SSFF HEALTH MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS REPORT PART II … · SSFF HEALTH MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS REPORT PART II (PROOF OF CONCEPT) DECEMBER 15, 1995 Reference: Contract No. NAS8-40365 Subrmtted

SSFF HEALTH MANAGEMENT

ANALYSIS REPORT

PART II (PROOF OF CONCEPT)

DECEMBER 15, 1995

Reference: Contract No. NAS8-40365

Submitted to:

Systems Requirements & Verification BranchSystems Engineenng Division

Systems Analysis and Integration LaboratoryGeorge C. Marshall Space Hight Center

Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama 35801

ALPHA TECHNOLOGY

3322 S. MEMORIAL PARKWAY, SUITE 215H, HUNTSVILLE, AL 35801

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19960017621 2020-05-20T17:15:40+00:00Z

SSFF HEALTH MANAGEMENT

ANALYSIS REPORT

PART II (PROOF OF CONCEPT)

DECEMBER 15, 1995

Reference: Contract No. NAS8-40365

Subrmtted to:

Systems Requirements &Venfication Branch

Systems Engineering Divasion

Systems Analysis and Integration Laborator3

George C. Marshall Space Flight Center

Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama 35801

ALPt-bk TECI-LNOLOGY

3322 S, MEMORIAL PARKWAY, SUITE 215H, HL2qTSVILLE, AL 35801

THE PART II, PROOF OF CONCEPT, PHASE HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY

COMPLETED.

ENCLOSED IN THIS REPORT ARE THE FOLLOWING ATTACt-LMENTS

1) GU-LDELINES AND ASSL_'k, IPTIONS

2) S L.'5.,gvLA_RY/C ONCL USIONS

3) FF-DAREL WORKSFIEETS WITH SUPPORTING ENCLOSURES

GDS SCHEMATIC

FLI"qCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGtL,-kMI,

- GDS MECHANICAL/ELECTRIC,ZL FF

- BLOCK FUNCTIONS TABLE

- FUNCTIONAL FAILURES TABLE

- ACTIVE COMPONENTS IN FL._CTIONA.L BLOCKS

4) XLM-NTA.INABILITY AND RELIABILITY CONSIDEtLkTIONS IN HEALTH

MANAGEMENT

l° GU IDELLN ES/ASSUMPTIONS

* Evaluate/,_uaalyze only the Gas Distribution Subsystem (GDS)

* Focus I-_l activities on the FF-DAREL Process

* Use the PDR Configuration (per COTR instruction)

(.All are aware that this configuration has change considerably since PDR)

* Deve!op I-LM Requirements from all available data on all subsystems (This is more

mature information than would normally be available for use in defining requirements)

Make assumptions, as necessary.' to complete this effort

* lfa "Component" fails in our analysis, we do not concern ourselves as to how it fails,

except to the extent of all the "Resulting Effects"

2. SUM,MARY/CONCLUSIONS

The Gas Distribution Subsystem was studied and evaluated utilizing the PDR

Configuration and with respect to the design features encompassing Health Management (I-_I)

aspects outlined in the Generic Handbook (specifically the FF-DAREL Process) This I-tiM effort

addresses equipment and failures at a higher level than FMEA efforts and results in less

worksheets, and focuses results toward "Test" and "Operations" issues

We were only able to conduct limited discussions with the skilled designers who are

extremely knowledgeabI_ of the GDS. This limitation has probably resulted in somewhat shallo_ '

analysis, but, the major subjects have been addressed and evaluated

The GDS is largely a self contained subsystem, and is largely simplex, but some

redundancy is included in the design and its functions have been identified and its use in [-LM have

been analyzed The lack of needed, or possibly desired, redundancy is also identified and its

impact is assessed A significant lack of"two fault tolerant Functional Failure" cases (component

and paths) are identified and a recommendation for simple inclusion of redundancy is being

discussed with the Detail Designer The details of the approach could be pursued, if desired, by

the Detail Design Engineer A significant amount of manual operations to perform "Corrective

Action" has been identified (even operational procedures) This condition often precludes

utilizing software to isolate and recover from Functional Failures

The software is not yet mature and detail was not available to us to insure whether or not

Paragraph 312631 in the S/W Requirement Specification, Level III (The SA,V shall be capable

of detecting, isolating, and responding to faults within the GDS) is being met Our conclusion is

that the PDR GDS configuration will not allow this requirement to be accommodated in many

instances I identified in the FF-DAREL Worksheets). Accommodating this requirement is a

significant effort, but is vital to our HM Concept and would be documented in the ISIRL for each

