social leg cases

8/12/2019 social leg cases

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-34586 April 2, 1984

HOSPICIO NILO, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ALMARIO GATCHALIAN, respondents.

G.R. No. L-36625 April 2, 1984

FORTUNATO CASTRO, petitioner,vs.JUAN CASTRO, respondent.

Lavides Law Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: +. wp h !1

Under Section 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844, the Agricultural Land Reform Code, alandowner may eject an agricultural lessee or tenant on the ground that the owner shall

personally cultivate the land himself. On September 10, 1971, Republic Act No. 6389, inamending Republic Act No. 3844, eliminated personal cultivation as a ground for theejectment of the tenant or leaseholder. The issue in these cases is whether or not theamendment in R.A. 6389 should be given retroactive effect to cover cases that were filedduring the effectivity of the repealed provision.

G.R. NO. L-34586 This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals'decision ruling that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive effect.

Respondent Almario Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of riceland at Barrio San Roque,San Rafael, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. T-76791 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. Petitioner Hospicio Nilo has been theagricultural share-tenant of Gatchalian since agricultural year 1964-65.

On February 22, 1967, petitioner filed a petition in C.A.R. Case No. 1676 with the Court of Agrarian Relations electing the leasehold system. On March 7, 1968, Gatchalian flied anejectment suit against petitioner on the ground of personal cultivation under Sec. 36 (1) ofRepublic Act No. 3844 which provides: t.hqw


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SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding, Exceptions. Notwithstanding anyagreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agriculturallessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholdingexcept when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a

judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate family willpersonally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitablylocated, into residential factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes ...

Nilo alleged by way of affirmative defense that the ejectment suit was but an act of reprisaland retaliation because he elected the leasehold system,

The two cases were heard jointly since they involved Identical landholding and parties. TheCourt of Agrarian Relations found that there was a bona fide intention to cultivate the landpersonally. The petitioner appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed thedecision of the Court of Agrarian Relations. The Court found no justification to undulyinterfere with the desire of Gatchalian to personally cultivate his own land.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that "personal cultivation as aground for ejectment of an agricultural lessee has been eliminated under Republic Act No.6389". The latter law which took effect on September 10, 1971 now provides: t.hqw

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head uponrecommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited forresidential commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes ....

The respondent Court of Appeals denied the motion resolving that Republic Act No. 6389has no retroactive application.

G.R. NO. L-36625 This is an appeal raised by petitioner Fortunato Castro to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations dismissing his complaint forthe ejectment of his tenant, respondent Juan Castro, on the ground of personal cultivation.The landowner wants to personally cultivate the land owned by him located in Pulilan,Bulacan with an area of 6,941 square meters. Petitioner Fortunato Castro questioned theconstitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which amended Section 36(l) ofRepublic Act No. 3844. The Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this Court on theground that the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6389 fails squarely withinthe exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

The complaint in this case was filed by the petitioner with the Court of Agrarian Relations.The petitioner asked for the ejectment of his tenant Juan Castro. The latter in his answeralleged that the petitioner was not the owner of the landholding in question and thatassuming the petitioner was the owner, he is nevertheless not qualified and fit to personallycultivate said landholding as he spends most of his time in mahjong sessions and incockpits.


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After the enactment of Republic Act No. 6389 on September 10, 1971, the respondentmoved for the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the ground that the new law eliminatedpersonal cultivation by the landowmer as a ground for the ejectment of an agriculturaltenant. The Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed the complaint. A motion forreconsideration was denied. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that:(1) the trial court erred in considering that Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which amendedSec. 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844 has a retroactive effect on an cases for ejectment ofan agricultural lessee 'from his landholding on the ground of personal cultivation even if thesaid cases were filed long before the approval of the said Act; and (2) the trial court erred innot considering that Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 is unconstitutional which point wasraised by appellant in his opposition to appellee's motion to dismiss the complaint and hismotion for reconsideration of the order dated December 17, 1971.

Since both cases involve the same issue of retroactivity, we shall resolve them together.

The issue of whether or not Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which amended Section 36(1) of Republic Act No. 3844, repealing as a consequence "personal cultivation" as a cause

for dispossession, should be given retroactive effect has spawned controversy. In Arambulov. Conicon (CA-G.R. No. 46727-R, January 6, 1972) and Palpalatoc v. Pescador (CA -G.R.No. SP-00089-R, February 22, 1972), the Court of Appeals held that the deletion ofpersonal cultivation as a cause for ejectment has retroactive application affecting eventhose cases pending in courts. The Arambulo case was elevated to the Supreme Court oncertiorari but was denied in a minute resolution "for lack of merit" (G.R. No. L-34816, March14, 1972).

In other cases, however, the Court of Appeals held that Republic Act No. 6389 has noretroactive effect. In Lorenzo v. Lorenzo (CA-G.R. No. 46842-R, September 4, 1971), theCourt made a categorical statement that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive effect.There are other cases where the appellate court split into two camps.

In resolving the controversy, we first apply established rules of statutory construction.

Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the New Civil Code) provides that: "Lawsshall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." According to thisprovision of law, in order that a law may have retroactive effect it is necessary that anexpress provision to this effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be understoodwhich is not embodied in the law. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that a law is a ruleestablished to guide our actions with no binding effect until it is enacted, wherefore, it hasno application to past times but only to future time, and that is why it is said that the lawlooks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formallygiven that effect to some legal provisions (Lopez and Lopez v. Crow, 40 Phil. 997).

As early as 1913, this Court with Justice Moreland as ponente announced: t.hqw

The Act contains, as is seen, no express words giving it a retrospective orretroactive effect, nor is there anything found therein which indicates anintention to give it such an effect. Its effect is, rather, by clear intendment,prospective.


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It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be construed ashaving only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of theLegislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or isnecessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubtmust be solved against the retrospective effect. The cases supporting thisrule are almost without number.

In the case of Reynold v. M'Arthur (2 Pet., 416, 434), it was said that

It is a principle which has always been held sacred in the United States, thatlaws by which human action is to be regulated, look forward not backward;and are never to be construed retrospectively, unless the language of the Actshall render such construction indispensable.

In the case of Leate v. St. Louis State Bank (115 Mo., 184), it was held that

In construing statutes in regard to whether their action is to be prospective orretrospective, all the adjudicated cases and all the text-writers with unbrokenuniformity unite in declaring 'that they are to operate prospectively and nototherwise unless the intent that they are to operate in such an unusual way,to wit, retrospectively, is manifested on the face of the statute in a manneraltogether free from ambiguity.

The case of Berdan v. Van Riper (16 N.J.L., 7) holds that where a statute issusceptible of construction as both prospective and retrospective, the formerconstruction will be adopted, but especially if the retrospective operation willwork injustice to anyone. ... (de Montilla v. La Corporacion de PP. Agustinos;

Ancajas v. Jakosalem, 24 Phil. 220).The doctrine of non-retroactivity was reiterated in the case of Segovia v. Noel (47 Phil. 543).Thus t.hqw

A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operatesprospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to thecontrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or bynecessary implication. Following the lead of the United States Supreme Courtand putting the rule more strongly, a statute ought not to receive aconstruction making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear,strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, orunless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No courtwill hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. ...(Farrel v. Pingree (1888), 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac., 843; Greer v. City of Asheville[1894], 114 N. C., 495; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. StruthersWells Co. [1907], 209 U.S., 306;)

An earlier opinion to the same effect is In re Will of Riosa (39 Phil. 23). This is still the ruleand it has stood the test of time (Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Llanes, 49 Phil. 466; De Mesa v.


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Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Phil. 342; Hosana v. Diomano, 56 Phil. 741; ChinaInsurance & Surety Co. v. Judge of lst Inst. of Manila, 63 Phil. 320; La Paz Ice Plant & ColdStorage Co., Inc. v. Bordman and Iloilo Commercial & Ice Co., 65 Phil. 401; The ManilaTrading & Supply Co. v. Santos, 66 Phil. 237; La Previsora Filipina v. Ledda, 66 Phil. 573;Tolentino v. Alzate, 98 Phil. 781; Tolentino v. Angeles, 99 Phil. 309; Tamayo v. Manila HotelCo., 101 Phil. 810; Valencia v. Hon. Jose T. Surtida, 2 SCRA 622; Buyco v. PNB, 2 SCRA682; Billiones v. Court of Industrial Relations and Villardo v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14SCRA 676; Lazaro v. Commissioner of Customs, 17 SCRA 36; Universal Corn Products,Inc. v. Rice and Corn Board, 20 SCRA 1048; Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Collector ofInternal Revenue, 25 SCRA 789).

A restatement of the doctrine was made in the case of Espiritu v. Cipriano (55 SCRA 533.)Thus t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

... Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to passretroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affectinjuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construedas intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings,unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessary impliedfrom the language of the enactment. ... (Jones v. Summers, 105 Cal. App. 51,286 Pac. 1093; U.S. v. Whyel 28 F (2d) 30.)

The general rule therefore, is that statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwiseprovided therein (Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172).To exemplify this doctrine, in Salcedo v. Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408), we held thatRepublic Act No. 2260 or the Civil Service Act of 1959 has no retroactive effect. In Padasasv. Court of Appeals (82 SCRA 250), we held that the Agricultural Land Reform Code orRepublic Act No. 3844 must be enforced prospectively and not retroactively and therefore,the rights created, granted, or recognized therein such as the right of redemption accruedupon the enactment of said legislation and may be exercised thereafter in appropriatecases. In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals (87 SCRA 263) reiterated in Castro v. Court of

Appeals (99 SCRA 722) and in Baltazar v. Court of Appeals (104 SCRA 619), we held thatPresidential Decrees Nos. 27, 316, and 946 cannot be applied retroactively.

More important than resort to statutory construction in determining the issue of retroactivityis the ascertainment of the objectives sought to be realized by the Code of AgrarianReforms.

In the declaration of policy in Republic Act No. 6389, the applicable objectives are: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

(2) To achieve a dignified existence for the sman farmers free from perniciousinstitutional restraints and practices;

xxx xxx xxx


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(6) To make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsiblecitizens and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society.

It is the legislature which determines the policy objectives of reform legislation.

