Somalia NSSP

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SOMALIA TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

FINAL DRAFT

NATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILIZATION PLAN

(NSSP)

2011 to 2014

18 OCTOBER 2011


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TABLE OF CONTENT

Abbreviations/Acronyms ... i

Foreword ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................... 3

1 INTRODUCTION

Defining the purpose of the NSSP 5

Strategic Environment Analysis .. 6

Threats and Risks Analysis . 8

Important gaps and challenges to the Somalia security and justice

Sectors . 9

2 National Security Vision. 11

3 Strategic Objectives of the NSSP.. 11

4. Guiding Principles to support the realization of the Vision through the

NSSP. 15

5 Priority Actions and Interventions 20

6. Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms

Implementation and Management Frameworks 20Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms .. 23

7 Funding and Resource Mobilization Mechanism . 23

8 Risks and Critical Assumptions 24

ANNEXES


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Abbreviations/Acronyms

AMISOM. ..................................................................... African Union Mission in SomaliaASWJ .......................................................................................... Ahlu Sunna Wal JamaaAU ................................................................................................................. African UnionAVR. ........................................................................................ Armed Violence ReductionCONOPS. ........................................................................................... concept of operations

CSOs. ....................................................................................... Civil Society OrganizationsDDR. ...................................................... Disarmament, Demobilization and ReintegrationEASFCOM. ..................................................................................... East African CommandEU. ............................................................................................................. European UnionIC. ................................................................................................. International CommunityICG. ......................................................................................... International Contact GroupIHL. ................................................................................... International Humanitarian LawJNA. ............................................................................................... Joint Needs AssessmentJSC. ............................................................................................. Joint Security CommitteeLAS. .................................................................................................. League of Arab StatesNSA. ............................................................................................ National Security AgencyNSC. ............................................................................................ National Security CouncilNSF. ............................................................................................... National Security ForceNSSP. ..................................................... Somalia National Security and Stabilization PlanPPP. ............................................................................................... purchasing power parity

SNF. ................................................................................. Somalia National Security ForceSOPs. ............................................................................... Standard Operational ProceduresSPF. .................................................................................................... Somalia Police ForceSSA. ......................................................................................... Security Sector AssessmentSSD. ...................................................................................... Security Sector DevelopmentSSI. ............................................................................................. Security Sector InstitutionSSR. ................................................................................................ Security Sector RefromTFG. ................................................................................ Transitional Federal Government

TFP. .................................................................................... Transitional Federal ParliamentTWG. ......................................................................................... Technical Working GroupUK. ............................................................................................................ United KingdomUNPOS United Nations Political Office for SomaliaUNSCR. ......................................................... United Nations Security Council ResolutionUSA. ............................................................................................. United States of America


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FOREWORD

Since elected in January 2009 as President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) ofSomalia, my governments primary focus has been to end the internal armed conflict that hasengulfed my beloved country for over two decades. A conflict that has been characterised bydifferent threats and risk factors such as Al-shabaab linked to international terrorists networks,proliferation of arms and ammunition, including landmines, transnational economic crime, andpiracy. Indeed, years of prolonged war in Somalia has caused the loss of many lives,humanitarian disaster, and displacement of over millions of Somalis now settled in various partsof the world either as displaced persons or refugees. My government currently has limitedresources (human, financial and institutional) to reinforce the national security institutions in

order for them to effectively tackle threats outlined above. Therefore, rebuilding of our nascentnational security sector institutions, particularly the Somalia National Force (NSF), the NationalSecurity Agency (NSA) and the Somalia Police Force (SPF) remain critical tasks for mygovernment. The good is to make them more responsive and in better compliance withinternational humanitarian law (IHL) and respect for human rights, as they work to defend andsecure the state and its citizenry. This will create the enabling environment for protection ofcivilians, delivery of humanitarian assistances, completion of the remaining transitional politicaltasks such as the constitution, political outreach and reconciliation and the conduct of peacefulfree, fair and transparent elections. The underlying tenet is that without security there can belimited scope for sustaining the political peace process:Peace needs security just as securityneeds peace.

While the process for planning and drafting this revised three-year National Security andStabilization Plan (NSSP) (2011 to 2014) has been a strenuous one, it is an importantachievement by all involved given the short time allotted for this task to be accomplished. Thecredit for this must be given to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), including regionalentities such Puntland, Galmudug, and Al Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ), to our numerous

international partners, whose representatives participated with openness and honesty, in anunfamiliar and ambitious integrated planning, mutual trust and confidence building exercise.

The document has evolved as result of several confidence building steps and consultativeprocesses, which I commissioned following my interaction with former Somali Senior MilitaryOfficials in Washington D.C in August, 2010. There, I had requested the former officials totravel to Somalia to conduct a Somalia-owned Security Sector Assessment (SSA) to complementan early version produced in 2010. The findings and recommendations of their SSA reports formthe basis for the revision of this NSSP for Somalia.

To further demonstrate the level of political commitment the NSSP process deserved, I consultedPrime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali to appoint a strategic planning team from across allrelevant ministries, the transitional parliament and civil society. Under the leadership ofHonourable Abdihakim E. Guleh the Deputy Minister of Interior and National Security, thereview process has been successfully completed.


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guidelines to all security forces not to allow the recruitment of children under the age of eighteenand anyone under eighteen found in the arm to be immediately released.

My Government is aware of its international obligations prohibiting the use of children inhostilities and is committed to ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The NSSPreflects our policy of no recruitment of children into its security forces. Under the NSSP, Somaliais committed to ensuring that gender perspectives are integrated in all security sectordevelopment activities, the practice of child soldering is eradicated and the protection of civiliansin Somalia is enhanced.

In a similar vein, through the NSSP, we will seek assistance to reform the Somalia military penalcodes of war and peace both of which predate the 1949 Geneva Conventions. We have

reconstructed our national security vision as follows: A secure and enabled federated Somaliawhich is in lasting peace with itself and with its neighbours; ensuring the restoration of security,access to justice and the rule law institutions such as police, judiciary and custodial corps);upholding of the human rights of its citizens; accountable, and able to defend its constitution,people, territorial unity and integrity. The restoring of security here refers to the creation a safeenvironment where local communities and citizens can foster a positive and thriving economicbase, underpinned with strong security guarantees that can cultivate and sustain peace, access tojustice, trust and confidence both at home and overseas. The net effect will be to create the

condition where political transformation in line with the Djibouti peace agreement and theKampala Accord can be sustained.

On that note, I wish to send out special messages about the NSSP, and the subsequentimplementation process:

First, to all Cabinet and National Security Council Colleagues: the NSSP will assist ourgovernment to achieve two immediate central objectives. First, it will strengthen our security andjustice institutions in order to sustain our recent military and security gains against Al-shabaab in

Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. Second, it will ensure a safe and enabling environment isestablished to complete the remaining transitional political tasks during our tenure, particularlythe constitution making process. I believe a successful implementation of the five core elements(policy development, professionalism, partnership building, inclusive and participation ofparliament and civil society, and enhancing international support for consolidation of stabilizationefforts e.g. AMISOM) of the NSSP will increase public trust and confidence in the security sectorinstitutions and improved livelihoods for the people.

Second, to the international community and donor partners: I believe the NSSP directly supportsthe first priority benchmark of the Kampala Roadmap: Improved Security in Mogadishu and therest of Somalia. Hence, it is expected that the NSSP will serve as the main conduit for creating asafe and enabling environment for a peaceful end to the transitional process in Somalia. It willensure that security and justice assistance are well coordinated through the work of the JointSecurity Committee (JSC) from 2011- 2014. The NSSP implementation must be seen as anenabler for the pursuance of the other benchmarks of the Roadmap: the constitution, political


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Third, to supporting Ministries: Indeed, the NSSP is a nationally owned programme formitigating threats of serious and transnational crime, directly linked to underdevelopment,political instability and humanitarian crisis in Somalia. In effect, improving security should

greatly assist development and political stability in Somalia. The implementation of the NSSPpriority actions must be seen as a team effort and capacity building opportunity, which must berecognised favourably as such by donors and external institutions alike. The NSC will provideexecutive oversight of the implementation of the NSSP. The Joint Security Committee (JSC) willcontinue to direct and monitor progress in the implementation of immediate priorities in theNSSP.

