SOUTHEAST ASIA SERIESVol. XXV No. 4

(Micronesia)

THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Part III: Micronesia

by Donald M. Topping

March 1977

Micronesia. The tiny islands. The Lilliput ofOceania lying just north of the equator, some ofwhose citizens are now trying to tie down theirGulliver. For the past 31 years, Gulliver has beenthe United States government, first through itsDepartment of Navy (1944-1951), and later throughthe Department of Interior, with close supervisionand support from the Departments of Defense andState, and the CIA. While there have been threeprevious Gullivers, none has the unique relation-ship that the United States has had with the123,000 inhabitants (1973) of the Trust Territory ofthe Pacific Islands (as the islands are known offi-cially).

its broadest sense are not synonymous. CulturalMicronesia would have to include the GilbertIslands and Nauru, which are not part of the TTPI.If the Marianas are to be considered Micronesian(some would argue on linguistic grounds that theyare not), we must include Guam in Cultural Micro-nesia but not as part of the TTPI. The TTPI alsoincludes two inhabited atolls whose people are purePolynesian (Kapingamarangi and Nukuoro). Whenmost people today (excluding anthropologists andlinguists) use the term Micronesia, they mean theTTPI, which is the way we shall use the term in thispaper to include the Caroline, Marshall, andMariana Islands, but excluding Guam.

The more than two thousand islands of Micro-nesia are indeed small, appearing as mere speckson wall-sized maps. By far the biggest is Guam,which has but a minuscule 225 square miles, muchof which is in steep volcanic hills (1,300 feet maxi-mum). The smallness of the other 200-plusinhabited islands is difficult to grasp, especially thetiny coral atolls that provide the only land area forthe 25,000 Marshallese and large numbers of Caro-linians. The islands of Polynesia and Melanesiaappear as veritable land masses in comparison.

In the emerging game of the International Lawof the Sea, it may not be the size of the individualislands that counts, but the amount of water theyembrace. Micronesia covers more than threemillion square miles of it stretching nearly halfwayacross the North Pacific. Economic control of thesewaters is one of the important items that theMicronesians are especially concerned about intheir discussions with the United States about thefuture political status of their islands.

The term Micronesia can be misleading. PoliticalMicronesia, which is the Trust Territory of thePacific Islands (TTPI), and Cultural Micronesia in

The first of the 2,241 islands of Micronesia to bevisited by a European were the Marianas, whenMagellan reportedly landed on Guam in 1521, justprior to going to the Philippines, 1,500 miles to thewest. Spanish missions were established in theMarianas as early as 1668, which sealed Spain’slong unchallenged claim until 1898, when she gaveup Guam to the United States and sold her re-maining Pacific possessions to Germany. Eventhough she got an early start in Micronesia, Spaindid not move into the Caroline Islands, eastern andwestern, until much later in the nineteenth century,and she never entered the Marshall Islands, whichform the third group of present-day politicalMicronesia. While Spain was laying claim to theCarolines, Germany in 1885 assumed the Marshallsas a Protectorate, primarily to safeguard Germanbusiness interests already established there and inNauru.

While Spain concentrated her efforts in theCarolines and Marianas on establishing missionsand Christian education for a few, Germany wasdeveloping her efforts toward making theMarshalls pay off through copra production. AfterSpain was forced out of the Pacific in 1898,

Copyright (C) 1977, American Universities Field Staff, Inc.

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Germany made a rather weak attempt to exerciseindirect control through traditional chiefs and toinitiate economic development (mainly copra)among her new possessions in the Carolines and theMarianas, but with little success. The UnitedStates, meanwhile, established her part of theSpanish-American War spoils as a military base(Navy), which Guam has been ever since.

The brevity of German control of Micronesia(1898-1914) was no doubt largely responsible forthe lack of any significant development or lastinginfluence in the Carolines and Marianas. For themost part, the Micronesians of these two areas wereleft with their own political systems to continuetheir subsistence style of living, with a few of thembeing sent to attend the few German schools pro-vided by the Protestant and Catholic missionaries.What little the Germans had accomplished in 1914was swept under by the comparatively long periodof Japanese rule from 1914 to 1945. Upon beingawarded control by a League of Nations mandate,the Japanese, who treated Micronesia as an integralpart of Japan, entered into a development schemewhich provided a considerable amount of economicsupport for the islanders as well as for thousands ofJapanese and Okinawan expatriates. By 1938, 58percent of the population of Micronesia wasJapanese.

along with "bathroom," "movie," and "baseballglove."

The most evident of the Japanese vestiges are thematerial remnants of World War II, ranging fromsunken aircraft carriers in the Truk lagoon to thetibias and femurs that are still being picked fromthe jungles and waters of Saipan, Peleliu, Yap, andTruk. Such souvenirs provide the main attractionfor the thousands of Japanese veterans, mourners,and priests who can be seen in virtually all parts ofMicronesia visiting battlegrounds and warmemorials, thereby reviving the memories ofmiddle-aged Micronesians for the bygone days.

The World War II years were hard on theMicronesians. Many were forced into labor by theJapanese in preparation of their defenses. Whenthe fighting came to the islands it caused wide-spread devastation and loss of life, partly becausethe islands are so small that they afford little roomfor protection. Food supplies became scarce as theJapanese supply lines were cut off and everyone wasforced to turn to the land and sea for survival.Micronesians could not understand why theyshould have to pay such a high toll for a warbetween two foreign powers who were using theirislands as the battlefield, and who killed more than5,000 Micronesians in the process.

Nostalgic Micronesians still rave about theJapanese period of civil administration as one ofbustling activity and prosperity, much of it theresult of enforced, though usually compensated,labor. A fully Japanese-staffed education system tothe sixth grade was established in each of thedistrict centers, a system which produced, espe-cially in Palau and the Marianas, the basis for fur-ther education of a core of elite whose continuedfluency in spoken and written Japanese attests tothe quality of their training.

Vestiges of the Japanese period are evident every-where, from such names as Tosiwo Nakayama, theTrukese President of the recent ConstitutionalConvention, to the ubiquitous soba, the Japanesenoodle soup so popular in Palau and the Marianas.Vocalists in the nightclubs of Koror, Palau’s Dis-trict Center, wail out love songs of Palauan lyricsset to Japanese pop songs of the 1930s, and in Yapand the Marianas one still hears such terms asben.jo, kachido, and gurobu in everyday speech

At the end of World War II Micronesia cameunder the aegis of still another caretakerthefourth in less than a century. By a special arrange-ment, unique in the history of colonialism, theislands of Micronesia were placed in the hands ofthe United States as a Strategic Trusteeship of theUnited Nations. While there were 11 trusteeshipsfollowing World War II, all but one having nowbeen terminated, there was only one StrategicTrust, the status of which can be changed only by aunanimous vote in the United Nations SecurityCouncil. This regulation requiring unanimity of theSecurity Council is probably the most crucial factorin determining Micronesia’s future political status,for no matter what the Mieronesians may desire,either the United States or the Soviet Union isalmost sure to veto.

The reason for the strategic nature of thistrusteeship becomes apparent when one considersthe enormous area of water surrounding theislands. Even in the innocent days of 1945, before

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people realized that fishing areas were being de-pleted or that seabed mineral deposits heldenormous potential, the U.S. government was con-vinced of Micronesia’s military importance, andwas determined to retain in safe hands what hadbeen gained through the greatest military effort ofall time. While the United States could not simplytake possession, as was done during the colonialperiod, she managed to gain close control with UNblessing. Still, accusations of postwar colonialismare increasing as United Nations membershipincludes a growing number of recently decolonizedcountries, and as the anticolonialist wave sweepsfrom the south into the north Pacific. Since theU.S.-TTPI relationship comes ultimately under theSecurity Council, however, the charges thus far inthe Trusteeship Council of the UN GeneralAssembly have brought little response. Today thepressure is intensifying from both within the TTPIand withoutoften from the UN visiting teamsfor a change in the political status. The debate onwhat the outcome will be has been the preoccupa-tion of Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams(recently replaced by Philip Manhard)and theMicronesian Political Status Commission since1971 when President Richard M. Nixon appointedthe President of the Asia Foundation to this specialambassadorial post. The negotiating team on theMicronesian side consisted of 12 appointedmembers of the Congress of Micronesia.

Two negotiators were selected from each of thesix official districts of Micronesia" Marianas, Yap,Palau, Truk, Ponape, Marshalls. Had they followedthe original UN trusteeship agreement, negotiatorson both sides should be aiming toward some formof self-government. For the past seven years,however, negotiations have been carried on, underCIA surveillance, as though the two parties hadentirely different goals, for they seem to be nocloser to an agreeable termination of the trustee-ship status than they were seven years ago. And,while the negotiators continue to use the termsCommonwealth, Free Association, and Indepen-dence, the political unit known as the TTPIappears to be heading toward fragmentation.

Although the trusteeship agreement does notstipulate the political unity of Micronesia, theUnited States has always acted as if it did. And atthe same time, the United States has obviouslyassumed that self-government, which is clearly

stipulated in the trusteeship agreement, meantfollowing the American model.

In 1949, under the Naval administration, thedemocratic secret ballot system was introduced forpurposes of forming legislative bodies in each of thesix districts. Their initial functions were largelyadvisory and, except in the Marshall Islands, noprovisions were made to include any significantparticipation by traditional Micronesian leaders.By 1965, the bicameral Congress of Micronesia(COM) was formed, with new senators and repre-sentatives from all parts of the TTPI meeting at theformer CIA complex on Capitol Hill in Saipan,where the High Commissioner and the TTPI head-quarters are located. This attempt to create unityout of the dozen scattered cultural groups of Micro-nesia brought together the first batch of young,American-educated Micronesians in a politicalbody whose charge was to start the long processtoward a new, self-governing political entity, thepattern for which had been cut and laid out by theUnited States. The pieces were far from being sewntogether.

During the first decade of its life, the COM triedhard but unsuccessfully to hold the six districtstogether. Despite the genuine efforts of Micro-nesian congressmen from all six districts, theunderlying resistance to unity finally surfaced in1972, and in 1976 the first fragment broke off. TheMarianas moved out of the TTPI framework andinto a Commonwealth association with the UnitedStates. The move, which was strongly encouragedby the United States, has precipitated demands forseparate status talks by the political leaders ofPalau and the Marshall Islands. Defying all logic,however, the United States has stiffly refused toconsider separate negotiations with other indi-vidual districts on the basis of the U.S.commitment to unity. But having set a precedentwith the Marianas, it is most likely that the UnitedStates will be forced by international judgment toconsider separate negotiations with the two dis-senting districts, whose basic issues will be dis-cussed later in this Report.

The concept of a unified, self-governing Micro-nesia was naive from the start. The organization ofthe far-flung, disparate island groups into oneidealized group may have simplified the adminis-tration (although the army of bureaucrats in

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Bureaucracy flourishes in Mieronesia, where it is fed by $80 million in annual appropriations. Photocourtesy Floyd Takeuehi.

Saipan would belie it), but it could not erase thevery real differences caused by linguistic and geo-graphical factors.