This Court would be thwarting and not promoting the objectives of Congress if we ruleagainst the small landowners in this case. The national goal of having independent and selfreliant farmers tilling their own small landholdings would not be achieved if persons whoown only two hectares or 6,941 square meters of land as in the instant cases cannot beallowed to work their land themselves but must be compelled to perpetuate a lessor-lesseerelationship. The desire of Congress to achieve a "dignified existence for the small farmers"is not served if two families one landowner and one tenant must share the measlyproduce from 6,941 square meters of land. Land reform and agrarian reform were intendedto equalize opportunities for land ownership, to enable a diffusion and sharing of wealth andnot a sharing of poverty or a fragmentation of tenanted farms into non-economic sizes.

We are aware of the deliberations and debates in Congress on Republic Act No. 6389. Westated in Aisporna v. Court of Appeals (108 SCRA 481). t.hqw

That it was the intention of the legislature in amending paragraph (1), sec. 36of R.A. 3844 to deprive the landowner of the right to eject his tenant on theground that the former would personally cultivate the land and also to abatecases brought by the landowner to eject the tenant on the same groundswhich were still pending at the time of the passage of the amendatory act, isclear and evident from the deliberations and debate of Congress whenRepublic Act 6389 was being deliberated, as published in the Senate Journal....

This Aisporna case is, however, notably distinct from the two cases now before us. In Aisporna, the court ordered the petitioner tenant ejected on the ground of personalcultivation by the landowner. The court order became final and executory. One year afterhis ejectment, Aisporna availed himself of his remedies under the law and filed a case forreinstatement with damages alleging that the owner failed to cultivate the land himself. Thetrial court ruled in favor of Aisporna. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed thedecision stating that during the pendency of the action for reinstatement, the law wasamended and personal cultivation as a ground to eject a tenant was removed. Theappellate court opined that with the abolition of personal cultivation as a basis for ejectment,the corollary proviso on reinstatement: t.hqw

... Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himselffor three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within oneyear after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he actedin bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of theland and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of saiddispossession.

was also eliminated.


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The issue in Aisporna was the right of the tenant to recover his status vis-a-vis thelandholding from whence he was ejected. To sustain the appellate decision would haveresulted in a plain case of injustice to the tenant and a condonation of bad faith. Ourpronouncements on retroactivity dealt with this issue alone and to the extent thatthe Aisporna decision may be interpreted as covering factual situations similar to the twocases now before us, to that extent we make it clear that it does not do so.

It is true that during the debates on the bill which was later enacted into Republic Act No.3844, there were statements on the floor that "the owner will lose the right to eject after theenactment of this measure" even in cases where the owner has not really succeeded yet inejecting the tenants (Senate Journal, Nos. 43 and 44, March 30 and 31, 1971, 2nd RegularSession 7th Congress). Nonetheless and inspite of these remarks, Congress failed toexpress an intention to make Republic Act No. 6389 retroactive and to cover ejectmentcases on the ground of personal cultivation then pending adjudication by the courts. t.hqw

... In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in theinterpretation of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain

information as to the intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also tosee whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way asto give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is notonly to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to seethat the language used sufficiently expresses that meaning. The legal act, soto speak, is made up of two elements-an internal and an external one; itoriginates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the latter maydefeat the former. (59 C.J.S. 1017; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and

Amusement Board, 107 Phil. 151).

In the case of Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusements Board, supra, we heldthat legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members andare not always safe guides and, hence, may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaningand purpose of the lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine with certainty whatconstruction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed thebill, by resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did not speak, maynot have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other(Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 499-501; Ramos vs. Alverez, 97 Phil. 844).

There have been cases in the past where we adhered to this doctrine. Thus, we held thatindividual statements made by Senators on the floor of the Senate do not necessarily reflectthe view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House ofRepresentatives (Casco Phil. Chem. Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347; Resins, Inc. v.

Auditor General, 25 SCRA 754). Accordingly, they are not controlling in the interpretation ofthe law in question (Phil. Assn. of Government Retirees, Inc. v. GSIS, 14 SCRA 610). Somestatements may be deemed to be a mere personal opinion of the legislator (Mayon Motors,Inc. vs. Acting Com. of Internal Revenue, 1 SCRA 918).

The interpretation of statutes is for the courts. And the courts are not necessarily bound byone legislator's opinion, expressed in Congressional debates, concerning the apPlication ofexisting laws (Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 102 Phil. 477).


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The petitioner-tenant in G.R. No. L-34586 contends that since Republic Act No. 6389 is asocial legislation and passed under the police power of the State, it should be liberallyinterpreted in favor of the tenants.

We agree with the petitioner-tenant that the law in question is social legislation. But social justice is not for tenants alone. The disputed land in L-36625 is only 6,941 square meters.The area of the land in L-34586 is slightly bigger, about two (2) hectares. A person with onlyone or two hectares of land to his name is equally deserving of social justice.

A majority of the landowners affected by the appeal of personal cultivation" as a ground forthe ejectment of a tenant own small landholdings. The records of Senate Bill No. 478 whicheventually became Republic Act No. 6389 reveal that the repeal has affected an estimated75% of landowners in the country who own tenanted lands of less than 3 hectares, 40% ofthose who own 5 hectares or less and 96% of landowners who own an area of less than 10hectares each.

