Southern Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy || The Mercenary Menace

The Mercenary MenaceAuthor(s): Akbarali H. ThobhaniSource: Africa Today, Vol. 23, No. 3, Southern Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy (Jul. - Sep.,1976), pp. 61-68Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185619 .

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The Mercenary Menace

Akbarali H. Thobhani

Definition, that common problem in the field of political science, arises immediately in discussing the subject of mercenaries. Among dictionary writers and publishers there appears to be no disagreement. In their strictly linguistic explanations, mercenary and mercenarism possess two basic attributes. These are (1) serving as a soldier primarily for monetary rewards, and (2) not being of the same nationality as the nationality of the army. The mercenaries are, therefore, hired troops serving in the army or armed forces of foreign powers. In the practical and real world of politics, however, who is regarded as a mercenary depends less on these attributes than on the observer's or commentator's own political perspective. For instance, in the Congo crisis of the early 1960s many Katangese secessionists used this label for the United Nations forces, and in the recent Angolan conflict many Africans and Westerners opposed to the PRA government similarly labelled the Cuban troops. In the same vein, non-French soldiers serving in the French Foreign Legion and the Gurkha soldiers serving in the British army could be regarded as mercenaries. Even though in recent years the African continent has been the one most victimized by mercenariism and most Africans passionately denounce the role of mercenaries, even they have not been able to agree among themselves on a definition. In 1972, in the wake of a foreign supported invasion of the Republic of Guinea, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) appointed a Commission of Legal Experts from nine member-states and assigned it the task of drafting a convention on mercenary activities. But, the Commission could not agree on the definition of mercenary.'

Despite the difficulties of precise definition, the general mercenary phenomenon has been condemned by most nations. The 1971 OAU summit passed a resolution condemning the use of mercenaries and reaffirming African determination to free Africa from the "scourge" that mercenarism represents.2 The United Nations in various resolutions has also condemned mercenary activities and has called upon member states to ensure that their countries, as well as their

1. Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series), June 1 30, 1972, p. 2496.

2. Colin Legum, ed., African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1971 72, London: Rex Collins Ltd., p. C4-5.

Dr. Thobharai, is Assistant Professor of Afro American Studies at Metropolitan State College, Denver, Colorado, and an Africa Today editorial consultant.

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nationals, are not used for the recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries. During upheavals in Zaire in 1967 involving a mercenary presence, a United States' representative to the United Nations, in an address to the world body, expressed his country's hope that Zaire "will be able to deal effectively with this latest mercenary threat" and went on to urge that "the mercenary danger which has threatened the Congo (Zaire) for so long be eliminated and not be permitted to recur.. ."3

Mercenarism is a centuries-old phenomenon. Machiavelli discusses the subject at some length in The Prince.4 But only in the 20th century and especially since 1960 has it become controversial and been commonly condemned. Post-1960 African experiences may for the first time result in the formulation of some international law on mercenarism and if this happens it will indeed be a significant African contribution to the development of international law.

It can be argued that during the establishment of colonial rule in Africa during 19th and early 20th centuries widespread use of mercenary soldiers, both Africans and non-Africans, was made by the European colonial powers. But this phase of Africa's experience is rarely discussed in the controversy surrounding mercenary activities. Neither is much controversy generated when one African government employs in its army nationals of another African country. The Army of Uganda, for instance, is said to include many nationals of Sudan, but little protest is heard. But the particular type of mercenarism which arouses passionate feelings in Africa and has been branded a "scourge" by the OAU has the added element of race. Mercenarism strongly conditioned by racial factors has frequently been experienced on the African continent since 1960.

The most recent instance of racial mercenarism of course, is Angola. Other African countries affected in recent years include Zaire, Nigeria and the Sudan. Zimbabwe is already affected. In all these cases,white mercenaries from Europe, South Africa and lately from the United States have been used to prop up colonialist, neo-colonialist, secessionist, or racist regimes. The image of a modern mercenary as a trigger happy European or a white person of any other nationality who enjoys shooting non-whites, especially if he is paid for it, is widely accepted in the entire Third World. This mercenary involvenment in Africa, for the most part, has tried and continues to try to stop the inevitable historical progress of Africa towards total liberation from colonialism, neo-colonialism and white minority rule, seeking to continue the direct or indirect domination of the white race and the western world over Africa. These mercenaries at best onl) succeed in delaying the triumph of African nationalism. In the process they accelerate the worsening of international race relations in general and Afro-Western relations in particular. In this sense, the

3. United States Department of State Bulletin, December 11, 1967, p. 808. 4. See K.W. Grundy, 'On Machiavelli and the Mercenaries," Journal of Modern African Studies, October 1968.

