Sorin Petrof - Mystification as a Communicational Strategy - Kierkegaard

8/10/2019 Sorin Petrof - Mystification as a Communicational Strategy - Kierkegaard

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Mystification as a Communicational Strategy

The Religios Space of Sren Kierkegaard

Sorin Petrof

PhD Candidate in Communication SciencesUniversit Paul-Valry Montpellier 3

[email protected]

Introduction

In the religious communication field the Danish philosopher Sren Kierkegaard

employed the concept of mystification as a religious practice in order to communicatein very particular way a religious message for someone who is not familiar with.

Apparently, mystification as a concept is prone to have a precise meaning due to its

famous, classical Marxist definition as a plausible misrepresentation of relationship

between socio-economic classes, the ruling one being the one that mystifies the

working mystified. But this is just the most used employment of mystification as a

category of theoretical analysis originating in the context of Marxist political

economic tradition. Mystification as a practice is older than Marx and has survived toits ideological narrative. It is even older than 1750s conservative thinkers from the

Republic of Letters who co-opted the term to describe pranks played on members of

their own social circle.

For the purpose of this paper, the analysis will be focused on religious field of

communication, especially on thinkers like Sren Kierkegaard where the practice of

mystification was employed as a communicational tool in order to reveal a certain

understanding of human processes and how this practice contributed to an extended

meaning of the religious sphere. Here the concept of mystification will be addressed

primarily as a communicational alternative that generates a constructed hierarchy, an

alternate reality experience and a normative mythology. Furthermore, in the language-

meaning ecosystem, the secondary meaning of the concept, as synonym for deception

and dissimulation, while still applicable, mostly would subsist as a transitional

denotation.


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Mystification as an Indirect Communication

In the context of the paradigm of mystification Sren Kierkegaard has introduced a

very interesting concept - the indirect communication1, a topic intensively used

by the Danish philosopher. In his later works he advanced the notion of the

deceptive love something that is manifested for the sake of others (McCreary, p.

27). In the autobiographical work The Point of View for My Work as Author

Kierkegaard is flirting with alternative forms of inter-relationships, but he does it only

in a fixed context, were the transmission of a religious message occurs. This indirect

form of communication is producing a mystification indeed, but this very action could

enlighten the recipient. The scope of this mystification is a paradoxical one - the

deception is used that the other one may be introduced into the truth. Kierkegaard

does not claim any innovative or surprising move when he is suggesting this practice;

the ethical historical precedent is transferred entirely to Jesus Christ.

InPractice in Christianitythe Danish theologian argues that the same motivation of

love had Jesus prompted to obscure his divinity when he became human. For

Kierkegaard, Jesus assumed the deepest incognito taking an unrecognizable2

shape (idem, p 29). This incognito did impossible the recognition of Jesus as divine

being and had the gift of transforming his particular communication into an indirect3

one (ibid.). Therefore, says Kierkegaard, as the incarnation of Jesus requires indirect

communication and adoption of an incognito so individuals who want to show love

for one another will imitate Jesus using the same kind of indirect communication by

adopting a kind of relational incognito, deceiving them in a mediated interaction

in order to be introduced into the truth. Kierkegaard identifies this as an indirect

method of helping others to love God (idem) and this method is called

mystification when someone is trying to deceive someone else in what is true4 .

1 See PhD thesis of Mark A. Tietjien, Kierkegaards Practice of Edification: IndirectCommunication, the Virtues, and Christianity , PhD Dissertation, Baylor University, 2006.2SeePractice in Christianity, 1850, pp. 127-128, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong,Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991.3

See pp. 132-36 fromPractice in Christianity.4See The Point of View for My Work as an Author, 1859, in The Point of View, translated by HowardV. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 21126. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998.


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The deception may consist in assuming a new identity or pretending to agree with

someone else when in fact you are not. All Kierkegaard's approach starts from what

he calls the illusion of Christendom . By that he is not referring to the illusory

character that religion may have on individuals, theme already extensively developed

by Marx5, but to the illusion produced by the Danish Christianity, namely that all

adherents of this religion actually live by the precepts of Christian teachings. Because

of this illusion, says Kierkegaard, to introduce the Christianity in Christendom a

difficult enterprise, the prerequisite for this action being to remove the illusion and

only by indirect communication this work can be done. In this context Kierkegaard

distinguishes between direct communication, the preferred contact method with those

who are ignorant6 in the religious truth and the indirect communication which

arises from the need to make the Christian values available to those who claim that

they already possess them. Where direct communication will fail, one who is

ignorant must be given some attention. . . But for those who are under the illusion,

then the illusion must be removed (1998, 53-54). Kierkegaard actually explains the

meaning of this paradox:

[i]f it is an illusion that all are Christians, and if something is to be done, it

must be done indirectly, not by someone who loudly declares himself to be an

extraordinary Christian, but by someone who, better informed, even declares

himself not to be a Christian. That is, one who is under an illusion must be

approached from behind [1998e, 43].

