Space Science Board

The Space Science Board of the National Research Council shares with NASA and the nation a deep sense of grief over the loss of the crew of the Space Shuttle Challenger - seven exceptional Americans whose lives were dedicated to some of our country's loftiest goals.

At this time of national reflection following the tragedy, much thought- ful consideration is being given to the goals and the future of the American space program. We believe that these reflections on our country's efforts in space are very appropriate. In the course of these considerations we urge that high priority be given to assessing the proper level o f resources required for the nation's space program and the proper balance between manned and u n m a n n e d ac t iv i t ies . This re- examination should assign to manned and unmanned systems and launch vehicles the roles that will permit each to serve the nation best, in contrast to the course we have been following for the past 15 years. The result of this analysis may call for the allocation of greater resources than we are present- ly devoting to the space program. It may call for better management of those resources or a mixture of both. In any case, we also believe that it is mandatory to ask whether this nation should proceed with such a highly visible, prestigious national enterprise on the frontiers of technology at an effective level of resources where the consequences of a single tragic acci- dent can cripple the entire program, civilian and military. It is now time to determine the strength of the national will for our country's space effort, to determine if it is our intent to pursue a pioneering program on the frontiers of space embracing a wide "range of activities. If the nation concludes, as we believe it should, that such a course is in the national interest, then it should resolve to devote to that effort the means to carry it out proper- ly.

Since 1974 the annual budget for the

civilian space program has remained almost constant at about $7.5 billion, corrected for inflation to 1986 dollars. This contrasts with a peak funding level three times as large as in the mid-1960s in the midst of the Apollo program. This substantial reduction in our space effort reflects a decision that was made at the conclusion of the Apollo program not to provide the means to undertake soon another ambitious, challenging space project similar to the one that had placed men on the Moon and returned them to Earth. Furthermore, following Apollo the nation failed to identify any clear goals for its space program, but, nevertheless, tried to attain a level of activity well above the limit set by the means that have effectively been avail- able.

The major new program in manned space flight that was authorized during the decade of the 1970s was the Space Shuttle, a transport system that was meant to be the sole national means of access to space and was expected ultimately to be economically self- sustaining. Later, related actions stop- ped the procurement of expendable launch vehicles before the Shuttle became a proven, reliable system; prevented planning for the develop- ment of advanced unmanned launch systems; and encouraged planning for two ambitious scientific missions, Galileo and Ulysses, to use the Shuttle in a manner that would severely test its capability in the first attempts to l a u n c h h igh p r i o r i t y s c i e n c e spacecraft. These decisions had the effect of making unmanned space missions, including those of space science, dependent on manned vehi- cles, the Shuttle in particular, in a way that caused serious problems for both aspects of the space program. This policy, which has deprived the nation of launch vehicles for major scientific payloads for almost a decade, has been devastating for space science.

The most recent launches of major science payloads requiring launch sys-

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tems of the Titan-Centaur class occur- red in 1977 when the two Voyager spacecraft were sent off toward the outer Solar System. In the mid-1960s scientific missions were being laun- ched at a rate of five to six per year by the United States. A measure of the level of activity and reliability of the United States program before 1980 is that nine interplanetary missions that were launched during that period are still sending valuable data from space. The Challenger accident means that at least a full decade will have lapsed between the launching of the Voya- gers and the next major scientific mission by the United States. Seven full scale scientific missions have been or are being prepared for launches that were scheduled to occur during the next two years. Several others were waiting in line behind these. In the meanwhile other nations have been methodically picking up the pace and improving the quality of their scientific enterprises in space.

As a matter of highest priority in a re-energized national space program to which a realistic level o f support is dedicated we strongly urge that the nation move rapidly toward the ac- quisition of a balanced fleet o f launch vehicles that will provide assured ac- cess to space for all activities demanded by our national space program. The characteristics of these launch vehicles should be determined by the needs and requirements of all potential users, military, commercial and space scien- ce. We recommend that space trans- portation and launch systems be ex- peditiously acquired that will allow human resources to be used where they are needed and can be most effective and allow unmanned vehicles to be the carrier of choice for other missions. A policy that merely provides for the use of existing commercial expendable launch vehicles would not be an adequate response to this recom- mendation.

In summary, it is our view that one of the most important lessons from the Challenger accident is that the objec- tives of a highly visible and important national endeavor such as our space program must be clearly stated, that an adequate variety and level of re- sources should be provided to carry

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out this program successfully, and that measures be taken to insure that those resources are efficiently managed. These resources should assure access to space all of the elements in the space program: civilian and military, manned and unmanned.

