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America as a Christian Nation?

Understanding Religious Boundaries ofNational Identity in the United States*

Jeremy Brooke StraughnScott L. FeldPurdue University

Though predominantly Christian since the time of its founding, the United States has become more reli-giously diverse in recent decades. Yet since the mid-1990s, the proportion of Americans who see theircountry as a Christian nation has reportedly increased. Though initially paradoxical, these trends areless mysterious if the idea of a Christian America (CA) is understood, not as a description of reli-

gious demography, but as a discursive practice that seeks to align the symbolic boundaries of nationalbelonging with the boundaries of the dominant faith community. Using data from the 1996 and 2004General Social Survey, it is shown that the growing prevalence of CA was restricted to Americans ofChristian faith, thereby widening an existing religious divide over the meaning of American identity.

Key words: national identity; Christianity; symbolic boundaries; social change; USA.

INTRODUCTION

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Christians remain the largestreligious group in the United States, as they have been since the countrysfounding. Hence it is not surprising that most Americans tend to think of theircountry as a Christian nation. According to a 2006 survey by the Pew

Research Center, two-thirds of American adults say they consider the UnitedStates a Christian nation (Pew Research Center 2006:5), while nearly a third of

*Direct correspondence to Jeremy Brooke Straughn, Department of Sociology, Stone Hall, 700W. State St., West Lafayette, IN 47907-2059, USA. E-mail: [email protected]. This paperhas evolved to its present form over several years. Earlier versions of the paper were written inclose collaboration between the authors. Later revisions, including the final version, were preparedby the first author in consultation with the second. The authors wish to thank Jim Davidson,Fenggang Yang, Dan Olson, Angie Andriot, Lisa Fein, Jun Lu, Dan Mroczek, and the five anon-ymous SOR reviewers for their helpful critiques of earlier drafts. We owe them our gratitude, buthold them blameless for any remaining errors.

# The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Associationfor the Sociology of Religion. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail:[email protected].

Sociology of Religion 2010, 71:3 280-306doi:10.1093/socrel/srq045

Advance Access Publication 4 June 2010

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respondents in another study strongly agree that, In the twenty-first century,the United States is still basically a Christian society (Wuthnow 2005:200).

In demographic and cultural respects, of course, America is no longer asChristian as it used to be. Over the last few decades, the proportion of

Americans professing Christian faith, especially of the Protestant confession,has experienced a steady decline. Although Christians still account for about78 percent of U.S. adults as a whole, the percentage of Protestants has fallenfrom over 60 percent in the early 1990s to around 50 percent as of 2006 (seealso Kosmin and Keysar 2009; Pew Forum 2008; Smith and Kim 2005).Meanwhile, the ranks of the religiously unaffiliated have grown from fewerthan 10 percent to between 14 and 16 percent over the same period (Hout andFischer 2002; Pew Forum 2008).

Yet paradoxically, the growth of religious diversity has not produced a conco-

mitant decline in the view of America as a Christian country. On the contrary,such views have generally grown more prevalent among U.S. adults since the turnof the century. As of the mid-1990s, only 60 percent of Pew respondents said theyregarded their country as a Christian nation. By 2002, agreement with this viewhad risen to 67 percent and reached a peak of 71 percent in 2005 before settlingto 67 percent the following year (Pew Research Center 2006:5).

Why is America increasingly perceived as a Christian nation, even thoughChristians have not been growing as a proportion of the American population?If the notion of a Christian America is not just a reflection of demographic

realities, what could account for its varying appeal over time? In this article,we suggest that such questions become more tractable when Christian Americadiscourse is viewed through the lens of recent work on symbolic boundary con-struction (Edgell et al. 2006; Kunovich 2006; Lamont and Molnar 2002;Wimmer 2008; Zimmer 2003). Rather than merely describing the demographicstatus quo, statements like America is a Christian nation represent a discur-sive practice that seeks to align the boundaries of authentic national belongingwith adherence to the dominant religious faith.

As we go on to argue, practices of symbolic boundary alignment are always a

double-edged sword, simultaneously designating certain groups as prototypical ofthe larger community while relegating others to the symbolic margins. Forexample, by conditioning recognition as an authentic American on adherence toChristian faith, the idea of a Christian America tacitly reinforces the moral pres-tige of the religious majority, even as it presents Americans of other faiths, orwith no formal religion, with invisible barriers to symbolic inclusion.Consequently, we anticipate that such ideas will appeal primarily to members ofthe religious ingroup and are likely to be contested by outgroups at risk of mar-ginalization. In other words, we expect Christian America discourse to be divi-

sive along religious lines, rather than a source of consensus and solidaritytranscending religious boundaries.

To the extent that Christian America discourse appeals mainly to U.S.Christians, it follows that most of its aggregate variation over time should be

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due to fluctuations within the Christian community. Moreover, becauseChristians are no more numerous today, relative to non-Christians, than in pre-vious decades, the growing prevalence of Christian America beliefs most likelyreflects an increase in the importance of Christianity to American identity

among Christian Americans themselves. Precisely why this should haveoccurred when it did is a question we take up in the course of our theoreticaland empirical analysis. Whatever its causes, however, the recent surge in thesebeliefs likely signals a growing divergence in attitudes between AmericanChristians and their non-Christian compatriots. To the extent that such polar-ization can present an obstacle to political consensus on major issues(DiMaggio et al. 1996), a widening religious divide over the meaning ofAmerican identity could become a source of future social conflict.

The rest of this article is structured as follows. In the next section, we

outline the contours of a boundary-oriented approach for explicating the linkbetween religious identity and conceptions of national belonging. In thesection thereafter, we develop a series of hypotheses which link the intensity ofChristian America beliefs to characteristics and attitudes of individuals, as wellas identifying a number of mechanisms to account for their changing patternsover time. In the analytic sections of the paper, finally, we put our hypothesesto the test using data from the 1996 and 2004 General Social Surveys (GSS).

