Sport Canada

7/31/2019 Sport Canada

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JOHN ALAN SUTHERLAND 24/01/12

OWN THE PODIUM

PROGRAM

GLOBALIZATION,INTERNATIONALIZATION AND SECTOR LEADERSHIP: THE

PARADIGM BEHIND CURRENT NATIONAL SPORTS POLICY IN CANADA

Since 2003 Canadian Federal sports policy has been shaped by the pressures of internationalization and

globalization through the converging interests of public and private sector leadership to sell the

Canadian brand globally through the sports accomplishments of elite Canadian athletes. National

sports organizations have been willing to relinquish autonomy over their sport and cooperate in this

policy in order to receive large infusions of public and private monies. The culmination of this

convergence process was reached at the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver when Canada won

the most gold medals of any host country. In an effusive display of nationalistic chest thumping by the

national media , leadership of all sectors announced that Canada had finally arrived as a force to be

reckoned with globally. However the costs of this policy to the needs of Canadian civil society and sport

in general throughout Canada have been high.


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AU # 2980775

GOVN 500

TERM PAPER

DR. SEAN RYAN

FALL 2011/ WINTER 2012

INDIVIDUALIZED COURSE

January 26/2012

Canada has won more gold medals at these (Vancouver2010 Winter Olympic) games than any

other nation, including powerhouses like the United States, Germany and Russia. What this

means is that the Own the Podium campaign has been an unmitigated success, something (in)

which all Canadians should feel an immense pride. Pride in our government for recognizing

(that) our athletes deserve the best funding, the best facilities and the best sense of ambition this

nation can provide them with; pride in the incredible achievement of our athletes to believe that

they are among the very best in the world, deserving of Olympic champion status; and pride in

ourselves as a nation that can stage a world class event, despite weather conditions that were less

than ideal , despite unwarranted criticisms from near and far, because Canada is a nation that has

always believed in itself , no matter what the rest of the world may believe (Ramphal, 2010).

Contained within this jingoistic rant is the current Canadian public sports policy backed by all

three sectors.

This public sport policy is built on a paradigm of elitism and olympism

(Hoberman, 2004). It is a product ofboth the effects of globalization on Canada and the

internationalization (Doern, Pal, & Tomlin, 1996) of the Canadian sport culture. It is funded


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by the public sector represented by Sport Canada (Macintosh & Whitson, 1990), an agency of

the Federal government. It is supported financially by donations from the private sector

represented by large multinational and national corporate sponsors, who spent millions in

advertising the Vancouver games and by the media who followed them like lapdogs for the

advertising dollars. It is administered by the voluntary sector leadership which is represented by

the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC) and the multiple National Sports Organizations

(NSOs) which represent the various sports which sent athletes to the games.

How did we arrive at this current national sports policy? It is clear from an

examination of all the facts leading to the creation of the Own the Podium programthat what

occurred is the process of the convergence of leadership interests (Kellerman, 1999) between the

three sectors which led to a new institution in order to accomplish public policy goals

(Kellerman). The decisions taken by the Federal government leadership were as a result of Sport

Canada officials consultations (Shaw, 2008) with the voluntary sector leadership (COC and

NSOs) under pressure exerted by the private sector leadership including both the national and

international corporations and the leadership of the International Olympic committee (IOC).

While the apparent success of the Games for Canada in terms of medals won might seem

an unmitigated success as claimed by its flag waving supporters, the current sport policy

raises many serious issues which have not been discussed. Citizen engagement has not been

present in debating which sectors interests does this policy serve; what has been gained and

what has been lost by Canadian civil society as a result of this policy; what does this policy

represent in terms ofgovernance and control over public sports policy in Canada by each of the

three sectors; how have globalization, and internationalization including world trade, and

financial practices shaped this policy; and finally where does Canada go from this point into


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the future with a policy that is prepared to sacrifice the notion of sport for all in favour of

massive funding for high performance athletes?