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mercenaries pose a menace not only to Africa but also to any prospects for improved Afro-Western relations.

Involvement by the United States nationals in mercenary activities in Africa, with minor exceptions, appears to be quite recent and related primarily to Angola and Zimbabwe. Mercenaries involved in the Nigeria- Biafra war, the first Congo crisis, the civil war in Sudan and the attempted invasion of Guinea were mostly European nationals. Some evidence points to the presence of CIA-backed anti-Castro Cubans from the United States in the white mercenary army of Moise Tshombe when he was Prime Minister of the then Leopoldville government. But during the height of the Angolan civil war several hundred U.S. nationals were reported as serving in the armed forces of the two pro-Western liberation movements.

Under United States law, it is illegal for a U.S. national to serve as a soldier in the employ of a foreign power, or for a U.S. citizen or foreign national to recruit soldiers within the U.S. The relevant sections of the U.S. Federal Code, Title 18 are cited below:

No. 958 Any citizen of the United States who within the jurisdiction thereof, ac- cepts and exercises a commission to serve a foreign prince, state, colony, district, people in war, against any prince, state, colony, district, or people, with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $2000 or imprisonment not more than 3 years or both. No. 959 Whoever, within the United States, enlists or enters himself or hires or retains another to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people as a soldier or as a marine or seaman on board any vessel of war.. shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years or both. No. 960 Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any foreign price or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $3000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both.5

The United States Government was officiall) not at war with Angola; therefore, participation by U.S. nationals in the Angolan conflict was contrary to law!. During the height of the Angolan crisis, mercenarv recruitment reportedly took place at several locations - Boulder, Colorado; Miami, Florida; Dallas, Texas and others.6 In its JanUiary 2, 1976 edition, the Chnrstian Science Monitor reported that about 300 Americans were already operating wNithin Angola and 300 more were ready to go and that these mercenaries received training at Fort Benning, Georgia. In late January diplomatic sources in Cape 5. United States Code Annotated, Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, St. Paul, AAinn . West Publishing Co., 1966. 6. See New York Times, January 1, 1976.

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Town confirmed that white mercenaries, mainly American and British, were assembling in various African cities for action in Angola. 7 Also in January, Senator John Tunney of California charged that American pilots were airlifting weapons to Angola and that his information came from an "eyewitness to operations in Angola."8 Roy Innis, Chairman of the Congress of Racial Equality - a U.S. civil rights group, admitted that his organization was recruiting black American veterans for service as a 'police force' in Angola. Despite these widely circulated reports of mercenary recruitment in the United States from some of this country's most respected news sources, the U.S. government denied any existence of mercenary recruitment. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department announced on several occasions that these reported mercenary recruitment activities would be investigated. The outcome of these investigations is not known, but as of yet no individual has been charged or indicted in the United States on any mercenary related activity.

United States government agencies are also reported to have been directly involved in financial support of mercenary recruitment in Britain. Under British law, mercenary recruitment in Britain for service in any country outside the jurisdiction of the British government is not illegal.9 A private British firm, the Security Advisory Services, did most of the recruiting there and a spokesman admitted that recruitment was financed with U.S. money and that the group was dealing through a liaison officer in the U.S. Embassy in London.'0 Various U.S. officials of lower administrative ranks denied these reports; but the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld refused to deny British reports that more than $20 million, mainly from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, was earmarked for expenses for mercenaries for Angola."

Any doubts concerning the presence of American mercenaries in Angola vanished with the capture of three American and ten British and Irish mercenaries by the MPLA forces. At the subsequent trial, their testimonies shed more light on the complicity of the British,the United States and other national authorities in facilitating the flow of mercenaries to Angola. The British mercenaries testified that during their journey from London to Kinshasa with stops in Brussels and Athens, they never had to deal with customs officials.'2 Gary Acker, one of the three Americans on trial, testified that he told the FBI about his involvement with mercenary recruiters, but the F3BI did nothing to stop these activities.'3

An ironic element in the Angolan situation was the alliance of the

7. Africa Research Bulletin, February 15, 1976. p. 3901. 8. Washington Post, January 7, 1967. p. 9 9. Washington Post, February 1, 1976. p. 18. 10. The Observer (London) February 1, 1976. p. 1. 11. Washington Post, February 2, 1976. p. 6. 12. Angola News Summary, (New York: MPLA Solidarity Committee), June 25, 1976. 13. Ibid.

