Special Warfare · United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special

Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–94–1 January 1994 Vol. 7, No. 1

As we face the ambiguity and uncertainty offuture operations, the commander’s intent gainsincreasing importance. Vital to success in all oper-ations, it is particularly key to success in contin-gency deployments and missions. Unfortunately,commander’s intent is often neither well under-stood nor effectively used.

When used correctly, the commander’s intentfunnels an organization’s collective activities toachieve the commander’s envisioned end result. Itis the central goal and stand-alone reference.

In the past, our attention centered on achievingthe present mission at the tactical level. However,in evolving to a more strategic orientation andrefining the ability to conduct operational-levelactivities, we have discovered that a narrow mis-sion focus is dysfunctionally limiting. Often, amission focus brings success at the tactical levelat the cost of resources which, from an opera-tional-level perspective, must be conserved.

Commander’s intent has certain features whichare pivotal to transforming intent into subordi-nate-unit actions:

• Commander’s intent must stand alone asguidance should no other directives be received.Its clear and concise wording enables subordi-nates to quickly grasp the successful end-stateand their part in achieving it.

• Commander’s intent provides unity and har-mony of effort across the strategic, operationaland tactical levels. Each statement of comman-der’s intent must form the basis for subordinatecommanders’ intents.

• Understanding the operational-level intentprevents subordinates from doing things whichmake tactical sense but are operationally wrong.

• Each commander must ensure his intent isunderstood two levels down. Subordinates mustunderstand the next higher commander’s intentto understand their mission and their part in theconcept of the operation.

• Commander’s intent outlines the “why” of amission, the results to be achieved, and how thoseresults affect future operations. Thus, comman-der’s intent addresses the longer term to ensureharmony of effort over time.

• Commander’s intent unleashes rather thanrestricts subordinates. It states only an opera-

tion’s outer boundaries, leaving individual maneu-ver schemes to subordinate commanders.

• Commander’s intent is the basis for the con-cept of operations, not a synopsis of it. Comman-ders must understand their superiors’ intents andform their own intents before planning begins.

• When possible, the commander should relatehis intent to subordinates face-to-face. Further,commanders should tailor the intent statement tothe recipients’ experience level. Finally, comman-ders should personally write the intent statementto reduce or prevent any loss of vision.

• Commander’s intent will be documented inparagraph 3 of the OPLAN/OPORD, just prior tosubparagraph 3a. While intent normally will notchange over an operation’s course, if changebecomes necessary, it must be personally trans-mitted from senior to subordinate commandersand then documented in a fragmentary order.

Commander’s intent is the commander’s visionof an operation, defining its purpose, the desiredresult, and, briefly, how to achieve the result. It isthe measure from which all subordinates’ actionsevolve. Commanders and leaders who make deci-sions guided by their commander’s intent ensurethe success of the force as a whole.

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

PB 80–94–1 Contents

Features2 The Blue Helmets: A History of United Nations Peacekeeping

Forcesby Sgt. Maj. Steve Burback

7 Cold-Weather Operationsby Maj. Carl W. Riester

12 Cobra Gold ’93: SOF Units Work with Thai Counterpartsby SSgt. Keith Butler

16 The Rapid Support Unit: Special Forces Support to Joint Task Force - Sixby Maj. Eric W. Buckland

19 Military Psychological Operations in the 1990sby Retired Col. Thomas A. Timmes

22 Israel’s Approach to Special Operationsby Michael Eisenstadt

30 The SOF Warfighting Center: Answering the Challenge of SOFSimulation Supportby John Wood, Ken Benway and Sherry Barnes

34 Why Civic Actions and Security Cannot Be Separatedby Capt. Kevin Dougherty

39 Special Forces Mission Analysis by the Operational Detachmentby Lt. Col. Henry Watson III

42 Commander’s Intent: Providing the Focus for Operationsby Maj. Kevin Benson

44 Interview: Officer Promotion BoardsMaj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

Departments46 Officer Career Notes48 Enlisted Career Notes49 Foreign SOF50 Update52 Book Reviews

Cover: Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

Commander & CommandantMaj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Graphic Art DirectorBruce S. Barfield

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of specialoperations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof both established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the author, and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presented inother official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, andshould be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:DSN 239-5703 or commercial (910) 432-5703. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare andthe author.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial operations units. Individuals desiring a privatesubscription should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government PrintingOffice, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Gordon R. SullivanGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Milton H. HamiltonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

05393

Headquarters, Department of the Army

January 1994 Special Warfare Vol. 7, No. 1

Since its creation in 1945, theUnited Nations has had a long anddistinguished history of peacekeep-ing and humanitarian relief. FromCyprus and Lebanon to Cambodiaand Croatia, the U.N.’s blue helmethas become a symbol of hope.

Since the close of the Cold Warera, U.N. peacekeeping operationshave multiplied in number andcomplexity. In 1990, fewer than10,000 U.N. peacekeepers weredeployed. Today, almost 80,000U.N. troops are involved in 17peacekeeping operations around theworld. In fact, the Blue Helmets areso popular that demands for theirservices increase by the day.

Before 1988, the U.N. had created13 peacekeeping operations. Since1988, 20 operations have beenmounted; 12 of those are in effecttoday — in Angola, Cambodia, ElSalvador, Kuwait-Iraq, Mozam-bique, Somalia, Western Sahara,the former Yugoslavia, Uganda-Rwanda, Liberia, Georgia andHaiti. Five of the pre-1988 U.N.

operations are still active — threein the Middle East, one in India andPakistan, and one in Cyprus.

In 1993, the U.N. spent $3.7 bil-lion on peacekeeping, nearly fivetimes what it spent for peacekeep-ing in 1991. Peacekeeping opera-tions are normally financed fromtheir own separate accounts on thebasis of legally binding assessmentson all member states, with the Unit-ed States’ share being 31.74 percentof all U.N. peacekeeping costs.

U.S. military involvement in U.N.peacekeeping and humanitarianactivities has also expanded inrecent years. More than 3,600 U.S.military troops are now serving insix U.N. peacekeeping operations.

U.N. systemThe U.N. system includes six

principal organs: the Secretariat,General Assembly, TrusteeshipCouncil, Economic and Social Coun-cil, International Court of Justiceand the Security Council, and near-ly 30 major programs or agencies.

The Security Council is the focalpoint for efforts to organize theU.N. collective security system andis vested with exclusive authority toaddress matters of internationalpeace and security. Peacekeepingoperations are approved by theSecurity Council and fall under itsauthority. While the other fiveorgans of the U.N. system maymake recommendations to memberstates, the Security Council has thepower to make decisions whichmember governments must carryout under the U.N. charter.

The Security Council consists of 15members, of which five are perma-nent — the United States, the Unit-ed Kingdom, the Russian Federa-tion, France and China. The 10 non-permanent members are selectedfrom regional groups and serve fortwo-year staggered terms. Presiden-cy of the council is rotated amongthe 15 members, with each presidentholding office for one month.

A proposal to establish a U.N.peacekeeping operation is first

2 Special Warfare

The Blue Helmets: A History of United Nations

Peacekeeping Forces

by Sgt. Maj. Steve Burback

brought to the Security Council by amember state, the U.N. secretary-general, or a party to a disputethrough another member state orthe secretary-general. In order forthe 15-member Security Council toadopt a proposal, there have to beat least nine votes in favor and nonegative vote, or veto, from any ofthe five permanent members.

U.N. charterUnder its charter, the first of the

purposes of the United Nations is“To maintain international peaceand security.”

Chapters VI and VII of the char-ter spell out concrete measureswhich the U.N. Security Council —the principal organ vested with theprimary responsibility for main-taining international peace andsecurity — can take to achieve thispurpose. The charter also recom-mends that states first make everyeffort to settle their disputes peace-fully, either bilaterally or throughregional organizations.

Under Chapter VI of the charter,“Pacific Settlement of Disputes,”the Security Council may investi-gate any dispute, or any situationwhich might lead to internationalfriction or give rise to a dispute.The council may recommend appro-priate procedures or methods ofadjustment if it determines thatthe recommendations are not bind-ing on U.N. members.

Under Chapter VII of the charter,the council has broader power todecide what measures need to betaken in situations involvingthreats to peace, breaches of thepeace, or acts of aggression. In suchsituations, the council is not limitedto recommendations but may takeactions, including the use of armedforce, to maintain or restore inter-national peace and security. Thiswas the basis for U.N. armed actionin Korea in 1950 and the use ofcoalition forces to expel the Iraqiarmed forces from Kuwait in 1991.It was also the basis for deploying aU.S.-led Unified Task Force to

Somalia in December 1992 to estab-lish a secure environment forhumanitarian-relief operations.

Peacekeeping developmentThe inability of the U.N. Security

Council to play an effective role inmaintaining peace and securityafter the start of the Cold War ledthe U.N. to turn to peacekeeping indefault. Although peacekeeping isnot prescribed for in the U.N. char-ter, the conduct of such operationshas evolved over four decades as away for controlling conflicts andpromoting the peaceful settlementof disputes. These operations havetraditionally involved the practiceof inserting unarmed militaryobservers or a lightly armed forcebetween two warring parties, afterreceiving the parties’ consent, tomonitor a cease-fire at the end of awar and create conditions neededfor peace negotiations.

There is even disagreement as towhen the “first” peacekeeping opera-tion was established. Most thinkthat it was the group of militaryobservers, known as the UnitedNations Truce Supervision Organi-zation, who were sent out during the

first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 tosupervise a cease-fire and then toimplement the 1949 armistice agree-ments between Israel and Egypt andIsrael and its Arab neighbors.

Thereafter, peacekeeping evolvedsteadily. In 1949, the U.N. deployedmilitary observers to supervise acease-fire between India and Pak-istan, in the states of Jammu andKashmir. In 1956 the first peace-keeping force was set up in the Mid-dle East after the Suez crisis to actas a buffer between the Egyptiansand Israelis. In 1960, the U.N.launched its operation in the Congoto verify the withdrawal of Belgianforces, prevent civil war, and main-tain the country’s integrity andpolitical independence.

In 1962, U.N. peacekeepersassumed responsibility for theadministration and internal securi-ty of West Irian, pending transferfrom Dutch colonial rule to Indone-sia. In 1964 the U.N. again becameinvolved in an internal conflictwhen it established a force to con-trol intercommunal fighting in theRepublic of Cyprus. In 1973, theU.N. deployed a peacekeeping forceto the Sinai, and in 1974, an observ-

January 1994 3

The U.N. Security Council in session. The 15-member council has exclusiveauthority over matters of international peace and security.

United Nations photo

er group was sent to the GolanHeights. Later, in 1978, the U.N.deployed a peacekeeping force tosouthern Lebanon.

Peacekeeping’s ability to evolve inthis way was greatly helped by thefact that the U.N. charter did notdefine it. This omission enabledstatesmen and the U.N. secretary-general to develop a flexible instru-ment which has been adapted to avariety of uses. This approach part-ly compensated for the SecurityCouncil’s limited ability to operateduring the Cold War.

The new eraIn the past few years, the new

political climate emerging from theend of the Cold War and theincreased cooperation among thepermanent members of the SecurityCouncil have contributed to a dra-matic expansion in U.N. peacekeep-ing operations. These developments

have also led to an important changein the character of such operations.They are no longer primarily mili-tary in composition and purpose.They are taking on new tasks andoften go far beyond traditional activi-ties of monitoring cease-fires. Theymay now protect relief shipments,respond to refugee needs, enforceembargoes, remove mines and seekto disarm warring parties.

Many U.N. operations nowinclude large civilian componentswhich carry out essential political,humanitarian and administrativefunctions, including election moni-toring, human-rights verification,humanitarian relief, institution-building and the restoration ofinfrastructure and services.

Recent operations have takenU.N. peacekeepers into unchar-tered territory — into areas wherethere are no agreements, wheregovernments do not exist or havelimited effective authority and

where the consent and cooperationof the parties cannot be reliedupon. All too frequently, their workis obstructed by well-armed irregu-lar groups and warlords who defyboth their national authorities,where these exist, and the interna-tional community.

Some examples of the new multi-dimensional peacekeeping opera-tions that have been set-up inrecent years include:

El Salvador: The United NationsObserver Mission in El Salvador,ONUSAL, deployed in July 1991and has been involved not only withmonitoring a cease-fire and relatedmeasures but also with reform andreduction of the armed forces, cre-ation of a new police force, reform ofthe judicial and electoral systems,human rights, land tenure andother economic and social issues.ONUSAL’S mandate was enlargedin May 1993 to include the observa-tion of the electoral process due to

4 Special Warfare

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Worldwide

SOMALIA

BOSNIA

MACEDONIA

CROATIA

WESTERN SAHARA

LIBERIA

EL SALVADOR

HAITI

MOZAMBIQUE

UGANDA-RWANDA

ANGOLA

LEBANONCYPRUS

GEORGIA

INDIA-PAKISTAN

CAMBODIA

IRAQ-KUWAIT

GOLAN HEIGHTS

MIDDLE EAST

Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

conclude with the general electionin El Salvador in March 1994.

Cambodia: In March 1992, theU.N. deployed one of the most com-plicated and ambitious operationsever undertaken. The cost of theU.N.-sponsored peace mission inCambodia was staggering by anystandard — $1.7 billion over thecourse of 20 months, to supportmore than 22,000 civilian and mili-tary personnel sent to administerthe peace plan.

The U.N. Transitional Authorityin Cambodia, UNTAC, was involvedwith supervising the administrationof the entire country, verifying thewithdrawal of Vietnamese forcesfrom Cambodia, demobilizing morethan 150,000 troops, repatriatingand resettling some 350,000 dis-placed Cambodians in camps on theThai border, disposing of literallymillions of mines left plantedthroughout the country, human-rights monitoring, and organizingand supervising a national election.The U.N.-organized election wasconducted successfully in May 1993,with 90 percent of registered voterstaking part in the election in apeaceful atmosphere. UNTAC’smandate ended on Nov. 15, 1993.

Somalia: On May 4, 1993, theU.S.-led Unified Task Force inSomalia ceased operations, and anexpanded U.N. Operation in Soma-lia, UNOSOM II, replaced it. UNO-SOM II has deployed more than26,000 troops from 28 countries,including 2,700 U.S. logistics troopsand 47 staff officers, to continue therestoration of peace, stability, andlaw and order; to provide securityand assistance in the repatriation ofrefugees and the resettlement ofdisplaced persons; to assist in there-establishment of the Somaliapolice force, in development of aprogram for the removal of mines,and in provision of humanitarianrelief; to assist in rebuilding Soma-lia’s government, political institu-tions and economy; and to monitorthe arms embargo and facilitate dis-armament efforts.

Unlike a traditional U.N. peace-

keeping operation, UNOSOM II wasestablished under Chapter VII ofthe U.N. charter, which authorizestroops to use force to disarm thewarlords who refuse to surrendertheir weapons and to ensure thatrelief supplies reach needy people.This marked the first time the U.N.has taken overall control of a peace-keeping force under Chapter VII.

Mozambique: In December 1992,the Security Council established apeacekeeping operation in Mozam-bique, ONUMOZ, to assist thenation in establishing peace. ONU-MOZ is charged with coordinatingseveral aspects of the transition topeace, including monitoring of thecease-fire, demobilization of com-batants, preparation for and moni-toring of elections, and the crucialhumanitarian-assistance effort.Despite some early administrativeand logistical problems, ONUMOZis now fully operational, with morethan 6,000 Blue Helmet forcesdeployed from two dozen countries.

Former Yugoslavia: The upheaval

in the former Yugoslavia illustrateshow the closing of the Cold Waropened a Pandora’s box of ethnicconflicts that had been kept down bythe ideological struggle of that era.

In response to the crisis, a U.N.peacekeeping force of 14,700 troopswas deployed to three areas inCroatia in the spring of 1992.Known as the U.N. ProtectionForce, or UNPROFOR, it was sentto promote and maintain peace,pending a final settlement. Later,however, the deteriorating situationin Bosnia and Herzegovina prompt-ed the Security Council to expandthe UNPROFOR mandate toinclude security and functioning ofthe airport at Sarajevo, protectionof humanitarian convoys and con-voys of released civilian detainees,monitoring of compliance with theban on military flights in theairspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina,and protection of “safe areas.” Also,in the first preventive operation inthe history of U.N. peacekeeping,UNPROFOR was deployed to Mace-

January 1994 5


Khmer Rouge soldiersin a zone controlledby the Khmer Rougein Cambodia. TheU.N. TransitionalAuthority in Cambo-dia supervised thedemobilization ofmore than 150,000troops.

donia to monitor borders with Alba-nia and Yugoslavia.

The peacekeeping challenge inCroatia and Bosnia-Herzegovinahas proved to be formidable and hasillustrated the difficulties the U.N.faces in its new brand of mission.U.N. troops have been attacked,U.N. headquarters shelled and U.N.relief convoys blocked. More than25,000 U.N. troops are now de-ployed, including a U.S. Air Forcesurgical hospital unit of 138 personsin Zagreb and a reinforced infantrycompany of 313 U.S. troops inMacedonia.

Past and presentU.N. peacekeeping has brought a

degree of stability to a number ofareas of the world over the years,having achieved important goals inplaces as diverse as the MiddleEast, Namibia, Nicaragua, El Sal-vador and Cambodia.

However, some of the 32 opera-tions launched since 1948 have fall-en short of their goals. Blue-helmet-ed peacekeeping forces were firstsent to patrol the mountains ofKashmir in 1949, and they are stillin place. So is the United Nations

Truce Supervision Organization,which arrived in the Middle East in1948 at the end of the first Arab-Israeli War. The United Nations Dis-engagement Observer Force hasbeen on the Golan Heights since1974. The United Nation InterimForce in Lebanon has been in placesince 1978, striving to prevent hostil-ities and to protect civilians caughtin the fighting. The U.N. Peacekeep-ing Force in Cyprus has been inplace for almost 29 years now, withno political settlement in sight.

Many of the new U.N. operationsare facing difficulties at the sametime. In some cases the lack ofresources and poor diplomacyappear to be the reason, but oftenthe explanation lies in an underesti-mation of the animosity that liesbehind these conflicts. In particular,recent difficulties of the U.N. opera-tions in Angola, Somalia, Bosniaand Haiti clearly demonstrate thattraditional approaches are not ade-quate where government and civilsociety have broken down or whereone or more of the parties is notprepared to end the conflict.

Over the years, U.N. peacekeep-ers have received uniformly positive

publicity for their service to thecause of peace. They all share thehonor of the Nobel Peace Prizeawarded the U.N. in 1988. Butpeacekeeping has become a riskyjob involving peacemaking, peaceenforcement and nation-building.Some 1,020 men and women frommore than 40 countries, including32 from the United States, havedied while in the service of U.N.peacekeeping forces.

The futureThe post-Cold War world remains

a dangerous one. Warning signs ofnew crises loom across the globe.Demand for U.N. peacekeeping ser-vices are certain to grow. It is notalways clear whether the U.N.should intervene in a particular sit-uation, nor is it always certain if itcan intervene effectively. In anyevent, if the U.N. is to play agreater role in keeping the peace, itmust strengthen its capacity toplan, organize, lead and serviceincreasingly complex peacekeepingoperations.

Sgt. Maj. Steve Bur-back currently servesas Special Assistant tothe Military Adviser tothe Ambassador, U.S.Mission to the UnitedNations. His priorassignments includetwo tours on the Army staff as wellas with the NATO HeadquartersLANDSOUTHEAST in Izmir,Turkey. He has extensive experiencein administering security-assistanceprograms, having been assigned tosecurity-assistance organizations inIndonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.He earned a bachelor’s degree inmanagement from Park College in1985 and is a graduate of the ArmySergeants Major Academy, the Secu-rity Assistance Management Course,and the U.S. Marine CorpsAdvanced Logistics Officer Course.

6 Special Warfare

U.N. ambulances drive through an area of heavy fighting in the formerYugoslavia. More than 25,000 U.N. troops are currently deployed there.


In his short story, “To Build aFire,” Jack London describes hischaracter’s failure to appreciate thedangers of cold weather:

Fifty degrees below zero meant 80-odd degrees of frost. Such factimpressed him as being cold anduncomfortable, and that was all. Itdid not lead him to meditate uponhis frailty as a creature of tempera-ture, and upon man’s frailty in gen-eral, able only to live within certainnarrow limits of heat and cold.

London’s description aptly pointsout the considerations of operationsin extreme cold, and while technolo-gy has enabled man to better sur-vive in extreme climates, the envi-ronment is still a factor to be reck-oned with.

Some readers may quickly dis-card this subject because their areaof orientation is directed towardwarmer climates. But in recent con-tingency operations such as DesertStorm and Provide Hope, forceswere augmented by soldiers fromother units, and no one special-

operations unit had exclusive rightsto its area of operations. These aug-mentees were subjected to unaccus-tomed weather, and units shouldconsider the possibility of conduct-ing training and operations in anextreme cold environment.

Training planIf a unit does not habitually con-

duct cold-weather operations, thetraining plan must be simple, followa logical progression, be resourcedat an acceptable level, and be ableto prepare an unacclimated noviceto fight, survive and win.

A robust physical-training pro-gram must be established well inadvance of the training. While thisshould be an integral part of anyspecial-operations unit, the fact iswe sometimes find ourselves in situ-ations preventing a regular pattern,particularly during field exercises,block leaves or support cycles.Ensure a minimum of 3-4 weeks ofsustained training prior to thebeginning of the plan. Make sure

prior cold weather injuries are iden-tified — they will be most suscepti-ble to further injury.

