Spec Ops Overview_Slides With Notes_JSOU

8/19/2019 Spec Ops Overview_Slides With Notes_JSOU

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Welcome to the Introduction to Special Operations Forces course lesson on Special

Operations.

In this lesson we will discuss the term Special Operations and identify some of thecharacteristics, requirements, and advantages of Special Operations, as well as, some

of the differences between Special Operations and conventional operations.


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To understand Special Operations warfare we need to first answer “What are Special

Operations?” This understanding is necessary to appropriately and effectively

conduct planning, execute operations, resource, support, and integrate Special

Operations without competition but as a complement to conventional forces andother governmental agencies.

Most armed forces are designed as large organizations for employment against

military threats. The equipment, training, and tactics are standardized for application

to a wide range of operations. Conventional forces conduct operations with baseline

tactical units against tactical level objectives.

Special Operations provide an option to conduct Tactical Operations using direct orindirect methods to achieve strategic and operational level objectives. Understanding

what Special Operations are is a foundation to build follow on learning about Special

Operations Forces, core tasks, and employment.


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Depending on one’s frame of reference, past experiences, and individual notions the

term Special Operations can have a different meaning and be easily confusing with

other terms and acronyms. Before proceeding it is important to fully understand

some terms and acronyms that are easily confused. Special Operations or SO whichare acts or activities.


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Special Operations Forces or SOF are forces or units of the military services

designated by the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support Special Operations.

Examples of Special Operations Forces include units such as the Army’s 75th Ranger

Regiment, the Navy’s SEAL Team 10 and Special Boat Unit 22, the Air Force’s 320th

Special Tactics Squadron and 353rd Special Operations Group and the Marine’s 1st

Marine Special Operations battalion.


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Special Forces or SF are specific U.S. Army Forces, organized, trained, and equipped to

conduct Special Operations with an emphasis of unconventional warfare capabilities.

At the individual level, Special Forces are those individuals who have attended and

successfully completed a qualification course and been awarded the Army Green

Beret.


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Doctrinal Special Operations are Tactical Operations conducted using either direct or

indirect methods to achieve strategic or operational level objectives using military

capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.

In addition to achieving military objectives, Special Operations can also be used to

support the application of diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of

power.

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SO can be conducted in all environments but are particularly well suited for denied,

hostile and politically sensitive environments.

Special Operations can be conducted independently or in support of conventionalforces, other U.S. government agencies, or partner nations and may include

operations by, with, or through indigenous, insurgent, or irregular forces.

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To fully understand the doctrinally definition of Special Operations we need to look at thedefinitions of each of the levels of war.

Strategic level of war— The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of

nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic securityobjectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve theseobjectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives;sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and otherinstruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve thoseobjectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategicplans.

Operational level of war— The level of war at which campaigns and major operations areplanned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or otheroperational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operationalobjectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the

operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustainthese events.

Tactical level of war— The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned andexecuted to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities atthis level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation toeach other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.

Special Operations are tactical operations, engagements, or activities that can have animmediate effect at the operational and strategic levels of war.

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Special Operations differ from conventional operations in a number of ways. They require specialized

personnel and equipment along with special tactics, techniques, and procedures exceeding that

resident in conventional forces.

These specialized forces require regional expertise, cultural knowledge, and language skills. Many of

America’s Special Operations Forces are focused on a specific geographic region of the globe. The

ability to speak the host nation language(s) coupled with an in depth understanding of the culture are

powerful tools when trying to establish relationships, trust, and mutual respect.

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Special Operations tend to accept a higher degree of physical or political risk. In many cases their

objective is a high value target located in a denied area and away from friendly support bases and

combat support units.

Operating in small teams, Special Operations Forces will often be numerically inferior to their

adversaries. This requires the implementation of risk mitigation measures into the operation. Given

the situation the decision to conduct a special operation can have a high degree of political risk, but it

can also reduce the chance of escalation.