Functional Failure and for use in Test and Operations Note The S/W requirement is also stated

in the "Core System Requirement Document", Para 337

The results of this study have shown a definite need for coordinating need for

measurements _ithin, and between, subsystems to accommodate insuring that Functional Failures

are properly revealed and can be substantiated as valid by other measurements, even from other

interfacin,, subsystems

3

Wewerenot ableto performa majorgoalof our Conceptinvolving"Developingan

additionallevelof InformationbydefiningIntersystemInformationalRelationships" Thiswas

becausetheExperimentModule(EM) andICE aretheonlyelectricalinterfacesto theGDS The

EM (specifically, the Crystal Growlh Module) has just within the past few days identified a

significant number of measurements for that system. This will allow some additional HM

considerations and evaluations, but time was not available to perform this task. The ICE Interface

is more mature, but was not addressed because of guidelines and time constraints on this effort

These efforts can be readily accomplished with additional time to perform the assessments

- We have concluded that the HM aspects in our Concept could nave been significantly

enhanced in the GDS design had the Concept been in place at the start of the Initial Design Phase

of the Project However, we feel that this Part II, Proof of Concept Phase, has been very

successful and has accomplished its purpose and indicates very useful types of information which

can be gleaned and evaluated from the current design and useful to the Project and Project

Manager in upcoming Reviews and throughout the SSFF Development/Operational Phase

.. % _:_.'.' ; k ' '-

m

(D

[k

..

(3(]i=11);db=l ;s!C] _oel=l ;uewn4£ul

UJ

Figure '2. GDS Pneumatic Schematic

3. FF-WORKSHEETS WITH SUPPORTING ENCLOSURES

FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAM

GDS.

GAS SIPPLY

MODULE

INERT GAS

ORU

RIGHT IR ]

----dT_- /_

EXP MOD

PRESSURE

CONTROL

ASSY

VACUUM

VENT

\SSY

TECS _ IN?

ElYl

SS LN2

CORE RACK

GAS CONTROL

MODULE

VLEFT IX

,}AS

SUPPLY

A_SEMBLY

EXP EXP

MOD MOD

1 2

!RESSUREIPRESS_REtONTROL [ CONTROL

ASSY [ _SSY

VACUUM VENT

ASSY

VAC VENT

MANIFOLD

(VRS}SSVS d_SSWGS(VES_

GDS ELECTRICAL VF

GDS

A

V

ACE _ PSCU

ICE [ CDMSL

GDS MECHANICAL I F

GDS

T ........

EM - 2

LI - JR',

EM - t

cR- IR_

6

BLOCK FUNCTIONS TABLE

GAS SUPPLY MODULE

a Supplies inert gas to Core Rack gas control module when manual valve is open

b Provides safety over pressure device (BD1)

c Provides manual pressure readout at all times

CORE RACK GAS CONTROL MODULE

a Provides control (manual valve) and filtering of GN2 from SSLNS to TECS

b Provides filtering pressure regulation and control (SV) oFLN2 ro IR (Left & Right) gas

supply assemblies

c Provides filtering, pressure regulaton and control (SV) of(AR) to _ (Left & Rightl gas

supply assemblies

d Provide over pressure safety devices (BD2,BD3)

GAS SUPPLY ASSEMBLY (2 EACH, 1 OF WHICH HAS 2 SEPAI:L_TE,DUAL

FUNCTIONS)

a. Provides source gas (AR or LN2) selection

b Provides (Selected) gas control (SV) to EM

c Provide blocking ofEM gasses which might travel backward to GDS (CV)

PRESSURE CONTROL ASSEMBLY (3 EACH, 1 FOR EACH EM)

a Provides control (SV) ofEM gasses to accumulator (for use when SS Vacuum Exhaust

System is not available)

VACUUM VENT ASSEMBLY (2 EACH, 1 OF WHICH SERVES 2 EM'S)

a Provides particle filtering

b Provides pressure relief(RV) [2 relief(redundant) valves for each E.M]