The almost 3,000 miles separating Palau fromthe Marshall Islands seem but a short step in com-parison with the remoteness between their lan-guages, social organization, and traditional polit-ical systems. Until the colonial period, there waspractically no awareness of each other’s existence.And in areas where there was precontact inter-action, such as that between Truk and Ponape, thetraditional relationship was marked by hostility,some of which persists today. Even the newproximity provided by jet aircraft (Continental Air-lines) and electronic communications does little todiminish each district’s awareness of a separateidentity which translates into suspicion of theironce-distant neighbors.

as it had been since the end of World War II. Whenthe Department of the Interior took over theadministration of Micronesia in 1951, it simplyfollowed the Navy’s practice of restricting travelwithin Micronesia to government employees whousually traveled on the once-weekly 13-passengerSA-16 seaplanes from Guam, the headquartersfrom 1954 to 1962, to the districts. Indeed,Interior’s administration was so similar to theNavy’s that no one thought it strange that theNorthern Marianas alone (except for Rota) wasunder Navy administration from 1953 to 1962, longafter the rest of the islands of Micronesia had beentransferred to Interior. Only later was it acknowl-edged that it wasn’t really the Navy after all, butrather the CIA which had appropriated nearly halfof Saipan to conduct a massive training project forNationalist Chinese whose plan was to retake thePeople’s Republic of China.

Beginning with the Kennedy administration inthe early ’60s, the United States began to realizethat Micronesia could not be kept secluded forever,

Developments in other parts of the colonialThird World, including those in Polynesia, joltedthe new Democrats in Washington into awareness

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that the United States, during more than 15 yearsof postwar administration, had done absolutelynothing toward helping Micronesia develop towardeconomic self-reliance and political self-govern-ment as outlined in the Trusteeship Agreement.Western Samoa was granted full independence in1962, Tonga in 1965, the same year in which theCook Islands became self-governing. By compari-son, the United States was obviously extremely slowin the process of decolonization, and the UN Com-mittee of 24 on Decolonization, established in 1960,would serve as a constant reminder.

With characteristic Kennedy fervor, the UnitedStates set out to make up for lost time, and in theprocess made many large errors, some tragic,others humorous in retrospect. Stories of both typeshave become modern legends throughout Micro-nesia, and serve as common fare for barroomchatter.

Many of the false startssuch as the ferro-cement boatyard in Truk and the miracle rice inPonaperesulted from the recommendationsmade by well-meaning economists from NathanAssociates and a team of experts who produced adocument called the Solomon Report, which re-mained highly classified before its cover was blownten years later by a Palauan student of journalismat the University of Hawaii. Among the recom-mendations of the Nathan and Solomon studieswere: (1) Move all outer-islanders to district centersfor convenience of management; (2) Saturate theislands with American teachers, preferably PeaceCorps, whose primary function would be "to teachthe English language, and patriotic songs andrituals."

The Peace Corps was alerted to go to Micronesiaas early as 1962. The plan did not materialize onthe grounds that the two government depart-mentsInterior and Peace Corpswould be, ineffect, competing. Instead of sending Peace Corps,Washington increased the annual budget for theTTPI from $5 to $15 million (plus supplements)in order to permit, among other things, thehiring of 300 more American contract teachers,and provide new housing for them, even on outerislands. The houses, built by a Guam contractor,were ordered to be first class, American style, com-plete with indoor plumbing and a private generatorwhich could fuel the electric stove, freezer, washerand dryer which came with each house. (Most of

the houses on the outer islands were occupied bycontract teachers for less than two years, stood forseveral more years as empty monuments to anotherscheme that failed, then were finally occupied byMicronesian residents.)

While the accelerated (and usually frantic)teacher program was under way, other types ofdevelopmental activity suddenly began to blossom.On the political front the most important event wasthe formation of the Congress of Micronesia (COM)which held its first session in Saipan’s Capitol Hillcomplex in the summer of 1965. Its 12 senators and21 representatives, most of them young andAmerican educated, entered the arena rathertimidly, knowing that the all-powerful High Com-missioner, a Washington appointee, could vetoanything since he exercised absolute control overthe purse strings. The first few sessions of the COMwere hardly more than rehearsals for the day whenthe administration would be forced to shift itsattitude toward accepting the Micronesian law-makers as something other than a bunch of politenative boys with engaging smiles. Indeed, most ofthe smiles have been lost during the educationalprocess which is still going on.

Efforts at economic development during the1960s were more diffuse, more costly, and, asidefrom the price support of copra and the establish-ment of a fish storage facility in Palau, a totalfailure. Job opportunities grew proportionately togovernment growth, which was considerable duringthe expansive years of the 1960s, when annual Con-gressional appropriations were increased by asmuch as 300 percent. Most of the new jobs were,not surprisingly, in the Department of Education,whose 2,500 employees (more than one-third of the7,000 salaried government employees in Micro-nesia) work toward the U.S.-transplanted goal offree, universal education through the secondarylevel for all Micronesians. (There are now 30 highschools in Micronesia, of which 14 are private.)

Other economic development schemes haveincluded trochus shell farming, ramie, fishponds,crocodile farms, miracle rice, ferro-cement boats,and a handicraft industry. Aside from a smallhandicraft shop in each district center, all effortshave resulted in failure. Even today, Mieronesia’sexports, except for copra (and, as of December1976, coconut oil from Palau’s new processingplant), fish (caught by Okinawan and Taiwanese

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fishing boats and stored in Palau’s freezer), and afew boxes of Ponapean pepper, have been nil, whileimports have steadily climbed.

Such a drastic imbalance can last only as long asthe government provides jobs, a situation that hasbegun to look gloomy indeed, especially to the3,000 high school graduates of the class of 1976,more than half of whom have gone abroad on gov-ernment scholarships for some type of tertiary edu-cation, thereby postponing the day when they andmany hundreds of other Micronesians return homewith college degrees and certificates in search ofnonexistent white collar jobs. Such hopelessprospects may be partly responsible for the phe-nomenally high suicide rate in Micronesia in the 16to 26 age group (70 per 100,000 in 1975). Surpris-ingly, the bleak employment situation has not yetled to any outmigration to the United States, exceptfor the 3,000-4,000 Palauans now living abroad,either in the United States or other parts of Micro-nesia.

In sum, the American economic developmentplans of the 1960s did not work in Micronesia, de-spite the infusion of nearly 800 Peace Corps Vol-unteers in 1966, most of whom were already intraining before the COM agreed to accept them.Under direct orders from President Lyndon B.Johnson, the Peace Corps dredged through its filesof new and previously rejected applicants to fill thelargest Peace Corps contingent of any place in the

world to serve a total population of 100,000. (Hadthe PCVs been sent to India in proportionate num-bers, there would have been five million of them!)

Unfortunately for the Johnson administration,the Peace Corps scheme in Micronesia did notaccomplish its mission of winning the hearts andminds of Micronesians. Young Peace Corpslawyers, who were advising the COM and indi-viduals on legal matters, especially those relating toland, became a thorn in the side of the TTPI ad-ministration, which demanded their removal.Upon learning of this, the COM demanded reten-tion of the lawyers or removal of all Peace CorpsVolunteers. The Peace Corps remained withlawyers, but in somewhat reduced numbers.Growing disillusionment among the PCVs overVietnam and America’s colonialist policy in Micro-nesia began to find its way into the Micronesiancommunity in the late 1960s, as did marijuana andother "radical" elements.

The young Micronesian students who were re-turning in ever-increasing numbers from Americanuniversities during the late 1960s and early ’70swere also bringing ideas to Micronesia which wereleading to a more critical look at America’s policythere. In their eyes, the young men of the firstCOM, who were educated during the previousdecade, became the "old men" of Micronesia,legislators and "localized" administrators who had

"Modern" Micronesianhouse in Palau, wherenative materials have beenreplaced by corrugatediron and plywood from theUnited States.

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fallen neatly in step with the American system.According to the young turks, only a few of whomhave succeeded to even minor political positions,the American system should be scrutinized muchmore closely before any serious and permanentpolitical decisions can be made.

Whether it was the influence of the Peace Corps,the young radical Micronesians, or simply thechanging times, Micronesians, through the COMand other bodies, began to press for an end tostagnation in Micronesia. Talk about a terminationdate for the Trusteeshipa question that theUnited States has assiduously tried to avoid untilrecentlybegan to surface, as did rather louddemands for economic activities to help support the70 percent of working age people who do not havejobs in what is coming to be a money-based (asopposed to subsistence-based) economy. By 1971,the rumblings had grown pretty loud. The smalltrickle of tourism developed by Continental andJapan Airlines was far from satisfying the economicdemands. The question of future political statushad to be squarely faced.

Sensing that the Micronesians had perhapsreached a turning point, and pressed by develop-ments in the UN, the United States began to movemore quickly on several fronts. While AmbassadorWilliams and the 12 Micronesians of the JointPolitical Status Commission of the Congress ofMicronesia proceeded to talk seriously aboutMicronesia as a political entity, most Micronesiansalready felt that TTPI fragmentation was inevi-table.

In a 1960 island-wide referendum, the inhabi-tants of the Marianas had indicated a desireto join their Guamanian brothers as permanentcitizens of the United States. The electorate inSaipan, Rota, and Tinian voted overwhelmingly infavor; the Guamanian voters, smug and protectiveof their decade-old U.S. citizenship, turned it downflat (ironic in view of Guam’s current pleas for rein-tegration and the Northern Marianas’ resoluteresistance). In 1972, when the Marianas beganasking for separate negotiations, they got a positiveresponse. In the face of criticism from the UN andthe COM, the United States, seeing that fragmen-tation might lead more quickly to strong politicalalliances, arranged for a separate Marianascovenant to be drafted and voted upon, the terms of

which would place the Marianas in a permanentCommonwealth relationship with the UnitedStates. With 90 percent of the registered voterscasting 78 percent of their ballots in favor of theCommonwealth status in June 1975, the firstfragment of Micronesia fell into the U.S. basket.

While dealing separately with the Marianas onthe one hand, the United States persisted in itsposition demanding unity for Micronesia, or whatwas left of it, in the political status negotiations.The Micronesians, on the other hand, sought arelationship with the United States--termed FreeAssociationpatterned after the Cook Islandsagreement with New Zealand. (J.W. Davidson,advisor to Western Samoa and the Cook Islandswhen their constitutions were drafted, was retainedby the Micronesians on the Political Status Com-mission.) Under this proposed arrangement, theFree Association status could be terminated uni-laterally by either party. Finally, the United Statescompromised on "Free Association" status for theremaining five districts, insisting still on a unifiedMicronesia (less the Marianas), and rejectingoutright the requests for separate negotiations withPalau and the Marshall Islands.

In an effort to prevent further fragmentation, orperhaps to settle the status question before Palauand the Marshalls became completely intractable,the United States pushed for a Micronesia-widereferendum and a 90-day, million dollar Consti-tutional Convention, which began one week afterthe referendum in summer 1975. Micronesiansvoted overwhelmingly for the unity of Micronesia,while the delegates to the Con-Con suppressed theirdifferences long enough to produce a draft consti-tution for the Federated States of Micronesia. Theink from the 43 signatures was hardly dry beforethe document was rendered meaningless by thewithdrawal of the Marshalls and Palau.

