Spiritual Investigations

8/9/2019 Spiritual Investigations

1/14

1

Loyd EricsonRel 429Wittgenstein and Religion

March 22, 2010

Spiritual Investigations:Wittgenstein and the Mormon Concept of Feeling the Spirit

The belief that a person can know the truthfulness of certain propositional claims lies

near the center of Mormon religious life. Latter-day Saints are encouraged to gain testimonies of

things such as the reality of God, the saving atonement of Jesus, the prophetic calling of Joseph

Smith and other Mormon leaders, and the scriptural authority of the Book of Mormon. These

testimonies are usually gained through the feelings or promptings of the Holy Spirit, or what

Mormons often refer to as the still small voice. As a believing Latter-day Saint and a

professing Wittgensteinian, I am interested in the type of clarification and elucidation of this

practice that might be brought on by a Wittgensteinian exploration. Thus, the intent of this paper

is to explore the grammar of this aspect of Mormon religious practice using Wittgensteins

writings in his Philosophical Investigations.1

While seeking propositional knowledge by the spirit is certainly not exclusive to

Mormonism, its role within the faith is perhaps more prevalent than among other Christian

traditions.2The final verses of Mormonisms found scriptures, the Book of Mormon, asks

readers to ask God . . . if these things [the writings in the Book of Mormon] are not true with

the promise that God will manifest the truth of it unto you by the power of the Holy Ghost

1Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, rev. 4

thedition, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and

Joachim Schulte (Chichester, West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009). All references are to the propositional

numbers in the text. Italics are original unless noted.2

Though this analysis focuses on the spiritual language-games of the Mormon tradition, I am sure that it could be

carried over into the language-games of most religious traditions.


2/14

2

(Moroni 10:4). Potential convertsas well as membersare encouraged to attain truths about

the Book of Mormon and other Mormon claims through this process. Once a month in worship

services, the pulpit is opened up for members to share the testimonies which they have gained by

this. These testimonies typically close with declarations of belief such as: I know the Book of

Mormon is true; I know that Jesus is the Christ; and I know that Joseph Smith was a true

prophet.

Because my own understanding of this concept my vary from the larger Mormon

tradition (and may be taintedby my own philosophical perspective), for the purposes of this

paper, I will be utilizing and responding to a 1983 talk written by Mormon apostle Elder Boyd K.

Paper, The Candle of the Lord.3

While this is by no means a philosophical piece, it is perhaps

the most popular commentary on the topic by a contemporary Mormon leader, and in my view

best exemplifies and illustrates the Mormon language-game of spiritual knowing.

Packer begins his talkby stating: We do not learn spiritual things in exactly the same

way we learn other things that we know. Here it already seems to be the case that talk of

knowing things of a spiritual nature involves a different language-game than talk of knowing

other sorts of things. While showing how words might be used differently with different

language-games, Wittgenstein points out that the certainty that a man is in pain is different

from the certainty that 2 x 2 =4. He concludes that the kind of certainty is the kind of

language-game (PPF 332). Because our various language-games use shared words that act as

clothing for our language-games, confusion arises when we fail to recognize their differences.

Thus, when a person says, (1) I know that Jesus died for my sins; (2) I know that Claremont

3Boyd K. Paker, The Candle of the Lord, Ensign, January 1983, 51ff. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day

Saints, http://www.lds.org/ldsorg/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=2354fccf2b7db010VgnVCM1000004d82620aRCRD

&locale= 0&so urceId=b4bbc5e8b4b6b010VgnVCM1000004d82620a____&hideNav=1 (accessed March 20 2010).

All citations from Packer are from this online version. Italics are his unless noted.