Political leadership is often described as the art of finding out what the voting public

wants and then acting, when in government, (Hargreaves, 1985) in such a way as to appear that it

is responding to these wishes. However once in power political leaders are not necessarily bound

by what the public wants nor to necessarily consult with the public. Leaders in the public sector

today believe that in areas of social policy the voting public is anti-globalist and that leaders and

governments have to act contrary to public opinion in the best interests of the nation (Doern, Pal,

& Tomlin, 1996). The extent to which governments and leaders encourage citizen engagement in

policy development depends on the degree to which they feel more comfortable pushing a policy

without engaging in public dialogue. This observation applies equally as well to the formation of

public policy on sport as to any other government policy.

National Governments have varying philosophies as to how the notion of sport can be

used to meet public needs in ways such as increasing nationalism, improving citizen health,

preparing youth for challenges as they enter the adult world, helping redevelop depressed

communities and even increasing a nations prestige on the world stage. Sport has in the

development of the modern nation state served as a means to promote all these goals in an equal

way. When governments have sought to formulate national sport policies it is usually when

government agendas have sought to portray the advantages of their political system externally.

Whether it is the Cuban leaders trying to sell the image of sport under a Communist State

(Scarpaci, Segre, & Coyula, 2002) or Stephen Harper as prime minister congratulating winning

Canadian medal winners in front of television cameras the gestures are political and for

international as well as national consumption.


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But central to whatever policy underlies apublic leaders or governments action there

continues to be an expectation by civil society that the public sector will serve as the guardian

of the broad public interest (Paqet, 1999). It is therefore difficult to understand how there can

be a lasting convergence between the public and the private sector on the issue of a national

public sport policy. Such a result has no likelihood of promoting a broad public benefit

(Houlihan, 2004). To the private sector sport is primarily a marketing opportunity medium to

advertise its product or services with the expectation that the more people watching will provide

a greater audience of consumers. To the private multinational corporation it matters little who

wins as long as the competition attracts the greatest number of viewers. After the event has

finished the fate of the nations youth is not an interest for the private sector unless it affects

sales of products or services. As a result there will always be a divergence of goals between the

public and private sector when we consider long range public policy goals.

But how do we define sport? Sport can include any activity involving physical movement

or physical motion. It can be any form of physical fitness undertaken for health, leisure, or

competition. It can be organized, individual, or directed by teachers in schools. It can be done

alone, in communities, within national or provincial borders or practiced at the international

level. Even the current Federal Child Fitness Credit Program recognizes activities throughout all

these areas as qualifying for child sport activity including everything from hockey to ballet, as

long as it is done in an organized way and payments are made to an organization for

participation.

Within the framework of the Canadian constitution, sport most often occurs at the

community or provincial level thus allowing provincial and local leaders and governments to

oversee athletic endeavors. The Federal government has traditionally involved itself at the


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national level of sport as a co-ordinator of national and international activities providing funds

for national sport and fitness programs under the policy areas of health and fitness. This paper

examines current national public sport policy because traditionally NSOs deal with the Federal

government and policies set by these bodies filter down to affect sports at the local level. As will

be seen the role of the Federal government leadership in directing sport development has grown

as sport policy has become centered on promoting Canadian athlete achievement to the rest of

the world.

In order to understand how current Federal public sport policy has developed it is

necessary to understand that public sport policies are underpinned by particular interpretive

frameworks or paradigms (Sam & Jackson, 2004) which are pushed or promoted by

governments. Who creates these paradigms; how are they created; what drives them; and what

they are? These are all questions, the answers to which are vitally important to the understanding

of how public sport policy develops. Paradigms shape the construction of public policy

problems, alternative approaches to resolving these problems and an acceptable government

intervention (Sam & Jackson, p. 205). Policy paradigms are attempts by public leadership to

establish causal relationships and to suggest how policy objectives might best be achieved (Sam

& Jackson, p. 207). Their importance lies in how paradigms link means and ends. Specific

means such as those adopted from business and managerial leadership, including re-engineering,

privatization and strategic planning, are tied to ends or goals of efficiency (Alvesson, 1991).