This occult approach of someone who is under the illusion and achieved by

indirect means is very necessary providing much needed opportunity for direct

communication. For Kierkegaard these indirect means may include, among others, the

disposition to temporarily accept a erroneous opinion or even ideas directly contrary

to their own beliefs in order to establish a communicative bridge to the other party in

order to convince the absurdity of his position that subsequently he may be introduced

5 Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protestagainst real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, andthe soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. Karl Marx, Critique of Hegels

Philosophy of Right. Introduction (1843)6In his Book on Adler, Kierkegaard also mentions Socratess method of indirect communication.

Here, too, the reason for indirect communication was the presence of illusion. For Socrates was awarethat those who should receive the communication were possibly in the untruth of all kinds of illusions;then it would not do to communicate the truth very directly (1998b, 170).


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into the truth, as in the case of Socrates, simulating ignorance in order to engage in a

conversation that produce meaning. The purpose of this deception is to stimulate and

produce a conversation that may lead to the realization of truth. However,

Kierkegaard offers an innocent definition of deception , an action that should not

be based on a dubious motivation or any profane goal but an approach that will

strictly limit to the communication strategy: What is, then, to deceive? It means that

someone will not start a conversation directly with what he would like to

communicate but will assume the illusion of his interlocutor taking it as certainty

(McCreary, p. 31). According to the Danish philosopher what matters in this

communicational construction is the goal, not the method.

But Kierkegaard is aware that when it comes to communicating the essence of the

Christian message the maieutic cannot be the final form because it requires a

temporary suspension of teleology. This could affect the understanding of truth but on

the other hand it would be wrong for not using this temporary suspension, cautious

and contextual, just for the transmission of truth. Eventually, opines Kierkegaard,

transmission must invariably result in direct communication, the transmitter must be

direct and honest about this: Direct communication is: to communicate the truth

directly; communication in reflection is: to deceive into the truth. But since the

movement is to arrive at the simple, the communication in turn must sooner or later

end in direct communication (McCreary, p. 33). Therefore to engage in this

missionary practice of mystification is not a simple action not even desirable one;

it will be limited to special cases, maintaining the exceptional circumstantial nature of

the practice.

Kierkegaard's literary work itself reflects this mystifying nature, the writer being

convinced that the indirect method of communication was much needed in religious

context of his time. His contemporaries lived in a grand illusion, and the essence of

this illusion was, according to Kierkegaard, a form of religion that lacks the aesthetic

Christian axiological content. Therefore, a frontal, direct, transparent approach proved

not only useless but completely unproductive. In this context Kierkegaard was

forced to adjust its strategy, his approach being a concealed one, using literary

pseudonyms to establish a communicative bridge to his contemporaries, but anindirect, mediated and obscure one.


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Kierkegaard called frequent his early works as aesthetic writing a direct reference

to the formal dimension of ceremonial, aesthetic religiosity of his contemporaries,

hence the need to address it in this form (McCreary, pp. 36-38). Also in the same

register the Danish writer refers to his work as an aesthetic deception7 in the form

of an incognito so all his pseudonymous writings are actually maieutic in nature,

although the early ones, while mystifying, being somehow in the service of

Christianity.

After establishing the initial relation between the "mystifier" and the "mystified"

Kierkegaard's role is to lead the audience book by book to the revelation of his late

writings where he is assuming the authorship of the works, directly and openly, to

demonstrate what actually mean to be a Christian. In this way, Kierkegaard begins

with the pseudonymous works, which seem to accept Christendoms illusion as truth,

but only in order to demonstrate its falsehood directly with the later works

(McCreary, pp. 37-38). As can be seen Kierkegaard is convinced that deception

into truth must have a purpose, the latter8works being the culmination of his early,

maieutic, writings that completes them through a direct, transparent and explicit

communication.

The first lines from The Point of View for My Work as an Authorare: A point has

been reached in my authorship where it is feasible, where I feel a need and therefore

regard it now as my duty: once and for all to explain as directly and openly and

specifically as possible what is what, what I say I am as an author (McCreary, p. 38).

By assuming the paternity of his writings Kierkegaard reveal the belief that

mystification is not an end in itself and that the strategy of indirect communication to

understand what it means to be a Christian must be completed in a direct, explicit

communication.

7In regard to the early works being a deception he admits that he did not have a complete overview of the whole dialectical structure from the very beginning of the whole work as an author .Therefore he would justify his actions by saying this: . . . Thus the esthetic writing is surely adeception, yet in another sense a necessary emptying. The religious is decisively present already fromthe first moment, has decisive predominance, but for a little while waits patiently so that the poet isallowed to talk himself out [1998e, 77] . See McCreary, p. 37.8See the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments(1846) the reference point

of Kierkegaard's later works which although written under a pseudonym is considered as a semi-revelation in the author's intentions in passing the "truth", but the work that will reveal mystification is considered The Point of View for My Work as an Author(1848 but published in part in 1851).


