SPECIALREVIEW · 2009-08-25 · CIALOANCOPY DONOTCOpy CentralIntelligenceAgency Inspector General SPECIALREVIEW Ij \ ~) COUNTERTERRORISIvlDETENTIONAND. INTERROGATION ACTIV1TIES (SEPTEMBER

$Page 1: SPECIALREVIEW · 2009-08-25 · CIALOANCOPY DONOTCOpy CentralIntelligenceAgency Inspector General SPECIALREVIEW Ij \ ~) COUNTERTERRORISIvlDETENTIONAND. INTERROGATION ACTIV1TIES (SEPTEMBER$
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Central Intelligence AgencyInspector General

SPECIAL REVIEW

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~) COUNTERTERRORISIvlDETENTION AND.

INTERROGATION ACTIV1TIES(SEPTEMBER 2001- OCTOBER 2003)

(2003-7123-IG)

7 May 2004

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TABLE OF CONTENTSPaaeb

INTRa D U CTIO N 1

SUMMARY.. kltl..." ...t to..el al.. ..< if ""'0'.." ..0.2

BA CK GROUND ;,""_"8 e.,. <II" Q e... ..0 4 6"'1 "... 9

DISCUSSION ~.... '0., ~'IIc'."";" ,.".. ,...,"

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GENESIS OF POST 9/11 AGENCY DETENTION AND lNTERROGATION

A.cr.wcrIESt. &1'Ii ...,... "., I... .., ;... ..'('1' ., (;,.. .tl 11

TfrE'CAPTIlRE OF ABU ZUBAYDAH MiD DEVELOPMENT OF EITs 12

Do J LEGAL Aj'VAL YSIS ; 16

NOTICE TO .4ND CONSULTATION ~VITIIEXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL

o FFICL1LS ...: ".. .: 23

GUIDANCE ON CAPTLffiEr DETENTIOn AND INTER.TWGATION 24

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DCI Confinement Gui delines 27

D CI In terra gation G uideHnes 29

Me di cal G tli delin es..."... ". 31. .

Training for Interrogations 31

DETENTION A]\lJ] Ij\JTERROGATION OPERA110NS AT"VI

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Videotapes of Interroga Hans. 36

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Background and Detaine es. ", ; 38

~ 39

Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines 40

Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques 41

Handgun and .Power Dri1I 41

'""Threats 11I' ". ,,'1' ;, f..., , iI... ..".t , ,. 42

Snl 0 ke.:r '.' ...e t",10 ,.It f'oi 43

Stress P osi ti ons 44

Stiff Brush and Shackles ! ; 44

Waterb oard Tecllnique.. ..: 44

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. Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques 69

Pressure Points 69

i\tlock Execution$ ...70

Use. of Smoke n ...n 72

Use of Cold ..c"

s.''''' 1.. (.c, "...C~"f"'c.I: , t.."t. 73

Water Dousing.. 76

Hard Takedo1-vn : 77

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Abuse at Other Locations Outside of the CTCPro gram... ".t"..". « t

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ANAL ~t'1TCALSupp~RTTO fNTERROGATIONS ..82

EFFECTIVENESS 85

POLICY CONSIDERATIONSAND CONCERj'JSREGARDING TIrE DETENTIONAND INTERROGA TION PROGR./tAf .91

Policy Consi derations 92

Concerns Over Participation in the CTC Program 94

ENDGA1vfE .~ .95

CONCLUSION S. .~ ~ 100

RECOMMEND ATIONS 106

APPENDICES

A. Procedures and ResoLUTes

B. Ch.ronology of Significant Events

C. ~lemorandum for John Rizzo: Acting General Counsel of theCentral Intelligence Agency, Re: Interrogation of an AI-Qa'idaOperative, 1 August 2002

. D. DCI Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees,

28 January 2003

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F. Draft Office of Medical Services Guidelines on lYfedicalandPsychological Support to Detainee Interrogations, 4 September2003

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

SPECIAL REVIEW

COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION ANDINTERROGATION ACTIVITIES

(SEPTErvrnER 2001 ~ OCTOBER 2003)(2003-7123-1G)

. 7 May 2004

INTRODUCTION

. 2.. ~ In November 2002, the Deputy Diiector forOperations (DDO) :informed the Office of Inspector General (OIG)

. that the Agency had established a program in the C0U11terterroristCenter to detain ari.dinterrogate terrorists at sites abroad ("the ereProgrmn"). He also informed OIC Jhat he had \lst learned of and haddis a tched a team to investigate

In January 2003, the DDO informed OIGthat he had received allegations that Agency personnel had usedunauth.orized inteITogation techniques with a detainee,'Abel Al-:Rahim.AI-Nashiri, at another foreign site; and requested that

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OIG investigate. Separately, OIG received information that someeU1ployees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities, at anoverseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations ofhumari rights. In January 2003, OrG initiated a review of Agencycounterterrorism detention and interro ation activities_

and the inciden t wi thAl-NashiTi.1 This Review covers the eriod Se tember 2001 to mid-October 2003.2

,

SUMMARY

the DCI assigned responsibility forimplementiI~g capture and detention authority to the DDO and to theDirector of the DCI Counterterrorist Center (D/CTC). "\ThenU.S.military forces began'd~tainin individuals inAf hanistan and atGuantanamo B,a ,Cuba,

the Agency began to detain and interrogatedirectly a number of suspected ten'orists. The capture and initialAgency interrogation of the first high value detainee, Abu Zubaydah,

1 ~ Appendix A addresses the Procedures and Resources that 0iG employed incQnducting trus Review. The Reviewdoes not address rertditions conducted by the Agency Or

interrogations conducted jointly with_e U.S. military. .2 (U) Appendix B is a chronology of significant events that occurred d~ring the period of this

Review.

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h1.March 2002, presented the Agency with a signilicant dilemma.4T!:"leAgency was under pressure to do everything possible to preventadditional terrorist attacks. Senior Agency officials believed AbuZubaydah was withholding information that could no.t be obtainedthrough then-authorized interrogation techniques. Agency officialsbelieved that a more robust approach was necessary to elicit threatinformation from Abu Zubaydah and possibly from other seniorAl-Qa'ida high value detamees.

5. (~ The conduct of detention and interrogationactivities presented new challenges for CIA. These includeddetermining where detention and interrogation facilities could besecurely located and operated, and icientifying and preparingqualified personnel to manage and carry out de tention andinterrogation activities. With the knowledge that AI-Qa'idapersonnel had been trained in the use of resistance techniques,another challenge was to identify interrogation techniques thatAgency personnel coul~ lawfully use to overcome the resistance. Inthis context, CTC, with the assistance of the Office or Technical.Service (OTS), proposed certain more coercive physical teclmiques touse on Abu Zubaydah. All of these considerations took place againstthe backdrop of pre-September 11, 2001 CIA avoidaIlce ofint-errogations and repeated U.S. policy statements condemningtorture and advocating the hllinane treatment of political prisonersCIll.ddetainees in the international commurtity.

6. (~ The Office of General Counsel (GGC) tookthe lead in determining and documenting the legal parameters andconstraints for interrogations. aGe conducted independent research

4 ~ The use of "high value" or "medium vaJuc" to describe terrorist targets anddetainees In this Review is based on how they have been generally categorized by CTC. eredistinguishes targets according to the quality of the inteJligence that they aTebelieved likely to beable to provide about cummt tenorist threats against the United States. .Senior AI-Qa'idaplan..T1.ersand operators, such as Abu Zubaydah and KhaIid ShaYlll Muhammad, fall into thecategory of "high value" and are given the highest prit>rity for capture, detention, andinterrogation. ere categori1eS those individuals who are beUeved to have lesser directknowledge'of such tbreatsr but to have infonnation of inte.lligence value, as "medium value"targets! detainees.

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and consulted extensively v,lith Department of Justice (DoD andNational Security Council (NSC) legal and policy staff. Working withDors Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), aGC determined that in mostinstances relevant to the counterterrorism detention and

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interrogation activities tile criminal prohibitionagainst torture, 18 U.S.c. 2340-2340B, is the controlling legal

. constraint on interrogations of detainees outside the United States. InAugust 2002, DoJ provided to the Agency a legal opinion in which itdetermined that 10 specific "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques"(EITs) wOl.lld notviolate the torture prohibition. Tills work providedthe foundation for the policy and administrative decisions that guidethe CTC Program.

7. ~ By November 2002, the Agency had AbuZubaydah and another high value detainee[ 'Abd Ai-RahimAl-Nashiri,incustod

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and the Office of Medical Services (OMS)provided medical care to the detainees.

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From the beginning, aGe briefed DO officersassigned to thes8:acilities on their legal authorities, and Agencypersonnel staffing these facilities docwnented interrogations and thecondition of detainees in cables.

10. ( There were few instances of deviationsfrom approved procedure with onenotable exception described in this Review _ vVithrespect to twodetainees at those. sites, the use and frequency of one Err, thewaterboard, went beyond the projected use of the technique asoriginally described to DoJ. The Agency, on 29 July 2003, securedoral Do] concurrence that certain deviations are notsignilicant forpurposes of Do]'s legal opinions.

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15. ~ Agency efforts to 'provide systematic,clear and timely guidance to those involved in the CTC Detentionand Interrogation Program was inadequate at first but haveimproved considerably during the life of the Program as problemshave been identified and addressed~ CTC implemented trai..rungprograms for interrogators and debrie£ers.6 lvloreover, building uponoperational and legal guidance previously sent to the field, the DeI

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6 ~ Before 11 September (9/11) 2001, AgenC'j personnel sometimes used theterms interrogation/interrogator and debrit.fil1g/debrieferinterchangeably. The use of these terms hassLT\ceevolved and, today, ere more dearly distinguishes their meanings. A debriefer engages adetainee solely through question and answer. An interrogator is a person who completes atwo-week interrogations ITaining program, which is designed to train, qualify, and certwf aperson tQ adm.i.tUster ~ITs. An interrogator GII\ administer EITs during an interrogation of adetainee only after the field, in coordination with Headquarters, assesses the detainee as\vithholding information. An interrogator transitions the detainee from a non-cooperative to acooperative phase in orde.r that a debriefer can elicit actionable i.nt~lligence throUghnon-aggressive techniques during' debriefing sessionS. An interrogator may debrief a detaineeduring an interrogation; however, a debriefermay not interrogate a detainee.

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on 28 January 2003 signed "Guidelines on Confinement Conditionsfor CIA Detainees" and "Guidelines on lnterro atioM ConductedPursuant

be made aware of theguidelines and sign an. ackno,"vledgrnent that they have read them.The DCI Interroga.tion Guidelines make formal the. existing CTCpractice of requiring the field to obtain specific Headquartersapprovals prior to the application of all BITs. Although the DC!Guidelines are. an improvement over the absence of such DCIGuidelines in the past, they still leave substantial room formisiri,terpretation and do not cover all Agency detention andinterrogation activities.

16. ~ The Ag~ncy's detention and interrogationof terroris:Is has provided intelligence tlLathas enabled th.eidentification and apprehension of other terrorists and warned ofterrorist plots pl~TlI1edfor the United States and around the world.The eTC Program has resulted in the issuance of thousa.nds ofindividual intelligence reports Md analytic products supporting thecounterterrorism efforts of U.S. policymakers and militarycommanders.

17. ~ Thecu~entcrCD€tentionandInterrogation Program has been subject to DoJ legal review andAdministration approval but diverges sharply from previous Agencypolicy and rules that govern interrogations by U.S. military and lawenforcement officers. Officers are concemed that public revelation ofthe CTC Prograffi ~villseriously damage Agency officers' personalreputations, as well as the reputation and effectiveness of the Agencyitself.

18. ( recognized that detainees maybe held in D:S. Government custody indefinitely if appropriate lawenforcement jurisdiction is not asserted. Although there has beenongoing discussion of the issue inside the Agency and among NSC,

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Defense Deparhnent, and Justice pepartment officials, no decisionson any "endgame" for Agency detainees have been made. SeniorAgency officials see this 'as a policy issue for the U.S, Governmentrather than a' CIA issue. Even with Agency initiatives to address theendgame with poJicymakeI"$, some detainees who carmot beprosecuted 1villlikely remain in CIA custody indefinitely.

19. ~ The Agency faces potenhally seriouslong-term political and legal challenges as a result of the CTC

'Detention and Interrogation Program, particularly its uSe or EITs andthe inability of the U.S. Government to decide what it will ultimately

-' .do with terrorists,detained by the Agency.

20. ~ This Review makes a number ofrecop:unendations that are designed to strengthen the managementand conduct of Agency detention and interrQganon activities.Although ~e Del Guideliries were an important step forward, theywere only designed to address the CTC Prog:t;am rather than allA' enc debriefin or interro ation activities.

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BACKGROUND

22: ~ The Agency has had intermittent involvement in theinterrogation of individuals whose interests are opposed to those offhe United States. After the Vietnam Warf Agency personnelexperienced in the field of interrogations left the Agency or moved toother assignments. In the early 19808, a resurgence ofmterest inteaching interrogation techniques developed as one of several

. methods to £os~erforeign liaison relationships. Because of politicalsensitivities the then-Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (ODCI)forbade Agency officers from UBing the word "interrogation,'" TheAgency then developed the Human Resource Exploitation (HRE) .

training program designed to train foreign liaison services oninterrogation techniques.

23. tsl In 1984, OIG investigated allegations 6f misconduct onthe part of two Agency officers who were involved in interro ationsand the death of one individual

Following that investigation, the Agencytook steps to ensure Agency persormel understood its policy on

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interrogations, debriefings, and human rights issues. Headquarterssent officers to brief Stations and Bases and provided cable guidanceto the field.

24. ~ In 1986, the Agency ended the HRE training programbecause of aUe ations of human ri hts abuses in Latin America..

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DO Handbook,

which remains in effect, explains the Agency's general:interrogationpolicy:

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DISCUSSION

GENESIS OF POST 9111 AGENCY DETENTION AND INTERROGATION

ACTIVITIES

25. ~ Thesrnin detentions and interrogations is

the National Securi

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27. ~. The DeI delegated responsibility forimplementation to the DDO and DjCTC. Over time,CTC also solicited ass.. I ce from other Agency components,including OGC, OMS and OTS.

7 (U IIFOUO) DoJ takes the position that as Coromander-in-Chiei. the President independently

has the Article II constitutional authority to order the detention. and interrogation of enemycombatants to gain intelJigence information.S

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28. (~ToassistAgen~understandin the seo e andim licatio~s_

OGC researched, analyze.d, 'andIe le al issues. These included

_papers with Agency officers responsiBle

THE CAPTURE OF ABU ZUBA YDAR AND DEVELOPMENT OF EfTs

30. ~) The capture of senior Al-Qa/ida operativeAbu Zubaydah on 27 March. 2002 presented the Agency with theopportunity to obtain aclionable intelligence on future threats to theUnited States from &.e most senior Al-Qa'ida member in US. custodyat that time. This accelerated CIA's develo ment of an interroaation

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31. ~ To treat the severe wounds that AbuZubaydah suffered UpOI1his capturer the Agency provided himintensive medical care from the outset and qeferred his questioningfor several weeks pending his recovery. The Agency then assembleda teani. that interrogated Abu Zubaydah tlsm non-a. essive,non-physical elicitation techrUques.

The Agency believed that Abu Zubaydahwas withholding imminent threat Wormation.

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. 32. ~) Several months earlier, in late 2001, CIAhad tasked an independent conh"actor psychologist, who had._experience in the U.S. Air Force's Survival, Evasion,.~ce, and Escape (SERE) tTaining programJ to research and .

write a paper on Al-Qa'ida's resistance to interrogation techniques.13This psychologist collaborated with a Department of Defense (DaD)psychologist who had_SERE experience in the u.s. AirForce and DoD to pro~perJ "Recognizing and DevelopingCountermeasures to AI-Qa'ida Resistance to InterrogationTechniques: A Resistance Training Perspective." Subsequently, th.etwo psychologists developed a list of riew and mOTeaggressive Errsthat they recommended for use in interrogations.

1213 (U IIPOUO) The SERE training program falls under the DaD foint Personnel Recovery

Agency GPRA). JPRA is responsible for missions to include the trairting for SERE a..TJ.dPrisoner ofWar and Missing In Action operational affairs including repatriation. S~RE Training is offeredby the U,S. Army, Navy, and Air Farce to its personnel, particularly air crews and specialoperations forces whq are of greatest risk of being capture.d during military operations. SEREstudent.s are taught how to survive in vaJjous terrain, evade and endure captivity, resistinterrogatioI15,and conduct themselvesto prevent harm to themselvesand EeHo"..prisoners of'liar.

33. ~) CIA's OTS obtained dam on the use of theproposed Errs and their potentia] long-term psychological effects on ,

, detainees. OTS input was based in part on information solicited froma number ,of psychologists and knowledgeable academics in the areaof psychopathology.

34. ~ OTS also solicited input from DoD/JointPersOlmel Recove'ry Agency (}PRA) regarding techniques used in itsSE~ training and any subsequent psychological effects on students.DoD/JPRA concluded no long-term psychological effects resultedfram use of the EITsl including the Il}OSttaxing technique, thewaterboard, an SERE sWdents)4 The OT5 analysis was used by aGCin evaluating the legality of techniques.

35. ~ Eleven EITs were proposed -foradoptionin the CTC Inten-ogation Program. As proposedr use 9f EITs would.be subject to a competent evalua tion of the medical and psychologicalstate of the detainee. The Agency eliminated one proposedteclmique---'after learnirig from Do} that this coulddelay the le~fol1mving textbox identifies the 10 EITsthe Agency described to Do].

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14 ~ According to individuals with authoritative knowledge or theSEREprogram, thewaterboard was used for de:monstratioI1 purposes on a very small number of students in a class.Except for Navy SEHEtraining, use of the wa.terboardwas discontinuedbecause of its dramaticeffect on the students ,\--howere subjects.

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Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

The attention grasp consists of grasping the detainee with both hands, with onehand on each side of the collar opening,. in a controlled and quick motion. In thesame motion as the grasp, the detainee is drawn toward the interrogator.

During the walling technique, the detainee is pulled forward and then quickly and-[innl}' pushed into a flexible false wall so that his shoulder blades hit the wall. Hishead and neck are supported with a roiled towel to prevent whiplash.

~ 111efacial hold is used to hold the detainee's head immobile. The interrogatorplaces an open paJm on either side of the detainee's face and the interrogator'sfingertips are kept well away from the detainee's eyes.

With the facial or insult slap, the fingers are slightly spread apart. The111.terrogator'shand makes contact with tl1e area bet:;veen the lip of the detainee'schin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe.

In cramped. confinement, the detainee is placed in a confined space, typically asmall or large box, which is usually dark. Con.£inement in the smaller space lastsno more than two hours and in the larger space it can last up to 18 hours,

Insects placed in a corilinement box involve placing a hamuess insect in the boxwith the detainee.

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. Durin.g wall standing, the detainee may stand about 4 to 5 feet frorn a wall withhis feet spread approximately to his shoulder width. His anns ar<~stretched out infront of him and his fingers rest on the wall to support all of his body weight. Thedetainee is not allowed to reposition his hands or feet.

.. The application of sh-ess positions may include having the detainee sit on the floorwith his legs extended straight out in front of him with his arms raised above hishead or kneeling on the floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle.

Sleep deprivation will not exceed 11.days at a time_

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-t The application of tlle waterboard technique involves binding the detainee to a

bench with his feet elevated above his head. The detainee's head is immobilized_

Land an mien-ogator places a cloth over the detainee's mou\:h and nose whilepouring wa ter onto the clot.1-tin a controlled manner. l\.ixflow is restricted for 20.to40 seconds and the

techni:.;;;WdUCes the sellS' non of dmwning and suffoc' tion.

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Dol LEGAL ANALYSIS

(' CIA's aGe sought guidance from DoJthe legal bounds of EITs vis-a-vis individuals detained

The ensumg legal opinions focus onthe Convention Against Torture and Other .Cruel, Inhumane andD€gracling Treatment or Punish:ment (Torture Convention),15especially as implemented in the U.S. criminal code., 18 D.S.C. 2340-2340A.' .

37. (u I jFODO) The Torture Convention specifically prohibits"torture," which it defines in Article 1 as:

. any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or.mental, is intentionally inflicted on a pers.on for such purposes asobtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or issuspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him ora third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of anykind, when such pain or suffering is in.ilicted by or at theinstigati?n of or ,vith the consent or acquiescence of a public officia.lor other person acting in an official capacity. It does not includepain or suffering arising only from., inherent in or incidental tolawful sanction. [Emphasis added.]

Article 4 of the Torture Convention provides that states party to theConvention are to ensure that all acts of "torture" are offenses l.U1dertheir criminal laws. Article 16 additionally provides t.hat each stateparty "shall undertake to prevent in any territory under itsjurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment orpunishment which do not amount to acts of torture as defined inAxtic1e I."

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15 (U/IFOOO) Adopted 10 December 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988) 1465 U.N.T.S. 85(entered into force 26 June 1987). The Torture Convention entered into force for the United States

. on 20 November 1994.