-- To Vacuum Exhaust System

c Provides Control (2 series SV & MV & DCV)of exhaust gasses to VES

d Provides Control (SV &MV) drainage of accumulator to VES

e Provides Selection of VRS or VES to downstream (outlet side) of EM

FUNCTIONAL FAILURES

GAS SUPPLY MODULE

a Fails to supply inert gas to core rack gas control

b Fails to stop supplying inert gas to core rack

c. Failure to provide over pressure relief

d Manual pressure gage fails to provide readout

9w

CORE RACK GAS CONTROL MODULE

a Fails to provide control and filtered LN2 to TECS

b LN2 to [R (Left and/or Raght) gas supply assemblies

Fails to filter

Fails to provide proper re malation

Fails to supply

,-MR.to IR (Left and/or Right) gas supply assemblies

Fails to filter

Fails to provide proper retaliation

Fails to supply

d Fails to provide over pressure relief

C

GAS SUPPLY ASSEMBLY

a DCV 1, 3 or 5 fails to allow selection of source gas

b SV3.7 OR 1l fails to control (On/Off) gas flow to EM

c CVI. 2 OR 3 fails to block EM gasses backflow into GDS

4 PRESSURE CONTROL ASSEM]3LY

Fails to vent EM ,_,asses to accumulator when commanded

"; V.-\('LUM VENT ASSEMBLY

a Fails to provide particle filtering

b Fails to provide EM pressure relief to VES (Redundant)

Fails to provide EM pressure relief to VES {Redundant)

c SV4. S. 12 fails to vent EM exhaust gasses to VES when commanded

d S\'O. 10. 14 and XIV4. 5 & 6 fails to provide drainage of accumulator to VES _shen

commanded

\'_e DC .. 4, e, fails to select VRS or VES to do,an stream EM when commanded

8

ACTIVE COMPONENTS IN FUNCTIONAL BLOCKS

GAS SUPPLY MODULE

- Pressure Vessel

- Pressure Gauge

- Safety Device

- Manual Valve

- Quick Disconnect

PVI

PGI

BD1

MV1

QDI

II CORE tL4.CK GAS CONTROL MODL_LE

For LN2

- Quick Disconnect

- Manual Valve

- Filter (01Mic)

- Manual Valve

- Pressure Regulator (1 Stage)

- Pressure Transducer

- Solenoid Valve

- Burst Disc

- Vent Filter

- Quick Disconnect

- Quick Disconnect

QD4

M'V2

F2

MV3

PR2

PT3

SV2

BD3

VF2

QD5

QD6

For Inert (.M1.) Gas

- Filter ( 01 Mic)


- Pressure Regulater


- Solenoid Valve

- Burst Disc

- Vent Filter

- Quick Disconnect

- Quick Disconnect

F1

PTI

PRI

PT2

SVI

BD2

VF1

QD2

QD3

III GAS SUPPLY ASSEMBLY (RIGHT IR)

- Quick Disconnect (AR)

- Quick Disconnect (LN2)

- Directional Control Valve

- Solenoid Valve

- Check Valve

- Experiment Module

QDll

QD12

DCV5

SVI 1

CV3

EM(R-IR)

IV PRESSURE CONTROL ASSEMBLY (RIGHT IR)


- Vacuum Sensor

- Solenoid Valve


- Accumulator

PT8

VS3

SVI3

PT9

ACC3

V VACU-L2M VENT ASSEMBLY (RIGHT IR)

- Relief Valve RV5

- Relief Valve RV6

- Filter (O1Mic) F5

- Solenoid Valve SV12

- Solenoid Valve SV 14

- Manual Valve MV6

- Directional Control Valve DCV6

- Quick Disconnect (VRS) QDI3

- Quick Disconnect (VES) QDI4

10

VI GASSUPPLYASSEMBLY (LEFT IR)

- Quick Disconnect (AR)

- Quick Disconnect (GN2)

QD7

QD8

For EM- 1


- Solenoid Valve

- Check Valve

- Experiment Module

DCV1

SV3

CV1

EM-I •

For EM-2


- Solenoid Valve

- Check Valve

- Experiment Module

DCV3

SV7

CV2

EM-2

VII PRESSURE CONTROL ASSEMBLY (LEFT IR)

For EM- 1

- Pressure Transducer PT4

- Vacuum Sensor VS1



- Accumulator ACC 1

For EM-2

-Pressure Transducer PT6

- Vacuum Sensor VS2



- Accumulator ACC2

ll

VIII VACUL,_¢IVENT ASSEMBLY (LEFT IR)

- Quick Disconnect (VRS) QD9

- Quick Disconnect (VES) QD10

For EM- 1

- Relief Valve RV 1

- Relief \'alve RV2

- Filter _ 01Mic) F3

- Solenoid VaNe SV4


- Manual Valve MV4


For EM-2

- Relief Valve RV3

- Relief Valve RV4

- Filter (01Mic) F4


- Solenoid Valve SV 10

- Manual Valve MV5


12

4. MAINTALNABILITY AND RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS

IN HEALTH MANAGEMENT

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The Space Station Furnace Facility (SSFF) is a modular facility which will provide the

platform for materials research in the microgravity environment. The facility is designed to

accommodate Experiment Modules (EM) which house an experiment The facility will provide

the function of interfacing the EM to ISSA services, conditioning and control for the experiment

module use, providing the controlled services to the experiment modules, and interfacing to and

acquiring data from the experiment modules

The SSFF has several subsystems which provide the above mentioned functions The

Subsystems are Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS), Command and Data Management Subsystem