THEORIZING RELIGIOUS BOUNDARIES OF AMERICANIDENTITY

Our theoretical approach is informed by recent research on the role of sym-bolic boundaries in the construction of social identities (Edgell et al. 2006;Kunovich 2006; Smith et al. 1998; Wimmer 2008; Zimmer 2003; for a generaldiscussion see Lamont and Molnar 2002). As Lamont and Molnar (2002)define them, Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by socialactors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space. They

are tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon[or contest] definitions of reality (Lamont and Molnar 2002:168). A key func-tion of symbolic boundaries is to separate people into groups and generatefeelings of similarity and group membership (Lamont and Molnar 2002:168).As Edgell et al. (2006:231) have shown, Symbolic boundaries are effective . . .in promoting a sense of solidarity and identity by virtue of imagining an otherwho does not share the core characteristics imagined to be held by those whoare legitimate participants in the moral order; the imagined community musthave outsiders as well as insiders.

In constructing symbolic boundaries, social actors select from a variety ofculturally available symbolic resources (Lamont and Molnar 2002; Zimmer2003), or boundary criteria. Thus, religious identity often overlaps withnational identity because [religion] provides one means of distinguishing

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ingroups from outgroups (Kunovich 2006:438). Yet defining one type of socialidentity (national belonging) in terms of another (religious affiliation) is notsimply a matter of boundary overlap. Rather, it involves a practice we call sym-bolic boundary alignment, or the nesting of one symbolic boundary within

another. For example, the statement that America is a Christian nation notonly posits an intersection between religious and national boundaries; it alsoimplies that the boundary between Christians and non-Christians helps regu-late the threshold between more and less prototypical Americans (on proto-typicality, see Mummendey and Wenzel 1999).

Because symbolic boundaries are always moral boundaries (Edgell et al. 2006;Lamont 2000), aligning national with religious boundaries is likely to have verydifferent consequences for religious ingroups and outgroups within the nationalcommunity. Among members of the ingroup, the notion of a Christian America

may, at times, serve as a rhetorical weapon in the arsenal of religious activistsseeking to mobilize supporters around social or political issues of the day(Regnerus and Smith 1998; Schwadel 2005). At other times, what sounds likethe battle cry of cultural warriors may only be intended to strengthen religiousidentification and solidarity among coreligionists. For example, Smith et al.(2000) argue that much evangelical discourse about reclaiming America issimply talk to construct and maintain collective identity. This evangelical rheto-ric is functioning not so much to actually get the troops ready to re-ChristianizeAmerica as to express and reinforce a distinctive identity for its adherents

(Smith et al. 2000:56). Thus, we do not assume that the appeal of ChristianAmerica beliefs will always rise and fall in tandem with religious politicization(Schwadel 2005; Servin-Gonzales and Torres-Reyna 1999) and deprivatization(Regnerus and Smith 1998; Wilcox and Goldberg 2002). The idea of aChristian America does not, by itself, imply that Christianity should be imposedon non-Christians, or that Christians should enjoy special rights and privilegesas a matter of public policy (see also Wuthnow 2005:200). Nor does it necess-arily entail the belief that religion should play a more prominent role in politics.In principle, a Christian who sees her/his faith as central to American identity

could still regard her/his religious beliefs and practices as a personal matter.Yet, whatever its symbolic function for self-described insiders, any talk of a

Christian America is likely to have a dispiriting impact on those it implicitlymarginalizes. Asked to comment on a conference dedicated to ReclaimingAmerica for Christ, one Jewish American responded that, When thelanguage becomes exclusively Christian, Jewish groups become at best ambiva-lent, at worst hostile (Smith et al. 2000:22). Such fears are not always mis-placed. Even if their immediate effects are largely imagined, symbolicboundaries can also have material consequences, serving as an essential

medium through which people acquire status and monopolize resources(Lamont and Molnar 2002:168). By attributing contrasting degrees of socialprestige to insiders and outsiders, symbolic boundaries can confer differentialaccess to material benefits and other advantages. As a result of these benefits,



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group members limit membership to protect their rewards (Kunovich2006:440). Indeed, if taken to extremes, symbolic boundaries can have evendirer implications, as when restrictive definitions of nationhood serve as apretext for depriving marginalized citizens of their civil rights or denying citi-

zenship to outsiders on the basis of race, religion, or national origin (Somers2006; Zolberg 2006).

HYPOTHESES

Drawing on our theory of symbolic boundary alignment, our next goal is todevelop specific hypotheses for predicting the salience of Christianity tonational identity in the American context. Two sets of hypotheses are pro-

posed. First, we attempt to specify the groups in society for whom the appeal ofChristian America beliefs (or CA) should be strongest, as well as some ofthe factors that should further enhance its appeal among potential supporters.Second, with these hypotheses in mind we consider some of the mechanismsthat could help account for changes in CA over time.

Predictors of CA

Most Americans are strongly attached to their country, exhibiting high levelsof pride in citizenship and national symbols (Smith and Kim 2006). However, any

restrictive definition of national identity is likely to be controversial, even divisive.Because the alignment of national identity with internal symbolic boundaries willhave different consequences for ingroups and outgroups, we believe that affinitieswith CA will differ significantly between dominant and non-dominant religiousgroups. In general, we concur with Kunovich (2006) that religious majorities aremore likely to state that the dominant religion is very important for national iden-tity, while religious minorities are likely to downplay the dominant religion as arelevant factor for national identity because their own religious backgroundexcludes them from membership in the nation (Kunovich 2006:440). Hence, we

expect that the salience of Christianity to American identity will be morepronounced within the Christian majority than the non-Christian minority(viz. believers of other faiths and the religiously nonaffiliated).

Hypothesis 1: CA will be higher among Christian Americans than amongnon-Christians

Among U.S. Christians, we expect to find significant variation betweendifferent denominations and confessions (Steensland et al. 2000:292). One waythat denominational heritage could motivate religious understandings of

national identity is by encouraging adherents to think of themselves as prototy-pical representatives of their faith tradition. For example, Smith and colleagues(1998) argue that evangelical Protestants are especially prone to regard them-selves as prototypical Christians. Thus, when evangelicals use the word



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Christian, most likely they are instinctively meaning evangelical Christian(Smith et al. 1998:124, original italics; cf., Smith et al. 2000:200; Wuthnow2005:200). CA could also have disproportionate appeal for Christians in tra-ditionally marginalized social categories, perhaps offering a means of compen-

sating for their historical exclusion. Such a dynamic might be at work in blackProtestant denominations, in which racial and religious identities are tightlyinterwoven (Pattillo-McCoy 1998; Steensland et al. 2000). We thereforeexpect that CA beliefs will have greater appeal to (white) evangelicals andblack Protestants than to mainline Protestants, Roman Catholics, and otherChristian groups.