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38. (VIIFODO) The Torture Convention applies to the UnitedStates only in accordance with the reservations and understandingsmade by the United States at the lime of ratification.l6 As explainedto the Senate by the Executive Branch prior to ratification:

Article 16 is arguably broader th.a:nexisting U.S. law. The phrase"cruel, inhuman. or degrading treatment or punishment" is astandard formula in international instruments and is found in theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights, tile International Covenant

. on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention o~

Hu-rnan Rights. To the extent the phrase has been interpreted in thecontext of those agreerI).ents, "cruel" and "inhuman" treatment orpunishment appears to be roughly equivalent to the treatment orpunishment barred in the United States by the Fifm, Eighth andFourteenth Amendments. "Degrading" treatlnent or pUD.i.shm.ent,however, has been interpreted as pote.lltially induding treatmentthat would probably not be prohibited by the U.s. Constitution.[Citing a ruling that German refusal to recognize individual'sgender change might be considered "degrading" treatment.} Tomake clear that the United States construes the phrase to becoextensive with its constitutional guarantees against cruel,unusual; and inhumane treatmentr the follmving understanding isrecQmmended:

"The United States understands the term 'cruel, inhuman ordegrading l-reatment or punishment,' as used in Article 16 orthe Convention, to mean the crueL unusual. and inhumanetreatment or PllIlishment prohibite.d by tile Fifth, Eighthand/or Fourteenth i\mendments to the Constitll1:ion of theUnited States."17 [Emphasis added.J

16 (U) Vierma Convention on U1€Law ofTreaties, 23 May 1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into

force 27 January 1980). TI,e United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention on treaties, butit generally regards its provisions as customary intemationallav.r.1"7(U/IFOUO) S.TreatyDoc.No.100-20,at15-16.

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39. (VIIPOUO) In accordance with the Conventio:n, theUnited States criminalized acts of torture in 18 U.S.c. 2340A(a),which provides as follows:

Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to committorture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conductprohibited by this subsection, shan be punished by death orimprisoned for any tenn of years Orfor life.

The statute adopts the Convention definition of "torture" as "an actcommitted by a person acting under the color of law specificallyintended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other'than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon anotherperson within his custody or physical control."18 "Severe physicalpain and suffering" is not further defined, but Congress added adefinition of "severe mental pain or suffering:"

[T1he prolonged mental harm caUBedby Ofresulting Irom-

(A) the intentional int1iction or threatened infliction of severephysical paul or suffering;

(B) the administration or application, or threatenedadministration or.application, of mind-altering substances orother procedures calculated to disrupt profOtmdly the senses orthe personality;

(C) the threat of umoinent death; or

(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected.to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administrationOr application of mind-altering substances or other procedurescalculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. . . .19

These statutory definitions are consistent with the tmderstanclingsand reservations of the United States to the Torture Corlvention.

1B (UIIFOUO) 18 USe. 2340(1).19 (VI/FOUO) 18 US.c. 2340(2).

18

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40. (U / jFOUO) DoJhas never prosecuted a violation of thetorture statute, 181).S.C. §2340, and there is no case law conslruingits provisions. OGC presented the results of its research into relevantissues under U.S. and intemationallaw to Dol's OLC in the summerof 2002 and received a preliminary summary of the elements of thetortuIe statute from OLC in July 2002. An unclassified 1 August 2002OLC legal memorandum set out OLCs conclusions regarding !TIeproper :interpretation of the torture statute and concluded that"Section 2340A proscribes acts inJlicling, and that are specificallyintended to inflict, severe pain or suffering whether mental' orphysical. H20Also, OLC stated that the acts must be of an "extremenature" anq that "cert$ acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading,bu t stili not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity tofall within Section 2340A's proscription against torture." Fw:ther

.describing the requisite level of intended pam, OLC stated:

Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensityto the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organfailure, impairment ofboclily function, or even death. For purelymental pain or suffering to amOlmt to torture under Section 2340, itmust result in significant psychological harm of significantduration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.21

OLC determined that a violation of Section 2340 requires that theinfliction of severe pain be the defendant's "precise objective," OLC.also concluded that necessity or self-defense might justifyinterrogation methods that would otherwise violate Section 2340A.22The August 2002 OLC opinion did not.address whether any otherprovisions of U.S. law are relevant to the detention, treatment andinterrogation of detainees outside the United States.23

20 (U i I FOVO) JAg..l Memorandum, Rc: S!:andi.'..rdsof Conduct for Interrogation under

18 D.S.C. 2340-2340A (1 August 2002).21 CUIIFOUO) Ibid., p.1.Tl (UIIFOUO) Ibid., p. 39.23 ~1J!IPOVO) OLe's analysis of the torture statute was guided in part by judicial decisionsunder the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) 23 U.S.c. 1350, whkhprovkles a tortremedj'for victims of torture. OLC noted that the courts in this context have looked at the entire course

q

41. (U / IFODO) A second undassified 1 August 2002 OLCopinion addressed the international law aspects of suchinterrogations.24 This opinion concluded that LLlterrogationmefhodsthat do not violate 18 D.S.C. 2340 '\-vouldnot violate the TortureConvention and would not come within the jurisdiction of theInternational Criminal Court.

42. ~ In. addition to the two unclassifiedopinions, OLC produced another legal opinion on 1 August 2002 atthe request of CIA.25 (AppendLx C:) This opinion, address~d toCLA.'sActing General COrn1sel,discussed whether the proposed useof BITs in interrogating Abu Zubaydah woulsI violate the Title 18prohibition on torture. The opinion concluded that use ofEITs onAbu Zubaydah would not violate tlle torture statute because, amongother -things, Agell.cy personnel: (1) would not specifically intend to:inflict severe pain or suffermg, and (2) would not in fact inflict severepain or suffering.

43. ~ This OLC opinion was based uponspecific representations by CIA concerning the manner in which BITswould be applied in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. Forexample, OLC \vas told that the EIT "phase" would likely last "nom.ore than several days but could last up to thirty days." The EITswould be used on "an as-needed basis" and all would not necessarilybe used. .Further, the EfTs were expected to be used "in some sort ofescalating fashion, culmin~ting with the wat~rboard though notnecessarily ending with this technique." Although some of the EITs

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of conducl, although a single incident could constitute torture. OLC also noted Ulat courts maybe willing to find a wide range of physical pain can rise to the levet of "severe pain andsuffering." Ultimately, however, OLC concluded that the cases show that only acts "of anextreme nature have been redressed ul1der the TVPA's civil remedy for torture," White HouseCOlIDSel Memorandum at 22 - 27.

..2'j. CUI/FODO) OLC Opinion by John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attomey Gel1eral, OLC

(1 August 2002). .25 ~ Memorandum for Jolm Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the CentralIntelligence Agency, ."Interrogation of al Qaida Operatiye" (1 August 2002) at 15.

J<'<--".

T

might be used more than once, "that repetition will not be substantialbecause the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after severalrep€titions." With respect to the waterboardt it was explained that:

. . . the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench. . .. nleindividual's feet are generally elevated. A Clothis placed over theforehead and eyes. Water is "then applied to the cloth.in acontrolled manner. As this is don~, the cloth is lowered until itcovers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated andcompletely covers the mouth and nose, the air How is slightlyrestricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. Thiscauses an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual's blood.This increase in the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased effortto breathe. This effort plus' the cloth produces the perception of"suffocation and incipient panic," i.e., the perception of drowning.The individual does not breathe water into his lungs. During those20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of (12to 24-]inches. After thjs period, the cloth is lifted, and theindividual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four fullbreaths. The sensation of drowning is inunediately relieved by theremoval of the cloth. The procedure may then be repeated. Thewater is usually applied llama CaI1.teencup or small watering canwith a spout. . .. [TJhis procedure triggers an automaticphysiological sensation of drowning that the individual cannotcontrol even though he may be aware that he is in fact notdrowning. [I]t is likely that this procedure would not last morethan 20 minutes in anyone application.

Finally, the Agency presented OLC with a psychological profile ofAbu Zubaydah and \-vith the conclusions of officials andpsychologists associated vlith the SERE program that ~e use of EITswould cause no long term mental harm. OLC relied on theserepresentations to support its conclusion that no physical harrn orprolonged mental harm would result from the use on him of theEITs, including the waterboard. 26

26 {'rs.f_ According to the.Chid, Medi<:alServic~, OMS was neither consulted nor

involved ip the initial analysis of the risk and benefits of EITs, nor provided with the 015 reportcited in the OLC opinion. In retTospect, based on the OLC extracts of the OTS rep~n"t,OMScontends that the reported sophistication of the preliminary BIT review was exaggerated, at leastas it related to the waterboarcL and that the power of this EIT was appreciably overstated in thereport. Furthermore, OMS contends that the expertise of the SERE psychologist/interrogators on

21

44. ( c; aGC continued to consult with DoJas theeTC Interrogation Program and the use of EITs expanded beyond theinterrogation of Abu Zubaydah. This resulted in the produdion ofan undated and unsigned .document entitled, "Legal PrinciplesApplicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of CapturedAl-Qa'ida PersoDnel.II27 Accordmg to OGC, this analysis waS fullycoordinated with and draftedro substantial part by OLe. In additiohto-reaffirming the previous conclusions regarding the torture statute, .1he analysis concludes that the federal \,var Crimes stahlte, 18 U.S.c.2441...do€s not apply to -Al-Qa'ida because members of that -group arenot entitled to prisoner of war statUs. The analysis adds that "the[Torture] Convention permits the use of rcruel, inhuman, ordegrading treatment] in exigent drcumstances... such as a nationalemergency or war." It also states that the interrogation of AI-Qa1idamembers does not violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendmentsbecause t-hose provisions do not apply extraterritoriallYI nor does itviolate the Eighth Amendment beca-q.seit only applies to personsupon whom cr1.rnin.alsanctions have been imposed. Finally, theanalysis states that a wid~ range of EITs and other techniques wouldnot constitute conduct of the type that would be prohibited by theFifth...Eighth, or Fourte€nth Amendments even were Lhey to beapplicable:

- The use of the following techniques and of comparablel approvedtechciques does not violate a.ny Federal statute or other law, wherethe CIA interrogators do not specifically intend to cause thedetainee to undergo severe physical or mental pain or suffering(i.e., they act with the good faith belief that their conduct will notcause such pain or suffering): isolation, reduced caloric intake (solong as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health ofthe detainees)! deprivation of reading materiall loud music or whi te

the waterboard was probably misrepresented at the time, as the SERE waterboard experience isso different from the subscq uent Agency usage as to make it almost irrelevant. Consequently,according to OMS, there was no a priori reason to believe that applyjng the waterboard with thefrequency ~d intensity with which it was used by the psychologist/interrogators was eitherefficacious or meclical1y safe.27 ~ "Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation ofCapturedAI-Qa'idaPersonnel,"attachedto 16June2003)-

22

noise (at a dedbellevel calculated to avoid damage to thedetainees' hearing), the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, thefacial slap (insult slap), the abdominal slap, cramped confinerneDt,wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, the use ofdiapers, the use of harmless insects, and the water board.

Accordin.g to OGC, this analysis embodies DoJ agreexnent that thereasoning of the classified 1 August 2002 OLC opinion extendsbeyond the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and the conditions thatwere specified in that opinion.

. ]-.J onCE TO AND CONSULTATION 1VI11IEXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL

OFFICIALS

45. ~) At th~ same time that OLC was revj.ewingthe legality of EITs in the summer of 2002, the Agency was consulting

'with NSC policy staff and senior AdrrUnistration officials. The DCIbriefed appropriate senior national security and legal officials on theproposed EITs. In the fall of 2002, the Agency briefed the leadershipof the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees on the use ofboth standard techniques and BITs.

46. ~ In early 2003, CIA offidalsf at the w:gingof the General Counsel, continued to inform senior Adrnitlistrationofficials and the leadership of the CQngressionalOversightCommittees of the then-current status of the CTC Program. TheAgency specifically wanted to ensure that these officials and theCommittees continued to be aware of and approve CIA's adions.The General Counsel recalls that he spoke an~ met with 'YVhiteHouseCounsel and others at the NSC, as well as DoJ's Criminal Divisionand Office of Legal Counsel beginning in December 2002 and briefedthem on the scope and breadth of the CTC's Detention andInterrogation Progranl.

47. ~ Representatives of the DO, in thepresence of the Director of Congressional Affairs and the GeneralCounsel, continued to brief the leadership of the IntelligenceOveTsight Committees on the use of EITs and detentions in February

23

and :r-./farch2003. The General Counsel says that none of theparticipants express~d any concern about the techniques or theProgram.

48,' ~ On 29 JUly2003, the DCI and the GeneralCounsel provided a detaileq briefing to selected NSC Principals on,'OA's detention and interrogation efforts involving "high valuedetainees," to include tJ:teexpanded use of EITS.28Accorc1ll,g to aMemorandum for the Record prepared by the Gen{;ral Counselfollowing that meerulg, the Attorney General confirmed that DoJapproved of the expanded use of various EITs, including multipleapplications of the waterboard.29 The General Counsel said hebelieves everyone in attendance was aware of exactly what CIA wasdoing with respect to detention and interrogation, and approved ofthe effort. According to aGC, the senior officials were again briefedregarding the CYCProgram on 16 September 2003, and theLntelligence Committee leadership was briefed again in September2003. Again, according to aGCr none of those involved in thesebriefings.expressed ~y reservations about the program.

GillDANCE ON CAPTURE, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION

49. ~ Guidance and training are fundamentalto the success and integrity of any endeavor as operationally!politically! and legally complex as the Agency's Detention andInterrogation Progr~. Soon after 9Ill, the DDO issued tridance ~nthe standards for the ca ture of terrorist taT ets.n .

50. ~ The DCI, in January 2003 approvedformal "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees"(Appendix D).and "Guidelines on 1i.terrogations Conducted

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(,-\ppl~:'\dix EL ",hi., h Jfi' di~dls~ed h~'i('\': Prior

to the DCI Guidelines. HeCldquarkrs provided gU1d.anct' \'iz: lnicrrnal

briefings and e1eclTCmic comml1nication~, to includ(' cab!!:?,::froj)~ CIA

Headquarters, to the field,

5:1, ~ TnN(1\'~mber 2002: ere i.nibatedcourses for individuals illvolved in interrogations.

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57. ~Before )a.nucu}' 2003, officers assign(~d tomanage detention facilities develo ed and im 11emcntcd confinem~.:ntcondition )focedl1res.

The January 2003DCI Guidelines govern the conditibt~$()n:ohfulement for CIAdetainees held i.rldetentionfadlitie.s-. +

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.done so.

59. ~) The DCT Guidelines specify legal"minimums" and requiTe that "due provision rnust be .taken to protectthe health and safe tv of all CIA d(>tainees." The Guidelines do not

-'.

require t1.1.atconditions of confin!:-~menl at tht'~detention facilitiesco~orm to U.S. prison or other standards. At a rmrunnu.n, hmvever,detention facilities are to provide basic levels of medical care:

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Further, the guidelines provide that:

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DCI Interrogation Guidelines

60. ~ Prior to January 2003, CTC and aGCdisseminated guidance via cables, e-mail or orally on a case-by-caseb_asis to address requests to use specific interrogation tech.niques.Agency management did not require those involved in interrogationsto sign an acknowledgement that they had read, understood, oragreed to comply with the guidance provided. Nor did the AgencymaintElin a comprehensive record of individuals who had beenbriefed 011mterrpgation procedures.

TIle DCIInterrogation Guidelines require that all personnel directly engagedin the interrogation of persons detained have reviewed theseGuidelines, received appropriate training in their implementation,and have completed fue applicable acknowledgement.

62. ~ The DCI Interrogation Guidelmes define"Permissible Interrogation Techniques" and specify that "unlessotherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA officers and otherpersonnel acting on behalf of CIA may use only PermissibleInterrogation Teclm.iques. Permissible Interrogation Techniquesconsist of both (a) Standard Teclmiques and (b) Enhanced

29

~.

Techniques.'f33 BITs require advance approval from Headquarters, asdo standard teclmiques whenever fea~ible. The field must documentthe use of both standard techniques .and BITs.

63. ~ The DCI Interrogation Gl1.ide11es define"standard interrogation techniques" as techniques that do notincorporate significant physical or psychological pressUre. Thesetechniques include" but are not limited to"all lawful forms ofquestiorring employed by D.S.law enforcement and militaryinterrogation personnel. Among standMd interrogation techniquesare the use of isolation, sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours,,34reduced caloric intake (so long.as the amOlITltis calculated tomaintain the general health of the detainee), deprivation or reading

,material, use of loud music or white noise (at a decibel levelcalculated to avoid damage to the detainee's hearing), the use ofdia ,ers for limited eriods ( e:nerall not to exceed 72hours.

and moderatepsychological pre.ssure. The OCI Interrogation Guidelines do notspecifically prohIbit improvised actions. A CTCjLegal officer hassaid" however" that no one may empl?y any technique outsidespecifically identified standard techrriques without Headquartersapprovdl.

64. ~ BITs include physical actions and aredefined as '''techniques th.at do 'incorporate physica1 br psychological

. pressure beyond Standard Teclmiques." Headquarters must approvethe use of each specific EIT in advance. EITs may be employed onlyby iIained and certified interrogators for use with a specific detaineeand with appropriate medical and psychologicaf monitoring of theprocess.55 .

33 ~ The 10 approved EITs are described in. the textbox on page 15 of this Review.34 rrs.- According to the General Counsel, in late December2003,t'1eperiod forsleep deprivation was reduced to 48 hoUl's.

351'ffit ) Before EITs are administered a detainee must receive a detailedVcl1910':C<!lassessmenl and ph 'sica! exam.

30

Medical Guidelines

65. ~ OrviSprepared draft guidelines formedical and psychological suppoit to detainee interrogations.

Training for Interrogations

In November 2002,initiated a pilot running 'of a two-week

Interrogator Training Course designed to train, q':1alify, and certifyindividuals as Agency interrogators.37 Several CTC officers,

36 (VI / AIUO) A 28 March 2Q03 Lotus Note from C/crC/Legal advised Chief, Medical

Services that the "Seventh Floor" "would need to approve the promulgation of any further formal. guidelines ForrlOw, therefore, Jet's remain at the qiscussionstage... 0"

including a former SERE mSlTuctor: designed the curriculum, whichincluded a week of classroom instruction followed by a week offlhands-on" h-alIlin in Ens.

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tScompleting the Interrogation Course are required to sign anacknowledgment that th~y have read,lmderstand, and yvillcomplywith the DCl's Interrogation Guidelines.

69. ~ In J~e 2003, CIC established a debriefingcourse for Agency substantive exp.erts.who are involved in questioningdetainees after they have undergone interrogation and have beendeemed "compliant." The debriefing course was established to trainnon-interrogators to collect actionable mtelligence from high value

"

detainees in CIA custody. The CQllrSeis intended to familiarizenon~interrogators with key aspects of the Agency interrogationProgram, to include the Program's goals ~d legal authorities, the DelInterrogatioI).. Guidelines, and the "folesand res onsibilities of all whointeract with a hi h'value detainee".

DETENTION AND INTERROGATION OPERATIONS AT

33

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where EITs were used. Th;::. c)" \ThoL,.,:jst! i;lk'r:c')~,1 h-.\rs (i_',nf...r~'('dI.. t.~ .

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with team rnembers before each interruvationPsychoJogical ev,:duul'ions 'were -,erforrned by

IS\,choloLrists.

15 November2002, 'The interrogation of Al-Nashiri proceeded <lfter

_the rH:ceSS,1ryrHeadquarters authCirizlii.icn.

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psychologist/interrogators began Al-Nashiri's interrogation using.BITs immediately upon his amval. Al~Nashiri provided leadinformation on other terrorists dur~t day of interrogation.On the twelfth day of interrogation_psychologist/inter'rogators administered two applications of the waterboard toAl-Nashiri during two separate interrogation sessions. Exilianced ..

t ti f Al N hit" tin d thr gl 4 D ber 2002,11m. e-rro. ~a.. oln 01 - a.s 1 co.n. ue.. . OIU:1 e.ce.ro.. . -o. . __,. ., ..

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Videotapes of Interrogations

.77" ~ Headquarters had intense interest in

~reasl of all aspects of Abu Zubaydah's interrogationll_ including compliance with the guidance provided to thesite relative to the use of EITs. Apart frOIDthis however, and beforethe use of EITsi the interrogation tearrls. decided tovideotape the interrogation sessions. One initial purpose was toensure a record of Abu Zubaydah's medical condition and treatmentshould he succumb to his wOWlds and questions arise about themedical care provided to him by CIA. Another purpose was to assistin the preparation of the debriefing reports, although the teamadvised CTC/Legal that they rarely, if ever, were used for thatpurpose. There are 92 videotapes, 12 of which mchide Errapplications. AI:tOGC attorney reviewed the videotapes' inNovember and December 2002 to ascertain compliance' with theAugust 2002 DoJ opinion and compare what actually happened withwhat was reported to Headquarters. He reported that there Was nodeviation from the DoJ guidance or the written record.

~ OIG reviewed the videotapes, logs, andcables~y 2003. OrG identified 83 waterboard

. a lications,IDost of which lasted less than 10 seconds. 41

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41 ~ For the purpose of this Review, a waterboard application constituted eachdiscrete ins lance in which water was applied for any period of time dUring a session.

36

blank. Two others were blank-except for one or two minutes ofrecording. Two qthers were broken and could not be reviewed. OIG

. compared the videotapes to_logs and cablesand identified.a-21-hour period of time, w:W"chincluded two waterboard sessions,tha t was not captured on the videotapes.

79. "~ GIG's review of the videotapes revealedthat the waterboard technique emplqyed at_was differentfrom the technique as described in the DoJ opinion and used in the.SERE training. The difference was in the maD1}erin which thedetainee's breathing was obstructed. At the SERESchool and in theDo] opinion,> the subject's airflow is disrupted by the.firm applicationof a damp cloth OVeTthe air passages; the interrogator applies a smal1amount of water to the cloth in a controlled manner. By contrastj theAgency interrogator continuously applied large volumesof water to a cloth that covered the detainee's mouth and nose. One ofthe psychologists/interrogators a~knowledged that the Agency's useof the technique differed from that used in SEREtraining andexplained that the Agency's technique is different because it is "forreal" "and is more poignant and c.onvincing.