3/14

3

is located in southern California; (3) I know that 28 plus 50 is 78; and (4) I know that I am

looking at a computer screen, she isusing the same word know in four different language-

games. Just as Wittgenstein says that the difference in language-games between motive and

cause might be seen in how they are discovered (335), the differences in the language-games of

knowing can be seen in how they are known. For (2) the person might say that she knows this

because she has lived there her entire life, has seen it located in the southern part of a map of

California, etc. For (3) she might say that she learned arithmetic in grade school and feels

confident in her abilities to make simple calculations. For (4) she might simply say that this is

what she sees with her eyes and has no reason to doubt her senses. While each of these ways of

knowing differ from each other and represent a different language-game of knowing, none of

them seems to be ways in which she might know that Jesus died for her sins.

Recognizing that spiritual knowing is a different type of knowing from its more casual

sense, Packer attempts to elucidate this by recounting an experience that he had with an atheist

while traveling a plane. After listening to the atheist press his disbelief in God, Packer says that

he responded bybearing his testimony: You are wrong, I said, there is a God. I know He

lives!The atheist, in turn, responded, You dont know. Nobody knowsthat! You cant know

it! [If] you say you know. Tell me howyou know. Appealing to a difference in language-

games,4

Packer asks the atheist if he knew what salt tasted like. With the assurance from the

atheist that he did, Packer then asked the atheist to describe the taste of salt.

After several attempts, of course, he could not do it. He could not convey, in words alone,so ordinary an experience as tasting salt. I bore testimony to him once again and said, I

know there is a God. You ridiculed that testimony and said that if I didknow, I would beable to tell you exactly how Iknow. My friend, spiritually speaking, I have tasted salt. I

am no more able to convey to you in words how this knowledge has come than you are to

4I should be clear that Packer does not use the words language-games, and it is more than likely that he has

never read Wittgenstein. However, how he refers to different types of knowing seem to appeal to a concept akin

to Wittgensteins language-games.


4/14

4

tell me what salt tastes like. But I say to you again, there is a God! He does live! And justbecause you dont know, dont try to tell me that I dont know, for I do! . . . From that

experience forward, I have never been embarrassed or ashamed that I could not explain inwords alone everything I know spiritually.

Packer seems correct to argue that spiritual knowing utilizes a different language-game than that

of knowing things such as math and geography. However, his analogy of salt only seems to show

that the language of knowing is not limited to the types assumed by the atheist, and instead

avoids the question of the atheist as to how Packer was able to know these things.

In his rebuttal to the atheist Packer seems to argue that because the atheist knew what salt

tasted like but could not describe it with words, Packer was justified in saying that he likewise

knew by the spirit that God was real, but similarly could not put it into words. There, however

seems to be a problem with this response. Rather than being unable to communicate or describe

the taste of salt, it seem that the atheist did, in fact, put into words both a description of the taste

of salt and how he knew of it. After Packer initially asks if the atheist knew what salt tasted like,

the atheist answered, Of course I do. When did you taste salt last? I just had dinneron

the plane. If I gave you a cup of salt and a cup of sugar and let you taste them both, could

you tell the salt from the sugar? Of course I could tell the difference. I know what salt tastes

like. It is an everyday experience. In his exploration of language Wittgenstein raises a similar

point:

Describe the aroma of coffee!Why cant it be done? Do we lack the words? Andfor

whatare words lacking?But where do we get the idea that such a description must,after all, be possible? Have you ever felt the lack of such a description? Have you tried to

describe the aroma and failed? (610; emphasis his)

Though Wittgenstein doesnt make it explicit here, the point seems to be that the aroma of coffee

is perfectly described by the words aroma of coffee. If those words are sufficient for

communicating an idea from one person to another, then why should a further description be


5/14

5

necessary or expected? If I want to describe what I am currently smelling to a friend over the

phone, I would simply need to say I smell coffee or I smell the aroma of coffee. If my friend

responded, I know what it is you that you smell, but what does that smell like? I wouldnt

know how else to respond. Her inability to understand me would not mean that those words were

insufficient for describing the smell of coffee. It would instead mean that she simply had never

been taught the meaning of those words. I would have to teach her the meaning by saying that it

was the aroma that one finds when entering a caf, or by later handing her a mug of coffee and

teaching her that this was coffee and the aroma from it was the aroma of coffee. If she did not

even know the meaning ofaroma or smell, the problem would then not be in the failure of

words, but in her failure to understand the English languageor perhaps a failure of her

olfactory senses. In a similar manner, Wittgenstein asks, How do I recognize that this colour is

red?One answer would be: I have learnt English (381).

