Sourcesandpoli/calconsequencesofEuropeanIden/tyamongmasspublics

PaoloBellucci

Thema'cArea4.Masspublics’concep'onsoftheEUandEuropeanci'zenship

PresidioMa>oli–Siena

TheIntUneproject

•  Fundedbythe6°EUFrameworkProgram,2005-2010•  Two surveys (elites andmass) in 16 EUmember states

(plus Serbia and Turkey, first wave only) in 2007 and2009(beforetheEUelec'ons)

•  A study on na'onal experts in Bruxelles (focusedinterviews)

•  Analysis of party manifestos and other partydocumenta'ononEUmaXers

•  Media (TV and newspapers) analysis of narra'ves ofEurope(corpus-assisteddiscourse)

IntUne:Why?

•  TostudyEuropeanCi'zenship(beyondlegalaccounts)

•  Tradi'onal theorising on ci'zenship: from liberal,communitarianandrepublicanperspec'ves.

•  New approaches: transna'onal and mul'culturalci'zenship (Kymlicka 2002; Pa>e, Seyd and Whiteley2004). A de-territorializa'on of poli'cs has occurred(Benhabib2002);thepowerofna'onstateshasshrunk,as transna'onal ins'tu'ons have emphasized universalrights;globalisa'onhasincreasedmigra'onandculturalheterogeneity.

Ci'zenshipI

•  IntUne’s perspec'veonci'zenshipislessradical:itdoes not assume that European ci'zenship mustnecessarilybeofthetransna'onaltype.

•  EU gradually emerged from consensual agreementsamong states, so ‘European ci'zenship is bound tocoexist (probably for a long 'me) with well-establishedna'onaldefini'onsofci'zenship’(CoXaandIsernia,2009)

Ci'zenshipII

•  WeregardEuropeanci'zenshipasbeingcomposedofthreecoreelements(Benhabib2002;CoXaandIsernia2009):

•  iden%ty–theextenttowhichpeoplefeelasenseofbelongingtowardsEurope;

•  representa%on–theextenttowhichtheyconsiderthattheEUrepresentstheireconomicandpoli'calinterests;

•  scopeofgovernance–theextenttowhichtheybelievethattheEUshouldbeprimarilyresponsiblefordecisionmakinginimportantpolicyareas

Iden'ty:acomponentofci'zenship

•  Ac'nginapolitydependsnotonlyonlegalrightsbutalso on the extent people feel that they are fullmembersofthecommunity.

•  Thishappenswhenconsciousnessofmembershipofagroupissalient,thatiswhentheawarenessoftheexistence of a ‘common fate’ relevant to people’spersonallivesbecomeswidespread.

è European iden'ty is studied from theperspec'veof Social Iden'ty Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986):feelingofaXachmenttoasalientgroup

Empiricaldefini'onofEuropeanIden'ty

•  Belonging: two long-serving Eurobarometerques'ons,a)degreeofaXachmentb)self-defini'on

•  Salience: Lilli and Diehl (1999)’s Na'onal Iden'tyreformula'on of the Collec've Self-Esteem ScaleoriginallyproposedbyLuthanenandCrocker(1992)

Fourques'onstotapEuropeanIden'tyinthemasssurvey

•  We use these four measures of European iden'ty along withmul'ple measures of our two other concepts of EuropeanCi'zenship – Representa'on and Scope of Governance – toassessthe‘dimensionality’ofEuropeaniden/ty.• Weuse a factor analy'c approach to assess theextent towhichIden'ty is (or is not) clearly differen/ated from these othercomponentsofci'zenshipinrespondents’minds•  We find that Iden/ty is indeed very clearly differen/atedsta's'callyfromrespondents’no'onsofRepresenta'onandofthetheproperscopeofEUGovernance•  We find also that European Iden'ty (as opposed to bothrepresenta'onand scope) isunidimensional. Any given individualfeels a general sense of European iden'ty – with ‘Europe’ – to agreaterorlesserdegree

HowthesemeasuresofEuropeanIden'tyfromthemasssurveyareused

Thekey(oblimin,rotated)factoranalysis.....Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 Trust in EU Parliament .785 .133 .186 -.173 -.301 -.217 Trust in EU Commission .729 .072 -.015 .066 -.191 -.145 EU Democracy Satisfaction .640 .082 .264 -.234 -.254 -.183 EU Decision-makers are Competent .626 .056 .242 -.289 -.144 -.083 EU should make policy – environment .123 .672 .109 .007 -.161 -.115 EU should make policy – crime .063 .672 .129 .014 -.088 -.023 EU should make policy – unemployment .003 .659 .127 -.086 -.136 -.047 EU should make policy – health -.004 .657 .132 -.100 -.070 -.077 EU should make policy – agriculture .123 .646 .115 -.006 -.153 -.128 EU should make policy – immigration .089 .608 .179 -.165 -.120 -.130 Favours EU responsibility for social security .121 .169 .777 -.189 -.135 -.026 Favours EU responsibility for tax system .060 .179 .723 -.132 -.141 -.095 Favours EU responsibility for foreign policy .233 .153 .691 -.075 -.201 -.002 Favours EU responsibility for regional aid .230 .076 .592 -.405 -.147 .119 Favours Turkey in EU .118 .090 .107 -.814 -.095 -.125 Favours EU enlargement .259 .094 .282 -.802 -.214 -.079 Feels European .306 .115 .146 -.059 -.700 -.203 Attachment to Europe .335 .140 .230 -.106 -.680 -.140 Europe affects me .070 .048 .088 -.091 -.630 .014 European versus National identity .142 .229 .137 -.118 -.617 -.185 EU policymakers ignore our country’s interests -.116 -.124 -.034 .129 .138 .817 EU policymakers don’t care about people like me -.240 -.080 -.039 .040 .155 .788 Rotation sums of squared loadings 2.50 2.81 2.42 1.80 2.24 1.59