The actual training plan shouldbe conducted in three phases:instructor training, beginner/novicepreparation, and whole-unit train-ing. Training should begin with anintense instructor-training program.A 10-12 day plan should suffice andshould include preparation andrehearsals of all programs ofinstruction. Subjects for the POI willbe driven by the culminating event,e.g., FTX, ARTEP, JCS exercise.

Each enabling task for the eventmust be identified and included inthe POI. The cadre needs to repre-sent the unit’s best trainers in thesespecialized tasks. Ensure each pri-mary instructor has a preparedassistant instructor. Safety andcold-weather-injury preventionmust be constantly reinforcedthroughout the POI.

The next step is the beginner/novice train-up. Plan on a 2-3-weektime span and conduct training at

January 1994 7

Cold-Weather Operations

by Maj. Carl W. Riester

8 Special Warfare

the closest facility with adequateconditions. This portion, based onthe number of beginners, requiresonly the cadre and trainees and notthe unit as a whole. The intent is toestablish an acceptable level of indi-vidual experience prior to theentire-unit participation, and train-ing should be geared toward build-ing confidence in the individual’sequipment and survivability.

At this point the unit should beprepared for deployment to its train-ing site. Although conditions are atbest slightly predictable, the selectedtraining site should offer the highestlikelihood of having the desired envi-ronment. Our most recent experi-ence demonstrated that Utah, Col-orado and Canada proved excellenttraining areas. The bottom line isthat you have to go where the weath-er supports your plan, and trainingmust be coordinated and budgetedwell in advance.

Initial training focuses on individ-ual skills, movement in particular.As a minimum, Nordic, alpine andsnowshoe training should be cov-ered. Be sure to incorporate otherindividual skills, such as weaponsfire and communications exercises,

into the program. A solid threeweeks should be dedicated to thesesubjects. A sample plan is givenbelow:

• Day 1-3 - Individual Nordictraining. Begin with essentialequipment (skis, individual kit)and, based on the level of training,move toward movement with ruck-sacks and sleds.

• Day 4 - Transition day. May beused to cover climatic subjects suchas avalanche safety, cold-weatherhealth considerations, weapons fire,etc.

• Day 5 - Alpine diagnostic exam:Under the supervision of instructorcadre, all participants negotiate acourse. Ability groups are designat-ed and given a dedicated instructorwho not only teaches but maintainsstatus of progress.

• Day 6 - Rest. Mandatory forrecuperation and preparation forupcoming training.

• Day 7-11 - Ability-group skiing.Groups should be subjected to avariety of conditions.

• Day 12 - Rest.• Day 13-14 - Ability-group ski-

ing. Should end with a re-evalua-tion of each skier and perhaps

include team-building events suchas the slalom or downhill racing.

• Day 15-17 - Unit (team, squad,section) skiing. This portion focuseson each subunit exercising newlylearned skills and working as anorganization.

• Day 18 - Rest.• Day 19-22 - This is optional

based on time, weather or resourceconstraints. During this time unitscan continue alpine or Nordic ski-ing, or focus on snowshoeing (thelatter not requiring much finesse,just exertion). Additional topics canbe advanced individual or groupweapons fire, use of the MobileOver Snow Transport, skijoring,communications, cold-weathermountaineering or land navigation.

• Day 23-25 - Shakeout STX/FTX.This exposes units to operationalconsiderations in cold weather. Thefocus should be on basic skills suchas shooting, moving and communi-cating, and on living conditions.Personnel will learn dynamics ofequipment and surviving in theenvironment.

• Day 26-28 - Recovery, mainte-nance, rest and preparation for theculminating exercise.

• Day 29-Completion - Culminat-ing exercise. If designing your ownFTX, 10-14 days of field time willchallenge all. Otherwise, durationwill be dictated by whatever exer-cise you are participating in.

This plan is recommended givenideal, unconstrained resources (bud-get, weather, time). It can be tai-lored to address mission-essentialtasks for whatever the end state is.

ConsiderationsCold-weather operations place

considerable and peculiar demandson personnel and equipment. Sol-diers are required to carry heavierloads for survival equipment, theproperties of materials change,weather becomes a major factor notjust for conducting operations, butalso for survival, and although thedemands will be greater, logisticalsupport will also be affected by the

Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group take a break duringa shake-out field training exercise in Colorado. Note depth of fire in snow.

Photo by Carl Reister

January 1994 9

weather conditions.History is replete with examples

of remarkable successes and disas-trous failures in extreme cold envi-ronments. The difference was ade-quate training, adequate clothing,knowledge of the environment andcounteractions, and a planned logis-tical base to support operations. Thefollowing considerations focus onhow to beat the weather in a typicalspecial-operations mission, assum-ing that small units will deploy withwhat they can carry, that they areconducting deep operations, andthat they will be divorced from aconventional logistics base whichcan respond immediately.

EquipmentThe typical winter soldier will be

required to carry an inordinateamount of gear even for basic sur-vival. The available space in a ruck-sack is quickly consumed withsleeping gear, long undergarments,extra socks, gloves, shelter andother clothing items. Even the lat-est technology in winter kit takesup considerable room.

This is not an area for shortcuts —soldiers must have adequate protec-tion against the elements. Leadersmust supervise and check to makesure subordinates not only adhere tothe packing list, but also don’texceed the required items — onesimply doesn’t have the luxury.

Using survival equipment as abase, determine the days of supplyfor food, water, batteries, PLL andfuel each soldier can realisticallycarry. A shakeout FTX is critical. Itwill provide a good rule of consump-tion rates for supplies and whatitems of equipment tend to breakeasily.

Review alternatives to haulingeverything on your back. Considerand experiment with differenttransport systems such as deer sledsor ahkio sleds. Both allow transportof additional gear but require sometraining in use and physical stami-na. Caching supplies is anotheralternative. Ensure cached items

are not degraded by the elements(especially batteries). Automatic oron-call resupply should be a prereq-uisite for winter operations. Remem-ber, however, that the delivery sys-tems will be subject to the sameweather constraints.

ClothingUnits should use whatever equip-

ment they have available, whetherit is the latest high-speed technolo-gy or 50s-style issue equipment.Both work. The latest break-throughs are all right if your budgetcan afford them; however, the oldarctic equipment such as parkas,arctic mittens and wool shirts aretime-tested and provide therequired protection.

No discussion of winter opera-tions would be complete withoutmentioning the key word COLD.Suffice it to say that the principlesmust be adhered to no matter howyou are equipped. Particular atten-tion must be paid to body extremi-ties, as they are most susceptible tocold-weather injury.

Footgear is a critical item. Evenvapor-barrier boots can lose theirabilities in extremes. If possible,

pack two types of footgear. The firstis that which is required to supportmovement. Boots to fit skis or snow-shoes should be flexible for move-ment but tend to be inadequate forstatic operations. For those periodsof stationary ops, our recent experi-ences demonstrated a mukluk-typeboot the best.

Another technique is to wear aquilted bootie inside of rubber over-shoes. Semi-daily foot checks aremandatory. This is a leadershipresponsibility and cannot beignored. Leaders should conductfoot inspections with qualifiedmedics. The onset of cold-weatherinjury can be instantaneous. Allneed to recognize preventative mea-sures, symptoms and emergencytreatment.

Another mandatory item shouldbe an instant heat source carried byeach man. One item we have used isthe Norwegian heater. This is basi-cally a case which burns solid fuel,providing an excellent quick meansof providing warmth. They can alsobe used to heat IV solutions. Thereare several types of commercialheat packets such as hand and toewarmers which can provide short-

Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group conduct an above-timberline ski after being dropped off by helicopter.


term heat to extremities. Use theseitems sparingly and save them forreal emergencies.

Several types of headgear areavailable to protect the ears andface. If you are required to operatein sub-zero conditions, a face maskis best. This provides protection forears and nose and allows vapor toescape. Even a wool scarf can beconfigured to cover exposed areasand is adequate when combinedwith a watch cap or pile cap.

For hands, mittens should bemandatory for all. Gloves tend toconstrict circulation needed to keepfingers warm. The old arctic mittenensemble is very reliable, and sol-diers should pack an extra set ofliners.

ShelterSpecial-operations missions will

probably preclude hauling an arctictent with a Yukon stove. Selectedshelter should provide protectionagainst wind and snow, ventilationand a floor to reduce conduction(absorption of cold by contact withthe ground). Additional items suchas sleeping pads and ponchosshould be laid to provide additional

barriers. For site selection, based onMETT-T, select a position out of thewind. Avoid low-lying areas wherecold air settles at night, the lee sideof cliffs where snow can drift, orpotential avalanche or rock-slideareas. Avoid using flame insidesleeping shelters. The hazards areobvious, but humans tend to be lazyin this area, and it requires con-stant reinforcement.

WaterEven in cold weather, individuals

will need at least a liter of waterper day to replace normal loss. Theplastic canteen is virtually worth-less in sub-zero weather. However,if you are required to carry them,consider storing and carrying themupside down. The bottoms willfreeze first, allowing access at theopenings. Metal canteens are betterbecause they can be heated directlyon stoves. Even the arctic canteenwill freeze if exposed for extendedtimes. Store these upside down, aswell.

You can keep canteens in yoursleeping bag at night to reducefreezing, just ensure they are tight-ly sealed. One mission-essential

item should be a thermos per man.When on the move, everyone shouldcarry a full thermos of heatedwater. This not only provides aquick source for warm beverages,but it could be critical in an emer-gency situation.

If required to procure water, lookfor available sources (creeks, lakes)before attempting to melt snow orice. If using an available source, usea tie-down to toss the canteen orbottle into the water, thereby avoid-ing getting hands and clothing wet.Melting should be used as a lastresort. If required to melt snow orice, choose ice first, as it will pro-vide more liquid. The cubic-inchratio of uncompacted snow to wateryield is 17:1.

NavigationThe difficulty of navigation in an

arctic environment is compoundedby limited daylight and magneticdeviations the closer one operates tothe poles. If a global positioning sys-tem is available, take it along. Theliquid display may freeze, so takepreventive measures such as carry-ing it inside clothing. Make sureyou consider batteries in your loadplanning. In a survival situation,field-expedient methods such asusing stars at night will at leastprovide cardinal direction.

WeaponsPrior to deployment, ensure you

have proper lubricants. During arc-tic operations, strip weapons com-pletely and clean with a dry-clean-ing solvent. Apply cold-weatherlubricants once all other lubricantsand rust-prevention compounds areremoved. Cold weather will put con-siderable demands on weaponsthrough normal firing. Considerpacking a small PLL to replacethose items susceptible to breakage.When bivouacking, leave weapons(under guard) outside shelters. Thiswill keep the weapon from “sweat-ing.” If you can’t leave them out-side, they will continue to sweat forabout an hour. Before taking

10 Special Warfare

Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group being inserted intoa cold-weather training area by helicopter.


January 1994 11

weapons into cold weather again,remove all condensation and cleanthem.

One hazard during normal opera-tions is blockage of the barrel bysnow, ice or other debris. A goodidea is to cover the muzzle beforemovement. Use an item that caneasily be removed by frozen fingersor that will blow off with the firstrounds you fire.

RationsAs important as water is the

caloric intake of each individualduring extended operations. Theoptimum choice should be arcticrations. These are much like thelong-range-patrol food packets.Each contains a main dehydratedmeal, granola-like bars, candy anda variety of beverages. The onlydrawback is that the main mealrequires about a half-canteen torehydrate. If using regular MREs orcanned food, take caution to preventspoiling. Keep food frozen untilready to eat. If storing outside shel-ters, take precautions against forag-ing animals.

Stoves are a necessity duringcold-weather operations. Heat tabsor other solid fuels are not efficientduring extreme weather. There areseveral adequate commercial andmilitary stoves available. It is notnecessary that everyone carry astove. Stoves and fuel should becross-loaded through the unit. Takeextra precautions when handlingfuel. Contact with exposed skin cancause instantaneous frostbite. Usestoves outside as much as possible.Make sure they are sheltered fromwind and other elements.

ConclusionOperating in cold weather is an

inescapable fact in much of theworld. It doesn’t have to be a debili-tating factor and, given properpreparation, will give units an edgein surviving and winning. Almostany contingency during extremecold-weather operations can bewar-gamed prior to execution.Establish a reading list from histor-ical examples (Russo-Finnish War,World War II) to mentally prepareleaders. Pre-mission FTXs in simi-

lar conditions will identifystrengths and weaknesses for finalexecution. Leaders need to thinkthrough all aspects of the opera-tion. With a logical and thoroughapproach, any unit can be equippedand trained to deal with the cold-weather environment.

Maj. Carl W. Riesteris currently the opera-tions and training offi-cer for the 2nd Battal-ion, 10th SpecialForces Group and wasformerly commanderof Company B, 2nd/10th. In addi-tion to the Special Forces Qualifica-tion Course, his military educationincludes the Infantry OfficerAdvanced Course and the ArmyCommand and General Staff Col-lege. He holds a bachelor’s degreefrom Westminster College. In writ-ing this article, Major Riester con-sulted numerous after-action reportsand conducted personal interviewswith members of the 2nd Battalion,10th Special Forces Group.

U.S. special-operations forcesjoined their counterparts in theRoyal Thailand Army to perform avariety of SOF missions duringexercise Cobra Gold in April andMay of 1993.

Special Forces soldiers from the3rd Battalion, 1st Special ForcesGroup, Fort Lewis, Wash., afterjumping into the combined jointexercise, worked with the Thai 4thRegiment, 2nd Special Forces Divi-sion. Missions included unconven-tional warfare, direct action, specialreconnaissance, and for the firsttime, personnel recovery and coali-tion warfare.

“For the first time, we’re attach-ing a team member to a convention-al unit commander,” said Lt. Col.Lynn E. Lanzoni, 3rd Battalioncommander. “We have the linguistswho can talk to the Thai units.They assist in the integration ofU.S. combat power into the maneu-ver of coalition forces.” About 30

percent of the 3rd Battalion’s sol-diers speak Thai, while 50 percentspeak other languages of SoutheastAsia.

Other firsts for Cobra Gold werethe 3rd Battalion’s operating a spe-cial-operations command-and-con-trol element, or SOCCE, at theCombined Army Forces headquar-ters. “They provide the groundtruth to the CARFOR commander,”Lanzoni added.

A-detachments on the groundpracticed recovering “downed” pilotswith the Thai soldiers and trainingguerrilla forces in escape and eva-sion. “The teams stay together theentire time to train for their pecu-liar missions,” said Maj. Kirk A.Moeller, operations officer for the3rd Battalion, who served as thedeputy training officer of the Com-bined Special Forces OperationalBase. “All of the teams do live-fireexercises during rehearsals for theirmissions. They’re using MILES

(Multiple Integrated Laser Engage-ment System) gear out there.”

The added realism of the SpecialForces training was expected tocatch the attention of conventional-force commanders as well. “CobraGold is not just for the Royal Thai-land military. Our added focus is toteach the Joint Task Force and com-ponents about our interoperabilityand what we can really do forthem,” Moeller said.

The combined Special Forcesteams worked with guerrilla forcesand “auxiliaries” — locals and non-combatants who support SpecialForces in an unconventional-war-fare environment — through ricepaddies, dense vegetation andmountain areas scattered through-out central Thailand. The auxil-iaries assisted Special Forces inacquiring supplies and helped storethem at scattered cache sites.

The teams watched “targets” for24 hours or more while on special-reconnaissance missions. Theyattacked “enemy” positions duringsimulated direct-action hits underthe cover of darkness after ruckmarching 10-20 miles following anairborne insertion. Special Forcesalso used mules provided by theThai army to make clandestineresupply treks across mountainousterrain.

Preparation is key in all SpecialForces operations, said WO 1 DanFarmer, an A-Team technician andacting team commander. “We’vebeen getting ready for our missionsfor a couple of days now. We’repumped and ready to go,” saidFarmer. While in isolation, theteam packed rucksacks with gear,then camouflaged their packs andload-bearing equipment with ropetwists.

They used isolation to reiteratemission objectives, practice for ajump the following day and sharpennight movement with a seven-milerucksack march. “ISO is the place tofine-tune missions. The A-teamsplan and prepare. They designatewho’ll carry what and who’ll dowhat,” said SFC Fritz W. Saddle-

12 Special Warfare

Cobra Gold ’93: SOF Units Work

with Thai Counterparts

by SSgt. Keith Butler

mann, an engineer sergeant whoserved as a member of an area spe-cialist team on the exercise.

RangersAlso jumping during the exercise

were 145 Rangers from Company B,3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regi-ment at Fort Benning, Ga., whotrained with the 2nd ThailandRanger Company throughout May.

The two nations’ Rangers beganthe month with survival classesfocusing on Thailand’s terrain andwildlife, weapons demonstrationsand mission-essential tasks — con-ducting raids, ambushes and move-ment to contact with enemy forces.“We did combined training everyday — did the same things at thesame places,” said 1st Lt. Steven F.Hanagan, assistant intelligence offi-cer for the 3rd Ranger Battalion“We learned from their leaders andthey learned from ours.”

During movement-to-contact ses-sions, the American and ThaiRangers practiced striking targetsboth day and at night, first withblanks, then with live rounds. “Live-fire training is critical. It’s the clos-est thing to combat,” Hanagan said.

“We have to keep our edge as themost highly skilled, light-infantryunit in the world,” said SSgt. DavidR. Isbell, a weapons squad leader inB Company. “We stay combat-readythrough intense training becausewe could be called on for a real-world mission any time. We can’tget that kind of training just at FortBenning.”

“The terrain here is unique. Theground is flat and sparsely vegetat-ed now. Thai hilly areas are verysteep,” said Sgt. Lindsay L. Bunch,a rifle squad leader in B Company.“The Thais have enemy all aroundthem. Many of their Rangers haveseen combat.”

After a month of combined train-ing and two parachute jumps, theAmerican and Thai Rangers tookpart in a mass tactical airborneoperation which began a three-dayfield training exercise.

For some of the U.S. Rangers, thetraining in Thailand brought morethan expected. Similarities in inten-sity, methods and personal dedica-tion surprised anti-tank squad-lead-er SSgt. David Wilson. “They (ThaiRangers) hit the wire, bustedthrough and assaulted a bunkerreally fast. It all went down simulta-neously with our guys. I wasimpressed,” he said. “The Thais arealso willing to learn. They are a lit-tle smaller than us, but they hauledthe anti-tank system (M-3 Carl Gus-tov). It weighs about 22 pounds.Each guy carries about five roundsthat each weigh about nine pounds.”

“I always knew the AmericanRangers are very disciplined. I wasso surprised that they were sofriendly,” said Royal Thai ArmyMaster Sgt. Suntad Kligklai, opera-tions NCO. “I hope we continue thistraining every year. Maybe nexttime we could go to the U.S. to trainwith them.”

PSYOPAmerican soldiers from the 4th

PSYOP Group and PSYOP ArmyReservists joined their Thai coun-terparts in spreading the word

about medical and engineeringcivic-action projects being conduct-ed by teams throughout Thailandfor Cobra Gold.

Live shows are part of the stan-dard mission for Thai PSYOP units,who visit farming communities todisseminate public service, healthand safety news. Two AmericanPSYOP soldiers, Specs. Shawn R.Hugo and David R. Pettijohn, werecast into the spotlight when,teamed with the Royal ThailandArmy’s PSYOP Battalion, theybrought a crowd of more than 500villagers to their feet with comicskits, singing and dancing routines.

“This was the best way to learnabout what they do. We have beenable to totally immerse ourselves inThai culture — we ate, slept, playedsoccer during our down time andshared the same living space 24hours a day,” Hugo said. “Everyonein Thailand’s PSYOP units isRanger-, Special Forces- and air-borne-qualified. In addition, they allknow how to play an instrument orsing. They work hard but have agood time.”

“I see they are very patriotic,”Pettijohn said. “As a standard they

January 1994 13

U.S. Rangers from Company B, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment prepareto train with their counterparts from the 2nd Thailand Ranger Company.

Photo by Keith Butler

sing their national anthem twice aday.”

Thai and American PSYOP para-troopers also developed, designedand produced public-service-infor-mation handouts for distribution tovillages throughout the exercise.The PSYOP Task Force created anddistributed more than 20,000 copiesof a coloring book for children, writ-ten in Thai, which reinforced mes-sages about personal hygiene. ThePSYOP Task Force also helpedinform local populaces of combined-arms, live-fire exercises to helpensure their safety.

“In developing an informationalproduct, we first decide the specificmessage we want to accurately con-vey to the populace, and then webrainstorm the entire issue,” saidSpec. Jeffrey A. Hood, a 4th POGillustrator. “It starts as a pencilsketch, then it’s scanned into a com-puter and later enhanced and col-orized. I produce my drafts in stan-dard sketchbook size, then shrinkthem to the size needed for the spe-cific task assigned.”

Once approved, sketches arematched with appropriate languagetext. This comes easily to membersof Company B, 8th Battalion, 4thPOG, since about 75 percent of themspeak Asian languages. “We’reanother asset in the task force’srucksack,” said Maj. Paul J. Mullin,commander of the 8th Battalion’s2nd Operational Detachment.

“The combination of our soldiers’abilities, talents and imaginationmake it possible to support civic-action projects by providing mediaand information to improve the qual-ity of life for people,” said SFC LarryD. Wright, NCOIC of the 2ndOPDET for Southeast Asia. “Therest of the Army is geared towardcompleting missions using force. Oursoldiers introduce alternative dimen-sions to conventional warfare.”

Cobra Gold ’93 was another oppor-tunity for American PSYOP soldiersto train, said Maj. Gary L. Nichols,CJPTF commander. “Most impor-tantly, we’re building rapport.”

