Solving the Tenants’ Dilemma

– Collective Action and Norms of Co-operation in Housing

Bo Bengtsson

UPPSALA UNIVERSITY

Department of Government

&

Institute for Housing Research

P O Box 785

S–801 29 GÄVLE, Sweden

tel. +46 26 420 65 21

fax +46 26 420 65 01

email Bo.Bengtsson@ibf.uu.se

ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Copenhagen 14–19 April 2000

Workshop 21. Associational Engagement and Democracy in Cities

1

1

Abstract

According to Mancur Olson’s free-rider theorem, collective action will neither be

initiated, nor sustained, unless found profitable by every single individual taking part.

This 'n-person prisoners' dilemma' indicates that not the failures but the successful

cases of co-operation call for an explanation, and that was the theoretical starting-point

of a study of tenant involvement in Swedish housing estates. The local histories of 26

housing estates of different characteristics and forms of tenure were reconstructed in

order to trace the norms and other social mechanisms behind the sustenance and

institutionalisation of collective action.

In most of the estates where co-operation had been institutionalised the crucial

mechanism seems to have been the development of norms of local utilitarianism (‘I take

part if it is needed and I can contribute to the collective good’). Co-operation based on

this norm tends to be representative rather than direct, and the level of activity is

comparatively low and undemanding. In collective-housing units and other estates

where tenants take on a certain amount of collective work in the estate, more

contract-like norms of reciprocity (‘I take part if others take part’) sometimes had

developed. Such norms make for higher but more unstable levels of activity. Selective

economic incentives and tenants’ self-realisation both seem to be of less importance in

upholding co-operation in housing estates than is often claimed in the theoretical

discourse on collective action.

Institutionalisation of co-operation seems to be possible in all types of estates,

regardless of physical and social characteristics. The critical step is neither initiation,

nor institutionalisation, but to go from initiative to sustainability. In this consolidation

phase, an important role is played by norms of everyday Kantianism (’I take part

regardless of what others do’). In all phases local leisure activities and ‘estate days’,

information to tenants, etc., are important in developing and reproducing a local

identity and social norms of co-operation.

The paper also discusses to what extent the social norms and other mechanisms

effective in sustaining and institutionalising co-operation in housing could be of

relevance to collective action in other arenas.

Introduction – Why Should People Co-operate in Housing Estates?

Advocates of residents’ involvement in housing management are often disappointed.

The activities of real-life tenants are seldom up to their expectations, and the expected

positive effects of participation, such as improved neighbour relations, strengthened

social control and diminished costs of maintenance and repair, are seldom found to be

more than moderate at best.

In a rationalistic perspective, however, there is really no cause for disappointment. Quite

the opposite, we should be surprised that tenants care to co-operate at all. According to

Mancur Olson’s famous free-rider theorem, collective action will neither be initiated,

nor sustained by rational actors, unless found profitable by every single individual

taking part (Olson, 1971).

2

2

Collective action can be defined as the voluntary provision of collective goods. The

theoretical characteristics of such goods, that may be tangible or intangible, are ‘non-

excludability’ and ‘jointness of supply’. People must co-operate in order to produce

them, but those who refuse to take part cannot be excluded from consuming the fruits of

co-operation. Olson's free-rider theorem implies that the self-interest of rational

individuals may lead them to abstain from taking part in the provision of the collective

good, which may lead to outcomes that are collectively non-rational (Olson, 1971; cf.

Samuelson, 1982, Elster, 1989, p. 17).

According to Olson and his followers collective action may not take place even in

situations where universal co-operation would be profitable to all. The reason behind

this paradox is that the individual actor may find it even more profitable to take a free

ride at the expense of the others. If everybody would act accordingly, the result would

be no co-operation, no collective good – and no free rides either. Thus, if we are rational

egoists, collective incentives alone will not guarantee collective action. They must be

complemented with individual, 'selective', incentives.

The main problem with Olson’s theorem is its claim for universality. We all know that

collective action in housing, as well as in other arenas, does take place all the time and

everywhere. In housing this is all the more remarkable, since housing is generally

considered to be a mainly private good, which means that co-operation between

residents is seldom a vital necessity as it is in a family or in the workplace.

I have argued elsewhere (Bengtsson, 1998) that we cannot understand co-operation in

housing, if we do not take into account the specificities of the housing estate as an arena

for collective action. Furthermore, we must not make the mistake of lumping together

all types of tenants, all types of collective action and all types of housing estates.

Different people may have different motives for taking part in collective action in

housing. The conditions of co-operation may differ between collective consumption,

collective work and collective decision-making. And the physical and social

characteristics of a certain housing area may be more or less favourable to collective

action.

For all its empirical shortcomings the free-rider theorem has proved to be extremely

fruitful in formulating research questions – and this precisely due to its universality.

What Olson’s dilemma tells us is that not the failures but the successful cases of co-

operation call for an explanation. In each particular case we must be able to point at

some specific mechanism that has helped to solve the tenants' dilemma.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss some such mechanisms of collective action on

the basis of findings from an empirical study of tenants’ co-operation in a number of

Swedish housing estates.

