class in the geography and social science literature(especially see Wood 1998).11 Explaining why this is the case is beyond the scope ofthis paper.12 Arguably, even if poor workers were able to use theirlabour power collectively and succeed in producingsome wealth, much of this wealth would be appropri-ated from them by their exploiterssuch as landowners,government officials and politicians, etc. I owe thispoint to one of the referees.13 The extent to which it succeeds in doing so dependson the discursive battles within the Bankbetween pro-market scholars and those who are inclined towardspolitical economy (Bebbingtonet al. 2002, 17, 37).14 Interestingly, Kenneth Arrow, the economist, also'would urge abandonment of the... term "socialcapital"' (2000,4), but on differentgrounds than Fine.15 These practices exist independent of the concept/theory used to describe/explain these.16 Bebbingtonalso gives this reason to explain his interestin social capital ('social capital is a sort of linguisticdevice'). But note that this is clearlynot his mainreasonfor using social capital (Bebbington2002, 802).17 My strategy might be construed as consistent withBebbington's suggestion that 'political economy...[can give] context and sense to any discussion ofsocial capital'and that 'notionsof social capital... [cangive] greater specification to our conceptualization ofthe links between politics and economy' (Bebbington2002, 801). But such construal would be mistakenbecause according to me there is nothing in this viewof social capital that says that we must necessarilyplace it in its political economy context for it to work.In terms of criticalrealism,social capital'scausalpowerdoes not depend on its placement within its classcontext as does vulnerability of wage earners, forexample, does. Indeed, as Bebbington,whose approachto social capital is very sophisticated (for example,see Bebbington and Perreault1999),himself says andrightly so, 'the structure of an actor's set of socialrelationships [which potentially constitute socialcapital] maps neither easily nor automaticallyontoclass... or other positions' (Bebbington2002, 801). Mystrategy on the other hand is really to argue for amuch more circumspect use of social capital than isthe case with Bebbingtonet al. More specifically, it isto firmly place the concrete practices that the conceptof social capital refers to (reciprocity, self-help, asso-ciational life, etc.) within a class framework; and,given the enormously constraining power of class onthe usefulness of social capital as a resource, socialcapital as a concept will have a minor role, althoughhow minor it is - howconstrainingclass is - will be ageographical/contextual question.


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Social Capital and Poverty of the Wage-labour Class