These represent the current domination of public sector leadership by the industrial leadership

paradigm (Kellerman, 1999).

In sport the use of this new public governanceparadigm, which includes preferences

for business models, strategic planning and marketing by the public sector, have been promoted


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by public leadership as both the means to address problems and as worthy ends in themselves.

Policy paradigms include both descriptive and prescriptive elements (Sam & Jackson, p. 207).

These paradigms function to establish the broad goals behind policy, the related problems or

puzzles that public leaders have to solve to get there and in large measure, the kind of

instruments that can be used to attain these goals (Hall, 1993). The propagation of policy

paradigms may be equally motivated by what is deemed culturally appropriate (Sam & Jackson,

p. 208). Paradigms are as well referred to as socially constructed and contested political

symbols (Stone, 1997).

Paradigms provide a useful analytical framework to understanding how policy is

constructed by public leadership. Paradigms reflect the limitations specific to the construction of

policy problems because of how leadership uses them to frame issues and causal descriptions,

Further they are useful to help convey the difficulties leaders in the public sector have to contend

with regarding the nature of intervention and the instruments proposed to address public

concerns. Finally there is the conceptual place of paradigms in linking levels of discourse among

the three sectors. They are a useful middle ground to link ideological theories of state/society

(such as neo-liberalism) with the field specific dominant ideas of public, private and volunteer

leaders and their related interest groups. There is an interplay between paradigms and ideologies

(Sam & Jackson, 2004). When viewing paradigms and policy it is important to acknowledge the

pressures of the interests of the private and voluntary sectors which are seeking satisfaction as

well as the interests of civil society at large. Public sector leaders have to balance these

competing interests in order to develop effective and promotable policies.

How have paradigms helped frame public sector sport policy in Canada? Prior to the

1980s Canadas national public sport policy could be characterized under the theme of Sport


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for All in which sport was promoted by public leadership based on a paradigm of bringing

social and health benefits to individuals and society as a whole (Keech & McFee, 2000). Sport

policy was based on a paradigm which had as one of its goals urban regeneration linked with

an ideology of welfarism and the welfare state which public leadership backed. Sport policy

evolved from the general to the particular (Hargreaves, 1985). This blended concept of sport with

fitness was best exemplified at that time by a prime minister, who was an active canoeist and

who loved the personal individual experience of combining sport with nature (Zakus, 1996).

Sport was seen by most Canadians as an individual pursuit; divorced from state control and

dependent upon a persons own desire to remain fit and healthy and to select whatever type of

sport or physical activity would bring that result. Given these attitudes in the Federal government

it made perfect political sense for Canadas public leadership to frame a sport policy interrelated

with health and fitness for as many Canadians as possible. Participaction was a slogan, a

television program and a key ingredient in stressing this interrelationship of health, exercise and

sport. Its purpose was to encourage Canadians to get active and out of the house from in front of

the television set.

However this national public policy of valuing sport, as an activity for all, did not

produce gold medalists for Canada in either the 1976 Summer Olympics in Montreal nor the

1988 Winter Olympics in Calgary (Knight, MacNeil, & Donnelly, 2005). Was this failure

because Canadians were competing internationally more as a team of individual athletes relying

on their personal private sponsors and their earnings from regular day jobs to fund their training?