3

3

Tenants’ Dilemma – From Free Riding to Assurance

As developed by Hardin (1982) the problem of collective action may be analysed as an

n-person variation of the well-known game prisoners' dilemma. This game is illustrated

in Figure 1 below.

neighbours

co-operate defect

co-operate 3, 3 1, 4

Tenant T

defect 4, 1 2, 2

Figure 1. Residents’ co-operation as n-person prisoners’ dilemma

The compulsory point of departure in rational-choice analysis is the calculus of the

individual actor. Let us assume that an individual tenant (let us call him ‘T’) in a certain

situation – e.g. a so-called ‘cleaning-up day’ in the estate – is faced with the choice

between contributing to the common good (‘co-operating’) or leaving it to his

neighbours to do the good work (‘defecting’). The outcome and T’s payoff are

determined both by T’s own strategy and by the strategies of his neighbours. (The

payoffs, on an ordinal scale, are indicated in the matrix, with T's payoff to the left and

neighbours’ to the right in each box; '4' is the highest payoff and '1' the lowest.)

In a prisoners’ dilemma situation T’s best outcome is when he defects while everybody

else co-operates (giving him a payoff of ‘4’). T’s second-best solution is where

everyone, including himself, co-operates (‘3’). This is better for T (as for everyone else)

than the case of mutual defection, where everyone stays at home (‘2’). Finally T’s worst

outcome is the ‘sucker case’, where he is the only one who co-operates (‘1’).

This preference order means that T’s best choice is to stay at home – regardless of how

his neighbours act. If they go out, fine. Then T gets his free ride. And if they choose to

stay at home, at least T will not be the sucker. And this does not only go for T but for all

other tenants with the same preference order. The tragedy of the prisoners’ dilemma is

that universal defection is the dominant outcome, regardless of the fact that universal

co-operation gives higher payoffs to all actors.

In game-theoretical terms a solution of an n-person prisoners' dilemma would mean

transforming it into an n-person game of assurance, where actors value taking part in

mutual co-operation higher than having a free ride on their neighbours’ expense. This

game is illustrated in Figure 2 below.

4

4

neighbours

co-operate defect

co-operate 4, 4 1, 3

Tenant T

defect 3, 1 2, 2

Figure 2. Residents’ co-operation as n-person game of assurance

Here the players prefer co-operation over free riding, and in time they would probably

find their way to the upper left, which is also a stable equilibrium. Once it has been

reached, neither T nor anyone else would have an incentive to change his strategy. In the

prisoners' dilemma, even if the players should somehow manage to reach the upper left

position, they would be permanently tempted to defect in order to get ‘4’ instead of ‘3’.

(See Bengtsson, 1998, pp. 101–104, for a more elaborate discussion on how tenant

involvement can be defined as games of prisoners’ dilemma, assurance, and ‘deadlock’

respectively.)

A Model of Collective Action in Housing Estates

The transformation from a prisoners’ dilemma to a game of assurance does not

necessarily mean a change in any objective sense. What is needed is rather a redefinition

of the situation, some sort of ‘social reconstruction’ (cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1967). At

least to some residents – enough to produce the collective good –

co-operation must be found preferable to defection.

In other words: for co-operation to be initiated and sustained there must exist some

mechanism that overrides the myopic egoism of at least some of the tenants. I will call

such mechanisms norms of co-operation. The role of such norms in the calculus of the

individual actor is illustrated in Figure 3 below.

In the model individual participation in collective action is described as a self-

reinforcing co-operative circle. The individual actor will not find his participation

(‘individual effort’) productive, unless he can see it as contributing to the common good

– which in this case can be broadly defined as the tenants’ collective influence on the

physical, economic, social, symbolic, etc. conditions of their housing estate (‘collective

influence’). The link between individual effort and collective influence are the resources

that the tenant intends to activate by taking part in co-operation (‘local resources’).

5

5

Figure 3. The co-operative circle on the individual level

Since the rational tenant would find his efforts futile if they would not contribute to the

common good, some expected results in terms of collective influence is a necessary

condition for individual participation. But, as we have seen, it is not a sufficient

condition. In a tenant-dilemma situation it would still be better for him to be a free rider

and let his neighbours provide the local resources. Hence, his choice to take part cannot

be understood solely as an act of rationality, but some social norm of co-operation

would also be needed to trigger his activity. The final arrow in the figure – completing

the co-operative circle – indicates that to be sustainable such a norm must be reinforced

from time to time by the tenant’s observation that his efforts have indeed contributed to

the common good and not been in vain.

Up till now I have discussed the general mechanism behind the individual’s decision to

take part. The next step is to transfer the model from the individual to the collective

level. The co-operative circle in aggregate form is illustrated by Figure 4 below.

On the individual level the relations depicted in the model were tautological in principle

– as long as the actor is rational in the weak sense of choosing what he prefers before

what he does not prefer (this is Elster’s notion of ‘thin rationality’; Elster, 1983, p. 1).

On the aggregate level, however, since different actors have different norms, different

preferences and different costs, the relations are not necessarily tautological. On this

level the co-operative circle may be seen as a set of hypotheses about non-deterministic

causal relations – though assigned a high prior probability by the general assumption of

rationality.

individual

effort

kollektivt

inflytande

collective

influence

local

resources

norm of

co-operation

6

6

Figure 4. The co-operative circle on the aggregate level

So far we have included possible differences between different tenants’ preferences and

capabilities in the model (via ‘norms of co-operation’ and ‘local resources’

respectively). We have also included possible differences between different types of

collective goods (via ‘collective influence’). However, the co-operative circle is not a

closed one. It remains to take into account the contextual variables of a certain housing

estate due to type of tenure and size of estate, socio-economic structure, etc. This is

done in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5. A model of collective action in housing estates

collective

action

kollektivt

inflytande

collective

action character of

estate

collective

influence

collective

influence

local

resources

local

resources

formal

rules

norms of

co-operation

norms of

co-operation

7

7

In the model ‘formal rules’ and ‘character of estate’ are seen as exogenous to the co-

operative circle. The institutional variables (‘formal rules’) are assumed to affect both

the conditions of collective action and the character of the common good (‘collective

influence’), whereas the structural variables (‘character of estate’ – including both

physical and social aspects) are assumed to have an influence on local resources and

norms of co-operation. This model was the theoretical point of departure of an empirical

study of collective action in Swedish housing estates that will be presented below.