The hypocrisy of separate negotiations with theMarianas while pleading for unity in the politicalstatus negotiations for Micronesia, bolstered by asham Constitutional Convention, did not gounnoticed by the Micronesians. As Carl Heine, aMarshallese author and political scientist put it:"As the United States sees it, the current negotia-tions are not so much about the future ofMicronesia, as they are about the future role ofMicronesia as a military base in the Pacific." While

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such insight is not new to Micronesians, publicexpression of it is a fairly recent phenomenon, andmay be one of the primary reasons for the stepped-up U.S. efforts to settle the political status issue by1981, a date which some Micronesians, especiallythose from the nonseparatist bloc (Yap, Truk, andPonape), view as too soon.

Undaunted, the U.S. administration carries onits program of Education for Self-Governmentwhich is supposed to lead to a Micronesia-wideplebiscite on the draft constitution. The UnitedStates originally wanted the political educationprogram conducted by the United StatesInformation Service (USIS), but in the face ofMicronesian opposition settled for an ex-PeaceCorps Volunteer as director, whose work is care-fully screened by Washington before being dis-tributed to the people. Intentionally noncontro-versial in content, the posters, pamphlets (trans-lated into different languages when translators areavailable), and radio programs of the Education forSelf-Government Project are described as stilted,boring, and communicating very little meaningfulinformation to the majority of Micronesians.

Parallel to the crash program in the politicalarena is a development program bolstered bymillions of U.S. dollars, some bestowed throughdirect appropriations and others by such means asthe military Civic Action Teams which, since the

early 1970s, have been conducting spectacularbuilding programs resulting in new roads, bridges,docks, irrigation systems, and athletic fields, toname but a few of the more visible projects, none ofwhich included any Micronesian training or par-ticipation.

While the budget appropriations for the TTPIwent from $15 million per annum in 1963 to $80

million in 1976, more and more federal programswere extended to Micronesia. Head Start, BilingualEducation, school lunch programs, USDA surplusfood, and food stamps are but a few of the manyfederal programs that have become available in thepast few years. The most recent and conspicuousbonanza is in the war claims payments made in1976, 31 years after the end of the fighting. Indi-vidual checks of up to $180,000 are exchanged forautomobiles, pickups, plane tickets, and lots ofbooze.

The overall effect of this new American largess inMicronesia is greater dependency than ever, a farcry from the self-reliance that was stipulated in theUN mandate. One hears quite frequently thecharge that the United States does not wanteconomic development in Micronesia, preferring tobuy the people off. Such criticism no doubtpersuaded the administration to allow the UNDPto comply with the COM’s 1974 request to producea truly Micronesian economic development plan.

Medical care in Micronesiais free, while the growingmalnutrition eats away atmodest salaries which buyimported foodstuffs. Photocourtesy Floyd Takeuchi.

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The result was the Five Year Indicative Develop-ment Plan for Micronesia completed in July 1976.

The UNDP team was the first non-U.S, organi-zation to make such a study in Micronesia since1945. The authors view it as the "first attempt byMicronesians to chart their own economic andsocial development in the thirty-one years since theend of World War II." The report went on toobserve that, "Micronesia finds itself with aneconomy that is grossly distorted in favor of a largecadre of highly paid government workers, whilesixty percent of its people still live in subsistenceeconomy." Seeking remedies, the Five Year Indica-tive Development Plan stresses the absolute need tocut back on government bureaucracy, extreme belt-tightening in social services, lowering of expecta-tions, and an increase in production of Micro-nesia’s resources, copra and fish, both of which re-quire backbreaking, unsophisticated work. SomeMicronesians have praised the plan as being thefirst realistic one in the history of the Americanadministration. The more cynical shrug it off asanother study that is unlikely to change the ways intheir 31-year-old welfare state, parts of which havedeveloped a Micronesian-styled cargo cult thatwould match any in Melanesia in terms of strength(not surprising in view of the amount of cargoduring the past five years).

There has never been much doubt about the U.S.intention to keep Micronesia within the Americandomain in perpetuity. During the Republicanadministrations of the 1950s the Strategic TrustAgreement was sufficient to maintain control at areasonably low cost. But with the establishment ofthe UN Special Committee on Decolonization in1960 and the beginnings of change in the ThirdWorld order, the new Kennedy administration hadto act to keep the critics at bay" President Kennedycommissioned a Task Force that produced thehighly classified Solomon Report.

In approving the Task Force in NASN No. 145,according to the Solomon Report,

The President... set forth as U.S. policy themovement of Micronesia within our politicalframework. In keeping with that goal, thememorandum called for accelerated devel-opment of the area to bring its political,

economic and social standards into line withan eventual association.

The question of how much it would cost to buyoff the Micronesians through the respectabledemocratic process of a plebiscite, rather thanholding on by force, was given careful thought bythe authors of the Solomon Report.

What should be the content and cost of theminimum capital investment and operatingprogram to insure a favorable vote in theplebiscite, and what should be the contentand cost of the maximum program thatcould be effectively mounted to develop theTrust Territory more rapidly.

And as the pressure mounts for a resolution of thequestion of the future political status for Micro-nesia, the annual cost of the cargo goes up appre-ciably.

The Nixon administration believed that theislands of Micronesia should be able to pay forthemselves, at least in part by serving as cheap-rentmilitary bases to replace some of those lost, or be-coming more expensive, in Southeast Asia. ThePentagon expressed its desire for permanent mili-tary bases in Palau and the Marianas, to balancethe one on Kwajalein Atoll, the missile receivingsite in the Marshalls, which has been under abso-lute military control since the end of World War II,its former inhabitants having been relocated longago. Surveys were made of the proposed sites (theAir Force for Tinian Island in the Marianas, andthe Marine Corps for Babelthuap Island in Palau),and high military brass began to appear in Miero-nesia’s airports and new Continental Hotels.

President Gerald R. Ford, upon assuming office,soon hired a Texas-bred financial wizard, Fred M.Zeder, as Director of the Office of TerritorialAffairs (DOTA), who foresaw other economicpotential, particularly in the Marianas and Palau,and who claimed to know what was best for Micro-nesia.

One of DOTA’s major economic proposals is forthe development of a multimillion dollar "super-port" (supertanker exchange facility and petro-chemical complex) in Palau, by far the most ambi-tious and formidable development plan in all of

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Micronesia, probably in the entire Pacific. Thisjoint venture between mega-eorporations and thegovernments of Japan, Iran, and the United Stateshas already caused deep cleavages among Palau’s13,000 people, and the issues are far from beingresolved. The superport is also a key factor inPalau’s current turmoil over the question of futurepolitical status.

To handle such projects as the Palau Superport,DOTA recently established an office in Honolulucalled the Hawaii Economic Development Office(HEDO). Headed by a former Peace Corps RegionalRepresentative in Truk, who later became the Dis-trict Administrator, and later still the Trust Terri-tory liaison man in Okinawa (handling millionsworth of surplus military equipment as the UnitedStates was dismantling there), the HEDO exists "topromote and solicit foreign investment for theTrust Territory," which has been permitted onlysince 1974. The HEDO has no Micronesian em-ployees or consultants.

In short, the United States is determined to keepMicronesiain whole or in partsnot for anydirect benefit to the United States or to the Micro-nesians, but mainly to keep others out. The UnitedStates has been willing to pay a growing price tokeep things under control, but would like to seesome economic development, U.S.-style, whichwould help pay the maintenance costs, regardlessof whether the development is suitable for smalland fragile island social and ecological systems.

What do the Micronesians want? A brief,generalized summary follows:

-The Marianas want Commonwealth statuswithin the United States, expecting that such astatus will bring more prosperity to the islandsthrough additional federal programs, minimumU.S. wage scale, and continued welfare programssuch as USDA surplus food and food stamps.

-Palau wants separation from the TTPI and anew, but as yet undetermined political status whichwould maintain some, though not exclusive,relations with the United States. Determination ofthe superport question is all important in workingout the future status.

-The Marshall Islands want separation from theTTPI and independence. The Marshallese are con-vinced that they can develop in their own style andunder their own steam once they are freed from theInterior Department’s shackles and have workedout satisfactory financial terms for the continuedU.S. occupation of the Kwajalein Missile Base.

Yap, Truk, Ponape.The three remaining dis-tricts (joined by Kusaie,* formerly a subdistrict, inJanuary 1977) are reasonably content with thestatus quo, and will probably go along with anychange in name of their relationship with theUnited States, as long as it does not result in anyreduction of U.S. financial support. The leadersfrom these island groups decry the separatist movesof the other three districts. The Ponapeans,however, are being mollified by the proposed shiftof the bureaucratic headquarters from Saipan toPonape, which promises a massive infusion offederal money. The Trukese would welcome almostanythingmilitary, tourism, slot machinestohelp boost the economy in their poor and overpopu-lated islands. And the 7,000 tradition-boundYapese, who currently receive more than $1,000 percapita annually in direct federal appropriations,just want to maintain the present levels of subsidyand be left alone.

Clearly, a number of problems need to be re-solved. The new Commonwealth status of theMarianas must be formally ratified by thePresident of the United States and, at least intheory, by the UN. Congress could create problemsby insisting on reintegration of all the Marianas,including Guam, a move that the United States iscertain to demand sooner or later, possibly at thefirst ten-year review period. The Security Councilwill very likely oppose the formal separation of theMarianas from the TTPI, but a veto by Russiawould probably make no difference since the movetoward Commonwealth has already progressed sofar.

The remaining districts of the TTPI are likely toremain docile as long as current levels of fundingare maintained, or, it is hoped, sweetened, sincethere are no viable get-rich schemes in the offing.The 31 years of the welfare lifestyle has had adecidedly debilitating effect on the energies andaspirations that may once have existed in theCarolinian communities of Truk and Yap, and the

*Official spelling is now Kosrae.

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prospects of the new Trust Territory capital inPonape is enough to keep Ponapeans happy.

Sadly, the little islands of the Caroline grouphave almost no choice since their potential for eco-nomic development is the most meager. Theleaders of the Marianas, Marshalls, and Palau, asthe following brief review indicates, feel they haveother options.

The Marianas

The almost official Commonwealth of theNorthern Marianas consists of the principal islandof Saipan (population ca. 12,000), the secondaryislands of Rota (1,400) and Tinian (750), and 10other mostly uninhabited islands to the north ofSaipan. Both Saipan and Tinian won recognitionduring World War II, with Saipan being the site ofs6me of the most brutal island fighting in thePacific, while Tinian served as the take-off pointfor the Enola Ga.v, the B-29 bomber which droppedthe first atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

The indigenous and current majority populationof the Northern Marianas is Chamorro, virtually allof whom claim blood relatives among theGuamanian Chamorros, from whom they werepolitically separated in 1898 when Guam, thesouthernmost island of the chain, went to theUnited States, while the northern islands were soldto Germany. The close genetic relationship of theGuamanian/Saipanese Chamorros was strength-ened earlier in the eighteenth century when all of theChamorros north of Rota were brought to Guam bythe Spanish government and held there for nearly100 years to facilitate control of their sometimesunruly (and "un-Christian") behavior. TheRotanese, being only 40 miles distant from Guam,proved more manageable and were allowed to stayon their island. During the century spent on Guam,the Chamorrosthose few thousand who survivedof an original 100,000---were thoroughly Chris-tianized, which was the main purpose for bringingthem to Guam in the first place.