There are gains for the Thai

PSYOP units as well. “AmericanPSYOP units move around a lot,while our soldiers stay in one areafor up to 10 years,” said Capt.Sunya Nimnoul, commander of theRoyal Thailand Army’s 3rd Compa-ny, PSYOP Battalion. “We provideideas on the mind-set of our people.The American soldiers haveexchanged ideas on things like theircomputer equipment.”

“It’s been a two-way street,” saidSpec. Michael J. Davenport, whoworked side-by-side with Thai coun-terparts in developing computer-generated products. “The Thais arereally friendly. We’ve built a profes-sional and personal relationship.”

Civil AffairsWhile PSYOP units provided

information on the medical andcivic-action projects, those projectsthemselves were the job of the Com-bined/Joint Civil Affairs Task Force,working at 12 remote sites through-out Thailand.

More than 1,400 Thai farmers,their children and animals swelledinto lines awaiting the arrival of the32 soldiers, sailors and airmen. Theteam, assisted by the Royal Thai-

land military, plunged into a 12-hour bustle of treating ailmentsranging from headaches to intesti-nal infections. All of the villagers inline were examined by doctors and,if necessary, given medicines at thepharmacy set up in a wood-plankschool.

“There’s more than 300 differenttypes of medicines there on thetable — everything from aspirin todrugs for worming,” said Capt.Lynne B. Westlake, a reservist fromthe 322nd CA Brigade, FortDeRussy, Hawaii. The pharmacistsfilled more than 500 prescriptionsin one day.

Around back, dentists extracteddecayed teeth from more than 400villagers, and physical therapistsinstructed villagers complaining ofa variety of aches on how to allevi-ate pain. Most of the villagers arefarmers who lead strenuous livestilling their fields. “The physicaltherapist told them how to squatand use their legs for lifting,” saidMaj. John C. Lewis, a reservist fromPortland, Ore.

In another Cobra Gold first,optometrists and a Navy opticiantechnician rounded out the crew of

14 Special Warfare

A team of American and Thai PSYOP soldiers uses a portable loudspeaker toinform a rural village of a medical civic-action program during Cobra Gold ’93.


medical personnel.“We’ve been making 50 pairs of

glasses a day,” said Petty Officer 1stClass Edwin R. Greene, whodeployed from Yorktown, Va. Theteam filled eyeglass prescriptionson the spot — Greene ground lensesto eye doctors’ specifications andpopped the glass into frames provid-ed by the Thai government. “Someof the villagers have had bad eye-sight for years. They thought theywould just have to live with it.”

The CJCATF also treated ani-mals, which are essential to the vil-lagers’ livelihood. Reservist veteri-narians Col. Thelton McCorcle,478th CA Battalion, from Miami,and Maj. George A. Jacoby, 445thCA Battalion, from Oakland, Calif.,examined and treated chickens,pigs, dogs, cats and livestock, givingshots for rabies, distemper andworms.

Lewis and Maj. George Otte, sani-tation engineers and members ofthe 351st CA Command, MountainView, Calif., checked village watersupplies. The two tested wells,nearby streams and “klongs,”caches which Thai villagers use tocatch rain water, for pesticides, bac-

teria and excessive minerals.Though drinking untreated rainwater is not ideal, drinking waterfrom the klongs is even worse, Ottesaid. The klongs are normally setagainst buildings and catch raindripping off the metal roofs.

“We’re testing the water for leadand zinc to prevent poisoning,” Ottesaid. “We’re also educating the vil-lagers in prevention. Until they geta central piping system, one of thesimplest things they can do is boilany water they ingest for up to 15minutes.”

“We’ve got an interesting mix ofvery anxious people from the medi-cal and engineering fields who arejumping into a ‘good Samaritan’role,” said Army Lt. Col. Robert M.Steadman, deputy commander ofthe U.S. Combined/Joint CivilAffairs Task Force headquarteredat Tak. Steadman, who works as afire captain in civilian life, com-mands the 426th CA Battalion inUpland, Calif. “The Thai militarysupport is excellent, as well. Theyassess the areas where we’re need-ed most and help us get care tothose people.”

The Civil Affairs team also joined

with troops from the 84th EngineerBattalion out of Hawaii and RoyalThai military to construct a 1,650-square-foot, brick community cen-ter, one of six projects, including anew school, constructed during theexercise.

“The whole thing is going to takeabout 17 days,” said SFC RonaldHarris, ENCAP platoon sergeant,amid the bustle of drilling, sawingand pounding at the school site.“The Thai military started beforewe arrived. Now we’re on theplumbing. They do things different-ly, so we’re getting a chance to learnand exchange information aboutbuilding.”

“These villages are far away fromthe city,” said Col. SomchaiKlaiyaitong, CJCATF commanderfrom the Royal Thailand Army.Klaiyaitong added that the MED-CAPs and engineering civic-actionprojects were excellent tools forbringing additional medicine andconstruction know-how to rural vil-lages and fostering an exchange ofeach nation’s ways of providingmedical care and building.

Throughout their stay, the CivilAffairs team lived under Spartanconditions. “We’re not here for all ofthe ‘cushies,’ ” said SFC Scott B.Olsen, MEDCAP NCOIC from FortBragg’s 96th CA Battalion. “We’reworking long days, but no oneseems to mind.”

When the day was done, the CivilAffairs team returned to their quar-ters in Tak — an open-bay barrackswith no television and a few fansworking overtime to cool the placedown. “We’re drowned in patients,but we can all get a good night’ssleep knowing we’re making a dif-ference out here,” Olsen added.

SSgt. Keith Butleris a journalistassigned to the PublicAffairs Office, U.S.Army Special Opera-tions Command.

January 1994 15

Col. Thelton McCorcle, 478th CA Battalion, Miami, Fla., gives shots to villagers’ cattle during Cobra Gold ’93.


“Alpha Two-Three, this is RomeoFive-Niner, over.”

“This is Alpha Two-Three, over.”“One-niner, I say again, one-niner

personnel moving past our position.All males, first two are armed withautomatic weapons. First one alsoappears to be wearing some type ofnight-vision equipment. Second oneappears to be using a hand-heldradio. Next one-five have large bagsor rucks. Last two in formation arealso armed. Over.”

“Roger. Will move to Red OneOne for interdiction, over.”

“Roger, Red One One. Out.”This type of radio transmission,

in this case fictional, frequentlyoccurs along the southwest borderof the United States. In this sce-nario, four Special Forces soldiers,members of the Rapid SupportUnit, are conducting special-recon-naissance training and have justreported real suspected drug-traf-ficking activity to a joint U.S. Bor-der Patrol/Arizona Department ofPublic Safety reaction team located

two kilometers to the rear of theSpecial Forces personnel’s observa-tion site.

The soldiers have passed someimportant information to the lawofficers. A few minutes later, thecivilian law-enforcement-agencyreaction team moves to a locationwhere they surprise and stop thesuspects. Based on their question-ing of the suspects and the physicalevidence, the reaction team makesseveral arrests and seizes thedrugs.

At the same time, the SpecialForces soldiers continue their mis-sion, avoiding direct involvement inthe law-enforcement activities.After the drugs have been seized,the good news is passed to the RSUmembers:

“Romeo Five-Niner, this is AlphaTwo-Three, over.”

“This is Romeo Five-Niner, over.”“Good bust on this end. Looks like

we got about 200 kilos of cocainehere. You were right: they were car-rying automatic weapons. Four

almost-new AK-47s. A set of PVS-7sand a Sabre radio, too. Thanks forthe help. Out.”

This kind of help is provided bythe RSU to law-enforcement agen-cies daily. The opportunity to applyspecial skills in real and challeng-ing situations is one reason whymany soldiers join Special Forces.Participating in a Rapid SupportUnit deployment gives the SF sol-diers an opportunity to contributedirectly to the well-being of theircountry while engaging in realistictraining.

In the past few years, SpecialForces units have quietly and suc-cessfully helped fight the war ondrugs by conducting military train-ing exercises within the southwest-border region of the United States.

Their training missions havebeen under the tactical control ofJoint Task Force - Six, located atFort Bliss, Texas. The commandcoordinates Department of Defensesupport to civilian law-enforcementcounterdrug efforts. While under

16 Special Warfare

The Rapid Support Unit: Special Forces Support to Joint Task Force - Six

by Maj. Eric W. Buckland

the tactical control of JTF-6, SF hasdirectly supported the various local,state and federal law-enforcementagencies within the southwest-bor-der region, including Texas, NewMexico, Arizona and Southern California.

Agencies request the assistance ofDoD assets through their represen-tatives working at OperationAlliance, or OPALL, an organiza-tion of some 25 state and federallaw-enforcement agencies whichdevelops strategies focusing oninterdiction, intelligence and inves-tigation of smugglers and drug-traf-ficking organizations and methods.OPALL is also located at Fort Bliss,and it passes the requests to JTF-6for execution.

Requests for support are normal-ly executed as what JTF-6 refers toas “deliberate missions.” A deliber-ate mission generally requires 1-6months of preliminary coordinationand planning. These have been con-ducted by active and reserve-compo-nent Army and Marine Corps assetsranging in size from a battalion toan SF A-detachment. In fact, during

the last three years, SF personnelhave conducted many of these mis-sions, earning praise from law-enforcement agencies for their pro-fessionalism and dedication.

But Special Forces’ most signifi-cant contribution within the regionhas been their performance in therapid-support-unit mission. TheRSU is designed to provide rapid,on-call support to law enforcementwith information or actionableintelligence on imminent drug-traf-ficking activities. OPALL and JTF-6recognize that an agency operatingwith perishable information needsDoD support which a deliberatemission cannot provide. Some mech-anism was necessary to provide afaster response, and the RSU con-cept was quickly developed, coordi-nated and fielded.

Built from the assets of a SpecialForces company, the RSU deploysinto the JTF-6 area of responsibilityfor 90 days. Along with the compa-ny headquarters and six A-detach-ments, the RSU is normally aug-mented by vehicle mechanics, rig-gers and communications personnel

from the company’s higher head-quarters. Other personnel and lim-ited logistical and administrativesupport from JTF-6 allow the com-pany to be virtually self-sufficient.The SF company establishes anadvanced operational base whichsimultaneously controls final mis-sion preparation, limited sustain-ment and post-mission activities,and the communications of all sixA-detachments. Normally, two orthree missions run simultaneously,and the RSU will accomplish about20 missions in a 90-day period.

Since the primary focus of theRSU is to provide rapid intelligenceto law-enforcement agencies, spe-cial-reconnaissance missions consti-tute the majority of the assistancerendered. These missions increasethe “eyes-on” intelligence capabilityof law enforcement by placing SFpersonnel along confirmed or sus-pected drug-trafficking routes. Mon-itoring all movement within theirarea, the SF soldiers report allactivity to the law-enforcementagencies.

If the information sent by the sol-

January 1994 17

TASK ORGANIZE

DEPLOY

ESTABLISH/OPERATE ISOLATION FACILITY

ESTABLISH/OPERATE ADVANCED OPERATIONAL BASE

PLAN/CONDUCT FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

SUSTAIN

LAUNCH A-DETACHMENTS

RECOVER, CONDUCT AFTER-ACTION OPERATIONS

REDEPLOY

ODB

SF-RelatedMission TasksAccomplished

CONDUCT MISSION PREPARATION

CONDUCT PRE-INFILTRATION ACTIVITIES

INFILTRATE OPERATIONAL AREA

CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE

AREA INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

EXFILTRATE OPERATIONAL AREA

POST-MISSION ACTIVITIES

ODA

CONDUCT MISSION PREPARATION

DEPLOY

TRAIN HOST NATION FORCES

PROVIDE C I/CS/CSS (FID OPERATIONS)

REDEPLOY

ODAStrategic Reconnaissance Foreign Internal Defense

3


diers fits the typical method ofoperation for drug smuggling, theagency will react to it. Often thereis little to report, but even thisinformation can be helpful: Con-firmed lack of activity in one spotallows agencies to concentrate theirefforts somewhere else. One recentmission reported information thatenabled law-enforcement agents toseize more than $5 million worth ofmarijuana.

In the past few months, the RSUhas begun to conduct more ground-reconnaissance operations. Lookingfor hidden cannabis-cultivationsites, the SF soldiers have workedin several different national forests,where they have encounteredmountainous and thickly woodedterrain. These efforts, too, havebeen rewarded: One A-detachmentdiscovered more than 1,600 mari-juana plants valued at more than$6 million.

Even if they provide no narco-trafficking detections, the special-reconnaissance missions offer out-standing training for SF soldiersassigned to the RSU. They have toplan their communications andresupply procedures meticulously,and templating their operationalareas to fix likely locations of drugmanufacturing and drug movementhones their skills in intelligencepreparation of the battlefield. Theenvironment includes a real-worldthreat and contains no artificial“exercise” limitations. Nothing canbe taken for granted.

In addition to SR, the RSU con-ducts mobile-training-team mis-sions. On recent MTTs, soldiershave instructed various local, stateand federal law-enforcement agen-cies in advanced marksmanship,small-unit tactics, land navigation,trauma medicine, troop-leading pro-cedures, airmobile operations andrappelling.

Besides increasing the abilities ofthe students, the MTTs alsoimprove the skills of SF personnelby refining their abilities asinstructors. Even though the stu-dents and instructors speak the

same language, their personalexperiences and backgrounds areremarkably dissimilar, and theMTTs are a challenge to cross-cul-tural communication.

The SF soldier usually learnsmore about the southwest-borderregion during a two-week MTT thanhe has learned in all his formerschooling. The training allows theSF operator to gain invaluableexperience in conducting operationsvery similar to what could beexpected during a foreign-internal-defense mission.

While RSU missions allowdetachments to train for many indi-vidual and collective tasks, theentire JTF-6 area offers numerousand varied chances for non-RSUmission training. In the last year,detachments have conducted diveoperations in the Gulf of Mexicoalong the Texas coast, ElephantButte Lake in New Mexico, andalong the California coast near SanDiego. Other detachments havetaken advantage of the many moun-tain ranges in the region andimproved their mountaineeringskills, and the RSU has madeextensive use of Fort Bliss’ MacGre-gor Range Complex.

The Air Defense Artillery Schoolat Fort Bliss has allowed several SFsoldiers to attend courses toimprove their skill with man-portable air-defense systems. Real-istic training scenarios and opportu-nities are limited only by the imagi-nation and innovation of the SFleaders.

Currently, the RSU is coordinat-ing an FY 94 deployment to conductlong-range desert movement withtheir vehicles. Another deploymentwould provide pack-animal and rid-ing skills to one or two detachmentsbefore deploying them on a 100-milecross-country patrol.

The RSU mission is a unique andvaluable experience for both SFdetachments and companies. Dur-ing a period when operationalrequirements are increasing and SFsoldiers have to supply their skillsthroughout the world, RSU deploy-

ments enable SF soldiers to honetheir skills prior to commitment insupport of theater commanders-in-chief. For that reason alone, theRSU mission is important, but insupporting counterdrug activities,the RSU has a direct and positiveimpact on the people of the UnitedStates and truly provides a serviceto the nation.

Maj. Eric W. Buck-land is the RapidSupport Unit Coordi-nator, J-3 Ops, JointTask Force - Six, atFort Bliss, Texas. Hisprevious assignmentsinclude serving as a detachmentcommander, company executive offi-cer and group assistant S-3 in the7th SF Group, serving as a compa-ny commander in the 82nd Air-borne Division, and serving in theJFK Special Warfare Center andSchool’s 1st Special Warfare Train-ing Group as S-3 of the 1st Battal-ion and commander of Company B,3rd Battalion.

18 Special Warfare

During this era of defense reduc-tions and changing national andmilitary strategies, what can bedone to maintain a strong, viableDoD PSYOP capability? Threeactions available to us are toincrease the tempo of peacetimeoperations, nurture functional area39B, and clarify terminology.

Our best answer lies with anactive program of peacetime psycho-logical operations as an integralcomponent of the emerging defensestrategy of the 1990s. PeacetimePSYOP is a highly visible programamong key personnel within DoDand a clear demonstration of ourcommunity’s support to both nation-al-security objectives and comman-ders-in-chief.

This kind of utility is absolutelycritical to the survival of PSYOP inthe future force structure. PSYOPcan do many useful things, but if itdoes not clearly demonstrate todecision makers a capability to pro-vide peacetime support to theCINCS and national-security strat-

egy, it can offer little justification tocontinue its current level of forcestructure. The alternative may besignificant unit and personnelreductions — reductions which thecurrent modest PSYOP force struc-ture cannot accept.

Despite the numerous successesof tactical and operational PSYOPduring Operations Just Cause,Desert Storm and Provide Comfort,there is no guarantee that adequatePSYOP units and personnel will beavailable to take on the challengingpeacetime activities conducted bycombatant commands.

PSYOP and PSYOP effectA second consideration that

affects the future of PSYOP, and onethat affects PSYOP planning andemployment, is our own understand-ing of what we actually do. There iscurrently no common understandingof what psychological operations areand what they are not. It appearsthat we do not clearly understandthe difference between the conduct

of military PSYOP as a unique oper-ation and other activities that havea PSYOP effect whether intended ornot. As things now stand, almostanything can be called a psychologi-cal operation.

In policy documents, articles andconversation, there is a lack of dis-tinction between military psycho-logical operations which areplanned and conducted for theirPSYOP effect and other operationswhich have a non-PSYOP purposebut also have a psychological effect.

The consequence of this lack ofdistinction is that DoD PSYOP poli-cy documents do not clearly definewhat types of activities areembraced by the term “military psy-chological operations.” Consequent-ly, since we do not clearly articulatewhat PSYOP soldiers do in peace-time, we can hardly expect decision-makers to understand PSYOP andcontinue to resource a viablePSYOP force structure.

PSYOP publications often leavean impression that such activities

January 1994 19

Military Psychological Operations

in the 1990s

by Retired Col. Thomas A. Timmes

20 Special Warfare

as troop reductions, ship port visits,air shows, freedom-of-navigationoperations and official visits arepsychological operations. Thesetype activities do send a messageand may be designed to influenceattitudes and behavior, but are theymilitary psychological operations?Should joint PSYOP doctrine,Annex D to the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan or the DoDPSYOP Master Plan, and others,imply (or state!) that these types ofactivities are military psychologicaloperations? The question is, wheredo we want to draw the line onwhat is a psychological operation?

After reading the documents thatframe PSYOP, it is easy to see howthe two concepts become blurred.However, if a peacetime activity isnot conducted under the authorityof the governing DoD directive forPSYOP, designed as part of aCINC’s annual program, andapproved by Office of the Secretaryof Defense, it is not an approvedPSYOP program but rather a pro-gram with a psychological effect.

The bombing of Libya, for exam-ple, had a successful psychologicalimpact, but since it was not con-ducted under the authority of thegoverning DoD directive, it was anoperation with a psychologicaleffect and not a psychological oper-ation. The difference may be mini-mal, but it may help frame a com-mon understanding.

This does not restrict the utilityof PSYOP expertise. PSYOPers atall levels of command and staff areexpected to provide their PSYOPexpertise to enhance the psychologi-cal impact of overseas air shows,ship visits and exercises. ProvidingPSYOP advice on the conduct of anair show, however, does not consti-tute a PSYOP program. It meansthe commander has considered theinformational aspects of the activityand the PSYOPer has performed avery important part of his job —providing advice on the informa-tional component of military activi-ties abroad.

Similarly, advising the comman-

der on when and how to conduct anexercise or how to improve relationswith local base workers is not a psy-chological operation, but rather avalid task for the PSYOPer and agreat benefit to the commander.

If we use the DoD directive crite-ria to define peacetime military psy-chological operations, use of theterm “PSYOP” will be less ambigu-ous and foster greater understand-ing within DoD and other agenciesas well.

Importance of FA 39BA third consideration for main-

taining a strong, viable PSYOPcapability resides in the health ofArmy’s functional area 39B(PSYOP). A well-trained and moti-vated cadre of PSYOP officers iscritical to the future growth andwell-being of both the FA andPSYOP itself. A 39B officer has avested interest in PSYOP. After all,his or her career will depend signifi-cantly on how well PSYOP performsin peace and war and how its per-formance is perceived by decisionmakers. These officers must bemotivated to fight for resources,missions and a chance to tell the

PSYOP story.To attract and retain this cadre of

motivated PSYOP officers, theArmy should be able to offer them areasonable chance of attaining thegrade of lieutenant colonel and thepossibility of colonel while servingin FA 39 billets. If we cannot offerthem that, we have little chance ofattracting and retaining solid anddedicated PSYOP officers.

Currently, the number of active-duty lieutenant-colonel and colonel-level 39B billets within DoD is lim-ited. Among those authorized, anumber are filled by Air Force,USAR and non-39B personnel.Additionally, not all of the majorcommands have 39B officers ontheir staffs.

It is time to take a hard look atall our existing lieutenant-coloneland colonel PSYOP billets to ensurethat active-duty Army officers cancarve out a successful “39” careerpath while maintaining the propermix of USAF and USAR representa-tion. (The importance of reserve-component representation cannotbe overstated, since they currentlyaccount for more than 70 percent ofPSYOP personnel.)

PFC James LaSpino, 6th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, talks withchildren in a Kurdish refugee camp during Operation Provide Comfort.

Photo by Michael W. Toney

January 1994 21

The issue of 39B billets and whooccupies them needs to be resolved.In this regard, the 1990 DoD PSYOPmaster plan asks for a study on theFA39 career field. This study shouldaddress these issues and chart acourse for their resolution.

Strategic operationsThe final issue that needs to be

addressed is the role of DoD PSYOPin strategic operations. This rolehas become as blurred as the issueof PSYOP and psychological effect.Our documents are replete withimplications that DoD PSYOP playsa far greater role in “strategic”PSYOP than it actually does or willin the near future.