Fourth, to Senior Security Military and Justice Sector Officials: Under the direction of the NSC,the JSC and its Technical Working groups, the NSSP Secretariat and all related senior officials

and Ministries will work as one body. The inclusive, consultative process of planning anddrafting this revised NSSP will continue during implementation and beyond. We will all beincluded in the information and communication flow during the NSSP roll-out andimplementation in an accountable, transparent way.

Fifth, to the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) Sub-committees on defence, national securityand justice: I will like you to feel able to play your vital role in legislating laws and providingoversight of the security services of Somalia on behalf of the electorate and your constituencies.

Finally, to the regional entities, including Civil Society, Media and the Public: There is a key rolefor you in the NSSP implementation process. Regional authorities such as Puntland, Galmudug,and Al Sunna Wal Jamaas and the public have greatly been involved in the process of revisingand adopting this NSSP; we will continue to involve and include you now and duringimplementation. The NSSP and the resulting improved security and justice sectors is there toserve you, the citizens. Security is no longer a Secret; it must be a public service, requiringpublic support and increased confidence.

On behalf of my Government and my personal behalf, I wish to express my sincere gratitude toDr. Augustine P. Mahiga, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for theUnited Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) for providing the support deserved to theTransitional Federal Government (TFG) to have completed this work in the shortest possibletime. Similarly, I wish to commend the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), IGAD,United Nations agencies and programmes, the European Union, United States of AmericaEmbassy Security Sector Development (SSD) staff, the United Kingdom, Japan, Egypt, andvarious international partners, who through the work of the Joint Security Committee (JSC),

provided the needed professional guidance and for facilitating the process, and many people,including former senior Somalia military officials who made the production of a revised threeyears NSSP document possible. I wish, to conclude by reiterating, Peace needs Security just asSecurity needs Peace. The successful implementation of the NSSP must be a priority for allSomalis.

WITH THE COMPLIMENT OF


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This revised Somalia National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) 2011 to 2014, hasbeen developed to ensure priority security tasks and benchmarks identified in theKampala roadmap are implemented in a holistic, timely and well coordinated manneracross various TFG ministries, departments, parliament, regional, districts and localcommunities in Somalia

1. The plan is designed to serve as the main conduit for alignment

of both national and international assistances for the implementation of prioritized,coherent, harmonized and sustained security, access to justice and stabilization

interventions in Somalia.

The document defines the process by which the Federal Government of Somalia will leadin re-orienting the policies, structures and operational capacities of security and justiceinstitutions and groups in Somalia, in order to make them more effective, efficient andresponsive to the provision of security and justice needs of its people. Its main focus is toconsolidate military and security gains in the South Central region of Somalia,particularly in Mogadishu, Puntland and Galmudug; while concurrently creating the

enabling environment for completion of the remaining transitional political tasks: theconstitutional making process, political outreach and reconciliation, and good governanceas envisaged in the Kampala Accord

2.

This revised NSSP is a product of a series of integrated strategic planning andconsultative processes. The actors involved include representatives from the Office ofPresident, Prime Minister, Transitional Federal Parliament(TFP), senior TFG civil andpublic officials, strategic advisors, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Puntland State ofSomalia, Galmudug State of Somalia, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ) and internationalpartners such as United Nations, African Union (AU), IGAD, European Union (EU),United States of America (USA), Italy, United kingdom(UK), East African Command(EASFCOM), League of Arab States (LAS), Egypt, Japan, members of the Joint SecurityCommittee (JSC) and the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia.

Building on the findings and recommendations of the reports of 2010 and 2011 Somalia

Security Sector Assessment (SSA), this revised Somalia NSSP clearly articulates anenvisioned National Security Vision for Somalia; sets out strategic objectives forachieving the vision, shaped by specific guiding and operational principles; identifiespriorities; outline roles and responsibilities of each actors, as well as specific set ofbenchmarks, resource mobilization, tracking and monitoring processes.

Th NSSP i h i id f h i hi h l l i d j i li


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agencies and institutions, from the provision of a uniformed response to serious crime,piracy, insurgency and international terrorism; ensuring effective partnerships andcoordination between state and non-state security and justice agencies and institutions;

creating substantial parliamentary and civil society inclusion and public participation insecurity and justice sector issues; enhancing and sustaining international support forAMISOM in consolidating stabilization interventions, to include Mine Action, smallarms and light weapons control, armed violence reduction, and DDR related interventionsin Somalia.

The rest of the NSSP is structured as follows: Section 1 provides a brief background, thepolitical and strategic environmental security context of the NSSP, defines its rationale or

purpose, identifies generic threats, risks and important challenges to the security andjustice sectors of Somalia; Section 2 briefly describes the strategic national securityvision reconstructed for Somalia as envisioned in the NSSP; Section 3 outlines thestrategic objectives to achieve the national security vision; Section 4, advances theguiding and operational principles envisaged in order to realize the strategic nationalsecurity vision; Section 5 focuses on the NSSPs priority actions and interventions thatwill support the strategic vision and objectives; Section 6, briefly describes theimplementation, management, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms; Section 7 refers

to the funding and resource mobilization mechanisms to support the implementation ofpriority actions outlined in chapter 5; Section 8, examines the potential risks andassumptions that will impact on the NSSP implementation process. An implementationaction plan for the NSSP, 2011 to 2014, in the form of a Results Framework withbenchmarks, timelines, costing, and measurable indicators is annexed.


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1. INTRODUCTIONThe Djibouti Agreement of 2008 succeeded in bringing together opposing politicalgroupings which led to the formation of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of

national unity in January 2009. Its function is underpinned by the Transitional FederalCharter of 2004, which provides direction on constitutional matters. The InternationalCommunity (IC) recognizes TFG as a credible partner to move the peace process forwardand restore stability in Somalia, but that the TFG requires substantial assistance indeveloping capacity to restore security and stability.

In June 2011, the Kampala Accord permitted a 12-month extension to the TFGs mandateto enable completion of the transition tasks and also directed the permanent establishmentof the Joint Security Committee (JSC) in Mogadishu. The TFG had developed NationalSecurity and Stabilization Plans (NSSPs) in 2006 and 2009, respectively, but substantialchanges in the military and security dynamics have prompted a requirement for a freshversion. This current NSSP provides the framework for describing how the TFG willcontinue to respond to the security sector stabilization and justice/rule of law needs of itspeople and the State.

1.1PurposeThe desired end-state of this current NSSP is to create an environment that meets internalsecurity needs and securing basic functioning of criminal justice system, while promotingrecovery from conflict. Any sustainable security and stabilization plan has to meetcitizens expectations of provision of basic services. The NSSP is also intended toprovide the foundation for building capacity in order to restore stability to the country. Itis an articulation of shared responsibility, pointing the way for the TFG and its national

and international partners to work together towards the realization of a shared nationaland regional security vision, and to monitor the consolidation of political, peace andstability throughout Somalia.

1.2ScopeThe TFGs mandate was extended by 12 months in July 2011, but the requirements of aNSSP necessarily need a longer-term planning horizon. Therefore, there is an implicit

understanding that a revision will be required in the post-TFG era and that the documentshould be living and dynamic, to take advantage of changing situations. The plan coversthe Offices of the President, Prime Minister, Ministries of Defence, Interior and NationalSecurity and Justice and Corrections institutions, the transitional federal parliament,regional and district security committees, and civil society organizations. It recognizesthat the ministries and their associated primary forces are engaged in security operations


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1.3Background: Strategic Environment AnalysisAfter the fall of the Mohamed Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somali plunged into a civilwar. A period of anarchy has followed. The conflict stems from the dynamics of

continuous bad governance during the civilian and/or military rules, characterized by theabsence of the rule of law. This bad governance has resulted in nepotism, clanism,embezzlement of the public purse and widespread corruption. Subsequently, thecombination of many other contributing factors, such as: the Cold war, the Horn of Africawar of 1977-1978, the proxy war led by clan-militias, armed and supported byneighboring countries, and the economic hyperinflation, had a detrimental effect on thecountrys meager economy.

Consequently, all state institutions were enormously weakened and incapacitated,including the law enforcement agencies, such as the court-system, the armed forces,police, custodian corps, intelligence services and coast guards. Public confidence andtrust in these institutions have been lost; as these institutions became moribund. Thepeople of Somalia have been left at the mercy of clan-based militia groups thatproliferated after the ousting of the Barre regime

3.