An Empirical Study of Collective Action in Housing Estates

In modern theoretical research on collective action it is generally considered less

difficult to sustain co-operation, once it has been initiated, than to get it started in the

first place. Some theorists rely on the so-called tit-for-tat strategy to develop norms of

co-operation in iterated games of prisoners' dilemma. This strategy prescribes that player

A should co-operate as long as player B does, and that A should retaliate B's defection

with his own defection in the next game. In the long run, either due to actors' long-term

rationality or due to evolution – ‘the survival of the fittest strategy’ – tit-for-tat is

expected to solve the collective-action dilemma (cf. Axelrod, 1986, Bianco & Bates,

1990, Coleman, 1990b).

The development of norms of co-operation can be discussed in terms of

institutionalisation. In Scott’s definition ‘...institutions consist of cognitive, normative,

and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social

behavior’ (Scott, 1995, p. 33). Consequently institutionalisation may be seen as a

process leading to the development of such structures and activities that are included in

Scott’s definition.

The important thing about institutions is that they are created by actors, but that, once

created, they live on and have effects on social interaction independent of the original

creators. This means that institutions can make the production of the collective good

less dependent on the consistent efforts of a limited group of committed enthusiasts. An

important indication that collective action has in fact been institutionalised in a certain

housing estate would be if all previously active tenants moved out and co-operation

would still be sustained – by new activists.

Earlier empirical research indicates that the institutionalisation of collective action in

housing estates may well be a lengthy process that calls for historical and longitudinal

approaches. Projects of tenant involvement have seldom been followed by researchers

for longer periods than two or three years at the most, and it has often been concluded

that this is too short a period to make it possible to say something definite about social

and economic effects, let alone about the possibilities to sustain co-operation over time

(Uggla, 1993, pp. 40–41).

In order to make it possible to cover a longer period of time we picked out for our study

only such housing areas that had been objects of earlier case study research. In

institutional terms the 26 selected estates differed widely:

8

8

11 were traditional rental estates with tenant participation;

2 were so-called tenant management co-operatives where tenants had taken over

some responsibility for the management of the estate (cf. Svensson, 1993, pp. 14–

19);

5 were so-called collective-housing units, characterised by a high degree of common

services, collectively organised by the tenants themselves (cf. Vestbro, 1992);

5 were traditional housing co-operatives with the specific Swedish co-operative

tenure of tenant-ownership (cf. Svensson, 1993, pp. 6–8);

1 was a so-called ecological village, also organised as a tenant-owner co-operative;

2 were organised as common facilities associations (cf. Svensson, 1993, pp. 20–21),

one based on owner-occupation and the other with mixed tenures: owner-occupation,

tenant-ownership and rentals.

There were also important differences between the estates in terms of location, size,

physical structure, socio-economic character, etc.

The purpose of the study was twofold. First, we examined to what extent and in what

circumstances co-operation in the housing estates had been instutionalized. In that

context we also looked closer at the circumstances when tenants’ collective action in a

certain estate had gone through a crisis or even broken down. Second, we examined

whether the local patterns of collective action would give any clue as to the character of

the social norms or other mechanisms that made co-operation sustainable and the

institutionalisation of collective action possible.

The co-operative histories of the 26 estates were reconstructed in order to trace the

mechanisms behind the rise and possible fall of collective action. In a second step we

concentrated on 8 of the areas, where collective action apparently had been

institutionalised, at least to some extent, and the process behind of this

institutionalisation was traced in more detail.

Results of the Empirical Study – Outline

The following presentation of the results from the study is based on Bengtsson,

Svensson & Eagle (2000) which is a full account of the study – in Swedish. The outline

of the presentation below is as follows:

First I will discuss to what extent collective action in the estates has proved to be

sustainable and to what extent it has been institutionalised.

Second, I will discuss the character of the collective action and the collective good

respectively.

Third, I will discuss what types of social norms of co-operation have been effective in

sustaining and institutionalising co-operation.

Fourth, the focus will be changed from the elements of the co-operative circle to the

exogenous variables when I discuss the importance of tenure and other formal rules in

sustaining collective action.

9

9

Fifth, I will go on to the other exogenous set of variables and discuss what impact the

physical and social character of the housing area may have on co-operation between

tenants.

Finally, I will discuss whether other factors than social norms of co-operation may

explain the sustainability and institutionalisation of social norms. In particular attention

is given to Olson’s concept of selective incentives and to the idea that collective action

may give rewards in the form of self-realisation.

The Crucial Phase of Consolidation

Judging from our study, it is possible to uphold collective action in most types of

housing areas – once it has been established. In 21 of the 26 estates we could trace a

continuity in the local co-operation from the day of the earlier studies (which varied

from the mid-seventies to the early nineties) up to the period of our study (1995–97).