Before the Chamorros began returning to Saipanin the mid-nineteenth century, some Caroliniansfrom the atolls lying between Yap and Truk werepermitted to settle on Saipan after fierce typhoonshad destroyed virtually all vegetation on their homeislands. These people formed the nucleus of what

has now become a Carolinian community onSaipan of 3- to 4,000 comprising more than 25percent of the population, enough to cause a ratherdelicate minority issue as the Northern Marianasmove into Commonwealth status. The fact thatsome of the Carolinians were there before theChamorros repatriated further complicates theissue.

During the Japanese period (1914-1945), largeportions of Saipan’s 47 square miles were plantedin sugar cane and other agricultural products,which generated enough economic activity to sup-port a prewar Japanese/Okinawan population ofmore than 45,000. Older Saipanese recall thisperiod as the halcyon days during which there wereschools, jobs, and a momentum which was neverregained after the American invasion.

The fierce fighting on Saipan and the postwaroccupation caused physical and social chaosthroughout the island. New villages were builtwhere none had existed, and some old ones neverquite revived. Vast tracts of fertile farmlandstheentire northern third of the islandwere appro-priated for the CIA training grounds, and theentire island was considered "Off Limits" until1962, when Saipan joined the rest of the TTPIunder the Department of the Interior.

Those were puzzling days for the Saipanese,some of whom continued farming while others wereemployed by the "Navy," which never explainedwhat was inside the thousands of canopied per-sonnel carriers that shuttled back and forthbetween the airport and the tightly guarded head-quarters which now hosts the TTPI. Complete withmore than 300 residences, including a ramblingone for the High Commissioner (who is knownthroughout Micronesia as the almost legendary andall-powerful "Hicom"), this sprawling head-quarters complex has already emerged as a polit-ical football in the new Commonwealth of theNorthern Marianas.

When the U.S. government finally gave up thenotion of aiding the Nationalists in retaking Com-munist China, the gigantic complex on Saipan’stallest hill seemed logical as the site for the TTPIHeadquarters, which had been occupying a smallset of frame buildings on Guam since 1954, when itwas moved from Honolulu. With the new spirit of

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the 1960s, action in the TTPI was bound to getheavier, which obviously meant that the relativelysmall bureaucracy had to grow. And grow it did,thereby making Saipan, the new capital, the mostprosperous of the TTPI’s six districts.

Saipan’s relative prosperity has long been con-spicuous. Even in the early 1960s Saipan had anairport while the other districts received only infre-quent seaplanes. Saipan had miles and miles ofpaved roads, while Micronesians in the other dis-tricts bounced through muddy potholes and chokedin the dust, and still do. Saipanese were wearingshoes and sitting in chairs while the others were justdiscovering rubber thongs and lounging comfort-ably on woven mats. The Saipanese, like their Gua-manian brothers before them, were learning fasthow to fall in step with an American system whichseemed, somehow, to lead to greater prosperity.

In the eyes of the other Micronesians, includingthe minority Saipanese Carolinians, the Chamorrosalways had it better. Even the 1,400 Chamorros ofRota profited from Rota’s being a separate DistrictCenter during Saipan’s Navy days in the 1950s.And on the Chamorro side, they had never feltcomfortable with those Carolinians, which is theChamorro term for all other Micronesians. If afeeling of kinship exists among any Micronesiangroups, it certainly does not involve the Chamorros,who have always identified with, and been enviousof, their disdainful brothers in Guam, who stillremember their Saipanese brothers as the Japanesecollaborators during the bitter years of the Japa-nese occupation.

Perhaps as part of the United States’ scheme topick off the more Westernized Chamorros early on,the Washington administration arranged for aMarianas-wide referendum in 1960 on the possiblereintegration of all the islands. The hopeful Sai-panese responded overwhelmingly in favor, whilethe Guamanians turned them down flat, guardingtheir ten-year-old American citizenship againsttheir country cousins in the northern islands, whohad always been gupalao---the Guamanian genericterm for any other Micronesian, including Sai-panese Chamorros and some of the darkerGuamanians from the southern part of Guam.

The referendum defeat was no great loss for theUnited States or the Saipanese, who began workingimmediately toward separation, the rest of the

TTPI be damned. In April 1972, the two Marianasmembers of the Joint Commission on the FuturePolitical Status of Micronesia made a formalrequest to Ambassador Hadyn Williams for nego-tiations which would bring the Marianas in a "closepolitical relationship with the U.S." The bold movewas explained in no uncertain terms"

...we desire membership in the UnitedStates political family because of thedemonstrated advantages of such a rela-tionship. More than any other nation withwhich we have had contact, the UnitedStates has brought to our people the valueswhich we cherish and the economic goalswhich we desire. Continued affiliation withthe United States offers the promise of thepreservation of these values and the imple-mentation of these goals. (U.S. Office ofMicronesian Status Negotiations. 1972:61)

The justification for separate negotiations indefiance of the Trusteeship Agreement was furtheramplified. One month later, Marianas’ SenatorOlympio Borja argued before the TrusteeshipCouncil in New York that the action they were re-questing was not toward political fragmentation,but rather toward fulfilling the obligation of self-determination. Besides, he had announced earlier,"the ideological schism which separates our peoplefrom the Marianas from people of the other dis-tricts became all too apparent and too pronouncedto ignore any longer." (Marianas Variety, May 26,1972, p. 6)

Most of the Micronesian political figures saw theissue as the first really major test of COM’sstrength. If it failed, concluded Senator AndonAmaraich from Truk, "The only logical conclusionis that the United States is attempting to fosterdisunity in the Trust Territory and to fragmentizeMicronesia." (Highlights, Special Edition, June 9,1972, p. 12)

Despite opposition from all the other districts,and the stern disapproval of the UN Visiting

1. The other Micronesian delegates on the Joint PoliticalStatus Committee reacted politely by recognizing thedesires of the Marianas people. However, they later went onrecord as opposing it on the grounds that only the Congressof Micronesia had the authority to permit one district tonegotiate separately.

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Mission, the United States, in December 1972,began separate negotiations with the Marianasdelegation, headed by a self-appointed, youngSaipanese lawyer who, in the late 1974 election wasvoted out of his COM senatorship. Two years later,during which time there was continued criticismfrom the COM (and mock participation in theCOM by the Marianas delegation), a final agree-ment was reached on the basic terms of the Com-monwealth Covenant. Six months later, after a fastand much-criticized political education program,90 percent of the registered voters cast 78 percentof their ballots in favor of the permanent Common-wealth status. The long courtship was over, and thewedding was on. Only the nuptials needed to beperformed.

In the U.S. House of Representatives, the Cove-nant Bill was passed easily. The Senate, however,raised some questions. As a safeguard againstprobable flack from the UN on the permanency ofthe proposed Covenant, Senator Jacob Javits intro-duced an amendment to allow for a review of thestatus after ten years, possibly in order to attach thenorthern islands to Guam at that time. After someminor debate, the Covenant Bill passed the Senate,and was signed by President Ford on March 24,1976.2

The Marianas Constitutional Convention, heldin the fall of 1976, produced, after some argumentover adequate representation for Rota, a 30-pageConstitution for the Commonwealth of theNorthern Marianas, complete with the followingpreamble (original in Old English typescript):

We the Peopleof the

Northern Mariana Islands,grateful to Almighty God

for our freedom,ordain and establish

this Constitutionas the embodiment

of our traditions and hopesfor our Commonwealth

in political union with theUnited States of America

2. One unexpected outcome of the Constitution of theNorthern Marianas has been the recent move by Guam tohold its own Con-Con in 1977. The terms of the new Constitu-tion made Guam’s 1950 Organic Act, written by Washington,less acceptable than it had been.

The next steps will be ratification by the voters(expected in March 1977) and election of their firstgovernor, 9 senators, and 14 representatives, fortheir bicameral government. Mr. Erwin Canham,the Resident Commissioner who is presiding overthe Transition Commission, will be replaced by theelected Governor of the Commonwealth in early1978. Barring the improbable rejection of the Con-stitution by the President of the United States, whocould veto it, the marriage will then be consum-mated and finally legalized by the termination ofthe UN Trusteeship Agreement. Whether the UNwill offer one more gesture of disapproval remainsto be seen, but it appears that the die has been cast.

Some of the more interesting features of the newConstitution relate to cultural preservation,minority rights, land ownership and alienation, andbusiness privileges. Otherwise it reads very muchlike a handbook on American political constitu-tions.

Perhaps as a tribute to one of the last vestiges ofprecontact Chamorro culture, Dr. FranciscoPalaeios, a Western-trained physician and memberof the Con-Con, wrote in as Section 1 under ArticleI: Personal Rights, the proviso that there shall beno laws "prohibiting the traditional art of healing"which is widely practiced by unlicensed "witchdoctors," better known by the HispancizedChamorro term suruhana (or suruhanu in case thehealer is male).

In hope of placating the somewhat uneasy Caro-linian community of Saipan, the predominantlyChamorro delegates to the Con-Con (4 Caroliniansout of 39 total)included, under Article III, theproviso for an Executive Assistant for CarolinianAffairs, who will be appointed by the Governorwith the consent of the Carolinian community.(This guarantee reflects Erwin Canham’s insistenceon his right to select two Carolinian members to theCon-Con in the event that none was elected).

The Executive Assistant for Carolinian Affairsmay well see his first action in connection withArticle XII, which covers the volatile subject ofland. Although the islands of the NorthernMarianas are relatively large and sparsely popu-lated, there is not a great deal of cultivable landavailable to individual tillers. The governmentgoing back to Spanish timesowns 80 percent of

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Saipan and more than half of Rota and Tinian. Thenew government will thus have vast tracts of land tomanage and, presumably, to dispense, by sale orotherwise, to its growing population, or to others.

Carolinians, if they are born in the Marianas orhave lived there since 1950, have rights to own landin the Marianas (if they have the money to buy it).Unfortunately, there are 500-600 Carolinians whomigrated to Saipan after 1950 and, after more than20 years of residence, consider it their home. Someproblems from this group are already known to berising, and will no doubt command the attention ofthe Special Assistant for Carolinian Affairs.

The Constitution also prohibits alienation ofland to any foreigners for the next 25 years, andleases (to anyone) are limited to 40 years. For-eigners are any people with less than "one-quarterNorthern Marianas Chamorro or NorthernMarianas Carolinian blood, or a combinationthereof...." Although land sales have always beenpart of the Hispanized Chamorro tradition, theytook place rarely. However, in recent years businesshas been brisk, especially in the areas near the pro-posed military base on Tinian, where local poli-ticians have been known to acquire a parcel of landin exchange for a Datsun pickup. Micronesiansfrom other districts are also known to be purchas-ing Marianas land, presumably for speculation.

The restriction against foreign (i.e., non-Northern Marianan) ownership of land has alreadyelicited protests from Guam, and from within theranks of the Con-Con itself. Questioning the con-stitutionality of such discriminatory laws, residentsof Guam (where land is a wide open commodity)point out that residents of the Northern Marianascan buy Guam land, but not vice versa. Con-Conlawmakers feel that precedents exist which justifythe restrictions under the Indian CommerceClause, but this will probably be challenged in theU.S. courts. Land speculation has already begun inthe Northern Marianas, and some of the Con-Condelegates themselves have made post-Conventionstatements supporting the democratic right tocontrol and dispose of one’s own property (meaningland). As the stakes go higher, it is not unlikely thatamong the earliest proposed constitutional amend-ments will be an attempt to liberalize the landalienation restrictions.