Durin'g this time, Headquarters issuedthe formal DCI Confinement Guidelines, the DCI InterrogationGU1delines, and the additional draft guidelines specifically

42~:i...;_.:';

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37

addressing requirements for OivlS persorulel. Thi.s served tostrengthen the command and COIltTolexercised over the CTCProgram.

Background dlld Dela.inees

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Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines

89.the Ageri viding legal and operational

briefings and cables that contained Headquarters~ .

guidance and discussed the torture statute and the Dol legal opiJ:u.on..CTC had also established a recedent of detailed cables between

-. ,." . . .

and Headquarters regarding theinterrogation and debriefing of detainees. The written guidance didnot address the fom standard interrogation tedmiques that,according to CTC/Legat the Agency had identified as early asNovember 2002.43 Agency personrtel were authorized to employstandard illterrogation techniques on a detainee withoutHeadquarters' p!ior approval. The guidance did not specifically

..;...

43(g{'fNQ The four standard interrogahon techniques were: (1) sleep deprivation not toexceed 72 hours, (2) continual use of light or darkness in a cell, (3) loud music, and (4) white noise(backgroUlld hum).

40

address the use of props to imply a physical ~eat to a detainee, nor9id it specificaJly address the issue of whether or not Agency officerscould improvise vvith any.other techniques. No formal mechanismswel'e in place to ensure that personnel going to the.field were briefedon the existing legal and policy guidance.

Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques

I

\!

90. ~ This Review heard allegations of the useof uttauthorized techniques The most significant, thehandgun and power drill incident/ discussed below, is the subject of aseparate orG investigation. In addition, individuals intervieweddurmg the Review identified, other techniques that caused concernbecause DoT had not specifically approved them. These included themaking of threats, blowing cigar smoke, employing certain stresspositions, the use of a stiff brush on a detaineel and stepping ,on adetainee's ankle shackles. For all of the instances! the allegationswere disputed or too ambiguous to reach any authoritativedeten:nination regarding the facts. Thus, although these allegationsare illustrative of the nature of the concerns held by individualsassociated with the CTC Program and the need for clear guidance,they did not warrant separate investigations or administTative action.

I

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Handgun and Pow~r Drill

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91. C'R: interrogation team members,whose purpose'it was to ~l-Nash.iri and debrief AbuZubaydah, initi.a11ystaffed_ The interrogation teamcontinued EITs on Al-Nashiri for two weeks in December 2002_they assessed him, to be "com liant." Subse uentl -, CTC officers atHeadquarters sent_enior operations officer (the debriefer)to debrief and assess Al-Nashiri.

92. ~The debriefer assessed AI-Nashiri aswithholding information/,at which pom~reh1stated_

hoodin.g, and handcuffing. Sometime between'

41

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28 pecember 2002 and 1January 2003, the debriefer used anImloaded semi-automatic handgun as a prop to frighten Al-Nashiriinto disclosing information.44 After discussmg thisplan wi. -

_the debriefer entered the cell where AI-Nashiri sat shackled andracked the handgun once Of twice close to AI-Nashiri's head.45 On\v~at was probab.l~ the ~~

debriefer tlsed a 'power drill tofnghten AI-Nasmn. \-Vl~consent, the debnefer enteredthe detainee's cell and revved the drill willIe the detaffiee stoodnaked and hooded. The debriefer did not touch Al-Nashiri with thepower drill.

93.~ Th~1.d debrie£er did not requestauthorization or report the use of these unauthorized techniques to

s. Ho"vever, in January 2003, newly arrived TDY officerswho had leai-ned of these incidents reported them to

Headquarters. OIG :investigated and,referred its findings to theCriminal Division of DoJ. On 11 September 2003,Do} declined toprosecute and turned these matters over to CIA for disposition.These incidents are the subject of a separate OIG Report ofInvestigation.46

Threats

94. ~ During another incident_thesameHeadquartersdebriefer,accordingtoa_ow~s presellt, threatened Al-Nasruri by saying 'that if he did not talk,'We could ge

!i!i!0UI TI1other:in here/' and, "yVecan bring your family

in here." Th debriefer reportedly wall.ted AI-Nashirito infer, for psychologica reasons, that the debriefer might b_

_intelli ence officer based on ills Arabic dialect, and that A1-Nashiri was in custod because it was widely believed inMiddle East circ es 1at .

tenogation technique :involves

-,ii

44 ~ 'This individual was not a trained interrogator and was not au.thorized to use EITs.45 (U / /FOUO) Racking is a mechanical procedure used with firearms to cha~l1ber a buliet or

simulate a bullet being chambered. ,'

-

46 ~ Unaut..ltorized Interrogation Techniques_ 29 October 2003.

-,

42

sexually abusing female relatives in front of the detainee. Thedebriefer denied threatenmg Al-Nashiri through his family. Thedebriefer also said he did not explain who he was or where he wasfronl when talkin with Al-Nashiri. The debriefer said he never saidh~ wa

.telligence officer but let

Al~Nashiri draw his O'Nnconclusions.

95', .An experienced Agency interrogatorreported that tl1e interrogators threatened KhalidShavkh Muha:mmad According to this interrogator, the

interrogators said to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad thatif anything else happen.s in the United States,. "We're going to killyour cNJdren." According to the interro ator,. one of the.' .

.terrogators sai.

provided tq hiln of the tp.reat.indicate. that the law had been violated.

Smoke

96. -An AgencinteIT6gat~r~in December 2002, he and another

smoked Cigars and blew'smoke in.AI-Nashiri's face during an intelTogation. The interrogator claimedthey did this to "cover the stenchlt in the room and to help keep theinterrogators ale.:t late at night. This interrogator said he would notdo this again based on "perceived criticisnl." Another Agencyinterrogator admitted that he also smoked cigars dudng two sessionswith AI-Nashiri to mask the stench in the room. He claimed he didnot deliberately force smoke into AI-Nashiri's face.

. .

TO

Stress Positions

97._ OIG received reports that interrogationteam me~be~oter'-tially injurious stress positions onAl-Nasruri. Al-Nashiri was required to kneel on the floor and leanback. On at least one occasion, an Agency officer reportedly pushedAl-Nashiri backward willIe he was. in this stress~otheroccasion said he had to intercede aite~

xpressed concern that AI-Nasb.iri'g a.nllSmight bedislocated from his shoulders. _expl~ed that, at the time,the interrogators were attempting to'P1:1tAl-Nashiri in a standingstress position. Al-Nashiri was reportedly lifted off the floor by hisarms while his arms were.bound berund his back with a belt.

Stiff Brush and Shackles

98. '- . terrogator reported thathe witnessed otll.er techniques used on Al-Nashiri th~t the

. interrogator knew were not specifically approved by DoI. Theseincluded the use of a stiff brush that was intended to induce pain onAl-Nashiri and standing on Al-Nashiri's shackles, which resulted incuts and bruises. When questioned, an interrogator who vras at

acknowledged that they used a stiff brush to batheAl-N ashiri. He described the brush as the kind of brush one uses in abath to remove stubborn dirt. A CTC manager who had heard of theincident attributed the abrasions on.AI-Nashiri's ankles to an Agencyofficer accidentally stepping on AI-Nashiri's shackles whilerepositioning him into a stress position.

Waterboard Technique

99. ~ The Review determined that theinterrogator& used the waterboard on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad ina manner inconsistent with the SERE application of the waterboardand the description of the waterboard in the DoJ OLC opinion, jn thatthe teclmique was used on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad a largenumber of times. Accorcling to the General Counsel, the Attorney

TOP

General acknowledged he is fully aware of the repetitive use of thewaterboard and that CIA is well within the scope of the Do} opinionand ~e authority given to erA by that opinion. The AttorneyGeneral was informed the waterboard had been used 119 times on asingle individ uaL

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SpecifiC Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques

164. tFS was butone event in the ear y man s of Agency activity in

that involved the we of interrogation techniques that.DoJ and Headquarters had not approved. Agency personnelreported a range ofimprovisedactions that int~rrogators anddebriefers reportedly used at that time to assist in obtaininginformation from detainees. The extent of these actions is illustrativeof the consequences of the lack of clear guidance at that time and theAgencis insufficient attention to interrogations :in

165.two incidents:and the death of a de~amee at a military base in Northeast

. Afghanistan (discussed further in paragraph 192). .These two casespresented facts that warranted criminal investigations. Some of thetechniques discussed below were used wi and will befurther address~d in connection with a ReperIn other cases of undocumented or unauthorized techniques, the factsare ambiguous or less serious, n~t warranting further investigation.Some actions discussed below 'rvere taken by employees orcontractors no longer associated '-\lith the Agency. Agencymanagem.ent has also addresseGlad:ministratively some of the actions.. -

Pressure Points

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167.~ howasfacing the shackle.d detaillee, reportedly watched his eyes to the pointthat the detainee would nod and start to pass out; then, the

shook the detainee to wake him. Thisprocess was re "eated for a total of three applications on the detainee.The acknowledged to OrG that he laid handson the detainee and ma -have made hhn think he was going to loseconsciousness. Th also noted that he ha_years of experience debriefing and interviewing people and l.mtilrecently had never been instructed how to conduct interrogations.

168. (SJtN:E) CTC management is now aware of this reported. incident, the severity of which yvasdisputed. The use of pressure

oints is not,and had not be~n, authorized, and eTC has advised thethat such actions are not authorized.

Mock Executions

"169.~:rhedebrie~oyed.the

handgun ~d ~ A1-Nashi~dvised thatthose actions were predicated on a technique he had "artici ated in.

~he debrie£er s"tated that when he wabetween September and October 20D2, offered tofire a handgun outside the interrogation room while e debrieferwas in.terview_ was thought to be withholding.infonnation.6s_staged the incident, whicl~ includedscremning and yelling outside the cell by other CIA officers and.guards. When the guards moved the detainee from the'interrogationroOffi, they passed a guard who was dressed as a hooded detainee,lying motionless 0;11the grOtmd, and made to"appear as if he hadbeen shot to death.

. .. .

70

TO

170._ The debriefer claimed he did not thinkhe needed to report this incident because th~adopenly discussed this pl~severa~ andafter the incident. When the debrider was late~dbelieved he needed a non-traditional technique to induce thedetainee to cooperate, he told~e wanted to wave a handgunin front of the detainee to scare him. The debriefer said he did notbelieve he was required to notify Headquarters of this technique,citing the earlier, unreported mock executio~

171.~ A senior operations officerec01mted that around September 2002_eard that the debrieferhad staged a'mock executi~m.81was not present but llilderstood itwent b~t was transparently:-ruse and no 'benefit was derivedfrom it~bserved that there is a need to be creative as long as it isnot considered torture. _tated that if such a proposal were madenow, it would involve a great deal of consultation. It would begmwi. management and would include CTC/Legat

172. ~ The_admitted staging a "mockexecution" in the first da~was open. According to the

the technique was his idea but was not effectivebecau.se it came across as being staged, It was based on the concept,from. SERE schoot of showing something that looks real, but is not.The recalled that a particular CTC interrogator latertold him about employillg a mock execution technique. The81_ did not know when this mcid~nt occurred or if it wassuccessful. I-Ie viewed this technique as ineffective because it was notbelievable.

71

~~Four~ho were intervie'wed admitted to either participating in

h ve- e ribe inci en r he in about them.

descrihed staging a mock execution of a detainee.Reportedly, a detainee who witnessed the "body" in the aftermath ofthe ruse "sang like a bird."

174. revealed that a roximatelyfour days before his interview with OIG, th stated hehad conduded a mock executio in October orNoveIl).ber 2002. Reportedly, the .firearm.was discharged outside ofthe building, and it was done because .the detamee reportedlypossessed critical threat information stated that he toldthe not to d~e sta~ed that he has not heardof a similar act occurring_ince then.

Use of Smoke

revealed that<;:igarettesmoke was once used as an interrogation technique in

~edly, at the request of_an interrogator, the officer, who does notsmoke, blew the smoke from a thin cigarette/cigar in the.detainee'sface for about five minutes. The detaiD.eestarted talking so thesmoke ceased. heard that a differentofficer had used smoke as an. interrogation techni~questioned numerous persopnel who had worke~boutthe use of s'moke as a technique. None reported any knowledge ofthe use of smoke as an interrogation tedmique.

'176..~drnitted that he has personally used smoke

inllala tion techniques on detaine'es to make them ill to the pointwhere they would start to "purge." After this, in a weakened state,

72TO

these detaffiees would then.th

Wormation.70 denied ever physicallyabusing detainees or knowing anyone who has.

Use of Cold

178. _InlateJuldetamee was bemg interrogatePrior to proceeding with any of the~ethodsfofficer responsible £o{the detainee_requestingHeadquarters authority to emPloy a prescribed interrogation planover a two-week period. The plan inchfded the following:

Physical Comfort Level Deprivation: With use of a wmdow -airconditioner and a judicious provision/ deprivation of warmdothing/blq.nkets, believe we can increaSe {the detainee's] physicaldiscomfort lev.e1to the point where we may lower hismental/trained resistance abilities. -

CTC/Legal responded. and advisedr "[C]aution must be used whenemploying the air conditioning/blanket deprivation so that [thedeta~ee's] disiomfort dnes not .lead to a serious illness or worse. fI

...70 ~This was substantiated in part by the CIA officer who participated in this act with the

73

TO L

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, 183.~Many of the officersinterviewed aboutthe use of cold showers as a technique cited that t;hewater heater wasinoperable and there was no other-recourse except for cold showers.Howeverl xplained that if a detainee was .coop~rative, he wovld be given a waffil shower. He stated that whena detainee was uncooperative, the interrogators accomplished twogoals by combining the.hygienic reason for a shower with theunpleasantness of a cold shower.,

cable'repor~ed that a detainee was left in a cold room, shaclde.d and naked,until he demonstrated cooperation.

, 185._ When asked ~03, if coldwas used as an interrogation tedmique,' the_responded,"riot per se." He explained that physical and envirOTInlental '

discomfort was used to e:rcourage the detainees to improve theirenvironment. bserved that cold is hard to define. Heasked rhetoriCally, "How cold is cold? How cold is ille threatening?"I-Iestated that cold water was still employed however,'showers were administered in a heated room. He stated there was nospecilic guidance on it from Head~~as IeHto itsown discretion in the use of cold. ~dded there is a cablefron1._docmnenting the use of "manipulation of the

, ,

environment.",

'

:I86. ~Although the DCI C'uidelihes do notmention cold as a technique, the September 2003 draft OMSGuidelin,es on Medical and Psychological Support to DetaineeInterrogations specifically identify an "uncomfortably coolenvironxnent" as a standard interrogation measure. (Appendix F.)The OMS Guidelines provide detailed instructions on safetemperature rangesf including the safe temperature range when adetainee is we't or unclothed.

75

Water Dousing

187. _ ,According to andothers who have worked "water dousing" has been used

~ince 'early 2003 when officer.introducedthis technique to the facility. 'Dousing involves ~ying a detaineedm'\TIlon a plastic sheet and pouring water over him for 10 to15 minut~s. Another officer explained that the xoom was maintained'at 70 d~grees or more; the guards used water that was at ,roomten1pera,ture while the interrogator questioned the detainee.

188. A review from April ~d1vfay2003revealed tha sought permission fromCT~to employ specific techniques for a number of detainees.lncluded in the list of requested techniques Waswater dousing.72Subsequent cables report~d the use and duration of the techniques bydetainee per interrogation session?3 One certified interrogator,noting that water dousing appeared to be a most effective technique,requested ere to confum guidelines on water dousing. A returncable directed that the detainee must be placed on a towel or sheet,may not be placed naked on the bare cement floor, and the ajrtemperatuI'e must exceed 65 degrees if the detain~ will not be driedimmediately.

.189. ~The DO Guidelines do not mention

water dousing as a technique. The 4 September 2003 draft OMSGuidelines, however, identify "water dousing" as one of 12 standardmea.sures that OMS listed, in ascending degree of intensity, as the11th standard measure. OMS did not further address "waterdousing" in its guidelines.

in a later paragraph used the term "cold water bath.".~. .:...

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76

Hard Takedown

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191. ~ According to_the hardtakedown ~as~ interrogations~art of theatmospherics.'f For a time, it was .the standard procedure for movinga detainee to the sleep deprivation cell It Was done for shock andpsychological impact and signaled the transition to another phase ofthe interrogation. The act af putting a detainee into a diaper cancause abrasions if the detainee struggles because the floar of thefacility is concrete. T~tated he did not discuss thehard takedown with~a.nagers, but he thou ht theunderstood what techniques were being used at

tated that the hard takedown had not been used recentlAfter taking the interrogation class, he understood that if

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he was going to do a hard take down, he must report it toHeadquarters. Although the DCI and OlvlSGuidelines addressphysical techniques anq treat them as requiring advanceHeadquarters appl'oval, they do not otherwise specifically addressthe "hard takedown."

192. stated that he was generallyfamiliar with the technique of hard t*edowns. He asserted tha t theyare authorized and believed they had been used one ormore times at

in order to intimidate a detainee. stated that hevvould not necessarily know if they have beel1used and did not.consider it a serious enough handling technique to requireHeadquarters approval Asked about the possibility that a detaineemay.have been dragged on th~ ground during the course of a hardtakedown_responded that he was unaware of that and did

. not understand. the pomt ?f dragging someone.alongthe corridor in

AbuseProgram

at Other Locations Outside of the CTC

193. ~ Aliliou 11.not within the scope of theerc Programr two other incidents were reported in2003.

As noted above, oneresulted in the death of a detainee at Asadabad Base76

194. ~In June 2003, the U.s. military sought an Afghancitizen who had been implicated in rocket attacks on a joint U.s.Army,md CIA position in Asadabad located in NortheastAfghanistan. On 18Jlffie2003,this individual appeared at Asadabad .

Base at the urging of the local Governor. TIle individual was held ina detention facility guarded by U.S. soldiers fronl the Base. During

, 76 lm. For more.than a year, ~IA referred to Asadabad Baseas_,.:.-.:.~t':.

the four days the individual was detained! an Agency independentcontractor/ who was a paramilitary officer!is alleged to have severelybeaten the detamee with a large metal flashlight and kicked himduring interrogation.sessions. The detainee died in custody on21 June; his body was tun1ed over' to a local cleric a..ndreturned to hisfamily on th~ following date without an autopsy being performed.Neither the contractor nor his Agency staff supervisor had beentrained or authortzed to conduct mterrogations. The Agency did notrenew the independeht contractor's contract, which was up forrenewal soon after the incident. OIG:isinvestigating this incident in .

concert with Dor77

The objective was to determine if anyone at- e school' ad information about the detonation of a remote-controlled improvised explosive device that had killed eight borderguards several days earlier.

196. ~ A teacher being interviewedre ortecil smiled and Iau hed inappropriately!

whereupon used the butt stock of his rifleto strike or "buttstroke" the teacher at least twice in his torso,followed by several knee kicks to his. torso. This incident waswitnessed by 200 students. TJ."leteacher was reportedly not seriouslyinjured. In response to his actions! Agency management returned the

to Headquarters. He was counseled andgiven a do.mestic assignment.

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ANALYTiCAL SUPPORT TO INTERHOG.-t'J'lO"XS

204. ~ DirectufJte of Intelligence an,l]ySI'Sassigned to CTC prOYide analytical su pport to ulterf(1gation t<,:,lillS Lnthe field. Analysts are responsible for dt2\'eJopLng requirement':' forthe questionin.p- of detainees as well as conductin deoridiIl?;S insome cases.

AnaJvsts, however, do notparticipate in Ute application of interrogation techniques.

'.

205. (f-S.( According to a number of thoseinterviewed for this Review, the Agency's mtelligence on AI-Qa1idawas limited prior to the initiation of the CTC futerrogation Program.

. The Agency lacked adequate linguists or subject matter experts 3...'1.dhad very little hard kn?wledge of what particular Al-Qa'idaleaders-who later becam,e detainees-knew. This lack of knowledgeled analysts to speculate about what a detainee "should know," viceinformation the anal st could objectively demonstrate the detaineedid know.

a detainee did not respond to a question posed' to him, theassumption at Headquarters was that the detah-tee was holding backand knew more; consequently, Headquarters recommendedresumption of BITs:

83 .

evidenced in the firlal \vaterboard session of ..\bu Zubanian.

liiiicCOrdin,. to a ~enio~ CTC officer, the interrogatio.n tea/mil

:01isldered Abu ZubZi\'dah to be compl1,mt and ""cUlted to.' .

termi.nate EITs. believed Abu Zubaydah continued to. .

withhold inforrnation,--. -.

"

TO

generated substantial pressure from Headquarters to 'continue use ofn~e EITs. According to this senior officer, the decision to resume useof the waterboard on Abu Zuba dah was made b senior officers of. .. .

the DOto assess Abu Zubaydah's compliance and wilnesse~ the

final waterboard session, after.which, they reported back toHeadquarters that the EITs were no longer needed on AbuZubaydah.

EFFECTIVENESS

211. ~ The dete~tion of terr<?ristshas preventedthem from'engaging in further terrorist activity, arid t1:).eirinterrogation has provided intelligence that has enabled theidentification and apprehe~ion of other terrorists, warned ofterrorists plots planned for the United States and around the world}and supported articles frequently used in the finished mtelligencepublications for senior polkymakers.and war fighters. In this regard,there is no doubt that the Program has been effective. Measuring'theeffectiveness of EITs, however, is a more subjective process and notwithout some concern.