Moreover, in three of the remaining five estates – where collective action had been

interrupted – this was due to some major and externally initiated change such as sale of

the estate, conversion of tenure or physical reconstruction. On the other hand, there were

also examples where local collective action had survived even in the face of such major

changes in overall conditions.

These findings are somewhat in contrast to the generally acknowledged difficulty to

establish common activities in housing areas without prior traditions of collective

action. There seems to be at least some truth in the thesis that the main problem is not to

sustain co-operation but to get it started in the first place.

However, the rational-choice distinction between initiating and sustaining co-operation

may well be too simplistic. The 26 estates were chosen from a larger group of 45

housing areas, where earlier case studies on tenant activities had been carried out by

other researchers. In most of the 19 estates that were left out from our study, outside

initiatives of tenant participation had not lead to any lasting activities among residents.

This indicates that the difficulty may indeed be neither to initiate co-operation, nor to

sustain it over a long time once it has been established. Instead the critical phase may be

one of consolidation, when co-operation ad hoc on some specific issue, is developing

into more recurrent common activities, but when social norms of co-operation are not

yet shared by a substantial number of tenants. Our findings indicate that this may be the

stage when local collective action is most vulnerable.

It is probably also at this stage of consolidation that co-operation is most dependent on

local fiery spirits, people prepared to take on the responsibility to arouse enthusiasm in

their neighbours and – if that does not succeed – even to run ‘common’ activities

virtually on their own (cf. Bianco & Bates, 1990, who emphasise the importance of

leaders in achieving and enforcing collective action). What awards more precisely that

make fiery spirits themselves move will be discussed below.

10

10

Institutionalisation and Local Identity

To what extent can the observed continuity of the local co-operation be seen as an

expression of institutionalisation? Or, referring to Scott’s definition: Have structures

developed that provide stability and meaning to collective action? There are some signs

of this, even though we were not in a position to make use of the acid test of moving all

previously active tenants away from an estate.

First, there were only a few estates where the local activity seemed to be depending on

one or two fiery spirits. Even though the core group sometimes was quite small, there

were almost always a larger group of tenants around this group that took active part as

members of the local board or in more informal functions.

Second, in most estates we could observe a continuos turnover of active people, most

obvious in the composition of the local board. And this was also true of the leading post

as chairman. Thus, even the fiery spirits seem to be replaceable, which also indicates a

degree of institutionalisation. This does not mean that the whole group of activists could

be replaced at the same time. Rather, in most estates there was some balance between

stability and renewal, similar to what has been observed in earlier studies of

tenant-ownership co-operatives (Bengtsson & Svensson, 1995, pp. 80–81, 104–105).

Third, large efforts were invested in finding replacements for activists who for some

reason wished to withdraw. This was not only done in the form of active ‘head-hunting’,

but also in a more long-term perspective by arranging activities that would serve to

create and reproduce local competence and communal spirit among the tenants.

Examples of such arrangements were organised information to tenants, local study

courses, leisure-time activities, and different types of estate festivities. The recurrent

cleaning-up days may also be seen in this perspective – they were seldom regarded as

work only. Such reproducing activities were more frequent in estates with sustainable

co-operation, and the level of participation was often higher than at formal meetings.

The reproducing activities are good examples of the self-enforcing mechanism

illustrated by the co-operative circle. Such arrangements are in themselves expressions

of institutionalisation, while at the same enforcing further institutionalisation.

Finally, in several estates it had been possible to reconstruct co-operation after internal

or external crises, e.g. when former activists had quit in protest. This observation

indicates that it may be easier to revive collective action where it has once been

established and later interrupted, than to initiate co-operation in estates where it has no

previous history. This importance of local traditions should also be taken as evidence of

institutionalisation.

The Character of Co-operation – Collective Action and Collective Influence

In most of our estates, even where co-operation showed all signs of institutionalisation,

the level of activity was moderate – sometimes outright low – both in number of

participants and in intensity. The weak engagement was most evident at formal

meetings, in particular in traditional rental estates. Even in co-operative

11

11

tenant-ownership estates with their democratic formal organisation, however, in general

only a minority of the members regularly show up at meetings (cf. Bengtsson &

Svensson, 1995, pp. 62–64).

Participation was generally higher on cleaning-up days and in other forms of collective

work than in formal decision-making. Furthermore the annual festivities that are

arranged in many of our estates often attracted many participants, and they seem to play

an important part in defining an estate as an arena of collective action.

The main exception to the moderate participation were the collective-housing units and

the ecological village, where participation in collective work and decision-making is

part of the local ideology and almost regarded as a contractual stipulation.

In most estates collective decision-making was indirect and representative rather than

direct, even though both tenant-owner co-operatives and collective-housing units have

an ideology of direct democracy. The great exception was the small ecological village

where all 16 households took direct part in important decisions. In this case, however,

the ideology of direct democracy combined with the small scale give almost unique

conditions for such procedures, and to use it as a benchmark for more traditional

housing areas would certainly be asking too much.

Despite the indirect forms of decision-making the legitimacy of the locally elected

boards of tenants seldom seemed to be questioned – which is another sign of

institutionalisation. They had considerable legitimacy in making decisions concerning

housing conditions, and in general they were also trusted to make decisions about

collective work in the estate – though not to order their neighbours to take part in such

work.

