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NatashaTusikov

PhDCandidate,Australian National University, Email: [email protected]

1

MeasuringOrganisedCrime-RelatedHarms:ExploringFivePolicingMethods

AfinalversionofthisarticleappearsinCrimeLawandSocialChange,onlinepublicationNovember2011.

Abstract

Manylawenforcementagenciesaroundtheworldhaveadaptedriskassessmentmethodology

toanalyseorganisedcrime.Theseassessments,whichareintendedtoprovidelawenforcement

managementwithrigourousanalysistoenablerationalandobjectivedecision-making

processes,areanintegralpartofintelligence-ledpolicing.Despitetheprevalenceofthese

assessments,astheassessmentsandtheirmethodologiesareoftentightlyrestrictedwithinthe

lawenforcementcommunity,itisoftenunclearhowlawenforcementdefines,analysesand

makesdecisionsaboutorganisedcrime.Whiletheuseofriskassessmentmethodologyto

analyseorganisedcrimeinpolicingisgenerallyunder-evaluated,criticspointtoserious

methodologicalweaknesses.Anotheraspectthatislessexploredinthescholarlyliteratureis

howlawenforcementconceptualisesandmeasurestheimpactorharmfromorganisedcrime

andusesthisanalysistoinformpriority-settingprocesses.Thisarticleexploreshowlaw

enforcementassessorganisedcrime-relatedharmbyexaminingfivepolicingmethodsone

eachfromAustraliaandtheNetherlandsandthreefromtheUnitedKingdom.Thearticlefindsthatthemethodshavesignificantshortcomings:themainconceptsaregenerallyill-definedand

theoperationalisationoftheseconceptsisproblematic.Moreimportantly,theproblems

evidentintheharmmethodsraiseseveralcriticalquestions,specificallywhethermeasuring

organisedcrime-relatedharmsisempiricallyfeasibleand,ifso,canbeundertakeninamanner

thatmeaningfullyinformslawenforcementsdecision-makingandlimitsunduepolitical

interference.

Keywords:organisedcrime,harm,risk,prioritysetting

Introduction

Inthelastdecade,manylawenforcementagenciesaroundtheworldhaveadoptedriskassessmentmethodologiestoassessorganisedcrime,includinginAustralia,theNetherlands

andtheUnitedKingdom(see[44];[51]).Theseassessments,adaptedfrombusinessand

scientificriskliterature(see[5])conceptualiseorganisedcrimeasaprobabilisticriskthatcanbe

assessed,mappedandmanagedinstructuredanalysesthatdeterminetherelativeriskfrom

specificcriminalnetworks.Thewidespreadbutlargelyunder-evaluatedadoptionofrisk

assessmentmethodology(exceptionsinclude[47];[44];[16];[51])isapartofpolicing

managementstrategiesthatemphasiseproactive,preventive,andcrime-reductionapproaches,

suchasintelligence-ledpolicing.Intelligence-ledpolicingisawidelyadoptedbutcriticallyunder-

theorisedandrelativelyunprovenmanagementstrategy(e.g.,[15]).Theintelligence-led

approachispredicatedonsoundintelligencepracticesandprocessesandisintendedtoinform

arationalandobjectivedecision-makingprocess(see[31]).Lawenforcements

conceptualisationoforganisedcrimeasarisktobegovernedisalsoshapedbytherisksociety

discoursethatseespoliceaskeyprovidersandcommunicatorsofriskknowledgeintendedto

reducesocietyscollectiveinsecurity([10]).

Thestudyoforganisedcrime-relatedconsequencesorharmshasbeentraditionallyover-

shadowedbyafocusonthreat([47]). AsMaguire([27]:328)argues,howtherelative

seriousnessofcrimesisdeterminedandbywhomarecriticalquestionsinrelationtolaw

enforcementpriority-settingprocesses,particularlyasonlyalimitednumberofinitiativescan

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beundertakenatanyonetime.Critics,however,arguethatlawenforcementoftenlacksan

empiricalbasisforitsfindings,resultinginweakpriority-settingprocessesandthearbitrary

designationofcrimepriorities(see[44]).