Foreign investment (including that from theUnited States)in the Northern Marianas is alsorestricted to some degree by the constitutional pro-viso that any corporate director must be of 51percent Northern Marianas descent.

While the new Constitution for the NorthernMarianas spells out the internal political structureof the new Commonwealth in considerable detail, itdoes not address the question of the real relation-ship between the Commonwealth and the UnitedStates. Most people presume that it will remainwithin the jurisdiction of the Department of In-terior, along with Guam, American Samoa, and theVirgin Islands. For the moment, the people of thenew Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas donot appear to be concerned.

The benefits of their new political affiliation withthe United States have already begun to pour intothe Northern Marianas. The United States willprovide $14 million per a.nnum (more than $1,000per capita) for the next seven years as a direct grantfor transition costs, of which $8.75 million, how-ever, will go for governmental operating costs.USDA food (more than 5,000 recipients) is stackedin kitchens throughout the islands. Typhoon relieffunds and war claims have helped generate thehighest level of prosperity the islands have everknown, and people have begun to talk excitedlyabout the forthcoming food stamps, welfare, andsocial security programs to supplement the manyfederal programs which already exist.

The signs of a welfare-oriented community areeverywhere. Yet, a leading Chamorro politiciannow working in the transition office proudly talksabout economic development while maintainingthat his people don’t want to become wards of theUnited States.

What type of economic development is possiblefor the Northern Marianas? Fisheries are not viable.Agriculture gets progressively weaker as more ofthe residents receive new government jobs andUSDA food. In addition, most of the land is stillheld by the U.S. government. Tourism, once thegreat hope, is looking very dismal of late. TheIntercontinental Hotel, the newest of four majorhotels on the island of Saipan, had 17 percent occu-pancy in December 1976, and the others were notfaring much better. There is hope that when (and

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if) Japan and Continental Air Lines begin operatingtheir direct flight service from Tokyo to Saipan’snew international airport the tourist business willpick up.

Hoping to stimulate the tourism, someSaipanese, with strong support from DOTA,attempted to reintroduce Las Vegas-style slotmachines in Saipan, which had been rejected aftera one-year trial because of social problems, butwere turned down by the Resident Commissioner,Erwin Canham.

In general, the federal support laid on top of anotherwise stagnant economy has not producedmuch ingenuity. The Chamorros are not at all dis-content with the status quo, nor are the Carolinians,who learned generations ago to settle for less thantheir Chamorro neighbors. From the U.S. point ofview, such choice real estate on the front line ofAmerica’s defense forces is cheap at twice the price.And with all that unused land in governmenthands, there may be room for some Yankeeingenuity somewhere down the line.

Marshall Islands

While the Northern Marianas were movingsteadily toward their Commonwealth status, andPalau was wrestling with its superport dilemma,the Marshall Islands, as early as 1973, began itsown strategy for separation from the TTPI and forseparate negotiations with the United States.

The first step was the formation of a separateMarshall Islands Political Status Commission,whose task was to review alternatives to trusteeship,and to communicate the various particulars to theMarshallese people, who would then be asked tomake a decision through the voting process. Thesecond step was to ask for separate negotiationswith Ambassador Williams and the United States,a request which has not been granted on theludicrous grounds of "preserving Micronesianunity."

The 25,000 Marshallese have reasons to bechafing. Being the easternmost district of theTTPI, nearly 2,000 miles from headquarters onSaipan, the Marshalls were always on the short endof the stick, or so it seemed to the Marshallese.Consequently, the Marshalls were the poorest in

terms of services such as transportation andcommunications, and often seemed to be cut offfrom supplies which the other districts took forgranted. Support for economic development underthe TTPI was virtually nonexistent.

The Marshallese have also felt cut off from theirclosest neighbors to the south, the Gilbert Islands,with whom they had traditional as well as familylinkages, and Nauru. The obvious cause for thisbarrier was the Marshalls’ membership in theTTPI, which discouraged, if not prohibited, anykind of exchange between American and non-American territories.

Unlike some of the Micronesians of theCarolines, the Marshallese became increasinglyimpatient with the stagnant economic policies ofthe TTPI administration. Although their land is inshort supply, the industrious Marshallese havealways maintained a comparatively high standardof living. Their copra is acknowledged as the best inMicronesia, and their vast fishing grounds areteeming with fish, most of which are now taken byJapanese fleets. (If the 200-mile economic zonebecomes an accepted reality, the area covered bythe Marshall Islands would be as large as anynational marine economic zone in the Pacific,except for French Polynesia.) But full exploitationof these limited natural resources has not only beenlacking but may even have been inhibited by mem-bership in the TTPI. At least, this is one of thereasons given for wanting out of the TTPI.

But the principal reason for wanting out of theTTPI, by most accounts, is related to the PacificMissile Range located on Kwajalein Atoll. Underthe present arrangement, the sizable revenues gen-erated through leases, salaries, and taxes onKwajalein must be divided among all districtsthrough the Congress of Micronesia. The Mar-shallese want to keep a larger share of the revenueswhich ultimately come from the use of their land.They also want less humiliating conditions for theMarshallese workers who service the thousands ofAmericans living on Kwajalein.

That Kwajalein is the focal point of negotiationsbetween the United States and the Marshallese isnot surprising. Resentment against the U.S. appro-priation of the entire atoll, which embraces thelargest lagoon in the world, has been brewing since

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1947, when the 148 islanders were relocated toneighboring Ebeye Island to make way for themissile test facility on Kwajalein. Today it is abillion-dollar complex with a resident Americanpopulation (complete with PXs, schools, movies,and a golf course) of 3,000 to 5,000 people, de-pending upon the nature of the experiments at anygiven period. (Since the activities of the MissileRange are highly classified, it is not possible tostate the full range of missile-related activitiesbeyond the primary one of interception of missilesfired from Vandenburg Air Force Base in Cali-fornia, 5,000 miles away.)

In 1964, the military began "leasing" the atollfor 99 years at $10 a year per acre, a rate that re-mained constant until 1971, when furthernegotiations under the Mid-Corridor Agreementresulted in annual payments of $420,000. Althoughthe comparatively generous increase in the leaserate answered some of the critics, it did not mollifythe Marshallese who still rankled over the years ofnonpayment, plus the fact that all taxes onAmerican and Marshallese salaries paid onKwajalein went to the COM for redistributionrather than directly to the Marshalls District. Fur-ther, the Marshallese are well aware of the goingrate for the lease of military bases in other parts ofthe world, specifically Spain, where the UnitedStates recently negotiated a five-year lease for $1.1

billion, 44 times the amount paid for Kwajalein! 3

Kwajalein’s insult is exacerbated by theU.S.-created slum of Ebeye, the island just 2.5miles from Kwajalein where the 400 to 500 Mar-shallese who were originally relocated there from the"labor camp" on Kwajalein have been joined bynearly 8,000 others who have come from all over theMarshalls in search of jobs (at American wages) atthe Missile Range. The few hundred lucky ones whoare employed on Kwajalein must commute daily byferry from the miniature middle-class America of"Kwaj" to the 70-acre, rat-infested "suburb" ofEbeye because, in true apartheid style, theislanders must be off Kwajalein between sundownand sunrise, and are not permitted to use anyMissile Range facilities, including the hospital andthe schools.

3. In March 1976, the United States agreed to increase theannual rent of Kwajalein to $710,000, and is now pushing fora 50-year lease. The Marshallese negotiators are holding outfor an annual review of any lease agreement.

The crowded, unsightly, and unsanitary condi-tions of Ebeye have been documented and publi-cized repeatedly in one grim report after another,but the conditions remain unchanged. TheMarshallese interpret this as yet another exampleof American unresponsiveness, and add this totheir list of grievances which, from their point ofview, can only be settled through direct, public, andseparate negotiations.

In addition to the Kwajalein-Ebeye issue, thereis the unresolved problem of the displaced residentsof Enewetak (Eniwetok) and Bikini, who were re-located "temporarily" in 1946-47 to make way foratomic bomb testing. After years of promises andrecent spurts of activity, the displaced islandershave still not been permitted to return to what isleft of their home islands because they are still too"hot" from radiation.

The Marshallese, impatient for an equitablesettlement of these basic issues, are demanding theright to handle their own affairs when it is a ques-tion of their own economy and well-being. Theywant, for example, to negotiate their own deals overfishing rights in the 200-mile economic zone. Theywant to become a transportation hub for the north-south Pacific air routes that Air Nauru (whichrecently acquired a hotel in the Marshalls)ispioneering. And they want to hook into the devel-oping pan-Pacific satellite communications net-work, which the Department of the Interior vetoedbecause the TTPI is a "strategic trust." (To callfrom Majuro to Nauru, 600 miles away, the routeis: Majuro, Saipan, Guamwhere the Navy moni-torsMelbourne, Nauru.)

In the face of continued U.S. rejection, the Mar-shall Islands Political Status Commission sent twodelegates to the UN Trusteeship Council in June1976 to present their case for independence, muchto the consternation of Ambassador Williams andthe entire Washington administration, which wasanxious to prevent further fragmentation and tokeep Micronesia’s problems out of the interna-tional eye. As a further embarrassment to theUnited States, a representative from the PoliticalStatus Commission attended (uninvited) the Six-teenth South Pacific Conference in Noumea, inOctober 1976, in an effort to enlist sympathy andsupport from the representatives of the 17 otherPacific Island governments who were in attendance.

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What the Marshallese really want may be some-thing less than full independence, for in theirrejection of the proposed Federated States ofMicronesia (as per the draft constitution) thePolitical Status Commission specified that, "Strongand friendly ties to the United States should bemaintained under a future status of free associationleading to independence." In the internationalarena, however, using the word independence ismore likely to bring a meaningful response fromthe United States than continued requests forseparate negotiations. Moreover, COM elections inthe Marshalls in November 1976 indicate that thereis less than unanimity in the Marshallese separatistmovement. Two incumbents, both clearly identifiedwith the separatist political bloc, lost their seats inthe House and Senate, and both were replaced bycandidates who ran on a platform which includedthe preservation of Micronesian unity.

Palauan youth with bicentennial colors painted on JapaneseToyota.

If the Marshallese can get a better deal onKwajaleinmeaning a larger share of the rev-enuesand some freedom to develop in their ownstyleincluding the right to negotiate economicmatters with foreign countriesthey may wish toremain within the American political family, whichis basically what the United States wants to guaran-tee. If the United States is not willing to grant thesepoints, we may see a much more forceful show ofdissatisfaction in the Marshall Islands.

Palau

In the fall of 1975, while the Marianas wastaking final steps toward separating from theTTPI, the Palauan delegates to the MicronesianConstitutional Convention stubbornly defended theunity of Micronesia through the proposed Fed-erated States of Micronesia, including all of theoriginal six districts of the TTPI. Palau’s sinceritywas questionable all along, in view of past intransi-gence over the question of the location of the newTTP! capital and a subsequent demand for sepa-rate negotiations between Palau and the UnitedStates.

Some have interpreted Palau’s insistence onunity as a final warning to the United States eitherto stop dealing separately with the Marianas, or beready for separate negotiations with everyone.Another motive might have been to test the realstrength of the Congress of Micronesia which theo-

retically had the sole authority to sanction separatenegotiations. Or, it could have been simply that thePalauans, along with the other Mieronesians, weremiffed by ambassadorial double-talk. Whateverthe reason, it is unlikely that Palau really earedwhether the Marianas remained in the FederatedStates of Micronesia, for there has never been anyaffinity between the Chamorros and the Palauans.