Or was it because these events occurred during the Cold War when success in international sport

was used by the Soviet Bloc countries to demonstrate their superior system with athletes who

trained year round with state support? The media wanted to make Canadians believe it was the


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former. The low or absent medal count for Canadians from international competitions made it

difficult for the private and public sector media, especially television networks, to interest

Canadians into watching amateur sporting events in which Canadian athletes had little chance of

winning. Without large audiences of viewers television broadcasters could not attract corporate

advertisers. Without winners NSOs had trouble attracting corporate sponsors to invest in

facilities and athlete training for their particular sports. NSOs appealed to public sector

leadership for funding to fill the gap when private sector money was not forthcoming. At the

same time the private sector was expanding its business under the pressures of globalization and

internationalization. Private sector leadership determined that it required larger markets of

consumers and needed effective ways of advertising their products. Sports events were ideal

vehicles in which the private sector could market products but the issue was how to attract larger

viewing audiences to these events without the presence of competitive Canadian athletes.

Voluntary leadership in the NSOs needed to be incorporated into this policy in order to continue

to generate volunteer involvement in sport.

As a result of these factors and lobbying pressures from leadership in both private and

voluntary sectors the bureaucrats of the Federal governments agency, Sport Canada, held

numerous conferences and consultations with the leadership of NSOs to determine why Canada

was failing to produce winning performances from its athletes at international competitions. This

process followed the scenario described by Kellerman (p. 147) of public management in the

form of government bureaucracy making decisions which eventually would impact upon policy

making by leadership in the public sector.

The conclusions reached by the public managers in Sport Canada was that NSOs

throughout the country and in every sport needed to embrace rational planning for amateur


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sports. This became the policy paradigm (Slack, Berrett, & Mistry, 1994) which succeeded in

shifting public sport policy in a different direction.

Rational planning which in theory had helped the private sector to become more

competitive domestically and internationally was becoming the new mantra of public bodies .

This paradigm ofrational planning for NSOs included both a causal description of a policy

problem-i.e. the disorganized amateurism of NSOs and their leadership in Canada, run in most

cases by volunteers, as being the hindrance to international success- and a preferred policy

solution including quadrennial planning under government supervision (Whitson & Macintosh,

1990). Embracing this paradigm by the public sector led to increased pressure by Sport Canada

on NSOs to adopt more businesslike approaches to their operations (Nixon, 2008). Rational

planning had the added advantage of allowing government officials in Sport Canada to control

the decisions for expenditures of public funds by the leadership of NSOs. In return for increased

public funding leadership of NSOs gave up their autonomy to set policy within their own sport

without government consent. As an accepted paradigm it became a reference point for further

policy behaviors for citizens and groups (Houlihan, 2004). The theory is that experts begin to

make professional claims to extend the paradigms application ; (government) bureaucrats

respond by channelling resources to ensure (what they believe are) sound program

implementation; politicians introduce symbols and rhetoric consistent with the paradigms

account of public purposes and governments role; and societal interests make their own

accommodations with the paradigm, some (such as private sector sponsors) obviously on terms

of their liking, others (voluntary sector NSOs) much more reluctantly to a compromise

(Bradford, 1999). A change in paradigm results in a significant shift in how programmatic or

administrative issues are dealt with in the future (Sam & Jackson, p. 206).


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This policy to better coordinate sport came at a time when the public sector leadership

had also accepted the need for governments to privatize, contract out and decentralize services

and responsibilities (Sam & Jackson, p. 216). The mantra of the neo-liberal policies of

globalization included the belief that less government was better and that the forces of the private

sector marketplace were best placed to determine the shape of a society and its heritage

(Pannekoek, 2009).

But in sport as opposed to business there is an obvious contradiction between the public

sector trying to coordinate the activities of the sport sector while at the same time exhorting the

sports organizations and the athletes to perform better. This contradiction is unlikely to be

resolved by the mere use of words like coordination, leadership and integration in a sport policy

(Works, 2000). There cannot be control and command without centralized structures, just as

there cannot be public responsiveness without empowerment. But achieving coherent structures

and simultaneously encouraging specialized delivery are contradictory aims. From the

perspective of government the problem is that despite debates about appropriate balance neither

extreme is apt to be any more effective in achieving the broader goals of sport policy than the

other (Sam & Jackson, p. 217).