Asriskassessmentsonorganisedcrimeandtheirrelatedmethodologiesaregenerallytightly

restrictedtothelawenforcementcommunity,itisoftenunclearhowlawenforcementdefines,

assessesandmakesdecisionsaboutorganisedcrime,leadingtocriticismsofmethodological

opacityandunnecessarysecrecy(see[45]).Whileanassessmentsfindingsmustremain

classified,theunderlyingmethodologyshouldbeasrigourousaspossible,meaningthatlaw

enforcementshould,wherepossible,makepublicitsmethodologyforacriticalreview.This

entailswhatKlerks([22]:97)callsadelicatebalancebetweendemocratictransparencyandthe

needtoprotectinformation.

Thisarticleassessesfivemethodsusedtomeasureorganisedcrime-relatedharmsonefrom

AustraliaandtheNetherlands,andtwofromtheUnitedKingdom.Itexaminesthereliabilityand

validityofeachmethodsoperationalisationofharm,buildinguponrecentevaluationsof

assessmentsonorganisedcrime(particularly[16];[51]).Thisarticlealsobuildsuponresearch

thatexploresthepracticalapplicationofriskassessmentmethodologytoorganisedcrime(particularly[2];[46];[33];[47];[1];[8])andseekstodevelopfurtherriskassessment

methodology.

Thisarticleisorganisedintothreesections.Thefirstsectionsituatesriskassessment

methodologiesaspracticedbylawenforcementwithinthebroaderriskandpolicingliterature.

Next,thearticleexaminestheconceptofharminriskassessmentsandexploresthetheoretical

andpracticalchallengesinvolvedintheconceptualisationandmeasurementofconsequences

fromorganisedcrime.Thefinalsectionoutlinesandthenassessesfivelawenforcement

methodsusedtoassesstheharmcausedbyorganisedcrime.

RiskAssessmentMethodologyRiskhasbecomeadefiningwordofthe21

stcentury([14]).Intherisksocietycharacterisedbya

pervasiveandconsumingsenseofinsecurityandfear,thereisaconstantneedforinformation

aboutrisks.EricsonandHaggerty([10]:6)notethatriskcommunicationandmanagement

systemsproliferateasfearbuildsuponitselfandtheproductionofsecuritybecomescentralto

publicandprivateinstitutions.Policeholdacentralbutnotexclusiveroleinthissocietyaskey

providersandcommunicatorsofriskknowledge([10]:5).Crimesareconceptualisedas

calculableandprobabilisticeventswithunequalsocialdistributionwithsomeindividualsfacing

higherrisksforparticulareventsthanothers.Policeareresponsibleforassessingandmapping

theactorsandspacesthatposehazardstothepublicinanattempttomaketheworldmore

securebyevermoreperfectknowledgeofrisk([10]:295).Theemphasisontechnology,

rationalityandprobabilisticcalculationsofrisksisdescribedasthescientificationofpolicing

([11]).

Theriskdiscourseunderliespolicingmanagementstrategiesthatemphasiseproactive,

preventiveandcrime-reductionapproaches,suchasproblem-orientedpolicing,community

policingandintelligence-ledpolicing.Thesestrategiesshare,asMaguire([27]:316,italicsin

original)notes,astrategic,future-orientedandtargetedapproachtocrimecontrol,focusing

upontheidentification,analysisand'management'ofpersistinganddeveloping'problems'or

'risks'(whichmaybeparticularpeople,activitiesorareas).Themanagementofpersistent,

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serious,andorganisedcrime-relatedrisksisatthecoreofintelligence-ledpolicingwhichwas

created,inpart,asaresponsetodissatisfactionwithtraditionalpolicingpracticesandconcern

overgrowinglevelsofcriminality(includingaperceivedincreaseinorganisedcrime)([31]).This

policingstrategyalsoemphasisesthatpolicingresourcesarefiniteandmustbeallocatedtoward

high-riskactivitiesandactors.Organisedcrimeisthereforeunderstoodasariskthatcanbe

differentiatedfromothercrimetypes.Actorsandillicitactivitiescanbeassessed,mapped,

rankedandtargetedaccordingtothelevelsofthreatandriskposed.