That the words what salt tastes like was sufficient for describing the taste of salt is clear

by the atheists response that he knew what it was and had just tasted it with his dinner. Just as

one has to learn the meaning of these words to know the language-game of describing salt, one

must also learn what it means to have spiritually speaking, . . . tasted salt. A small confusion

seems to arise when Packer states that he is no more able to convey to you in words how this

knowledge has come than you are to tell me what salt tastes like. The athe ist did not need to

further describe what salt tasted like because he and Packer both already understood the words

taste of salt as shared description of the taste. If Packer had not known what those words

meant, the atheist could have easily taught him by handing Packer a small packet of salt and

explaining that this is what was meant by taste of salt. If this was still unable to convey


6/14

6

anything to Packer, the atheist would be left to either think that Packer was not able to taste or

that Packer had not yet learned the simple English word taste.

Furthermore, it seems that spiritual knowing involves a different language-game than

knowing tastes and smells. How one comes to know the taste of salt is abundantly clearone

simply tastes it. This is all built into the life surrounding the language-game of taste. If there is a

question of whether or not something tastes like saltthough Im not sure how this would

ariseit could easily be answered by comparing it to the taste of a block of salt. To the contrary,

Packer argues that knowing things by the spirit involves an entirely different language game:

We do not have the words (even the scriptures do not have words) which perfectlydescribe the Spirit. The scriptures generally use the word voice, which does not exactly

fit. These delicate, refined spiritual communications are not seen with our eyes, nor heardwith our ears. And even though it is described as a voice, it is a voice that one feels, more

than one hears.

Taking this even further, Packer adds that should an angel appear and converse with you,

neither you nor he would be confined to corporeal sight or sound in order to communicate. This

knowing of the spirit involves a language-game of voices that are not heard with ears, and things

seen which are not seen with eyes. Rather they are usually something that is felt.

The question then concerns what is meant by a Mormon when says she has learned

something by the spirit. As Wittgenstein points out, if two persons are to communicate

something, they must agree in the language they use, with this agreement being in the form of

life (241). Furthermore, it is not only agreement in definitions, but also . . . agreement in

judgments that is required for communications by means of language (242). Like the discussion

of the taste of salt, in order for one person to communicate that something tastes salty there must

be both shared definitions (i.e. the definitions of taste and salt) and shared judgments (i.e. an

agreed upon notion of what it means for something to taste salty, or perhaps a packet of salt


7/14

7

which can be used as a standard). Similarly, for a language of knowing things by the spirit to

have sense there must also be both an agreement of definitions and an agreement of judgment. It

is clear from Packers description of the exchange he had with the atheist that neither of these

was present when he was attempting to communicate how he knew of Gods existence.

Concerning what the feeling of the spirit is, Packer writes that it is

neither loud nor harsh. It is not a voice of thunder, neither . . . voice of a great

tumultuous noise. But rather, a still voice of perfect mildness, as if it had been a

whisper, and it can pierce even to the very soul and cause [the heart] to burn. (3 Ne.11:3; Hel. 5:30; D&C 85:67.) Remember, Elijah found the voice of the Lord was not in

the wind, nor in the earthquake, nor in the fire, but was a still small voice. (1 Kgs.19:12.) The Spirit does not get our attention by shouting or shaking us with a heavy hand.