PublicopinionholdamoderateratherthanastrongallegiancetoEU:longerlejtail.Howeverno'onofEuropeisreadilyavailableandaccessibletopeople’smind,andnotdevoidofanemo'onalloading

Differences in European Iden'ty (0-10) scale betweencountries (average country scores minus overallaveragescore)

Distribu'onoftheEuropeanBelongingandEuropeanSalience(0-10scale)acrossEurope

VarianceinthepaXernofassocia'onbetweenBelongingandSalienceacrosscountries:- ononeend,Bri'shci'zens:EuropeisquitesalientbuttheyareliXleaXachedtoit- attheopposite,Italians’slevelofEUaXachmentiscomparabletotheirperceivedsalience

Explainingdifferences:micro-macrocontextualfactors(bivariateanalysis)

•  EU Iden'ty does not systema'cally co-vary withsocial structure: educa'on only a moderateassocia'on;classhasnoimpact,soreligion

•  Weak correla'on with lej-right self-placement,moderatewithpoli'calengagement

•  SystemlevelofEUIDnotdependentondura'onofcountry’smembership

•  Average EU ID lower in post-communist countries;higherinhighQualityofGovernancepoli'es

SourcesofEuropeanIden'ty:theore'calperspec'ves

Fourperspec'vesdevelopedover'meinresponsetothe evolving nature of the suprana'onal Europeanarena:

u Cogni'vemobilisa'onu Instrumentalra'onalityu Poli'calmobilisa'on/judgementalheuris'csu Affec've/iden'tarian

Cogni'vemobilisa'on

•  Associatedwith early analysesof integra'onCM focusesonindividual resources and value orienta'ons held to affectEuropeana>tudes(Inglehart,1977;1979)

•  Knowledge,informa'onexposure,post-materialistvalues•  Cosmopolitanism seen as a source for developing allegiance

toasuprana'onalcommunity•  Later analyses focused both on individual resources and on

lifeexperiences(travel,foreignlanguages)•  Mediaplays a role by providing visibility to rela've abstract

en'tysuchasEurope(Dies-Medrano,2003;Bruter,2005)

Instrumentalra'onalityI

•  Early trade-economic focus of EU integra'on fosteredresearchondeterminantsofEUa>tudesintermsofra'onalcalcula'ons of individual and collec've costs and benefitsaccruing from Europe (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel,1998)

•  Egocentric individualism: individual posi'on in the labourmarketasloser/winnerfromfreemovementofcapital/labour

•  Sociotropicu'litarism:country’scompe''veadvantagefromlesseningtradebarriers

•  Percep'on of group interests being threatened in thealloca'onofwelfarebenefitsbyimmigra'on(McLaren,2006)

Instrumentalra'onalityII•  Butisnotinstrumentalra'onalityquitedistantfromsocial

iden'ty?•  No. Iden'fica'on can also be an instrumental choice: ‘an

individualisinstrumentallyaXachedwhenheseesthesystemasaneffec'vevehicleforachievinghisends’(Kelman,1969)

•  Social Iden'ty Theory highlights the mo'va'onalunderpinning of iden''es. Choice-based process ofiden'fica'on with a group can be based on differentmo'va'ons: social mobility, rela've depriva'on, percep'onofrealis'cgroupsinterest(Huddy,2001)

•  EUiden'tymaydrivenfromamul'plicityof‘ra'onalchoice’factors:directeconomicinterests,desiretoenhancepoli'caleffec'veness,higherinterna'onalstatus

Poli'calmobilisa'on/judgementalheuris'cs/cues

•  Mainidea:masspercep'onsofEuropearedefinedinna'onalpoli'cal arenas. Par'es, poli'cal elites andmassmediamay‘cue’ voters in their views of Europe and its ins'tu'ons(HoogheandMarks,2005)

•  Peopleuse ‘proxies’ (Anderson,1998):exampleofheuris'csinclude quality of governance, democra'c sa'sfac'on, trustinna'onalandEuropeanins'tu'ons,par'sanship.