(CDMS), Gas Distribution Subsystem (GDS), Thermal and Environmental Control Subsystem

(TECS), and the Instrumentation and Control Electronics (ICE). Subsystem

4.2 HEALTH MANAGEMENT INTRODUCTION

The facility is designed, constructed, tested to determine to be in an operable state, and lifted

into space Once in orbit, the SSFF is available to be placed on-line and to accept EM's in order

to perform experiments. The EMs are to be removed and replaced as required and remain in

operation for 2880 hours. This means that the SSFF is a mission oriented system Analysis will

determine whether the system is to be a repairable or non-repairable system

4.3 SYSTEM LEVEL HEALTH MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS

For the SSFF to accomplish its intended purpose, it must operate without failure for 2880

hours Since reality states that perfection is impossible, trade-offs must be made so that the

mission can be accomplished in a cost effective manner The intent is to minimize the cost and

successfully accomplish the intended mission. For example, say that the cost of an E.Xl plus the

cost or'lifting the EM into orbit is $600,000 O0 and each EM can be used oNv once TabJe I

sho_s an assumed relationship between Cost and P(MS) Assume that the allowable budge: is

52 4 million This means that the P(MS) must be 0 97 in order to meet budget in order to have _._

guaranteed successful mission. But, trade studies reveals that it is possible to build a system tha_

meets a P(MS) or reliability of 0.94; however, that it is very costly to build an SSFF that meets :_

reliability of 0 97 Thus engineering must perform some trade-offs in order that a successful

mission can be performed as well as to be within cost

13

It is known that the SSFF is composed of five subsystems. A network model of the

subsystems is a series system This means that all of the subsystems must work for the system to

be a success If one subsystem fails, then the system fails Figure 1 shows the network model

Equation 1 is the mathematical expression that represents the network model

P(MS) cost to achieve

success (worst

case)

099 12

0 98 18

097 24

096 3 0

095 3 6

0.94 42

T.M3LE COST Vs P(MS)

P(MS) = P(EPS) * P(TECS) * P(CDMS) * P(ICE) * P(GDS) .................. (1)

Where P(MS) is the probability of mission success

P(EPS) is the probability that the EPS does not fail

P(TECS) is the probability that the TECS does not fail

P(CDMS) is the probability that the CDMS does not fail

P(ICE) is the probability that the ICE does not fail

P(GDS) is the probability that the GDS does not fail

14

NEIWORK MODI far the

SSFF

Figure 1 Network Model of the SSFF

First some approximate values of the probability of mission success will be selected. From

Table 1, a value for P(MS) of 0.94 seems to be a practical selection for a beginning analysis

Since a P(MS) has been selected, the determination of test criteria can be investigated

P(MS) P(SS)_ROBABILI_" OF _ROBABILI_" OF

MISSION SUCCESS) SUBSYSTEM SUCCESS)

0.99 0.99799

0.98 0.99596

0.97 099393

096 099187

095 0 98979

094 0 98770

Table 2, Trial P(MS)

Consider the SSFF as a single component system having a time-to-failure that is exponentially

distributed Evaluate analytically and by simulation the model using a P(MS) of 0 ?4 for a period

of 2880 hours Equation." is used to determine a trial failure rate for the SSFF

t"(J.IS) = exp(-2t) ...............

15

, (2)

094 = exp(-2* 2880)

2 = Ln (094)/2880

2 = 02148/10exp6fperhr ........................................... (3)

Equation 3 is the failure rate at which the SSFF must operate in order to provide the P(MS) of

094 This failure rate must be distributed over the five subsystems From Equation 1 O,

assuming that all subsystem failure rates are equal, the P(MS) equals to 0 9877

This means that the failure rate for each subsystem is,

2 = 4297/10 exp 6 fper hr .............................................. (4)

Hence, the next step is to perform some trade studies to determine the availability of component

parts with the required failure rates, cost, and lead time for the procurement of these parts From

experience, the availability of component that possess the required failure rates and meets costconstraints is not cost effective Trade off's will have to be made