Though we have not examined the social representativeness of the boards in any detail,

there were be some problems here. The most obvious shortcoming was the low number

of immigrants among activists even in estates with a high percentage of immigrant

inhabitants. Sometimes complaints were also heard about the difficulty to get young

households to participate in common activities. In traditional rental estates and in

collective-housing units the balance between men and women among the activists was

even, but in the boards of traditional housing co-operatives there was often a male

dominance, which has also been observed in earlier studies (Bengtsson & Svensson,

1995, pp. 112–114).

The collective good produced through tenants’ co-operation differed between areas and

over time. The mixture between collective consumption, collective decision-making and

collective work varied widely due to local circumstances. Both in rental and

co-operative estates the collective influence was often produced by representing the

local community of tenants in consultations, negotiations and conflicts with landlords,

municipalities and other external parties. Not seldom an initiative was enough for

residents to have things their way. In other cases, however there was a genuine conflict

of interest, and in some estates drawn-out and infected controversies processes had left a

negativistic mark on local co-operation in general. Hence, in rental estates where tenants

seldom have any formal decision power, the landlord’s attitude is crucial for the

development of local collective action.

12

12

Reciprocity, Everyday Kantianism, and Local Utilitarianism – Three Ideal-Type

Social Norms of Co-operation

In the rationalistic model presented above collective action would neither be initiated,

sustained nor institutionalised unless residents are moved by some social norm of

co-operation. So the research question is not whether such norms are present when

tenants co-operate, but rather what is more precisely the character of those norms.

In his discussion of how social norms may interact with self-interest in creating

collective action Elster defines social norms as motives that are not outcome-oriented –

in contrast to rationality. Further, while rationality is always future-oriented, the past

plays an essential role in the operation of norms (Elster, 1989, pp. 46–47, 98–99).

Elster presents three ideal-type social norms of co-operation, which he calls (1) the

‘norm of fairness’, (2) ‘everyday Kantianism’ and (3) ‘utilitarianism’. Elster’s ‘norm of

fairness’ is actually a norm of reciprocity, and I will use that term in the following

discussion. It tells a person to co-operate if, and only if, a substantial number of others

co-operate. A norm of everyday Kantianism tells a person to co-operate if and only if

universal co-operation is better for everyone than universal defection – regardless of

whether others in fact co-operate or not. The norm of utilitarianism finally tells a person

to co-operate if and only if his taking part would make a positive contribution to the

collective utility – regardless of his personal costs and benefits (Elster 1989, pp. 48–49,

187, 192). Since in a housing estate this collective utility calculus would include the

neighbours I will refer to this type of norm as local utilitarianism.

The norm of everyday Kantianism says: 'If I don't co-operate, why should anyone else?'

while the norm of reciprocity says: 'If others co-operate, why shouldn't I?'. Finally the

prescription from the norm of local utilitarianism reads: ‘I take part if it is needed and if

I can contribute to the collective good in my estate’. Of course other norms of

co-operation are also possible, including combinations of the three discussed.

Institutionalisation and the Norm of Local Utilitarianism

In the study we could identify a certain number of fiery spirits who seemed to be

engaged in the welfare of their estate regardless of what others did. They certainly

appeared to be driven by a norm of everyday Kantianism (though they may also be

chasing selective incentives of some sort, cf. below). However, the fiery spirits were

much too few in number for this norm to explain the sustainability and

institutionalisation that had taken place in our estates. Probably, fiery spirits – and

everyday Kantianism – are more important in initiating and consolidating collective

action than in its institutionalisation.

In general the norm of reciprocity does not fit very well with our observations either. If

this norm was commonly accepted by tenants in an estate, co-operation would be much

more unstable than it was found to be. The dynamics of reciprocity is of a tit-for-tat

character, implying that if some people take part others will join in and, inversely, if

13

13

some back out others will also withdraw. Such a pattern was rarely observed in our

estates, which indicates that the norm of reciprocity is less strong in this context than

could be expected from its prominence in the theoretical discourse on collective action.

In general taking part in collective action did not seem to be regarded as an absolute

duty – neither unconditionally as in everyday Kantianism, nor conditioned by the actions

of one’s neighbours as in the norm of reciprocity. Nevertheless co-operation did seem to

be regarded as some sort of duty, at least by some tenants at some points of time – but

by different tenants at different points of time. A considerable number of tenants chose

not to take a free ride throughout, as a consequent rational egoist would, but to make

their contribution when it is needed – and the ‘need’ in practice appeared to be defined

as when other activists ask you to join in. At that point the decision seemed to be based

on estimates of one’s individual restraints in time and capacity rather than on calculi of

one’s individual costs and benefits.

The norm of local utilitarianism fits rather well with these empirical observations. There

is much to indicate that this norm has been the central mechanism behind the

institutionalisation of collective action in our estates. More precisely a norm of

co-operation based on local utilitarianism would incorporate three conditions:

1. Collective action must be judged to give positive results, i.e. the collective benefits

must exceed the collective costs (in game-theoretical terms it must be a prisoners’

dilemma and not a ‘deadlock’, cf. Bengtsson, 1998). This is judged by the individual

himself.

2. The number of activists must at a certain point be insufficient without the

individual’s (or someone else’s) contribution. This is in practice judged by others.

3. The individual must have the time and capacity to make a contribution. This is

judged by the individual himself – perhaps in dialogue with current or former

activists who know what the job would demand.