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Special Operations rely on a variety of unique modes of employment in order to infiltrate and

exfiltrate to and from a target area undetected.

Examples include freefall airborne operations which could be either high altitude high opening

(HAHO) and high altitude low opening (HALO) techniques.

Other modes include SCUBA operations or the use of underwater submersibles and low-level terrain-

following fixed and rotary-wing operations.

All of these different modes represent unique capabilities that are not resident in conventional forces.

They require specialized equipment and training which is often of higher physical risk than that of

conventional operations.

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Special Operations are quite often dependent on very detailed and real-time intelligence

requirements. Depending on the mission, this could include things like guard schedules, the height

and thickness of walls, precise locations of both friendly and hostile forces, which way doors open

and close, to name a few.

The intelligence collection efforts required to conduct Special Operations against widely dispersed

global terrorist threats is far different than those required in traditional warfare. In traditional

warfare it takes a relatively low level of effort and resources to find the enemy but a substantial

amount of resources to defeat them.

Take the Cold War for example; we knew where the Soviet forces were located, their order of battle,

what equipment they had, and their capabilities. They were not hard to find because they

maneuvered in very large formations and quite often did not try to conceal themselves.Consequently, it took a rather low level of effort to find the enemy but a substantial effort to engage

and finish them.

The current campaign against violent extremist organizations is just the opposite. It requires a

substantial level of effort and resources to find the target but a much smaller force to quickly conduct

a finishing operation.

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Special Operations are often conducted at great distances from major operating bases with operating

units widely separated and disbursed across the operational area. This makes Special Operations

ndependent from friendly support and service support and more reliant on indigenous support and

assets.

Because Special Operations are conducted over extended distances they require sophisticated and

redundant voice, data, and video communications that can literally communicate around the world.

Additionally, those systems must be compatible across the service Special Operations Forces or

Special Operations information enterprise as well as with the conventional forces.

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Special Operations are typically defined by one or more of the following

characteristics:

• Low visibility or clandestine operations

• Conducted across the entire range of military operations

• Complimentary to conventional operations

• Often conducted by, with, or through non-U.S. forces

• Direct and indirect approaches

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Special Operations are typically low visibility or clandestine operations. Low visibility

operations incorporate actions to limit the exposure of those involved and/or their

actions.

Examples include the use of civilian aircraft and vehicles or unmarked Department of

Defense aircraft to travel or the wearing of civilian clothes to reduce the U.S.

signature.

Clandestine operations are operations conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy

or concealment of the operation.

Clandestine operations differ from covert operations which are operations that do

not necessarily hide the operation or act but rather hide the sponsor of the act.

Covert operations provide the sponsor plausible denial. The Department of Defense

does not typically perform covert operations.

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Special Operations are conducted across the full range of military operations from

peacetime engagement to major operations and campaigns. They are typically an

integral part of a theater campaign plan.

Although Special Operations can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific

theater or national objectives, they are most often designed and conducted to

support the overall success of the geographic combatant commands’ campaign plan.

Special Operations do not substitute or compete with conventional operations but

rather support and complement them.

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Special Operations are often conducted using indigenous or surrogate forces. The

use of non-U.S. forces has several advantages to include providing legitimacy to the

operation and reaching a resolution favorable to the United States or its allies

without the need for an overt U.S. conventional force commitment.

The opening days of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan provides a good

example of the use of indigenous forces. In early October 2001 U.S. Special

Operations Forces infiltrated into Afghanistan, linked up with insurgent forces of the

Northern Alliance and assisted them in overthrowing the Taliban controlling the

country. The initial U.S. force operating with the Northern Alliance was two teams,

twenty-four men, from the Army’s Fifth Special Forces Group.

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Special Operations have some unique requirements.

• They rely on individuals and small units proficient in specialized, nonconventional

combat skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation.