Theroleofpoliceasknowledgeworkers([10])becomesinintelligence-ledpolicingarelatively

specialisedfunctionthatisperformed,intheory,bytrainedintelligenceexpertsinspecialised

roles.Atthecoreoftheintelligencefunctionisthe(largelycivilian)analyticalcomponent.The

emphasisonrationalitywithinintelligence-ledpolicingrequiresatransitionfromtheanalytical

functionthatwasrelativelyintuitiveandunstructuredtoamoreformalisedapproachbasedon

specifictechnologicaltoolsandmethodologiesthatpurportstoprovideamoreobjective

assessmentofcrime([20];[11]).Despitedecadesofcallingfortheprofessionalisationof

intelligenceanalysis,practitionersandacademicsalikedebatewhetheritis(orisbecoming)a

discipline(e.g.,[12]).Criticsassertthattheresearchmethodsusedinintelligenceanalysisare

notrigourousbutratherfairlyplasticanddesignedforworkingwithdirtydatainmanufacturinganintelligenceproduct([20]:50).

Policeknowledgeaboutorganisedcrimerisksiscommunicated,inpart,throughrisk

assessments,aconceptborrowedfrombusinessandscientificliterature(see[5]).Definitionsof

threatandriskvaryaccordingtotheassessorsneeds;however,thefundamental

componentsofariskassessmentmodelarearealisticrecognitionofhazard,ascaleofriskand

adefinedprotocol([5]:182).Inthecontextoforganisedcrime,ariskassessmentwouldinvolve

anassessmentofthenatureandmagnitudeofthethreat(i.e.,actorsposingrisk),the

probabilityandfrequencyofathreatoccurring(i.e.,achievingspecificcriminalaims),andthe

determinationofthenatureandscaleoftheimpact(i.e.,harm),intentionalorinadvertent,

shouldthethreatberealised(see[46];[5]).Lawenforcementsriskassessmentsareintendedtodirectrationalandevidence-baseddecision-makingbyallocatingresourcestowardhigh-risk

issues(see[46];[49];[1]).

Thetransitionofpolicefromfront-lineresponderstoknowledgeworkerswhoareexpectedto

deliveramorerational,objectiveandcost-effectiveevaluationandtargetingofparticularcrime

risksisproblematic([20];seealso[15]).Despiteloftyclaimsbylawenforcementoffundamental

shiftsinorganisationalandoperationalstrategiesfromreactivetoproactiveapproachesto

crimecontrol,researchersquestiontheactuallevelofchangethathasoccurred([18];[27];

[32]).Skepticismoflawenforcementsclaimsofanalyticalobjectivityandrationality([35];[20])

isevidentincritiquesoflawenforcementandgovernmentalassessmentsoforganisedcrime.

Thesecritiquespointtoseriousproblemsinbothconfidentialandpublicassessmentsof

organisedcrime,particularlyweakmethodology(see,forexample,fortheNetherlands[47];

[22];[51];forGermany[48];forEuropol[45];forCanada[51];andfortheUnitedKingdomand

Belgium[16];[47]).Scholarsquestiontherigourandvalidityoftheseassessments,cautioning

thatfindingsmayreflectidiosyncraticlawenforcementinterestsratherthananobjective

measureoforganisedcrime([9]),or,morebluntly,warningthattheassessmentsaremore

ritualincantationthanaknowledge-basedprocess([45]:261).

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Despitetheinterestinboththeacademicandlawenforcementcommunitiesinapplyingrisk

assessmentmethodologytoorganisedcrime,Dorn([7]:292)rightlyarguesthateffortsto

operationaliseseriousnessandharmareintheirinfancy.Therehasalsobeenrelativelylittle

comparativeanalysisofhowlawenforcementagenciesconceptualiseandmeasureharm,or

evaluationsofthetechniquesusedtomeasureharm(notableexceptionsare[50];[9];[17];

[54]).Thisgapispartlyexplainedbyweakorundevelopedmethodologies(see[47];[22];[51];

[16])orunnecessarilysecretiveprocesses(see[45]).Aswell,academicsandpractitionershave

traditionallyaccordedgreaterattentiontothedefinitionandmeasurementofthreatoverharm

([47]).However,wheretheconceptofharmisincorporatedintoriskmethodology,as

Zoutendijk([51])notes,fewassessmentsexplicitlydefinewhatismeantbytheconceptor

indicatehowitismeasured.Moreover,theseassessmentsgenerallylackastructuredapproach

toharm([47];[16];[51]).