Many of these landowners who filed actions for ejectment on this ground are retirees whohave opted to leave the stresses and strains of city life and to return to their home towns topersonally cultivate their small landholdings. They are teachers, clerks, nurses, and otherhardworking and frugal people who in a lifetime of sacrifice gathered their pitiful littlesavings and purchased small farms to supplement the inadequate pensions from theGovernment Service Insurance System or the Social Security System. The owners of thelots in these cases had the bona fide intention to personally cultivate their lands as provenand found by the trial courts. To hold that they can no longer eject their tenants because ofRepublic Act No. 6389 would deprive them of their right to enjoy their property which theyhad already asserted before the statute was passed. Precisely, the legislators, in providing"personal cultivation" as a ground to eject tenants intended to encourage and attract thelandowners to go to their respective provinces and till their own lands. Unfortunately, theground of "personal cultivation" was abused and used as a pretext to eject the tenant andthis led to the amendatory law.

This unfortunate consequence should not work an injustice upon those small landownersproven to have the bona fide intention to personally cultivate their lands. In Gonzales v.GSIS (107 SCRA 492), we held that: t.hqw

It should also be borne in mind that Republic Act No. 3844, then known asthe Agricultural land Reform Code, is a social legislation whoseimplementation has been made more imperative by Section 6, Article 11 ofthe 1973 Constitution. It is designed to promote economic and social Stability.It must be interpreted liberally to give full force and effect to its clear intent.This liberality in interpretation, however, should not accrue solely in favor ofactual tillers of the land, the tenant-farmers, but should extend to landownersas well, especially those owning ,"small landholdings", by which is meantlandholdings of 24 hectares and less than 24 hectares. These landownersconstitute part of the economic Middle class which the Government is tryingto build. They deserve as much consideration as the tenants themselves inorder not to create an economic dislocation, were tenants solely favored but


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this particular group of landowners impoverished. (See "Whereas", clauses ofLOI No. 143).

In Cabatan v. Court of Appeals (95 SCRA 323), we similarly held that: t.hqw

... the reliance by the tenants-lessees on"social justice"as a reason to supportthe continuance of an unjust and inequitable rental rate is not only improperbut would countenance and perpetuate an injustice against the landholder-lessor. This, the constitutional precept of "social justice" was never meant todo.

xxx xxx xxx

Social justice as thus defined and in its true meaning is not meant tocountenance, much less perpetuate, an injustice against any group-not evenas against landholders. For the landholders as a component unit or elementin our agro-industrial society are entitled to 'equal justice under law' which ourcourts are, above everything else, under mandate of the Constitution todispense fairly, without fear nor favor.

xxx xxx xxx

... A cursory study of the long line of decisions on social justice will readilyreveal, however, that the concept has been fleshed out-the principle,conceptualized as Justice Laurel enjoined in the celebrated caseof Calalang vs. Williams not thru mistaken sympathy for or misplacedantipathy against any group whether labor or capital, landlord or tenant but evenhandedly and fairly, thru the observance of the principle of "equal

justice under law," for all and each and every element of the body politic."(Eg. Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940) cited, supra; Guido vs. RuralProgress Administration, 47 O.G. 1848, (1949) 84 Phil. 847, a reconciliationbetween conflicting claims of social justice and protection to property andrights; Militona Estate Inc. vs. De Guzman, et al., No. L-11912 (1959), 105Phil. 1296 (unreported).

In Dequito v. Llamas, (66 SCRA 504) we ruled that the petitioner-tenant ought to know thatif he has rights to protection as a tenant, the landowner has also rights under the law. Theprotective mantle of social justice cannot be utilized as an instrument to hoodwink courts of

justice and undermine the rights of landowners on the plea of helplessness and heartlessexploitation of the tenant by the landowner.

Our decision to deny retroactive effect to the amendatory provision gains added strengthfrom later developments.

Under the 1973 Constitution, it is even more emphasized that property ownership isimpressed with a social function. This means that the owner has the obligation to use hisproperty not only to benefit himself but society as well. Hence, the Constitution providesunder Section 6 of Article II that in the promotion of social justice, the State "shall regulate


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the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, andequitably diffuse property ownership and profits." The Constitution also ensures that theworker shall have a just and living wage which should assure for himself and his family anexistence worthy of human dignity and give him opportunities for a better life (Sections 7and 9, Article II) (Alfanta vs, Noe, 53 SCRA 76; Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA194).

In line with the above mandates, this Court upheld the constitutionality of PresidentialDecree No. 27, which decrees the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil andtransferred to them the ownership of the land they till, in Gonzales v. Estrella (91 SCRA294). We noted the imperative need for such a decree in Chavez v. Zobel (55 SCRA 26).We held in the latter case that "on this vital policy question, one of the utmost concern, theneed for what for some is a radical solution in its pristine sense, one that goes at the root,was apparent. Presidential Decree No. 27 was thus conceived. ... There is no doubt then,as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree isnow part and parcel of the law of the land according to the present Constitution."