Since the precedent had been set by the Mari-anas, the Palauans soon began to make similar de-mands. What started as a written request for sepa-rate talks from the Palauan community living inSaipan resulted in a referendum, in September1976, in which 88 percent of those who voted inPalau (in a very poor turnout) requested separationfrom the TTPI, and separate negotiations with theUnited States.

Exactly what Palau’s 13,000 citizens want is notat all clear, for the Palauan community is verymuch divided on some major issues. Most Palauansagree that they should start doing things their ownway. They also feel, as do the Marshallese andMarianans, that the unity of Micronesia has alwaysbeen imposed and artificial, preserved only by U.S.insistence and support, and is a hindrance to anykind of creative development in Palau.

Of all the districts of Micronesia, Palau was themost fully developed during the Japanese period.Farming, fishing, and phosphate mining (on

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Angaur) were primary industries under the Japa-nese, and were supplemented by some timber,boatbuilding, and a little tourism. During the peakof the prewar Japanese periodthe Japanesealways treated Palau as an integral part of Japannearly 25,000 Japanese were actually living in the"islands, which include the largest single island(Babelthuap) in Mirconesia. (Palauans prefer thespelling Babeldaob, which reflects the meaning:"above the sea.")

Because of their heavy concentration of Japaneseinhabitants, fortification, and strategic location,the Palau Islands were heavily battered duringWorld War II. When the smoke cleared, manyparts of the outer islandsespecially Peleliuwerein ruins. What was not damaged or destroyed bythe fighting was put to the torch, including theJapanese town of Koror, which was "wasted" onorders from a Japanese-hating U.S. Marine CorpsColonel.

Travelers to Palau in the mid-1960s wereshocked to find Palau still in a state of postwarshambles. The relics of war were everywhere. Allsigns pointed to a stagnation that was even moreegregious than in the rest of the TTPI. With itseconomy having lain dormant for so long, and itsinfrastructure totally destroyed, Palau would haveto start all over again with help from the UnitedStates, help which the Palauans waited for in vainfor another ten years.

This is not to say that the United States did notoffer assistance. During the 1960s schools werebuilt (including the Micronesian OccupationalCenter, a TTPI-wide vocational school), a fishstorage facility was installed (in cooperation withthe Van Camp Corporation, now a subsidiary ofRalston Purina), and an attempt was made todevelop a tuna fishing fleet. An airstrip was openedand a few miles of road were built, mainly in con-nection with the new airport.

As in the rest of Micronesia, U.S. activities inten-sified during the early 1970s, with military con-struction units (known as Civic Action Teams) dis-playing their skills and equipment by buildingmore roadways, small bridges, and athletic fields.The mid-1970s have brought still more stepped-upactivity, including a copra processing plant (firstshipment of coconut oil was made in December1976) and a major bridge linking Koror withBabelthuap, which is likely to have a drastic effecton movement in the islands. Still, not much wasbeing done for any effective development of Palaubv Palauans, which is what many people in thecommunity wanted.

In the early 1970s when the Pentagon began tohint that it wanted to build military bases in theMarianas and Palau, reaction in the Palauan com-munity was mixed. While some viewed the pro-posed Marine Corps training base on the island ofBabelthuap as a direct path to social disaster,

Commuters’ boat from Koror tocoastal villages on BabelthuapIsland.

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others saw it as the first viable step toward eco-nomic selfsufficiency. The rental fees for the landand the support services for the base would providethe needed foundation for Palau’s economic devel-opment, provided the terms for the lease were satis-factory.

Before the discussions about the proposedmilitary base reached a formal or official stage,however, another plan began to emerge which wasof such magnitude as to make a military trainingbase pale in comparison. This plan, already wellconceived by the governments of Iran, Japan, andthe United States before any Palauans were in-formed, is known as Port Pacific of Palau, and callsfor the construction of a supertanker port exchangefacility and petrochemical complex on the island ofBabelthuap. It is this plan that has given birth tonew political turmoil in Palau, including a politicalsplit between the traditional and elected leaders,and has no doubt contributed to the growingdemands for separate negotiations with the UnitedStates. The Palauans at last began to sense thatthey had something to negotiate; the use of theirislands by multinational corporations and govern-ments.

The story of Port Pacific is hardly a complimentto America’s manner of dealing with Micronesia.On the contrary, it is a complement to the secrecyand "tricks" of other negotiations, particularly theCIA-bugged Political Status Talks between 1969and 1976.

Shrouded in secrecy from the very beginning, thefirst rumblings about the "superport" (to use themore common term of reference) began in Palau inthe spring of 976, just after a copy of three secretin-depth studies of the plan were slipped to a youngPalauan journalist by a Palauan priest (who neverdivulged his sources). All three studiesthe MitreReport, the April Report, and the May Reportbear the name of Robert Panero, formerly of theHudson Institute, who runs a consulting firm inNew York City, and who is also a consultant to theIndustrial Bank of Japan and the Nissho-IwaiTrading Company. The dates on the reports goback as far as October 1974, which indicates thatsomebody had been thinking about the superportfor a long time.

When the content of the three reports began tofilter into the Palauan communityat first throughpublication in the local, occasional newspaper, TiaBelauthe reaction was explosive, producirig aseries of aftershocks which are still being felt. Fac-tions immediately developed between the pros(local busnessmen, Palauan bureaucrats in theTTPI Headquarters on Saipan, and most electedrepresentatives) and the cons (young intellectualsand one of the two paramount chiefs) over the pro-posed development, and each faction has outsidesympathizers. Moreover, on the pro side, there isfinancial support.

Lining up in favor of the development are thegovernments of Iran (which would provide the oil),Japan (which would make the supertankers andbuy the oil), and the United States (which wouldhave ultimate control over who gets how much oil),plus major corporations in Japan and the UnitedStates, chief among which are the Industrial Bankof Japan and the Nissho-Iwai Trading Company,Panero’s clients. (Iran’s government conducts itsown business directly.)

The Director of the Office of Territorial Affairs,Fred M. Zeder, left no doubt as to the U.S. positionwhen he accompanied Robert Panero to Palau tomake a public endorsement, for this was the verytype of development which the man from Texasunderstood best: it was big, and it was oil.

Heading the opposition forces is the Save PalauOrganization, a group of 20 or so young Palauans,mostly university-trained and underemployed orjobless, with their counterpart groups at theUniversity of Hawaii and environmentalist centerson the U.S. mainland. These young intellectualshave won, for the first time, the support of some ofthe 16 traditional chiefs, who have recently beenrebuffed again by the Palau District Legislature.Friends of the Earth, the Audubon Society, andother internationa! conservation groups rushed into support the opposition, as did the highlyrespected Pacific Science Congress (which wasreprimanded by the High Commissioner formeddling in others’ affairs).

"We are not opposed to development," saysHigh Chief Ibedul, the 32-year-old ex-Armysergeant who heads the Save Palau Organization,"but not the type that is going to destroy our societyand our islands." Fearful of his influence, the

DMT-3-’77 -22-

The incomparable Rock Islands of Palau--just an oil spill away from disaster.

elected legislators of Palau recently attempted torelieve him of his hereditary title.

What the Save Palau Organization is opposing israther awesome in its magnitude and politicalimplications. Although the details of funding arenot clear, the proposed facility could cost well inexcess of one billion dollars (references are made to$20 billion in the Panero reports), and the benefitsfrom it would be split four ways" Iran 40 percent;United States, Japan, and Palau 20 percent each.

In addition to providing exchange facilities forsupertankers of one million deadweight tons(DWT), the contents of which would be siphonedoff by smaller tankers from Japan, Taiwan, SouthKorea, and other allies, the facility would alsoinclude a complete petrochemical complex, whichcould process raw minerals from New Caledonia,Papua New Guinea, and Western Australia.Nuclear and thermal power plants would provide atleast part of the energy, according to the plans.

Panero map, the foreign community would live inPalau City in the southeast portion of BabelthuapIsland, which now has a resident population ofunder 7,000. The technicians would devote theirskills to achieving a throughput of 150 million tonsper year, plus a 3-month supply storage area for allof Japan’s needs in the event of another oilembargo.

One of the first questions raised by the oppo-sition forces is "Why Palau?" After nearly 30 yearsof always being at "the end of the line," completelycut off from transportation and communicationwith the rest of the world except that which passesthrough Guam, why should Palau suddenly becomethe point of convergence of three internationalpowers with a proposed facility which could proveto be overwhelming to this small society, whoseislands embrace a marine ecosystem said to be un-rivaled in beauty, variety, and natural balance. Asdetails of the plan emerged, the answer becameclearer.

Since a facility of such complexity would requirean alien technical work force for the "forseeablefuture," a new community of 10- to 12,000 people isalso included in the Panero plan. According to the

Iran wants to sell more oil. Japan wants to buy it.Iran wants to ship the oil in supertankers. Japanwants to build them. Japan’s environmentalistgroups are presumably strong enough to prevent

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such an accident-prone facility from being built inJapan, and will probably fight successfully to keepthe planned million-ton supertankers completelyaway from Japan’s coastlines and waters. Thus, anearby exchange facility is needed to keep the oilmoving and the pollution factor down, at least asfar as Japan is concerned.

Since the large supertankers must avoid theshallow, wreck-strewn Malacca Straits and comethrough the more easterly Makassar Straits, Japanfirst considered a potential superport site insouthern Indonesia, but decided against it becauseof the political instability there. The more easterlyroute through the Makassar Straits would bring thesupertankers very close to the Western CarolineIslands as they turned northward to Japan. Thelarge land mass of Babelthuap Island with its huge,reef-protected lagoon was practically made to orderas the perfect site. What is more, there was notmuch doubt about the political stability, underU.S. administration, in this corner of the TTPI.Palau, therefore, seemed the perfect choice as theplace to which Japan could "export its pollution."

On the United States side there has always beenthat nagging question of what to do with Palau,whose inhabitants were becoming more restless andresentful with the passing years. The superport ideafired the DOTA’s imagination, and also caught thefancy of the military which saw the superport asfulfilling their need for a "strategic oil storagefacility." As the Panero report pointed out, "SinceWW II Palauans living under U.S. administrationhave developed slowly, their economic life is under-developed with scant hope of rapid change withoutoutside impetis." To the DOTA, the superport wasjust the outside impetus that was needed to getPalau on its own economic feet. All that was left tobe done was to persuade the Palauans.

The persuading began with trips for Palauanpoliticians to Teheran, Washington, Singapore,and Tokyo. Public hearings in Palau conducted byPanero himself have been attended and supportedby DOTA, HiCom, and high-ranking militaryofficers. Palauan bureaucrats employed by Head-quarters in Saipan have come out strongly insupport of the plan.

Whether the Palau superport plans will materia-lize hinges on Palau’s future political status; and,

Palauan women and children of Babelthuap. Will the "super-port" affect their lives?

in a sense, Palau’s future status depends on thesuperport. While the United States is acting asthough it is pretty certain of Palau’s political sta-bility, both Iran and Japan would like some sort ofguarantee, at least a resolution of the Trusteeshipstatus. The United States may be willing todemonstrate its confidence by negotiating for themilitary base on Babelthuap Island, as was pro-posed earlier in 1973.