212. ~ When the Agency began capturingterrorists, management 'ud ed the success of the effort to be ettinthem off the streets,

85-....

ap_ 0 0

significant, actionable information, the meas~re of success of theProgram increasingly became the intelligenc~ obtained from the

.

detainees.

213. ~ Quantitatively, the DO has sigI:lificantlyincreased the number of counterterrorism intelligence reports ,viththe inclusion of Wormationfrom detainees in its custody. Betwe~n9/11 and the end <?fApril 2003, the Agency produced over 3,000intelligence reports from detainees. Most of the reports came "from

_e providedbythehighvaluedetaineesat

214. ere frequentlyuses the.information from. one detainee, as well as otll.er sources, to vet the:h1formation of another detainee. AlthOl.J.ghlower-level detaineesprovide less :infprmation than the high value detainees, information[Tom these detainees has, on many occasions, supplied the .

information needed to robe the hi h value detainees further.the hiangulation.of

intelligence proviQ.es a fuller knowledge of Al-Qa'ida activities thanwould be possible from a single detainee. For example, [yfustafaAhmad Adam al-Hawsawi, the Al-Qa'ida financier who wascaptured with Khalid Shaykh lYfwuurunad, rovided the Agency'sfirst intelligence pertaining to anotherparticipant in the 9/11 terrorist plot. Hawsawi'sinformation to obtain additional details about role fromKhalid Sha kh Muhammad

215. Detainees have providedinform

.

at-ion on Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist gro_.note includes; the modus operandi of Al-Qa'ida,_

errorists who are ~apable of mounting attacks in the

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216~ ~ Deta:iJ::teeill:forID.ationhas assisted in theidentifi'Cation of terrorists. For example, inform.anon from AbuZubaydah helped lead to the identification of JosePadilla and -

. Binyam Ivluharnmed-operatives who:had-plans to detonate auranium~topped dirty bomb :ineither Washington,. II .Co,or NewYork City. Riduan "Hambali" Isomuddin provided Worwation-thatled to the arrest of previously u.nknown members of an Al-Qa'ida cellin Ka1'achi. They were designated as pilots for an aircraft attack.inside the United States. Many other detainees, including lower-leveldetainees such as Zubayr and Majid Khan( have provided leads toother tenorists, but probably the most prolific has been Khalid

-

Shaykh Muhammad. He provided informatiqn that helped lead toth.earrests of terrorists including SayfuUah Paracha and his son UzairParacha, businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh Muharrl.1nadplanned touse to smuggle explosives into the United State~; Saleh Ahnari, asleeper operative in New York; and 1vfajidKhan, an operative whocould enter the United States easily and was tasked to researchattacks Khalid Shaykh Muhammad'sinformation also led to the investigation and pI'osecu~Faris,the truckdriverarrestedinearly'2003inOhio._

'-

blow up severalU.S. gas stations to create panic and havoc; hijack and fly an airplaneinto the tallest building in Califon-uain a west coast version of the .

World Trade Center attack; cut the lines of suspension bridges. inNew York in an effort to make them colla se;

This Review did not w"tcover any evidence that these plotswere imminent. Agency se;nior managers believe that lives have beensaved as a result of the capture and interrogation of terrorists who

. were planning attacksr in particular Khalid Shaykh 1vluhammad, AbuZubaydahr Hambalir and AI-Nashiri.

218.detainees as one.of the most 1m.intelligence. viewedanalystsr knowledge of the terrorist target as having much moredepth as a result of information from detainees and estimated thatdetainee reporting is used in all counterterrorism articles roducedfor the most senior olic makers.

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TO

said he believes the use of BITs has proven to be exb:emely valuablein obtaining enormous amOlmts of critical threat information from'detainees who had otherwise believed they were safe from any harm

. in the hands of Americans.

. 220. ~ InasTImc};las EITs have been used onlysince August 2002, and they have not all been used with e,:ery highvalue detainee, there is limited data on which to assess theirindividual effectiveness. This Review identified concerns about theuse of the waterboard, specifically whether' the risks of its use werejustified by the results, whether it has been unnecessarily used insome instances, and whether the fa_ctthat it is being applied in ama:rmer different from its use in SERE trciining brings into questionthe continued applicability of the Do} opinion to its use. Alth,ough

,

the watexboard is the most intrUsive of the EITs, the fact thatprecautions have been taken to provide on-site medical oversight inthe use of all EITs is evidence that their use poses risks.

221. ~ DetermirUng the effectiveness of eachEIT is important in facilitating Agency management's decision as towhich techniques should be used and for how long. MeaSUr1Ilg the

, overall effectiveness of lliTs is chi;1llengingfor a number of reasonsincluding: (1) the Agency Carlnot detenrune with- any certamty thetotality of the intelligence the detainee,actually posses~esi (2) each'detainee has different fears of and tolerance for EITs; (3) theapplication of the same EITs by different interrogators may have

..

--- --N" -""!!1

222. ~ Thewaterboardhasbeen us"edon threedetainees: Abu Zuba dah( AI-Nashiri, and Khalid Sha khMuhammad.

223. Prior to the us~ of EITs, Abu Zubaydahprovided information fo intelligence reports.. Interrogatorsapplied the waterboard"to Abu Zubaydah at least 83 times during.August 2002. During the period between the end of the use of the

"

waterboard and 30 April2003r he provided information rorapproximately8additional reports. It is not possible to saydefinitively that the waterboard is the reason for Abu Zubaydah'sincreased prQduction, or if another factor, such as the length Qf .

det~tion, was the catalyst. Since the use of the waterboardhowever; Abu Zubaydah has appeared to be cooperative

" 224. ~ vVith respect to Al-Nashirir_- reported tvvo waterboard sessions in November 2002, afterw 11:\ e psychologist/interrogators determined that AI-N~shiriwas com liant. However, after bem move

Al-Nashiri was thought to be withholdinginformation. Al-Naslfui subsequently received additional EITs,

. b\lt n.ot the watetboard. The Agency then. detennined AI-Nashiri to be "compliant." Becauseof the litany of

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techniques used by different interrogators over a.relatively shortperiod of time/ it is difficult to ideJ;ltifyexactly why AI-Nashiribecame more willing to provide information. However/ followingthe use of BITs/ he provided information about his most CUIrentoperational plalming and as opposed tothe historical information he provided before the use of EfTs.

.225, ~ ~theotherhand,KhalidShaykh

Muhammad/ an accomplished resistor/ provided only a fewintelligence reports prior to the 'use of the waterboard/ and analysis ofthat information revealedlhat much of it was outdated/ inaccurate, orincomplete. As a means of less active resistance, at the beginning oftheir interrogation/ detainees routinely provide information that theyknow is already known. Khalid Shaykh Muha:mrnad received 183a lications of the waterboard in March 2003

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGf1RDING IRE DETENTION

AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM

226. ~ The ~ITs used by the Agency Lmder theCTC Program are inconsistent with the public policy positions' that theUnited States has taken regarcting human: rights. This divergence hasbeen a cause of concern to some Agency personnel involved with-theProgram. -

.

'-

T

..

Policy Considerations

. 227. (UI I FOUO) Throughout its history, the Uni~edStates hasbeen an international proponent of human rights and has voiced -

opposition to to'rture and mistreatment of prisoners by foreigncQuntries. This position is based upon fundamental principles that aredeeply embedded in the American legal structure and jurisprudence.

. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, for. .

example, require due process of law, while t11.eEighth Amendmentbars "cruel and lillusual ptmishments."

228. (U I I FOUO) The President advised the Senate whensubmitting the Torture Convention for ratification that the UnitedStates would construe the requirement of Article 16 of the Conventionto "undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction otheracts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatnlent or punishment whichdo not amount to torture" as "roughly equivalent to".and "coextensivewith the Constitutional guarantees agall1St cruel, Unusual, andinhumane treatment."BI To this end, the United States submitted areservation to the Tort1.:lre Convention. statmg that the United Statesconsiders itself bound by Article 16 "only insofar as the term 'cruel,in11.uman or degrading treabnent or punishme.nt' Ineans the cruel,unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the5th, 8th and/ or 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the UnitedStates. II Althoug~ the Torture Cqnvennon expressly provides that noexceptional circumstances .whatsoeveri including war or any otherpublic emergency, and no order from 9-superior officer, justifiest~rtUIe, no similar provision was included regarcling ads of "cruel,inhmnan or degradu1.g LTeaLmentor punishment."

--~:-.

81 (DI IFOUO) See Message from the President of the United StatesTransmilling the

Converltion Aga.iruitTorture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or PUrlishmef1t,Sen. Treaty Doc. 100-20, 10QIhCong., 2d Sess., at 15t May 23,1988; Senate Committee on ForeignRelations, Executive Report 101-30, August 3D,1990t at 25, 29, quoting summary and analysissubmitted by President Ronald Reagan,. as revised by President George H.V-l..Bush.

92

229. (VIIFQDO) Annual U.S. State Department CountryReports on Human Rights Practices have. repeatedly condenmedharsh'interrogation techniques utilized by foreign governments. Forexample, the 2002 Report, issued in'March 2003, stated:

[The United States] have bee.n given greater opportunity to makegood all. our co~trnent to uphold standards of human dignilyand liberty. . .. [N]o country is exempt from scrutiny, aI1.daUcountries benefit from constant striving to identify theirweaknesses and improve their performance. . . . [T]he Reportsserve as a gauge for our intemational human rights efforts,pointing to areas of progress and drawing our a ttention to new andcontinuing challenges.

In a world,marching toward q.emocracy and respect for humanrights, the Uni ted States is a leader, a partner and a contributor.\"1e have taken this' responsibility with a deep and abidi;ng beliefthat human rights are universal. They a.renot groundedexclusively in American or western values. But their protectionworldwide serves a core U.S. national interest.

.

The State Department Report identified objectionable practices in avariety of cOlmtries including, for example, patterns C!fabuse ofprisoners in Saudi Arabia by such means as "suspension from bars byhandcuffs, and ~1Ieats against family members,.. . [being] forcedconstantly to lie on hard floors [and] deprived of sleep. . . . " Otherreports have criticized hooding and stripping prisoners naked.

230. (U/ jFOVO) In June 2003,President Bush issued astatement in observance of "United Nations International Day inSupport of Victims of Torture:" The statement said in part:

The United. States declares its strong solidarity with torture victiIII.Sacross the world. Torture.anywhere is an affront to human dignityeveIy1"fhere. We are committed to building a world where humanrights are ~espected an.d protected by the rule of law.

TO

Freedom from torture is an inalienable human right.'"

Yettorture continues to be practiced around tile world by roguer~gimes whose cruel methods match their determination to crushthe human spirit. . . ,

Notorious human. rights abusers.', have sought to shield their

abuses from the eyes of the world by staging elaborate deceptionsand denying access to international human rights monitors. '

. .

The United States is committed to th~ woridwide elimination oftorture and we are leading this fig~t by example. I ceillon allgover:nments to join with the United States and the community oflaw-abiding nations in prohibiting, investigating, and'prosecutingall acts 0,£tortme and in undertaking to prevent other cruel and

. unusual punishment. . . .

ConcenlS Over Participation in the ere Program

.231: ~ During the course of this Review, ~ number of

Agency officers e)..-presseditTIsoIicitedconcern about the possibility of .

recrimination or legal action resulting from their participation in theCTC Program. A number of officers expressed concern that a hum.anri hts au mi t ursue them for activities

Additionally, they feared that the Agency"\-volid not stand behind them if this occurred.

232. ~ One officer expressed con~em th~t one day,Agency qfficers will wind l:p on some ':wanted list". t~ ~Pi ar beforethe vVorld Court for war CrImes stemrn.mg fromachvlties

Another said{ "Ten years from now we're going to be 'sorrywe're doing this. . . [but) it has to be done." He expressed concernthat the CTC Program will be exposed in the news media and citedparticular concern about the possibility of being named in a leak

'-.',

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237. ~ The number of detai.nees in CIA custodyis relatively small by COmpM\SOn with those in U.S. military custody.Nevertheless, the Aoo-ene\', like the military, has an mterest i.n theJ ,disposition of detainees and pdrhcular i.nterest in. those who, if notkept in isolation, would likely divulge m£onnation about the

.circumstances of their detention.

..82

- - -- -

to prosecution .1::' ,1 \'i;lblc' pn::;Sibi1ij '-, _\l1l\:-:-L [. II' \.l'rl.1i;'; ,kL1in,"!'~.

date/ hovvevc'r. no dt'Li:-.iol} h<i~b('tll\ J\1;'I(\e ll.' IH(f~ v;_'d '::I\h thi....

option.

&~..' ~ (VI fFOliC.SSC!.

-.----

CONCLUSIONS

250: ~ The Agency's ~tention andinterrogation of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabledthe identificati<?n an.d apprehension of other terrorists and warned ofterrorist plots plarmed for the United States and around the world.The CTC Detention and Interrogation Program has resulted in theissuance of thousands of individual intelligence reports and analyticproducts supporting the counterterrorism efforts ofD.S.policy makers and military commanders. The effectiveness ofparticular mterrogation techniques in eliciting infOlmanon that mightnot otherwise have been obtained cannot be so easily measured,however.

251. ~ Mter 11 September2001,fi1imerousAgency components and individuals invested imroeIlBe-timeand

,

effort to implement the CTC Program quickly, effectively, and withinthe law:, The work of the Directorate of Operations, CounterterroristCenter (CTC)j Office of General CoUnsel (OGC), Office of MedicalServices (OMS), Office of Teclmical Service (OTS)

_has been especially. notable. In effect, they began withalmost no foundation, as the Agency had discontinued virtually allinvolvement in interrogations after encountering difficult issues with

, earlier interrogation progr~s in Centra~ America and the Neal' East.Inevitably, there also' have been some problems with current

.

activities.

,~ . .'. :'.

. 252. ~ OGC worked closely with DoJ to determine theleg~ty of the measures that.came to be known as enhancedinterrogation techniques (EfTs). 9GC also consulted with WhiteHouse aii.dNational Security Council officials regarding theproposed. techniques. Those ~ffortBand the resulting DoJ legalopinion of 1 August 2002 are well documented, That legal opWon

, was based, in substantial part, on OTS analysis and the experienceand expertise of non -Agency personnel and academics concerningwl;lether lo.ng-term psychological effects would result ITom use of the'proposed tec-1u:riques.

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253. ~ The DoJ legal opinion upon which the Agencyrelies is based upon technical definitions of "severe" treatment andthe "intent" of the interrogators, and consists of finely detailedanalysis to buttress the conclusion that Agency officers properlycarrying out BITswould not violate the Torture Convention's'prohibition of tOli:Ure,nor would they be subject to criminalprosecution under the U.s. torture statute. The opinion does notaddress the separate question of whether the application of standardor enhanced techniques by Agency officers is consistent with thetmdeTtcL1.dng,accepted conditionally by the United States regardingArticle 16 of the Torture Convention, to prevent "cruel, inhuman ordegrading treabnent or punishment."

. 254. ~ Periodic efforts by the Agency to elicitreaffirmation of Administration policy and Do} legal backing fo1' the

. .Agencys use of EITs-as they have actually been employed-have

.been well advised and successhll. However, in this process, Agencyofficials have neither sought nor been provided a written statementof policy or a formal signed update of the Do} legal opinion,inclucl.ing suCh important determinations as the meaning andapplicability of Article 16 of the Torture Convention. In July 200-3,theDCI and the General Counsel briefed senior Administration officialson the Agency's expanded use of BITs. At that time, the AttoTIleyGeneral affirmed that the Agency's conduct remained we11within thescope of the 1 August 2002 DoJ legal opinion.

255. ~ A number of Agency officers of variousgrade levels who are involved with detention and interrogation

.

acti'\rities are concerned that they may at some future date bevulnerable to legal action in the United States or abroad and that theU.S. Government will not stand behind them. Although the currentdetention and interrogation Program has been subject to DoJ legalrevie'w and Administration political approval, it diverges sharplyfrom previous Agerlcy policy and practice, rules tha t governinterrogations by U.S. military and law enforcement officers,statements of U.S. policy by the Department of State, and public

101

statements by very senior U.S. officials, :inducting the President, aswell as the policies expressed by Members of Congress, otherWestern governments, :international organizations, and human rightsgroups. In 'addition, some Agency officers are aware of interrogationactivities that w~re outside or beyond the scope of the written DoJopinion. Officers are concerned that future public revelation of theeTe Program:is inevitable and will seriously damage Agencyofficers' personal reputations, as well as the reputation andeffectiveness of the Agency itself. '

,

256~~ The Agency has generally providedgood guidance and ,support to its officers who have been detainin

,

and inteno atin hi 11.value terrorists usin EITs, ursuant to

In particular, eTe did a co:mri1.endable'ob in directin themterrogations of high value detainees atAt these foreign locations, Agency personnel-with one notableexception described in this Review-followed guidance andprocedures and documented their activities well.

.

257. (.rs,( By distinction, the Agency-especiallyin the. early months of the Program-failed to provide adequatestaffiri& guidance, and support to those involved with the detentionand rnterro alion of detainees in

258. ~Unauthorized, improvised, inhumane,and undocumented detention and interro ation techni ues were.. .

used

i--T........~:-...-.

102

subject of a seGeneral.

unau onze tec ques were use in t e Interrogation 0 anindividual who died at Asadabad Base while under interrogation byan Agency contractor in Jtme 2003. A "enc officers did not normallyconduct interrogations at that location me Agencyofficers involved lacked timely and adequa e gm an~e, training,experience, supervision,.or authorization, and did not exercise soundjudgment.

259. ~ The Agency failed to issue in a timely.manner comprehensive written guidelines for.detention andinterrogation activities. "Although ad hoc guidance \vas provided tomany.officers through cables a~d briefings in the early months ofdetention and interrogation activities,. the DCI Confinement anqInterrogation Guidelines were not issued tUltil January 2003, severalmonths after initiation 'ofinterrogation activi and after man

. of theunauthorized activities had taken lace.

.~60. ~ Such written gt;dq.anceas does exist to

address detentionsandinterrogati,ons undertaken by Agency officers.s inadequate. The

Directorate of Operalions Handbook contains a sin le ara raph thatis intended to uide officers

Neither this dated guidance nor generalAgency guidelines 0n routine intelligence collection is adequate toinstruct and protect Agency officers involved in contemporaryinterro ation activities

261. ~ During the .interrogations of twodetainees, the waterboard was used in a manner. inconsistent with the'written DoJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002. DoJ had stipulated that

103

its advice ~vasbaseQ.upon certain facts that the Agency hadsubmitted to Do], observing, for example, that ".. . you (the Agency)have also orally infoJ.!.nedus that although s0n:-eof these tedmiquesmay be used with more than once [sic], that repetition will not besubstantial because the techniques generally lose their effectivenessafter several repetitions." One key Al- a'ida ten'oristwas sub'ectedto the waterboard at least 183 times

and was denied sleep for a period of 180 hours.In this and another instance, the technique of application and volumeof water used differed from the Do} opinion,

OMS provided comprehensive medicalwhere EITs were

OMS did not issue formal medicaJ; guidelines'lUltil April 2003., Per the advice of CTC/Legal, the OMS Guide1meswere then issued as "draft" and remain so even after being re-issued

. .

in September 2003.

264. ~ Agency officers report that reliance onanalytical assessments that were unsupported by credible intelligencemay have resulted in the application ofEITs V'rithoutjustification,

.

Some participants in the Program, particularly field inten-ogators,judge that CTC assessments to the effect that detainees arewithholding information are not always supported by an objective'

104

evaluation of available information and the evaluation of theinterrogators but are too heavily based, instead, on preswnptions of"\vhat the individual might or should know.

266. ~ The Agency faces potentially seriouslong-term political and leg"al c;hallenges as a result of the CTCDete;r:ttion"and"Interrogation Program, particularly its use of BITs andthe inability of the U.S. Government to decide what it \vill ultimatelydo vvith terrorists detaine~ by the Agency. "

-

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......-,",

RECOt\f~\'1ENDA TTONS

107

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Appendix A

PROCEDURES.AND RESOURCES

_ 1. (T~.A team/led by the Deputy InspectorGeneral, and c81nprising the Assistant Inspector General forInvestigations, the Counsel to the Inspector Generat a seniorInvesligations Staff Managerl three Investigators! two Inspectorsl anAuditof, a Res~arch Assista-Dt,and a Secretary participated in this.Review.

2. t~ OIG.tasked relevant components for allinformation regarding the treatment and interrogation of allindividuals detained by or on behalf of CIA after 9/11. Agencycomponents provided O~Gwith over 3~/OOO page~ of do~uments.OIG conducted over 100 interviews with individuals who possessedpotentially relevant information. vVeintervie\ved senior Agencymanagement officials, includ.ing the Del, the Deputy Director orCentral Inte~ligence, the Executive Director, the General Counsell andthe Deputy Director for Operations.-.A.s nevI information developed I

OIG re-interviewed several individuals.

OIC personnel made site visits to theinterrogation facililies. Ole personnel also

to review 92 videotapes of interrogations

.. ".