For this example, the GDS is selected When perusing the SSFF Maintainability .4malysis. a

component in GDS was found that had a high failure rate of 21 9 failures for eveR' million hours

When evaluating the P(MS) of the subsystem and entire SSFF, this high failure rate component

was found to be a series element in the network model. The P(MS) of this component is 0 e38 e_

This figure is lower than the system P(MS)

In Section 2 above, it was stated that the determination of the system type as to a repairable

or non-repairable svstem would be made From the results of the trade studies mentioned in the

previous paragraph, the system must be a repairable system in order to meet the P(.MS) of 0 _4

Bv using maintainability, the system P(MS) can be raised in a very cost effective manner It is

universally agreed that component parts with lower and lower failure rates are expensive and a

high man-hour requirement for maintenance is also very expensive Again a trade study is needed

to determine a cost effective balance Lets say that the trade study revealed that no science _ill

be lost if this high failure part can be replaced and the system returned to operation within 30

minutes This decision will accomplish two things, the P(MS) of the system will be increased and

the cost _ill be reduced Secondly, by managing the failure rate of the component, the

requirement for lo_, failure components is reduced

Let's investigate the test requirements for this maintenance action From Equation 5, the

relative uncertainty can be calculated From this analysis, test criteria will be selected It is given

that the avera,,e time to repair the part or MTTR is 30 minutes Assume a standard deviations of

l or 3 minutes How man,,' trial runs are needed to yield certainty of success Using Equation 5,

Table 2 was constructed The Table shows that as the number of trials increase the degree of

uncertainty decreases Also as the standard deviation decreases or narrows, the number of

16

requiredtrialsincreasesfor a desired level of certainty From Table ,_,"the selection of a certaintyis selected with a standard deviation of one The reason for the selection is for a fewer number of

trials the higher degree of certainty is achieved.

Ro. = s/x,/-£ ..................................................... (5)

Where R = Relative Uncertainty of the Trial Test

X

n

= Standard Deviation

= Average or Mean Value

Number of Trials Required

n S

1 3

4 3

2 5 3

3 6 3

1 1

X U nc C

30 01 090

30 005 095

30 002 0 98

30 0 016 0 983

30 0 033 0 97

4 1 30 0 017 0 98

25 1 30 0 007 0 99

36 1 30 0 006 0 99

Table 2, Relationship between Number of Test Trials Vs Degree of Certainty

17

4.4 REQUIR MENTS

The I-LM requirements of the GDS can be stated.

The failure rate of the following systems shall be no greater than 4 297 failures in one

million hours

1 EPS

2 TECS

3 ICE

4 CDMS

The GDS shall have a mean time to repair (MTTR) of 30 minutes with a standard deviation of 3

minutes

Test requirements shall be that sufficient trials be conducted so that a 98% degree of certainty isachieved The number of trials shall not be less than 25 The success criteria shall be that 98°0 of

the trials result in the replacement of the single component and the SSFF returned to service in

less than or equal 30 minutes

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Form Approved

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE O_BNo.o7o4-olaa

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per.response, including the time for reviewing Instructions. searching existing data sOurces

gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing an d rewewlng the collection of reformation, Send comments recsardlng this I_urden est!mate or any other aspect of this

collection of information, including suggestions for reducing th=s burden, to Wash*ngton Headquarters Services, OirectOrate TOT Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson

Davis Highway. Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2, REPORT DATE

Dec 15, 1995

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS

SSFF Health Management Analysis ReportPart II (Proof of Concept)

6. AUTHOR(S)

Lee Wilson, Jim Spruill, Yin Hong

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Alpha Technology3322 S.Memorial Parkway, Suite 215-HHuntsville, AL 35801

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

National Aeronautics & Space AdministrationMarshall Space Flight CenterMSFC, AL 35812

3. REPORTTYPEAND DATESCOVEREDMay 18 - Dec 15, 1995

NAS8-40365

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER

None

10. SPONSORING / MONITORINGAGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARYNOTES

Final Report Required by the Contract

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

Analysis on SSFF Health Management

14. SUBJECTTERMS

Health Management Follow-Up Study

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18.OF REPORT

Unclassified

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONOF THIS PAGE

N one

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONOF ABSTRACT

None

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

5316. PRICE CODE

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

Standard Form 298 (Rev 2-89)Prescttbed by ANSI Std, Z]9-18298-102

Documents

SSFF HEALTH MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS REPORT PART II … · SSFF HEALTH MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS REPORT PART II (PROOF OF CONCEPT) DECEMBER 15, 1995 Reference: Contract No. NAS8-40365 Subrmtted