Currently, the State Departmentand U.S. Information Agency arethe lead U.S. government agents forpublic-diplomacy activities. Theyhave both the charter and themeans to execute those responsibili-ties. During the Persian Gulf War,for example, USIA and Stateemployed VOA, Worldnet, the Wire-less File, opinion polls, briefingteams and a diplomatic presence inthe region (and around the world) toexplain U.S. policy. DoD PSYOPwas not offered an active role in thisstrategic public-diplomacy effortjust as it was not during OperationsJust Cause or Urgent Fury. Cur-rently, we lack the means and thecharter.

Desert Storm, on the other hand,proved beyond a shadow of a doubtour ability to successfully executetactical and operational PSYOP. Wehave that charter, the means, the

experience and the expertise. Weare the recognized experts, and weemployed our skills during DesertStorm with measurable effect.

This is not to say that our onlyrole is tactical PSYOP. Our peace-time programs, as limited as theynow are, are highly successful anddefinitely not tactical. Regardless ofthe level of play, we need to clarifyterms, to stop addressing desiredroles as if they were realities, andwhile recognizing our limitations,maximize our tactical and opera-tional capabilities. For the further-ance of military PSYOP, the StateDepartment and USIA should viewDoD PSYOP as an active partner inthe international information arenaand continue to increase and insti-tutionalize the level of interactiondisplayed during Operation DesertStorm.

To this end, we need a high-levelpolicy statement to clarify the roleof DoD in the overall U.S. govern-ment’s international informationprogram. Additionally, the Depart-ment of Defense should publish apolicy to clearly affix roles andresponsibilities for internationalinformation activities amongPSYOP, public affairs and publicdiplomacy.

PSYOP is a military treasure thathas earned its right to continue.Memories, however, are short. Weneed to continually demonstrate ourvalue to the defense establishmentthrough professionalism and mean-ingful service.

Retired ColonelThomas A. Timmes iscurrently assigned tothe Office of the Assis-tant Secretary ofDefense for SpecialOperations and Low-Intensity Conflict as the assistantfor PSYOP and Public DiplomacyPolicy and Programs. During morethan 28 years of active Army servicehe held a variety of assignments,including two tours in Germanywith the 3rd and 8th Infantry Divi-sions and a tour in Vietnam assenior adviser to a Vietnameseinfantry battalion. His PSYOPassignments include service as chiefof the Asian research team, com-mander of the Unconventional War-fare Operational Detachment andbattalion executive officer for the 1stPsychological Operations Battalionfrom 1979 to 1981. From 1981 to1987, he was assigned to the Pen-tagon as the Department of theArmy PSYOP staff officer and sawservice in Grenada during Opera-tion Urgent Fury. From 1987 to1989 he commanded the 9th PSYOPBattalion. He served as chief of thePSYOP Division and Chief of thePSYOP and Civil Affairs Branch,Operations Directorate of the JointStaff from 1989 until his retirementin 1992. In addition to a bachelor’sdegree from La Salle College, heholds a master’s degree in historyfrom John Carroll University inCleveland.

Few armed forces have compiledas impressive a record of success inthe field of special operations as theIsraeli Defense Forces, the IDF.

In Israel’s case, necessity has pro-vided the incentive for the develop-ment of its special-operations capa-bilities. Since the birth of the statein 1948, the threat of guerrilla war-fare and terrorism waged by regularand irregular Palestinian fedayeen(and more recently the guerrillas ofthe Lebanese Shiite Hizballah orga-nization), and the threat of warwith neighboring Arab states havebeen a pervasive fact of life inIsrael.

As a result, every Israeli govern-ment has devoted significant atten-tion and resources to fighting ter-rorism. This high-level interestspurred the development of asophisticated special-operationscapability.

These threats, as well as thesecurity doctrine of the IDF — withits emphasis on pre-emption andprevention, offensive action and

retaliation, provided the impetusfor the creation of an impressivespecial-operations capabilitythrough the creation of a number ofhighly capable elite units in theground and naval forces.

UnitsIn the IDF, special operations are

conducted by a number of eliteunits capable of both conventionaland special operations. These unitscan perform direct-action and spe-cial-reconnaissance missions, aswell as more traditional counterter-rorist missions such as hostage res-cues. In addition, these elite unitsreceive high-level support fromIsrael’s civilian and military leader-ship and priority access toresources, including quality person-nel, equipment and intelligencesupport. This is a major factor intheir success.

The IDF’s elite units trace theirorigin to Unit 101, founded inAugust 1953 to carry out reprisalraids against Arab states harboring

Palestinian fedayeen and infiltra-tors. Its commander was Lt. Col.Ariel Sharon, a battalion comman-der in the reserves. Although Unit101 never numbered more than 45men and carried out no more than afew dozen missions prior to itsmerger with the 890th ParatroopBattalion in January 1954, its lega-cy has influenced generations ofIDF soldiers.

Unit 101 demonstrated that asmall, elite unit could achieveimpressive results on the battlefieldand set the standards for the perfor-mance of the entire armed forces.Moreover, Unit 101’s informalatmosphere, unique sense of espritde corps and standards of combatleadership became norms for theIDF and part of the combat lore onwhich generations of IDF officersand enlisted men have been raised.Through the successors to Unit 101its spirit has been perpetuated inthe IDF.

Primary responsibility in the IDFfor special operations is currently

22 Special Warfare

Israel’s Approach to Special Operations

by Michael Eisenstadt

shared by five elite units: SayeretMatkal, the general-staff reconnais-sance unit; Sayeret Tzanchanim,the reconnaissance company of the35th Paratroop Brigade; SayeretGolani, the reconnaissance compa-ny of the 1st (Golani) InfantryBrigade, Sayeret Giv’ati, the recon-naissance company of the 84th(Giv’ati) Infantry Brigade, andKommando Yami, the IDF’s navalspecial-warfare unit. The IDF mayalso possess a number of smallerand highly specialized units for spe-cific types of missions.1

• Sayeret Matkal is the IDF’s pre-mier special-operations and coun-terterrorist unit. It is commandedby a lieutenant colonel and consistsof about 200 men (including staffand support personnel) organizedinto teams of 12-16. It is subordi-nate to the director of military intel-ligence and is generally tasked withthe most sensitive, dangerous anddemanding missions, includingdirect-action and special-reconnais-sance missions, as well as hostagerescues. Personnel have also report-edly been seconded to the Mossad toconduct assasinations. It is capableof insertion by sea, air or land.2

• Sayeret Tzanchanim, SayeretGolani, and Sayeret Giv’ati are thereconnaissance companies of theIDF’s three premier active infantrybrigades. Each is commanded by ajunior major or senior captain, andconsists of about 200 men (includ-ing staff and support personnel)organized into a number of 12-16-man teams, and is capable of con-ducting conventional infantry andspecial-operations missions inde-pendently or in conjunction with itsrespective parent brigade, and canbe inserted by sea, air or land.3

• Kommando Yami is the IDF’snaval special-warfare unit. It iscommanded by a naval captain andconsists of about 300 naval com-mandos (including staff and supportpersonnel). The unit is often taskedto conduct direct-action and special-reconnaissance missions againstcoastal targets, and at-sea countert-errorist missions. Naval commando

personnel also conduct beach recon-naissance and security tasks forparatroop and infantry-reconnais-sance units during seaborne inser-tions. Principal means of insertionemployed by the naval commandosinclude armed speedboats, inflat-able rubber rafts, swimmer-deliveryvehicles, submarine lock-out, andswimming (surface and subsurface).Naval commando personnel are alsocapable of airborne insertion.4

These units are among the finestwithin the IDF. Within the groundand naval forces, they act as cen-ters of excellence that attract thefinest soldiers and provide themwith intensive training and exten-sive operational experience, creat-ing a skilled and experienced lead-ership cadre. The IDF general staffis dominated by former paratroopand infantry officers, many ofwhom have served in one of theseunits at some point in their careersand thus have some special-opera-tions experience.

While this reliance on multipur-pose units has generally served theIDF well, its principal drawback isthat the elite paratroop and infan-try units involved in special opera-

tions in peacetime are usuallyemployed as conventional infantryin wartime. As a result, these unitssuffer the heavy casualty rates typi-cally incurred by infantry. Forinstance, during both the 1973 and1982 wars, the Golani Brigade suf-fered heavy losses. Out of a totalstrength of about 2,500 personnel, itlost in 1973 130 dead and 310wounded, including the brigade’sdeputy commander, two battalioncommanders, and the commander ofSayeret Golani. In 1982, it lost 46dead, including the commander ofSayeret Golani, and 10 other Say-eret personnel.5 As a result, thecapabilities of these units have gen-erally been degraded by major wars,impairing their ability to fulfilltheir special-operations role afterthe fighting.

OrganizationWhile these units can conduct

special operations independentlywith little or no augmentation, theIDF will usually form, on a mission-specific basis, task forces comprisedof ad hoc mission groups drawnfrom these units. Task forces aregenerally rank-heavy, and the size

January 1994 23

Members of Unit 101, the elite Israeli unit founded in 1953 to carry outreprisal raids against Palestinian fedayeen and infiltrators.

IDF photo

and configuration of a task forceand its constituent mission groups,which consist of hand-picked NCOsand officers, is mission-dependent.6Task forces are also sometimes aug-mented by personnel with special-ized skills such as intelligence, com-munications and demolitions, fromelsewhere in the IDF, to create amix of skills and capabilities notfound in any single unit.

Assessment and selectionThe personnel-selection process

for the IDF’s elite units is key factorin their success. Selection com-mences prior to induction and con-tinues through the initial phase of asoldier’s compulsory service. TheIDF attempts to identify potentialcandidates for its elite units at theearliest date possible. It employs asophisticated array of screeningphysicals, psychological tests andinterviews, aptitude tests and ques-tionaires. These are administered inthe year preceding conscription andduring the first week of active ser-vice to identify personnel possessingthe requisite physical, psychologicaland motivational attributes, leader-ship abilities and special skillsrequired by these units. Personalreferrals from unit members mayalso play a role in selection.7

Candidates who score well on thepre-conscription tests are invited tovolunteer for the IDF’s most selec-tive elite units, such as SayeretMatkal or the naval commandos,and attend a mandatory pre-con-scription assessment, known as agibush, or trials week, which lastsfive days and which tests their lead-ership skills, physical strength andendurance, and performance understress. Subjective evaluations byunit personnel, in combination withobjective test scores, serve as thebasis for selection. Only about 10percent of the candidates pass theSayeret Matkal gibush, while about30 percent pass the naval comman-do gibush. Those who pass areoffered the option of serving inthese units upon conscription.8

By contrast, the 35th Paratroop,Golani, and Giv’ati infantry brigadesdo not conduct pre-conscriptionrecruiting. The 35th ParatroopBrigade draws exclusively from vol-unteers at bakum, the IDF’s absorp-tion and assignment base at TelHaShomer, near Tel Aviv, duringthe first week of service.

Volunteers for the paratroopsundergo a mini-gibush (gibushon)at bakum lasting half a day, andonly about 25 percent of all volun-teers are accepted into the brigade,while the most promising candi-dates are offered the opportunity tovolunteer for Sayeret Tzanchanim.They must pass a gibush sayeret,lasting three days and held at theWingate Institute in Herzliyya,which consists of road marches,physical tests and trials, and lead-ership-reaction drills. Only about 40percent pass the gibush sayeret, andthe best of these are selected fortraining as reconnaissance para-troopers.

The remainder report for para-troop basic training and will even-tually serve in one of the line bat-talions of the 35th ParatroopBrigade. Volunteers for Sayeret

Golani and Sayeret Giv’ati attendsimilar gibushim during their basictraining.9

Some personnel are identified onthe basis of combat performance,peer ratings and the recommenda-tions of their commanders duringthe early operational phase of theircompulsory service. They may thentransfer to one of these units as anNCO or officer.

A mix of overt and latent incen-tives and pressures ensure that ahigh-quality pool of applicants vol-unteer for service in elite units. Thestatus and prestige accorded mem-bers of these units within the IDFand Israeli society at large is suffi-cient incentive for many to volun-teer. In addition, service in eliteunits is considered career-enhanc-ing. Civilian-employment opportuni-ties may be more favorable for veter-ans of elite units, while service in anelite unit is perceived as a fast trackto the top for those planning a careerin the military.

TrainingTraining for Sayeret Matkal, Say-

eret Tzanchanim and the navalcommandos commences with para-

24 Special Warfare

Members of Sayeret Tzanchanim, the 35th Paratroop Brigade’s reconnais-sance company, take part in an operation in March of 1968.

IDF photo

troop basic training, which lasts sixmonths, followed by airborne quali-fication. During the first weeks ofbasic training, conscripts areformed into teams consisting of upto 20 candidates. Each team mem-ber is assigned a specific role orfunctional specialization, such asrifleman, machine-gunner,grenadier, sniper, radioman ormedic, and receives specializedtraining, although emphasis is alsoplaced on cross-training within theteam.

Training of team personnel is con-ducted by the unit chain of com-mand — the team leader (a lieu-tenant), and team sergeant. As aresult of this arrangement, individ-ual and collective training occursimultaneously, concurrently build-ing individual and unit proficiency.

Following paratroop basic train-ing, candidates for Sayeret Matkal,Sayeret Tzanchanim, and the navalcommandos continue with special-ized training conducted by theirparent units at various locations,within the team framework. Train-ing emphasizes land navigation,combat marksmanship, demolitions,communications, observing and

reporting, camouflage and conceal-ment, hand-to-hand combat, evasivedriving, and infiltration and exfil-tration techniques (including mili-tary-free-fall parachuting). In addi-tion, naval commando trainingemphasizes seamanship, underwa-ter navigation and scuba training.Attendance at an NCO course is anintegral part of qualification train-ing for all these units in order tohone the tactical and leadershipskills of candidates.

Because of these requirements,the basic-qualification courses forthese units are very long. Forinstance, qualification of reconnais-sance paratroopers in Sayeret Tzan-chanim takes 20 months, whilequalification for the naval comman-dos takes 24 months. By the time ateam finishes qualification trainingand commences operational service,its members have spent 20-24months training together, andthrough attrition, its numbers havebeen significantly reduced. Theproduct, however, is a tight-knit,well-trained unit.

Nearly all officers in the IDF areselected from the ranks, and quali-fied reconnaissance and naval com-

mando NCOs may attend an offi-cer’s candidate course (this entailsan additional commitment of a yearor more, depending on the unit).While some newly commissionedsecond lieutenants return to theirparent unit to train and lead teamsof their own, others might be sent tofulfill positions elsewhere andthereby help to raise professionalstandards throughout the IDF.Those returning to their parent unitcan expect to fulfill various com-mand or staff positions and toreceive rapid advancement.

Mission planningBecause of the politically sensitive

nature of special operations, plan-ning is generally conducted at thegeneral-staff level. The process ischaracterized by the involvement ofthe most senior, capable and experi-enced personnel in the IDF in allfacets of the operation, and closecoordination between planners,intelligence personnel and operators.

This ensures the most effectiveuse of available skills, experienceand time, minimizes bureaucraticobstacles to effective communica-tion and coordination, and ensuresthat intelligence is tailored to therequirements of the operators. Theplans group is formed on an ad hocbasis and usually includes the chiefparatroop and infantry officer andhis staff, the commanders of theassault force, the chief of the opera-tions branch of the general staff andhis chief of current operations, andthe director of military intelligence.

For joint operations, the comman-ders of the Israeli Air Force, or IAF,and Israeli Naval Force, or INF,and their key staff personnel, andkey members of air and sea crewsare also included. In addition, thechief communications and electron-ics officer, or the chief combat engi-neer officer may be included whenspecial communications, electronicwarfare or engineering support isrequired.

The chief paratroop and infantryofficer holds overall responsibility

January 1994 25

Members of Sayeret Golani board a helicopter which will take them on areconnaissance mission.

IDF photo

for planning and executing specialoperations involving paratroop orinfantry forces. He is also responsi-ble for selecting units to participatein special operations, and for desig-nating the assault-force comman-der. The commander of the navalcommandos plays a similar role inplanning and executing specialoperations in which his units playthe leading role. The chief of staffgenerally provides only guidanceand advice, although he may occa-sionally intervene to resolve inter-service conflicts or other disagree-ments between planners.

While the involvement of themost senior and capable militarypersonnel in the planning and exe-cution of special operations is astrength of the Israeli system, itmay, in certain circumstances, havedrawbacks.

One notable example of thisoccurred in September 1973, priorto the 1973 war, when Palestinianterrorists belonging to the Syrian-supported Al-Sa’iqa organizationhijacked a train in Austria carryingSoviet Jewish emigrés. As a resultof this action, Austria closed theprincipal transit facility for Soviet

Jewish emigrés at Schonau castle.In the aftermath of this event,senior Israeli politicians were preoc-cupied with the political crisis withAustria sparked by this incident,while the attention of senior mili-tary personnel and the intelligencecommunity was directed toward theoverseas terrorist threat, and notthe emerging threat on Israel’s bor-ders, contributing to the success ofthe Egyptian and Syrian surpriseattack several days later.

Intelligence supportDetailed, accurate and timely

intelligence is vital to the success ofspecial operations. The directinvolvement of the director of mili-tary intelligence and other seniorintelligence personnel in the plan-ning process ensures that special-operations task forces receive priori-ty support from Israel’s national-level intelligence organizations.

Moreover, intelligence-supportcoordination lines are short anddirect. The director of militaryintelligence or his deputy is a directparticipant in the planning processand manages and coordinates theintelligence-collection effort, there-

by assuring unity of effort withinthe intelligence community. Theclose coordination between intelli-gence and operations personnel,including members of the assaultforce itself, ensures that the intelli-gence-collection effort and intelli-gence products are tailored to theneeds of the consumers.

ResponsivenessThe IDF believes that because of

the inherent limitations and perish-able nature of intelligence, it mustbe able to plan, prepare and executespecial operations rapidly. Special-operations personnel must be capa-ble of improvising to react and adaptto the unexpected to accomplish themission. For instance, the Entebbehostage rescue was planned, pre-pared and executed within 48 hours.Speed and flexibility is enhanced by:

• The IDF’s willingness to allocateor divert resources and personnelfrom throughout the armed forces ona priority basis, in support of animpending operation.

• The maintenance of missionfolders for nearly every type of con-tingency, and trained units capableof implementing them.

• Concurrent, parallel planning byall elements to make optimal use ofavailable time.

In addition, the small size of Israeland the location of key units andfacilities near the center of the coun-try facilitates rapid planning andcoordination.

Detailed rehearsalsWhen feasible, troops conduct

rehearsals on mock-ups or models ofthe objective, or at locations in Israelthat resemble it. For instance,rehearsals for the storming of ahijacked Sabena Boeing 707 atLydda International Airport in May1972 were conducted on-site on aBoeing 707 located in a nearby hang-er. Similarly, rehearsals for the raidinto Beirut in April 1973 to assassi-nate three senior PLO officials anddestroy a PDFLP headquarters wereconducted at an unoccupied residen-

26 Special Warfare

Members of Sayeret Giv’ati deploy along Natzanim Beach near Tel Aviv inpursuit of a Palestinian terrorist squad in May 1990.

IDF photo

tial apartment complex in north TelAviv that was thought to resembleparts of Beirut.

Rehearsals test the validity of theconcept of the operation, identifyproblems in execution, hone specialprocedures, and improve the inte-gration of the various elementsinvolved in the mission. Plans areconstantly refined and updated inaccordance with insights gainedduring rehearsals and new intelli-gence information, until the execu-tion. Like various aspects of theplanning process, rehearsals areconducted concurrently by the vari-ous elements of the task force, priorto a final rehearsal involving asmany elements of the task force asare feasible.

Command linesUnder Israeli law, cabinet

approval is required for all militaryoperations. However, special opera-tions generally attract particularlyhigh-level interest and involvementdue to the politically sensitivenature of these operations and themilitary risks involved. The defenseminister will often monitor theprogress of an operation with the

chief of staff, the chief of the opera-tions branch, and other general-staffofficers, at the general-staff opera-tions center at IDF general-staffheadquarters in Tel Aviv. However,once an operation commences, opera-tional control is retained by the mili-tary. The mission commanderretains overall operational responsi-bility and decision-making authority.Command authority is usually limit-ed to two principal echelons, andcommand lines are clear, short anddirect:

• The mission commander is usu-ally the chief paratroop andinfantry officer. He reports to thechief of staff and holds overallresponsibility for the planning andexecution of the operation. He isusually located as close to the areaof operations as possible.

• The task-force commander hasoperational control over all missionassets and is the commander bestable to assess and influence the situ-ation. Several different individualsmay successively fulfill this role dur-ing various phases of an operation,including the mission commander,the assault-force commander, or thecommander of air or naval assets

transporting the assault force to orfrom the objective. However, theassault-force commander usually ful-fills this role during the assaultphase of an operation.

This system preserves unity ofcommand while maximizing theoperational autonomy and flexibili-ty of the force commander andshortening the decision cycle,enabling him to rapidly adjustplans in the event of unforeseendevelopments. This is vital, sinceoperations must sometimes bebased on incomplete intelligence.

Points left uncovered during plan-ning can be resolved only at the dis-cretion of the commander on the spotduring execution. In addition, thesystem minimizes confusion overcommand relationships and simpli-fies communications to reduce nettraffic, diminishing the likelihood ofa communications-security breach.

InsertionIsrael’s elite units are capable of

insertion by sea, air and land. Forraids against objectives close to itsborder, overland approaches of 10-15kilometers are preferred, withextraction usually accomplished byhelicopter.