Appendix B

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Appendix C

TOP ~RETu.s. Deparbnc:nt of Justice

Office ofLcgal Coui1sd

Augu.stl,2002

Memorandu.m for John RiizoActing Gener:11Cauos.:! of the Central Intelligence Agency

Y011have asked for this Office!s vieVr"SCI~whether cer<EiI}proposed conduct wouldviola.t-ethe p,rohibition against torfJlre found at S~tion 2340A of title 18 of the Unite4 StatesCode. You have askcl for this advIce in the course of con.ducting imeIT<Jgat1onsof AbuZubaydah. As we UJ1derstandit, Zubaydah is one.oftlie pjghest ranking mernbers of the <;\lQawa(f,IToristorganiT..ation, with \\imch th~ United States is cUiTelltlycngagt.d in 1111international fu"TIlW<:.onflic-tfollowing the attacks on w.eWorld Trade. Ce.nterIDd the. Pent1!.gollon September 1l,2001. Th:i$letter memorializes ourpr.evious erat advice, gi en 011July 14,2002 and July 16,2002, that the proposed conduct wourd uot vi{}late.tills prohibition.

l

Our ad.vict: is Da:s~ uP~!i the fuI:Iflwmgfact!>,v.t.ieh.5'OUhav~provided.to u.s. We alsoundersfund that you de not have all)' fuGlsin your poss.ession contr2ry to the f-aGts(]utliqeaJ1.C-r;:,md. this opinion is limited to these facts. Ifthe'se. facts were to ch:mgo, this a.dvice would nOlnecessarily apply. Zuba}"'rlEhis currently being held by tbe United States. Tbe lllten'Ogation teamj$ certain that he bas additional informa'tion that he refuses to divulge. Specifioally, he iswithholding information regarding terrorist p-c-twQrksin the United States or in Saudi Arabia andinfOimati.on regarding plans (0 conducla!15clcs within the United States or against our interestsover:rea.,>.Zubaydah has become accustomed to a certain l~vel oftteatrnent and displays.no signsof 'willingness to dLsc10sefurther infoITruilio.h.t-,.foreDver,your intelligence rndicates that th30reiscurrently a level of"chatl;c;r" cq!1alto that which preccd~d LheSeptember ll.atticks. In iight ofthe infor.m.8rion you believe. Zubaydah h:1.S.a1'1dthe high ]evel of threat you believe !lOWexists.you .wish to move t~ mt(:rrogations into what you ha'le'rl~ribed. as .m "increased pressure~u~n .

As part ofd1.is mcrease;d pressure phase, Zubay&h wi\! Mve COllta(;.(only with a newinte.rrogation specialist, whoil he 110:no! mct previously, and the Survival. Evasion, R~istancc..Escap~ ("SERE") training psychologist w!K!has be~Din\'oJved wilb !hI'.interrogatioD2 since Ihcybegan. TIllS phase wi!! likely last no more;than severa1 days but could las! up to thirty days. Intilis phase., you wouJd like to employ tel1techniqUes that you believe will dislocate his

T~RRr

eXpe.ctatiollS rcg;u-ding tht treatment he bclieves he will receive B11de.ucourage. him to discJose

the crucial infoIII1atiol1 mentioned above. These len techniques are: (1) attention grasp, (2)

walling, (3) fucial hold, (4) facia! slap (insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing,(7) SITe.sspositions. (8) sleep deprivation, (9-) insects plac.ed in a c.ffi!finemeut box, and (10) the

wate.rboard. You have informed us that the Use oft:hes~ techniques would be 011an as-needed

'basis and t..l-}a1not aJI ofthese techniques will n~sarily be used. The i[l~ogation tc&"11woulduse: these: techniques in some combination to convince Zl1baydah. mal t4e only way.he can

influe.n.ce hi.s sun:o\4l.drng.environment is through.cooperation. You rowe, however, informed usth~ you expect these techiUques to be used in some sort of esccla:dng faslliqll, culqlinating wimihe. wat€!board, th-ough hOt ll~tcssarily ent!illg with thjs recbnique. MO"reqvf,t, you-:have-a!so

orally i:nfonned us that although some, of these iechniqu.es Inay be used ...villi more than once, tfutt

r~pe.tirion will not be; subst:E.ntial because. the te.clm.iques generally low their e;ffe.cdv~aess aftet

several repe;ti.QOTIS. You haV'~ als'q ,informed us that Zaba~itlah slistained a woU!!d dtui.ng biscapture, which i~ being treated.

Based on the: facts you have. given us, W~ uhdersiand. each of these ~.cb.niq1Jes 10 be asfqUows. The attention grasp consists of gr:asping the.individual "lith both hands. one hand one.a.chside of the. collar opening, in (l cOntrolled an.dquick motion. In.the samemotion as thegrasp; the ii1di'vidtialis Q.ra\.\'!ltow8qi~ inten'ogat<>r.

For walling, a flexible fuIse wall will be c01!Structed, The individual is plaev--d with his

litels l'o1ichihg.tl1e:wa:1l :Th~ mrerro-ga.tor puUs .the in:divrous1 fot:ward 'and:then -qtt5JJk1y'andfumly pt!.S~e5 the individual into the wall. It is the individual' 5 shoulder blades that hit th~ walL

Durillgthi.s'motioa, the head and neck are supported with a. roUed hood or towel that provides ac-colJar effect to help prevent whiplash. To further reduce the probability of inJIlry, the

in.dividual G alLowed to rebound from the flexible waLL Yau have ornJly informed uS that thefa1se wall is in par\. conEtructed io create a loud sound when th.e. iru:1ividillil hits it, which ",ill

11.1rthershock or surprise in the individual_ In part, the.idea. is to crea"tea.'SQuad thal wilLmake. theimpaGt seetn far \vorse thaJ1it is atJd \"hatwill be far wo~e than ai:Lyinjuq.thal D1ig\+tresult fromthe. actioD..

The facial hold is used to held' the. head jrnmQQile. One apiill pq!in is-'pl¥ed on,eith~rside of (he individual's face. 1he fingertips arc; kept \i\'Cil a.way ftom the indivi~l:s e.yes.

With tlie facial slap or insult s{"p, the m.terr<:i"gatoI'slapsthe iru.l"ividual's face \\,jth fingerssIightJy spread. The. hand tmke.s GOn.tactwith the ;Ire<>directly between the tip of the individual'schin and th.e bottom of the correspondin.g earlobe. The mteITogaior inva.des tl1e indhiduaJ"spersonal sp.ace. The goal of the facia!slap is not to inflict physical pain that is se.vereor lasting.lnstead, the purpose of the facial slap is to induce shock, surprise, andior humilia{j:dn,

~~.

Cramped GOufinemenl invO-i\'e8the pla.ecrneut ofthe i.ndivi.d\lalin a confined space, thedimensiGn5 ofwhich re-strict<heL'1<liVidual'smovement. The co!:Lfine{\space is usuallyd.ark,

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The d.urdtion of confinement varies baSed up~n tlre sire of the contllner. For 1he farger cGrtf111~d

sp~. the individual can stand up Of slt down; the smaiI~r space is large eno~trp. fur th~'Subjed to.:>itd0W~ Confiii.em~nt in dle larger space canlast Up_ t9 e!E~teel1houf$~ for the sma.ll-erspace,COnfil1ctffi&tt lasts for no more than two hours.

Wall standing is used to induce muscle fatigue. The illdiviGual sumds about four fo .fivefeet u-om.a waU, ",ith his feet spread approxima!iZIyto shoulder width. His aITQ..'jare str~tched(jilt in front ofhi.ro, with his fingers ~sting on'the walL His Engers support ;;1[of his body

wei.ght. The individual is not permitlro to move or ttpositiculil$ liand~ or fud.

A variety ofsrrei;s positions may be used. You ha.ve informed us that these positionsarenot designed to produce the pain associated with contortion.s 01:twisting of the bGdy. Rather.som.ewhat like walling, they arc de.sign.ed.to produce the physical diswmfort associaM:dwithmt1~cIe fatigue. Two particular stress positions are likely to be used. on Zuba.ydah: (l}.sitting onthe £IGor '\\I'Fchlegs ci.'tended s!l1I1ghtout in ITob1of hIm with his arms raiSw. above his 400; and

.(2) kneeling on the floor '>>mileleaning back at a 45 degree angle. You have also orally informedU$that through obse.rving Zubaydah in captivity, you have noted 1:1>2the app~s to be quite:flexible despite bis wouud.

Sleep deprivaq.o n ma.y ~ used. You have.1ndicated iliat your purpose in using t:l;rist5Chnique is. to reduce tbe indh.iduiJ's wilityto think ail.lrls feet and, tbrougb the dfscQmforta:;sotmtell with tack 'of~p;' tum(}d\'are-h1mio'"oop~ri!.te: 1:he-e-frechJf-sucb:o<{~ep..dc:pri"i<&on. -.-.

\viH g(;neraUy remit after one or two nights'ofunintetpJPted:slet;p. You hn.ve-infohnd U.smatyour. resear:eh has revealed: that, in rare instauMS, sohiJ~individmds who areaIreadypredisposedto psychologiCal problems may e.xperience abnom1al reactioflS to sleep deprivation.. Even inthose cases', however, rea,ct.ion.s abate after the il'\rlividualis permit.ted to' sh:~p. Moreover,personnd with medical training;IT"eavailable to and will intervene in (he-unlikely event Df anabuol"l1H\lr~action. You hav~ qrallv infGnned us the~yo," would !lot d.~l?ri\'eluba.yaah of sleeprOTmor~ t.~aJieleven days at 8.time and tIlat )'ou h.a.veDre\-~ouslykeot him a,,"'akefor 72 hours,from which no melltal or physical ha~ resUlrtd.

.

Y01.1would like to place Zubayd<ili in a cramped confineme.nt box. ,0tb. an in.se.ct. You

have irtfomw.dus that he a.ppear:;to have a fearofinsecT.$.fn particuleJ:.Y9Uwould like to tellZubaydah dial :\'ou intend. to place. a stinging L'1Sectin10the.box with him. You would, however,p!:a.cea hannless insect in the box. You.have Grally infQJ:mea.lIStl1Z.ty{)Uwould jn fact l;;.cea

arml 5 j sect.suGh. as a caru:oHlar i.a.the box.\¥ifu.ill~

Finally, you would 4kc to use a te;tbn.iq~ (;ailed !:he"waLtrboar:d." In this prawiun; theindividual is bour,d sec.urely to.an hidi.n.~ bench, w1;1ichis approxirnn.toLyfour mt by seven fe~tTue individual's feet e.re generally elevated. A clQth isPta=l6ver tl1efdt~~<:adand eY~. \Ve.rer

T~3

A

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is tJlel~applied to the cloUt il1a.cGlitroHed manner. As th.is is done, the clod, is lowere.d untit itCOVeTS'both the nose and mouth.. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the. mouth

Md ncrse, air fl-ow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 sec-onds due to the. prese.nce of the doth.. This

causes an increase it}carbon dioxi<k-level in the individU2.l's. blood:. This increas~ 1n the carbolldioxide leve! stirtlluates'inere.2Eed (lffort to brtathe.. This' effort pIns the <::lothpiQd1i~ $0

ptrceplion Of"suffocatibn and incJ:pie.n.t panic,", i.e.,\.the percep.tioD. 'Of dt0wt..i~~. 11,l~1ndividl1al

docs ll!)( 'bre.a.th~ an}~water into his lun~. Durilig tli.ose 20 lo 40 seconds, v.ra.tcr i.g c.ontm\Jo~!yapplied from a. height of twelve to t\V~fy-t'dUt Il.'rClie!i,After thIs-period. fuy cloth. r$ :!ifte4, and

th~ individual. is allowed to bt'~a:the unimpeded fur thre.e Or f()uf~l breaths. 'fhe se!1sati,oit'ofdrowning is il'm:nedi4tcly rdi~v.e.(fby the removal df ihri cloth. The-procedure may.thci1 Oe-'

re-peared. The water is usu.aUy applied from a cante.en cup or small wat~ri.ng catl With 8. spout.

You have orally inf{)rmed us that this procedure triggers aD automatic physiological- sensatiol1 of

dro''r'ning that the iodividuaf cannol c.ontrol even. though he; may be. aware: that he is. in fact notdcowning. You have also orally i..'1fo'rrneJ us that 1'tis likely ti)at tj-11s'Procedure Vioaia Dot last

more than 20 minutes in any aile application.

W-ealso understand that a medical expert with SERE experience. will be prese.ntthrough.out this phase. and tr,at the proce.di.1re5'''ill be stoppe.dif deemed medically Il,(?()e.SSarytoprevent severe mental or physicd harm to Zubaydah. A.smcnuoned a.bove: Zuhay(,12hsumredan injury during his ca.pture. You have inform.e.d\L~that steps Vr-i!l~ t2...1<ento ensure. diat tbisinjur)1is not in any wa.yexacerbated by the useof these.m~thods and tt:PJ adeqU2.temedicclatreri.fiOllwiJI-be give!! to cnsure that it "viR .heal properly_.

.

II.

fu this part, We. t-eviewt\1e conte.xt within Which these proceaures w1ll be applied.. You

have inforroed us that you ha:ve taken. vado\1S ~eps tb 3$cerraio wimt eff~t, if a.rJ.y, these. techniques wourd have on Zubaydah's mental health. Thesesame teclici.q1,l~,willi the'exception

of the insect in the cramped. confined space, have been iIsed and continue to oe used on some.member? of our military personnel during their SERE training. Be.cause offue us~ oftheseprocedures in training CUr<)Wnmilitai-y personnel to resist intetTogations, YQ\).have consulted'with various individuals who.have c:>-'tensive~xperien.ce in the useo.fthesD techniques. You havedone so in order 10ensure that no prolonged l11~tl.talharm would result frem tile use ofthes.eproposed 'procedures.

D¥"Qugh your consultation with various individuals r!;Sponsible for such h:airling, youhave learned thai thes~ t<:clmiques ha\!(: be.. :. ~ -,. . t f . CQnduct ,vjthout any

. . .e t of rolonJ!ed mental bami. f the SERE school,

as'report mt, during the seven-year pe.riod that he spent ill thost po'Sltlons, m were two requests nom Congress forinformation concerning alleged injuries resulting from tberraining. On~of these inquiries wasprompted by the temporary physical injllry a trnine.esustainedas result ofbeiog placed in a

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T~REr

cOlifintmeht box. The.other inqu.irlinvolVedclaimsthat tileSERE tl1lirung cause.d twoindividuals (0 engage in criminal b~havior, namely, felony shoplifting and downloa!iin& tlrildpo

.

mo.iraph;l ooto a military computer. Acconiing to this.official, dJ.eScclaims \:ere f~~oreover, he.has il.1dicat~that duringthe.three:mda ha!fycars'be spe.[)t~~f the SERE program, he trilinerl I0,000 ~t1ldell.\:S.Of those.stude.llts, olily t\vo.droppedout oft11etraio.jugfollowing tbe.LIScOftJl~t techniques.Althougb on rareoCC3SioDssome stUdencs temporarily postponed the rem.ainqer oft11eir training and receivM psychologicalcounse.ling, tbose. slllden!s were able to finish theprogramwithoutany indi.catio~of sllbseque.fitmenral he.alrh effects.

.

:H~'~~r'.~.. pnhg ase

ten'ye.ars; insofu as he is i';{2re, tiQi1~13ffu~''iili1iVroqW.hvliQ CO~\p1.eted.the' pro gram: suf(e:rGd ip.yadve.r$c men.tal health effects. H~ 1iifoD1\.edyo.t1:that time. W<!S()ne:p6:SQ~ wiiQ .Jidfu:1t cQroplete

the {r'aming. That p~rson experiem:ed' an adverse mental. he8lth leactiOn. that lasted. ouly fwohours.

.After those l\vo hours, the individu.aYs symptoms spontmeGusly. dissipated without

requiring tratmCI1t Qr counSeling and no other symptoms were ovcl reported by this i!idiv-iduaLAccording to the information. you have provided to us, this assessment of the use ofthese

proce.dur~ ru.dudes the i.1Seof the wate.rboard.

.n-GJmthe\.iuch--YQtisupplicl:l to us.

has experience 'with the use ot 11'0 ese pro' ures In a course of CQoduGt,wit the'6kcept!Onorthe insect ill the confme.rnentbox arJdthe Waterboard.This me.morandlUncQ'nfirmsthat theuse ofthes6 procedures has no! resuh.ed.iiJ any reponed instances ofproloo.ged mentallw.m, andv: fuw 'nstances Qfirnmeiliate and temporary adverse p.'i~hologic8. responses to the tra,ipjl1g.

eported thal 2.small minority of studel1ts have had temporoy adverse.psychological reactions during training. Offue 26,819 Sll1de.utstrained frum 1992I:bro~gh 2001in tlie Air Force. SERE training, 4.3 percrot Gfthose students ~ contact with psychologyservices. Gfthose.4.3 percetit, only 3.2 p.erc~1itwerepulle;c,i!Ibm.$e'Qm:gmm...for psychologicalrcasO?s._ Thus, outof~le srodents trained'ov.er~~ DrilY

..

O.1~Ut.~

.

e1.c' LW~;'.ut~ea!~Q~ (heprogr-am for psychotoglcal reasons. Furfuecmore, althol1gn~ca(ed that surveysof students havin~ coropl~i:I. this:troining.are !;lotdone,i1ei?t~ confidenCe1l1atthe (rainingdid not causean¥ long-tean psyChological impact He basedJus conclusion on the debriefing ofstudents that is daM a..fte.rtho training. More importa.n.tly,he based this asseSSment on the factt!la( although training is required tQbe extremely stressful in order to be effeCtive, very fewcomplaints have be.ci1made regarding the training. During ru5'tenure, in which HJ,0ODstudentswere Imined, no congr.ession.a! complaints h3.vebeen wad~. While th~ was' ene In.spectorGeneral complllint, it W.8.$flot due: to psychological coneems. MOlWvc:r,he: was av..1ITeof on.lvone hotter inquiring about the lo['..g":'~rmimpact ofthese rechrJques from aD individual trained.

TO~B£T 5

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overtwe.nty~ouud. thatit wasimpassibleto attribUte.thisindividual's-symptomstohis !.raining.~onduded tl.12tif (herear~anylong-termpsychologicaleffectsof cheUnited States Air Force lrailling using the proceduf<:S outlined aoove they "are certain.ty .minimal."

Willi fP..sFecr to the w<!.terboard, you. have also orally informed us (hat tbe. Ni;'vy contiu\J!"-S

to use it in training. You h.w~ infonned us that your on-site ~sychologi;;Es, whIJ have ext~!';xperi.ence: with the use ofthe \>''aterboard in Na.vy trainio.g, have not eric6uri.t,,,red any significantlong-term inenta! health consequences from its use. Your oa-sire-psycl1blogi.$ts have. alSo

indicat6ithat JPRA has likewise Dot repocte<I'Ill1YsignillGaI!.t long:-!.e'rm.mental healthcOQsquetlCes from t:h:<:l)Se of the '\\'.'iterboaro. Y 0.\1'have iufuuned us that. Qther-smices 'Ce~~

llse of the wate.rboard because. it wa:sso successf1J1 as an interrogErion technique, but Qot becauseof aII.}'COllceiDS OVe! ,my harm, physical or n1en.ta~. caUsed by iL It WaIfa.... '. ..

almos.t 100 percent effettive in producil1g GOoperation among the tDllnees. itooindlcatc.d 01at he had observed the: use of the \varetboa.'"d in Navy troinfug .s9m~ rerr to.

,.ve

times. Each time it resulted in c0.GperaMn but it dld not rosu!t in a11)'ph.ysical harm'to the-student.

You have also revie.wed d1Crdeva11t literature and fOUIld0.0empirical data on the effectof these tedmiqtle.s, \\.1th the exceptimr of sleep deprivation. Vn.thrasp~ct' ta sleep depriv"ti.o!1,you have informed lISthat is 110tuncommon for someone to be deprived 0 f steep for 72 hot4"'Sa.l1dstill petform excellently en vimia].-spaticl JOOt-or.fusl-ffiandshQIt-t(;:rmmeroory t:e$ts. Althoughsome individuals may experience hallucinations, attorc:liDgto the-literature you sorve,yed, thosewbo ~xper1en.ce such 'Psychoti.c SY1!1ptQn1Sha.v~almost aJwar~>,hadsuch episoaes prior to tb.<:sleep d~dvatioD. You l1av'Cindicated the s{lIdiesof len."tJth.ysleep deprivation shOwed nbpS)'cITosis, loosening oft.J1ough!s>flattening ofeffiQ~ojJ.S,delusions, Ofparano'id id~~. In opecase,.eVenafter eleven day~ of d~~riv;ltio~ nO'.Dsy.chosi5or'pcnna.r;e!lt bra.i:o<4ma~td. OCCUlTed.ill faDt th.c n\dlvI.dual [c;port<:dfeelil1g almost backtonormBI alIer o!)e night's sleep. Fur'tl1er,base.d aLlthe experiences "ith. its lL"'efu military traicing ("llere it is' induced for up to 48 hpurs),you fo1i!id that rarely, if ever, will the individual suffer harm after th~ sleep deprivation isdis~htinue:d. Instead, the. effects remit after a f~w good nights of steep.

You have tak.en the additional step of consulting with U.S. interrogations eX:p~rtSJan.dother individuals with oye;rsight over the SERE.training process. Non~ of these individuals wasaware of any prolBtige.d psychological efteet caused by the use of any of the above. techniqueseither se.parately' or as a course of conduGt. Moreo\'eJ', you consulted.with 'outside psycbologiStswho reported that they were unaWareohny cas~ where long-termproblems have OCCtL'TeiJ~ <1reS\1lt of tbese technlques.

Moreover, in consulting \\-;th a numher ofmental health experts, you have learned thatthe effect of any oftbe.se procedures will be dcpe.ndant on the.in.dividual's personal history,tuLtural history md psy<:holog!<;:RItt'.nd£,;ffde..~.To that tncl.,)'ou iUiVCinformed us !:hiltyou have

.