This new policy of rational planning for sports along the lines of successful private

sector management was believed capable of producing international sport winners. But creating

this policy involved little in the way of broad citizen engagement outside of the voluntary NSO

leadership and its discussions with the Federal bureaucracy. In fact as the focus of public

leadership narrowed to produce more high performance athletes the ties of sport to the local

community and to promoting the broad concepts of health and fitness were weakened . As this

policy of more organization began to be implemented through the 1990s into the twenty-first


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century there was positive reinforcement for it by leadership in all three sectors. Government

pumped more public money into NSOs and distributed performance bonuses to athletes. All of

these led to modest successes at international competitions. But the biggest winners were the

fortunate NSOs that could convince the public sector that they were able to better organize their

affairs and therefore were entitled to more public funding. Organization, funding and results

were not necessarily synonymous. The overall effect of this change in sport policy was that

sports in this country came to be defined within parameters ofbeing bureaucratic, quantitative,

masculine, commodified and instrumental (Macintosh & Whitson, 1990).

After Vancouver-Whistler was awarded the 2010 Winter Games in 2003 the focus of

new national sport policy was narrowed even more in terms of increased funding by public

leadership toNSOs who could develop potential medal winners for the Winter Games. More

pressure on public sport policy in Canada came from another source-internationalization in the

form of the international sports community leadership both from the private and voluntary

sectors. Following the successful bid the International Olympic Committees (IOC) president

openly criticized Canadas previous performances in 1976 and 1988 as not representing a good

enough product for a host country i.e. suggesting that Canadas athletes were not able to compete

for medals with the worlds best (Shaw, 2008). Cynics said this criticism was prompted by the

International Olympic Committees thirst for increased television and sponsor revenues.

Following this criticism the leadership of the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC) in

partnership with the leadership of the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC) let it be

known at a meeting in Calgary in 2004 that a new paradigm for Canadian public sport policy was

needed. This would require increased government funding on selecting and supporting particular


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sports and athletes who had the best chance of winning medals at the 2010 Winter Games. This

was the basis for the creation of the Own the Podium program.

The Own the Podium program as promoted by the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC)

was to make Canada the top medal winning nation at the 2010 games. An independent consultant

was contracted to analyze each sports objectives, provide recommendations on changes and

resources required and determine if the goals were achievable. After the report was received a

steering committee was created to manage implementation of the recommendations. Public

opinion was accessed through surveys to see if the general public supported a plan to fund elite

athletes who had the best chance of winning medals at the games. Those affirmative responses

were predicted given the frenzy of nationalism stirred up by the media.

Increased funds under the Own the Podium program were to be distributed to winter

sports based on annual report reviews and an accountability model. The consultants report

called for a $21 million annual increase in funding for winter sports over the 5 years preceding

the Winter Games in Vancouver with a total spending just by the public sector of $118 million.

This revised sport policy focusing on elite athletes advanced a pyramidal model of sport

development (i.e. where a broad base results in an elite) reinforcing globalizing neo-liberal

notions of society as a meritocracy (Sam & Jackson, p. 209). The government made no efforts

to address the ever existing tensions between elite sport and physical education. This increased

shift to focusing on high performance athletes came not only as a result of the global pressures

from the IOC but in general terms from the effects of globalization and internationalization

creating the need for national states to make a mark on the global scene.


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It is clear that the Olympic Games are a precursor to the rampant spread of modern

globalism in the latter part of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century (McFee,

2000). The Olympic ideals described in such phrases as the burnishing ofa flabby and cramped

youth by sport by showing it wide horizons---horizons which ----will bring about a ferment of

international peace (Tomlinson, 1984) were an early manifestation of a globalizing force. In

fact the idea of using the Olympic games as a form of propaganda by the host nation and public

leadership to impress the world with the size and the efficiency of the Games and with the

accomplishments of its athletes (Graham, 1986) dates back to the Berlin Olympics of 1936 put

on by Hitler and the Nazis, if not before (Hoberman, 2004).