In a recent publication (The Progressive,February 1977), a former aerospace engineer whohas worked for 16 years on submarine-launchedmissiles, claims: "The chronology of events and thenature of Micronesian negotiations lend strongcredibility to that south-sea rumor that Palau willbe Trident’s [a ballistic missile submarine] forwardbase." If using Palau as a forward base for ad-vanced naval submarine weapons is indeed part ofthe U.S. plan, the secrecy surrounding the plans forPort Pacific seems well motivated.

Knowing that action on the superport cannot beput off indefinitely, it is most likely that the UnitedStates will find some justification for holding sepa-rate negotiations with Palau soon. The UnitedStates will in all probability ask for a fairly tightpolitical association, the name of which is any-body’s guess; and it will include an option on the30,000-acre military training facility, whosepresence will assure Japan and Iran of Palau’spolitical stability. In return, the Palauans will re-ceive that much needed economic impetus, whichmay turn out to be a destructive blow to the 13,000

DMT-3-’77 -24-

Palauans and the few hundred Sonsorolese of theWestern Caroline Islands.

Should the superport plan fall through, Palaucan still hope to negotiate for the military trainingbase and some autonomy to develop her own agri-culture, fishing, and tourism in a more modest way.Once free from the yoke of the TTPI, Palau,because of the location and the incomparablebeauty of her lagoons and islands, could become amajor traffic center for tourists and other businessas the north-south transportation lines open up inthe Pacific.

The Remainder ofthe TTPI

As for the rest of Micronesia, the United States isreally pouring on the coal, hoping for a settlementof the political status question by 1981. The suddeninfusion of federal money from war claims pay-ments and new federal programs is matched onlyby the stepped-up political and economic activity,which has been directed toward carrying out the"favorable plebiscite" recommendation in theSolomon Report.

The Education for Self-Government program,conducted out of Headquarters, is in full swing. Anew Administrative District appeared January 1,1977, when lonely Kusaie Island, whose 4,000people had always suffered from the indignity ofliving in a subdistrict of Ponape, 350 miles distant,was proclaimed a District Center. And capitalimprovement programs are popping up nearlyeverywhere, especially on Ponape, which was se-lected by the COM (after considerable oppositionfrom Palau) as the future site of the new capital ofMicronesia.

It would appear that the Micronesian stage isbeing set for the final act.

While the United States is having its problemswith the rebellious Palauans and Marshallese, sheseems to have hit upon the right formula fordealing with the Ponapeans, Trukese, Yapese,Kusaieans, and the other minority groups(Ulithians, Woleaians, Mortlockese, Kapinga-marangis, Nukuoros, Mokilese, Pingalapese, andothers, all of whom speak different languages).Basic to the formula are rather generous federalfunds.

The Ponape community is pleased at theprospect of being the new capital of the TTPI.While they do not expect the physical plant for theHeadquarters to be as elaborate as Saipan’sCapitol Hill (at least, not initially), they arecounting on an influx of 361 new foreign familieswhich are already firmly affixed to the bureaucracy.Since facilities for these 361 families do not nowexist, Ponape is getting set for a massive buildingprogram, already under way with new roads,sewers, street lights, and a multimillion dollar hos-pital, long completed but unused due to lack of asewage system. Even though few Ponapeans areinvolved in the construction activitiesnearly all ofwhich are carried out by Korean labor--there willbe the inevitable short-term economic spillover.

According to Mr. Resio Moses, the newPonapean District Administrator, his people arenot at all unhappy with the status quo, except thatthey would like a little more money. They see thecapital relocation as a satisfactory means to thatend.

What effect this change in status is likely to haveon their society is apparently of small concern tothe Ponapeans. According to Moses, the socialsystems, once rigidly stratified, are deteriorating,and the education system is the primary cause.Chiefs, known as nahnmwarkis, once highly vener-ated, now ask for cash contributions at title-repay-ment feasts instead of the traditional giant yamsand pigs, and are getting less and less of it. Liketheir fellow chiefs throughout Micronesia, theirland distribution roles have eroded with the en-croaching cash economy in which land is nowbought, often by politicians, for fees ranging fromcartons of cigarettes to Datsun pickups, which havea maximum life span of two years on Micronesia’srain-washed roads.

While most Ponapeans, Yapese, and Trukesewould like to see the original six districts of theTTPI remain unified in their future political rela-tionship with the United States, they are preparedto accept the fragmentation as inevitable. Whatmay hold these districts together is not, as they seeit, any affinity they have for each other, but rathertheir lack of choice.

The Yapese, generally regarded as the most con-servative and tradition bound of all the Micro-

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nesians, would not reject an increase in their $7

million annual appropriations, but there are limitsto what they are willing to compromise for anyadditional revenues. Basically, the Yapese do notwa. a..e way

ro.es a.s omStprimitive and colorful, and so far they have provedfairly resistant to any abrupt cultural changes. TheYap District Legislature and community groupspersistently refused permission for the constructionof a Continental Hotel (as found in Palau, Guam, /Saipan, and Truk), which was the only major pro-posal ever offered to Yap, the military having no ......interest beyond the maintenance of the presentCoast Guard LORAN station.

Although the idea of progress has come to YapDatsuns, marijuana, incredible quantities of beer,and severe malnutrition in the district center--ithas not hit the Yapese with as much force as therest of Micronesia. Traditional leaders, customs,and taboos still exert some influence, but notenough to counter some of the social problems thathave already surfaced (e.g., drunkenness is theprincipal reason for absence from junior highschool classes). While the Yapese would welcomeadditional sources of income, they are unlikely toask for it very loudly, and they are absolutely un-willing to consider such offers as a superport ormilitary base, not that any are likely to be fOrth-coming.

Truk’s 32,000 peoplethe most heavily anddensely populated district in Micronesiawould bemuch more likely to strike up a deal. When the44-year-old District Director of Education pro-claimed, "What this place needs is a militarybase," he was probably speaking for a large num-ber of his fellow Trukese, many of whom rememberthe bustling days before World War II, when Trukwas the major Pacific base for the Japanese Navy,much of which still lies at the bottom of the extraor-dinarily large (50 miles in diameter) Truk Lagoon.

Although there has been no talk about building aU.S. Navy base in Truk, it strikes some Trukese,and other observers, as a logical possibility. Thereis still strong talk among the military about fall-back positions, as military presence in Southeastand East Asia declines. The Truk Lagoon is anatural harbor, and at an optimal distance fromGuam in terms of serving as a back-up base. There

Traditional Yapese meeting house with piece of stone moneyin foreground. Photo courtesy Floyd Takeuchi.

would be little resistance from the Trukese who, forthe past 32 years, have seen no prospects of eco-nomic development, and are rated the poorest ofthe Micronesians in per capita income. Should theRussians or Chinese show any signs of developingtheir new foothold in Polynesia into something evenquasi-military, the possibility of the United Statesremilitarizing Truk becomes even more logical.

Still, because of the Trusteeship Agreement, theUnited States may be reluctant to establish a visiblemilitary presence in Truk, at least not until afterthe termination of the Trusteeship, possibly asearly as 1981 if the United States has its way.

The Micronesians from Ponape, Truk, Kusaie,and Yap are still thinking in terms of Free Asso-ciation with the United States, the details of whichhave not yet been refined. What the Micronesianswill try to hold out for includes"

DMT-3-’77 -26-

1. More district autonomy with direct districtfunding (already proffered by AmbassadorWilliams to the Marshalls in an effort to fore-stall their independence move).

2. A strong COM, with a governor selected bythe legislators from among their own ranks.

3. Protection from alienation of their land andsurrounding waters.

4. Prohibition of testing, use, or disposal ofradioactive or toxic materials.

5. Protection against future declarations of emi-nent domain by the United States.

The Micronesians believe that they still iaavesomething worthwhile to negotiate. As one of thesenior Senators from the COM, a Mokilese, put it:

Micronesia must remain a unity in makingits deal with the U.S. because the new frontline position [vis-a-vis Asia] is now Guam,the Marianas, and soon Palau. They willhave the Marshalls to protect their rear. Doyou think the U.S. wants a soft underbelly?They need us as a fall-back position, andthey will pay for it.

Others have come to similar conclusions, butwith a more pointed rationale" the United Stateswill be willing to pay in order to keep others out, atactic which is known in officialese as "strategicdenial."

As for the real meaning of the future politicalstatus of TTPI, the same Mokilese Senatorsounded a note of what may be characteristicMicronesian fatalism when he said"

What difference does it really make? Whichever way we decide, somebody in the Secu-rity Council will veto it. If we settle for FreeAssociation, the Russians will say no. If weask for independence, the Americans willsay no. And that takes us right back towhere we are nowin limbo.

Guam

Although Guam is geographically located inMicronesia, it has never been a part of the TTPI,even thoUgh the Trust Territory headquarters was

located there from 1954 to 1962, and it is still thetransportation, communications, and commercialcenter for the entire area. Apart from its officialexclusion from the TTPI, Guamanians themselvesdo not consider themselves Micronesians, and lookwith great disdain on their less sophisticatedneighbors. Most Guamanians, in fact, do not evenknow where the islands of the TTPI are located,very few have been there, and hardly any of themcare.

While Guam is not included in political Micro-nesia, it is securely lodged within the Americanpolitical framework, and its presence looms large inthe Micronesia-U.S. picture. That it is thesouthernmost of the Mariana Islands is a strongargument in favor of their reintegration, which theU.S. Congress and a large number of Guamanianswould like to see, but which the Saipanese stronglyoppose. As the biggest, most populated, and mosttechnologically advanced island in Micronesia,Guam has always played a prominent logistic rolein the TTPI, and is likely to continue to do so, re-gardless of the new political shape taken by theTTPI.4

What the United States would obviously like tosee is a Micronesia that could be put into oneadministrative package, not an assortment ofa territory, a commonwealth, and several freelyassociated states. Therefore, it would appear thateventually Guam will be affected in one way oranother by the decisions on the future politicalstatus of Micronesia, despite Guamanian aloof-FIeSS.

Guam, U.S.A.as its boosters and license platesproclaimremained an obscure Navy outpost inthe western Pacific until December 1941 whenits small contingent of Navy and American civilianemployees was captured by Japanese forces shortlyafter the bombing of Pearl Harbor. After two andone-half years of hated Japanese occupation,American forces returned to wage one of thecostliest and most destructive battles of the Pacific

4. For example, at present, the Socio ConstructionCompany, based in Guam, holds major construction con-

tracts in the TTPI and Guam, where it is authorized toemploy alien Korean labor. The company’s officers include

prominent Guamanian politicians, an American, and twoKoreans.

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War. Although most of the 225-square mile islandwas razed during the fighting, the Guamaniansembraced the U.S. troops with a fervor that has notabated to this day. Liberation Day is Guam’sbiggest annual celebration, and Vietnam veteransare still heroic.

During the years of the Japanese occupation,Chamorros from Saipan were used as translatorsand overseers of their Chamorro cousins of Guam.The Guamanians could view this only as collabora-tion with the enemy, and still harbor considerableresentment against the Saipanese. Very likely, itwas this resentment more than anything else thatmoved the Guamanians to vote overwhelminglyagainst the reintegration of all the Mariana Islandsin the referendum of 1960, and is responsible forthe nearly universal prejudice, except for someyounger Guamanians born after the war years,against the Saipanese that still exists.