• Special Operations normally require precise tactical-level planning, detailed

intelligence, and knowledge of the culture and language of the area in which the

mission is to be executed.

• Rigorous and often unique training, along with detailed mission rehearsals, are

integral to the conduct of most Special Operations.

• And, as previously pointed out, Special Operations often rely on the use of

sophisticated or unique methods of insertion and extraction from hostile, denied,

or politically sensitive areas conducted at great distances from friendly support

and sanctuary.


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trategic or operational objectives are often more vulnerable to a small unit than to large conventional

ormations.

pecial Operations provide military responses that minimize political liability or risk of escalationssociated with larger more visible build up and use of conventional forces.

Well equipped and proficient forces can be deployed to avoid detection and failure in order to accomplish

olitically sensitive missions.

nally, the results of Special Operations are normally disproportionate to the size of the force employed.

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pecial Operations are conducted using direct and indirect approaches. Both approaches are designed to

fluence the behavior of adversaries.

hese approaches enable the full potential of Special Operations Forces capabilities. They can be applied

cross the range of military operations and can be employed separately, intertwined and simultaneously.ow and when the approaches are applied depends on the objective or desired end-state.

eep in mind that direct and indirect approaches are activities, not people, units, or capacities.

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The direct approach is a short, sharply focused offensive action to isolate and

defeat a threat.

Direct approaches focus on the physical or material such as a specific terrorist

or critical piece of infrastructure.

These activities are normally associated with violent kinetic actions and have

clarity of purpose and a clearly defined aim. The direct approach is

characterized by technologically-enabled small-unit precision lethality,

focused intelligence, and interagency cooperation integrated on a digitally-

networked battlefield.

Extreme in risk, precise in execution, and able to deliver a high payoff, the

effects of the direct approach are immediate, often visible to the public and

have tremendous effects on the enemies’ networks.

They are decisive at impact but do not necessarily achieve a definite end

state.


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Indirect approaches are focused on the psychological.

They seek to prepare, shape and influence the environment, and target the

minds of an adversary and/or a population.

Indirect approaches are normally much longer in duration than direct

approaches, some may take decades. They are normally planned for and

executed in a protracted, methodical, and deliberate manner and are often

conducted by, with, or through surrogate or indigenous forces to preserve

legitimacy or obscure the sponsor.

Special Operations activities that support the indirect approach include

training, equipping, advising, and supporting foreign or partner nation forces,

Civil Affairs operations and the conduct of both tactical and strategic level

information support operations and campaigns.


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The Doolittle Raid conducted in the early days of World War II offers an excellent historical example of

a special operation.

Following the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, Japanese forces wererampaging through the Pacific capturing Wake Island and Guam and attacking the Philippine Islands.

America did not have the capability to retaliate against Tokyo. We did not have Army Air Corps bases

n proximity to launch an attack on Japan and the Navy did not have the capability to get close

enough to Japan to launch aircraft carrying a payload of any significance. The Japanese seemed

unstoppable and American morale was severely low.

n January of 1942 a project was devised to launch Army Air Corps B-25 bombers off of a Navy aircraft

carrier. The objective of the project was to bomb the industrial centers of Japan. It was hoped that

the damage done would be both material and psychological. Material damage was to the destructionof specific targets with ensuing confusion and retardation of production.

The psychological results, it was hoped, would be the recalling of combat equipment from other

theaters for home defense, thus affecting some level of relief in those theaters, the development of a

fear complex in Japan, improved relationships with our allies, and a favorable reaction on the

American people.

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n order to meet the mission parameters the aircraft were specially modified to carry more fuel and

conduct bomb targeting from 1,500 feet. To accommodate these modifications other equipment was

removed, including tail guns, the lower gun turret, radios, and the normal targeting sight which

weighed several hundred pounds. One of the aircraft pilots devised a simple, cheap, and lightweight

targeting site to replace the normal aircraft sight. In fact the materials for the improvised sight costonly twenty cents. Another innovative idea was to replace the removed tail guns with broomsticks

painted black to give the appearance of weapons.