With the support of the international community, a peace process was initiated in 2004based on the IGAD Mbagathi process. This process lead to the adoption of a TransitionalFederal Charter in 2004, the signing of the Djibouti Agreement in August, 2008, andrecently the Kampala Accord in 2011, respectively. Both the Agreement and Accordpave the way in ending the conflict in Somalia. The 2008 agreement allowed for theestablishment of a broad-based TFG incorporating opposition groups, provided hope forthe war-ravaged country.

Both the Djibouti Agreement and Kampala Accord provides for security and justicesector development interventions. For example, Article 8c in the Djibouti agreement, andArticle 5 of the Kampala Accord calls for the establishment and reform of a JointSecurity Committee (JSC); cessation of hostilities and deployment of UN peacekeepingforce, and the subsequent withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. The TFG has continued effortsto both consolidate its authority particularly with respect to security sector development.However, limited achievements have been made in reaching out to many groups,including clan-based militias as possible as mandated. This includes their integration into

a robust formal security sector structures.

As part of its outreach and reconciliation implementation strategy the TFG signed anagreement withAhlu Sunna Wal Jamaa(ASWJ) on March 15 2009. ASWJ continue tobe described as a moderate Sufi Islamist group formed in 1991 to counter the growinginfluence of militant reformist movements like Al-Ittihad Al-Islamic Though a power


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Apart from the lack of an adequately articulated and clear reconciliation framework andof a determined effort on the part of the TFG leadership, the TFG has also not established

an effective security sector development legal and policy framework, executive andlegislative oversight mechanisms, as well as an effective communication strategy.

TFGs public relations campaign and outreach strategy to mobilize support from Somaliswithin and outside Somalia has therefore been inadequate to counter Al Shabaabsmoreradical messages. There has been little if any effort to reach out to various Somaliconstituencies. Consequently, the TFG is less engaged with the Somali public. TFGneeds to continue to work towards building trust and confidence of the public 4.

At the operational level, the primary defence and security forces are still weak to sustainthe military gains already made after Al-shabaabs organized withdrawal fromMogadishu on 6thof August, 2011. The National Security Force (NSF) for example lackssufficient training, equipment, and logistics to face the non-state actors insurgent groups,which have grown powerful over time. There is significant necessary reliance on theAfrican Union - the AMISOM stabilization force. Together with the AMISOM forcesTFG forces now control Mogadishu.

Efforts to initiate dialogue and relations with the Jihadists are proving a daunting task.That said, it is clear that support for the Jihadists or Islamic ideological groups isdiminishing from a significant section of Somalis opposed to the foreign nationals forceslinked to Al Qaeda. Al-shabaabs withdrawal from Mogadishu in early August 2011 is anopportunity which, if not seized promptly, could be lost if warlords and their militiasmoved in to fill the vacuum. This could results in inter-factional fighting replacing thatwhich was previously against a recognized common enemy. There is an urgent need tocontinue to support the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the TFGforces with requisite resources to enable them discharge their responsibilities effectively,especially to enable them consolidate and control the areas recently vacated by Al-shabaab. The NSSP is designed to meet this immediate goal.

1.4Current Measures and AchievementsThe TFG and the Somalia security institutions together with loyal militia groups such as

ASWJ reinforced by AMISOM are determined to foster peace and stability in Somalia. In

recent times, the combined forces have made serious military and security gains against

the insurgent militias leading to their defeat and ultimate withdrawal from Mogadishu

and some regions in the south central. It is now evident that Mogadishu is almost 100

percent under the control of the TFG forces and AMISOM.


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cordial relations with AMISOM. This has had a significant positive impact in national

security.5

In essence, the technical, training and financial support of the international communityincluding UN agencies, EU, United States SSR Team, the United Kingdom, AMISOMand other bilateral donors are proving critical and essential to the rebuilding of the SomaliSecurity and justice sector institutions. President Sheik Ahmed Sharif, Prime Minister Dr.Abdiwali M Ali, TFG relevant Ministers, heads of the security and justice sectorinstitutions, parliament and civil society indicated that more support (technical andfinancial) from donors through the work of the Joint Security Committee and its technicalworking groups is required and would enable the government to overcome major threats

to the establishment of security, justice, peace and recovery in Somalia. They all call forconsistent, sufficient and well-coordinated international assistance.

On 6 May 2011, the TFG revived its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) after a lapse of 20years. The EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from the Somali coast-line, followingconcerns about illegal and over-fishing and dumping of toxic waste. However, the SNAhas no means with which to enforce the EEZ, thus depriving it of revenue and necessaryprotection of its natural resources.

Public perception of TFG and AMISOM forces is positive. The Anti-TFG propagandamachinery is proving ineffective. There is need to continue proving additional support toTFG/AMISOM civic education and to raising public awareness of its role and mandate.However, despite these achievements, a number of generic threats and risks outlined inthe preceding section persist that continue to undermine peace and stability in Somalia.

1.5Threats and Risks AnalysisThe threats and risks facing war-torn Somalia are many and include: instability,protracted violence and human rights violations including gender-based violenceperpetuated by extremists/insurgent armed groups such as Al-shabaab, proliferation ofsmall arms and ammunition including landmines, clan-based armed militia groups withpotential to cause de-stabilization, unprotected borders, weak public sector institutions,corruption, piracy, illegal fishing and destruction of other marine resources belonging to

Somalia, illegal economic activities including logging, charcoal production and moneylaundering, absence of social services, poverty, and chronic unemployment. If thesethreats and risks are not immediately tackled, the national economy and interest, as wellas the security of the Somali people will be profoundly affected.

Beyond Mogadishu, the security situation remains difficult in South-Central Somalia.


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ASWJ and smaller clan militias giving an estimated total of 9,000 men. It is urgent tostrengthen and rebuild national security institutions to respond and eliminate the abovementioned threats and risks

6.

1.6Key ChallengesThe current Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) have limited resources (human,

financial and institutional) to tackle those threats and risks. They are faced with important

structural challenges that continue to undermine the operational effectiveness of the

security and justice sectors agencies and institutions in tackling the above threats. For

example, the ability to develop and implement robust policies and strategies is critical to

the success of TFGs agenda for security and justice sector development based on theprovisions of the Djibouti and Kampala peace processes. At the moment, however,

although the political will and commitment exists, the TFG lacks adequate institutions

and experienced human resources that can effectively and efficiently support strategic

and policy development processes in the security and justice sectors. A focus on

strengthening the legal and policy making structures, institutions and human resource

capital for Security Sector Development (SSD) in Somalia is essential. This should be

done in a wide effort that seeks both to improve training for civil and public servants inthe security and justice line ministries and institutions, and to deliver a broader campaign

on the importance of improved security and access to justice.

For primary Somalia Security and Justice Agencies, such as the army and the police, on

the other hand, the delivery of specialized training, equipment, payment of stipends,

rehabilitation of office spaces and having in place Standard Operational Procedures

(SOPs) and management systems are the main structural challenges ahead. In addition,

the lack of adequate command leadership in the NSF, to develop, defence and militarypolicies, serve as a serious limitation towards improving the effectiveness and

professional standards of the NSF with adherence to the rule of law, respect for human

rights and the protection of civilians.

Right sizing, doctrinal development, integration of the various militias and

professionalism remain a huge challenge for the TFG. The 2009 National Security and

Stabilization Plan (NSSP) projects the security forces levels as: NSF - 25,000 (includingthe Navy and Coast Guards); National Police Force- 12,000; the National Security

Agency (NSA) - 3,000, and the custodian corps- 5,000 personnel. These projections are

yet to be met7and need to be re-evaluated. A new assessment of the infrastructure and

logistical needs of the security, justice and custodian corps in a rapidly changing

environment especially in areas under the control of TFG/AMISOM is urgently required


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effective courts system, has created a generation that has no experience of the Rule of

Law: they are not socialised to the idea of criminals being prosecuted. This lost

generation also means that there is a lack of experience within the judiciary. Access to

justice is also limited as the judiciary, courts, custodian corps, etc are not equipped andfunctioning effectively.

The perverse interpretation of Islam by Al Shabaab has resulted in multiple, flagrant

abuses of human rights. The civil population is subjected to targeted killings and

assaults, repressive forms of social control, and brutal punishments under its draconian

interpretation of sharia8. With the withdrawal of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu, it is

important that the administration of justice is conducted by the adherence to international

norms. The absence of sharia law was an original Al-Shabaab claim. The introduction

and upholding of true sharia law therefore undermines its cause, and thus it has both a

political utility and is legally valuable.