The objectives of the manned and unmanned elements o f the program should not be mixed in ways that reduce the effectiveness o f either of

RCA Americom

RCA American Communications, Inc (RCA Americom) a wholly-owned subsidiary of RCA Corporation, is a pioneer in the satellite communica- tions field, having been in this busi- ness since 1973. RCA Americom laun- ched its first C-band satellite in 1975 using a Delta expendable launch vehi- cle (ELV); and of the subsequent nine satellites, seven Satcom C-band satel- lites have used the Delta launcher, and two Ku-band satellites have used the Shuttle.

Recent events have created new interest on the part of the US govern- ment in a mixed fleet of Shuttles and ELVs. RCA Americom strongly re- commends prompt expansion of NASA launch services to include a Shuttle/ELV mixed fleet. Under no circumstances should commercial space ventures be denied access to Shuttle launch services. The mixed fleet concept requires adequate Shut- tle availability as well as an adequate mix of expendable launchers to enable it to meet future launch requirements.

• Returning to a single US launch system is unacceptable to the com- mercial users of space, be it the Shuttle or a single expendable sys- tem. Events of the last several months have shown the vulnerabil- ity of the US to an extended shutdown.

• Specifically, RCA Americom re- commends immediate expansion on the part of NASA to a mixed launch fleet using both the Shuttle as well as expendable launch vehi- cles. The fleet should be made up

them. To do so threatens the forfeiture of our scientific and technological lead- ership in space.

Source: The Space Science Board of the National Research Council of the US National Academy of Sciences, 'The na- tion's space program after Challenger: the roles of manned and unmanned systems for launching scientific space missions', 12 May 1986.

of vehicles with sufficient flexibility to be capable of launching, at economical rates, satellites across a wide range of payload weights. Flexibility can be provided by a mixed set of vehicles in addition to the Shuttle, including the Delta, Atlas, Centaur and Titan, in vari- ous configurations. In the interest of reducing launch costs, there should be a multiple payload capacity for ELV launches, similar to the Shuttle.

• RCA Americom does not believe it prudent to attempt to foster ELV commercialization by excluding commercial satellites from the Shuttle. We also do not believe that commercial izat ion of US launch services without extensive government assistance, at least in- itially, will offer a competitive alternative to foreign ELVs, such as Ariane.

• RCA Americom believes that ELVs can be competitive with for- eign launch services and offer a parity with Shuttle pricing, but only with US government support. Such support is justifiable, since the US government should place a value on the prestige associated with having a highly-reliable but still price-competitive mixed fleet. It also addresses the outflow of mil- lions of dollars to foreign launch services.

• Government assistance could take various forms. For example, a com- mitment by the government to use ELV launch services for military and space exploration packages would increase production, thereby reducing the cost per launch. The government should accept respon-

sibility for providing ELV launch capability as a national resource and develop a reimbursement poli- cy based on recovery of in- cremental costs applicable to both ELVs and the Shuttle. Given the present situation, we do not believe ELV commercializa- tion should begin until the present US launch crisis is over and the backlog of commercial and military space packages has been substan- tially reduced, if not eliminated altogether. Once the problem of the current backlog has been dealt with, if the government continues to favor transition of ELVs with appropri- ate government support to private industry, NASA should be the exclusive government agency to guide the transition, and then only to qualified launch vehicle manu- facturers. With its ELV back- ground and expertise, which will be enhanced with immediate expan- sion of the NASA fleet to include state-of-the-art ELVs, NASA is more capable than other agencies, which lack its hard-earned know- ledge, experience and technical management skill. Even after the transition has been underway, NASA should remain the govern- ment's cognizant agency to insure that a cost-competitive US ELV launch capability is maintained. Using its demonstrated expertise in this area, NASA could promote performance and reliability im- provements, monitor the design of hardware manufac tu r ing , and assure the reliability of an adequate volume of launch services at the least possible cost. To interpose other US government agencies or private entities as middlemen or agents between launch vehicle companies and satellite operators would not be productive.

RCA Americom believes the fore- going recommendations are necessary to maintain the competitive edge that the American satellite manufacturers and owners-operators now hold in the world. As one of the largest owner- operators of domestic communica- tions satellites, RCA Americom pro-

278 SPACE POLICY November 1986