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Specialized Active Networking Technologies for Distributed Simulation (SANDS)
Specialized Active Networking Technologies for Distributed Simulation (SANDS)
HARP
HLA Active Routing Project
HARP
HLA Active Routing Project
Northrop-Grumman (TASC) and the University of Massachusetts, Amherst
5-June-2001 2
The Distributed Simulation Scalability ProblemThe Distributed Simulation Scalability Problem
What We Have...
What We Want...• Ability to receive only needed information -- Active Interest Filtering
• Multicasting for scalability
• Receiver, network overload from indiscriminate delivery
5-June-2001 3
Active Interest FilteringActive Interest Filtering
Aggregate Available Content:
A, B, C, D, E, F
Aggregate Needed Content: A, B, C, D, E
F not needed by any receiver -- eliminated immediately
D E
AB
C B and D not needed by left rcvr -- eliminated at earliest point
A
CE
A
CE
Needs: B, C, DNeeds: A, C, E
Has: D, E, F
Has: A, B, CActive Packet’
Data Subscribers
Active Node
Data Provider
Data Provider
ABC
Active Packet
D E F
A and E not needed by right rcvr -- eliminated at earliest point
DC
B
BD
C
- Unneeded data eliminated at earliest opportunity - Exact filtering provides optimal delivery efficiency
5-June-2001 4
R
R R R R R
R
ARAR
AR
AR
S
Simple ExampleSimple Example
2) Merged into a single Ifilter by the Active Nodes, and...
3) Pushed upstream towards the sender.
RRRRR
AR
AR AR
AR
Filter Installation
1) IFilter (Interest Filter) subscriptions from downstream interfaces are...
2) Filter on outbound interface evaluates header
Filter Operation
1) Message with interest header sent to multicast group
4) Filter evaluates header
5) Discards message
3) Allows message through
Key
S - Sender
A - Active Router
R - Receiver
AR
R
S
S
R R
5-June-2001 5
Active Interest Filtering ArchitectureActive Interest Filtering Architecture
• Secure filter signaling using SANTS (NAI Labs)
• SANTS/AFSP integration (Aerospace)
• Active Filter Signaling Protocol (AFSP) and ASP EE (ISI)
• Filtering and simulation components (TASC/UMass)
• HLA-compatible RTI (GaTech)
Filtered Data
IFilters Merged IFilters
Filtered Data
Active Router
AFSP
Filter Manager
Filter (Firewall)
SANTS
Simulation Host
AFSP Host ModuleDistributed Simulation(ModSAF)
Subscriptions
IFilters
Sim Data
Filter Manager
HLA-Compliant RTI
AN Mods
Filters
Parameters
SANTS Module
Simulation Data
Simulation Data
5-June-2001 6
Active Interest Filtering DemonstrationActive Interest Filtering Demonstration
Red Tank Platoon A
(3 T-72M Tanks)
Red Tank Platoon B
(3 T-72M Tanks)
Red Tank Platoon D
(3 T-72M Tanks)
Blue F16 Flight (8 Aircraft)
100baseT ethernet LAN**
Active Routers
Local ModSAF Hosts*
Local ModSAF Hosts*
5-June-2001 7
What We’ve Accomplished To DateWhat We’ve Accomplished To Date
• Dynamic, active interest filtering• Running under a real HLA-based simulation• With code modifications almost exclusively
limited to RTI components• Using Active Networks• With substantial, quantifiable improvements
in network efficiency• And virtually no added latency
5-June-2001 8
And Some Nice Extras And Some Nice Extras
• Coordinated, integrated activities from interested potential end-customers– DMSO authorized and funded Georgia Tech
RTI work– STRICOM authorized and funded ModSAF
enhancements
• Interaction of two EEs in same host• Mix of real and tunneled multicast
5-June-2001 9
Key Performance InnovationsKey Performance Innovations
• Two-pass Filter Setup– Use knowledge of upstream filtering to reduce,
distribute processing load
• Decision Tree Organization– Organize interest filters as a decision tree– Processing proportional to log of no. of filters
vs. linear with no. of filters
• Filter Simplification– Approximate large numbers of filters with a
smaller number of simpler covering filters
5-June-2001 10
Two-pass Signaling ExampleTwo-pass Signaling Example
AR
Subscriber Requested Filters
Response filters from publisher (exact filtering)
Active Routers
ACCEPT filters
DENY filters
AR
AR
AR Active Routers
AR
AR
5-June-2001 11
Interest Filtering: Key InsightInterest Filtering: Key Insight
• Subtle but important differences from graphics problems: – Need only determine if packet falls within any subscriber filter, not
which filter it falls within
AR
1) Subscriber provided request filters
2) Publisher provided response filters
Active Router
ACCEPT filters DENY filters
Filter tree needs only a single test
Filter tree needs only a single test
IF in REGION then ACCEPTELSE DENY
5-June-2001 12
Filter Tree ConstructionFilter Tree Construction
• Four problems of interest: – Two primary cases: with or without traffic density
information• Average vs. worst-case performance metric