Significantly, P.D. No. 27, which decrees the emancipation of the tenant from the bondageof the soil, transfers to him the ownership of the land he tills, and provides instruments andmechanisms therefor, has recognized personal cultivation as a ground for retention and,therefore, exemption from the land transfer decree. Personal cultivation cannot be effectedunless the tenant gives up the land to the owner.

Presidential Decree No. 27 provides: t.hqw

In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7)hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it.

The redistribution of land, restructuring of property ownership, democratization of politicalpower, and implementation of social justice do not require that a landowner should bedeprived of everything he owns and that even small parcels as in these two cases nowbefore us may not be worked by the owner himself. The evil sought to be remedied byagrarian reform is the ancient anachronism where one person owns the land while anotherworks on it. The evil is not present in cases of personal cultivation by the owner.

Taking over by the landowner is subject to strict requirements. In addition to proof ofownership and the required notices to the tenant, the bona-fide intention to cultivate mustbe proved to the satisfaction of the court. And as earlier stated, the tenant is Protected incase the owner fails to cultivate the land within one year or to work the land himself for threeyears.

The seven hectares retention under P.D. No. 27 is applicable only to landowners who donot own other agricultural lands containing an aggregate of more than seven hectares orlands used for residential commercial industry or other urban purposes where they deriveadequate income to support themselves and their families. (Letter of Instruction No. 472dated October 21, 1976).


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To Support his petition, Fortunate Castro in L-36625 asserts that Section 7 of Republic ActNo. 6389 is unconstitutional

The amended provision reads: t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon rommendationof the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential commercialindustrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the agriculturallessee shag be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five timesthe average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last fivepreceding calendar years.

. There appears to be nothing unconstitutional in the above provision. If Mr. Castro ischallenging agrarian reform itself, then his challenge is puerile if not hopeless. We ruled inVda, de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian Relations (22 SCRA 792) that the Agricultural LandReform Code is valid and justified. In Paulo v. Court of Appeals (54 SCRA 253) we ruled: t.hqw

... Land Reform which is now transforming the rural existence of the farmers,has become more imperative in view of the provisions of the NewConstitution. Thus Section 6, Article II thereof directs that 'the State shagpromote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare and security of all thepeople,' and for the attainment of this end, directs that 'the State shallregulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and diffuse of privateproperty, and equitably diffuse ownership and profits.' Section 6, Article XVIIof the Transitory Provisions provides that the implementation of declaredagrarian reforms' shall be given priority. There is no question that the massive

overhaul of the system of land ownership by the transfer to the tenants of theownership of the land they till and the grant to them of the instruments andmechanisms to increase their land's productivity will decisively improve thepeople's livelihood and promote political and social stability.

And, of course, Section 12 of Article XIV specifically mandates that "the State shadformulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenantfrom the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution." At anyrate, there is no need to pass upon the constitutional issue for the purpose of resolving thenarrow question of retroactivity of the questioned provision.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. L-34586 is denied for lack of merit and thequestioned decision of the Court of Appeals is aimed. In G.R. No. L-36625, the questionedorder of the lower court is set aside and the case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court ofBulacan for trial on the merits.

SO ORDERED. 1wph1.t


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO, SALVADORARANETA, GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, PIO PEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE M.ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL, FELIXBERTO M. SERRANO, and ROMANOZAETA, petitioners,vs.PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA and JOSEAVILES, respondents.

Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B. Guevara, Jose M. Aruego, Sotero H. Laurel and Felixberto M.Serrano for themselves and for other petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

REGALA, J .:

We are called upon in this case to decide the grave and fundamental problem of theconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement gratuityand commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to theelective officials of both houses (of Congress)." The suit was instituted by the PhilippineConstitution Association, Inc. (Philconsa, for short), a non-profit civic organization, dulyincorporated under Philippine laws, by way of a petition for prohibition with preliminary

injunction to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and the disbursing officers ofboth Houses of Congress from "passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning thechecks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former Member of theHouse of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No.3836; and likewise restraining the respondent disbursing officers of the House and Senate,respectively, and their successors in office from paying the said retirement and vacationgratuities."

It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, at least to the end that it provided forthe retirement of the members of Congress in the manner and terms that it did, isunconstitutional and void. The challenge to the constitutionality of the law is centered on thefollowing propositions:

1. The provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congressis not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of section 21 (1) of Article VI of theConstitution.

2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutionalban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office,contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.


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3. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allowsmembers and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service andgives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service,which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while allother officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty(20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one monthsalary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months.

4. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest ratereceived, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of thelegislators to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

The text of Republic Act No. 3836

The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:

AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OFCOMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS

AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines inCongress assembled:

SECTION 1. Subsection (c), Section twelve of Commonwealth Act Numbered OneHundred eighty-six, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Thirty hundred ninety-six, is further amended to read as follows:

"(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of age, who has

rendered at least twenty years of service. The benefit shall, in addition to the returnof his personal contributions plus interest and the payment of the correspondingemployer's premiums described in subsection (a) of Section five hereof, withoutinterest, be only a gratuity equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service,based on the highest rate received, but not to exceed twenty-four months: Provided,That the retiring officer or employee has been in the service of the said employer oroffice for at least four years immediately preceding his retirement.

"Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the House ofRepresentatives and to an elective officer of either House of the Congress,regardless of age, provided that in the case of a Senator or Member, he must haveserved at least twelve years as a Senator and/or as a member of the House ofRepresentatives, and, in the case of an elective officer of either House, he musthave served the government for at least twelve years, not less than four years ofwhich must have been rendered as such elective officer: Provided , That the gratuitypayable to a retiring senator, member of the House of Representatives, or electiveofficer, of either House, shall be equivalent to one year's salary for every four yearsof service in the government and the same shall be exempt from any tax whatsoeverand shall be neither liable to attachment or execution nor refundable in case ofreinstatement or re-election of the retiree.


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"This gratuity is payable by the employer or office concerned which is herebyauthorized to provide the necessary appropriation or pay the same from anyunexpended items of appropriations or savings in its appropriations or saving in itsappropriations.

"Elective or appointive officials and employees paid gratuity under this subsectionshall be entitled to the commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave, based onthe highest rate received, which they may have to their credit at the time ofretirement."

SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, June 22, 1963.

The Solicitor General's Office, in representation of the respondent, filed its answer onSeptember 8, 1964, and contends, by way of special and affirmative defenses that:

1. The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to theofficers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute "forbidden compensation"within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution.

2. The title of the law in question sufficiently complies with the provisions of Section21, Article VI, of the Constitution that "no bill which may be enacted into law shallembrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

3. The law in question does not constitute legislation.

4. Certain indispensable parties, specifically the elected officers of Congress who

are authorized to approve vouchers for payments for funds under the law inquestion, and the claimants to the vouchers to be presented for payment under saiditems, were not included in the petition.

5. The petitioner has no standing to institute this suit.

6. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act ismerely "in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member"and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

A brief historical background of Republic Act No. 3836

Republic Act No. 3836 was originally House Bill No. 6051, which was introduced byCongressmen Marcial R. Pimentel of Camarines Norte and Marcelino R. Veloso of the ThirdDistrict of Leyte, on May 6, 1963. On the same date, it was referred to the Committee onCivil Service. which on the following May 8, submitted its REPORT No. 3129,recommending approval of the bill with amendments, among others, that the word"TWENTY" in the bill as filed representing the number of years that a senator or membermust serve in Congress to entitle him to retirement under the bill must be reduced to"TWELVE" years, and that the following words were inserted, namely, "AND THE SAME


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(referring to gratuity) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX WHATSOEVER AND SHALLNOT BE LIABLE FROM ATTACHMENT OR EXECUTION NOR REFUNDABLE IN CASEOF REINSTATEMENT OR REELECTION OF THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the bill withthe proposed amendments was approved on second reading. It was passed on thirdreading on May 13, 1963, and on the same day was sent to the Senate, which, in turn, onMay 23, 1963, passed it without amendment. The bill was finally approved on June 22,1963. As explained in the EXPLANATORY NOTE attached to the bill, among others

The inclusion of members of Congress in subsection (c), Section 12 of C.A. 186, asamended, will enable them to retire voluntarily, regardless of age, after serving aminimum of twenty years as a Member of Congress. This gratuity will insure thesecurity of the family of the retiring member of Congress with the latter engaging inother activities which may detract from his exalted position and usefulness aslawmaker. It is expected that with this assurance of security for his loved ones,deserving and well-intentioned but poor men will be attracted to serve their people inCongress.

As finally approved, the law (Subsection [c], paragraph 2, Section 1, R.A. 3836) allows aSenator or a Member of the House of Representatives and an elective officer of eitherHouse of Congress to retire regardless of age. To be eligible for retirement, he must haveserved for at least twelve years as such Senator and/or as member of the House ofRepresentatives. For an elective officer of either House, he must have served thegovernment for at least twelve years, of which not less than four years must have beenrendered as such elective officer. The gratuity payable by the employer or office concernedis equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service in the government. Saidgratuity is exempt from taxation, not liable to attachment or execution, and not refundable incase of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.

First legal point personality of the Petitioner to bring suit.

The first point to be considered is whether petitioner Philconsa has a standing to institutethis action. This Court has not hesitated to examine past decisions involving this matter.This Court has repeatedly held that when the petitioner, like in this case, is composed ofsubstantial taxpayers, and the outcome will affect their vital interests, they are allowed tobring this suit. (Pascual v. Secretary, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; and Gonzalesv. Hechanova, 60 Off. Gaz. 802 [1963]).

The petitioner, Philconsa, is precisely a non-profit, civic organization composed of severalleaders from all walks of life whose main objective is to uphold the principles of theConstitution.

In rejecting the motion to dismiss in the case of Pascual v. Secretary, supra , this Courtstated, among other things, that "there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of thetaxpayers, laws providing the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that theexpenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering anunconstitutional act constitutes a misappropriation of such funds, which may be enjoined atthe request of the taxpayers." 1 This legislation (Republic Act 3836) involves thedisbursement of public funds.


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We are not, however, unmindful of the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates in the case of Massachusetts v. Mellon , 262 U.S. 447, holding that:

... the relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is verydifferent. His interest in the moneys of the Treasury partly realized from taxationand partly from other sources is shared with millions of others; is comparativelyminute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation of any payment out ofthe funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for anappeal to the preventive powers of equity.