Thispaperfirstdescribesharmandthendiscusseskeytheoreticalandpracticalchallenges

relatedtomeasuringorganisedcrime-relatedharmsbeforeexploringfourcasestudies.

DefiningHarm

Organisedcrimeisoneofthemostcontestedtermsinacademiccriminology([36]:490),aphantom([43])characterisedbyadiversityofactivities,participants,criminalcapabilitiesand

differentorganisingstructures.Measuringorganisedcrimefirstrequires,asVonLampe([49]:

85)argues,conceptualclarityandcertainty,aconsiderablechallengeforaphenomenonthat

continuestoprovokedebateregardingitsconstituentelements(see[1];VonLampeswebsite).1

Organisedcrimeisalternatelydescribedwithafocusonorganisation(actor-andnetwork-level

analysis),ormarket-leveldynamics(bothlicitandillicit),oracombinationofboth,andeach

conceptualisationresultsinadifferentfocalpointforanalysis.

Whentheanalyticalfocusisoncriminalorganisations,damagefromorganisedcriminalityis

understoodasnegativeeffectsthatcanbedirectlyattributedtospecificcriminalactorsand

networks.Hamilton-SmithandMackenzie([16])describeaframeworkinwhichriskisdeterminedbasedonscoresofcriminalnetworksattributes,calculationsbasedonnetworks

criminalactivities,andacombinationofboth.Harmcanbemeasuredatthecriminalnetwork-

levelusing,forexample,criminal-attributescales(seeKlerks2000in[46]),criminaloffence-

scalesorstatute-penaltyscales.

Whentheanalyticalfocusisonwhatcanbetermedsector-ormarket-relatedharms,

includingconsequencestothelegalmarket(see[1]),harmisgenerallyunderstoodinbroad

(potentiallyoverlapping)categories,whichcoverarangeofdamagesthatarenotattributableto

specificcriminalnetworks,witheffectsrangingfromphysical,economic,psychological,political,

social,community,intellectualtoenvironmental(e.g.,[26];[2];[46]). Atthesectorlevel,these

effectsaremostcommonlyqualitativelyassessed,thoughsomeresearchestimatescrimecosts

usingthesecategories(e.g.,[30]).Costsrelatedtoorganisedcrimearegenerallydividedinto

tangibleeffectsthathaveclearlyidentifiablevictimsandconcretedamages(e.g.,medicalbills)

orintangibleeffects,suchasfearofcrimeorthelossofqualityoflife(e.g.,[6]).Network-level

(i.e.,micro)andsector-level(i.e.,macro)approachescanalsobecombinedtodeterminethe

1See Klaus Von Lampes Organised Crime Research website at http://www.organised-

crime.de/OCDEF1.htm.

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relativelevelofharmfromspecificcriminalnetworksand,morebroadly,assessorganised

crime-relatedharmsthatcannotbeattributedtospecificcriminalnetworks.

ChallengesintheAnalysisofOrganisedCrime-RelatedHarms

Theanalysisoforganisedcrime-relatedharmssuffersfromthesamevulnerabilitiesthattrouble

allorganisedcrimeresearch:adearthofstandardiseddataonorganisedcrimeand

victimisation,alackofcommon(orcomplementary)methodologicalapproachesandrecords-

managementsystems,restrictiveprivacylaws,andanoften-secretivepolicingculture(see[35]).

Researchchallengesrelatedtoorganisedcrime-relatedharmsarenotfurtherdiscussedinthis

articleastheyareeffectivelycoveredelsewhere(seeparticularly[28];[21]).

Thissectioninsteadexploresthedisjuncturebetweenlawenforcementsconceptualisationof

organisedcrime-relatedharmsandcriticalquestionsraisedintheacademicharmliterature.The

conceptofharmvariesaccordingtohowonedefinesandcategorisesthebehaviourthatresults

inthedamage.Whenharmisconceptualisedwithinalegalistframework,thefocusisupon

violationsofcriminallaws,whereassocio-legaldefinitionsofcrimeincludecivilorregulatory

violations,particularlyinreferencetocorporatecrime(see[50]).Ashiftfromalegalistfocusto

asocio-legalframeworkwouldenablelawenforcementtoassessorganisedcrime-relatedharms

morecomprehensivelyandalsolikelyprovidemoreattentiontocorporateharms.Someresearchersrecommendadeparturefromthelegalframeworkaltogethertoenableanalysisof

activitiesthatarelegalbutdamaging,suchastheuseofdrift-netsincommercialfisheries(see

[50]).However,suchamovewouldbeoutsidelawenforcementsmandateandtheostensible

purposeofitsriskassessments.