TO~~E1' 6

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completed a psychological assessment of Zubadyah. This asscssmem is based 011imerview$ 'Nill,Zubayd.ah., observations ofhim., and information col1ected from other-sources suc.h as intelligcnce

and press reports. Ourundersranding of Zubaydah's psychological profile, which we set forthbe-low, is based on that asses~rnC:ilt.

According to flris as.sessmecnt,Zubaydah, though anI}; 31, rose 'l.uick.Jyf::om ver;y lowkvd mujahedh'l tQ third or fourth man in al Qa.t0a. He hag 5erved as Us;j.rnaBiD,L2;den's sepiorlieutenant. In. that capaci.ty. he bag Illi!lHJ.geda ~letwork oftrail1iug c.amps.H~ has beeninstrumental in the Mining of operatives' for a.lQaedu, the EgypuErt Islarnic Jilmd,artd orucr

. terrorist ekrnents. inside Pakistalland Afghanistim.He acted as "th~Deputy Camp Conu11<l:!1derfor al Qaeda wdining camp in A.fglE.nistm, peFSonaJlyapproving entry and gradu<itionof allrra.inees during 1999-2000. From 1996 umi11999, he approved all ir:.dividilals going iil and outof Afghanistan to the. trainin.g CfullpS. Further, no OM went in and oui ofPeshay''ar, Pakistanwithout hiI'>i<nowlerlge:and approval..He also act~d as al Qae.da'sco@linator of eXternalconta.!:ts 1j.ndforeign commUJlic.atioD.S.AdditiotJaUy, tie has acted as al Qa.~da's c.oun.ter-incetligence officer aud has been tru$led to find spies within the:.arganization.

Zu1;1aydah has been invQlved L'1c:verymajorterrorlst.6p.eraUOrI carried. out by al Qaeda..He was a plamler for the MilleJ1Jiium pIotto at1ack. D,S. and Israeli targets during the MUle.Dll.ium

celebraaens in Jordan. Two of the cell"tral fig.ores ill this plot who we,re. arre.rted mvtide"n:tilied

Zubaydah as the. supporter of rheir cell and the plot. He also served as a pJalmer for the Paris

EmbMsy- plot"in 2001. Morzo\'er; he was one of the p.1a1lIlf,fSofllie September II att.ack" Priqrto his C8pture, he: was wgaged in pla!lJ.1:ingfiituf(~ tertOlisi attacks against U. S. inte.restS.

Your psychological ~:;essmi:Ilt indicaTe.s_tbat it is beEeved Zu.baydah wrote a! Qaeda' smanual on resistance- techniques , You also b~Heve that his experiences in al Qaeda make him"Wen-,!-cquainted with. an.d 'well -veIS,e&LfJsuch' tcohni~s. As part of'hisro-le in. at Q1tcda,ZuGayd.$:visi.1:ed incIMd.uili-.in pnson and he"lpl<dthem ~pon theirre.t~e_ Tbrollgh tflls.contatt

a~d a~v:itics \-v"h:b.othet 0.1QtWdam,ujahedin, you be:lit\ve!hat he knQWSma.n.ystorks of capture,jr..terro~tian, aud ~istance to such in.terro.gatiull: AdditionaJty, he has spok(;fl. \vith Aym.a,d al-

Zawalilii, and you beJi~ve it is likely thai thet\\'O <!i9cussedZawahiri's tl:perie.nc6S as a. prisoner

of the Russians and the Egyptians.

Zubaydah stated dUrlag iDlerviews dla.the thinks of an)' activ![}'"outside of jihad as"silly." He has indic.ate.dth.at his hear( !llld mind are devQted to ser\'mg Allah and LsIEiB.through

. jibd and he has stated that he has no dou.bL~or regretsabout committingwmse.lfto jihad.Zubaydah believes that the global victory ofIslam i~ ine-vitable. You have. infoDl1ed us that uecontinues to express his unabat~ desire to kill ;\merkans 8l1dIt;\,~..

Y1Jurpsychological assessment describes his pe:rsonality:os follaws. He. is "8 highly seU'-- dir~ted individual \-vho priies his iad€:pendence." He ha.$"nards-cisne features," which are

evidenced in the attention he pays to his personaf appearance and his "obvious <e-fforts'to

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~REf

d~molJ5trate that he is really a rather.'h1.!mbkai1d regular guy. '" He is "somt'iv!1at cODlpu1sive"

in how he organizes his environment and business. fIe is confident, self-aSsured, aad PQSS~ses

an air of authoni}'. Whil5 he. admits to at times v,'teStling with h'ow to determine Who is an

"innocem," he has ackt10\\~edgerl cclebrating the deslrUction of the World Trade Center. He is

inreUigent and intellectually curitHls. He displays Hexcdlent self-discipline." TIle as$e.ssmemd.escribes him as a perfccliooist, pf.L~istent, private, and highly capa.bl~ in his ~ocjal interactions.He is very gullrded abOLrtopening up to others and your assessm~nl repeatedly emphasize~ that

he tends not to trust others e2.sily. He is alS()Uqukk to recogni.ze and ass~ss the moods andmotivations of otl!Er.s." FurthermoT'C: he is proud o{lUs !).bility to li"eand dece~v~others

stlcce$stl.!lly. Through. his OOception he has! among oilier things, p~nred fu:e lQcat10n of alQaroa. safeh0U5eS and- ev~ acquired. Ii United Na1t.ons refugee: ideiitffiGa'l;ion card.

. Accortiipg to )'OUl:~rls. Zubaydah do~ not ha.ve.au)"prc-exlstWg. mental GBn4itiqIis orprobletns.tbat would make him. Jike1y tosmer prolonged meI,1(allia:n'rl from Y<:n1J"'proposed

imerrog.aiion metl1ods. Through reWing.his diaries and iJtterviewing lum, you have fmind IlOhistory of "111000 disturbance Ofoilier psychia.tric pathology[,]" "'th0ught dL<-order[,].. .. . e>:J.d.uriP..gmood or [!1entalhealth proble.ms." He is ia fact "r~arkably resiHent and ccnfic!c.ntthai. he c<!novercome. adversity." When h~ encol1!\terssfmss or low mood, this appears to last only for ashort rime. He deals "'.ith stress by assessing its source, evaluati.ng the coping resources availableto him. and then taking action.. Your assessment [Jomsth.at he is "generally s~lf-suffi.cient andrdies OILhis undersrnnding and applic.ation of religious and psyd ological principles, mtel!igen.ceand d~scip~:irJ.eto a.voidand.overoome'problems."Mere0'Ver,you OB.VG-f<JLl.E.d-that hGhas a"roliabl.e arid durablo supp0rt system" in hiBfii1th;"the bles-sings of religIous kad~s, aadcamaIaderie of1.ike-miud<::dmujaberlin brothers." Duricg detemion, Zubaydah has Ib.a.-ragedhismood, remaining at most points "cirtums~> ~Lll1,c-oatrolkd, arid deliberate." He hasmaint3itkd this demeanor during aggressive inrerrogations and reductions in sltep. Yau d.escribethat in an initial C(Jofroutati0l1a1incident, Zubaydah showed signs of sympathetic ncr\'Ous systemEIow:al, which you think was possibl)' fear. Althouglt this incident led him to discloseintelligence information, he was able to quickJy regaL'1his composure, his air of ccnfidenGe, andhis "strong resolve'"' not to reveal Eo.!"!)'information.

O'(:eral1,you sulnmariu his primary strengths as the following: ability tQfocus, goal-c1ireu[w tlbciplulc, untOlUgpuGC;emotional rl;gilietl~c,str~ Savvy, abHity to orgqnize auclrn.anage people, k.een <;;b'se.rvationskills, ftl1idadaptabiJity (can aJlth::ipat~and 2.da.ptunder eu.res.s>it.dwith minimal resomces), ca~city toass~ss and exploit th-eneeds of others, -and:ab1t4")'toadjust goals to emergin.g opport\1nities.

YQUalltidpate that he ."I..iIIdraw upon his vast knowledge. of interrogation tecbIiiques to. cape with the inteuogation. Your assessmel1t indicates that Zubaydah may be willing to die IO

proteet the most important infonnation thai he holds. Nonetheless, you sie oJ the view that hisbelief tbat Islam will ul.timat.elydominate the world and thai this victory is inevitable mayprcvldo': the chance that Zubaydah will vvr. iRfnrma1ion and ratiQI11ili~ it solely as a ~porary

T~~r oo

T~T

s<;:!back.Additionally, you bdieve he may be v,'iIling COdisclose some infonnation, partic.ularlyinformation he deems to not be.critical, but which ma)' uJtimmeJy be llieful to u.<;WhCll pieced

\ogc;rl1~rwirh oilier imelligenc~ infol111J!tiollyou ha~ gained.

ill.

. Section 2J40A makes it a criTI1Jn."a!'offe.p.s~ (or aDYp~rson "oursid~ of the United'Srni:es[10] cq.nuuitfj qr attempt() to' comm.it torture." Section 2340(1) de.fine$ tOr!UTOas:

an act committed by a persor. acting under the color onaw spedfiGally illrended toi.urlici severe physical or mental pain Of s\!ffc:rmg (other ilian pain or suffering

incidental to lav.wl sanctions) upon anothe.r person. within his custody of physicalconrrot

18. U.S,C. § 2340(1). A:; we Q11tfin.edin our opinion aD. standards of con.duct und& Sett.io!),

2340A. a violation of2340Arcquin~s'(fshO'wih.g!full: (1) the torture occurred outside the UnitedStares; (2) the .d.efendant acted.under the colpr oflaw; (3) the victim was \.vi:thinthe derendant'scustody Of contra!; (4) the defendant speciiically intended toinflict ~vere pari:!or suffcffiig; and(5) that the acted inflicted .s<::verepain or suffering. S~e MemoranduIll f9f Jo1111Rizzo, Ac.tingGeneral Counsel for tbe Centrel Imelligenre Agency, f)"omJay S. Bybee, Assis:tant AttorneyGeneral, Offiee of Legal Counsel, Re: Siandarck afCon..1.uctfor Illien'oganol1 under f8 u.s.e§§ 2340-2348A at 3 (.A;u~st 1, 2001) CSec-noilJn40A Memorandum"). You ha\l~ asked. U5toassume that Zubayadah is being held outside the United Stales, Zub<'-.yaaahis within U,S.c1:lStody;and the interrogatOts axe actlt1.gunder the color of law. At issue is whether tll.1:olast twoelemenlS would be met by theuse of the:.proposes procedures,namely: wlle~herthose using theseprocedures would have the requisire ment3.] state iilld.whel~er these' proc.ed.ures v.'tmld inflict'sever~ paio Ofsuffering Within tJlemeaning onhe st811j.te.

Severe Pain OJSuffi:rin!!. In Grcierf-orpain Orsuffering to rise ta th~ level of tortllrc, thestatute requites that ~tbe severe. .1;I.swe haVc>pre\liQuslyexplained, tills re2ches b!11yextre:meacts. see id. at 13. Nonetheless, ch-awingupon cases under the TodureVicrim ProtecuoQ Act(TVPA), which has a ddiuiHC!Iloftort\,!re that issirnilar to Sectiort l~40's d~fini1.1on,we. f(.\Ulldthat a single event of suffioientJy ime:nsc pain may fall within this probibiti<m. See id. at 26. Asa.Tesult, We llave aoalyzed each Qfthese techniques separarely. In further drawing trpon U,0Se.cases, we also bave fou.nd (hat courtS tend to raJrea tatality-<Jf-..the-circumsraIlcesapproach andconsider all entire course. 0f conduct to de.term.ine whether rorrure ha.<;OC.Ctlrw:LSee jd. at 27.Therefure, in addition to cOilSideringeach technique separately, \\'e cousider them l'ogcther as

"-course of conduct.

Section 2340 defines torture as the inflicuoTl of severt physical or mental pllin orsuffe.ring. We will considerph.ysicaJ pain and menml polo separately. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1).With respect to physical pain, we previously concluded that "severe pain" within th.e meaning of

9

'T~R£T

Section 2340 is pain thm is difficult forme individual to endure ~l1dis of en it1ttt1sitj'ak.in to thepain accompanying serious physical injul')'_ Se.r3Scction 1340A Memorandurt1. a16. DrawingUpOll the TVPA precedent,. \w,:;have nmed that examples ofac!-s inflicting s~ver~,pain that typify

torture are, among other things., severe beatings wid, WeapollS such as c1ubs, and the buming ofprisoners. Sell id ar 24. We conclude below that none oUhe proposed te.clmiquts inflicts suchpain.

The. fac,ialhold ;;ild tbe.atknrion gr3-<pinvolve 110physical pain, In the absence. of suchpain it is obvious that they cannot be said to i:nilict sev~re physical pain or suffering. The stresspositions and wall stfmdlng both may result in muscLefatigue. Each involves the sustaintdholding of a position. In wall standing, it wiJI b~ holding 2.position 1.'1which an of theindivi.ducl's body weight i:splaced on his fi!lg~[ tips. The sttess positions will jjkely include.sitting Oilthe floor \'lith kgs extended straight out ill fnmt and arms raised above the head, andkneeling on t11«;fi'(}Oiand le:arringback at-a IfSdegree angle. Arty paJn associate.d \vith muselefatigue is nQt of the intensi1:'fsufficient to amQ\Jntto "severe pn)fsical pain or s~~g" under thestatute, 110r,des[Jile its discomfort, ean it be said to be diffi~ult to eIldure. t foreoi'er, you haveorally informed us that no streo,-s:position wilt be used that co\l1dint~rfurc "",itht.1.c.healing ofZuba.ydah's wound. Therefo~, we cooclude thatthese techniques ilwolve discomfort th31 fallsfur below tbe threshold of seVere physical pain.

Similar.ly, although the contlnementb@;es(both s!illJ.1land [:,rge} are physkallyutidJm.fbrtable '~u;;e ili~it size res11-ittsmtl'vel11eDt,they are not"$Osrruill as to require theindividual to contort his body to-sit (smill box) or stand (l2Ige box). Yon have also orallyinfomwJ us that despite hiS'wound, Zu.baydaJlremains quit~ flexibLe,which wo1.1ld,substimticltyreduce any paill associated with being placed in the box. \Ve have no information. from the.mEodjca]expects you have consulted that tbe limited duration for which the individual is kGpl in,he.boxes causes any substanrid physic.al pain. As a result, we de !lot think the use of theseboxes CEltbe s?id to cause pain that is oHlle imensit}' ass()cia.t~dv,~lhserious physical inJury.

The use. of one of these boxes wilh the introduction. of an in..-<ectdoes Dot alter thisassessme.nt. As We understand it, no actually harmft'tJ: imcct ",ill be, placed in the. box. Thus,tbough the. introdu<>tion of an insect UHfypr6duce trepidation in Zubaydah. (which we. disc\:1ssbelow), ir.ceort;iinly iloe~ Hut t:<!.usepb.Y3ic~Xpui[\.

As j{)r sleep de-po valiorL, it is clear that depriving SQmeone 0 f sleep doc-.s no! iD\'OIve

se:vW'ephysical pain within tile meaning of the stiltute. ,Jiihik sleep' deprivatiDD may involvesome physical discomfort, such as the fatigue or tbe discomfort e.xperienud in the difficulty ofkeeping one's eyes O~l, these effects remit after the individucl is permirred to sleep. Based onthe facts you have provide4 us, we are no! aWi'1t'e;of any evidenc.e.tlw.tsleep dc;prjva{io!1results iEse.VI:J:~physical pain or suffering. As a r~Jt, its use do~ not violate Section 2340A.

Even th6se t~\plques lliat involve:physicil cont<lctbetween the intr.;rroB'ltaran{\ the

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individual do nol result in se.vere pain. The fucial slap 2.nd wallir.g contiin precautions to ensure

rhm no pain even approachi.ag this !eve;[ results. The slap is deli\'~red with fmgers slightlyspread, which you have ex.pJained (0 us is <lesign~d to be less painful than a dosed-luUld slap.

The sJap is also delivered to the fleShy part ofthe face, further reducing aflY risk. of physical

da.-na.ge or serious pain.. Tbe facial slap does not produce pain that is diff\.Gtilt TOend.1!re.

Likewise, waUiflg mvolves quickly pulling the person fonvar4anp. then thrusting hiJ!! against a

flexible false. wall. YOll have informe.d.us that the sound bfhitting the. wall will s:ct\).aJtybe: far..

worse tll:'ill any possible injm)' to the. individual. TIle use of the inIled towel around the ne-de aJso.

reduces any risk ofinJtrry. White it may hurt to be pw;h~d against tile walL,any paill experiencedis not of me intensity a5S<Jdated ""i:th strious. physical injury.

A..s v,.-eunderstand i~ 11(';11the waterboaxd is used, the subject's body respo~ as if thesubject were d.tow!1ing~vefi though the. subjeci may be weE a.\%re that he is in fact notdro\>;-1ung.YG1JhaveinJ:onned us that this prdcedure does nOlinflict 3ctU.alp!1ysi<:alhaIrn. TIlus,although the subjectmaye:}.:perie:!3C<J the fear or panic associat~d with !:befeelihg of drO\vning,L'1ewmerboard does not inflict physitaJ pain. A5we e;.:pl.aiaedin rhe Section 2340AMemQrandum, "pa.in and $1Jff<;rL'1g"as used in Section 2340 is besr understood as s..singleconeept, Dot distinct concepts of "pain" as distillgtJished from "suffering." Sei! $ection 1340A

Memorandum. at 6 n..3. The wat<':rbo;;rd, wvjch inflicts no pai..ll.or !lcwd barnnvhatsoe.ver, does!lot, 111our view inflict "severe pain or sufferiag." Even if one we.re to parse the sta,tu~e morefindy to attempt to trea.i "suffering" as a disriuct concept, the warerboard could not be said to

inflict severe suffering. TILe:waI~rboarci is simply a con.trolkd 2.Gutce.pisode, lac:kL'1g the

connotation of a proiracred period of time genera!!)' given to suffering.

Finally, as we discussed above, you have informed us thar L11de.termicing whidiprocedures to use and hO'..,'you will use them, you MV.: selected (ecbniqut:.s ilial v,ill not hanil

Zubay-d:ah's Wound. You haV~aJS0 indicated that numerou.s steps will be tak~n to eIJ.,>uretharnoue of these procedur!;:S in any wa.y interfere? willi th~ proper he.slirrg of Zubaydah' s wa'UIid.

Y oul'l.a.ve also ind1~fud that, should it appear at any time thatZubayd.cll is experiencing. se erepa:iFl(jr sufferilig, the medical persollilel. all b.andwill srop rbe.Use ".if'any teehruliue..

EVe-ltwhen all ofthe:;e m.ethQd.sare considered combin6d in an ovetaH coUrse g[coDducl,Lhey stiU would not inflict severe physkal paiu or suffering. As di~cus5ed ab6\'~, a numtJ~r ofthese acts [{~u!t ill no pb.rdca! pain,others prlJl1ue~only ph)'siceJ rtiscornfor(,' Ycm have;l1diceted hiat tht3~ acts wi\! !":Olbe used \\~Olsubstamia! repttition, sa tbat there is no possibilitythat severe. physical rain CQuldarise from suc.hrepetirion.. Ac.cordinjSly,We concll1de lhat lhese~cts ndthcr se.paIatelynor as part of a course of conductwould iDfECL$\'OVe.-e.physicc.l pain orsuffering within the meaniI1gof tile statUte.

We next consider whether tile:use oft:besetedmiques wowd inflict severe mental pain orsuffe.rin.g within the !l1e<iniagofSectlo!12340. Sectiotl2340 de-rUlessevere mentaJ pail'! orsuffering as "the. prolonged mental harm caused by or resuiting from" one of severo! predic:o.te

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acts. 18 D.S.C. § 2340(2). Those prerlicate acts are: (1) the intemiona! infEction or threatenedit:Jt1klion of severe physical pain or sufferin~; (2) the admi~tratron or applkariofl, or threatel1zd

administratiOll or application of mind-alterirrg substances or other procedures. calculared to.

disrupt profotludly the senSes Of rhe perSOill!uty; (3) the Threat of immim~nl dea!h; or (4) the threat

that al1Y ofthe. precedin.g aclS win be, done Laanother pCrSon. See 1"8"U:S.C. § 2340(1)(A}.{D).

. _~ we .ha.ve explained, ,his list 0(' predicate acts is excJusive. Set! Section 2340A Memaxanrlumat 8. No other acts can suppOrt a cha.rge under Sectio[l1340A oasea on the infliction of sever~m~n~al pain or s':ufferil.1g. See id. 1bu5: if the methods that you have described do liot eithe.r in

and of themselves constitute one of these acts or as a course. of conduct fulfill the predicare actn~qujre-meltt, the prohibition has !lot been violated. See id. Betere acidressiag these kchn.iqu~,...I.'I~[late thal,it is plain that none oftlll::se procedures.involves a dm:a1 to any third part.y, the "Use'of any kind of dmgs, or (or the 1"Ga$0l1Sdescribed above, the jafJic\:ion of severe physicaJ pain.TITUS,the question is wheilier any of these ~cts, separately ()r as a.ecurse of CG.11dtlct,constitUtes athreat of severe physical pain or ~L1ffedng-ra.procedure. dcsi-gned.to disrupt praf01llldly tile senses,or Ii threat ofi.rnminent death. As we previously c1Cpla.iJ.ied, whetherau action.constitutesa-threatmust be assessed fi:om the standpoint pf ~"ieasona:qleperson in theS\lbj~t' oS.pOsition. $-ee.iri at9.