Hypothesis 2: Among U.S. Christians, CA will be higher among evangelicalsand black Protestants than other Christians

Independently of denomination or confession, we further expect that thesalience of religion to national identity will increase with the importance ofeither religious or national identity. As Hoge and De Zulueta (1985) haveargued, the importance of any one component [of identity] relative to othersshould predict whether the component in question is likely to influenceothers (Hoge and De Zulueta 1985:22). In previous research, religiosity hasbeen measured by the frequency of attendance at religious services (Kunovich2006), while closeness to ones country is a good indicator of national identifi-cation (Huddy and Khatib 2007). We therefore predict that:

Hypothesis 3: Among U.S. Christians, CA should increase with (a) frequencyof religious attendance and (b) feelings of closeness to America

According to recent studies, religious identities often become more salientin a religiously diverse environment (Kunovich 2006; Smith et al. 1998;Wilcox and Goldbert 2002). For example, Christian Smith and colleaguesargue that solidarity among evangelical Christians grows stronger with feelingsof embattlement in the face of religious pluralism (Smith, et al 1998, 2000),while Wilcox and Goldberg (2002:371) suggest that highly committed

Christians may see growing diversity as threatening their religious hegemonyand as undermining the nations status as a Christian nation. Since immigra-tion is a major factor in the growth of religious diversity (Smith and Kim2005), feelings of embattlement and outgroup hostility should be manifested inpreferences for reducing the current rate of immigration (Bail 2008; Esses et al.2001).1 Hence:

1An alternate approach is to calculate the degree of heterogeneity in a particular

region of residence. However, such measures would be inappropriate in the present case, astheir effects tend to be confounded with those of religious participation (Voas et al. 2002).In contrast, measures of outgroup attitudes should help capture the ways in which religiousoutgroups have been depicted in public and private discourse, and hence more directlyreflect the impact of cultural diversity on boundary salience at the individual level.



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Hypothesis 4: Among U.S. Christians, CA will increase with preferences forrestricting the rate of immigration to the United States

Accounting for change over time From these propositions, we can derive anumber of mechanisms that could affect changes in the overall prevalence ofCA beliefs over time. Our main focus is on two types of mechanisms: (1)gradual shifts in the religious composition of society (compositional effects) and(2) major events that affect the salience of religious and national boundaries(period effects). As we will see, there are good reasons to doubt that demo-graphic changes since the 1990s could have directly produced a concomitantincrease in CA in the population. We therefore expect that any aggregate rise inCA will have occurred in response to major eventsa reaction, moreover, thatshould be especially pronounced among members of the Christian majority.

Compositional effects In light of Hypothesis 1, it is indeed paradoxical thatbelief in America as a Christian nation would have grown more prevalentduring a period when the proportion of Christians in the population was onthe decline. If CA is typically higher among U.S. Christians than amongnon-Christians, then a decrease in the percentage of Christians should causeCA to become less prevalent in the population, since its adherents have grownproportionately less numerous. By the same token, Hypothesis 2 implies thatthe overall prevalence of CA should vary with the ratio of Christians incertain denominations (especially evangelicals or black Protestants), otherthings being equal. According to the most recent wave of the AmericanReligious Identification Survey, there was some growth in the share ofChristians belonging to evangelical denominations or non-denominationalcongregations between 1990 and 2008, mostly at the expense of mainlineProtestant churches (Kosmin and Keysar 2009:5). However, the rate of growthin these groups does not appear to have outpaced that of non-Christian reli-gions or of Americans who do not identify with any religious tradition.Whereas the U.S. population is 30 percent larger today than in 1990, there are50 percent more non-Christians and 138 percent more nones (Kosmin andKeysar 2009:4; on the latter category, see also Hout and Fischer 2002).

On balance, then, we do not believe that changes in the religious makeupof American society would be sufficient to account for the growing prevalenceof CA beliefs since the 1990s. Indeed, it seems more likely the net effect ofcompositional change has been to diminish the rate of growth in CA in recentyears.

Hypothesis 5: Changes in the religious composition of American society havefavored the attenuation of CA in the population

Period effects Independently of demographic trends, religious conceptionsof American identity could have experienced a net surge if major events of theday have brought religious and national issues to the forefront of public atten-tion. For example, Huntington (2004:340) asserted that, in the wake of



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religiously motivated attacks on their homeland, Americans increasingly definethemselves in religious and cultural terms: September 11 dramatically symbo-lized . . . the beginning of a new era in which people define themselves primar-ily in terms of culture and religion . . . . For Americans the religious component

of their identity takes on new relevance in this environment.Recent studies confirm that beliefs about the role of religion in public life

often fluctuate in response to historic events. For example, Regnerus and Smith(1998) argue that religious deprivatization tends to occur in cycles, becomingespecially pronounced in times of significant crisis. Throughout U.S. history,disturbing shifts in the moral order . . . [have] prompted a revisiting of tra-ditional or commonsense strategies of action by the organizational sources ofpolitical and religious meaning systems . . .. During these unsettled times,religious convictions play an increasingly prominent role in the public sphere,

before receding again into taken-for-granted ways of life during moresettled periods (Regnerus and Smith 1998:1351; cf., Swidler 1986).