For reaching more distant inlandobjectives, the IDF has traditionallypreferred the CH-53 heavy transporthelicopter for the insertion of forces,due to its range, capacity and relia-bility. During helicopter-supportedoperations, forces employ low-alti-tude flight profiles and terrainmasking to minimize the possibilityof visual or radar detection. Heli-copters insert the assault force out ofnoise range of the objective (4-7 kilo-meters, depending on weather andterrain), and the force approachesthe objective on foot, using terrainand stealth to mask its approachuntil the commencement of theassault.

Finally, the Mediterranean coastalregion offers particularly advanta-geous conditions for seaborne infil-tration. While the cluttered mar-itime environment in the Mediter-

January 1994 27

Operators from Kommando Yami in action. The naval unit conducts direct-action and special-reconnaissance missions against coastal targets.

IDF photo

ranean hinders the identificationand tracking of hostile surface-shipmovements, thermal stratificationand high ambient noise levels permitsubmarines to operate largely unde-tected throughout much of the area.

The INF maintains various assetswhich can be used for the insertionof special-operations forces. Its twoSa’ar 4.5 missile-patrol boats caneach accommodate two attack ormedium transport helicopters, whileits Reshef and Sa’ar III- and II-classmissile-patrol boats are capable ofcarrying armed speedboats on side-mounted davits, as well as inflatablerubber rafts. The INF’s three Type206 Gal-class submarines can insertpersonnel by lock-out. Prior to aseaborne assault, naval commandoswill generally be inserted undercover of darkness by a missile-patrolboat offshore to reconnoiter andsecure the landing site, followed bythe assault force in rafts. Exfiltra-tion is usually by raft or helicopter.

The range and flexibility of theINF’s missile-patrol boats wasdemonstrated by their role in theassassination of PLO leader Khalilal-Wazir in Tunis, in April 1988.Two Sa’ar 4.5 and two Reshef-classboats reportedly transported theSayeret Matkal assault force and aKommando Yami security elementto Tunis. Two AH-1S Cobra attackhelicopters were reportedly aboardone of the Sa’ar 4.5s that partici-pated in the assassination of Wazir,to provide fire support to theassault force if necessary. An AB-206 was reportedly aboard the sec-ond Sa’ar 4.5 to provide on-callmedevac support.10

SurpriseThe IDF conducts nearly all spe-

cial operations at night, under coverof darkness, to maximize the likeli-hood of surprise and to exploit itsproficiency in night operations.

The IDF’s operations security isgenerally excellent, due to the eleva-tion of secrecy to the level of aninstitutional norm in the IDF,through compartmentation and dis-

semination of information on a strictneed-to-know basis, and through theimplementation of specific opera-tions-security measures, such as:

• The employment of dedicatedOPSEC officers to monitor theOPSEC posture of units earmarkedfor an operation.

• The maintenance of routineground and air activity to maskpreparations for an operation.

• The observation of radio silenceduring the operation, except to pro-vide specific instructions to theassault force in the event of unfore-seen developments and to relay situ-ation reports.

• Strict censorship of militarynews reporting prior to, during andafter the operation.

The practice of investing the com-mander on the spot with responsibil-ity for operational decisions. Usingthe command net primarily forreporting also limits the volume ofradio traffic, improving communica-tions security. Finally, the shortplanning time available for mostoperations minimizes the likelihoodof an OPSEC breach.

The IDF also employs a variety ofdeception techniques, including:

• Visual deception measures,including the use of civilian clothes,foreign military uniforms, and for-eign equipment and weapons byassault-force personnel.

• Passive and active electronic-deception techniques such as radarmasking (shadowing civilian air andmaritime traffic en route to anobjective), and jamming of hostileradars to mask the presence or theidentity of IDF air or naval forces.

• Diversionary actions, such asair and artillery strikes, in the vicin-ity of an objective to distract enemyradar operators and mask thesounds of helicopters used to insertthe assault force near the object.

AudacityThe IDF believes that there is a

direct relationship between audaci-ty and success in special opera-tions. The deeper one strikes into

hostile territory, the greater thelikelihood of achieving surprise,and the greater the psychologicaleffect on the enemy. In the wordsof former chief paratroop andinfantry officer Emmanuel Shaked,who played a central role in theemergence of Israel’s approach tospecial operations, “I alwaysbelieved ... that an operation200km from the border is less dan-gerous than an operation near theborder, since surprise is assured.”11

As a result, the IDF has tended tofavor hitting the enemy deep in hisown territory and has developed asophisticated capability for long-range operations.

Over the years, however, manyof the IDF’s finest soldiers havebeen killed in special operations,and consequently, the IDF hasbeen reluctant in recent years toemploy these units in high-riskoperations which could be accom-plished by the air force or by othermeans. This point was underscoredby Maj. Gen. Matan Vilnai, a for-mer chief paratroop and infantryofficer, commander of the 35thParatroop Brigade and SayeretTzanchanim, in a 1988 interview.Discussing a daring helibornereprisal raid into upper Egypt thathe led in 1968, he stated:

Today, our reconnaissance unitshave attained a degree of proficien-cy we did not have back then — yetwe have not conducted an operationlike this one since. As a matter offact, our capabilities today aremuch greater. The problem is — theaudacity to take such a decision. ...Today we see things differently. Onemust remember that in the interven-ing period we had the Yom Kippurwar. The IDF of today is an armythat has more than once failed, andit has learned to live with this. Butthis fact has its consequences.Today we know that we may fail.Back then, we didn’t realize this.12

After-action reviewsAfter-action reviews are held

immediately after every operation

28 Special Warfare

and are used to evaluate the plan-ning and preparation for the opera-tion, its execution and the efficacyof friendly and enemy tactics, tech-niques, procedures and equipmentin order to derive lessons-learned.

Participants include members ofthe general staff and the task force.Participants are expected to bedirect and honest in their reporting,without deference to rank, and theinformality which characterizesrelations between ranks in the IDFgenerally encourages candor. Theseare followed by more thorough anddetailed after-action reports basedon internal post-mission debriefsconducted at the various levels ofcommand of all elements involvedin the operation.

ConclusionsFor a variety of reasons the IDF’s

efforts to create a first-rate special-operations capability has receivedhigh-level support. Manifestationsof this include the fact that a dis-proportionate number of general-staff officers have extensive special-operations experience (service inelite special-operations-capableunits is career-enhancing, not a lia-

bility), the most senior and experi-enced officers in the armed forcesare intimately engaged in allaspects of the planning of specialoperations, and special-operations-capable units enjoy priority accessto resources and personnel — theseare major factors in the IDF’s suc-cesses in this area.

The strength of the Israeli sys-tem, however, is also its weakness.In past wars, the senior personnelwho would be involved in the plan-ning of special operations were gen-erally engaged in planning andfighting the crucial conventionalland battles of the war and had lit-tle time to address special opera-tions. Consequently, special-opera-tions-capable units were oftenemployed as elite infantry inwartime. The lack of an indepen-dent special-operations organiza-tion — with the ability to plan andexecute operations on its own —thus limits the IDF’s ability to con-duct special operations in wartime.As a result, most of the IDF’s spe-cial-operations successes haveoccurred in peacetime, in the waragainst terrorism, when the IDFcould mobilize all its resources in

support of a specific operation.Senior IDF personnel recognize

that no single military operation orsuccess will provide a solution to theproblem of terrorism. Many believe,however, that within the context ofa protracted struggle with guerrillaand terrorist organizations, specialoperations may yield important ben-efits — degrading the offensive mili-tary capabilities and disruptingcommunications, destroying mili-tary facilities and equipment, andforcing the opponent to allocateadditional resources to self-defenseand security.

In this light, the IDF has succeed-ed in creating responsive and flexi-ble organizational arrangementsand highly capable units for con-ducting special operations which,despite some failures, have moreoften than not succeeded in accom-plishing the objectives set by Israel’spolitical and military leadership.

Michael Eisenstadt is currently amilitary fellow at the WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy,Washington, D.C.

January 1994 29

Notes:1 The Israel Border Guard also has a special counterterrorist unit,

Yamam (Yechida Neged Michablim) which has competed with thevarious military units for recognition and a greater role in the coun-terterrorist effort. Established in May 1974, the unit has reportedlyprovided support to the Shin Bet (Israel’s civilian internal securityintelligence service) during cordon-and-search operations in Israel,the West Bank and Gaza, and South Lebanon. In its first major oper-ation, it rescued a busload of Israelis taken hostage by Palestinianguerrillas near Dimona, Israel, in March 1988. Leroy Thompson, TheRescuers: The World’s Top Anti-Terrorist Units, (Boulder, 1986), pp.131-132; Topaz Carmi, “We Proved Our Worth,” Bamahane, 22September 1988, p. 9. In addition, since 1988, the IDF has estab-lished a number of snatch squads, reportedly composed of personnelwho speak Arabic and dress as locals and operate in the West Bankand Gaza to identify and apprehend leaders of the Palestinian upris-ing. Two of these units — code-named “Samson” (Shimshon) and“Cherry” (Duvdevan) — achieved a certain degree of internationalnotoriety following accusations in the Western press that they wereengaged in the assassination of Palestinian activists. Jon D. Hull,“Code Name ‘Cherry,’ ” Time, 7 November 1988, p. 41.

2 Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, Counterattack: The West’sBattle Against the Terrorists, (New York, 1982), pp. 77-93; Uri Mil-stein, History of the Paratroops: Spring of Youth (Hebrew), (Tel Aviv,1987), pp. 1545-1550.

3 Rami Carmel, “To Be a Sayeret Trooper,” Soldier of Fortune,April 1989, p. 43.

4 Milstein, op cit., pp. 1421-1463; Haim Ravia and Emanuel Rosen,

So You’ve Been Drafted! (Hebrew), (Jerusalem: 1989), pp. 147-148.5 Casualty figures for the 1973 war are from Avi Bettelheim,

Golani: The Fighting Family (Hebrew), (Golani Brigade Command,July 1980), p. 166. Casualty figures for the 1982 war cover only theperiod June 6-26, 1982, and are from Avi Bettelheim, Golani in PeaceFor Galilee (Hebrew), (Golani Brigade Command, October 1982), pp.62-63.

6 Mission groups from Sayeret Tzanchanim, Golani, or Giv’ati areoften augmented by personnel from the line battalions and combatengineer company of their respective parent brigades.

7 For additional details, see Reuven Gal, A Portrait of the IsraeliSoldier, (New York, 1986), pp.76-96; Ravia and Rosen, op. cit., pp. 11-74.

8 The naval commandos also conduct a pre-conscription gadna(paramilitary youth) scuba course during summer vacation. Thosewho pass the course are offered the option of serving in the unit.Ra’anan Tchervinsky, Mommy, or the Commandos (Hebrew), BenGalim, December 1986, pp. 36-38; Ravia and Rosen, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

9 Ravia and Rosen, op. cit., pp. 98-99; Dor’am Gunt, “EveryoneWants Sayeret” (Hebrew), Bamahane, 22 March 1989, pp. 19-20.

10 David Halevy and Neil C. Livingstone, “The Killing of AbuJihad,” The Washingtonian, June 1988, p. 166.

11 Milstein, op. cit., p. 1604.12 Yosef Argamon, “Operation Shock” (Hebrew), Bamahane, 2

November 1988, p. 49.

Current world conditions demandthat U.S. special-operations forcesbe prepared for employment in avariety of contingencies. Comman-ders and their staffs must developtraining strategies to prepare theirsoldiers to deal with drug traffick-ing, natural or manmade disasters,regional conflicts, civil wars andhostile insurgencies.

One means of preparing soldiersis through the use of computer sim-ulations, which can bring the real-ism of the battlefield to the class-room. Battle simulations have beensupporting military training formore than eight years and haveproven to be useful for staff plan-ning and course-of-action develop-ment. They have replaced manyfield exercises, providing a consider-able savings for the Department ofDefense.

For SOF, simulations offer ameans of applying basic principlesof war to a variety of SOF missionprofiles. They allow the SOF soldier

to “think through” planning andpreparation requirements beforeactual mission execution, whileexposing the liabilities of potentialcourses of action.

As an enhancement to existingtraining, simulations provide thecommander with the ability to trainand evaluate his staff’s ability toexecute its mission requirements.Simulations also assist in the devel-opment and implementation ofemerging SOF doctrine.

Warfighting CenterThe Army Special Operations

Forces Warfighting Center wasestablished at the JFK Special War-fare Center and School in February1993. Its mission is to provide com-puter-simulations support to theacademic programs at the SWCSand to support operational units ofthe Army Special Operations Com-mand. The Warfighting Center’sstaff consists of military, Army civil-ian and civilian-contract personnel.

Simulations in the WarfightingCenter provide a high-tech graphicsenvironment and the capability toarchive the effects of student staffplanning and coordination andleader decisions on the simulatedbattlefield.

The Warfighting Center is cur-rently using two simulation pro-grams: the Brigade/Battalion BattleSimulation, or BBS, and Janus, ahigh-resolution model that supportsthe individual soldier with respectto movement and individualweapons employment. Both simula-tions are designed to train the syn-chronization of battle staffs andsmall-unit leaders, and they havebeen adopted by the WarfightingCenter for training in SOF-uniquemissions.

BBS focuses on battle-staff train-ing and mission-planning require-ments, from low- to high-intensitywarfare. It allows brigade and bat-talion commanders and their staffsto practice decision-making in a

30 Special Warfare

The SOF Warfighting Center: Answering the Challenge

of SOF Simulation Support

by John Wood, Ken Benway and Sherry Barnes

realistic, time-stressed, combatenvironment. Players must be ableto develop and assess large amountsof tactical and logistical data to for-mulate situation estimates andmake decisions. BBS comprises 10workstations: one higher-controlworkstation, four maneuver work-stations, an artillery-control work-station, an air-operations and air-defense workstation, a personnel-and-logistics workstation and twothreat workstations. Each stationcontrols a number of units.

BBS allows controllers to deter-mine terrain and weather underwhich units will operate, and itallows the simulation of variousaspects such as operational states,rates of movement, effects of directand indirect fire, obstacles, equip-ment damage, casualties and prob-lems of resupply.

Janus is a two-sided, interactiveground-combat simulation whichportrays two opposing forces direct-ed and controlled by two sets ofplayers. Each player directs, moni-tors and redirects actions of thesimulated units under his control,without a complete knowledge ofthe disposition of the opposingforce. JANUS focuses mainly onmilitary systems which participatein maneuver and artillery opera-tions on land. It, too, allows simula-tion of movement speeds, obstaclesand the effects of direct and indirectfire.

There are currently 10 BBS work-stations and 16 Janus workstationsfully operational at the WarfightingCenter. In October, the WarfightingCenter began testing the applicationof computer simulation in the Spe-cial Forces Operations and Intelli-gence Course. In January, the Spe-cial Forces Warrant Officer BasicCourse and the Special Forces Offi-cer Qualification Course also begantest-bed activities.

Early in 1994, the WarfightingCenter is scheduled to become aregular part of these courses and tooffer battle-simulation exercises tooperational SOF units, as well.Both BBS and JANUS models will

be available to SWCS and opera-tional units.

Computer simulationBattle-simulation software such

as that used in the WarfightingCenter is designed to hide itssophistication behind easy-to-usemedia. Trainers employ full-colormaps that incorporate the positionsof both friendly and enemy units,computer terminals, color monitorsand specialized software. A real-time mission scenario is presentedto the soldier, with data deliveredunder similar conditions to those ofan actual mission.

Simulations allow the soldier toevaluate his skills via a fully auto-mated, user-friendly system. A suc-cession of easy-to-understandmenus allows users to make selec-tions in order to find or enter data.Menu selections are made by press-ing an “up” or “down” arrow, andthen a “select” key. There are nocodes or commands to memorize,nor do users need extensive train-

ing or experience to use any of thesimulation systems available. Theyare required only to think as sol-diers — not as computer experts.The trainer can create a realisticmission environment by selectingterrain, season, weather conditions,mission, opposing forces and SOFtask organization.

InstructionDuring a block of instruction

focusing on SOF advisory require-ments, for example, students mightbe presented with a tactical conceptfor the defense of a light-infantrybattalion sector. Operations andIntelligence Course students mightplan and analyze courses of actionusing the simulation to display bat-tle positions and to compare andcontrast their relative strengthsand weaknesses.

Students in the SF EngineerCourse might use a simulation todevelop a barrier, mine and obstacleplan to support the defensive con-cept. That plan might then be

January 1994 31

A student in the Special Forces Opera-tions and IntelligenceCourse mans a BBSworkstation during astudent command-post exercise.

U.S. Army photo

applied to the computer as a screen-generated engineer overlay. Theinstructor leads the students in aseminar format to address thestrengths and weaknesses of theplan.

Meanwhile, over in the SFWeapons Sergeant Course, the stu-dents could be building a fire-sup-port plan for mortars and artillerywhich would tie in with the engineersergeants’ barrier plan. Medicscould develop estimates for the man-agement and evacuation of casual-ties in the context of the integratedbattalion planning effort. All theplanning and analysis comes togeth-er in the command-post exercise.

The illustration above shows thefunctional layout of the WarfightingCenter and how its parts interactwith the training audience. Thelevel of realism experienced by thetarget audience is the measure ofsuccess for any simulation. In thecase of a student command-post

exercise, for instance, the studentbattalion commander and his staffwould operate within a typical tacti-cal-operations-center environment,while communications are ongoingwith subordinate units.

It is important to understand thatthe student battalion staff only“sees” what is reported by simula-tion controllers. These reports con-stitute the effects of battalionstaffing and the commander’s deci-sions. Those decisions, in the formof battalion orders, are passed tothe control cells (manned by theusing unit, and representing thesubordinate units of the battalion)where they are entered in the com-puter in the form of tactical orders.

The simulation then calculatesreal-time rates of movement overchosen routes, assesses casualtieswhen engagements occur amongfriendly and enemy units, and com-putes consumption rates for thevarious classes of supply based on

the tempo of operations.These calculations generate sub-

ordinate-unit situation reports thatare passed via wire or radio to thebattalion TOC for further staffingand decision-making by the com-mander. The battalion staff andcommander receive reports on theeffects of their decisions, thus gen-erating more decisions and feed-back — providing the interactiveaspect of the simulation.

Operational useOperational units may take

advantage of the same capabilities.Units scheduled for deploymentOCONUS or to a combined trainingcenter may employ simulationsbeforehand to refine staff SOPs,“spin up” new staff and comman-ders prior to employment, and toassess training needs. The databases for both BBS and Janus aresophisticated enough to allow thereplication of foreign doctrine, for-

32 Special Warfare

INFORMATION

PLANNING

DECISION

EXECUTION

WIRE/RADIOWIRE/RADIO

TACTICALOPERATIONS

CENTER

EXERCISECONTROL/DIRECTOR

SIMULATIONCONTROL

WARFIGHTING CENTER

Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation

DECISION MAKING PROCESS

EXERCISE CONTROL


eign equipment and weapons sys-tems — an ideal medium in whichto prepare for FID/advisory-relatedmissions.

A unit might use BBS as one ofseveral phases in a training strate-gy leading to an operational or exer-cise employment. Given the premi-um put on time faced by all opera-tional units, the simulation mightbe used to exercise individual phas-es of an operational concept, withinterim periods used to “fix” train-ing needs.

Conceptually, a unit might chooseto exercise movement planningfrom a port of entry overland to anassembly area in Phase I of the sim-ulation. The archiving capability ofthe simulation then permits aseamless continuation into PhaseII, perhaps movement to contact, atsome later date. Over time, the unitcould fight its way through its bat-tle plan, with staff training inter-spersed as appropriate. This strate-gy is particularly useful for reserve-component units whose trainingopportunities are concentrated indiscrete, dispersed training periods.

In war, SOF soldiers will fight aseffectively or as poorly as their com-manders have trained them. Today,SOF soldiers must be able to trainfor multiple contingencies as part of

a joint and combined team. Theemergence of simulations give SOFcommanders an advantage in maxi-mizing their training capabilities,while optimizing scarce trainingresources.

Simulations are as flexible and asadaptive to training as the comman-der is imaginative. Coupled withinnovative training concepts devel-oped by the commander and hisstaff, they will prepare the SOF sol-dier to meet the complexities of themodern battlefield.

While simulations may never cap-ture all of the human aspects of thetactical environment, they canallow us to exercise concepts in anear no-cost, no-risk environment.The SOF Warfighting Center allowsSOF soldiers to learn from theirmistakes on the screen, instead ofon the battlefield.

John Wood isemployed by LogiconRDA as site managerin support of theARSOF WarfightingCenter. He has servedin computer-simula-tion management positions with thecompany for more than four years.He retired from the Army in 1990

with 21 years of service in Armorand Aviation units. He holds abachelor’s degree in law enforcementfrom Eastern Kentucky University.

Ken Benway isemployed by LogiconRDA as senior special-operations analyst insupport of the ARSOFWarfighting Center. Aretired Army lieu-tenant colonel, he served in bothInfantry and Special Forces units,including the 3rd, 5th and 10th Spe-cial Forces Groups, and as chief ofcontingency operations, SOJ-3 of theSpecial Operations CommandEurope. He holds a bachelor’s degreein political science from ColumbusCollege, Columbus, Ga.

Sherry Barnes is a software engi-neer employed by Logicon RDA atthe ARSOF Warfighting Centeruntil August 1993. She was previ-ously assigned to the XVIII AirborneCorps Battle Simulation Center,also at Fort Bragg.

January 1994 33

In “The Case for Separating CivicActions from Military Operations inLIC,”1 Regina Gaillard recommendsthe creation of what she calls a U.S.Development Corps as a new mili-tary unified command. Her statedgoal is to delink civic action andhumanitarian and civic assistancefrom counterinsurgency and LIC,and Gaillard criticizes current LICdoctrine for failing to adequatelydistinguish “between such diverseactivities as humanitarian assis-tance, nation building, counterin-surgency and civic action.”