Rather it whispers. It caresses so gently that if we are preoccupied we may not feel it atall. Occasionally it will press just firmly enough for us to pay heed. But most of the time,

if we do not heed the gentle feeling, the Spirit will withdraw and wait until we comeseeking and listening.

This paragraph perhaps sums up every way in which feeling the spirit has been described by

Latter-day Saints. From their childhood, or from their investigation into Mormonism before their

conversion, Mormons have been repeatedly taught that this is what the Holy Spirit feels like. A

big question remaining though is how it is that a person recognizes when they are actually

feeling these things. Because the meaning of these words do not seem to be immediately

recognized by those outside of the faith (as exemplified by the atheist), an investigation of this

language must ask how it is that these words come to be understood in the spiritual language-

game, and how one becomes certain that she is understanding these words properly. This

becomes even more pressing when Packer writes,

Be ever on guard lest you be deceived by inspiration from an unworthy source. You can

be given false spiritual messages. . . . The spiritual part of us and the emotional part of usare so closely linked that [it] is possible to mistake an emotional impulse for something

spiritual. We occasionally find people who receive what they assume to be spiritual

promptings from God, when those promptings are either centered in the emotions or are

from the adversary.


8/14

8

The question that must be asked is how is it that a person is able to know that she is feeling the

spirit? How is this learned? Furthermore, how does she know that what she is feeling is simply

not her own thought or emotions? While Packer writes that it is possible with words to show

another how to prepare for the reception of the Spirit, he offers little measures beyond the

descriptions just listed by which a person is to know that she is feeling the spirit. Just as with his

debate with the atheist, Packer leaves the discussion with his assurance that the feelings of the

spirit are real and the assurance that he has felt it, but with nothing to teach the other how they

might come to recognize or learn it.

As mentioned earlier, Wittgenstein points out that for communication in language to take

place, there must be some agreed upon standard by which two or more persons understand a

language. This standard of judgment, however, does not have to necessarily be some kind of

absolutely verifiable measure, nor does the internal feeling have to be strictly verifiable.

Wittgenstein notes that the sensation of pain is largely tied to pain behavior: If I see someone

writhing in pain with evident cause, I do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me

(PPF 324). We identify pain through a persons pain behavior. If someone stubs their toe hard

against a corner and yelps in pain, we identify them as being in pain. In the same fashion, if

someone is walking normally and does not hit anything, we do not normally wonder if they are

in pain. The feeling of the spirit, like pain, can certainly be an internal impression. However,

there must be some type of external way of expressing that one has learned something by the

spirit, otherwise there would be no way to way to discuss it, nor know of it. Wittgenstein writes:

What would it be like if human beings did not manifest their pains (did not groan,grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word

toothache. Well, lets assume that the child is a genius and invents a name for thesensation by himself!But then, of course, he couldnt make himself understood when

he used the word.So does he understand the name, without being able to explain itsmeaning to anyone?


9/14

9

Wittgenstein concludes by pointing out:

When one says He gave a name to his sensation, one forgets that much must be

prepared in the language for mere naming to make sense. And if we speak of someones

giving a name to a pain, the grammar of the word pain is what has been prepared here;it indicates the post where the new word is stationed.

His point, again, is that for the concept of pain to have any sense in a language, there must be

certain behaviors, practices, and/or other ways of speaking about pain that give this concept life.

Without these things, there would be no way for a concept of pain to exist in our language.

Because we do not feel the sensations of pain of another, we learn the concept of pain through

observing pain behavior associated with the words pain, hurt, ouch, etc. Without these

things, we would have no way to communicate to another when we are experiencing the

sensation of pain.

Like pain, for the concept of spiritual feeling and knowing to have a sense, there must be

some public behavior, practice, and/or language associated with it. Simply saying the spirit told

me or, as Packer put it, spiritually speaking, I have tasted salt does not convey the meaning of

those words to someone who has not yet learned themjust as saying I feel pain does not

communicate anything to someone who has not yet learned the concept of pain. Mormons

typically attach certain emotions and states of mind to their feeling of the spirit that do act as

public and communicable expressions and provide a life for which these concepts can be learned.