No argument cao be madethai.the a~i.~ntiongrasp or the (-adaJ.hold c.onstiilltethreats ofirnrainent death or ~e protedures designed to disrupt profoiuldly the senses or personality. illgeneral The grasp 1!l1d.the faci<'..Ihold will. startle the subject, produce f~2r, or even insult him. Asyou b1.l.V6il1for:med us; the IlSeof tr..zse.tedmiques..islJot a<:companiw by 1up~ific verb?lthroiHof s~Verephysical pain or sufferi.ng,To the extent thar theset~b.niques could be considered athrei3.tof severe physical pain or suffering, such a threat would have. to be. infeITt~dfrom Ulc actsthemselves; B~cause these actioJ3$them;;elves involve no pain, neither could be interpreted by areasQnable. person in Zubaydah"s position to C"onstitutea threat of se.vere p:iin or su...fferiilg.Accvrdingly, these two techniques. are 110tpredicate acts within the:'meari5ngof SectiOn 2340.

The facial slzp Jike\vise.falls ourside the set of predicate acts.. It plain:Jy is not a thre.:u ofirn.rnihellt deaHl, und<:r S\';l;.tioi'12340(2)(C),or 8.procedure designed to disrur.rt prafoundlythesenses orpersollality, under Section 2340(2)(B). Though it may hurt, as discussed above; theeffect is ooe of s.marting or stln~ a.T\dsurprise Ofhumiliation; bUt not severe pain. NQr does italo!Je constiMe a th.reat of S2Y<:repaiD I)f suffering, under Section 2340(2)(A). Lik~ the faciat .

hold and the a1tenaon gresp, the u!;e of this slap is not accompanied by a specific verbal threat offurther escalating violence. Additionally, you hav6 infonnlC:dus Ihat in one use this technique

. will tyPically involve at most tWOslaps. ~rtHinJy, the use-of this slap may dislQdge 1!l1)'expectation ilia! Zubaydah bad !.hathe would not be touched in a pbysica!Jy aggressive marmei.Nonetheless, this alteraIioil in his e.xpectations c01.!ldhardly be.wmtru.ed by a rea.sGnable:personin Ius situatiou to be tantamount to a threat ofsevcte physical pain 0; ~uif"0rillg. At mosL, thistechnique sugg~ts that the circ.umstances of his confinement and interrogation have dlanged.Therefore, the facial slap is Dot within the.st.ntutc's exclusive list of pmdiane ac.tS.

/TO~CRET i2

.

TO~lliT

Walling plaffily is not a prc~ure cclculated to disrupt p(ofOlUJdly {he senses orpw;.onality. \Vhile wal!i:llg involves what rrughl be characterized as rough handling, it docs nOt

involve the threat of imminem death ar, as discussed above', dIe irJlictiol1 of severe physical pain.MOl:eover, once agmn we. understand that use of ihis technique \>orin.no1.b~ accompdnied by any

specific VBJ'bal threat that viQknce wil! e>l$ue absent cdoperat!OIJ. Tr,us, like. the. facial s!ap,

walling can ostly co!1StjM.e. i! threat efsevere..plrysiC31 pain if a reasonabk F~on wb~d infer

such a threat !iom the use of t4e. technique itself. Walling does !'IGtin and of itsdf inflict s~vere

»-3.in.or suffering. Like the f~da1 slap, '.<JaIllngmay aJter tM suhj~ct'$ -e).."pectarion Mto thetreatment he believes he will receive. NOilcthe!ess, ,he chmcter of me. action frills so fur short ofinfltcting severe pain or suffering wixhiJl.dLC me.aning ohhe sts:tut~ Ihat.evea.ifhe: infe:rred mIltgreater aggre::.-siven.ess \vas to follow, tbe type of actions d>.:at<:ou!d be reasonably be anticipated

would still fail below artything sufficient to iof1jet severe physical pain Ofsuffering undcr thestatuto. Thus, \"Ie.conclude tha.t (his technique falls outside tha prDscribcd. predicate ac15.

Like walling, str~s positions and waU-standingarenot proceduresc~kulated to disruptprofo1ill.dJythe sense.s, nor arc rhey threats or imminent death. Th<:seproce.dutcs, as discussedD-OO\'e,invQlve. the use of musde fatigue to encourage cooperation aod do not themselves

.co!lstitute the inf1icriOilof SeYer~physical pain or suffeti.og. Mmcover, chere is [10asp...'"Ctof.violence to either technique. that remotdy ougge-sl5fumre se-verepaiD or s\lffering from whichsuch a threat of futur-~hm:-mcould he inferred. They simpl)' k"1volvcrotting the.sllbject. to remaini.r.UDwmfortable POSit:iOllS.'?ll1iJethese ac~ may indi<:aieto tho':subject that b: may be placed in1},esepositions again. ifhe do~s nol disdose intPrrnatioLl,the us,o of Liese te.chniqn.eswoulq DO'Sllgg~S'tto a reasona.ble person in tM subject's posi.aon that _heis b~i£lg!hre<>.te-nedwith severepain or sucrering. Accordi:agly, we oondude [hat these tv.'o pruce:dures do not constiture any oCthe predicate. acts set furth in Sc;ction 234D(2).

.As with -Ule:otner techniques discussed so far, crajnped coEf.ncme.nt is not <Ithreat of

ilIuninent death.. [t may be.argued diat, fucl1Singin.part on the. faci that the bOx.e:5wilJ be 'with?Uilight, placement ill these boxes would CQusritutea pwo;dure. designed to disrupt profoundly tIltsenses. As we explained ill.our recent opinion, how~v";:'J:,ro "dlSropt prol1Juodly the-senses" ati':chnique must produc.~an ex:u-e.meeffect iIIthe subj~t. See Sectica2340A M~Ol1Jlldum at10-12. We have previously concluded that this requires that the.proceat1!e cause slibstantblinte.ffe[e;J1cewith t'he indi"idual's cogrJtive, abilities or furuia.'T1eI:1wIyalter his person.ality. Seeid. <it11. l\'forcover, tbe.SUituterequires that sucp procedures must be calculated t{)produce chiseffect. &e. [d. at 10; 18 U.s.C_ § 2340(2)(B).

With respect to the small C-O?.fllil7.me.ntbox, you have informed us that he would spend atmost two hour.; in Chisuox. You hs:v~ informed us iliJil your purpose io using LI,e.se.boxf'.$ is not10 interfere with his senses or his pe.rsonaEty, but to cause him physic3{ discomfort that '.'.'illencourage him 10 disclose critical infOJ:mation. Moreover, your imposition of time limitations onthe. use ofdIl::.er ortlIe boxes ;:.150il1diC<ltestha1ihe use of these. bexes is QOldesigned orcalcul:;led 1.0disrupt profoundly the sense.s or personality. F.)r the largerbox, in which he can

T~RET l'. J

bott, stand and sit, he may b~ placed iri tillSbox fu.r..u[3 to eignt?en hou~ al a time, while yo.uh.aveinforme.d. us thM 11(}willl1ever spend more thqh an h~ur ftt time in the -smi\~ler box. .These l1me

limits J;i.ll:dH~rensure that no profgund disruptio't! ef~ ~n~s or ~r:sons.lrty, were It even

possible, would resulL Ai>such. the use 0f the cdnfihemetlt oo~es does 110("con.stimte aprocedure calculated to disrtIpt profoundly the senses or pe-rsol\ality.

Nor does the use of the boxes thre~ten Zubaydah v:i[h.s~vere physical pai~ or suff-e.ru1g.

While a.dditioP.a! time spoor in the boxes may be threatened, their use is nOl accompanied byar.tye.xpress threats of seveTe ph}''5ic~1 pain Of suffering. Like the S\Ie5S positiolls and 'walling,

p!.acement in the boxe-s is physicaUy uncomfortable. but any such discomfort does not rise to theleve] of severe physi.catpain or sllffermg. A.(Scordingly, a re.ason.able perS'on in "I:be.subjecc's

posITion would not infer fuJm ll1e use of this tedmique thztsevere pbysical pain:is th<;;llext step

in his interrogator's treattne1'!t of j:lJro.. Therefor.e, \'ie conc1ud:eiliat the uSCiot the eorilin.emcn.tboxes'docs not faH.-within. the sUtUte's requir~.d predicate acts.

In additi-otl tDu:singthe.&Jn.finementboxes alaoo, )'Oualso would Hke to intrqiiiice-aninsect into one oftne bo:(~ with Zuba.ydah. k we urkrstimd it.,you plan to inform Zubaydahthat you are gOl1lg.'to ph1~ a slfuging insect l£1tothe box. but you \>,'ill-actu3.l!yplace a harmlessin.sect in the bo:<, such a$ a cal:etpillat. If you do so, to er1.surethat you are outsi~ theprediG<U:eact requiTt".rnent,you must infonn him that the insects will not have a sting that would .producedeath or se"Verepfu ff, bo\vever, you were to place the ip.scctin the box without informing-him,ha.r: YGUaN 'r1aIDg so.. thci3., iB er<";!~:-tQ.not commTt a pr.edicate acr, yoo should I1b1 affirmativ..el.}L

lC:<1.dhim to believe that 3nyillicc 's'!Jt~twbichhas:i ;." 'J.,,,,'. 1.l.r!h..", 1'~ ~.\I .'

.<1ffi '. a. :;; ".th.

'0 <mg:aS you" e ~j: I:.rorthe. appruaches \vebave descri' y{'e' insect's placement in the box would not co!1Stitu.te a tIDe;;.,

of SEVerephysica.l pain or sufferi!1gto a reasmlable person in his position. An.individual plac<:.riin a box, even an. individual wit.h a f~r of insects, would not reasol1.2.bly feel threatened withsever~ physical pain GTsuffering if 3 caterpillar was placed in. ille box. Further, you ha.ve.

informed us that you are !lot aware that Zubaydah has any allergies <<Iinsects, and you have Dot

inf9rmed USof an)' other factors d!at would cause a r-easonc.hleperson in that same,situa1ion tobeli.evc illat ~f1 unknowu insect would cause him :;evere ph)'sical pain or death. Thus, we

CO!lC}ude dlat the. placement of the. insecr in the confine.ment box with Zubaydah would not

CDnst1illte. a predicate att.

Sleep "deprivation ~so cl~y does !lot iuvolve.i thrill of in'ili,il1entdeath. ,A.ltf10ugni,. produce~ ph)'Sical discomfort, i1cannot by said to con.stilJ,ltea furc;atof se.vere phy&jcatpain or

suffering from the perspective. of Itreasonable person in Zubaydah's position. Nor could sleepde.privati9BCousmute a procedme caIclilatedto disrupt profoundly me selISes, so long as skepdeprivation (as you hav(t informed us is your intent) is us~d for limited periods, befotehallucinations or other profound disruptions of the senses would occur. To be sure, sleepdeprivation may reduce tbe.subject's ability to think on his fGel Indeed, you indica~ that this is'

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the tflkllded resu1t. His mere'reduced ability tQevade.your qUEstions and res1st a~wering doesnot, however, rise to the level cf (ji.sr'tip.tlo~ r:e1ll,1iredby th(: st<1tut~. As We explained aQove, a

distup-g.on within the meanL'1g ofthe stature {si.!n extreme one, substantiaUy intl5rfeflng wjih 2.11

individual's cognitive abilities, for example; inducing hilUuci!1aLra!lS, 0: drivlng him Coengage in

uncha.racteriStic se.lf-'destnJ.ctiv~ behavior. See in/i'a 13; Sectto!11340A rAemcrandum at ! 1.Therefore, the limited use of skep deprivation does not constitute one of the I'c:quired predica~3Cl.$.

Vie fi.nd that the use ofth.e waterboard constitutes a threat of i.mminent death. As youhave explained the wa~oard procedllte to us, itctea.t.es in the subject the uo.cont;roilableph.ysiologic!il sensation thaHhe St1bj~c.tis drowriL>;g.Although. the p!o~tlre \vill be monitoredby pets.orinel with tnedicallra1n.ing and extenSive SEREscli.ool ()xp~l:ienct w.ith thjs prq~cluic\>n.1Qvfi:l1e11s'Urethe subject's mental ar;d tIDysiC31 safety.the subj~ctis not aWareof all-y'lJfthes~precautions. From the vantage. point of any reasonable. person. u...rlderguillg thiS procedure in slJ.th

circlJ."ll1.Stances, b.~ would fee! as ifl1e is drovmin.g at v<;,rymOI11<'::\\£of the procedure due to the

uncontroUable physiological sen.sa.tion he is experienc.ing.. ThWi, !lu:; proce.dure cannot beviewe.~ as too uncertain to s13.risfyth.; i.mminel1~ requirement A.ccordif\..g!y, it constitutes atbreat of imminent death and filiills !he pred.ic~ act requirement un.der t~e statute.

Although the warerooard cOllSt1tUt-e.Sa threat.of imminent dearh; prolonged mental harmmust nonetbeless result to violate the sta...tmory.p.rohibitionon inflictio£l of severe me.r..taipain Or:>utte-rinfl"',See Seetion 2340A Memomndum at r W-e.hav,epr~viaus.ty cGndud~ .that.ptGlangedmen:tB1!b.a.mt is mental harm of some: J;as:ting (fur-Mion, e,g.,. menm! harttJ 13$ting rilontns or yem;s.See (d. Prolonged, mental harm is not ~impl)'tlle stress experWT.1c(:din, for e.;xample., E.[J

intemj-gation by state police. See. (d. Based on your research into the US(:of these met.hods at thesE,R.:E,scboo! ::md consultation wi1h others with ex~rei'se in the.fidd ofpsychblogy andinterrogation, you do not 8.'>lticipatethat any prolcQged menial harm would result from the 11S(:ofthe wa.teruoard. Indeed, YOUha.ve advised USthai. the relkfis almost irmnediate. V\~li'Ol1the cloth is~el11ovedfrom the nose ";'ld mouth. ill the. absence of proJonged menial harm, 0.0severe me.ntal.r:;in or !;nffr:rine would h:w;>,t.mr;ninflicted, ami"th~ ~e ofthese pflJO"...o.\!,tt:".swould llot (:oo..st-in1t~tortu~e within !he meaning of the statu:te.

'When the.se aCG are coliSidered as a c.oUfseof conduct, we are. unsure whether these actsmay CQustttute a threat of severe physic.at pain or sufferiug. You hav~ indiuterl to USthat youhav~ noL determ.ined either the order or the. precise timing for implementing lh~se procedures. Itis conceiva.bJe that tlJese procedurescould be used in a c.ourseof escabting,c.onduct,movingincrementally an.drapidly from least physiC3J.!y U}tr\lsi\re,e.g., facial hold., to u1~most physicalconCac.t,e.g., walling or the waterbo;>rd. As we understandit, based on his treatment sOfar,Zubaydah has come to C:X~C(\1141:no physkal ham \\oi11be.done to him. By using thesetechniques in increasing intensity and in rapid successiQr..,the goal wO\,lldbe to dislodge thisexpectation. Based au the facts you ha.ve pfDvirled to \IS,we cannot say definitiveJy ~)3t theemire cours~ of conduct would cause a reasonable person to.belkve that he is bemg thfeatened

TO~~T !5

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wjth severe pain or suffering \.\ithin the mC311illg of section 2340. On. the other hand; however,

under c.crtaj'llcircumstances-for exaJ'~1pk,rapid escalation in the use ofthest rechniquescu!millating in tbe waterboard (which we acknowlcd!!e consritm~s ;: threai ofimmin.ent death)accompanied by verba.!.Qr ather suggesuoos that physical violence \\>illfollow-might cause areasonable person'tobelieve that theyarc faced withstich a r1m~at. Without 1110reinformation,we are UI1.rerta.illwhether !be course of conduct would con.slilUtea predicate act uflder Section2340(2).

Even if the cDU!seof'c.oIiduct were thought to pose a thr~at ofphysicaf pain onuffe.nng,it would neverthek$s-on tite f:aelS before. us-not oonstirute a vio~tioD. of Section 1340A. Not001y ~Usl the C()UrS!:of oonduct b~ a prediC3te act, but also [hose who use the procedure mustactually cause. prolooge(1 menta.l h.1.fin. Bas<od on the information that you have provided to us,

indicating thai no evidence exists.that.this course of cond.uct prOOuees any proJonged mentalJ12.l1l1,'we. conclude that a C<Jusc' of conduct using m(!Se pro~dUIe.s <IUdculminating in the

wate.rboard would oot violare Section 234DA.

Specific futeIit. To violate the statute; an i"ndividu?\must ha.ve the. specific intem LDir.flic.t severe pain or suffering. Because spedfic intent is 3a.eJ.e.mentof the offerise, the absence.'of specific intent negate.s the. chargeoftort.ure.. As Wt)pj.eviotisJyopined, ro have the requiredspecific mtent, an individual mUSi~xpre$sly intend to cause such s(;;verepain or sumring. See

. Scctton 2340A MemOral"1aumat j citing Carter 1-'.UniredS1tJff5,530 U.S. 255,267 (2000). Wehave fllrthet found chat if a defendam acts with the good faith belief that hi.s actions will notcause 'such suffering, he ha.s not acted with specific' inteIlL See ia.. at 4 efring South AIl. Lmtd.

Ptrshp. ofTe1111. \I. Re;$e, 218 F.3d 518, 531 {4th Cir. 2002). .t..~defendant acts i.r1good faiibwhen he has an honest belief that his actions will hot resulrin severe pain'or suffering. See fa.effing Cheek \I. United Stales, 498 U.S. 192,202 (1991). A.lrhough a.'l Moest be1ittfneed '!lOt bere.as0nable, such a betief is easier to establish whl'!re \:hereis a reasonable basi's fot it See id. at 5.Good faith may be established. hy, among other things, the.rtlianae on the advice of experts. Seeid. at 8.

Bas~ on th~ inforotation you ha.'\Ieprovided us, we believ.e.that t"hose carrying out These.procedures would not have the specific intent to i.nflia severe physical pain or suffering. Theo~jeetive of these techniques is nm to cause se.vere physicrl pain. FirSf, the constafll presence ofpersonnel with medical trc..iningwho have the authorityto stop l!jeinterrogation should it appearit is medir..aUy n~.e.ssf\ry i"rl.i('.1\It~~tlml if is nol your inlenl {oC!!use.:»e.verephysical pain. Thep~rsonnel on site have extensive experience with these specific leclmiques as {hey are use.d inSERE schoal training: Second, youhave illfonned us thatyou are taking steps to ensure. thatZubaydah '$ iujury is not w9i:sened or his recoVery impeded ~y rhe US6of These techniques.

Third, a.~L0U.~~ve described them to us, the.propos.ed techniques involving Physicalcontact between the iute.ITogalOrand Zubaydah actually contain precautions to prt::vc!llanysen1;JllSph.ysical ham! to Zubaydah. fn "wallinp a rolled hood or tOwel 'will 00 us~d to prevent

.

TO~RET 16

.4

.TO~R£T

whiplash and hewm be;permitted tp rebound from the fI6xful-eVT'aUto re<!uc~me.likelihood ofin.jury. Similarly, in the ''fadal hold:1 the fingertips wiU be kept well away from the bis.e5'es 't{)en:surethat there lS:!1o'injury to them. TIle purpose of that facial hol.q is.nol.in.jUfe him but tohold the head ul1lnabife. Addiri.onally', whikttl.e stress positions and wall sranding willun.doub~eti!y result in physical discomfort by tiring the musctes; it is obvious that tbes~ p051t1ollSa,e nOtil1tendc;dto produce\h~kind of e.x-treme.pain requiredby the statUre.

Funheonore. nQsoec:iflc imem to cause. severe mental pain or suffering a-ppe.arsto bepresent As we explained in our ream opir.ion, an iudividu2.!;nUSlhave the specific intent toc:1US<".prolong~d menta! h:1rmin order to ha.ve lb:::specific iment to inflict severe mental pain orsuffering. See Section2340A Memorandumat 8. Prolongedmenta!harm is :mbstantialmeDwharm. of a sustained duralloll: e.g., barm lasti!Lgul.onths or even years a.ft~rthe acts were Ll1llictcdupon the-prisoner. k; we indicatc.d above., a good faith.beliefc.au n~ate this demeatAccordingly, if a~ indivi.dual conducting ~e interrogation has a good'faith bclicl that theprQce-dure:she wi.!1apply, separatcly Qrtogtthe.r, would not result inprolonged:'.mCfluu hann, that1I1diviili.lall-acksthe r~quisite specifi~ !n.te.'1t~..Js oonclusion C.QlIceming~i:fic mtept is fu(thetbolsrered by the due diligen.ce [hat.has been cOl1d1Jc~dCO!1ce.rn4'1gfu~ efJ-ectsof theseinterrogation procedures;

The. mental h.ealth experts thai you bave eonsl.iltedhave indicated that the psyc.hologicalimpact of a course of conduct must b;: assessed with reference 10 the subject' 5 psychologicalhistory and cUITent.mental hea.lth sta11lS.The healthier th;: indiv'...dua.1:the less likely ili.~ the useor 2.t1}'one p-rocedureor s(:( of proc:x:dure:sas a course qf c.ondu.::twill result in prolouged mentalharm. A compre~l15ive psychological profile of Zubaydah has be~n c'real~d. In creatin.gthisprofile:, your pe.rsormcl drew on dlfect intervLcws. Zuba.ydah's 'diaries, obScr:\'auoll of Zubaydahsince his C~.t1Jr~ and" ii <:!;.. e "nre! igence'and ress reports.