In a housing area where several tenants share the norm of local utilitarianism, collective

action will show a combination of continuity and renewal. The general level of activity

will be stable but low, but co-operation will not break down entirely – except perhaps

from external disturbance. This pattern coincides well with the observed development in

most of our estates.

The reproducing activities discussed above seem to be of importance both in

establishing a common identity in a housing estate – thus defining what is ’local’ in

local utilitarianism – and in developing social norms of co-operation based on local

utilitarianism.

Though the norm of local utilitarianism seems to be the basis of co-operation in most of

our estates, the small ecological village and some of the collective-housing units

exhibited a somewhat deviant pattern of co-operation – a pattern that fits better with the

norm of reciprocity. In such estates there are often strong elements of selection and

self-selection of people moving in, combined with procedures of introduction aimed at

making tenants see participation in common work as an integrated part of their

14

14

residence. Here the responsibility to take part in common activities was often seen more

or less as part of a social contract between tenants.

As mentioned the norm of reciprocity makes for higher but more unstable levels of

activity. Probably the recruitment procedures also result in a relatively high percentage

of everyday Kantians in such estates. The stronger engagement in the forms and

contents of collective action also means that controversies over such issues seem to be

more frequent than in more traditional housing areas.

Tenure and Formal Rules

The model in Figure 5 includes two sets of exogenous variables, ‘formal rules’ and

‘character of estate’. In housing probably the most important institutions are the tenure

forms or, in Ruonavaara's (1993, p. 1) wording, ‘the historically and geographically

specific forms through which possession of housing is organised’. Of course, those

institutional arrangements are important also in defining the rules of the local games of

collective action.

It would seem that tenant-ownership, the specific co-operative tenure in Sweden, offers

stronger incentives for collective action than both owner-occupation and the rental

tenure. A tenant-ownership estate is owned jointly by its tenants, and it is prescribed by

law that all important decisions concerning the management should be taken either at a

general meeting or by an elected board of tenants. Thus, the law defines a minimum

level of democratic co-operation (cf. Bengtsson, 1992, 1993 for details).

As could be expected, the importance of such externally defined rules could be seen

most clearly in the co-operative estates of our study. Though engagement among tenants

had been low from time to time in those estates, it had always been possible to uphold

some minimum level of collective decision-making. Even when the level of activity is

fading in a housing co-operative, the legal regulations about annual reports, general

meetings and election of a board of tenant-owners bring pressure to bear on members to

keep at least some co-operation going. The democratic autonomy laid down in

co-operative rules may also serve as an ideological foundation, on which social norms

of collective action on the estate level can be built.

The Physical and Socio-economic Character of the Estate

We have not found any simple and clear-cut relations between the physical character of

the estates and the development of sustained or institutionalised co-operation. As we

know from earlier research, the share of households going to formal meetings is

considerably higher in small estates (cf. Bengtsson & Svensson, 1995, pp. 86–90). This

pattern may in itself be an expression of local utilitarianism, since in a small estate such

meetings could not fulfil its formal function with a low attendance, whereas in a large

estate a small percentage of attending tenants is enough for that. Small size makes

co-operation more vulnerable in other aspects as well, and in some of our small estates it

has sometimes been be difficult to strike a beneficial balance between continuity and

renewal among activists.

15

15

In Swedish housing co-operatives – broadly speaking – middle-class, middle-aged,

Swedish-born family men tend to take part in common activities in housing areas more

than lower-class, elderly or young, immigrant, single women (cf. Bengtsson &

Svensson, 1995, pp. 112–120). Some social factors that are often considered to be

conducive to the development of mutual trust, and hence to favour collective action, are

social and cultural homogeneity and group stability (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 88–89).

If we see institutionalisation of collective action as the dependent variable and formal

and structural conditions as independent variables, we would expect the probability of

institutionalisation to be higher in co-operative than in rental estates, higher in small

estates than in large ones, higher in estates with high socio-economic status than in

low-status areas, higher in culturally homogeneous estates than in heterogeneous ones,

and higher in estates with special procedures of recruitment than in others. Table 1

below gives estimations of how eight estates that were picked out for more intensive

case studies would score on those five independent variables.

Table 1. Social, physical and institutional prerequisites of collective action in

eight housing estates (‘++’ = good; ‘+’ = fair; ‘–’ = poor)

tenure size socio-economy culture recruitment

S. Biskopsgården – – – – –

traditional rental

Nödinge – – – – –

traditional rental

Nybodaberg – – – – –

traditional rental

Stolplyckan – + ++ ++ ++

rental collective

Fristad – + ++ ++ ++

rental collective

Tuggelite ++ ++ ++ ++ ++

ecological co-op

Kryddgården ++ – – – +

traditional co-op

Lupinen + + + + +

mixed tenures

In the eight areas picked out for intensive case studies our preliminary studies had

indicated that some institutionalisation of co-operation had probably taken place. The

table shows clearly that the institutional and structural prerequisites in several of the

estates were far from perfect. Quite the opposite, the three traditional rental estates not

only had a tenure that would not be expected to favour collective action. They were also

large (500–900 dwellings) and had a low-status population with a high percentage of

16

16

immigrants. Finally the recruitment of new tenants included neither selective nor

introductory elements to support collective action.

Judging from these observations it seems possible both to sustain and to institutionalise

co-operation among tenants in most type of housing estates. Neither socio-economic

status, nor social homogeneity and stability, nor organisational arrangements aimed at

supporting co-operation have been crucial in bringing about institutionalisation.