Six years after the liberation of Guam, the U.S.Congress in 1950 passed the Organic Act of Guam,which made Guam an unincorporated Territory ofthe United States, while making 30,000 Chamorrosnew citizens of the Republic. The Organic Act,which became Guam’s Constitution, also called fora unicameral legislature (to be elected by popularvote) and a governor (to be appointed by the Presi-dent of the United States) who would answer to theSecretary of Interior, in whose Department the newTerritory had been placed. Before that, Guam hadessentially belonged to the Navy, and was con-sidered for all practical purposes a Navy base.

The Navy did not take this loss easily. In fact,most feel that the contest for control is still goingon. As late as 1962, Navy security clearances wererequired for visitors and contract employees of thegovernment of Guam. In 1975, the Navy was lockedin serious combat with the government of Guamand the Department of Interior over the construc-tion of an ammunition wharf in Sella Bay, one ofGuam’s most picturesque areas of unspoilednature, and a favorite scenic spot for Japanesetourists. (The battle was only recently resolved infavor of the government of Guam.)

Navy control of the island, however, was dilutedconsiderably when the Air Force began to developthe mammoth Andersen Air Force Base, fromwhich approximately one-third of the B-52

bombing missions over Indochina were launched.During the 1960s, as air power emerged as theprimary defense force, the Andersen complex grewto occupy the entire northern section of the island(including the best farming and copra land). Sincethe Air Force is a relative newcomer, Navy still hasstronger community influence, along with theCatholic bishop. And between the two of themAir Force and Navythey own and occupy (oftenwith empty space) one-third of the islandthechoicest third. (The government of Guam alsoholds one-third of the island, which leaves one-third in private, often alien, hands.)

Under Navy administration there was no pre-tense of self-government, except for the tokenGuam Congress whose elected members served asadvisers to the Naval Governor, who never soughtany advice. The Organic Act changed things byproviding for an appointed civilian governor and a21-member legislature, which has developed into aconsiderable internal force in island politics.

After three Guamanian governors had beenappointed, the islanders elected their first one in1971 (a Republican), and turned him out of officein 1975 in favor of Governor Ricardo Bordallo, aGuamanian Democrat with Charles Reicheanideals, who now has his hands full trying to gaincontrol over an incredibly inflated economy whichhas sprung some serious leaks.

Guam’s course has often been rocky, and almosttotally without plan. Both natural and man-madedisasters have had major effects. During the 1950s,Guam plodded along at about the same sluggishpace as Micronesia, only many levels higher. Agri-culture and fishing became virtually extinct as thematuring Guamanian population drifted into theplentiful government jobs, which were being pro-vided by the government of Guam (as a result oflocalization and expansion) and the huge militarybases. Since Guamanians abhorred blue-collarwork, and, as new Americans, felt they were aboveit, Filipino laborers and technicians were importedby the thousands to build new physical plants (mili-tary and civilian) and keep them operating.

Its limited nonmilitary transportation/commu-nication linksa once-weekly Pan Am flight fromHonoluluand the laws prohibiting alien owner-ship of land and businesses also served to restrict

DMT-3-’77 -28-

any dramatic development during the 1950s. InNovember 1962, however, the complacent, rela-tively quiet, and steady little island of Guam washit by a force that was to change its Pacific Islandways forever. Typhoon Karenthe fiercest stormin the recorded history of the Pacific, according toFleet Weather Centralliterally tore the islandapart, demolishing more than 90 percent of civilianstructures. With generous typhoon relief and re-habilitation funds from the Kennedy administra-tion, plus the easing of restrictions on alienthat isU.S.ownership of land and businesses, Guambegan to quicken its developmental pace in the post-typhoon era, and kept it going for quite some time.

As the momentum created by Typhoon Karenbegan to slow down in the mid-1960s, it received aboost from another type of storm that was pickingup speed in Indochina. Each new B-52 brought toAndersen Air Force Base created a new communityof its own, and as their numbers increased, so didthe tempo of Guam.

New blood was injected into the island by the"Kennedy" immigration act of October 3, 1965,when the U.S. Congress made the first majoramendment to the 1952 McCarren-Walters Act.The amendment dramatically increased thenumber of Asian immigrants to the United States.Because Guam was the front door to the UnitedStates, some of them, especially those who couldnot afford to go further, stayed in Guam, "WhereAmerica’s Day Begins" (to quote the banner line ofthe Pacific Daily News, Guam’s only newspaper).

With thousands of new immigrants coming tothe islandthe majority from the Philippinestheland alienation codes began to crumble, until by1970 land sales were open to the world, andanybody with the cash could open a business. Suchan open door policy proved particularly attractiveto businessmen from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,and Hong Kong, and brought in others from theUnited States, the Philippines, New Zealand, andNauru, which is now putting up Guam’s tallestbuilding.

As the war in Indoehina moved inexorablytoward a frenetic crescendo, so did Guam’seconomy and social system. The amount of airtraffic that came through Guam alone was enoughto set the island spinning. Tourists from Japan

began to flock to the new hotels (mostly Japanese-owned) along Tumon Bay, where one of the majorattractions was to sit at the Guam Hilton poolsideat early cocktail hour to watch the B-52s returningto Andersen Air Force Base, sometimes at the rateof one per minute. Military brass from all over flewin and out of Guam like starlings, and hundreds ofthousands of GIs passed through Guam’s tiny ter-minal, usually in the middle of the night.

And there were the bombs, which had to betrucked from Apra Harbor in the south to Ander-sen in the north. During the carpet bombingperiod, the huge trucks inched their way, bumperto bumper, up Marine Drive, Guam’s major artery,which passes right through the capital, Agana.

The transition from a sleepy, Pacific Island com-munity of the 1950s to the cosmopolitan, war-fedfrenzy of the late 1960s and early ’70s, proved morethan the society could bear. Crime against peopleand property is claimed by everyone to be a seriousproblem, much of it related to drug trafficking(which is said to have abated since the Vietnam dis-engagement.) Many residents of Guam carry guns,especially when they go out at night. The once-strong Chamorro family system is breaking down,with increased family feuds (usually over land) anddivorces. The language, too, seems well on its wayto extinction.

The rather abrupt ending of the war in Indo-china brought Guam’s prosperity to a sudden halt,and its military-based economy immediately beganto feel the pinch. Then, as though by the grace ofGod, the spring of 1976 ushered in TyphoonPamelareportedly as bad as Karenwhich againblew much of the island’s vegetation and construc-tion away. While the actual damhge may not havebeen as severe, it was enough to get millions ofbadly needed federal dollars in the form of typhoonrelief, enough to keep Guam afloat for a whilelonger.

The 100,000 people now living on the island,mostly in concrete homes and apartments, areseemingly not concerned about their economicfuture after the post-typhoon funds are gone.Under the prevailing U.S. wage scales, consumer-ism is at an all-time high, as are tastes, especiallyfor color TVs (many of them purchased through PXmail order catalogs), air conditioners, and huge

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American cars which clog the islands’ highwaysfrom daybreak till after midnight.

It may be that they have no need for concern.According to the PacOqc Daily News (December 13,1976), "It appears that the federal government isspending pretty close to half a billion dollars [perannum] on Guam. This is an incredible figure,which figures out to more than $5,000 for eachman, woman, and child on the island." Thisincredible sum of money (a "conservative esti-mate," according to the Director of Planning) is notjust a flash in the pan, like typhoon relief money. Agood portion of it is steady income, primarily fromtaxes, all of whichincluding military incometaxesgo directly to the government of Guam.Other steady sources of federal income includesocial security, Housing and Urban Developmentgrants, Interstate Highway funds, and just aboutevery Health, Education, and Welfare program inthe books.

In spite of enormous amounts of money goinginto Guam, its economic problems are not solved.The island’s 8.1 percent unemployment rate con-tinues to climb as more Ilocanos leave theirpoverty-ridden province in the Philippines forGuam, U.S.A. The once-bustling tourist hotelshave fallen on hard times, as Japanese tourist travelhas decreased and shifted to other Pacific islanddestinations. And since tourism is the only sourceof income aside from the federal trough, Guam willneed some help, logically in the form of militaryspending, to keep pace with population growth.

Despite Guam’s glittering prosperity, mostMicronesians cite it as the epitome of what theydon’t want their islands to become. Many of themcome to Guam on TTPI or other federal business,and enjoy the shops, hotels, restaurants, bars,hookers, and skin flicks, but they insist that suchthings would not be good for Micronesia. LikeJapan, with its plans for a superport in Palau, theMicronesians want to export their social pollutionto Guam and Honolulu.

However, the Micronesians seem to like the ideaof having more federal money, and in that respectGuam serves as the ideal model, as in, for example,bilingual education, school lunch programs, andcoastal zone management funds. Indeed, Guammay serve as the overall model for future island

development in the American Pacific, especially inthose islands just to the norththe new Common-wealth of the Northern Marianas.

The present Guamanian leadership (electedGovernor in 1975)is not complacent about thesematters, and is setting out to try to change thestatus quo. A Constitutional Convention endorsedby 90 percent of the voters in November 1976, willbe held this year for 120 days, involving 40 electeddelegates. Whatever they come up with will betransmitted by the Governor to the U.S. Congress,which can amend it "in part or whole." The GuamCon-Con may prove to be the first real attempt totest how far self-government, as defined in theOrganic Act, can go.

Several factors prompted the Con-Con on Guam.Many people were miffed because the Saipanesewere allowed to write their own Constitution, whileGuam was saddled with its 26-year-old, Washing-ton-authored Organic Act. The general feeling wasthat Saipan got a better deal. Additionally, therehas been a growing demand for a clarification ofthe role and authority of the military on Guammotivated in part by the Sella Bay controversy, andother land matters. Guam also wants the power toset its own immigration laws (Guamanians arealready outnumbered), and to have complete accessto foreign shipping, now prohibited under the JonesAct.

Supporting these is a flicker of an ethnic aware-ness movement which is beginning to take on somepolitical overtones.

It is highly unlikely that the Guamanians willpersist in their demands for change in the face ofWashington resistance. Certainly they would not doanything to jeopardize the federal largess, on whichthey are irrevocably dependent. What they wouldprobably settle for, and what the United Stateswould certainly welcome, is a rewritten constitu-tion, a change in name of status, and a promise of amore central position in the affairs of other Micro-nesian islands that were once in the TTPI.

And on the other side, it is likely that the UnitedStates will show some consideration for Guamaniandesires as the withdrawal of military forces fromSoutheast Asia continues, and as President Marcos

DMT-3-’77 -30-

talks of raising the rent on military bases in thePhilippines. Although there is little danger of theUnited States losing its hold on Guam, it wouldmake everybody in Guam happier if the money

keeps flowing. Just how long the United States canor is willing to keep Guam’s economy green will nodoubt depend on developments in other parts of thePacific and Asia.

[Part III concludes the series, The Pacific Islands, by Donald M. Topping.]

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

General

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Polynesia

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Melanesia

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Chowning, A. An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Melanesia. Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1973, 55 pp.

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Micronesia

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De Smith, S.A. Microstates and Micronesia. New York, N.Y. University Press, 1970, 193 pp.

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