On 27 April 2010, the UN passed UNSCR 1918 (2010) calling upon member states tocriminalise piracy under domestic law. Since much piracy activity takes place within theEEZ, Somalia has a greater responsibility to comply with the UNSCR, but currently lacks

sufficient resources to fulfil its obligations. It also lacks legislation. There are otheropportunities in maritime law that the TFG and the International Community shouldconsider in order to attack piracy more comprehensively. These include the 1988Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of MaritimeNavigation; the 1979 Convention against the taking of Hostages and the 2000 UNConvention on Transnational Organised Crime.

The Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) is weak on defence and security matters and

lacks the capacity to support the drafting of appropriate legislation related to the securityand justice institutional development that is needed before the end of the politicaltransition. Somali civil society and NGOs have limited capacity to engage in SSDinterventions. Above all, they continue to be marginalized from the efforts of rebuildingthe national security sector. Neither the Executive power nor the Parliament havehistorically encouraged civil society and NGOs to contribute to public debates aboutnational security including the police, the army, correctional corps and intelligence. TheNSSP contains a number of initiatives to strengthen the role and capacity of civil society

in this respect, and also to raise awareness in the ranks of the security forces throughcivic education and training. A more open dialogue is desirable and this can beengendered by better and consistent strategic communications that inform the public andpublic opinion.

The NSSP will help to overcome the threats risks and important challenges identified


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A clear national security vision, a set of five strategic objectives, shaped by a series ofguiding and operational principles for improving security and stabilization in Somalia are

outlined in the succeeding sections.

2. NATIONAL SECURITY VISIONThe national security vision of the NSSP is as follows:

A Secure and enabled federated Somalia that is in lasting peace with itself and

with its neighbours; enjoying restored security, access to justice and the rule oflaw; upholding the human rights of its citizens; accountable, able to defend itsconstitution, people, territorial unity and integrity.

3. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE/SThe realization of a shared national security vision as outlined above is shaped by a set offive strategic programmatic objectives. They are:

Objective 1: To strengthen higher level security and justice policy and strategy

development and coordination mechanisms

The purpose of policy development is to institutionalize a set of international norms,rules, principles, identities and organizational structures and processes to be adequatelyput in place to ensure democratic governance and accountability of the security sector inSomalia. Support should be provided at the political level for the development ofstrategic higher level security and justice policies and decision making processes. Suchpolicies will enable relevant security and justice institutions and agencies to develop theirown sectoral priorities, reform and implementation strategies.

Important entry points for supporting policy and strategy development processes are the

National Security Council (NSC), cabinet, relevant ministries and the JSC. Such

interventions includes, capacity building on strategic planning, functional and

management reviews, priority setting, decision making, resource management and

budgeting; development of standard operational guidelines for security and justice sectorspersonnel about the value of a Whole-of-Government approach that defines the roles and

responsibilities of each security and justice sector components in the delivery of these

services.

Objective 2: To rebuild affordable accountable and professional defence/army


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The TFG will ensure the combat readiness and the operational effectiveness of SomaliasNational Security Force personnel by imparting them an improved and comprehensive

capacity-building programme, including the provision of appropriate selection andrecruitment mechanisms, training, equipment, and gender compliance.

The TFG will take advantage of existing regional and international training supports forthe NSF, the Somalia Police Force (SPF), NSA, custodian corps, etc, as a step towardsstandardizing its national security and defence doctrines; and improving the professionaldevelopment of all elements of the security and justice agencies. To ensure the retentionof the instruction of the troops, the TFG should consider conducting the NSF troops

basic military training inside Somalia. The training curricula in addition to the regulartraining cycle should also address those areas of serious challenges in todays battleground and provide soldiers the foundation of guerilla warfare, counterinsurgency,counterterrorism and urban and asymmetric warfare. The NSF training should alsoencompass a strong civicorientation program that teaches the troops citizenship, peaceand religious education (i.e. citizens rights and responsibilities, human rights, the rule oflaw, common good and loyalty to the state, etc.). The curriculum and pedagogy of thiscivic orientation programmust be prepared by the Ministry of Education and Ministry of

Religious Affairs in coordination with the Ministry of Defense. And the instructionalprogram should be incorporated in the regular military training and taught by competentteachers in civic and religious subjects. To ensure the combat readiness of the NSF,priority should be given the training of junior commanders (junior officers, such as,second lieutenant to captain) and the NCOs. To that end, the TFG should put a particularemphasis on train-the-trainersprogram, whereby former officers and NCOs are given abrief refreshment course so that they could properly train the troops.

Besides, the NSF should establish a standardized organizational military structure for

small and medium level units (battalion, company, platoon and squad) that would

determine unit formation and a clear ranking structure corresponding to its size. The

Somali NSF, the Army, the Police Force (SPF), NSA, and the Custodian Corps, should

standardize its national security and defense doctrines; and improve its professional

development of all elements of the security and justice agencies.

To secure Somalias territorial water and enhance the capacity to protect coastal and

maritime security, including piracy, toxic waste dumping, and illegal fishing, and armed

robbery in the Somali coast, it is critical that in addition of strengthening the operational

capability of NSF elements in land, to build a viable Somali Navy with efficient

operational capacity, training; and armed and equipped with adequate weaponry,


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that the headquarters and training facilities, as well as, the troops barracks areimmediately refurbished. This will guarantee that the command and control of NSF unitsis secure; the troops have adequate quarters; the routine trainings programmes are

regularly and frequently carried out.

To rebuild the Somali NSF and equip them with the necessary weaponry and heavyequipment it is important the previous United Nations Resolutions embargo be lifted. Theexistence of these resolutions will hinder the NSF to carry out their defensive mandate.The TFG will ensure that the structure and command and control of NSF (army, police,navy and coastal defense, air force, and custodial corps) are in conformity with theSomali Transitional charter, chapter X Art.65.

The Command and Control structure will be based on these two principals: Operations(communications, artillery, reconnaissance, engineering and armor units) and Logistics(supply, personnel, administrations, health, transportation and armament). A code ofconduct for the NSF officers will be created and published. Military Courts with theirAttorney Generals will be established. A database of the existing codes and status will becreated; Jurisdiction and the relationship between the Military Courts and Civilian Courtswill be reconciled.

The process of selecting, vetting and recruiting Somalis into the ranks of NSF will bedone in a transparent and accountable way to ensure regional and clan balance within theNSF. To ensure the size and strength of the security forces, a proper registration processwill be established. All personnel should be issued a picture ID carried all the time andthey must be verified and accounted for.TFG will contact all Pro-government leaders ofall armed groups to broaden the reconciliation process and convince them to join thepeace process and integrate their militias with TFG security forces.

The development and strengthening of procurement policy and procedures for thepurchase, supply and disposal of all defence, and security equipment will be clearlydefined and applied based on standard operational procedures. Appropriate structuralsupport is required, including organizational decision making and change managementstructures in relevant security and justice agencies to improve their level ofprofessionalism, and in establishing a strong and neutral transitional chain of commandand control mechanisms and structures. Capacity-building is an essential prerequisite to

increase absorptive capacity.

Objective 3: To ensure effective partnership and coordination between state and non-state security and justice agencies/institutions

Dealing with transnational organized crime and terrorism will require an increased level


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and investigations; support a framework for regular meetings between and across thevarious structures of the NSSP implementation process and oversight platforms, and fillcapacity gaps in the security and justice sectors.

If included through effective partnerships, non-state security and justice actors can feedinformation to the relevant state security and justice agencies and institutions such asinformation on the current security threats as a result of Al-Shabaabs withdrawal, and onincidents involving abuses and human rights violation. CSOs may also provide a pool ofexpertise in research, administration and management which can support a successfulimplementation of the NSSP. Interaction and the level of collaboration and cooperationwill be enhanced through the work of the NSC, JSC, NSSP Secretariat, line Ministries

project implementation secretariats, regional and district security committees.