To some extent this may be explained by the indirect forms of collective action and the

moderate level of activity that characterise most of our estates. This means that far from

all tenants in an estate need not to embrace social norms of co-operation for

institutionalisation to take place. This explains why in some of our housing areas with a

high percentage of immigrants (up to 40 per cent), co-operation had been

institutionalised without immigrants taking active part more than marginally.

Selective Incentives and Self-Realisation – Alternative Explanations?

So far the observed sustainability of collective action in our case-study estates has been

discussed in terms of institutionalisation and social norms, in particular norms of local

utilitarianism. Alternative explanations of co-operation discussed in the theoretical

literature are selective incentives and self-realisation. (Another factor often emphasised

in the theoretical literature is trust; cf. Coleman, 1990a, pp. 177–180, Hardin, 1992, pp.

505–507, Putnam, 1993, p. 167. These authors’ accounts of trust are, however, easily

translated into norms and institutionalisation.) Our results, however, indicate that neither

selective incentives, nor self-realisation plays an important role in upholding co-

operation in housing estates.

Olson himself points to selective incentives as a possible solution to the

collective-action dilemma. By selective incentives he means that it is possible for a

group of agents to make others co-operate by promises of rewards or threats of

punishment (Olson, 1971, pp. 33–34, 51). Of course, selective incentives are not

necessarily monetary. Power, social reputation, love, friendship, personal satisfaction –

and the risk of their opposites – may be just as strong motives as economic gains.

In general individual economic selective incentives seem to be marginal at the most in

tenant participation and other forms of local collective action in housing. Fees to board

members and other activists are small or non-existing in housing co-operatives and local

tenants associations. Moreover, if individual incentives – economic or non-economic –

were in fact important, one would expect either some competition for posts, or – if only

some of the members are incentive-sensitive – a slower turnover among activists.

In fact economic incentives did support co-operation in some of our estates, but those

incentives were universal rather than selective, e.g. when energy costs went down or the

need for maintenance and repair decreased as an effect of tenants’ activity. Of course,

the observation that tenants were motivated by such collective incentives is entirely

consistent with an interpretation in terms of local utilitarianism.

17

17

The prospect of self-realisation may also serve as a selective incentive. This would,

however, be a procedural incentive, where not the collective good, but the co-operative

process per se is found rewarding by participants. Self-realisation is the basic value

behind the communitarian ideas of collective action in housing and on other local

arenas. (Elster makes a distinction between two different types of self-releasers; ‘elite

participationists’ who get their kicks from belonging to the vanguard, and ‘mass

participationists’ who enjoy being part of a large movement; Elster, 1989, pp. 203–204).

Elster has also suggested that the difference between consumption and self-realisation

should be defined in terms of saturation. In economic theory consumption has

diminishing marginal utility, meaning that every extra unit of consumption adds less and

less to a person's well-being. Activities that give self-realisation have the opposite

pattern; the more a person indulges in them (provided, of course they are suited to his

preferences and resources), the more satisfaction he gets on the margin (Elster, 1986).

According to communitarian ideas, self-realisation may be reached through collective

decision-making (‘participatory democracy’), through deepened social relations

(‘community’) or through work for a common cause (‘unexploited labour’), though

probably not through collective consumption only (cf. Bengtsson, 1998, pp. 112–114).

All those types of rewarding activities may in fact take place in housing estates, but in

general only marginally. In most estates the core of the co-operation consisted of

collective decision-making – but in indirect and representative forms rather than

participatory. Collective work was also done in many estates, mostly in the tenant-owner

co-operatives and the collective-housing units. Judging from the considerable efforts

invested in making residents take part, however, this work did not have the increasing

marginal utility that Elster assigns to self-realising activities. In general the mechanism

bringing about collective work seemed to be social norms of utilitarianism and

reciprocity and not the pursuit of self-realisation.

Finally, some collective consumption also took place, in particular in estates where

co-operation had been going on for a long time. As mentioned, participation was often

higher in festivities and other leisure arrangements than in collective work or

decision-making. Even if we accept Elster’s view of consumption as the opposite of

self-realisation, collective consumption could still give self-realisation to some

participants, e.g. the organisers of the festivities – who were in fact doing collective

work.

The time pattern of collective action in our estates would, however, indicate that its

contribution to self-realisation was moderate at best. In general the level of activity was

moderate and indirect and there were often signs of saturation – decreasing marginal

return – among activists, which is also verified by the high rates of turnover. If

self-realisation had been a prime mover of co-operation, activities should be expected to

intensify over time. In all our estates, however, collective action had been stable or even

somewhat stagnant – in one or two cases even drastically decreasing.

18

18

Concluding Discussion

In most of our estates where collective action had been institutionalised, to all

appearances the crucial mechanism was the development of local utilitarianism. In the

collective-housing units and the ecological village more contract-like norms of

reciprocity also seem to have played an important role. Everyday Kantians are few in

number in the local housing arena, and this norm is probably more crucial in initiating

and consolidating co-operation than in its institutionalisation. Selective economic

incentives, and the prospect of self-realisation, are both of less importance in sustaining

collective action in housing estates than could be expected from the theoretical

discourse.

Can these findings from the local arena of the housing estate be generalised to other

arenas of collective action? Are norms of utilitarianism the ‘cement of society’ that

Elster and other rational-choice theories are chasing? Even though the reader may find it

daring to discuss this fundamental question on the basis of some case studies in housing

estates, I will end the paper with some reflections on this.