Such phenomena are commonly known as period effects, or societal reactionsto sudden changes of political climate during a particular interval (Alwin andMcCammon 2003; Weil 1987). In the case of pure period effects, major eventswill produce a more or less uniform increase (or decrease) in the prevalence ofparticular beliefs in society as a whole. Unfortunately, it is often difficult todetermine whether any particular set of events is directly responsible for pureperiod effects, since we cannot rule out other developments that may have

occurred during the same interval. Certain kinds of events, however, have moredistinctive consequences, affecting different segments of the population in con-trasting ways. An instructive example is what Regnerus and Smith (1998) callselective deprivatization (see also Casanova 1994). In the wake of the 1960s,they argue, conservative evangelicals came to supplant socially liberalProtestants as the most vocal advocates for the public role of religion, therebyreversing a longer trend of privatization among religious conservatives (Regnerusand Smith 1998; cf., Smith et al. 2000). By extension, we will speak of selectiveintensification whenever historical developments cause particular attitudes to rise

only in certain groups, while declining or remaining stable in others.In the case of CA, we doubt that the impact of recent history will have

been uniform. Although events like the attacks of 9 of 11 or the invasion ofIraq could have enhanced the salience of religious and national issues forAmericans in general, Hypothesis 1 leads us to expect that the relevance ofChristianity to American identity should intensify primarily within theChristian majority. Hypotheses 3 and 4 provide additional support for thisexpectation. If recent events have caused CA to intensify among U.S.Christians, they may have done so, in part, by elevating the level of religiosity,

patriotism, and xenophobia in the population. Religious minorities, on theother hand, are unlikely to respond by recognizing the dominant religion as ahallmark of the true American, since this would reinforce their symbolic mar-ginality within the imagined community (cf., Kunovich 2006).



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Hypothesis 6: Unsettling events since the mid-1990s have enhanced CAamong U.S. Christians

Finally, we expect that period events which trigger selective intensificationon the part of Christian Americans will also have heterogeneous effectson different categories of Christians. In general, we expect CA beliefs tointensify the most among those who were most inclined to embrace them inthe past. Specifically, we predict that any increase in CA should have occurreddisproportionately among evangelicals and black Protestants (H2), Christianswith frequent religious attendance (H3a), Christians with high levels ofpatriotism (H3b), Christians with more negative attitudes toward nationaloutgroups (H4). We refer to such patterns as (selective) intensification atthe top.

Hypothesis 6a: Selective intensification will occur faster among those cat-egories of Christians where CA was previously higher

DATASET AND VARIABLES

Sample

Our analysis draws on two waves of GSS data collected by the NationalOpinion Research Center and obtained electronically from the Inter-

University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR 04295). TheGSS has conducted face-to-face interviews with a representative sample ofAmerican adults every year or two since 1972 (Davis et al. 2007). In 1996 and2004, items from the 1995 and 2003 national identity modules of theInternational Social Survey Project were included in the GSS questionnaire forabout 2,500 cases.2

Dependent Variable

In 1996 and 2004, the GSS questionnaires included a battery of items pre-

faced by the following question: Some people say the following things areimportant for being truly American. Others say they are not important. Howimportant do you think each of the following is? Responses for each boundarycriterion were coded as very important (1), fairly important (2), not veryimportant (3), or not important at all (4). We measure the salience ofChristianity to American identity (CA) using the variable AMCHRSTN (Tobe a Christian), which we reverse coded to rise with level of importance.AMCHRSTN closely resembles items commonly used to measure what we callboundary alignment, or the salience of particular boundary criteria for symbolic

2Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables discussed belowcan be found in Appendix A in the Supplementary Material accompanying this article atSociology of Religion online (http://socrel.oxfordjournals.org ).



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belonging in a specified ingroup (Bail 2008; Citrin et al. 2001; Edgell et al.2006; Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2006). We generally expect this vari-able to behave in similar ways to other measures of CA beliefs (e.g., PewResearch Center 2006; Smith et al. 2000; Wuthnow 2005). An advantage of

the AMCHRSTN item over alternative items (e.g., Is America a Christiannation) is the specification that being a Christian makes one more trulyAmerican, thereby highlighting the normative implications of symbolicboundary construction.

Independent Variables

Religious affiliation In order to capture distinctions among clusters ofProtestant denominations, as well as between these and other religious cat-

egories, our analysis employs an aggregation method developed by Steenslandet al. (2000), which combines information in the RELIG, DENOM, andOTHER variables into a single polytomous measure of religious tradition. Theresulting variable (RELTRAD) codes self-reported religious affiliation as evan-gelical Protestant, mainline Protestant, black Protestant, Roman Catholic,Jewish, other, or nonaffiliated. However, about 40 percent of respondents inthe other category are self-identified Christians (36 percent Protestant,4 percent Orthodox). Because we are often interested in contrasting Christiansand non-Christians, we have moved respondents who are coded as other on

RELTRAD, but as Protestant or Orthodox on the RELIG variable, into a sep-arate category of Other Christian. The remaining others (comprising adher-ents of non-Christian traditions) are combined with Jewish respondents andlabeled as Other Faith. Our modified RELTRAD variable thus codes religiousaffiliation as: evangelical Protestant (1), mainline Protestant (2), blackProtestant (3), Roman Catholic (4), Other Christian (5), Jewish/Other Faith(6), or nonaffiliated (7).

Other independent variables Additional predictors of CA for Christiansinclude religious commitment, national attachment, and immigration prefer-

ences. In our multivariate models, we also include controls for birth cohort,education, sex, region of residence, and race.3 To adjust for non-response bias,household sampling design, and sampling differences between survey years, allof our results were generated using a weighting variable (WT7204) provided bythe National Opinion Research Center.

3A description of these variables is available in Appendix B in the SupplementaryMaterial accompanying this article at Sociology of Religion online (http://socrel.oxfordjournals.org). Other candidates for inclusion as independent variables (e.g., income,

marital status, family background, citizenship) showed very weak or insignificant relation-ships with the dependent variable and would have made no meaningful contribution to ouranalysis. Although party affiliation is related to CA for one of our two survey years, itseffects appear to be spurious, arising from its associations with certain included predictors(e.g., religious affiliation, religious attendance).



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WHO THINKS BEING A CHRISTIAN MAKES ONE MORE TRULY

AMERICAN?

Descriptive Analysis

We begin our empirical investigation by examining the distribution of CAbeliefs at the outset of our period of study. As a provisional test of our first twohypotheses, we cross-tabulate the bivariate relationship between CA and reli-gious preference using our 1996 GSS sample (table 1). In the sample as awhole, we find that 53 percent of respondents regarded being a Christian aseither fairly (15 percent) or very important (38 percent) for being trulyAmerican. As expected, however, this majority consensus masks a sharp diver-gence of opinion between Christians and non-Christians. Among Christians,nearly 62 percent believed that being Christian is either very important

(44 percent) or fairly important (18 percent) for being truly American,whereas nearly 66 percent of non-Christians felt that Christian faith was notat all important, and almost one in five (19 percent) thought it was not veryimportant.