Latin America is the focus ofGaillard’s concept, and she arguesthat low-intensity conflict can nolonger serve as a blanket term forall applications of U.S. militarypower in the region. In fact, sheconcludes that “any civic action pro-posed by the Army for Latin Ameri-ca must emphasize humanitariandevelopment and be completelydivorced from ‘security,’ counterin-surgency and LIC.”2

Gaillard’s remarks should concern

professional soldiers on twoaccounts. First, establishing a sys-tem whereby the military could beroutinely committed overseas tohumanitarian efforts that require notraditional military security opera-tions would dangerously dilute themilitary’s war-fighting focus.

Second, by advancing the notionthat civic action and security can beseparated, Gaillard is ignoring thelessons of Vietnam. Although Gail-lard directs most of her remarkstoward a Latin American scenarioin which she sees diminishingsuperpower competition, sheignores the fact that insurgenciesoften have nothing to do with super-power competition.

A major effort in Vietnam was“pacification,” which has beendefined as “a specific strategy orprogram to bring security and polit-ical and economic stability to thecountryside.”3 This linkage of secu-rity with other measures is critical.In Summons of the Trumpet, Brig.Gen. Dave Palmer notes:

The initial tendency to separatepacification from purely militaryactions ... was an error. They are atmost two sides of the same coin. Thereis no ]“other.” Against an insurgencymovement, pacification can never suc-ceed without military security, whilemilitary operations are a wasteunless they lead to pacification.4

Statements like Palmer’s are acommon theme in Vietnam litera-ture. Robert Komer, the first directorof Civil Operations and Revolution-ary Development Support, wrote in1970, “There can be no civil progresswithout constant real security.”5

Still Gaillard insists that “devel-opmental and economic assistanceshould not be tied to security.” Sheclaims the benefit of such a demar-cation would be the avoidance of“political pitfalls” and perceptions of“a hidden LIC agenda.” This lattercomment in particular ignores theconcept of insurgency as a three-phased entity6 and the idea that“emphasis on military civic actionvaries with the intensity of insur-

34 Special Warfare

Why Civic Actions and Security Cannot Be Separated

by Capt. Kevin Dougherty

gent activities.”7 As the insurgencyintensifies, priorities on civic actionand military operations will natu-rally require adjusting.

Steve Metz confirms this observa-tion in his article “Airland Battleand Counterinsurgency.”8 He citesfour functional areas — economic,political, social and military —which must support one anotherand gives an example in which eco-nomic development is the maineffort and all other initiatives act inits support.

Gaillard’s argument for separationdoes not accommodate an intensify-ing insurgency like Metz’s modeldoes, and she cannot guarantee thestability of Latin America. On Dec.12, 1992, the Inter-American Dia-logue, including such panelists asformer President Jimmy Carter,identified problems such as poverty,social inequalities, inadequate dietand inflation as being prevalent inLatin America.9 Such conditions cre-ate the vulnerable population essen-tial to an insurgency. Peru,Columbia and Ecuador are potentialhot spots, and the recent coupattempt in Venezuela is indicative ofthe instability in the region.

Close to 90 percent of Latin Amer-icans may now be ruled by civiliangovernments, but as Gabriel Marcel-la notes, “appurtenance of civiliangovernment (is not) equal to democ-racy.”10 Marcella identifies a newtype of revolutionary in Latin Amer-ica; one that has “chosen a strategyof protracted warfare to take advan-tage of the vulnerabilities of LatinAmerican societies and the inconsis-tencies and discontinuities of theprincipal external support element,i.e., U.S. policy.”11 The fact thatobservers such as Gaillard and Mar-cella can reach different conclusionsabout the degree of the insurgentthreat in Latin America is indicativeof the ambiguity of the LIC environ-ment and probably the best argu-ment for not separating civic actionand security.

Gaillard does not address how theU.S. should safeguard its civic-action progress as an insurgency

intensifies, resurfaces or develops.It took the United States some timeto learn this lesson in Vietnam, anda brief discussion of the StrategicHamlet and Combined Action Pla-toon programs provides a counter toGaillard’s claim that civic actionshould be separated from security.

In February 1962, South Viet-namese President Ngo Dinh Diemlaunched the Strategic Hamlet Pro-gram. Inspired by the successfulBritish action in Malaya, the pro-gram was designed to resettle peas-ants in semi-fortified communitieswhere they would be provided withcomprehensive social services andprotection from the Viet Cong.There were numerous problemswith the Strategic Hamlet Programwhich will only be highlighted here.

The successful resettlement pro-gram in Malaya was undertakenamid very different social and polit-ical conditions which would not beduplicated in Vietnam. In Vietnam,most of the peasants were forcedinto compliance and bitterly resent-ed leaving their ancestral homesand fields. To make matters worse,widespread corruption preventedmany of the promised social ser-

vices from ever materializing.12

With the fall of the Diem regime,the term “strategic” hamlet wasreplaced by “new life” hamlet; thelatter program intending to elimi-nate the earlier oppressive andauthoritarian nature of the action.13

These programs failed for a varietyof reasons, but the one that must benoted in light of Gaillard’s article isthe lack of security.

In 1963, the official statistics list-ed more than 10,000,000, or approx-imately 70 percent, of the14,400,000 inhabitants of SouthVietnam as living in nearly 9,000strategic hamlets or in urban cen-ters. Verification of the statisticsafter Diem’s overthrow in Novem-ber showed that only 10 percent ofthe hamlets were really defensible14

The program was grossly overex-tended and “fell apart when therewere no longer sufficient interven-tion forces available for repellingsizeable Viet Cong attacks againstthe hamlets.”15

But the problem was more thanjust attacks from outside the hamlet.Viet Cong infiltrators lived withinthe supposedly secure fortifications,and, as American officials observed

January 1994 35

Heavy equipment of a U.S. Army engineer unit stands in sharp contrast to alocal ox cart during a road-building operation in Latin America.

Photo by Mike Edrington

later, “Two Viet Cong in a hamletcan still undo most of what we’veaccomplished.”16 Thus the strategicor new-life hamlets represented asizeable government presence in thelives of the peasants. With this gov-ernment presence came the expecta-tions of services such as justice,health programs, welfare activities,road maintenance, electricity andagricultural assistance.

But as Lt. Col. John Clelandnoted in 1966, these services “can-not be brought into an area untilpacification has been provided to thepopulation.” With this in mind, heconcluded, “The military objective inVietnam must be to provide protec-tion to the population.”17

Recognizing this reality, theMarine Corps proposed a plan for“Combined Action Platoons.” Theplan called for placing a Marinerifle squad with a company of theSouth Vietnamese Regional Forces(the local militia) to form the CAP.The CAPs would provide security inorder to allow pacification efforts inthe areas of health, education, eco-nomic development and land reformto win over the peasants.

The Marines had more historicalexperience with pacification thanthe Army did, having been exposedto similar situations in Cuba, Haiti,the Dominican Republic, Nicaraguaand Panama. Lt. Gen. Victor Kru-lak commented, “The Vietnamesepeople are the prize,” and it was theCAPs that would provide the securi-ty they needed.18

The CAP plan recognized that“The Vietnamese who is persuadedto cooperate with his governmentagainst the communist elementassumes a tremendous risk.” Whilethere were benefits to cooperationsuch as clothing, food, educationand medical assistance, the threatof Viet Cong violence often out-weighed these positive aspects.Therefore, local security was “amutual goal” for the Marines andthe Vietnamese. The CAP offered asolution to the dilemma the Viet-namese faced between cooperationand potential violence.19

Gen. William Westmoreland, how-ever, favored a purely military solu-tion won through big-unit engage-ments. Therefore, the United Statesrejected the strategy of protectingthe population as being undulydefensive.20 With the military focus-ing on the shooting war, civic actiontook a back seat. Under these condi-tions, pacification achieved little,and “The fundamental problem wasa lack of security.”21

One must be careful when draw-ing conclusions from history. LatinAmerica, the focus of Gaillard’s rec-ommendation, is a different situa-tion from Vietnam, but, if oneaccepts the Army’s doctrine of athree-phased insurgency, not tomention the obvious lack of com-plete stability in Latin America, itseems inevitable that security willeventually become a critical issue.

Gaillard’s notion of delinkingcivic action from counterinsurgencyand LIC does not recognize the les-son learned in Vietnam that “Civicaction is a weapon of war and, to beeffective, it requires the same accu-racy, coordination and supportgiven any other weapon.”22

Interestingly, Latin America hasalready benefitted from the hardlessons of the Strategic Hamlet Pro-gram. In Guatemala, the Polos deDesarrollo (Development Center)has been a highly successful resettle-ment program. Military civic-actionteams live in the village to supportextensive civilian-developmentefforts. What ensures the survival ofthe program is that each new villageis trained to defend itself with acivil-defense force composed of near-ly all the village’s men. Lt. Col. JohnFishel and Maj. Edmund Cowan citethis security as “a central factor ofthe war for moral legitimacy in LatinAmerica.”23

Recent events provide anotherexample of a situation requiringsecurity and civic action to belinked. While Operation RestoreHope could not be classified as aninsurgency situation, it did providelessons-learned concerning civicaction and security. In Somalia,civic action by itself obviouslyfailed, and Marines and soldierswere needed to protect the humani-tarian effort. One former Somalianpoliceman astutely observed, “If

36 Special Warfare

An American adviser discussestroop developmentwith a VietnameseCivilian DefenseForce commander in 1969.

U.S. Army photo

there is no security, there is nofood.”24 Thus, experiences in Viet-nam, and more recently in Somalia,provide a good argument againstseparating civic action and securityin any arena involving the military.

This essay emphasizes Gaillard’sidea of separating security and civicaction, but she is actually advocating“a new, separate ‘peacekeeping’ doc-trine” to delink HCA from LIC/coun-terinsurgency. This HCA/peacekeep-ing specialty would be devoted to“development construction and med-ical, managerial and conservationcivic assistance.” Although she callsthe concept “non-warfighting,” Gail-lard argues that “the institutionalexperience of the services makes themilitary the most capable organiza-tion for such a mission.”25

Gaillard has great vision for herproposed Development Corps, see-ing it as a rejuvenated Civilian Con-servation Corps which would “helpretain force structure and facilitiesin the United States and contributeto alleviating joblessness and lackof skills both in the Third Worldand in the United States.”26

This is a curious mission for themilitary and exactly the sort of thingLt. Col. Charles Dunlap cautionsagainst in “The Origins of the Ameri-can Military Coup of 2012.”27 Thegist of Dunlap’s article is that suchfactors as the end of the Cold War,public confidence in the militaryborne of the convincing Gulf War vic-tory, and exasperation with the gov-ernment’s apparent inability to solvethe nation’s problems lead to themilitary’s being tasked “with a vari-ety of new, non-traditional missions,and vastly escalating its commit-ment to formerly ancillary duties.”

Dunlap believes the militarycould be easily lured into such acondition because, as one journalistobserved, “winning a share of thebudget war ... require(s) that themilitary find new missions for apost-Cold War world that is devoidof clear military threats.” Non-tra-ditional roles represent one meansof budget-justification.28

The drawback that Dunlap notes

January 1994 37

5th SF Group Provides Security for Provide Relief

When the United States formed Joint Task Force Provide Relief tocommit DoD aircraft to deliver food-relief shipments to Somalia andNorthern Kenya, one of the JTF commander’s main concerns was thesecurity and safety of the relief-aircraft crews.

Warring Somali factions constantly impeded the efforts of relief agen-cies to supply food to starving Somalis, and loosely organized securityarrangements at the airfields presented an inherent danger. The com-mander’s concerns were reinforced by accidental discharges from theweapons in the hands of Somali airfield guards, fire fights near the air-fields and two incidents of bullets hitting U.S. airplanes.

The intention to use U.S. forces was announced Aug. 13, 1992; the 5thSpecial Forces Group at Fort Campbell, Ky., was alerted on Aug. 15 toprovide security for U.S. personnel and equipment during the food-deliv-ery flights into Somalia. The commander of Company A, 2nd Battalion,5th SF Group accompanied the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teamfrom U.S. Central Command on its initial assessment. The remainder ofthe company joined him on Aug. 22 at Moi International Airport atMombasa, Kenya, site of the JTF headquarters. The company consistedof one Special Forces B-detachment, which provided command and con-trol to five 12-man SF A-detachments.

The concept of the operation was to station an eight-man reactionforce, the Airborne Security Augmentation Team, or ASAT, aboard anAir Force C-130. The ASAT would fly routinely near the Somali airfieldsand land during an emergency. Contingency plans for medical or main-tenance emergencies, search and rescue or airfield evacuation wereready for execution from the aircraft.

Each ASAT consisted of one officer and seven NCOs and was requiredto have at least one SF medical NCO and one SF communications NCO.Two desert-modified vehicular systems, with mounted crew-servedweapons, were center-loaded aboard the aircraft. Each contained suffi-cient fuel, ammunition and survival, communications and navigationequipment for three days of desert operations.

Once committed to an emergency, the ASAT was capable of respond-ing to a variety of situations and could rapidly organize into a dis-mounted or mounted role. Teams were ready to shoot, move, communi-cate and survive, but every effort would be exercised to avoid provok-ing a confrontation.

On the ground, Air Force Combat Control Teams provided air trafficcontrol and weather data for each flight. Each CCT element was aug-mented with an SF medic and an SF observer who provided “eyes-on-tar-get” information. Each SF soldier was rotated into airfield observer dutyso that he would be familiar with the terrain and situation at each field.

Operation Provide Relief lasted from Aug. 21-Dec.1, 1992. U.S. forcesflew more than 1,400 sorties into Somalia and delivered more than250,000 tons of rice, beans, cooking oil and other food staples. Althoughthe ASATs were never called upon to respond to an emergency, they flewan average of 30 missions, each logging more than 300 flight hours perteam. In fact, the SF soldiers had more flight hours than any other U.S.forces in the area of operations.

— CWO Bruce Watts, 5th SF Group

is that “each moment spent per-forming a non-traditional mission isone unavailable for orthodox mili-tary exercises.” He argues that “mil-itaries ought to ‘prepare for war’and leave the ‘peace waging’ tothose agencies of the governmentwhose mission is just that.”

Military analyst Col. Harry Sum-mers supports these observations byciting the pre-World War II Canadi-an military in which “instead ofusing the peacetime interregnum tohone their military skills, seniorCanadian military officials soughtout civilian missions to justify their

existence. When war came they werewoefully unprepared.”29

Thus there is a danger to war-fighting readiness in Gaillard’s pro-posed Development Corps. If, as sheclaims, there is no need for securityin civic actions in Latin America,then what is the role (or need) of ourmilitary there? Such actions fallwithin the realm of other agencies.If, on the other hand, a true LIC sit-uation, complete with the probabilityof an intensifying insurgency exists,then the military must heed thelessons of Vietnam and insist thatsecurity and civic action be consis-tently linked.

Capt. Kevin J.Dougherty is a small-group instructor forthe Infantry OfficerAdvanced Course atFort Benning, Ga. Hewas previously asenior observer at the Joint Readi-ness Training Center and hasserved with the 101st Airborne Divi-sion and the Berlin Brigade. He is a1983 graduate of the U.S. MilitaryAcademy at West Point.

38 Special Warfare

Somali children wait for food in Mogadishu. Operation Restore Hope providedlessons on the need for security in humanitarian-assistance missions.


Notes:1 Regina Gaillard, “The Case for Separating Civic Actions from

Military Operations in LIC,” Military Review, June 1991, p. 30. The1993 edition of FM 100-5 replaces the term LIC with “operationsother than war.” To remain consistent with Gaillard’s terminology, Iwill continue to use “LIC” in this essay.

2 Gaillard, p. 39.3 Thomas Boetlcher, Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow (Boston:

Little, Brown, and Co., 1985), p. 301.4 David R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet (Novato, Calif.: Pre-

sidio Press, 1978), p. 221.5 Robert Komer, “Clear, Hold, and Rebuild,” in Army, May 1970, p. 19.6 FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict (Washington,

D.C.: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, 19 October 1992), p. 2-5.7 FM 7-98, p. D-7.8 Steve Metz, “Airland Battle and Counterinsurgency,” in Military

Review, January 1990, p. 36. 9 “Panel calls for effort to help the poor in Latin America,” in

Columbus, Ga., Ledger-Enquirer, 13 December 1992, p. B-8.10 Gabriel Marcella, “The Latin American Military, Low Intensity

Conflict, and Democracy,” in Journal of Interamerican Studies andWorld Affairs, p. 45.

11 Marcella, p. 52.12 John Lewis and George Kahin, The United States in Vietnam

(New York: The Dial Press, 1967), p. 140.13 Wesley Fishel, Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conflict (Peacock Publish-

ers, 1968), p. 372.14 Fishel, p. 569.

15 Fishel, p. 381.16 George Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and

Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: Newberry Award Records, Inc.,1979), p. 228.

17 Lt. Col. John Cleland, “The Objective and Vietnam,” in MilitaryReview, July 1966, pp. 85-86.

18 James S. Olson and Randy Robert, Where the Domino Fell:America and Vietnam, 1945 to 1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press,1991), p. 144.

19 Capt. R.E. Williamson, “A Briefing for Combined Action,” inMarine Corps Gazette, March 1968, p. 41-43.

20 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1978), p. 86.

21 Herring, p. 159.22 Lt. Col. Hoyt Livingston and Lt. Col. Francis Watson Jr., “Civic

Action: Purpose and Pitfalls,” in Military Review, December 1967, p. 22.23 Edmund Cowan and John Fishel, “Civil-Military Operations and

the War for Moral Legitimacy in Latin America,” in Military Review,January 1988, p. 41.

24 “U.S. frees Somali capital,” in Columbus, Ga., Ledger-Enquirer,10 December 1992, p. A-10.

25 Gaillard, p. 39-40.26 Gaillard, pp. 40-41.27 Charles Dunlap, “The Origins of the American Military Coup of

2012,” in Parameters, Winter 1992-1993, pp. 2-20.28 Dunlap, p. 10.29 Dunlap, p. 13.

There is no more critical asset to aSpecial Forces operational detach-ment conducting mission planningand preparation than time. There issimply not enough time during isola-tion to accomplish everything thatthe detachment would like to doprior to deployment.

This article presents an opera-tional technique which helps toensure complete mission analysisby the isolated detachment prior toits mission planning. The focus hereis on the first 2-4 hours, immediate-ly following the mission briefing, ofthe 96-120-hour mission-planningcycle.

Although mission-planning con-sumes less than five percent of mis-sion-preparation time, there is nomore important increment in theprocess. Without a complete under-standing of the mission, preparationfor and execution of the missionbecome a matter of chance. Com-plete understanding is the result ofa systematic and thorough missionanalysis. The first few hours are

thus a great determinant of successor failure.

This is not another checklist foran ODA or ODB to follow while inisolation. The author is a firmadherent to the adage, “Don’t tell aman how to suck eggs,” and use ofthis technique makes it more likelythat the FOB commander will nothave to tell the detachment com-mander how to do his job when hepresents an unworkable or overlycomplicated plan at the detachmentmission-concept briefing.

This techniques is not new: some-thing like this process is followed bythe ODA/ODB in analyzing its mis-sion, and most FOB commandersand staffs will receive some detach-ment feedback in at least one in-progress review between the mis-sion briefing and the detachmentMICON briefing. What is differentis the formalized approach to mis-sion analysis which leaves no gapsand guarantees that time will notbe wasted on mission planning inthe wrong direction. The technique

employs the most important troop-leading procedure — supervision.

The technique is usable in boththe deliberate and time-sensitivemission-planning processes as setforth in FM 31-20. It is not meant toreplace the mission-briefing processor the “give-and-take” between thedetachment and the FOB staff sec-tions in isolation. Rather, it pro-vides a more systematic structure towhat usually follows the formalmission briefing in IPRs on a lessformal basis. It also saves the timeof the FOB commander and hisstaff.

The entire detachment shouldparticipate in the commander’s mis-sion analysis; however, it is bestbriefed one-on-one by the ODA orODB commander to the FOB com-mander, or in his absence, to theoperations-center director. An alter-native is the detachment comman-der and senior NCO briefing theFOB commander and senior NCO.

My practice was to give thedetachment commander the option

January 1994 39

Special Forces Mission Analysis by the Operational Detachment

by Lt. Col. Henry Watson III

40 Special Warfare

of whom he wanted present. Thebattalion command sergeant majorand I usually took the mission anal-ysis briefing in the isolation-facilityteam room, as the team is availablefor input if needed.

The only training aids necessaryfor this process are an easel with apad of butcher paper and large felt-tip markers. Detachments havelong followed the practice of writingout various aspects of their mis-sions on butcher paper and postingthem to the walls of their isolationareas, and this technique adoptsthis usual practice. Writing out thematerial reinforces it in the writer,and posting it to the walls rein-forces it throughout the whole team.

Mission analysisOn successive sheets of butcher

paper, write out in their entirety:

1. SFOD Mission Statement (exactly as given).

2. Commanders’ intents:A. Headquarters two levels higher (exactly as given).B. Higher headquarters (exactly as given).

3. Specified mission tasks in chronological order:A.B.C.

4. Implied mission tasks in chronological order:A.B.C.

5. Mission-essential tasks starred (*) in #3 and #4.

6. Constraints/limitations on execution of mission:A. Command-imposed.B. Environmental.C. Threat-imposed.

7. SFOD’s restated mission.8. SFOD commander’s intent

(commander’s view of mission execution on perfect battlefield).