Pis we iJldicated above., you haw} informed us dlat your proposed iUle.rrogatiol1methodsbaVe.beea used and continue to b~ used in SERE training. Tlis our unde.rsamd:ing that tbeSe(cchniqucs are Dot used one by one in iso!acion, but as a 11111course. of condu.ct COresembLe a realinterrogation. Thus, the information de.r.jvedfrqm SERE traipjng bears both upon the impact ofthe use of the individual techniques :and upon tbdr use <ISa cour.s~ of couducl You bave foundthat the Use of these methods tiJgt::dler or separately, includ.ing the use of the waterboatD., !las {}Ot

resulted in any npgative I(}ng-t~$ mental he.alth consequenc.es. The. continued use of tl1~se

methods "wi.thout me.J:imJhealth consequences to the trainees indicate3 that it is highly improbable

TO~RET 17

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T~RET

that stJch consequMtes would result he-reo B.ecause )'011have conducted the due dilJgence to

delem)ine that these proc.edures, either alone orin c.ombinatioJl,do nol produce prolonged mentJl,

hann, we believe that you de not meet the specific In'tent requireme!lt necessary to violateSt;CtlOI12340A.

You lIave' also' informed us that you hav:e r~viewtd tho tel.evant: literatm'e on th.e s':lbjec~and consulred with ot!tsid~ pSS'chol<)gLsts~ YOU! rcvic:w of the Ijier2ture unCb,veroo: no. empirical

data en the us~ of tl)cse procedures, \\.'1ili the exceptioo onJ:eep de.privari-on for v.<W.cl~no long,..

term health conseqj.lenclZS resulted. Tl1e:Qt~tsjde psychbtogists with whom yO-\!~onsu-1t:edindicated were \.lt1a.W'are'ofany cases wh~re long-rctm problems have octurred as a r-e:sutt ofti\ese

t-:dmiaues..

As described above, it appears you have conducted an extensive ir.quiry to ascerca.!n whatimpac.t.,if any, the.se procedure..~iodividuaHy and as a course of c()uduC!.\>;,ouldhave an 'Zubaydah. You have colisulrGti witb interrogation experts, induding thos:! with substantialSERE school expetieoce, consulted with outside psyt.hologists, cornple1cd a psycb.ologlc.alassessment an.d reviewed the. relevant Hterature on. this topic. Based GOthis inquiry, you believethat the use of the procedures, inCluding th~ walerboard, and as a course of conduct would notresult in prolonged menta! ba.'111.Re,liam:e on this information abo~Zubaydah and about the.eff~i of th.e Use of these lec.imiq1.le5mote generally d.emonstJ'ates lh!:present~ of a good faithbeiief (hat 110proJol1g~d mental haIrn wiU result from using Ihese methods in. the i.nterrogation ofZubayda11. Moreover, '-'ie t.1rinkthat this represents not only 3.1.1honest bdieJbut also area:rouBb1ebelief based all the information.that you haveS\lppliedto us. Thus, we believe:thatthe specific intent 10 inflict pwlonge.d lDemar is Dotprese,nt, and.c-onrequently, there is' 110sp'ecific intent to in.fiict sev~re mental pain or suffering. Accordingly, '~'e conclude iliat on. thefacesin this case.the use of tbe~ methods separa.tely or a.course 0'1conduct would [lot ViolateSection 2340A. .

Based ort the foregoing,. and based on the facts that. YOTIhav~ provideQ, we C(mr,{uiie: 'fu.a.trIte interrogation procedures that you propose would not violate. Section 1340A.' We;'\-.;,i:shtoemphasize that this is our best reading of the law; ho\vever, yvu should. be a.ware th.:?!there ar~ no,

cases construing this stc.tule;just as there huve been nb prosl:.cuuons brot!.ght under it.

Please lel us know [[we- call be of fmiller assistance.

t 8

Appendix D

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Guidarinas on confinement Conditions For CIA Detainees

These Guidelines govern the'conditionsCIA D~tainees, who are personfacilities that are under the

acilitie'S U ;

of confinement forion.control of

These Guidelines recognize thatenvironmental and other co~ditions/.as,well. as particularizedconsiderations affecting any given Detention Facility, will,vary from' case to case and. location to location. .

.. .

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2.

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Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees

3. Responsible C~A Officer

'The Director, .DCI Counterterrorist Center shallensUre (a} that, at all tim\3s. a specific Agency staffemployee {the ~Responsible CIA Officer"} is designated asresponsible for each specific Detention Facility,. (b) thateach Responsible CIA Officer has beenprovia8d with a copy ofthese Guidelilies and has reviewed and si.gnedthe attached.

.Ac)cnowledgroent, and, .Ie) that ~ach Re~onsibIe. CL:1\.O;Eficer andeach CIA: officer partic~pating' e.

..,

individuals a.etained uren.1ant tQe with a

ed Ji'ursuantand has

reviewed and 'signedthe .A<:: . O\oredgment attached thereto. .SUbject to operational and security considerations, .theResponsible CIA Officer spall be present at, or visit, eachDete~tion Facility at intervals appropriate to thecircumstances.

4.

APPR.OVED:

\ \~~\o!.Date

.

-

Guidelines on Continement conditions for~IA Detainees

,It t am t.he ',ResponsibleCIA'Officer for the

Detention FacilitS" known as . By my signature,below, I acknowledge tha~ I have read and understand'and willcomply.with the ~Guidelines on Confinement conditions for CIA

'

Detainees' of t 2003.

ACKNOWLEOOED1

Name, Date

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Appendix E

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C'ill:i~ . ;:... .. d' : tJf.. ~. . .!. . . . a~ . ._;; ..,. .. , ;-

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. .These Guidelines addres~ .the.conduct of interrogations of

'.personswho are detainedursuantto the authorit.ies setforth i

These Guidelines complement internal Directorate ofOperations guidance relating to the conduct ofinterrogations. In the ev.ent of any inconsistency between~isting DO guidance and these Guidelines, the provisions ofthesE!Guidelines shall control.

.

. . .

.1..

Unless otherwise appro~ed by Headquarters. CIAofficers and other personnel acting on behalf of CIA may uSeonly pe:r:missible Interrogation ~echniques. permissibleInterrogation.Techniques consist of Doth (a) StandardTechniques and (b) Enhanced .Techniques.

.'.

.Standard Teqhniaues are techniques that do not.

incorporate physical or substantial psychQlogical pressure;These techniques inclu~e, but are not limited to, all lawfulforms of ~estioning.eroployed py us law enforcement andmilitarY iD.terrogation personnel. Ami;mg Standard .Techniques.are the U~~ of isolation, sleep deprivation not to exceed72 hours; reduced caloric intake (so long as' the amount i6calculated to maintain the general' health of the detainee),deprivation of reading mqterial,' use of. loud ciuaic'or whitenoise (at a decibel level qalculated to avoid damage to'thedetainee's hearing)I and the use of diap~deriods er 1 not to exceed 72hours.....

ALL'1':-3:1S DOC ~ .CLASSIFIED TOP S

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, Eph9,ncet;1 Te~hniCl).1es are techp.iques that do,

inco;;porata physical 'Qr psycho,logical pressure' b~yondStandard Techniques. The: use of each specif~c 'EnhancedTech!'1..ique :must. be approV'~d ~y Headquarters in advance, m;tdmay b~ employed only by approved interrogators for use w~ththe specific detainee, with appropriate medical andpsychological participation fn the p~ocess. These techniquesare, the attention grasP! ,walling, the facial hold, thefacial slap (insult slap)', the abdominal slap, crampedconfinemeuit, wa..llstanding; ~tress po:;>itionst sleepdeprivation beyond 72 hours, the use of diapers for prolong~dperiods, the use of.harmless insects, the'water board, andsuch other techniq~es as may,~e ~ecifidally'approv.edpursuant:,to paragraph 4 belqw.' The 115.e of each EnhancedTechnique {s subject to specific temPoral, phystcal, andre~ated conditions, iriclud~ng a competent evaluation of themedical and psychdlogical state of the getainee.

2._A ro riate medical and psychological persolLOel shallbe readily.ava~lahle for consultation andtravel to the .in~errogation site d~irig,all detainee.interrogations employing .Standard Techniq;u.es, and appropriatemedical and.psychological personnel must be on site during~ll detainee interrogations employing 'Enhanced Tecbni~~es"In each case, the ,medical and psy~hological personnel shallsuspend the interrogation if they determine that significantand prolonged.physical or mental injury, 'pain, or sUfferingis likely to result if 'the int~rrogation is not 8~spended.In any such instance, the interrogation team shallimmediately report the facts to Headquarters for ~agementand legal review to determine whether the interrogation maybe resumed. .

3. In~errogati0n Personnel

The Director, DCI'CounterterroristCenter shallensure that all personnel directlY'engaged ~~"nterro ation of persop.s 'detained pursuant

have been appropriately ~creene romn me ca. psyc 0 ogical, and security standpoints), have

reviewed~ese Guidelines, have received appropriate trainingin :their implementation, and bave completed the attachedAcknowle.dgment.

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~ideline on Interrogations Conducted PUrsuant.to the

4.

Whenever feasible, advanc~ approval i9, re~ired forthe use' of Stan9ard Techniqu~s by an interrogation te~m. In'all inst.ances, their use shall'be doc'llJ.-nentedin cabletra.ffiq"

'

J?:dor approval in writing '(e.g.,by writtenme.ll1orand1JIUor in cable traffic) from the Director" DCI

. CoUnterterrorist:.Center, wiCh the concurrence of the Chief,GTC Legal Group, is ~eqUired for, the use of any,EnhancedTe~~que{a);'and ~y~be provid~d.onlywhere D}CTC hasdet.etmined that. (a) the specific detainee is pelieved topossess '~formation ~bout risks to the citizens of the UnitedStates or other nati6nE!, (b), the 'use of the EnhancedTechniqlie'{s) ,'is appropriat.e in order .to obt.ain thatinformation, (c) -'appropriate'mer4caJ, and psychologicalger~onnel have-concluded that the use of the .Enh~cedTechniqQe(s) is not expected to produce ftsev~re physical ormental ,pain 9r suffering," and (d)' the personnel authorizedto .e,rnplGY the Enhanced,Technique,(s},havecorrrpleted t.heattached Acknm'Vledgmen.t. Nothing in these Gllidelinesaltersthe r~ght to act ,in self-defense.

5.

In each interrogation sess10n in which w~ EP~ancedTechnique ~s employ~, a contemPoraneous record shall becreated setting'for~ the nature and duration of each suchtechnique employed, 'the identities of those present, and acit.ation to the required Headquarters approval cable. Thisinformation, which may be in the form of a cable, shall beprovided to Headquarters. -

APF-ROVED:

,-

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I II ackQowlEidge tbat ! have read andunderstand. ana will. comply with \::he "Guidelines onIn terra tions Corid~cted Pursuant to

of

Name Date

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Appendix F

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DRABT OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL A1'ID PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO,

DETAlNEEINTERROGATIONS,

'September 4, Z003

The following guidelines 'offer general references for medical officers supportingthe detention of terrorists captured a:rid turned over to the Central Intelligence Agency forll1ierrogation and'debriefing. There are fureedifferent contexts in which these gu1delinesrh~y be applied: (1) during th~.pe.rlod ofinltial interrogation, 2 duriri the moresustained riod ofdebri finO. at an interrogation site, and (3,. -. .e- ... . -. e-, . ,:'.<-~--,:::\'-:-:,',':" :_-:;-';---',. :'~:,--:,' ~.

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".' Il'irERROGATION SUPPORT.,

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;~ Captured terrorists turned over Inthe C.I.A. for interrogationmay be subjectedtoa,~de range of legally sa:O.ctibnedtechIiiques, all of which are also used on U.S. uiilitaryp~rsoimel in SERE training programs. These are designedto psychologically "dislocate"the detainee, ma..TImize,rusfeeling of.vulnerability and helplessness, and reduce orel~nate his will to resist our efforts to obtain critical intelligence.

, Sanctioned interrogation techniqu.es Dl1lstbe specifically approved in advance byth~ Director, CTC in the ease of each individual case, They include, in approximately,ascending degree of in~ensity: ' '

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Standard measures (Le., withQutphysical or substantial psychological pressure)Shaving

,

Stripping ,

Diapering (generally fa;!:penoik not greater than 72 hours)HoodingIsolationWhite noise or loud music (at a decibel level that will not damage hearing)Continuous light or darknessUncomfortably cool environmentRestricted diet, including reduced caloric intake (sufficient to maintain

,

general health)ShaGkling in upright, sitting, or horizontal positionWater DousingSleep deprivation (up to n hours)

'Enhanced measures (wi~ physical or psychological pressure beyond the above) ,

A~ntion graspFacial hold

Insnlt (facial) slap

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.-AQdorniIiaf slapProlonged diaperingSle.ep depri'{ation (over 7.2hours)Stress positions .

-on knees, body slanted forward or backward. --leaning with forehead on wall

Wallin.

g .Cramped. commement (COn:fme~ent'baies)Waterboard . . ,

. .

In all instances the general goal of these techniques is a psychological imp'act, andnot some physical effect, with a specific.goal of "dislocat[ing) his expectations regardingthe treal:n)enthe believes 1).ewill receive.,.:" The more physical techniques aredelivered in.a manner carefully limited to avoid seriqus physicax harm. The slaps forexample -are'd~igned "to induce shock. surprise, andior humiliation" and "not to inflictphysical pain' that Is severe or lasting." To this .endthey must be delivered in aspecifically circUmscribed manner, e.g., with'tmgers spread. Walling is.onJ.yagainst as'pringhoard designed to be lOudand bounc/, (and cushion the blow): All walling andmos.t a~entioD ~ps are delivered on~ywith the subject' s 'hea~ solidly supported with atowel to avoid extens"ion-flexioninjury.. ','

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OMS is responsible for assessing and monitoring the health of ,allAgencydetAinees s,!:!-bjectto "enhanced" interrogation techniques, aiJ.d'fordetermining that theauthorized adIninistration of these techniques would.not be expected to cause serious Orper+nanent harm. I "DCI Guidelines" hav~ been issued formalizing these responsibilities,and these should be readdirectl;y.

Whenever feasible, advance approval inequired to use any measures beyondstanda,rd m.easures; technique-specific advanced approval is required for all "enhanced"measures and is conditional on on-site medical and psychological personne12confirmingfrom direct detainee examination that the enhanced technique(s) is not expected toproduce "severe physical or mental pain or suffering." As a practical matter, thedetainee's physical'condition .must be such that these interventions ",ill not have lasting

1 The standard used by the Justice Department for "mental" harm is "prolonged mentalhan:n," Le., "ment~ harm of some' lasting duration, e.g., mental harm lasting months OTyears."<'In the abs'ence of prolonged mental harm, no severe mental pain or suffering \-','auld ha ye been

inflicted.". Memorandum of August 1, 2002, p.15.

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Unless the waterboard is being used, the medical officer can be a p'hysician ill aPA;use of!:hewfitcrboard requires the presence of a physician. .

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'effect, and his psychological state strong enough that no severe psychological harm willresult. ' '

The medioafiinplicatioM of the DCI guidelines are discussed below_

General intake evaluation

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Although brief, the data should reflect what \~a:schecked and include negative fmdings.

Medical treatment

It is important that adequate medical care be p:rovidedto ~etainees, even those

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undergoing enhaIicedintecrogation.Thoserequiringchro:i1i~medicationsshouldreceivethem, acute medical roblerns should betreate and ade uate fluids and nutritiQnprovideg.

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The basic diet during the period of enhanced interrogation need not be palatable,but should iriclude adequate fluids and nutrition. Actual consumption should oe

,monitored and recorded. . Lf uidEnsure or e uivalen.t is a ood wa to assur.e that thereis adequate nutritioQ.

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Individuals refusing adequate liq~~tage should h~ve flui<;lsad:II1lliister~4afthe ea.rliest si~s of dehydration.,-",

If there is-any questione monitored and recarded.

Uncomfortably cool environments

Detainees can safely be pla~ed in uncomfortablengths of time, ranging from hours today!?,.

Core body temperature falls after more than 2 hours at an ambient temperature of10°C/50°F. At this temperattJ:reincreased meEabolicrate cannot compensate for heatloss. TheWtIOrecommended minimum indoor temperature is l8DC/64°P, The"thermoneutral zone" where minimal compensatory activity is required to maintain coreternperature is 20°C/68°F to 30°C/86°F. Within the thermoneutral zone, 26°CnSop isconsidered 0 timall comfortable for ~ghtly clothed individuals and 30°Cl86°P for naked

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If there is any possibility that ambient temperatures are below the thermo neutralrange, they should be monitored and ~e actUal te;mperatures documente:

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White noise orJoud music

As apractical gcide, there is no perIl!anent hearing risk for continuous, 24-hours-a-day exposures to sound at 82 dB. or IDwer; at 84 dB for up to 18.hoUrs a day; 90 dB forup to 8 hoUrs, 95 dB for 4 hours, 'and 100 dB for 2 hours.. If necess' instruments canbe provided ,to measure these ambient sound levels.

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Assuming no medical contnundications arc found, extemkd period.s (up to 72htmis)' in a standing position can be approved. if the hands'1\.rQno hi" er than head leveland w~i htishorne full . bthe lQwer.extren1itie.s.

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NOTE: Exatnin~ns perfonned during period3 of $leep deprivation shouli:tfnclude theCUrTen( number of hours without $leep; and, if only. a brief rejfpreceded thisperiod, thespecifics afthe previou.s deprivation al.ro should be recorded,

. Cramped confinement (Confinement boxes)

confInement in. thesmall box is allowable up "to 2 hours, Confinement in the large box is ]imited to 8consecutive hOllIs,

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Wa.terboard

, 'This is by far the most traumaticof the enhanced interrogationtechniques.Thehistorical context here was limited knowledge of the use of the waterboard iri SEREtraining (several hundred trainees experience it' every ye,ar or two). 'In. the SERE rp.odelthe subject is iinmobilized on his back, and his forehead and eyes covered-'?fith a cloth.A stream,of water is directed at the upper lip., Resistant subjects then.havethe Cloth.

lowered to cover the nose and mouth, as the water contin~es to be ,applied, fullysa~tlng the cloth, and precluding the passage of air. .R~latlvelylittle water enters the '

mouth. The occlusion (which may be partial) lasts no more than 20 seconds. On removalof the cloth, the subject is immediately able to breathe, but continues to have waterdirected at the upper lip to prolong the effect. This process can continue for severalminutes. and involve up to 15 canteen cups.of water. Ostensibly the primari'~esiredeffect derives from the sense of suffocation resulting uom the wet cloth temporarilyoccluding the nose and mouth, .and psychological impact of $e continued application rifwater after. the 'cloth is removed; SERE trainees usillilly have only a single exposure tothis tecbuique, and never .more than two; ~ERE ~ers' consider it their most' effectivetechnique.'mId doom-it virtually irreSistible in the trainiIlg setting.

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The SERE training program has applied the waterboard technique (singleexposure) to trainees for years, and reported1y there have been thousands of applicathmswithout significant or lasfu1g medicalqaillplications. The procedure nonet1l!~les$carriessom.e risks, par.1Jcularly when repeated a large number of times or when applied to anindividual less fit than a typical SERE trainee,' Several medical diniensio11'! need to be

, monitored to ensure the safety of the subject.

In our limited experience, extensive sustained use of the w?terboard can introduce.new risks. Most seriously, for reasonsof physicalfatigue,or psychologicalresignation,the subject may simply give up, allowing ex~essive filling of the airways and loss ofconsciousness, ./ill umesponsive subject should be righted immediately, and theinterrogator should deliver a snb-xyphoid throat to expel the water. If this fails to restore

. nonnal breathing, aggressivemedicalinterveI).tion.isrequired, Any s~bjectwho hasIeach~d this degree of compromise is not considered an appropriate candidate for thewaterboard, and the physician on the scene can not approve further use of .the waterboardwithout specifIc CrOMS consultation and approval.

A rigid guide to medically approved use. of the waterboard in ess~ntially healthyindividuals is not possible. as safety. will depend on how the water is applied and' the&pecific response eaeh time itis used. The following general'guidelines are based onvery limited knowledge. drawn -from.very few'Sllbjec!:S whose experien~e and response

'. was quite varied. These rep~sent only the medical guidelines; legal guidelines also areoperative and may be more' restrictive. .

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. A series (within a "session'') of several reh~tively rapid waterboard applicatioI15i~medically acceptable in all health sub' ects, so Ion as there i5 no indication of some

~_ Severalsuch sessionsper 24 hours havebeen employedwiilioutapparent medical complication.. The exact number of sessions cannot be prt;scribed, andwill depend on the response to e~ch. If more.thari 3 sesS!ODSOf 5 or more applications

.are envisioned within a 24 hours period, a careful medical reassessment must be made.before -each later session.

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By days 3-5 of an aggreSsive program, .cumulative effects become a potentialcon~em. Without any haxd data to quantify either t!ris risk or the advantages.of this.technique, we believe that beyond this po~t continued intense.waterboard applications'may not be medically appropriate. Continued aggressive ~e 9f the waterboard beyond'

.this point should be reviewed b the HVT teaIIl in consultation with Hea uarters rior toany :further aggressive use.

NOTE: In orckr to best infann iii.ture meflicaI jUdgments and recommendations. it is'. impdrta1J.t that every applica~an of the wat~rboard be thorough~y doclfT11ented: h~w long

each application (and the entire procedilre) lasted, how m~lchwater.was Wled.in theprocess (realizing 'that much splashes. oft), how exactly the water was applied, if a sealwa? achieved, if the naso- or oroplw.rynx wasfilled, what sort of volume wa.sexpelled,how long was the break between applications,' and how the subject looked between eachlrea.1ment.

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Documents

SPECIALREVIEW · 2009-08-25 · CIALOANCOPY DONOTCOpy CentralIntelligenceAgency Inspector General SPECIALREVIEW Ij \ ~) COUNTERTERRORISIvlDETENTIONAND. INTERROGATION ACTIV1TIES (SEPTEMBER