Unfortunately, I feel obliged to take a rather modest stand on the possibilities to

generalise our results to other sectors of life – considering the ‘universal peculiarities’ of

the housing estate as an arena for collective action. Three important such characteristics

are the spatial concentration that makes potential co-operators meet regularly and

spontaneously, the moderate group size, normally small enough for tenants to know

each other by sight, and the long-run character of neighbourhood relations, where the

'exit' alternative of moving to another area is often expensive, due to transaction costs

and 'attachment costs' (cf. Dynarski, 1986, Bengtsson, 1995, pp. 127–129). These three

prerequisites should generally make it easy to initiate co-operation.

On the other hand, as mentioned in the introduction, collective action in housing is

seldom an absolute necessity the way it is in a family or a workplace. A housing estate

may be adequately run and its dwellings tolerably well maintained without tenants

taking active part. In the long run, of course, local co-operation may give some social

benefits, such as improved personal security in the neighbourhood and an increased

sense of belonging within a local community, but even those benefits could probably be

supplied also by other means. This may be one reason why the social structure in a

housing area often consists of ‘weak ties’ (Schiefloe, 1990; cf. Granovetter, 1973). And

this may be the explanation why we found consolidation to be a more critical phase than

both initiation and institutionalisation

Together these peculiarities would seem to make the housing estate a fertile breeding

ground for an institutionalisation of co-operation based precisely on the rather ‘cool’

norm of local utilitarianism. Probably other mechanisms – selective incentives,

self-realisation, everyday Kantianism and norms of reciprocity – are relatively more

important in sustaining co-operation in ‘hotter’ fields such as politics, labour and the

private sphere.

19

19

References

Axelrod, R. (1986) ‘An evolutionary approach to norms’, American Political Science Review 80, pp.

1095–1111.

Bengtsson, B. (1992) ‘Not the middle way but both ways – cooperative housing in Sweden’, in: L. J.

Lundqvist (Ed.) Policy, Organization, Tenure – A Comparative History of Housing in Small Welfare

States (Oslo & Stockholm: Scandinavian University Press).

Bengtsson, B. (1993) Prosperous Ambivalence – Housing Cooperatives in Sweden (Gävle: National

Swedish Institute for Building Research).

Bengtsson, B. (1995) ‘Housing in game-theoretical perspective’, Housing Studies 9, pp. 229–243.

Bengtsson, B. (1998) ‘Tenants’ dilemma – on collective action in housing’, Housing Studies 13, pp. 99–

120.

Bengtsson, B. & Svensson, K. A. S. (1995) Demokrati och ekonomi i bostadsrätt (Democracy and

Economy in Tenant-owner Cooperatives) (Gävle: Meyers).

Bengtsson, B., Svensson, K. A. S. & Uggla, C. (2000) ‘Hyresgästens dilemma – om hållbart samarbete i

bostadsområden’ (Tenants’ dilemma – on sustainable co-operation in housing estates) (Gävle: Meyers,

forthcoming).

Berger, P .L. & Luckmann, T. (1967) The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City: Anchor).

Bianco, W .T. & Bates, R. H. (1990) Cooperation by design: leadership, structure and collective

dilemmas, American Political Science Review 84, pp. 133–147.

Coleman, J. S. (1990a) Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Belknap Press of

Harvard University Press).

Coleman, J. S. (1990b) Norm-generating structures, in: K. S. Cook & M. Levi (Eds.) The Limits of

Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 250–273).

Dynarski, M. (1986) ‘Residential attachment and housing demand’, Urban Studies 23, pp. 11–20.

Elster, J. (1983) Sour Grapes. Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press).

Elster, J. (1986) ‘Self-realisation in work and politics’, Social Philosophy and Policy 3, pp. 97–126.

Elster, J. (1989) The Cement of Society. A Study of Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press).

Granovetter, M. S. (1973) ‘The strength of weak ties’ American Journal of Sociology 78, pp. 1360–1380.

Hardin, R. (1982) Collective Action (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press).

Hardin, R. (1992) ‘The street-level epistemology of trust’, Politics and Society 21, pp. 505–529.

Olson, M. ([1965] 1971) The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups

(Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).

Ostrom, E. (1991) Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Putnam, R. D. (1993) Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton

University Press).

20

20

Ruonavaara, H. (1993) ‘Types and forms of housing tenure: towards solving the comparison/translation

problem’, Scandinavian Housing and Planning Research 10, pp. 3–20.

Samuelson, P. ([1954] 1982 ‘The pure theory of public expenditure’, in B. Barry & R. Hardin (Eds.)

Rational Man and Irrational Society? (Beverly Hills: SAGE).

Schiefloe, P. M. (1990) ‘Networks in urban neighbourhoods: lost, saved or liberated communities?’

Scandinavian Housing and Planning Research 7, pp. 93–103.

Scott, W. R. (1995) Institutions and Organizations (Thousand Oaks, London & New Delhi: SAGE).

Svensson, K. A. S. (1993) Co-operative Housing in Sweden – A Building with Many Façades

(Stockholm: Co-operative Institute).

Uggla, C. (1993) Forskning om boendeinflytande – en litteraturöversikt (Swedish Research on Tenants

Participation) (Gävle: National Swedish Institute for Building Research).

Vestbro, D. U. (1992) From central kitchen to community cooperation: development of collective housing

in Sweden, Open House International 17, pp. 30–38.