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Zaire government with the mercenaries. No other country in recent history has suffered more from the brutality, barbarism and the destructive character of the 'dogs of war' than Zaire in the 1960s. Yet, the government of Zaire apparently had few qualms about violating the many resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity on mercenary activities, most of them, in the first instance, adopted in response to Zaire's experience with mercenaries.

In upholding the death sentences passed on some of the mercenaries tried in Angola, Angolan President Augustinho Neto declared that "It is imperative that the practice of mercenarism be banished once and for all from our planet."'4 The Angolan experience once more dramatized the disregard that many Europeans and white Americans have of Africa and Africans. It also laid to rest the myth of the military 'invincibility' of white mercenaries that had developed during the 1960s. But, it does not appear to have scared off the 'dogs of war' nor to have caused the governments of mercenary source countries to take more stringent steps against mercenary-oriented activities.

Zimbabwe is the latest focal point for mercenary activities. Once again, white Americans are discreetly but unquestionably being recruited through ads placed in several magazines."5 At the mercenary trial in Angola, a letter written by an American recruiter and found in the possession of a captured mercenary was presented as evidence. The letter elaborated on the opportunities available to Americans for mercenary services in Zimbabwe. According to this letter, there exist least four military groups that Americans could join."' These are the regular army in which a mercenary is hired at the same rank that he had upon discharge from the U.S. armed forces; the Special Air Service; a police unit; and an unidentified fourth group. Service in Special Air Service was a prerequisite for enlistment in this fourth group and the letter went on to state that in this group "they paint themselves black, speak the language and actually filter into the terrorist camps." In June 1975 Zimbabwe African nationalists charged that white Americans were being recruited with the knowledge of the U.S. State Department and that Zimbabwe-bound mercenaries were being trained at a Marine Corps facility at Quantico, Virginia.'7 A State Department spokesman, while denying the latter charge, acknow ledged that there were indications that these reports of mercenary revcruitment wvere accurate and a firm named Phoenix Associates w as identified as doing the recruiting."8 Government

14. Washington Post, July 10, 1976. p. 4. 15. See David Anable, 'The Return of the Mercenaries," Africa Report, November December 1975. 16. Angola Weekly News Summary, June 25, 1976. 17. New York Times, June 22, 1975. 18. Ibid.

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investigations of these and other firms have as of yet not resulted in any legal proceedings against mercenary recruiters. One of the American lawyers who served as a defense counsel for the American mercenaries at the Angola trial, after returning to the United States, expressed bitterness at the fact that no legal steps have been taken against recruiters.

Since it is illegal for British citizens to serve as mercenaries in Zimbabwe, a country technically under the British crown, it can be expected that the illegal white Rhodesian regime will seek more white mercenaries from the U.S. as the liberation struggle intensifies. There are several reasons for this. The United States has a large pool of militarily trained war veterans who have not been able to obtain employment in the civilian sector or who are not satisfactorily employed. Men mostly from this category ended up in Angola. Secondly, English-speaking mercenaries will be more useful to the Rhodesian Front then the others. Thirdly, many white Americans themselves believe in 'white supremacist' ideas and wholeheartedly sympathize with Ian Smith's objectives. Fourthly, many Americans are convinced that the struggle in Southern Africa is one between the 'free world' and the 'communists.' It is not uncommon to meet Americans who firmly believe that Angola and Mozambique have fallen to the communists and see no relationship of these African struggles to the American experience in 1776. Nor do they recognize that in the process the freedom fighters of Angola and Mozambique helped liberate the masses of the Portuguese people also from the rule of a fascist, oppressive regime. On July 22nd, 1976 the Columbia Broadcasting Service on its evening television news featured an interview with an American who was serving in the armed forces of the illegal Smith regime and he justified his presence in Zimbabwe on the basis that he was fighting against a communist insurgency movement. On the whole, the American general public and many in the administration do not believe that there exists a political system worse than any Marxist-Leninist system, such as the racist, colonialist system under white minority control in Southern Africa.