Objective 4: To increase the inclusion and participation of parliament and Civil Society

Organizations in Somalia security and justice sector Development efforts

The TFP is generally considered to be weak, both in terms of process and effect, and thesame applies to the sub-committees which should be active in the field of defence andsecurity, justices and human rights. Civil society is similarly lacking in capacity andvoice in the security sector in Somalia. The NSSP will support the TFP in training of theparliamentary committees in matters of defence, security and justice; conducting ananalysis of the gaps in the existing legal framework for security governance, and providemodel laws to support the drafting of legal frameworks for the Somalia Police Force,Army, NSA, Coast guards etc. It will also support the development of reporting andanalytical processes, especially security sector budgeting analysis. The engagement ofCSOs and NGOs on Somalias security sector development issues will enable theperspective of the general public to be factored into security and justice policy

development and governance processes. The capacity of specialized SSD sensitive CSOswill be built to advocate, monitor and report on SSD interventions with respect to humanrights, gender equality and the rule of law. It is also important to establish a democraticinstitutional arrangement to ensure easy and transparent access for citizens to expresstheir concerns in any of these respects. Their contribution in this respect can help with thehigh level strategic monitoring of the progress and effectiveness of the NSSP and caninform assessment and situational awareness in respect of trends that demonstratewhether stability is improving, and whether life for citizens is getting better, getting

worse, or stable but at least not subject to the daily horrors and frustrations of conflict.

Objective 5: To enhance and sustain international support for the stabilization of

Somalia

The recent withdrawal of Al-shabaab demands an urgent need of review of the AfricanU i Mi i S li AMISOM i l d i l i f h i


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of operations (CONOPS) in support of international stabilization support in Somalia. Therole of the TFG would be crucial to ensure national sovereignty is maintained.

Somalia has endured decades of continuous armed violence, resulting in proliferation ofsmall arms which are trafficked across the porous Somali borders. Combined with awarrior ethos, Somalis use weapons as an accepted form of conflict resolution, and thisstimulates a lack of accountability which fosters a culture of impunity and disrespect forthe Rule of Law. The problem is most acute in south-central Somalia; in Somaliland andPuntland, progress has been made in demilitarizing society.

Assessments indicate that Al-Shabaab could change tactics and employ more IEDs and

suicide bombers to stretch TFG and AMISOM manpower by conducting attacks inostensibly secure areas, thus reducing their capacity to mount further offensiveoperations. A vigorous initiative is required to reach out to communities to encouragethem to report suspicious activity and collaborate with the security sector. Whilstenjoying more success at the tactical level, the TFG currently does not possess thecapability to generate Operational level gains that can be guaranteed to be sustainable.The establishment of District Security Committees will be useful.

The NSSP will promote stabilization programmes for disengaging combatants, DDR,Armed Violence Reduction (AVR), small arms and light weapons reduction, MineAction and broader explosive management to assist in de-militarization of Somalia. Suchprogrammes will be carefully managed, to prevent the recruitment and training of radicalyouths that could defect to Al-Shabaab or international terrorist organizations.Meanwhile, reports of newly trained Al-Shabaab recruits being trained near Kismayo is aconstant reminder that the threat has not disappeared. The NSSP must address the issuesof de-radicalisation of such recruits, many of whom may have been coerced into

membership. Conversely, opportunities to conduct second-generation DDR activities,based on community interests, are required to contribute to the overall goal ofstabilisation.

4. OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLESAs a founding principle, the NSSP, will be approved by the council of ministers of theTransitional Federal Government on the recommendation of the NSC, and subsequentlyby the Transitional Federal Parliament. A number of operational principles have beenidentified below along the lines of the five strategic programmatic objectives for asuccessful implementation of the NSSP. Key elements of the NSSP strategicprogrammatic interventions will be executed along the lines of the following operational

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Legal environment: The Transitional Federal Charter authorizes the creation of anArmy9and Police (Article 65). The same article requires that the structure, function andsystem of cooperation between elements of the Somalia National Army should be

regulated by law. Any changes to the structure advocated in the NSSP should thereforebe approved by legislation. In addition, legal pluralism is a key feature of the rule of lawin Somalia, with 3 principal sources: xeer- which is customary law; sharia, based inIslam and formal secular law, based on colonial and post-independent developments.The NSSP will be implemented bearing mind in improving security and access to justice,and respect for human rights requires the establishment of an integrated justice systemthat is accessible to all, and which uses the strengths of the various systems andmechanism under these 3 different codes.

National ownership: The true hallmark of the NSSP is the collaborative effort of variousSomali government agencies in partnership with the international donor community.Such a partnership is needed to give better focus and importance on mobilizing political,financial and human resources needed to do the job. At this juncture however, the idea ofnational ownership is crucial because it places responsibilities on the right shoulders andpromotes the principle of accountability. A viable and functional NSSP Secretariat inMogadishu is fundamental to support the execution and implementation of the NSSP

implementation action plan (2011 to 2014).

Somalias national ownership of the NSSP would initially involve creating legalownership by way of legislation as well as the centrality of regional, district and localgrass-roots participation throughout the process of implantation of the NSSP. Lessonscan be learned in this respect from the ways and means undertaken by both Somalilandand Puntland. In both places all sectors of society assembled themselves and forgedtogether a peaceful way forward in their respective communities and neighborhoods.

Evidently then, any meaningful stabilization effort for Somalia to be truly locallyowned and successful must be conceived and understood within the context of publicparticipation.

Financial Sustainability: The UN/WB Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) of 200610

concluded that Somalia was one of the poorest countries in the world with an annual percapita income of $226, compared to an average of $515 in sub-Saharan Africa. Mis-management, inequitable and cumbersome tax systems and weak administration of taxresulted in government revenue being only 5-7% of GDP between 1984 and1990. Thecombination of natural disasters, local conflict and the absence of government has alsonegatively impacted the economy. 20 years of anarchy, broken infrastructure, adysfunctional judicial system and a poor technological base have all ruined the economicbase. Moreover, large numbers of unemployed male youths are vulnerable to being


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conditions where clan loyalty thrives, since clan solidarity then offers the only hope ofsurvival.

Foreign investment in Somalia is very low. The lack of security, political instability,weak financial management mechanisms, poor infrastructure and land rights issuescollectively create a negative environment for investors. Moreover, there is a lostgeneration who has little formal education, reducing the pool of skilled labour forforeign investors. For the security and justice sector ministries, the priority to enhancesecurity is clear. The TFG needs sustained economic support from the internationalcommunity to successfully implement the provisions of the NSSP.

Robust relationships with partners are required, and this must be underpinned byimproved coordination processes and transparency. Potential donor fatigue must bemitigated by active engagement and demonstrable progress. Active engagement shouldalso seek to ensure optimal communication in order to assist, or manage a process ofharmonisation for Development Partners. This will help to avoid wasteful duplication,repetition or the danger of swamping the current weak and limited absorptive capacity ofthe TFG as stabilization of Mogadishu starts to permit a greater influx of developmentassistance and support.

Over time, the international community will require the relevant security and justiceministries and agencies to assume full budgetary responsibility, so force generation anddevelopment (of the military, for example) must take into account the longer-termrequirements for self-financing and sustainability by the Somali Government. Financialexpectations at all times will be carefully managed.

Accountability to the public:The NSSP will only be as meaningful if its implementation

enhances the security of citizens. The NSSP implementation process must thereforebenefit all citizens equally. From the start, in order to build confidence and ensurelegitimacy, NSSP has to be based on the principles of accountability. Putting in placeaccountability mechanisms will safeguard concerns about the provision of financial andtechnical support by international partners and actors. Therefore, the NSSPimplementation process will be subject to independent monitoring, oversight andevaluation procedures of all its operations and financing transactions.

Transparency: the NSSP will be implemented based on clearly articulated legal andpolicy frameworks; established structures, standards and practices that will enhance thetransparent management of public financial supports to the security and justice sectorinstitutions and agencies, including parliament and civil society organizations in Somalia.The implementation process will also be subject to enhance cooperation and information-


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Inclusive and participatory, democratic oversight: So far, the process of revising theNSSP has been highly inclusive and participatory, involving a wide range of TFGministries, the TFP, international partners, regional authorities( specifically the Regional

States of Puntland and Galmudug), pro-TFG non-state actors, such as ASWJ, CSOs, andNGOs to the extent possible. The NSSP therefore is the result of a continuous integratedstrategic planning, consultative and dialogue processes. It is crucial that the process ofimplementation of the NSSP remains that way, as transparent and as consultative aspossible to ensure appropriate service development, delivery and accountability. TheTFG has committed to work jointly with regional administrations in the implementationof the NSSP, and to collectively seek support and assistance of international developmentpartners.