When asked what they mean when they say that they have felt or learned something by the spirit,

Mormons often respond with such things as: I felt extreme joy; My confusion went away; I

clearly knew at that moment what to do; or I had an overwhelming sense of peace come over

me. These might further be accompanied by things such as changes in lifestyle, actions resulting

from those feelings, or declarations of belief or knowledge. Practices and behavior such as these


10/14

10

all establish a way of understanding and learning the concept. If a person was to say that she felt

the spirit, but when prompted said that she felt nothing emotional, learned nothing, and felt no

motivation to do anything, we would want to say that she was confused and misapplying the

words. Similarly, if someone said that she was in pain, but also added that she was not hurt,

discomforted, or feeling any unpleasant sensation, we would be at a lost as to what she meant

and assume that she was confused in her use of the word pain.

There is, however, a key difference between the concept and language-game of pain and

that of spiritual feeling. As Wittgenstein points out, there is a type of certainty involved with

expressing the sensation of pain:

It cant be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I knowIm in pain.What is it supposed to meanexcept perhaps that I am in pain? . . . This much is true: it

makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to sayit about myself. (246)

According to Wittgenstein, the concept of pain is such that the subject experiencing the pain

cannot doubt it. If someone were to say I believe I am in pain, but I might be wrong we would

want to say that they are not using the words properly, for pain is a sensation which one should

be clear on whether or not they were experiencing it. However, it makes sense in Mormonism to

doubt ones own spiritual feelings. It is not uncommon for a person to say, I believe the spirit is

telling me that this is right, but I might be wrong. They might worry, as Packer indicated, that

what they believe to be the promptings of the spirit are in fact from their own emotions or

desires, and not divinely originated. After praying for guidance on a personal matter and feeling

that they had received an answer, they might still question whether this answer came from the

spirit or if it was simply the result of their own fears or hopes.

Despite this uncertainty, there is still a level of certainty in this spiritual language-game

that is akin to the certainty of a person feeling her own pain. This is in the feeling of an answer


11/14

11

or prompting regardless of its source. While it could make sense to say, I feel this is right, but

Im not sure if it is from the spirit or myself, it would not make sense to say, I feel this is right,

but Im not sure if I am really feeling this. Just as with the person who doubted her own pain,

we would want to tell this person that she is not using the word feel correctly; otherwise she

would not doubt whether or not she felt something.

What this points to is that in the language-game of spiritual feeling, there is both the

language of feeling something and the language of discernment of what is felt, though they may

both be couched in the same language-game. Thus the statement from the believer , the spirit

told me that Jesus was physically resurrected, can be unpacked into at least two separate claims:

that she felt that Jesus was resurrected, and that she believes those feelings were from the spirit

and not her own self. The former seems to require no more elucidation, as talk of knowing things

because of ones feelings is rather common.5

However, it still does not seem clear how one

comes to believe that the feelings were from the spirit and rather from her own self.

One might want to argue that there is no real difference between the feelings of ones

own self and that of the spirit, and that confusion arises in attempting to differentiate between the

two. Because descriptions of the feelings purported to be indicative of the spirit are similar to

(and perhaps indistinguishable from) feelings arising from emotions and desires it is

understandable that one might think that there is no difference between them. This assessment,

however, would go against the religious life and practice of believers who find much meaning in

5See Stephen Colbert, Truth From the Gut, Colber t Nation, http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-

videos/218576/february-11-2009/truth-from-the-gut (accessed March 20, 2002).