CA was also higher among evangelical Protestants than most otherChristian groups, although it was even more pronounced among blackProtestants. Fifty-eight percent of evangelicals and 69 percent of blackProtestants regarded being a Christian as very important for being trulyAmerican, while 36 percent of mainline Protestants, and 30 percent of

TABLE 1 The Salience of Christianity to American Identity, by Religious Affiliation

(N 1,283)a

How important is being a Christian for being truly

American? (percent)

N Not at all Not very Fairly Very Total

All respondents 1,283 25.2 21.4 15.4 38.0 100.0Christian 1,049 16.0 21.9 17.6 44.4 100.0

Evangelical Prot. 346 6.6 19.1 16.8 57.5 100.0

Mainline Protestant 247 21.1 22.3 20.6 36.0 100.0

Black Protestant 111 5.4 13.5 12.6 68.5 100.0

Roman Catholic 318 24.5 28.0 17.3 30.2 100.0

Other Christian 26 34.6 19.2 26.9 19.2

Non-Christian 224 66.2 19.2 5.1 9.4 100.0

Jewish/other faith 84 66.7 20.2 2.4 10.7 100.0

Nonaffiliated 148 66.2 18.9 6.8 8.1 100.0

a1996 GSS (weighted results). Column and row totals reflect rounding error andsample weighting.



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Roman Catholics held the same view. The remaining Christians (chieflyquasi-Protestant denominations and sects) were more ambivalent. Only19 percent thought of their faith as essential to American identity, while justover a third felt the opposite way.

Multivariate Analysis

Analytic strategy To ensure that these religious differences are not due toother sources of variation among religious groups, we use a multivariate pro-cedure to estimate the effect of religious affiliation on CA while controlling forour other independent variables. Because AMCHRSTN is highly skewed (withvery important as the modal category), we have dichotomized our dependentvariable to highlight the threshold between very important and all otherresponses. We use binary logistic regression (Long 1997) to estimate the neteffects of the independent variables on the log-odds that being a Christian isregarded as very important for being truly American. For ease of interpret-ation, our discussion focuses on the exponentiated regression coefficients(exp[b]).

Results The first model in table 2 tests whether religious affiliation(Christians vs. non-Christians) significantly influences CA in the 1996 sample.As expected (H1), Christians are considerably more likely to regard being aChristian as very important for being truly American. If fact, the odds ofsuch a response are more than three and a half times as great for this groupthan for non-Christians, controlling for other differences between them. Thetest statistic (DX2) indicates that the model fits the data significantly betterthan a comparison model without religious affiliation.

Models 2 4 test whether CA varies significantly by denomination, reli-gious attendance, national attachment, and outgroup attitudes amongChristian respondents in the sample (H2H4). As expected (H2), the appealof CA is quite a bit stronger among evangelicals and especially blackProtestants compared to mainline Protestants (Model 2), though it is substan-tially weaker among smaller Christian sects and denominations. Independentlyof denominational differences, Christians who attend religious services morefrequently (H3a), display very strong national attachment (H3b), or favor alarge reduction in immigration (H4) are significantly more likely to see theirfaith as essential to American identity (Model 3). When the control variablesare added (Model 4), most of these effects remain statistically significant andsimilar in size.4

4The exceptions are black Protestants and other Christians. Although both coefficientestimates are in the expected direction, neither attains statistical significance inModel 4. We suspect that these denominational differences do exist in the population, butthat our sample contains too few cases in these categories to rule out the possibility ofrandom error.



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TABLE 2 Logistic Regression of CA Beliefs on Religious Tradition and Other Predictors, 1996a

All respondents (N 1,005) Christian respondents

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

b sd(b) exp(b) b sd(b) exp(b) b sd(b)

Christian 1.307 0.296 3.694***

(Mainline)

Evangelical 0.916 0.193 2.499*** 0.749 0.203

Black Protestant 1.417 0.290 4.123*** 1.335 0.304

Roman Catholic 20.091 0.201 0.913 20.122 0.209

Other Christian 21.409 0.734 0.244 21.552 0.751

Religious attendance 0.550 0.085 1.733*** 0.513 0.084

National attachment 0.358 0.163 1.431* 0.597 0.160

Immigration

Reduce some 0.022 0.194 1.022 0.072 0.193

Reduce a lot 0.577 0.185 1.780** 0.611 0.183

Education 20.409 0.087 0.665*** Cohort (,1940)

194059 20.595 0.203 0.551**

!1960 21.197 0.209 0.302***

Female 0.083 0.153 1.086

South 0.647 0.159 1.909***

Race (white)

Black 1.061 0.252 2.891***

Other race 1.307 0.296 3.694***

Constant 22.091 0.373 0.124*** 20.701 0.151 0.496*** 21.909 0.243

22LL X2 1053.581 1075.422 1009.378

DX2 23.711*** 68.509*** 66.045***

df 1 4 4

aFor Model 1, DX2 tests whether the addition of religious affiliation improves model fit. Model 2 only). Models 3 and 4 are compared with Models 2 and 3, respectively.

***p, .001, **p, .01, *p, .05, p, .10 (2-tailed t-test).

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THE GROWING SALIENCE OF CHRISTIAN FAITH TO AMERICAN

IDENTITY

Descriptive Results

Having confirmed that most of our hypothesized predictors significantlyinfluence CA in the expected direction, we turn to the question of whetherthere has been any significant increase in CA during our period of study and, ifso, whether the patterns of change are consistent with the kinds of mechanismsour theory envisions. We begin by cross-tabulating our dichotomous measure ofCA by survey year. As a preliminary test of compositional change (H5) andselective intensification (H6, H6a), we examine the distribution of respondentsby religious affiliation, as well as the rates of change in CA by religious affilia-tion, over time (table 3).