Article 33 of the TFG Charter makes provision for Parliament to investigate any matterof public interest. There are concerns about the professional knowledge ofParliamentarians to be effective overseers of the security sector, and capacity-building isrequired. Under the Djibouti process, the JSC is mandated to lead the process of creatingsecurity institutions and coordination and oversight of the security issues with theinternational community for assistance programmes. It also provides policy advice to theTechnical Working Groups. Article 5 of the recent Kampala Accord also reiterate the

importance of the JSC : The parties agreed that support for the current militaryoperations and completion of the rebuilding the security forces are fundamental to thesuccess of the transitional period and agreed that a reformed Joint Security Committeewill seat permanently in Mogadishu.

The engagement of CSOs and NGOs to conduct research, advocate; monitor and provideoversight of the NSSP will add real value to the NSSP process.

Protection of Civilians, women and childrens rights and minority groups: Somalia is asignatory to some International Humanitarian Law (IHL) treaties

11, such as the Geneva

Conventions; the Convention of the Rights of a Child, and the Optional Protocol to theConvention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflictand the Convention on cluster munitions. Protecting civilians, including women, childrenand minority groups rights from violations including from sexual exploitation and abuseand other forms of gender-based violence, requires the adherence to all internationallyagreed conventions, resolutions, international human rights law, internationalhumanitarian law and other bodies of the law; access to justice and equality before thelaw; establishing the ROLs; creating a safe environment and building social andeconomic stability. Lagging behind this explosion in humanitarian and human rights law,Somalia is at a significant disadvantage: it has no laws for combating people or humantrafficking, financing terrorism, money laundering, drugs, dealing with piracy, or for


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In addition, the TFIs and AMISOM are both obligated to ensure that civilians includingvulnerable groups such as women and children are protected from violence and atrocitiesas a legal and moral endeavor. AMISOMs civilian protection strategy include: support

for the Transitional Federal Government, peace process, protection from physicalviolence and creating a safe and violent free environment. The national security apparatuswill have the legal obligation to protect and serve the people including, women, childrenand minority, IDPs etc. Translating these obligations during the implementation of theNSSP will be a priority. Prioritizing the protection of civilians particularly women,children and minority is both a legal and moral endeavor.

Respect for the culture, customs and religious beliefs:The majority of Somalis belong

to a pastoral, nomadic culture, herding camels and live-stock. Today, some of these livein urban areas for part of the time. Dir, Isaq, Hawiye and Darod clans are primarilypastoralists, and descended from the common ancestor Samale; in the south, the agro-pastoralists are primarily Rahanweyn and Digil, descendents of Sab. The next largestgroup is primarily cultivators, whilst smaller proportions of the population derives itseconomic livelihood through commerce and fisheries, and live principally in the coastalcommunities. There are numerous examples in which elders have brought inter-clanviolence to an end. This suggests that implementation of the NSSP should encourage

bottom-up solutions and traditional mechanisms as well as de-centralisation of somefunctions. Ministry policies should reflect these traditional mechanisms whereappropriate, especially in the establishment of regional and district security committees. .The NSSP must serve as a conduit for reaching out to these different groups and besensitive to their needs.

The informal method of resolving conflict through the use of clan elders is a key featureof Somalias customs. The active participation of district commissioners, clan elders, and

religious and community leaders including women elders, leaders and preachers in theNSSP implementation process and the link to restorative justice are strengths. These localauthorities, religious and community leaders can be powerful actors in conflict mediationand SSD for Somalia. The NSSP must ensure that gender-based violence and theprotection of the vulnerable are addressed appropriately through main-streaming genderissues in the detailed implementation plans that will be cascaded for all componentsunder the Strategic Objectives outlined in the broader results framework that is annexedto this document.

The National Security vision is designed to adhere to Islamic legal principles as per theTFG Charter. The NSSP therefore will be implemented bearing in mind the importanceof the human rights including womens rights in Islam, the unity of the Somali people,embedding the progressive cultural values, traditions and customs for instance, the


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5. PRIORITIZATION AND SEQUENCINGAs envisioned in the NSSP, the office of the President, Prime Minister, governmentministries, departments and agencies as well as non-state actors and relevant components

of the wider public make up the security and justice sectors in Somalia. This particularlyincludes, the NSC, JSC and its technical working groups, line ministries of Interior,Defense, justice, the NSF, SPF, NSA, coast guards, as well as structures from otherorgans of government. The process or campaign of stabilizing Somalia wouldimmediately require prompt interventions and joint operations of each of these securityand justice apparatus.

Although the stabilization of Somalia would be the product of their direct effort, each of

these security and justice structures will need to develop their own areas of interventionin a prioritized manner. The NSSP serves as the conduit for harmonization, merging,coordinating and streamlining the priority actions and intervention of these security andjustice bodies at the strategic national level. Security is more sustainable when linkedinstitutionally and through policies and practices at all levels of government. Strongcoordination, collaboration and participation of all stakeholders is required. The NSSPemergency phase requires capturing public attention and donor support.

Comprehensively improving the professionalism and operational effectiveness of thesecurity forces and institutions are urgent priority interventions for the NSSP. This isreflective of what the Somalia government is going to do towards reclaiming the countryback from outlaws and various criminal groupings. A consolidated list of priority actionsand interventions are outlined in the annexes, to serve as a quick reference point tosupport negotiation for support by the international donor community and to act as thebasis for the more detailed programmatic planning that both the TFG itself, and its

international development partners will wish to undertake in a phased, sequenced andharmonized way. (see the Annex).

6. IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND EVALUATIONThe limited institutional setting and human resource capacity available in Mogadishu, tosupport the realization of critical transitional security sector development tasks as

outlined in the provisions of the Djibouti peace agreement has been a major source ofconcern to the international community through the work of the JSC. In many instances,the lack of adequate staffing and national institutional structures, has led to much lowerabsorptive capacity of resources provided by the international community for sectorspecific interventions. The implementation of the NSSP will not be an exception to thistrend if effective and credible strategic advisory support, coordination, implementation,


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civil society (including traditional male and female leaders and elders, religious leaders/preachers, sultans, NGOs community based organizations and womens groups), theprivate sector, the UN, AU/AMISOM, EU, IGAD and the international community atlarge. Effective collaboration and coordination among these entities will be crucial tosuccessfully implement the NSSP. While ownership will lie with Somalis, success will becontingent upon building effective and strategic partnerships with the InternationalCommunity.

6.1NSSP Coordination MechanismFour coordination and oversight bodies will be strengthened or set up to provide the

necessary implementation, quality assurance, oversight and leverage required for timely,effective and efficient implementation of the NSSP, namely i) the Joint SecurityCommittee linked to the overall Kampala Roadmap Coordination and MonitoringMechanism, and (ii) the JSC Technical Working Groups (TWGs) (iii) the NSSPSecretariat, and iv) the regional and district Security Committees.

a) Coordinating Development Assistance through the Joint Security Committee(JSC)

In collaboration with UNPOS and AMISOM, the TFG has already in place the JSCframework that supports security sector development policy and decision makingprocesses between the TFG and the international community. The JSC will also continueto serve as a platform for coordinating all international assistance for the implementationof the NSSP. The NSC will be its national counterpart. The Committee will also beresponsible for tracking, monitoring and evaluation of all sector specific projects relatedto the NSSP. The JSC will have a secretariat in Mogadishu, to work closely with the

Somali-lead NSSP Secretariat.

b) JSC Secretariat and its Technical Working Groups (TWG)

The JSC Secretariat will comprise Liaison officers from the TFG, AMISOM and UNPOSthe three co-chairs of the JSC. The Secretariat will be established to support the JSCpolicy guidance, monitoring and evaluation of the NSSP implementation process. TheJSC Secretariat and its technical working groups will have responsibility for

i) organizing JSC Meetings,ii) reviewing sector specific progress and plans, consistent with the NSSP

benchmarks and indicators, andiii) reviewing the work of the JSC technical working groups, and d)

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c) The NSSP Secretariat

In the first year of implementation, the TFG will set up a NSSP Secretariat within theOffice of the President or the Prime Minister to provide technical support to the SomaliaNational Security Council (NSC), line ministries and security and justice agencies andCSOs to fast track the operationalisation of the NSSP Implementation Action Plan. Otherkey functions of the Secretariat will include to:

i) set up and provide strategic advisory capacity support for theimplementation of the NSSP to all relevant defense, security and justice

line ministries, parliament, CSOs, and district security committees,ii) support the development of sector specific project proposals based on a setof results framework and monitor the outcome from all sectors anddistricts security committees,

iii) coordinate with the JSC Secretariat in the preparation of the first annualreport on NSSP implementation, and

iv) work collaboratively with the JSC structures established for coordination,monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the NSSP.