•  Key point:whatmechanisms atwork? Theymay operate inoppositedirec'on

•  Transferheuris/csproject towardsEuropeposi've/nega'vefeelingsorigina'ngfromthedomes'cpoli'calsystem

•  Subs/tu/on heuris/cs look to Europe to compensate fordomes'cna'onalfailings

Affec've/iden'tarianperspec'ves•  Social sciencehassince longrecognized the importance

ofloyal'esandiden''esasenduringsourcesofpoli'calbehaviour

•  This approach has achieved greater prominence in the

wake of the rising Euroscep'cism that followed theMaastricht Treaty. An'-EU and populist par'es’ targetwaspeople’sheartsandfeelingratherthanthestateoftheirpocketbooks.

•  Two main disputes in literature: a) reciprocaldependence between na'onal and European iden''esb) the meanings associated in people’s minds withna'onal/suprana'onaliden''es

Inclusive/exclusiveiden''esascribed/achievedmeanings

•  Na'onal iden'ty constrains EU iden'ty to the extent theformer competes with the laXer (exclusive iden'ty). Thisconstraining effect does not operate if mul'ple ‘inclusive’iden''escoexist

•  Na'onal and European iden''es may have different

contents: the formermainly seen in ascrip've (cultural andethnic)terms; the laXer in achieved/acquired (poli'cal andcivic)terms(Rui-Jimenezetal.2004)

•  Thisdis'nc'on is relevant also forna'onal iden''es (HallerandResler,2006;Ba>stelliandBellucci,2002)

FactoranalysisconfirmsthatthereareclearAscrip'veandAchieveddimensionstothemeaningsofNa'onalandEuropeaniden'ty

Factor 1 Ascribed

Factor 2 Achieved

Be National – Christian .699 .083 Be National – Born .805 .169 Be National – Parents .835 .152 Be National – Culture .411 .545 Be National – Respect Law -.070 .803 Be National – Feel .423 .565 Be National – Language .151 .665 Percent variance explained 32 25 Factor 1

Achieved Factor 2 Ascribed

Be European – Christian -.051 .702 Be European – Born .244 .814 Be European – Parents .253 .816 Be European – Culture .616 .322 Be European – Respect Law .770 -.005 Be European – Feel .743 .212 Be European – Language .688 .051 Percent variance explained 30 28

• VarimaxrotatedfactoranalysesindicatethatthereisanAscrip/veandanAchievedcomponentofbothNa'onalandEuropeanIden'ty,withthesamevariablesloadingoneachfactoratbothNa/onalandEuropeanlevels• Getthesamebasicresultiftheanalysisisconductedseparatelyfor:

• EliteversusMass• EastversusWest• MenversusWomen...

b beta b betaCognitive Mobilisation

Left-Right extreme .00 .01

Education .07** .03 Affective/Identitarian

Political Influence .05*** .06 Trust other

Europeans .06*** .07Media Exposure .02** .03 National

Attachment .16** .06Political Sophistication .08*** .10 Regional

Attachment .17*** .07Visited EU Countries .10*** .08 Town

Attachment -.08** -.03Non Electoral Participation .03** .03 Achieved

National Identity .07*** .06Instrumental Rationality . Ascribed

National Identity -.02* -.03EU Personal Benefits .83*** .21 Macro

Contextual Variables

EU National Benefits .39*** .09 Communist Past/

not -.73* -.18Retrospective economic evaluation

.04 .02 Trade Openness .00 .08Political mobilization

Quality of Governance -.08 -.03

EU Institutional Trust .20*** .19 Macro-Micro

Interaction EU Representation - Efficacy

.04*** .05 Quality of Governance LOW * National Institutions Confidence

.09* .03

National Institutional Confidence

-.07** -.07 Demographic Control

Variables

Not shown

Pro-EU Party Identifier .01 .01 Constant 4.7*** Left-Right Ideology .00 .00

OLSN.=16133Adj.R2=.30Panelcorrectedstandarderrors

4.42

4.62

4.82

5.02

5.22

-4.49 -1.99 0.51 3.01 5.51

National Institutional Confidence

Quality of Governance = LOW Quality of Governance = MEDIAN Quality of Governance = HIGH

Eur

opea

n Id

entit

y

EuropeanIden'tyandNa'onalIns'tu'onalConfidenceaccordingtoQualityofGovernance

Sowhat?WhatdrivesEUiden'ty?•  Doallthefourtheore'calperspec'vescarrythesameexplanatory

power? For each we built an addi've comprehensive index(rescaled0-10):

•  Cogni'vemobilisa'on:b=.27•  Instrumentalra'onality:b=.21•  Poli'calmobiliza'on/heuris'cs:b=.15•  Affec've/iden'tarian:b=.15

•  Country’s system level features do not impact significantly on EUiden'ty:within-systemvarianceisfargreaterthatbetween-systemvariance.Notablyexcep'on:Communistpast

Identity

Representation Scope

.45

.27

.83

.49

.40

.53

EUci'zenship:ReciprocaleffectsamongEUIden'ty,Representa'onandScope(3SLS)

EUSupport EUvote

Iden'ty .07 .12

Representa'on .09 .03*

Scope .17 .02*

R2 .18 .04

*Notsignificant

So what? The behavioural consequences of EUci'zenship: support for EU integra'on and vo'ng attheEPelec'ons