12/14

12

the difference between these two experiences and would deny that their most important and life-

changing experiences were simply manifestations of their emotions and desires.6

What then are the criteria or shared judgments that provide the believer with a concept of

a difference? In other words, how does a believer learn and determine that a feeling is from the

spirit and not her own self? Within the Mormon tradition there may be some external measures

that these feelings can be laid against. For example, Packer warns that supposed spiritual

experiences that authorizes [the recipient] to challenge the constituted . . . authority in the

Church are clearly not from the spirit. Furthermore, the spiritual or temporal intelligence

which we have already received can be a measure to judge whether or not something is of the

spirit or of herself. Because of these things, the believer might have reason to tell herself that

something is surely not from the spirit as it went against the scriptures or against her own

common sense.

The questions though still remain of how the believer can determine whether a feeling is

from the spirit or from her emotions and desires when it comes to things (such as personal

matters and choices) that are not within the scope of authoritative and common sense measures.

Furthermore, the question remains of how the believer is to understand her feelings when they

directly challenge these measures. It would not be uncommon to hear a believer say, This

seemed to go against all common sense, but I knew that the spirit directed me to do it. How

does she know it is one and not the other? (What does she mean when she says it is one and not

the other?) It is here that Packers description of learning by the spirit fails to take account of an

important aspect of religious languagethe language of faith. From the very beginning of his

talk, Packer fails to recognize (or clearly state) that his religious conception of knowledge lacks

6I am not saying anything about whether or not their feelings actuallycame from an outside divine source. Rather,

this is to say that the role that spiritual feeling plays in the religious life of the believer is such that it could not be

justan emotional response.


13/14

13

the empirical or experiential certainty of the other types of knowing (such as knowing the taste of

salt) that he wanted to compare it to. While acknowledging a different conception of knowledge

that involved a different source, his use of knowing seemed to imply that the product of certainty

was the same. When Packer tells the atheist, There is a God. I knowhe lives! a confusion

arises between the two when they both speak as if their use ofknowing utilized a shared meaning

of experimental or experiential certainty. They both failed to see what was evidenced by

Packers inability to put what he wanted into words.

The typical religious use of knowing among Mormons, however, usually does not imply

this certainty of knowledge.

7

Instead it employs the language-game of faith. An oft-cited passage

of the Book of Mormon reads: faith is not to have a perfect knowledge of things; therefore if ye

have faith ye hope for things which are not seen, which are true (Alma 32:21; cf. Heb.

11:1).Unlike language of knowing pain or tasting salt which ultimately appeals to a standard of

certainty (or at least modest certainty), the language of spiritual knowing appeals to a standard of

uncertainty, mystery, and faith. It is a statement of belief and knowing, despite the lack of

certainty that we normally appeal to when stating our knowledge. The power and religious value

in the testimony of knowing is not in a statement and language-game of experiential or

experimental certainty, but in its declaration of belief despite its uncertainty.8

7A common practice among Mormons is to emphasize the word know when bearing their testimony. For

example, see how many times know is italicized in Packers talk, even when addressing other believers do not

doubt his faith. This emphasis of not just knowingbut rather knowingboth highlights the different use of the

word and adds to the confusion by what is meant. Imagine somebody who emphasizes the word knoweach time

they state a fact, especially when it is not in dispute. (I knowthat 1+3=4).8If the monthly testimony meetings in Mormon chapels were merely a recitation of facts known through such

certainty, the meetings would have a very different meaning and religious sense. How would it differ from people

getting up and reciting facts they read from an almanac?


14/14

14

Through an exploration and elucidation of language using the methodology shown by

Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, it can be easily seen that the Mormon religious

language-game of the spirit differs in many ways from other common language-games of

knowing. While they employ words and concepts (such as feeling and knowing) that can be

shared across language-games, the spiritual sense of knowing differs in both the method by

which it seeks to gain this knowledge and the standard of judgment by which it is understood and

stated. A statement of spiritual knowing is a statement a faith ground in mystery and uncertainty.

A failure to recognize this key difference both fails to recognize the value it has for the religious

believer and can result in confusion when attempting to communicate it.

Documents

Spiritual Investigations