The institutional location of the Secretariat will be evaluated in the second year ofimplementation of the NSSP. The secretariat will provide all progress reports on theimplementation of the NSSP to the JSC through its Secretariat.

d) Regional Administrations and District Security Committees

During the drafting process for the NSSP, a delegation of the TFG Ministers and officials

visited the regions and held discussion with regional administrations and ASWJ toconfirm to seek their agreement to and formal endorsement of the NSSP. The regionalstates expressed that the principal security sector priorities were: dealing with al-shabaab,many of whom have been arriving in the regions since being pushed out of Mogadishu;the need for AMISOM to expand its operations to the north, and the need to deal withpiracy. They also expressed the serious need for humanitarian aid with a reported400,000 IDPs in Puntland and no food aid ships coming into Bossasso.

Hence, in line with TFGs emerging security sector decentralization policy andprogrammes, security coordination structures will be set up in each region and districts tosupport tactical and operational planning, implementation and monitoring of the NSSPprocess. All regional and district security committees will be set up through the Ministryof Interior and National Security. The composition and size of the regional security


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i) monitor and track the implementation of NSSP specific projects andactivities at the district level,

ii) serve as early warning mechanisms for security threat and risks analysis,and

iii) prepare weekly progress reports for review by the NSSP Secretariat andthe JSC secretariat.

6.2Monitoring and EvaluationIt is evidence that M&E provisions were missing in the 2006 and 2009 NSSPframeworks. Hence, it is desirable for the TFG and the international community to

develop joint results based monitoring and evaluation system that will support thesuccessful implementation of the NSSP. The proposed NSSP M&E framework must bebased on robust monitoring and performance benchmarks. The framework will attempt tointegrate and measure positive changes and impact of the NSSP on peoples lives inSomalia. It will involve greater coordination of efforts at all levels.

The JSC Secretariat will take the overall lead in coordinating all higher level monitoringand evaluation and oversight of activities of the NSSP. The NSC and its committees will

provide the national counterparts. In particular, the JSC will oversee and coordinate theactivities of the its technical working groups; ensure effective collaboration in datacollation to inform progress and adjustment of planned actions, analysis and reporting onestablished and agreed benchmarks consistent with the NSSP implementation ActionPlan, the provisions of the Kampala Roadmap, and its monitoring and reportingmechanisms.

7. FUNDING AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION OUTLOOKSustained and timely advisory, human and financial supports the implementation of theNSSP priority actions need to be assured. Clearly, implementation of the 2006 and 2009NSSPs suffered from funding gaps. Resource mobilisation is therefore crucial forsuccessful implementation of the NSSP. Time and means should be provided to harnessresources in a well coordinated manner. The NSSP implementation action plan willrequire significant financial resources, especially meeting the costs of training, office

facilities/rehabilitation or reconstruction, stipends and salaries, and equipment tostrengthen the operational capabilities of the primary security and justice institutions andagencies. Three main sources of funding have been identified: TFG own resources,bilateral and multilateral resources/support, including the UN SSI Trust FundMechanism.


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Bilateral Supports: Direct bilateral assistance to support the implementation of the NSSP

is envisaged. This has been the case in the past and it is necessary to ensure that such

assistance is, to the extent possible, well coordinated within the framework of the work of

the JSC, its technical working groups and the NSSP Implementation Action Plan. It willbe a duty of the JSC and the NSSP Secretariat to try at the very least to ensure that

activities funded in this way are harmonized in terms of their phasing and sequencing,

and their alignment with other activities and support especially if both types of support

are for one particular component, or with a view to contributing outputs to the

achievement of a common higher level outcome or strategic objective of the NSSP.

UN Programmes, Agencies and Security Sector Institution (SSI) Building Trust FundMechanism: As a result of the current low level domestic revenue base, security sector

development interventions in Somalia has been heavily donor dependent. Continuing lack

or the availability of only limited donor support to some programmes, such as training,

reconstruction and rehabilitation of barracks and office space, stipend payments,

equipping the Somalia Police Force, army, coastal guards, and immigration officers, will

seriously impact on consolidating recent military gains in Mogadishu and in Somalia as a

whole.

The UN SSI Trust Fund mechanism established after the Istanbul conference in 2009could be a perfect financial management and disbursement framework for SSDinterventions in Somalia. New donor support is required. There is huge funding gap tocontinue to support Somalias security and justice sector development activities,including issues around disengaging or defecting fighters/DDR in Somalia. Donorcontributions to the UN Somali Security Institution building Trust Fund need to increase,

not only to support SSD interventions, but also those that relate to stabilization andrecovery efforts in support of regional authorities and administrations.

On 22 December, 2010, The Security Council emphasizes the importance ofstrengthening the Somali Security forces including the development of effectivecommand and control. While emphasizing the Somalis hold the primary responsibilityfor achieving political stability, security and the rule of law, the Council urges MemberStates and regional and international organizations to contribute generously and promptly

to the United Nations Trust Fund for the Somali security institutions, and to provideassistance to the Somali security forces. The NSSP is resource intensive and its successwill require the fulfillment of pledges and contributions from bilateral and multilateralorganizations.


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increased political will from the TFG, Somaliland and Puntland authorities to collectivelyengage in translating the envisioned National Security Vision for Somalia.

8.1CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONSIt is recognized that the mandate of TFG expires in August 2012, but that security andstabilisation planning require longer horizons. Accordingly, this plan has a 3-yearhorizon, and identifies some quick wins to create momentum. The NSSP will need to bereviewed in the post-TFG mandate era.


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ANNEX 1 : SOMALIA NATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILIZATION IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN (NSSP) (to be implemented from

2011 to 2014)

Area/sector Key Issues Priority Action Benchmarks Responsibility Risks and Assumption12

Strategic Objective One: To strengthen higher level security and justice policy and strategy development and Coordination Mechanisms

1.1. National Security

Policy and strategy

development capacity

strengthened

1.1.1. National SecurityCouncil (NSC) Decisionmaking structure andprocesses.

Establish a Secretariat tosupport the work of theNational Security Council(NSC) and theimplementation of the

NSSP.

4 6 weeksDevelop Terms of Reference, JobDescription and Action plan.3 months: Recruit personnel and6 months: provide training, such

as confidentiality and procedures

Office of the President leadOffice of the PrimeMinister (OPM) executive body to

carry out all the tasksin the benchmarkcolumn

No political support. Nopre-planning process. Notfollowed through all tasks inthe benchmarks column;

Absence of funds rendersNSSP implementation moredifficult

1.1.2. Joint SecurityCommittee Meetings

A JSC Secretariatestablished, equip andstaff in Mogadishu

Baseline : UNPOS and SomaliaEmbassy in Kenya currentlyprovide JSC Secretariat supportsince August, 2010

Target : 4 6 weeksTOR to be adopted, recruitment

process completed. Suitableoffice identified with officeequipment.

UNPOS lead

OPM to oversee theprocess.AMISOM/AU and

other partners to beconsulted

A: UNPOS, TFG andAMISOM identify aconducive office space inMogadishu. Donors support

the JSC with technicaladvice through the SSI trustfund, R: Bureaucraticprocess could delay theestablishment of the JSCSecretariat.

Location of office notproperly consulted to allconcerned parties.R: Violence spreads in run-up

12The 2 Main Assumptions made in this document are:1. that fulfilment of the requirements of the Kampala Accord will enable this NSSP to be valid for 12 months and then indicatively for a further 24 months to

consolidate the political transformation process; and2. that IC funding support will be forthcoming to support Governments own revenues for many of the proposed activities.