9. Necessary personnel, equipment and training.

10. Mission-essential personnel, equipment and training

starred in #9.11. Valid SFOD mission? (why or

why not?)12. Within SFOD’S mission

capabilities? (why or why not?)13. Define success criteria (be

prepared to support).14. Assess risk (be prepared

to support).15. Commander’s planning

guidance to SFOD.16. Additional comments, issues,

warstoppers.

To be briefed to FOB commandernot sooner than two and not laterthan four hours following missionbriefing.

The first item is a given — themission of the detachment exactlyas received. The next two items areextremely important: the comman-der’s intent as received from theSOC, JSOTF or SFOB, as well asthat from the FOB, exactly asreceived. Even a quick-and-dirtyanalysis should assure the detach-ment commander that these firstthree items have clear relevance toeach other.

Steps 3, 4, 5, and 6 comprise thecenter of mass of the mission-analy-sis process. Step 5 requires goingback through the specified andimplied mission tasks, respectively,and noting with an asterisk thosewhich are mission-essential. Com-mand-imposed constraints and limi-tations may include rules of engage-ment, dictated infiltration and exfil-tration methods, time-on-targetwindows, etc. Environmental con-straints and limitations includeweather, terrain, light conditions,etc. Threat-imposed constraints andlimitations are self-explanatory.

These steps require the consideredsystematic analysis of every memberof the detachment. Everyone needsto understand all specified andimplied tasks and their respectiveroles in each, from mission planningto debriefing. Each soldier shouldalso understand the role of a teammember he may be called upon toreplace during execution of the mis-sion. Finally, the constraints must

be factored into the formulation ofany plan of execution.

A detachment which correctlycompletes these four steps, to thedegree of real understanding byeach team member, has enoughinformation with which to devise aplan of execution with a high proba-bility of success. Complete under-standing of the mission by alldetachment members also improvesmission execution in the thickestfog of battle.

Steps 7 and 8 are commander-to-commander, first-line supervisor,“operator head space” checks. TheFOB commander cannot be confi-dent in deploying an SFOD unlessthat detachment commander canarticulate how he sees execution ofhis detachment’s mission given aperfect battlefield. There can be nocompromise on the necessity thatthe FOB commander be convincedthat the detachment commanderand his detachment have a realisticgoal and that it is the same goal asthe FOB’s.

Steps 9 and 10 give the FOB com-mander a hint of how the detach-ment commander intends to accom-plish his mission prior to thedetachment’s MICON briefing,which consists of the detachmentcommander’s estimate with coursesof action and analysis of the enemycourses of action.

These steps also begin to roughout an isolation training schedule,as well as to identify potential nec-essary training areas, rehearsalaids, etc., which the detachmentfeels necessary for its missionpreparation. Finally, by starringmission-essential personnel, equip-ment and training, it establishespreliminary abort criteria in theseareas.

Steps 11 and 12 are rather subjec-tive, but they do relate to the abilityof the particular detachment toaccomplish the mission. Neither ismeant to become a detailed discus-sion of special-operations forces’ mis-sions and capabilities, but if theODA or ODB commander indicatesthat his mission is neither SOF-valid

January 1994 41

nor within his detachment’s capabili-ties, it identifies a serious problemwhich must be resolved by the FOBprior to that detachment beginningits detailed mission planning.

Steps 13 and 14, while also sub-jective, do contain elements of objec-tivity. Again, these serve as tests of“operator head space” within thedetachment. Supporting reasons forSteps 11-14 do not have to be fullywritten out, but should contain keywords.

The FOB commander should bevery interested in the mission-plan-ning guidance that the detachmentcommander has or is going to pro-vide to his ODA or ODB upon com-pletion of the mission-analysisbriefing. As time has been identifiedas the critical factor in missionpreparation, the FOB commandercan feel confident that the detach-ment is headed in the right direc-tion if mission-planning guidancefrom the detachment commander tohis unit places emphasis on the crit-ical nodes.

Step 16 reiterates and empha-sizes points raised above, especiallyin the areas of any issues requiringresolution and any war-stoppersidentified by the ODA or ODB commander.

The requirement that the missionanalysis be briefed by the detach-ment commander not sooner thantwo and not later than four hoursfollowing mission briefing ensuresthe best use of limited time. Twohours is minimal in order to do anadequate mission analysis. If thedetachment is unable to accomplishthe analysis within four hours,(assuming this is not the first timethe team has used the process),then something is amiss in theFOB’s or detachment’s approach tomission analysis, or in the missionbriefing by the FOB. In no eventshould the detachment be giventime to sleep on the problem — itshould brief the FOB commanderprior to rest.

It should be pointed out that theprocess followed by the ODA orODB is duplicated in the FOB, at

least as contained in the first eightsteps. Items 7 and 8 by the FOBbecome items 1 and 2B, as briefedto the detachment.

Steps 9 and 10 give the FOB com-mand sergeant major informationon which to base a warning order tothe operations sergeant major andthe ISOFAC sergeant major to planfor and coordinate training areas,rehearsals, coordination of drawingof equipment, any additionalweapons training, etc. This allowsthe senior NCO leadership at everylevel to focus efforts on providing

what is critical in isolation toensure mission accomplishment.

To that end, a primary function ofthe battalion command sergeantmajor should be observation ofrehearsals by the detachment.Experience shows isolation time isbetter spent in rehearsals than onbriefbacks. Injecting the FOB CSMinto the rehearsal loop raises theimportance of the practice, especial-ly if mission-deployment approval iscontingent upon a successfulrehearsal of a mission-essentialtask.

The best-case scenario places a

personal computer and a competentoperator in each detachment isola-tion team room. If possible, the mis-sion-analysis briefing should beplaced on a computer disk or print-ed out for distribution to the FOBstaff and the ISOFAC, so that theycan begin to play their supportingroles to the deploying detachment.The AST NCO is integral to suc-cessful mission planning and mustalso be included in coordinatingrequired support.

This mission-analysis process isneither set in cement nor exhaus-tive for all circumstances. Adapt itto fit your needs. Whatever youdevelop should be an annex to theFOB SOP. If understood and fol-lowed at ODA and ODB levels, itwill not be perceived as telling sol-diers how to do their jobs , butexactly the opposite. Detachmentswill like the process, some soonerthan others, and leaders and teammembers will find themselves refer-ring back to Steps 3, 4, 5 and 6many times during their mission-planning cycle.

Lt. Col. Henry Wat-son III is currentlyattending the FletcherSchool of Law andDiplomacy at TuftsUniversity as an ArmyWar College fellow. Hehas served in a varietyof airborne and light-infantry, Mili-tary Intelligence, Special Forces andother special-operations assign-ments, including service as com-mander of a reserve-component Spe-cial Forces MI company and the 2ndBattalion, 11th SF Group. Hisactive duty was as an Infantry offi-cer in the 2nd Battalion, 509thInfantry in Germany and the 3rdBattalion, 21st Infantry in Vietnam.He holds BA and JD degrees fromthe University of Kentucky andpractices law in Cynthiana, Ky.

“Detachments havelong followed thepractice of writing outvarious aspects oftheir missions onbutcher paper andposting them to thewalls of their isola-tion areas, and thistechnique adopts thisusual practice. Writ-ing out the materialreinforces it in thewriter, and posting itto the walls reinforcesit throughout thewhole team.”

As a concise expression of thepurpose of an operation, the com-mander’s intent is important in pro-viding a focus for subordinates.

Many biographies, monographsand essays describe the importanceof a clear commander’s intent, andexamples from history clearly dis-play the importance of a clearunderstanding of the higher com-mander’s intent.

In October 1917, Lt. Erwin Rom-mel was serving with the Wurttem-berg Mountain Battalion in the Ital-ian Alps. Key to the Italian defenseswere the fortifications aroundMount Matajur, the highest point inthe region. Over a period of days,Rommel led attacks that reachedthe slopes of the mountain, and hewas on the verge of breakingthrough the Italian defenses, whichwould completely unhinge theentire front.

Flushed with success, Rommelwas preparing to continue the attackwhen he received an order from hisbattalion commander: “The Wurt-

temberg Mountain Battalion with-draws.”1 The battalion commander,on a mountain peak behind Rommel,formed the impression that MountMatajur had been taken and wasordering a reorganization of the bat-talion for the defense. Rommel wasfaced with a dilemma: continue theattack or comply with orders.

The bulk of the battalion began towithdraw, except the forces withRommel. Rommel asked himself,“Should I break off the engagementand return to Mount Cragonza (Thesite of the battalion commander)? ...No!”2 Rommel reasoned that theorder was based on incorrect knowl-edge of the situation and the oppor-tunity that existed. Rommel wrote,“Unfinished business remained ...and the terrain favored the plan ofattack.”3 Rommel was successful,broke through the Italian defenseand seized Mount Matajur. He didnot follow orders because he knewthat the corps commander’s intentwas unfulfilled.

A similar incident occurred during

the Battle of the Bulge whenCreighton Abrams understood theintent of the Army commander —“relieve Bastogne.” Bastogne wasencircled; the 4th Armored Divisionwas ordered to relieve it. Abrams,commanding the 37th Tank Battal-ion, led the vanguard of the ReserveCombat Command, or CCR. Theplan was to attack through the townof Remichampagne, to Clochimont,then to Sibret, and finally into Bas-togne.4 Abrams led from the front inhis own tank, Thunderbolt.

The battle for Remichampagnewent well, especially since a flightof Air Force P-47s arrived unexpect-edly to bomb and strafe the Germandefenses. By mid-afternoon Abrams’battalion was down to 20 tanks andthe infantry battalion of CCR wasunderstrength by 200 men. Dark-ness was falling fast. The orderswere to continue to Sibret. Abramssensed that the enemy was instrength there, but he could breakthrough to Bastogne and begin therelief if he went through the town of

42 Special Warfare

Commander’s Intent: Providing the Focus

for Operations

by Maj. Kevin Benson

Assenois.5 Lewis Sorley describesthe scene in Thunderbolt, his biog-raphy of Abrams.

Abrams and Jaques (the infantrybattalion commander) stood by theside of the road ... Finally Abramsturned to Jaques: “Let’s try a dashthrough Assenois straight into Bastogne.

Abrams and Jaques didn’t checkwith anyone about this switch inplans. The CCR commander wasweak ... and if Abrams had calledand asked for the change in mission,he probably would have been denied.6

Abrams and the 37th Tank madethe dash and linked up with the sol-diers of the 101st Airborne holdingBastogne. Abrams, the commanderon the spot, knew that the mostimportant thing — relieve Bastogne— took precedence over an ordermade without current knowledge ofthe situation. Abrams understoodthe Army commander’s intent.

These historical examples high-light the need to make the intentstatement very clear. In bothinstances, the intent clearly con-veyed the guiding purpose of theoperation, providing guidance in theabsence of other orders or the pres-ence of conflicting orders. Both com-manders on the scene understoodthe intent of the operation andknew that accomplishing the intentand the original mission was moreimportant than following orderswith a new mission.

The intent must provide focus forcommanders at least two levelsbelow, since operations do notunfold as expected once contact ismade. During an operation, deci-sions must be made with little or notime for contemplation. Assump-tions made during the planning pro-cess are open to doubt aftercontact,7 and as one leader of Armorsaid, “The fog of war must not beginwith the commander’s intent.”8

The Command and General StaffCollege teaches a format approach tothe intent, essentially: purpose,method, and end-state.9 While the“schoolhouse” standard is an intentof 3-5 sentences, other formats range

from 1-2 sentences scribbled on thematrix-format task-force operationsorder found in FM 71-2, to multi-paragraph intents found in GDPplans and formal, deliberate plans atCorps and higher headquarters.

The intent is a key part of theoperation plan. Doctrinally, theintent is written as part of the exe-cution paragraph, immediately fol-lowing the concept of the opera-tion.10 Its placement implies a tie tothe concept. Indeed, since theschoolhouse format includes“method” as a part of the intent,this may be the correct place in theorder. But the true tie, as the his-torical examples show, is not to the

concept or method of employment offorces, but to the mission. It is thepurpose of the operation and thedesired end-state that must guidesubordinate commanders once thebattle is joined.

In fact, an alternate proposal forplacement of the commander’sintent would be to place it in para-graph 2b. of the field order, asshown below:

1. Situation.2. a. Mission.

b. Commander’s Intent.3. Execution.

Placing the intent with the missionwould not inhibit any commanderfrom stating what he wants in the

intent sub-paragraph, and it wouldmore clearly demonstrate the natu-ral tie between the two.

Wherever its placement, the com-mander’s intent guides the action ofsubordinate units and leaders whenevents become wrapped in the fog ofwar. More than 100 years ago,Clausewitz wrote, “Everything inwar is very simple, but the simplestthing is difficult.”11 The soul of themission order is stated in the com-mander’s intent, the simple thingthat must be accomplished and keptin mind throughout the operation.

Maj. Kevin Benson currentlyserves in the Plans Division of theG-3, XVIII Airborne Corps, FortBragg, N.C.

Notes:1 Erwin Rommel, Attacks, trans. J.R.

Driscoll, (Vienna, Va.: Athena Press, 1979),p. 270.

2 Rommel, p. 271. It must be added that thearmy commander promised a Pour le Merite(the Imperial German equivalent to the Con-gressional Medal of Honor) to the officer whocaptured Matajur (Rommel, p. 273).

3 Rommel, p. 272.4 Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: From the

Battle of the Bulge to Vietnam and Beyond:General Creighton Abrams and the Army ofHis Times (New York: Simon & Schuster,1992), p. 76.

5 Sorley, p. 69.6 Sorley, pp. 75-80.7 Carl Clausewitz, On War, ed. & trans.

Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 101-102.

8 Taken from conversations with Lt. Col.Doug Tystad during my year of study at theSchool of Advanced Military Studies, 1991-1992. Tystad commanded a tank battalionwith the Tiger Brigade during Desert Storm.

9 U.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. The Com-mand Estimate Process, ST 100-9,(USACGSC: [n.p.] July 1992), page 2-5.

10 Memorandum for record, dated 14September 1990, Subject Commander’sIntent. The memorandum states that theTRADOC commander directs that the intentbe written in the operations order immediate-ly preceding paragraph 3.a., Concept of theOperation, e.g.,

3. ExecutionIntent:a. Concept of the Operation.

11 Clausewitz, p. 119.

January 1994 43

“During an operation,decisions must bemade with little or notime for contempla-tion. Assumptionsmade during theplanning process areopen to doubt aftercontact, and as oneleader of Armor said,‘The fog of war mustnot begin with thecommander’s intent.’ ”

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow iscurrently the commanding general,JFK Special Warfare Center andSchool. During more than 30 yearsof commissioned service, he hasserved as a commander or staff offi-cer with Infantry, MechanizedInfantry, airmobile, airborne andSpecial Forces units. He was selectedand served as a member of a recentbrigadier-general promotion boardresponsible for selecting 38 officerswho would make the greatest contri-butions to meet the leadership andmanagement needs of the Army. Thefollowing questions and answers arebased on that experience.

SW: What are the voting tools youused in selecting these officers?Shachnow: This board was verysimilar to the normal officer-selec-tion boards. The primary tools onwhich we based our decisions were

the photograph, Officer RecordBrief, Official Military PersonnelFile and, in some cases, letters tothe president of the board. It wascritical that these records were cur-rent and properly constituted. Sincewe were dealing with colonels hav-ing approximately 24-25 years ofservice, their records contained aconsiderable amount of material.

SW: How many members were onthe board?Shachnow: There were 24 generalofficers. The most senior officer wasa four-star, and the most junior aone-star.

SW: How much time does a membernormally spend examining a file?Shachnow: That would depend onthe individual; however, most wouldvote a file in approximately threeminutes. Since 24 different officers

examined the file, a very completepicture emerged.

SW: What is the purpose of a screenvote?Shachnow: Our mission was toselect 38 officers out of a total of1,746. In order to bring the num-bers to a manageable proportion, ascreen vote was conducted first. Theindividuals’ records were evaluated,and the members voted “yes” if theindividual was best-qualified, “no” ifnot qualified or if qualified but notbest-qualified.

SW: Can you explain what a hardvote is?Shachnow: A hard vote is conduct-ed after a screen vote. A hard voteconsists of assessing the individual’srecord and then giving it a subjectivescore. The scores are as follows:

44 Special Warfare

Interview:Officer

PromotionBoards

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

6 +/- Top candidateSuperior performerNo. 1 choice

5 +/- Clearly above contemporaries

Outstanding performerMust select

4 +/- Above contemporariesVery strong in all areasShould select

3 +/- Fully qualifiedSolid performerSelect

2 +/- QualifiedAverage performerCapable of doing the job

1 +/- Needs more experience

SW: What criteria did you use inevaluating the individuals’ records?Shachnow: The board receivedguidance, and the following criteria,which are not all-inclusive, wereused:• Ability to work with diverse

groups, such as foreign armies,the joint staff and reserve forces.

• Ability to conceptualize, chartstrategies and formulate policies,as opposed to merely organizingsolutions to problems.

• Ability to provide direction andforce that shaped outcomesrather than reacting successfullyto a series of events.

• Genuine concern for soldiers,civilian employees and their families.

• Ability to represent the Armyeffectively and articulate persuasively.

• Selfless performance as an officer.

• Overall manner of performance:scope and variety of tasks, levelof responsibility, trends in efficiency.

• Integrity, character and ethicalstandards.

• Intelligence, creativity and pro-fessional knowledge.

• Potential to serve in demandingpositions.

• General physical condition.

SW: Is a spouse’s positive contribu-tion to the military communityhelpful?Shachnow: Board members areprohibited from considering themarital status of a military mem-ber, or the employment, educationor volunteer service of a member’sspouse, in the selection process.

SW: What does it take to be promot-ed as a general officer?Shachnow: Competence, timingand luck.

January 1994 45

“The primary tools onwhich we based ourdecisions were thephotograph, OfficerRecord Brief, OfficialMilitary PersonnelFile and, in somecases, letters to thepresident of theboard. It was criticalthat these recordswere current andproperly constituted.”

46 Special Warfare

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

With the filling of the SF Warrant Officer Program in FY 1994, the pro-gram will enter its sustainment phase, which promises to provide betterquality, training and utilization for all SF WOs. As accessions decrease,recruitment and selection will become increasingly competitive, and selec-tions for MOS 180A will emphasize, in addition to other prerequisites,applicants’ language capability, experience (considered with future servicepotential), age and special skills. Other 180A sustainment issues willinclude:• Revision of AR 611-12, Manual of Warrant Officer MOSs, to reflect the

new standards of grade and grade coding for all WO assignments. Therevision will also provide improved upward and lateral mobility for MOS180A.

• Development of a chapter on 180A in DA Pamphlet 600-11, Warrant Offi-cer Professional Development. This chapter will provide vital career guid-ance to all SF WOs in the areas of training, education, goals, duties andassignments and will be considered “must” reading. Promotion guidanceis normally derived from professional-development publications.

• Evaluation of MOS and duty titles and an MOS title. The term “techni-cian” is at times misleading for SF WOs and bears reconsideration.

• Development of senior and master WO job descriptions. These jobdescriptions will be a guide for SF WOs serving in authorized grade-coded CW3, CW4 and CW5 positions. These guides will be used to deriveindividual job descriptions for those WOs serving in staff positions.

• Proposal of mandatory language training for all entry-level WOs nothaving a current DLPT score of (L) 1+, (R) 1+. This proposal, if imple-mented, would better prepare entry-level WOs for detachment opera-tions prior to their first assignment. Front-end loading of language

There has been a change of policy for the awarding of constructive creditfor the Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course:• Master Policy 4-91, which outlined the criteria for awarding construc-

tive credit for phases of the CAOAC was rescinded effective Sept. 30,1993.

• Master Policy 93-2, now effective, states that constructive credit forphases of CAOAC will not be granted. The new policy further states that“exempt credit” will be granted for the common-core subcourses con-tained in the Phase I correspondence course when the requirements ofparagraphs 1-17 and 1-31 of DA Pamphlet 351-20, Army CorrespondenceCourse Program Catalog, dated April 1, 1993, are met. Simply stated, anofficer who has completed the six core subcourses now common to everyArmy reserve-component advanced course may request exempt creditwhen applying for enrollment into CAOAC by providing the subcoursecompletion notices with the DA Form 145 application.

Requests for constructive credit for phases of CAOAC received after Oct. 1,1993, have been returned to the originating headquarters without action.For more information, contact Maj. Ron Fiegle, Special Operations Propo-nency Office, at DSN 239-6406/9002, commercial (910) 432-6406/9002.

Policy changes regardingconstructive credit

for CAOAC

SF warrant-officer programenters sustainment phase

January 1994 47

training will take the burden of language training from the unit, whilegiving units the use of a fully trained warrant officer.

• Evaluation of a policy on age and active federal service for WO appli-cants. These policies will assist the commandant, JFKSWCS, to betteridentify the right candidate at the right time in his career. These poli-cies will be essential to the long-term sustainment and growth of asenior warrant force.

• Development of Army Education Requirements System-coded positionsfor advanced civilian education. These key positions will allow for a fullyfunded degree program in a given discipline in return for a three-yearutilization tour.

• Mandatory initiation of a special background investigation. SBIs will berequired under the revised standards of grade in AR 611-112 for all SFWOs not having one. This SBI will increase the information access forall WOs, and it will provide greater assignment latitude for senior andmaster WOs.

• Establishment of senior WO advisers to commanders. The WO adviserswill advise the commanders on all WO issues to be outlined in DA Pam-phlet 600-11. Some of the additional duties will include: advising thecommander on the correct use, professional development and career pro-gression of warrant officers; providing a focal point for dissemination ofwarrant-officer information up and down the chain of command; con-ducting routine warrant-officer professional-development classes, andadvising and assisting junior warrant officers.