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Although Kierkegaard does not use the term "demystification", he is referring to this

process when he says that where a mystification . . . is used in the service of

earnestness, it will be used in such a way that . . . the true explanation is available to

the person who is honestly seeking [it] (McCreary, p. 34).

Therefore the incognito, suggests Kierkegaard, must be permeable enough and the

deception easy to be deciphered if in the end is to be identified as deception. Christ

again provides an handy example for Kierkegaard, because the Danish writer states

that Christs whole life here on earth would indeed have become a game if he had

been so incognito that he had gone through life totally unnoticed (idem).

So the writer's advice is that when someone wants to use mystification as method he

must be sure that the true explanation is at hand for those who seek the truth

earnestly. Here Kierkegaard is closer to the original almost etymological meaning

of the concept of mystification, especially one developed by Goethe and Rousseau.

This meaning was quite familiar and very handy for Kierkegaard a method of

initiation into the mysteries of reason using obscuring, deception, for the other to be

taken to a higher level of understanding and which necessarily must be completed by

a demystification (Jeandillou 1994; Abramson, 2005). However, unlike the French

and German Enlightenment, for Kierkegaard mystification is a sacred and not a

profane practice, not indexed as a game for the aristocratic elite and not even as an

initiating pedagogical method of the mystified into the superior knowledge.

For the Danish writer the mystification can occur only in a certain space and time -

19th century Danish9Christianitya religion the despite its claim cannot provide the

mechanisms for an authentic Christian life, hence the need for the Christianization of

Christianity or the sacralisation of the profane. But this sacralisation cannot occur

through direct communication or collectively but by restricting the communicational

space at individual level through the mystifying approach. This conversion of public10

space into a private one creates the basis for communicating the truth of God to those

9It about the state church in Denmark (Den Danske Folkekirke) formal known as Evangelical Lutheran

Church in Denmark.10In the context of Danish Christianity as state religion, the distinction between the public and privatespace on religious ground is completely useless being branded by Kierkegaard as oxymoron.


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who claim to already know and practice this truth, this newly created space becoming

a sacred one. One who assumes the position of mystifier can do this only from a

fixed, almost still perspective, as he is called only to reproduce the circumstantial and

contextual of Christs example11, motivated by the same love for others. Here's how

the production of meaning in Kierkegaard paradigm of mystification is based on a

prefabricated meaning built already on the historical-ethical precedent of Christ. The

modern apprentice who communicates Christsmessage should assume the status of

imitatio Christi, a perspective where in the context of his approach, the semiotics

is reduced just to an ethical mimicry.

Conclusions

Because the Danish official religion generated the illusion that of truth, Kierkegaard

felt entitled to use mystification, obscuring and deception in order to lead sincerely,

concerned individuals preoccupied of Christianity towards an authentic adoption of

the real, practical values and to dispel the illusion of a single, public, uniform

experience. In other words if the religious illusion is to be shattered, the individual

must be disconnected from the source of that illusions and then initiated on a personal

level to paradoxical another illusion, a temporary but a necessary one in order to

achieve the goal, namely the mystification into truth. Obviously some ethical

objections could formulate here for even using such methods in the first place.

However it should be noted that Kierkegaard himself warned against an irresponsible

using of the practice of mystification always calling for caution and moderation

(McCreary, p 40). In this regard, for Kierkegaard, the mystification must not exceed

the circumstantial context; as indirect method of communication it has already been

revealed in permanent example of Christ; so any attempt to overrun beyond that

and to streamline and secularise the practice of mystification is considered risky

and false . As a language tool, being a symbolic form of communication,

mystification should have an ambivalent character, an ambiguous one, precisely

because the production of the meaning does not suffer a semiotic obstruction.

11 Kierkegaard has proposed even the assuming of an humble, low position in order that themystification effect be quite credible .


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Bibliography

Abramson, J., Learning from Lying: Paradoxes of the Literary Mystification,

Newark, University of Delaware Press, 2005.

Jeandillou, J-F.,Esthtique de la Mystification Tactiques et stratgie littraire,

Paris, Les ditions de Minuit, 1994.

Kierkegaard, S.,Practice in Christianity, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,

1991.

Kierkegaard, S., The Point of View for My Work as an Author, Princeton, N.J.:

Princeton University Press, 1998.

Marx, K., Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right. Introduction (1843).

McCreary, M. L., Deceptive Love: Kierkegaard on Mystification and Deceiving

into the Truth , The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 39, No. 1 (March 2011), pp.

25-47.

Tietjien, M. A., Kierkegaards Practice of Edification: Indirect Communication, the

Virtues, and Christianity , PhD Dissertation, Baylor University, 2006.

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Sorin Petrof - Mystification as a Communicational Strategy - Kierkegaard