It is clear from the lavish displays put on by host nations and the increased levels of

nationalism among the host countrys press that the instrument of the Olympic Games as a

globalizing force does not depend upon whether they have remained true to the aspirations of

their founder. The important thing in life is not the victory but the contest; the essential thing is

not to have won but to have fought well (Shaw, 2008).These words of the founder of the

modern Olympic Games, Baron Pierre de Courbertin, (Tomlinson, 1984) portray an idealistic

international athletic competition with lofty virtues which appear to be directly opposite to the

goals set by the Own the Podium program with its pouring of large sums of money into

training elite Canadian athletes in order to win as many medals as possible.

Despite the fact that the universal nature of the rules and records of sport make the

Olympics a global phenomenon par excellence (Bale & Christensen, 2004) they do not prevent

host countries like Canada from milking every ounce of national pride out of the Games.The

results of the Own the Podium program in the Vancouver games were more than hoped for in

most of the competitions. The medal haul was greater in some areas than had been expected. But


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after the euphoria of podium performances by Canadian athletes has died down and the medal

memories have faded where does future sport policy direction in Canada go?

The program had been expanded prior to 2010 to continue funding potential medal

winners up to the 2012 Summer Olympic Games in London, United Kingdom. However unlike

the Winter Games, Canada has never been a significant presence in the Summer Games except

for the rare personal performance of a committed athlete such as sprinter Donovan Bailey .

Combining this fact of a history of few medals in Summer Games with the traditional summer

holiday travels of Canadians the viewership for 2012 will be significantly reduced and the

private sector will not commit to donating the same level of funds as in 2010. The crunch will be

for the public sector as to how far public leadership will continue to fund high performance

athletes at the expense of other government programs. Obesity for young people in Canada has

increased and there is very little funding left in the public coffer to fund healthy programs for

Canadas youth who are not elite athletes.

Why is the public sector leadership continuing to pour millions of dollars into the

training of high performance athletes with the hope of garnering medals when these monies

could go into supporting sport and physical fitness on a broader scale to more Canadians at the

local level. Public sector leadership should not be fooled as to who benefits most from the

Olympic Games or any international competition. Critics of the Olympic Games have suggested

that the motives behind them have more to do with economic gains for societys private sector

elite as opposed to an athletic competition. The Olympic Games at the local level are all about

real estate (Shaw, p. 5). Unfortunately the myth of the Olympics being about sports is kept

alive in the mind of the public by saturation advertising dulling the background drumbeat of

scandals and misspent public funds, IOC members on the take, corrupt (competition) judges and


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doped-up athletes (Shaw, p. 4). Even the agreement entered into with the International Olympic

Committee by the Canadian government and Canadian Sports bodies required among other

things payment of $225million for capital costs of sport and event venues, $55million payment

to a Legacy Endowment Fund, providing all security services and exempting the IOC from any

Canadian tax (Shaw). Under the leadership of Antonio Samaranch , the Olympic movement

became a powerful machine canalizing public money into private pockets-into multinational

enterprises, media corporations and Mafiosi. Olympism became a sort of reverse Robin Hood:

taking money from the poor-via media licences and public support-and giving it to the rich.

Olympic sport functioned as an enterprise of globalization, following commercial rationality

(Bale & Christensen, p. 74) .

As to fostering global relations between countries George Orwell said it best when he

wrote that I am always amazed when I hear people saying that sport creates goodwill between

nations------------At the international level sport is frankly mimic warfare (Orwell, 1945). The

Games proved to be no impediment to prevention of the First and Second World Wars nor to

subsequent limited wars and terrorism.

What then drives public leaders and their bureaucratic managers to rush to fund

international competitions like the Olympic Games and elite athletes. Public leadership as well

as the public have a great respect for athletic winners whether in professional sport or in the

Olympics. This respect reaches a height of adoration that borders on idolatry (Shaw, p. 167) .