The results in the first line confirm that the salience of Christianity toAmerican identity has significantly increased. Between 1996 and 2004, thepercentage of very important responses rose by more than 11 percentagepoints, from about 38 percent to almost 50 percent. As we suspected, theoverall rise in CA was accompanied by a slight decrease in the proportion ofChristians (by about 3 percentage points) between survey years. AlthoughRoman Catholics and Other Christians grew by about 2 percentage pointseach, their gains were offset by a 5-point loss on the part of mainlineProtestants, from 19 percent to just 14 percent. Nor was their any proportion-

ate growth in the two bastions of belief in a CA. Whereas evangelicals wereequally represented at both time points, black Protestants suffered a 2-pointloss. Among non-Christians, Americans with no religious affiliation expandedtheir relative numbers by 3 percentage points, from 12 percent to 15 percent,while adherents of non-Christian faiths held steady (for a more detailed analy-sis of these trends, see Kosmin and Keysar 2009; Pew Forum 2008).

Given the gradual diminution of Christians (and the lack of proportionategrowth in denominational bastions), it is unlikely compositional change wasresponsible for the observed increase in CA between survey years (H5). A more

likely explanation, we hypothesized, is that the rise in CA represents a type ofperiod effect, or societal reaction to unsettling events. Specifically, we pre-dicted that major events which focus attention on matters of religion andnationality should lead adherents of the dominant religion to accentuate theimportance of their faith as a component of their national identity (H6). Aswe see in the last set of results, the rise in CA was indeed concentrated in theChristian majority. Whereas the percentage of very important responsesincreased by an average of 15 points in the Christian category, there was nosignificant change for the non-Christian groups.

In substantive terms, the fact that CA intensified where it was already themost pronounced means that the existing divide between Christians andnon-Christians grew even wider during our period of study. The breakdown bysubgroup confirms this impression. While there was no significant change



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among religious nones and adherents of other faiths, there was a significantincrease in CA for nearly all categories of Christians, though it is greater insome categories than in others. Before drawing firm conclusions from theseresults, however, we must first determine whether they remain significant whenother variables are taken into account.

Multivariate AnalysisFor a more rigorous assessment of composition effects versus selective

intensification, we turn again to multivariate logistic regression. For thispurpose, we have combined the 1996 and 2004 surveys into a single sample

TABLE 3 Compositional Change and Selective Intensification, 1996 2004 (N 2,486)a

All Respondents All

years

1996 2004 D19962004 LR X2D

CA ( percent very important) 42.9 37.5 48.9 11.4 33.404***

Religious affiliation (percent)

Christian 79.9 81.1 78.5 22.6 2.664

Non-Christian 20.1 18.9 21.5 2.6

100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0

Evangelical Protestant 26.4 26.7 26.2 20.5 26.367***

Mainline Protestant 16.7 18.8 14.3 24.5

Black Protestant 7.8 8.7 6.8 21.9

Roman Catholic 25.8 24.9 26.9 2.0

Other Christian 3.1 2.0 4.3 2.3

Jewish/other faith 7.1 7.3 6.8 20.5

Nonaffiliated 13.0 11.6 14.7 3.1

100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0

CA by religious affiliation

(percent)

Christian 51.2 44.4 59.3 14.9 42.313***

Non-Christian 10.1 9.4 10.7 1.3 0.204

Evangelical Protestant 62.7 57.5 68.7 11.2 8.039**

Mainline Protestant 41.6 36.0 50.3 14.3 8.087**Black Protestant 73.0 68.5 79.5 11.0 2.883

Roman Catholic 39.4 30.2 49.0 18.8 23.120***

Other Christian 47.9 19.2 63.8 44.6 14.107***

Jewish/other faith 9.5 10.6 8.2 22.4 0.259

Nonaffiliated 10.0 8.1 11.9 3.8 1.211

Sample size (N) 2,486 1,311 1,175

aWeighted results. Note: Column and row totals reflect rounding error and sampleweighting.

***p, .001, **p, .01, *p, .05,

p, .10.



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and added a variable for GSS year to estimate the amount and direction ofchange in CA between surveys (table 4). The first model estimates the effectof survey year on our dependent variable. (We include sex, region, and race inthis model because their distribution is the same in both surveys.) The expo-

nentiated coefficient for survey year (1.712) in this model confirms thatthat the odds of a very important response were significantly higher, by about70 percent, in 2004 than in 1996.

Compositional change The next model adds main effects for the remainingindependent variables to see if distributional changes in these predictors as awhole help account for the rise in CA between survey years. As noted above,the modest decline in the ratio of Christians to non-Christians would beexpected to favor a slight decrease in the prevalence of CA over time (H5). Inaddition, two of our control variables that had strong negative effects in

table 2 seem likely to have changed in ways that would exert downwardpressure on the growth of CA. In particular, the appeal of CA was considerablyweaker among better-educated respondents (Regnerus and Smith 1998;Schwadel 2005) and respondents belonging to more recent birth cohorts(Edgell et al. 2006; Kunovich 2006). Over time, the rising level of educationalattainment and gradual replacement of older by younger cohorts should havetended to suppress the rate of increase in CA.5 On the other hand, we con-firmed (in table 2) that religious attendance, national attachment, and restric-tive immigration preferences all had significant positive effects on CA at the

beginning of our study. If these have been on the rise since then (H6), thenthey might help explain some of the increase in CA over time, perhaps evencompensating for suppressing influence of demographic trends. On inspectingthe results in Model 2, however, it appears that the impact of any positivetrends has been overshadowed by countervailing winds of compositionalchange. Here, the estimated effect of survey year (2.224) is even more positivethan in the previous model, once all the independent variables are included.This suggests that the rise in CA might have been even sharper if there hadbeen no changes in the predictor variables.6

Selective intensification Having confirmed that the observed rise in CA wasindeed significant, even though formidable demographic trends should have

5In the case of birth cohort, an alternative possibility is that the observed age differ-ences simply reflect naturally occurring variations over the life span (also known as life-cycle effects). If this is the case, then the trajectory of CA would be unaffected by cohortreplacement (cf., Alwin and McCammon 2003).

6Upon further analysis (not shown), we confirmed that religious attendance andnational attachment had increased significantly between surveys (and still had positive

effects on CA at the later time point), but that the rise in educational attachment and thegrowing proportion of younger to older cohorts were far more dramatic. CA was also signifi-cantly higher among Christians favoring large reductions in immigration; to our surprise,however, immigration preferences had actually grown more liberal over time. We addresssome of the possible causes and implications of this trend in the conclusion.