For more information, contact CWO 3 Shaun Driscoll, SF WO manager inthe SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-2415, com-mercial (910) 432-2415/9002.

Under a memorandum of agreement between the Special Warfare Centerand School and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, USAREC hasassumed the SF officer recruiting mission formerly performed by theSWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Under the MOA, three SF-branch-qualified captains with extensive ODA experience have beenassigned as recruiters in paid parachutist positions of the SWCS table ofdistribution and allowances. The captains are attached to USAREC for a24-month tour of duty, with one each assigned for duty at Fort Campbell,Ky., Fort Bragg and Fort Lewis, Wash. Duties will require extensive TDYtravel, both CONUS and OCONUS. These officers will play a vital role inthe future of the SF Branch by recruiting the best-qualified captainsthroughout the Army.

USAREC assumes SF officer recruiting role

The third iteration of the FA 39 graduate course completed its studies dur-ing August 1993, with 39 officers receiving master’s degrees in internation-al relations. On Sept. 2, 1993, 40 students began in-processing for the 1994course. Officers interested in applying for the 12-month FA 39 graduateprogram should contact Jeanne Schiller, FA 39 manager in the SWCS Spe-cial Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406/9002, commercial(910) 432-6406/9002.

FA 39 graduate programgrants degrees to 39

48 Special Warfare

DA Pamphlet 600-25, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer ProfessionalDevelopment Guide, is scheduled for fielding by April. Chapter 14 of thepamphlet will relate general guidelines for Career Management Field 18,Special Forces. Qualification standards will include those for fully andexceptionally qualified soldiers, enhancement courses, mandatory require-ments and special assignments. Other information will include entry-levelrequirements and CMF development, including objectives by grade, assign-ments and schools, additional skill identifiers and skill-qualification identi-fiers, and self-development initiatives. Included in the chapter will be guid-ance by the SF proponent, the commanding general of the Special WarfareCenter and School, to all promotion boards for selection.

The Special Forces enlisted force is filling rapidly. The list below shows theapproximate force fill projected for fiscal year 1994:

MOS Authorized Inventory proj. %

18B 841 1,037 12318C 704 787 11218D 746 704 9418E 925 1,038 11218F 453 476 10518Z (8) 692 620 9018Z (9) 155 158 102

Totals 4,512 4,814 107

The SF proponent has asked commanders of SF units to encourage SF sol-diers in MOSs 18B, 18C, and 18E to volunteer for 18D training. Volunteersshould be in the rank of staff sergeant, staff sergeant promotable orsergeant (with two years’ ODA experience). The 18D MOS is currentlyexperiencing a high promotion rate to SFC and MSG in the primary andsecondary zones. Soldiers should apply through their chain of command.

The U.S. Army School of the Americas, Fort Benning, Ga., currently hasseveral opportunities for Spanish-language-qualified Special Forces NCOsto teach in its Commando Course and Counterdrugs Course. All SF assign-ments are authorized jump pay, and soldiers have an opportunity toincrease their Spanish-language capability. For more information, contactLt. Col. Wayne Kirkbride, director of special operations and civil-militaryoperations, at DSN 835-1137.

The calendar-year 1994 senior enlisted centralized board for MSG andSFC/ANCOC selection is scheduled to meet as follows:

MSG Feb. 22 - March 26, 1994SFC/ANCOC June 7 - July 3, 1994

New 600-25 to include chapter on Special Forces

School of the Americas looking for SF NCOs

1994 senior enlisted selection board scheduled

SF soldiers encouraged to cross-train to 18D

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

January 1994 49

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

The Feb. 26, 1993, explosion at New York’s World Trade Center highlightedU.S.-based links with Islamic extremist organizations abroad. Many otherareas of the world perceive threats from Islamic separatist or terroristgroups, and to the extent that these threatened countries are U.S. allies orconstitute areas where U.S. forces may be deployed, the issue of Islamicextremism constitutes an important intelligence collection and planning con-sideration. Somalia has become a case in point: U.S. humanitarian-assistanceand peace-support operations in Somalia which began with OperationRestore Hope acquired dimensions that extended beyond the starvation andcivil war that initially prompted U.N. involvement. Of particular note are thenumerous reports of Islamic extremist elements providing weapons, training,manpower, planning and other assistance to Somali factions, including mostprominently, those of clan leader Mohammed Farah Aideed’s Somali NationalAlliance. Western and Middle Eastern reporting indicates that “Islamic”assistance from Iranian, Iraqi, Sudanese and other quarters (including Arabveterans of the war in Afghanistan) has been provided to attack U.S. andinternational forces in Somalia. While the levels of support by these groupsvary widely, some Moslem sources judge that the early June 1993 attack byAideed’s forces on Pakistani peacekeepers, which resulted in 25 killed,marked the beginning of a more aggressive posture by Somali forces that hadbeen the recipients of outside aide from Islamic terrorists. Subsequent armedactions by Somali factions and U.S./U.N. forces have seen casualties grow andunderscore what appear to be more effective actions by factions that earlierseemed more akin to well-armed street gangs than organized military forces.Whether this effectiveness can be attributed to outside terrorist cadrestrained or provided by Islamic extremist groups awaits more authoritativeinformation. Given potential U.S. peacekeeping deployments, security-assis-tance missions and other roles in African, Middle Eastern, Asian or Europeanareas where Islamic extremist groups perceive interests, their global organi-zation, support infrastructure and tactics have gained new importance.

Somalis may have ties to Islamic extremists

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

From the earliest U.S. deployments to Somalia, the East African tradition ofchewing khat leaves and stalks has received widespread attention. Khat traf-ficking has been identified as a substantial source of revenue for clan factions,and it may have increased as the opportunities to pilfer humanitarian-assis-tance shipments diminished. Some U.N. peacekeepers have complained aboutofficial U.N. indifference to khat trafficking, but it is generally acknowledgedthat the use of khat is so basic a part of Somali life that its ban would beunthinkable. In any event, the sale of khat is well-established among someEast African immigrants abroad, including those in some major U.S. cities.Though its widespread use by other Americans is not anticipated, the drugdimension of the U.S.-Somalia association is the kind of unanticipated devel-opment that may characterize U.S. involvement in other regions.

Somali ‘khat’ trafficking produces high revenues

50 Special Warfare

USASOC, SF Commandname top soldiers

The U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand and the Army SpecialForces Command have recentlynamed new top enlisted soldiers.

CSM Henry D. Bone was namedthe new USASOC commandsergeant major in August, replacingCSM Jimmie W. Spencer, whoretired. Bone’s previous assignmentwas that of command sergeant majorfor the U.S. Army Special ForcesCommand.

CSM Willie E. Weaver has beennamed the new command sergeantmajor for USASFC. Weaver was pre-viously the command sergeant majorfor the 3rd Special Forces Group.

4th POG gets Gulf Warstreamer

The 4th Psychological OperationsGroup received the MeritoriousUnit Commendation and campaignstreamers for actions in DesertShield and Desert Storm during aceremony on Fort Bragg Oct. 7.

Lt. Gen. J.T. Scott, commandinggeneral of the U.S. Army SpecialOperations Command, affixed thestreamers to the group colors and toindividual battalion guidons at theceremony.

Scott credited the soldiers of the4th POG with saving Americanlives by inducing many Iraqi sol-diers to surrender without a fight.

Members of the 4th POGdeployed to Saudi Arabia in August1990. Joined by reservists and coali-tion-force soldiers, the PSYOP taskforce transmitted surrender appealsthrough video products, broadcasts,leaflets and loudspeakers duringthe conflict.

Soldiers from the reserve units

that participated in the war stood information during the ceremony withtheir active-duty counterparts. Theyrepresented the 13th PsychologicalOperations Battalion, Fort Snelling,Minn.; 18th Psychological Opera-tions Company, St. Louis, Mo.; 19thPsychological Operations Co., FortSnelling, Minn.; 244th Psychologi-cal Operations Co., Abilene, Texas;245th Psychological Operations Co.,Dallas, Texas; and the 362nd Psy-

chological Operations Co., Fayet-teville, Ark. — Gerard Healy,USASOC PAO

5th Battalion, 19th Grouplooking for soldiers

The 5th Battalion, 19th SpecialForces Group of the Colorado ArmyNational Guard currently has open-ings for soldiers qualified in mili-tary intelligence.

The unit needs soldiers in MOSs96B, 96D, 98C, 98G and 98H, aswell as the 18 series. The battalioncan provide soldiers the opportunityto attend Airborne and Rangerschool, language training and theSpecial Forces Qualification Course.For more information, contact SFCMark Smith at DSN 877-1857, com-mercial (303) 273-1857.

CA, PSYOP students needproper orders

The Special Warfare Center andSchool’s 3rd Battalion, 1st SpecialWarfare Training Group, reportsthat some soldiers arrive at FortBragg for training in Civil Affairsand PSYOP with improper orders.

The 3rd Battalion provides billet-ing, transportation and rations onlyfor soldiers attending Civil Affairsor PSYOP advanced individualtraining, according to Maj. StevenNovitske, battalion executive offi-cer. Orders for all other than AITsoldiers must reflect that billetingand rations are not provided.

As of Nov. 1, 1993, the 3rd Battal-ion has been restructured into fourtraining companies, Novitske said.Company A, an officer training com-pany, teaches the PSYOP OfficerCourse, the Civil Affairs Course, Re-serve Civil Affairs and PSYOP Of-ficer Advanced Courses, the Region-al Studies Course and the SpecialOperations Staff Officer Course.Company B, an enlisted trainingcompany, teaches the Civil Affairsand PSYOP AIT courses and the Ci-vil Affairs Operations Course. Com-pany C teaches European, Africanand Latin American languages, andCompany D teaches Asian and Mid-dle Eastern languages.

Requests for attendance in all CA

UpdateSpecial Warfare

Lt. Gen. J.T. Scott attaches the Meritorious UnitCommendation streamer to the 4th POG colors.


and PSYOP courses must comethrough the Army TrainingRequirements and Resources Sys-tem, Novitske said. Language quo-tas for SOF personnel should berequested through the Army SpecialOperations Command, DeputyChief of Staff for Personnel.

New special texts, diving regforthcoming

New training products and regu-lations will soon be available fromthe Special Warfare Center andSchool’s Advanced Skills/Survival,Evasion, Resistance and EscapeDevelopment Branch.

Two new special texts, Close Quar-ters Combat and Special OperationsTarget Interdiction Training andEmployment, will be distributed dur-ing 1994. These texts will be dis-tributed as working documents tostudents at the SWCS attending theSpecial Operations Training Courseand the Special Operations TargetInterdiction Course, respectively.

A new diving regulation,USASOC Regulation 350-20, is cur-rently in final staffing by the ArmySpecial Operations Command. Theregulation covers all Army SOF div-ing operations and issues andexplains the inspection and certifi-cation process of dive lockers by theNavy Safety Center.

For more information, contactCapt. William L. Morris, AS/SEREDevelopment Branch, at DSN 239-9018, commercial (910) 432-9018.

SOLLMIS revised; ready fordistribution

The Special Operations LessonsLearned Management InformationSystem, or SOLLMIS, has beenrecently revised and is ready to beredistributed.

Current users who have notreceived an upgrade since February1993 or all who would like a copy ofSOLLMIS should send floppydiskettes (either five 5 1/4-inch orthree 3 1/2-inch) to Commander,USAJFKSWCS; AOJK-DE; Attn:SOLLMIS; Fort Bragg, NC 28307.

Lessons-learned may be submit-ted in writing or entered on theSOLLMIS program and exported ondiskette. For more information, con-tact DOES at DSN 239-1548/5255.

SOF veterans dedicatememorial stones

Two groups of SOF veterans werehonored recently during memorial-stone dedications in the JFK Spe-cial Warfare Memorial Plaza.

Members of the OperationalGroups from World War II’s Officeof Strategic Services gathered Sept.10 to commemorate their unit’sachievements.

The Operational Groups wererecruited by the OSS during WorldWar II to work in small groups withunderground and resistance forcesin Europe, Burma and China.

Members of the Korean War EraRanger Infantry Companies dedicat-ed their memorial stone Sept. 28.

Organized in 1950, the KoreanWar Rangers conducted reconnais-sance and combat patrols through-out the Korean peninsula. Theyfought as lone units and spearhead-ed conventional forces’ advancesagainst North Korean and Chinesecommunist soldiers. In 1951, theRanger companies were disbanded.

Delta seeks recruitsThe U.S. Army's 1st Special

Forces Operational Detachment -Delta plans and conducts a broadrange of special operations. Its mis-sions require rapid response using awide variety of skills and the flexibil-ity to maintain the lowest possibleprofile of U.S. involvement.

Officers and NCOs undergo thesame assessment, selection andtraining. Assignment requires exten-sive prescreening and completion ofa 3-4 week Assessment and SelectionCourse, followed by the six-monthOperator Training Course.

NCOs may serve in staff and lead-ership positions through the rank ofsergeant major. Officers can com-mand at the captain, major and lieu-tenant-colonel levels and serve as

executive and operations officers.There are also a wide variety of staffpositions at DoD, JCS, DA, USASOC,USSOCOM.

General prerequisites are thatapplicants be male; volunteer; beU.S. citizens; pass a modifiedHALO/scuba physical and eye exam-ination; be airborne-qualified or vol-unteer for airborne training; pass abackground security investigationand have at least a secret clearance;be at least 22; have no history ofrecurring disciplinary action; passthe five-event physical fitness quali-fication test (inverted crawl; run,dodge and jump; push-ups; sit-ups;and a two-mile run) and a 100-meterswim, all while wearing BDUs andboots; and have a minimum of twoyears’ active service remaining uponselection.

NCOs must be sergeants throughsergeants first class; qualified intheir primary MOS; and have a GTscore of 110 or higher. Officers mustbe captains or majors; advanced-course graduates; college graduates;and have at least 12 months’ success-ful command at the captain level.

The 1st SFOD-D conducts world-wide recruiting twice a year: March-July for the fall course, and Septem-ber-January for the spring course.Call the 1st SFOD-D at DSN 236-0649/0689, commercial (910) 396-0649/0689.

USACAPOC commanderreceives second star

Brig. Gen. Donald F. Campbell,commander of the Army CivilAffairs and Psychological OperationsCommand, was promoted to majorgeneral Nov. 8.

In October, President Bill Clintonhad nominated Campbell for promo-tion to major general and Col. BruceB. Bingham, commander of the358th CA Brigade, King of Prussia,Pa., for promotion to brigadier gen-eral. Senate confirmation of Bing-ham’s nomination is pending.

January 1994 51

52 Special Warfare

Prisoner of the Rising Sun. ByWilliam A. Berry, with James E.Alexander. Norman, Okla.: Universi-ty of Oklahoma Press, 1993. ISBN 0-8061-2509-8. 241 pages. $24.95.

This book provides a movingaccount of the extreme hardshipsendured by those captured in thePacific Theater during World War IIand the atrocities committed by theJapanese Imperial Army. Theauthor, a Navy ensign captured atthe fall of Corregidor, accuratelydescribes how miserable captivitycan be when faced utterly unpre-pared, with the torments of hunger,isolation and harsh interrogation.Non-signators to the GenevaAccords, the Japanese governmentdenied those captured humane treat-ment, even though they held prison-er-of-war status. This clearly illus-trates the important distinctionbetween the classification of beingheld captive as a war prisoner or acriminal.

The author gives an excellentexample of the type of dilemma thatmight be put to the prisoner who isthe senior ranking officer, or SRO.The Navy Bluejacket’s Manual, abasic handbook for all Navy men,explicitly stated that seamen mustconsider escape if captured. The con-centration camp regulations stated,however, that one attempted escapewould result in the death of 10 menfrom the escapees’ “blood group.”After an escape and weeks of success-ful evasion, the author and two oth-ers were captured and delivered backto an internment camp. Fearful ofretaliation, the SRO ordered theescapees to identify themselves totheir captors as prior detainees andface possible execution, rather thanjeopardize the lives of dozens of fel-

low prisoners.The questions are posed: when, if

ever, does a servicemember decide torelieve the anguish of starvationwhile evading capture, forgo thatfinal day of freedom and surrender?Can the SRO legally and morallydecide how to meet the needs andwelfare of the majority and does thatjustify the possible sacrifice of a few?As these difficult decisions presentthemselves, the SRO must be guidedby a fundamental principle of leader-ship: to be responsible for the livesand welfare of those under his com-mand at all times.

Also this: can anyone realisticallyexpect to be completely versed in allthe “correct” responses to the poten-tially life-threatening situations heor she is faced with in captivity? No.Can they prepare themselves to bet-ter endure capture? Yes, throughattendance at one of the militarySurvival, Evasion, Resistance and

Escape Courses. As illustrated inthis book and in events as recent asDesert Storm, capture by enemyforces does not discriminate by mili-tary specialty or gender.

As a young reserve intelligenceofficer in 1941, the author realizedhow truly unprepared he was forwartime service, let alone the threeyears he would serve as a Japaneseprisoner of war. Fifty years later, thearmed forces have made consider-able changes in how servicemembersare prepared to fight.

These advancements have beenbased on victories and defeats on thebattlefield. Important lessons havelikewise been learned on how sol-diers, sailors and airmen prepare tosurvive captivity while keeping theirhonor intact. These techniques havebeen drawn from the experiences ofthose who endured captivity inWorld War II, Korea, Vietnam andthe Gulf War. It is through the suf-fering of men like Lt. Cdr. WilliamA. Berry that the U.S. forces havebeen able to improve and providerealistic training that emphasizessurvival with honor.

CWO 3 Robert McKagueJFKSWCSFort Bragg, N.C.

Experience of War. Edited byRobert Cowley. New York: Dell Pub-lishing Co., 1992. ISBN: 0-440-50553-4. 574 pages. $14.95.

Experience of War is an anthologyof articles compiled by the editors ofthe Quarterly Journal of MilitaryHistory. If you are a military-historybuff, this anthology is a treasuretrove of sometimes little-known sto-ries from historical accounts of warsfrom as far back as ancient Greece

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

and up to the Persian Gulf War.Fifty-one articles make up the

anthology, and it would be hard tofind better reading material to placeon your nightstand. Since the arti-cles are relatively short — eachfocusing on a specific topic of mili-tary historical significance — thevolume makes for excellent bedtimereading.

There are too many articles toattempt to recount all in this review,but a few of the more interestingexamples should serve to make thepoint. Essays include “The Origins ofWar,” “Alexander (The Great) inIndia,” “Cannae,” “The MasadaMyth,” “The First Crusade,” “TheStonewall Enigma,” “Ulysses S.Grant’s Final Victory,” “Mutiny onThe Potemkin,” “The Secrets ofOverlord” and “The Gulf Crisis andThe Rules of War.”

These essays’ credibility comesfrom the outstanding array of someof military history’s best modernchroniclers. These include DavidClay Large, Robert L. O’Connell,Martin van Creveld, David Lamb,Richard M. Ketchum, Paul Fussell,Thaddeus Holt and Stephen E.Ambrose, to name only a few.

Pieces are arranged in historicalchronological order — althoughthere are few articles which relate to

one another in any meaningful way.Robert Cowley did a very credible jobin selecting some of MHQ’s finestarticles. There is literally somethingin Experience of War for everybody.

It is important to recognize thatExperience of War, as all MHQessays, are configured for the gener-al reader. Articles are written in nar-rative, not academic style — whichmakes the stories easy for readingand comprehension. In this review-er’s opinion, the anthology losesnothing by its lack of footnotes andother laborious academic trappings.

The bottom line is that Experienceof War makes for great reading. At$14.95, the book is a bargain forthose who have more than a passinginterest in the history of warfare.

Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph, Jr.Joint Special Operations Cmd.Fort Bragg, N.C.

The Secrets War: The Office ofStrategic Services in World WarII. Edited by George C. Chalou.Washington, D.C.: National Archivesand Records Administration, 1992.ISBN 0-911333-91-6. 392 pages. $25.

This book is a collection of papersoriginally presented at a NationalArchives conference of the same titleheld in Washington in July 1991. Itis a valuable collection of articleswhich highlight various intelligenceand operational aspects of the Officeof Strategic Services and how to getinto the sources for more informa-tion. It is in this latter aspect thatthe book provides its most valuableservice. It is essential reading forany researcher interested in pursu-ing a topic on the OSS.

The articles presented in this col-lection cover how the OSS was creat-ed, how the various branchesevolved, the recruitment of person-nel, its relations (not always smooth)with the various British intelligenceand special-operations agencies, andsome of the OSS’s more successful(and unsuccessful) operationsaround the world.

Of particular value are the articles

on the penetration of Thailand bythe OSS, the failure of the McDowellmission to Yugoslavia in 1944 andthe discussion of James Angletonand his counterintelligence opera-tion (X-2) in Italy. While the empha-sis throughout the book is on intelli-gence operations (which was, afterall, the main reason for the existenceof the OSS), an article by JamesWard on the justly famous Detach-ment 101 gives some background onthe operational and unconventional-warfare successes of the OSS.

All in all, this is a very useful andinteresting book which should be onevery SF soldier’s reading list. TheOSS was filled with a colorful collec-tion of amateurs who make for inter-esting reading. Along the way, theirstories provide valuable lessonslearned. For the serious researcher,The Secrets War provides an essen-tial synopsis of what is in each of theOSS Record Groups and how to eval-uate what one finds. I recommend itto both the operator and theresearcher.

Dr. Richard W. StewartDirector of History and MuseumsUSASOCFort Bragg, N.C.

January 1994 53

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

Special Warfare

Department of the ArmyJFK Special Warfare Center and SchoolATTN: AOJK – DTP – BFort Bragg, NC 28307 – 5000

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