The phenomenon aptly known as jock sniffing seems mostly to reach its apogee among

middle aged men (Shaw, p. 167) which incidentally is the group most represented in the

leadership of all three sectors involved in modern day international sports. This is the emotional

basis for stressing the need to Own the Podiumhyping every medal into a collective jock


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sniffing frenzy (Shaw, p. 168). If it were really about sports, wed all be celebrating the

amazing achievement of anyone able to perform at such a high level at all. (Shaw, p. 170). No,

its all about winning gold, silver or bronze and making their owners household celebrities at

home.

The media plays a major role in encouraging the cult of athlete admiration in order to

sell advertising to sponsors who want to associate themselves with winners and those celebrities

admired by the public. Most of what the average person knows about the Olympics in general

and the local bid comes from the corporate media (Shaw, p. 171). Globalization in regards to

the Olympics means that the worlds economy is not run for the benefit of the majority of those

on the planet (Shaw, p. 193). On September 2000 when members of the Sydney based Anti-

Olympic alliance challenged Olympic legislation in street protests their message was clear: the

Olympic Games serve the interests of global capital first and foremost (Bale & Christensen, p.

135). This was not the first time that anti-Olympic activists had made the important connection

between the Olympic industry and global capitalism, or had challenged Olympic sponsors for

their complicity in environmental destruction, human rights abuses, and the widening gap

between rich and poor countries, and between rich and poor within a country (Bale &

Christensen, p. 135).

Where has the public dialogue or opportunity for citizen engagement in the creation of

this elitist public sport policy been? The very demand to better co-ordinate sport delivery has

come at a time when the propensity for governments and public leadership has been to privatize,

contract out and decentralize services and responsibilities.


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The continuing tension and debates, between whether the public sector should engage in a

sport policy that favours elite sport over a policy promoting broader physical education,

continue. The crisis of legitimacy surrounding Sport Canada and its involvement in sport policy

caused by these long standing tensions between mass participation and elite objectives

(Bergsgard, Houlihan, Mangset, Nodland, & Rommetvedt, 2007) will have to be revisited after

the 2012 Summer Games. It is clear that a shift towards more encouragement of elite athletes

leads to a more fragmented sports policy and away from a public policy which has any socially

redeeming values or concepts. Where is the social value in the current sport policy? How can we

engage the public in discussion of sport policy when the policy is centering more on the high

performances of elite athletes? State involvement in sport has centred on principles of

accountability due to Sports Canadas reliance on grants as its primary instrument and because of

the relative autonomy of partner sports organizations. The Federal government is criticized for

being too interventionist in the affairs of NSOs while at the same time not being accountable for

outputs and outcomes (Peters, 1995). Lack of medalling will result in public criticism of not

getting enough bang for the buck (Knight, MacNeil, & Donnelly, 2005). Building public value

concerns the need to obtain legitimacy and support. The task of building support and legitimacy

for a policy or of enhancing the effective claim that an official may make on society at large, is

what political management is all about (Moore, 1995). Public managers and leaders must work

to fashion legitimacy and support for themselves, their policies, or their organizational strategies.

What are the international trends and wider government expectations in relation to sport?

It has been proven in the past that a broad national sport policy can generate economic growth,

decrease health expenditures, promote social integration, and develop national identity

(Hargreaves, 1985). What has happened to the Canadian Sport Policy (CSP) tabled in 1993


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which set out those wider goals? That policy had come from extensive consultation between

leadership in both the public and voluntary sectors. It is still technically the blueprint for Sport

Canada. That public policy had four objectives which were to enhance: excellence, participation,

capacity( modernization) and interaction (collaboration and cooperation ). Sadly these goals have

been overshadowed by a rush for medals. While Kellermans governance paradigm may bring

the three sectors together the result as in Canadas current public sport policy may not produce

public goods of benefit to Canadian society.

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