The general view in the United States, which is followed here, is stated in the AmericanJurisprudence, thus

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standingto attack the constitutionality of a statute the general rule is that not only personsindividually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing theillegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the

constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761;emphasis supplied.)

As far as the first point is concerned, We hold, therefore, that the contention of the SolicitorGeneral is untenable.

Second legal point Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 falls within the prohibitionembodied in Art. VI, section 14 of the Constitution.

The first constitutional question is whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI,of the Constitution, which reads as follows:

The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unlessotherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand twohundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, andexclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective districts in the caseof Members of the House of Representative and to and from their places ofresidence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. Noincrease in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the fullterm of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representativesapproving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of theSenate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive anannual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos (emphasis supplied)

Before discussing this point, it is worthy to note that the Constitution embodies somelimitations and prohibitions upon the members of Congress, to wit:

1. They may not hold any other office or employment in the Government withoutforfeiting their respective seats;


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2. They shall not be appointed, during the time for which they are elected, to any civiloffice which may have been created or the emoluments whereof shall have beenincreased while they were members of Congress; (Section 16, Article VI,Constitution)

3. They cannot be financially interested in any franchise;

4. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein the Government is an adverse party;

5. They cannot appear as counsel before any Electoral Tribunal; and

6. They cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case where an officer or employeeof the Government is accused. (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution)

In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) also prohibitsmembers of Congress to have any special interest in any specific business which willdirectly or indirectly be favored by any law or resolution authored by them during their termof office.

It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention wisely surrounded the Constitution withthese limitations and prohibitions upon Members of Congress. This is a practicaldemonstration or application of the principle of the and balances which is one of the peculiarcharacteristics of our Constitution. In the light of this background, can We conclude thatCongress can validly enact Republic Act 3836, providing retirement benefits to its members,without violating the provisions in the aforementioned Article VI, Section 14, of theConstitution, regarding increase of the compensation act including other emoluments ?

It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the National Assembly

(unicameral body) was fixed at P5,000.00 per annum each. This was raised to P7,200 perannum by the enactment of the 1940 Constitutional amendment, when the unicameral body,the National Assembly, was changed to Congress, composed of two bodies, the Senateand the House of Representatives. Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act 4143,the salary for the Members of Congress was raised to P32,000.00 per annum for each ofthem; and for the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives, to P40,000.00 per annum each.

Likewise, it is significant that, as stated above, when the Constitutional Convention firstdetermined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was onlyP5,000.00 per annum, but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: "Noincrease in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of allthe members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase." Inother words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National

Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until afterthe expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to theapproval of such increase. (See Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, pp. 296-300; Sinco, Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th ed., p. 187)


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This goes to show how zealous were the members of the Constitutional Convention inguarding against the temptation for members of Congress to increase their salaries.However, the original strict prohibition was modified by the subsequent provision when theConstitutional amendments were approved in 1940 2

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in theterm compensation "other emoluments." This is the pivotal point on this fundamentalquestion as to whether the retirement benefits as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fallwithin the purview of the term "other emoluments."

Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded "emolument" as "the profit arisingfrom office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which isannexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites. 3

In another set of cases, "emolument" has been defined as "the profit arising from office oremployment; that which is received as compensation for services, or which is annexed tothe possession of office, as salary, fees and perquisites; advantage, gain, public or private."The gain, profit or advantage which is contemplated in the definition or significance of theword "emolument" as applied to public officers, clearly comprehends, We think, a gain,profit, or advantage which is pecuniary in character. (citing Taxpayers' League of CargonCounty v. McPherson, 54 P. 2d. 897, 90l.: 49 Wy. 26; 106 A.L.R. 767)

In Schieffelin v. Berry , 216 N.Y.S. (citing Wright v. Craig, 202 App. Div. 684, 195 N.Y.S.391, affirmed 234 N.Y. 548, 138 N.E. 441), it has been established that pensions andretirement allowances are part of compensation of public officials; otherwise their paymentwould be unconstitutional .

In another case, State v. Schmahl , 145 N.W. 795, 125 Minn. 104, it is stated that "as used

in Article 4, section 9, of the Constitution of Minnesota, providing that no Senator orRepresentative shall hold any office, the emoluments of which have been increased duringthe session of the Legislature of which he was a member, until after the expiration of histerm of office in the Legislature, the word "emoluments" does not refer to the fixed salaryalone, but includes fees and compensation as the incumbent of the office is by law entitledto receive because he holds such office and performed some service required of theoccupant thereof."

From the decisions of these cases, it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or anotherspecies of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessingany office.

Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators andMembers of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act,which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder,without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and theHouse of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter tothe prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.


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Third Legal Point Whether or not the law in question violates the equal protection clauseof the Constitution.

Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the features of saidRepublic Act 3836 are patently discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protectionclause of the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, part. 1.)

In the first place, while the said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members ofthe House of Representatives who are elective officials, it does not include other electiveofficials such as the governors of provinces and the members of the provincial boards, andthe elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities.