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TABLE 4 Logistic Regression of Christian American Beliefs (CA) on Survey Year, All Respondents (N

Model 1 Model 2

b sd(b) exp(b) b sd(b) exp(b)

Year: 2004 0.537 0.095 1.712*** 0.799 0.116 2.224***Christian 1.744 0.207 5.722***Attendance 0.704 0.062 2.021***Attachment 0.430 0.115 1.538***Immigration

Reduce some 0.073 0.134 1.076 Reduce a lot 0.479 0.137 1.614***

Education 20.367 0.060 0.693***Cohort (,1940)

1940 59 20.648 0.161 0.523***

!1960 21.095 0.162 0.335***Female 0.274 0.095 1.315** 0.184 0.110 1.201

South 0.743 0.100 2.103*** 0.471 0.116 1.769***Race (white)

Black 0.920 0.155 2.508*** 1.073 0.184 2.923***Other 20.900 0.218 0.406*** 20.543 0.249 0.581*

Christian Year Constant 21.016 0.093 0.362*** 22.791 0.279 0.061***22LL X2 2555.824 2032.524 DX2 184.895*** 523.300*** df 5 8

Nagelkerke R2

0.118 0.399

aFor model 1, DX2 is the difference in 22LL X2 compared to a null model (intercept only). Modeand 2, respectively.




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favored a net decline, we now wish to see whether selective intensification onthe part of the religious majority was sufficiently powerful to overcome theattenuating effects of compositional change. In the final model, we add a mul-tiplicative term for the interaction between religious affiliation (Christian/

non-Christian) and survey year. If selective intensification explains the overallincrease in CA over time, then the coefficient for the interaction term shouldbe significant and positive, while the main effect of survey year should be non-significant. On inspecting the results in the last column, we see that bothexpectations are confirmed. Net of compositional change, the increase in oddsof a very important response was 2.7 times greater for Christians than fornon-Christians. Because the coefficient for survey year is not significant,we can infer that there was no discernable net change in CA amongnon-Christians, corroborating our earlier inference that the existing gap

between Christians and non-Christians has grown even larger over time.

PATTERNS OF CHANGE WITHIN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY

As our findings up to this point make clear, the idea of a ChristianAmerica is an issue about which Christians and non-Christians remain deeplydivided, and all the more so in times of international and religious conflict.But how do these unsettling times affect previous differences within the

Christian community itself? Does the rising belief in a Christian Americapromote greater consensus around religious conceptions of national identity, ordoes it only widen existing divisions between various segments of the Christiancommunity? To answer these questions, we conclude our empirical analysis byexamining the patterns of change in CA among different groups of Christians.Although we know that CA was higher among Christians, on average, at theend of our period than at the beginning, Hypothesis 6a predicted that the rateof intensification should be significantly greater in those categories ofChristians where CA was already stronger. Thus, we expected that CA would

increase more among evangelicals and black Protestants than among mainlineProtestants and other Christian groups, as well as among Christians who attendservice frequently, display strong national attachment, and advocate greaterrestrictions on immigration.

As before, we use logistic regression to estimate the expected change inodds that Christianity is regarded as very important for being truly American,holding other factors constant. To see whether the change in odds differed sig-nificantly between categories of Christians, we add multiplicative terms repre-senting the interaction between survey year and the other independent

variables of interest. (For ease of interpretation, the independent variables withhypothesized interaction effects are coded as dichotomous.) To ensure thatpositive coefficients for each interaction term represent positive changes in thedependent variable over time, categories of each independent variable with the



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smallest observed increase in CA are used as reference categories. The resultsare presented in table 5.

Since we know that the only significant rise in CA took place amongChristian Americans, it is not surprising that the coefficient for survey year in

Model 1 is significantly positive. Overall, the observed odds of a very impor-tant response among Christians doubled in size between 1996 and 2004.Because it is still significant, and even more positive, when we add the otherindependent variables (Model 2), we can safely conclude that this result is notexplained by compositional change. More striking is that the main effect ofsurvey year is no longer significant when the interaction terms are included(Model 3). Thus, although there may have been a modest (28 percent)increase in odds for Christians as a whole, most of the net change in CA evi-dently occurred in those categories where the interactions with survey year are

significant.Consistent with our prediction, CA experienced fairly substantial growth in

the category of frequent churchgoers. While the net odds of a very importantresponse did not change significantly for less-than-weekly attendance, theyincreased by a factor of 2.7 if attendance is at least a weekly occurrence, almosttripling the previous gap in odds between frequent and less frequent attendees.In other cases, however, the patterns are more suggestive of upward convergence,or intensification from below. Among mainline Protestants, for example, thenet odds of a very important response were only 42 percent as great as for evan-

gelicals (and black Protestants) in 1996, but by 2004 the gap had all but disap-peared. For the Other Christian category, the rise in CA is exceptionallydramatic. At the end of our period, the estimated odds were more than fivetimes as great as at the beginning, and about 70 percent as great as for evangeli-cals (compared with an odds ratio of 13 percent in 1996).

Although these exceptions are inconsistent with our prediction of intensifi-cation at the top, we believe they are most likely related to compositionalchanges (H5) for which analysis was unable to control.7 In the case of main-line Protestants, we suspect that the much of relative increase in CA in this

shrinking category was due to attrition by the weakly committed into the cat-egory of religious nones (cf., Hout and Fischer 2002). Although limitationsof our data do not permit us to confirm this directly, it would mean that theremaining contingent of mainliners is increasingly composed of strong believersin a CA. If this is what occurred, then the finding would be a byproduct ofcompositional change, rather than genuine intensification from below.

Unlike that for mainline Protestants, the surge in CA among OtherChristians coincided with a twofold increase in the relative size of the category.

7An alternative possibility is that CA had already reached some practical upper limitin its usual denominational bastions, so that any further increase among Christians couldonly come from below. However, such a ceiling effect would not account for the excep-tional rise in CA in the category comprising the most frequent churchgoers.