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to the end of the transition

1.1.3. Functional NSSPSecretariat

Establish the NSSPSecretariat to effectivelyprovide strategic advisorysupport relevant lineministries and agencies

Baseline : 0

Target : 2 monthsNSSP Secretariat established,NNSP ImplementationCoordinator appointed; staff andequipped with Somalia qualifiedstrategic advisors to support theimplementation of the priorityactions in the NSSP by lineministries, security and justiceagencies/institutions

Lead : Office of thePresident/Office of thePrime Minister

Partners: Ministry foNational Security andInterior, MOD,Justice, SPF, NSF,Custodian corps, NSA,planning, Min ofGender & FamilyAffairs; TFP andCSOs

A: Political will and fundingavailable to establish NSSPSecretariat.

R: Misunderstanding ofroles and responsibilitiesbetween the JSC Secretariatand NSSP Secretariat.

Selection and Recruitmentof strategic advisorscompromised

Organized regularbriefing sessions,seminars and exchangevisits for NationalSecurity Council (NSC)

members

Baseline : One Higher levelSenior Leadership seminar onsecurity decision making processconducted in January, 2011.

Target : 3 to 12 months

At least 5 to 10 briefing sessionsand seminars attended by NSCmembers. Level of understandingof SSD in Somalia, and the rolesand responsibilities of each lineministries clearly understood.

Lead : Office of the

President

Partners: OPM, NSC

members, and

internationalpartners.

A: NSC willingness tocontinue with higher levelbriefings and seminars forMinisters and head ofsecurity and jsutcie

institutions.

R: Ad hoc arrangement,change of ministers andhead of security institutions.Politcial wrangling.

1.1.4. Legal and policyframework

Undertake the reformationof out-dated andincompatible policies andrequirements as well asdraft new laws that are allinclusive.

Baseline : 0

Target for assessment and

drafting: 6 to 9 months.

Establish a policy developmentcoordinating unit. All ministries

OPM Lead

Partners: Allministers areresponsible to bringnew or revised

A: Prioritization of fundingdue to competing priorities,if not prioritized with strictdeadlines.No proper appraisal toministers.R: Lack of competent legal


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existing policy andlegislation conforms tointernational bestpractice and standards

to assess all policy documents andto identify and draft new laws.Ministers to present their draft tothe COM for approval andadoption, then OPM to forwardapproved new laws to be tabled tothe parliament for ratificationbefore dissolution and elections.

documents to theCOM.OPM to devise actionplan with timelines, soeach ministry canreport progress on aweekly basis.

experts to assist ministers.Bureaucratic process withinTFIs or No political support

1.2. Strategic planning 1.2.1 Decentralization ofSecurity Sector Asessment/

Development assistance.

Support the conduct of acomprehensive Security

Sector Assessment (SSA)in all regions of Somalia,that include mapping ofgaps, needs and prioritiesvulnerable sectors, suchas IDPs, women andchildren

Baseline: SSA already completedfor South Central. DPs to fund

Regional

Target : In one year

SSA conducted in other regionsof Somalia, and startimplementation of actions plansconsistent with internationalstandards

Lead : Office of thePresident and Prime

Minister

Target: Regionaladministrations suchas Puntland,Galmugud ,Somaliland . Gedo etc;UN and IC Partners

A: it will be possible toalign regional SSAs for

Federal policy making.R: Lack of cooperationbetween Regionalauthorities;

Political risk in relations toother emergingadministrations in Somalia

1.2.2 National Securitypolicy developmentfollowing the adopting of anew constitution forSomalia

Establish a genderbalanced sub-committeeto develop a NationalSecurity Policy

Baseline: SSA and NSSPImplementation Action Plandeveloped

Target:By 2013

A comprehensive NationalSecurity Policy formulated andpublished for Somalia

Lead: Office of thePresident/PrimeMinister

Partners:MIO,MOD, Ministry ofFinance, TFP, CSOs,Justice, andinternational partners

A: Political decision andleadership, andcommitment to completea national security policy

R: disruption to NSSP

implementation due topolitical wranglingamong the TFIs aboutending the transition

1.2.3 Develop acomprehensive financial

Use external and localresources and engage

Baseline: National budgetaryallocation and SSI Trust Fund.

Office of thePresident;

A: TFG seek private sectorsupport to ensure continuity


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resource mobilizationstrategy that will finance the

implementation of theNSSP.

more with private sectorand diaspora

Bi-lateral arrangements alreadyexist.

Target: 3 monthsDonor pledging conference willfollow circulation of NSSP to IC.

OPM;Ministry of Finance

for MDTF and bi-lateral arrangements.

of funding and manageexpectations for the NSSP

R: Pace of transformationslows/stops during run up toending the politicaltransition

1.3. Policy development on

cross-cutting issues

1.3.1 Protect the SomaliExclusive Economic Zone(EEZ)

Establish a Joint MaritimeAuthority (JMA)

Baseline : Coast guards existwithin the National SecurityForce (NSF) and the SomaliaPolice Force (SPF)

Target : 1 yearPolicy and Legislation draftedand enacted to establish a JMA,support the capacity building ofthe Coast Guard and enhancemonitoring, control andsurveillance (MCS) of SomaliEEZ in accordance with United

Nations Convention of on theLaw of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Action Plan developed in year 2.

Lead:MOD

Partners:Ministry ofMarine Resources,

Ministry of Interior,Ministry of Justice,and internationalpartners

A: Political will, human andfinancial support available

R: security risk to personnel

and civilians, especiallyinternational partners

1.3.2. Maritime Security andCounter piracy policy,legislation and programs

Appoint a Counter PiracyCoordinator under adesignated Minister

Baseline : 0

Target : by 20 January Effectivemaritime security and counterpiracy policy and legislation inconjunction with regional entitiesincluding Puntland State ofSomalia and Somalilandestablished:

Lead :Office of thePrime Minister

Partners: Ministry ofMarine Resources,MOD, ForeignAffairs, Ministry ofInterior, Ministry ofJustice, and relevantinternational partners

A: The securityenvironment continue toimprove; political andtechnical commitmentmaintained

R: Lack of cooperation andcollaboration between theregional entities, includingSomaliland and Puntland.

Develop an integrated Baseline : IOM and UNODC Lead : Ministry of A: Funding and technical


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violence including sexualexploitation and abuse

to sexual violence inconflict in line with

UNSCR 1325, 1820, 1960

and AMISOM.Target:3 months

Task Force, Policy and actionplan developed.

Affairs,Partners: Ministry of

Interior, Ministry ofDefence, Ministry ofLabour & Youth; UNAgencies, UNPOS,UNICEF, IOM,OCHA, UNHCR,AMISOM, and donorpartners

recommendations of relatedUN Security Council

Resolutions on sexualviolence in conflict

Lack of funding to supportsurvivors of violence

1.3.6 Disaster Management Establish a National

Disaster RiskManagementDepartment/structure todevelop a coherent policyframework aligned withthe NSSP implementationmechanism for Somalia

Baseline : NIL

Target: 6 to 12 months

Rehabiliate, equip, and staff astart up National Disaster RiskManagement Department alignwith the overall NSSPframework.

Lead: Office of the

President

Partners: OPM,Ministry of Interiorand National Security,MOD, Fire Services,SPF, NSF and theinternationalcommunity

A: Resources are provided

and the political willmaintained to support theestablishment of a NationalDisaster ManagementDepartment under the officeof the President.R: Potential resistance fromsome line ministries andstate institutions. Legal

instrument not enacted ontime .

1.4.Functional Security

Sector Ministries

1.4.1Ministry of Defence Develop a policy andstrategy on defencetransformation, militaryintegration, wounded inaction (WIA) and killingin action (KIA);collection and control ofweapons, including heavyand small arms,ammunition andexplosives, as well asother dual-use items fromliberated areas;

Baseline : 0

Target :

Within 6 months for policy; 6months for FR and Strategic Plan cascading to 1 year Op Plan andcosting.

Lead MOD/NSF;

Partners: Cabinet,MOI, NSF, ParliamentConsultants andinternational partners;

A: Provided there ispolitical will andcommitment.

R: Lack of commitment,changes in the actors;deterioration of the securitysituation; Lack ofconsultancy funds;


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Establish a SNFtransformation Secretariat

Baseline: 0

Target: 6 monthsSupport the establishment of adefence and militarytransformation Secretariats inMogadishu, South centralSomalia

Lead: MOD

Partners:office of thePresident, primeMinister, Ministry ofInterior, Finance,Justice, planning, andinternational bilateraland multilateralpartners

A: Defence and militarypolicy development and

making,

Documents

Somalia NSSP