The principle of equal protection of law embodied in our Constitution has been fullyexplained by Us in the case of People v. Vera , 65 Phil. 56, 126, where We stated that theclassification to be reasonable must be based upon substantial distinctions which make realdifferences and must be germane to the purposes of the law.

As well stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States (second edition), p.1937, the principle of the requirement of equal protection of law applies to all personssimilarly situated. Why limit the application of the benefits of Republic Act 3836 to theelected members of Congress? We feel that the classification here is not reasonable. (Seealso Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed. [1962]; Selected Essays on Constitutional Law[1938-62], p. 789; The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. Law Rev. 341.)

Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement benefitsafter serving twelve years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officersand employees are given retirement benefits after serving for at least twenty years. In fact,the original bill of Act 3836 provided for twenty years of service.

In the third place, all government officers and employees are given only one retirementbenefit irrespective of their length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic

Act 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the House ofRepresentatives upon being elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement benefitsor equivalent to six years' salary.

Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to an employee who had beenretired and reappointed is suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth

Act 186, as amended), this is not so under Republic Act 3836.

Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are notmembers of the Government Service Insurance System. Most grantees of retirementbenefits under the various retirement laws have to be members or must at least contribute aportion of their monthly salaries to the System. 4

The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features of Republic Act 3836, as faras Members of Congress are concerned, apply with equal force to the elected officers ofeach House, such as the Secretaries and the Sergeants-at-arms. Under Republic Act 3836,the Secretaries and Sergeants-at-arms of each House are given the benefits of retirement


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without having served for twenty years as required with other officers and employees of theGovernment.

Fourth Legal Point Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to thesubject matter expressed in the act.

Another Constitutional point to determine is whether the title of Republic Act 3836 complieswith the requirement of paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which readsas follows:

No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject whichshall be expressed in the title of the bill.

We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts toconstrue the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act,liberally.

It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling ornotice whatsoever to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacationand sick leave privileges to members of Congress. It is claimed that petitioner learned ofthis law for the first time only when Jose Velasco, disbursing officer of the House, testifiedon January 30, 1964, before Justice Labrador, in connection with the hearing of the case,and he revealed that in 1963, Congress enacted the retirement law for its members. In factthe Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1964-65, Republic Act No. 4164, provides:

13. For payment of retirement gratuities of members of the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3836 : PROVIDED, That no portion of this Appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all approved claims shall

have been paid

P210,000.00.

In the appropriations for the House of Representatives the following items appear:

7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Membersand employees of the House of Representatives, as provided for under Republic ActNo. 1616 P300,000.00

8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sickleaves as provided for under Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities ofMembers and employees of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No.1616 P1,300,000.00.

In the Appropriations Act of 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642), the following item appearsin the appropriations for the Senate:

13. For payment of retirement gratuities of Senate personnel pursuant to theprovisions of Republic Act No. 1616: PROVIDED, That no portion of thisappropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all approved claims shallhave been paid P100,000.00.


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It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 1965-1966, the item in the Senate forP210,000.00 to implement Republic Act 3836 was eliminated.

In the appropriations for the House (1965-1966), the following items appear:

7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Membersand employees of the House Of Representatives as provided for under Republic ActNo. 1616 P1,200,000.00.

8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sickleaves as provided for under Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities ofMembers and employees of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No.1616 P1,700,000.00.

It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of section12, subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and.3096, the retirement benefits are granted to members of the Government Service InsuranceSystem, who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age. Thisparagraph is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.

On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members ofCongress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government ServiceInsurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relateto subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, thisportion of the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and electedofficers, such as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each House) is not related in anymanner to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the Government ServiceInsurance System and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its

members.Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an

Act should be expressed in its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surpriseor fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publicationof legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the opportunity of beingheard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire (Cooley, ConstitutionalLimitations, 8th ed., Vol. 1, p. 162; See also Martin, Political Law Reviewer, Book One[1965], p. 119)

With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:

The Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflecttheir contents is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in itstitle, and it is not necessary that the title be a complete index of the content. (Peoplev. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535)

The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in itstitle should be reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactmentof necessary legislation. It should be given a practical, rather than technical,


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construction. It should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the titleexpresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane tothat general subject. (Sumulong v. The Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)

The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly illustratedand explained in Central Capiz v. Ramirez , 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raisedwas whether Commonwealth Act 2784, known as the Public Land Act, was limited in itsapplication to lands of the public domain or whether its provisions also extended toagricultural lands held in private ownership. The Court held that the act was limited to landsof the public domain as indicated in its title, and did not include private agricultural lands.The Court further stated that this provision of the Constitution expressing the subject matterof an Act in its title is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to Congress, but itis mandatory . It is the duty of the Court to declare void any statute not conforming to thisconstitutional provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley, ConstitutionalLimitations, pp. 162-164; 5 See also Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676; Sutherland onStatutory Construction, Sec. 111.)

In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title ofsaid Republic Act 3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation ofthe aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.

In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first, theprohibition regarding increase in the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equalprotection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title of a bill shall not embrace more thanone subject.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act No. 3836 is herebydeclared null and void, in so far as it refers to the retirement of Members of Congress and

the elected officials thereof, as being unconstitutional. The restraining order issued in ourresolution on December 6, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Barrera, J., took no part.

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