One difficulty in implementing the U. S. anti-mercenary recruiting laws is the fine legal line between actually recruiting U.S. nationals to serve as mercenaries and merely providing information to the public about job opportunities in other countries, which is not against the present law. Organizations such as the Phoenix Associates emphasize in their ads that they only offer information and do not recruit. It is due to this technicality that some of the reputed recruiters have been successful in channeling mercenaries to the zones of operation without violating U.S. laws. But a number of American groups and individuals have been reported to have actually recruited mercenaries for service in Angola and Zimbabwe. Apparently, their activities must still be under investigation or the government has not found strong case against them, or simply turns a blind eye. How willing is the U.S. administration to prosecute those who are known to 66




be mercenaries? During the trial of the mercenaries in Angola and after the sentencing, not once did the U.S. government suggest that the three Americans on trial may have violated the U.S. laws nor did it call for their extradition. By that time it seemed to be quite well established that Americans were involved as mercenaries in the Angolan civil war contrary to U.S. law. The U.S. government's reaction to the Angola trial demonstrated its own reluctance, to put an end to mercenary recruitment and by implication its approval of mercenary recruitment activities in the United States.

The matter of Americans serving as mercenaries in Zimbabwe against the African nationalist movements is now further complicated. The illegal Smith regime has given a new twist to the mercenary recruiting business by referring to those whites who go to Zimbabwe, with the aim of serving as soldiers, as immigrants.19 According to the U.S. immigration laws, a citizen who emigrates loses his citizenship upon taking an oath of allegiance to another state. There are no restrictions under law prohibiting Americans to travel or emigrate to Zimbabwe, although the State Department has recently advised against it. But Zimbabwe is not presently recognized as a sovereign state in international law nor by the United States! Could then, an American lose his citizenship for taking_ an oath of allegiance to a state that in theory is not yet a state? What happens if an American emigrates to Zimbabwe and serves in the armed forces without technically taking an oath of allegiance? Could he be prosecuted for violating U.S. anti-mercenary laws or would he be immune from them since he left as an emigrant? These are some of the legal technicalities that arise under this new situation. It is clear, therefore, that the existing anti-mercenary laws of the U.S. are outdated and inadequate, and were not drafted with the racial confrontation existing in Southern Africa in mind. A need for revision and expansion of these laws exists.

As mentioned earlier, in the aftermath of the mercenary involvenment in Angola, there may, for the first time, develop a clearly defined international law and code on mercenarism. Although most nations have condemned mercenary activities in resolutions of international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, there is disagreement among nations as to whether mercenarism is outlawed or is regarded as a crime in international law. Most African countries tend to see mercenarism as a crimiie involving illegal entr) into foreign territories, violation of the sovereignty of a state, the killing of peoples and the destruction of property. Wastern cotuntries, on the other hand, would like to regard mercenaries as prisoners of war to be so treated under the Geneva Convention. The U.S. position is ambiguous. Under its law

19. The Denver Post, July 23, 1976. p. No. 9.

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mercenarism is a crime, yet it called for captured mercenaries to be treated as prisoners of war. Also, one would expect that the resolutions and declarations of the United Nations, overwhelmingly approved by the international community, would be recognized to have some legal force in the international political system; but this is not the case. There is disagreement among international legal experts and scholars on the issue of international organizations such as the United Nations' General Assembly being a source of the development of international law.20

During the trial of mercenaries in Angola, an international commission of inquiry on mercenarism also met in Luanda. This commission of 44 members representing 32 counttries prepared, after several days of deliberations, a 12 article document which has been proposed as a basis for an international convention on mercenarism.21 Under this "Luanda Convention" mercenarism would be declared a crime in international law and any activity geared toward organizing, financing, supplying, equipping, training, promoting, supporting or employing mercenaries would be a crime also. Secondly, mercenaries would not be regarded as lawful combatants and therefore not entitled to prisoner of war status. Thirdly, mercenaries would face extradition to the- country which was victimized by their activities or be prosecuted in their own countries. The United States government has as yet not expressed its views towards this particular document or on the need for a body of international law on mercenarism.

Conclusion

In conclusion, mercenaries continue to pose a threat in the international system, particularly in the southern African situation. Whereas in the 1960s mostly European nationals filled the ranks of mercenaries, in the 1970s U.S. nationals are becoming increasingly involved and this is further poisoning African-American relations and needlessly leads to further internationalization of conflict in Africa. The nature of conflict in southern Africa is primarily not around the isssue of communism; it is between colonialist and oppressed people and it is vital that the American people and the administration come to terns with this. That African nationalism will triumph in southern Africa is inevitable. Mercenaries only delay this victory causing, in the process, a lot of unnecessary loss of lives and property. It is in the long terimi interest of the United States to put an end to misdeeds and mischief by American mercenaries in Africa, and to support the cause of African liberation in southern Africa.

20. See Obed Y. Asamnoah, The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.

21. The Observer (London), June 20, 1976. p. 9.

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