The crews were all volunteers. Initially they volunteered for a mission that would be extremely

hazardous, require a high degree of skill and be of great value to the nations’ defense efforts. They

were not told of the exact mission until they reported for training and rehearsals at Eglin Field,

Florida. Once advised of the mission, they were given an opportunity to revoke their volunteer

statements, but none did.

The plan called for the aircraft to launch from a point 400 miles off the east coast of Tokyo just before

dark, bomb at night, and then fly on to recovery fields in China. To improve bombing accuracy one

plane would take off ahead of the others and fire bomb flammable areas of the city for the other

planes to use as navigation aids. The plan allowed the planes to take off during daylight hours and

arrive at their recovery fields in China prior to darkness.

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Unfortunately the best laid plans are subject to the fogs and frictions of war. At around 0730 on the

18th of April 1942 the Naval Task Force, still some 800 miles from Japan, was spotted by a Japanese

picket boat. Although the vessel was sunk by the task force, there was concern that the element of

surprise might be lost. This resulted in a decision to launch the mission immediately.

An immediate launch, eight to nine hours earlier than planned, would result in a daylight attack and a

night time recovery in China. Both of these would significantly increase risk to the aircrews.

Nevertheless, between 0820 and 0920 hours on 18 April 1942, sixteen specially modified aircraft and

eighty men, five per aircraft, departed without incident from the aircraft carrier Hornet on a historic

mission.

Although the bombings were successfully carried out, all of the aircraft involved were lost and elevencrewmen were killed or captured. The actual physical damage caused by the bombings was negligible

but the strategic effects of the mission were enormous.

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From a psychological aspect the morale of the American public skyrocketed while the Japanese

psyche was severely wounded. Japan’s leaders believed they were invulnerable to an American

attack and made the people believe they were untouchable. However, the daring daylight raid by

American bombers over Tokyo shook the confidence of the Japanese people and caused doubt in

their military leaders.

Militarily, Japan was forced to recall some of its front line forces and instead commit them to

homeland defense. These forces included Japan’s main carrier battle force operating in the Indian

Ocean, which was wreaking havoc against British naval forces and merchant shipping in order to

extend their sea and air picket lines further out to sea. This recall removed a significant amount of

pressure on British forces operations in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, the appearance of twin-

engine land-based bombers confused the Japanese high command about the source of the attack. It

was later concluded that this strengthened Admiral Yamamoto’s resolve to capture Midway Island

which subsequently resulted in a decisive American victory at the battle of Midway.

The Doolittle raid, which was officially named Special Aviation Project Number One, clearly fits the

doctrinal definition of a special operation and demonstrated many of the characteristics of a special

operation, along with some of the differences from conventional operations. It was a tactical

operation to achieve strategic level objectives. It was accomplished by a small number of specially

trained volunteer forces using modified equipment and tactics that were not routinely resident in the

nation’s conventional forces. The mission demonstrated a capability that the Japanese didn’t know

the United States possessed, was carried out far from friendly lines of support, had a high level of

physical risk to the aircraft and crews, and the recovery phase of the operation was completely

ndependent of friendly support relying totally on Chinese civil and military assistance.

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This concludes the first lesson in the course. To sum up the lesson:

• Special Operations are tactical level operations best applied to achieve operational

or strategic level effects.

• They are different from conventional operations and have unique characteristics,

requirements and advantages.

• Special Operations are applied across the full range of military operations using

both direct and indirect methods which can be applied separately, intertwined, or

simultaneously.

• Special Operations compliment rather than substitute conventional operations and

should be planned for during development of the theater campaign plan.

• Understanding the characteristics, attributes, and requirements of Special

Operations provides a fundamental understating of the types of missions that U.S.

Special Operations Forces perform. In our next lesson we will look at the

Documents

Spec Ops Overview_Slides With Notes_JSOU