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TABLE 5 Logistic Regression: Interactions with Survey Year, Christian Respondents (N1,614)a

Model 1 Model 2

b sd(b) exp(b) b sd(b) exp(b)

Survey year 0.714 0.104 2.041*** 0.900 0.121 2.460*** 0

Religion (Evangelical)

Mainline 20.568 0.161 0.567*** 20Black Protestant 20.054 0.336 0.947 20

Catholic 20.488 0.144 0.614*** 20

Other 20.832 0.313 0.435** 22Attendance: frequent 1.231 0.132 3.424*** 0

Attachment: weak 20.412 0.119 0.662*** 20

Immigration: liberal 20.331 0.126 0.718** 20

Education 20.288 0.061 0.750 20Cohort (,1940)

1940 59 20.734 0.169 0.480*** 20

!1960 21.180 0.172 0.307*** 21

Female 0.189 0.104 1.208 0.215 0.115 1.240 0South 0.731 0.110 2.076*** 0.543 0.125 1.721*** 0

Race (white)Black 0.810 0.172 2.249*** 0.895 0.282 2.447** 0

Other 20.640 0.239 0.527** 20.412 0.261 0.662 20Interactions:

Religion (Evangelical)

Mainline 0

Black Potestant 0Catholic 0

Other 1

Attendance: frequent 0

Attachment: weak 0Immigration: liberal 0

Constant 20.741 0.101 0.476*** 0.804 0.212 2.234*** 1

22LLX2

2110.320 1847.794 DX2 145.118*** 262.526*** df 5 10

Nagelkerke R2 0.114 0.295

aRespondents with a non-Christian affiliation or with no religious affiliation are omitted. For Modecompared to a null model (intercept only). Models 2 and 3 are compared to models 1 and 2, respectively.




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As it turns out, roughly 40 percent of this growth was made up by newcomersof foreign origin. In light of our theory, we would expect recent immigrants ofChristian faith to be especially attracted by the idea that being a Christianmakes one more truly American. Although limitations of sample size prevent

us from testing this inference, it would mean that the disproportionate rise inCA among Other Christians represents a special case of compositional change,rather than selective intensification. That is, even though the percentage ofChristians among recent immigrants is slightly lower than in the population(Pew Forum 2008:47), a disproportionate influx of foreign-born Christians intothe Other Christian category may have increased the proportion of memberswith strong CA beliefs.8

If these conjectures are borne out in future research, then our findings indi-cate that the growing prevalence of CA among Christians resulted primarily

from selective intensification among the most frequent churchgoers, regardlessof denominational affiliation and other characteristics. In other words, just ashighly committed Christians are more likely than others to embrace the idea ofa Christian America, they are also the most prone to find comfort in this beliefduring unsettling times. It also means that, within any given Christian denomi-nation, the most frequent churchgoers have drawn even further ahead of lessactive Christians in promoting religious conceptions of American identity.From the formers perspective, being a pious Christian may be increasinglyviewed as more American than mere nominal membership in a Christian

denomination.

CONCLUSION

Conceptions of national belonging inevitably fashion borders and bound-aries between people like us and others who do not fully belong (Edgellet al. 2006; Kunovich 2006; Lamont and Molnar 2002; Smith et al. 1998;Zimmer 2003). Just as some men and women, Caucasians and AfricanAmericans, or Christians and Jews will be thought more or less prototypical oftheir sex, race, or religion than others, the symbolic boundaries of nationalbelonging recognize shades and gradations of authenticity among those theydesignate as insiders with respect to the national community. Thus, while theacquisition of U.S. citizenship has traditionally sufficed to make an Italian,Indonesian, or Ivorian immigrant into an American by nationality, the ques-tion of who is more truly American also depends on how understandings of

8A large proportion of Roman Catholics are also immigrants (Pew Forum 2008:19),but the percentage was about the same in both of our samples, perhaps explaining whythere was no net increase in CA for this group over time. It may also explain why the oddsratios for Roman Catholics are similar to those for mainline Protestants, especially if thelatter are becoming more favorable toward CA due to selective attrition.



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national belonging are aligned with other dimensions of social membership,including the boundaries of religious faith.

Because symbolic boundaries can have practical consequencesaffectingsocial prestige or even political clout (Kunovich 2006; Lamont and Molnar

2002)it is perhaps only natural that the dominant groups in society wouldseek to align the boundaries of national belonging with membership in theirparticular communities. Thus, because America has always been a predomi-nantly Christian country, many American Christians no doubt feel justified inviewing their religion as characteristic of the true American. Among individ-ual Christians, the degree of alignment between religion and national identityalso tends to reflect the salience of both religious and national boundaries.Within the religious majority, belief in a Christian America (CA) grows sig-nificantly stronger with intensity of religious commitment and national

attachment.Substantial variation also exists between different segments of the

Christian community itself. For example, CA appears to be especially prevalentin evangelical denominations, perhaps because they tend to position their owndoctrines and practices as more orthodoxand more Americanthan thoseof other Christian traditions (Smith et al. 1998, 2000). In other instances, reli-gious definitions of national identity may function primarily as a strategy forcombating social and symbolic exclusion. Such a strategy might explain thespecial appeal of CA within the black Protestant community.

Whatever their meaning for religious insiders, however, any religiousunderstanding of American identity is likely to meet with skepticism, if notresentment, among those they symbolically marginalize. Understandably,non-Christian believers, as well as those with no religious affiliation, overwhel-mingly reject the notion that being truly American requires adherence to thedominant faith. Such opposition to a Christian America need not be construedas denying the objective importance of Christianity in American life. Morelikely, it represents a desire to downplay the symbolic significance of religion fordefining American identity, in favor of religious pluralism and tolerance for

diversityvalues that also have deep roots in U.S. history.Given the diminishing ratio of Christians to non-Christians in the United

States (Kosmin and Keysar 2009; Smith and Kim 2005), one might haveexpected the overall prevalence of CA beliefs to decline over time. Yet as wesaw, Americans were even more likely to espouse these beliefs after the turn ofthe century that they had been just a decade before. As of 1996, 38 percent ofour respondents regarded being a Christian as very important for being trulyAmerican; by 2004, the figure had risen to

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Sociology of Religion 2010 Straughn 280 306