– Two variations per case: explicit or implicit DENY filter representations
• Two-pass vs. single pass signaling
ACCEPT filters
DENY filters
Explicit DENY filters from two-pass signaling
Implicit DENY filters from one-pass signaling
5-June-2001 13
Leveraging Traffic Density InformationLeveraging Traffic Density Information
Accept Filters
Filter Space
Base ProblemDensity Info Unavailable:
Balanced Tree
ACCEPTDENY ACCEPTDENY
ACCEPTDENY
ACCEPT
DENY
Density Info Available: Probabilistically Biased Tree
5-June-2001 14
Leveraging Upstream Filtering InformationLeveraging Upstream Filtering Information
Upstream Filtering Information Unavailable Upstream Filtering Information Available
D
DD
D
DD
A
A
A
A
A A
A AForeshadowing
5-June-2001 15
Tree Construction ApproachTree Construction Approach
• Tree construction must also be fast– Optimal construction has high computational complexity
– Solution: constrain each step in the construction to a single level search, estimating results of any subsequent processing
• Then: given a set of filters within some region , partition into subregions and so as to minimize
ˆ ˆ( | ) |S SCost D P S R D P S R where
S R S
andˆ ˆs SD D are estimates for the depths of the two subtrees that will be constructed from filters in and respectively
SS
an( d| ) |P S R P S R are the probabilities that a packet will fall in subregions and given that it falls in region , respectively
SS R
SSRR
5-June-2001 16
Explicit DENYs with Density InformationExplicit DENYs with Density Information• Subtree depth estimated as log of number of filters
– Equivalent to Huffman bound assuming equiprobable filters– Full Huffman bound possible: less accurate, more work
• At each step, may use either ACCEPT or DENY filters– Choose type with minimum cardinality (fewest decisions)– Add in some cost for opposing sense (e.g., 0.5*card(), 1, etc)
• Cost metric then becomes
2
2
log min 1, 1 ( | ) ,
log min 1, 1 |
Cost card ACCEPT S card DENY S P S R
card ACCEPT S card DENY S P S R
where
card FILTERTYPE A
is the cardinality of filters of type FILTERTYPE in A
5-June-2001 17
Selection ExampleSelection Example
BASE PROBLEM
CANDIDATE SPLIT 2
card(left A) = 6card(left D) = 0P(left) = 1/3card(right A) = 3card(right D) = 9P(right)=2/3Metric = 4/3
2
2
log min , 1 ( | ) ,
log min , 1 |
card ACCEPT S card DENY S P S R
card ACCEPT S card DENY S P S R
card(left A) = 8card(left D) = 1P(left) = 1/2card(right A) = 8card(right D) = 1P(right)=1/2Metric = 1
DA AD
RESULTING FILTER TREECANDIDATE SPLIT 1
5-June-2001 18
Mappings to Remaining ProblemsMappings to Remaining Problems
• Without density information (i.e., P()) metric becomes
• Without explicit DENY filters, metric becomes
2
2
log min , 1 ,max
log min , 1
card ACCEPT S card DENY SCost
card ACCEPT S card DENY S
2
2
log 1 ( | ) ,
log 1 |
Cost card ACCEPT S P S R
card ACCEPT S P S R
• Without density info and without explicit DENYs
2
2
log 1 ,max
log 1
card ACCEPT SCost
card ACCEPT S
5-June-2001 19
Concluding RemarksConcluding Remarks
…coming clean...
5-June-2001 20
Lessons Learned: Failure No. 1Lessons Learned: Failure No. 1
• We’ve been solving the wrong problem
– Not so much a filtering problem • Does this packet go out this interface (for each
interface)?
– But more a routing problem• Which set of interfaces does this packet go
out?
5-June-2001 21
Solving the “Right” ProblemSolving the “Right” Problem
AR
AR
IF1 IF2
IF1IF2
IF2
IF2
IF1
IF1
IF1
IF1
• Not multiple, independent egress filter trees returning accept/deny results
• Instead, a single ingress filter tree returning list of admissible egress interfaces, integrated with forwarding functions– Eliminates redundant, per interface filtering
5-June-2001 22
Lessons Learned: Failures No. 2 and 3Lessons Learned: Failures No. 2 and 3
• We didn’t anticipate security impact in current design– Active routers create new filters through aggregation, but– Dynamic content not (easily) securable
• Filter aggregation also causes an overhead problem– Change from any user ripples through entire the system:
• But new aggregate filter highly redundant with previous filter
– As number of filters becomes large, aggregate filters too big for signaling mechanism, forces simplification
• Filter simplification adds overhead, inefficiency– Non-zero simplification processing time– Simplification can result in excess data delivery
5-June-2001 23
Solution (?)Solution (?)
• Avoid aggregation– Propagate user filters end-to-end
• (Much!) smaller and static: can be secured• Obviates (for the most part) need to simplify• Exact information throughout the tree
eliminates overhead, inefficiency
– At odds with current AFSP design point• Rethinking signaling approach
5-June-2001 24
S’allS’all
Questions?