Lawenforcementriskassessments,notsurprisingly,alsotendtoexcludedamageinadvertent

andotherwiseresultingfromthestatesinterventionsagainstorganisedcrime.Suchcollateral

damageiswellknown,particularlyinrelationtoanti-drugmeasures,forexample,research

indicatesthatlawenforcementinterventionsinillicitdrugmarketscouldunintentionally

increaseviolence([40]:6).Therelationshipbetweencounter-measuresagainstorganisedcrime

andcollateraldamageshouldbeassessed,especiallyifthesemeasuresgenerategreaterharmsthanthecrimetargeted([8]:35)oriflawenforcementincorrectlyattributesharmcausedbyits

counter-measuresassolelycausedbyorganisedcrime.Thispresupposes,asVonLampe([48])

argues,thatlawenforcementcancriticallyandeffectivelyevaluateitspractices.Italso

presumesthatlawenforcementhasboththewillandcapacitytoreviseorhaltharmfulcounter-

measures.

Lawenforcementriskassessmentsgenerallyreflectanormativeapproachtoorganisedcrime-

relatedharmswhichrecogniseslittledistinctionbetweenharmfromconflictualcrimes( malain

se)versusconsensualcrimes(malaprohibita).Consequencesfromconflictualcrimes,suchas

fraudortheft,generallyhaveclearlyidentifiablevictimsandmoreconcretedamages.In

contrast,harmsfromconsensualcrimes(e.g.,illicitdrugs)aredifficulttodetermine,asthe

goodsarevoluntarilydemandedandsuppliedbutcanresultinnegativesocio-economiceffects

(see[4]).Somenegativeeffectsoccurirrespectiveoftheactivityslegality(e.g.,overdosesor

lostproductivityduetoalcohol),whileothers(e.g.,illicitmarket-relatedviolence)woulddecline

significantlyweretheactivitylegalised.Whenanactivityislegallypermittedinsomesettings

andnotothers,analysismustdistinguishwhetherthenegativeeffectsarerelatedtoorganised

crimeorareintrinsictotheactivity([26]:46).Analysismustconsiderwhichconsequences

relatedtoconsensualcrimesshouldbemeasured,ifany,andhowtheseshouldbecalculated.

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Lawenforcementriskassessmentsrarelyincludeaconsiderationofpositiveeffectsfrom

organisedcriminalityasthereappearsanimplicitassumptionthatallorganisedcrime-related

activitiesarenon-consensual.Manyscholars,incontrast,notethatorganisedcrimecanprovide

theruleoflawwheregovernmentisabsentandinjectwealthintoeconomies,bothdeveloping

(e.g.[37])anddeveloped(e.g.,[42];[41]).Onbalance,however,thereappearstobeaninverse

correlationbetweenorganisedcrimeprevalenceandastateseconomicwealth,asVanDijk

([41])determinedinhiscompositeorganisedcrimeindex.Harmanalysisshouldconsider,as

Maltz([26]:43)argues,boththeeconomiclossestovictimsandeconomicgainstocriminal

organisations,witharecognitionthatthelossesandgainsarenotnecessarilycomplementary

(e.g.,propertymaybedestroyed).Determiningthenetcostoforganisedcrimemayprovidea

moreaccurateaccountingofharms,althoughthiscostingisoftenpoliticallyuntenableand

problematictocalculatewithanyaccuracy.Animportantstepwouldinvolveashiftbylaw

enforcementfromanassumptionofharminallorganisedcrime-relatedactivitiestoa

determinationofdamage.

Discussionoftheaboveissuesinvariablyraisesmorequestionsthananswersanddemonstrates

aneedforacriticaldiscussionofthesocio-historicalconstructionofharmandassumptions

underlyingcurrentunderstandingsoftheconcept.Iftheanalysisoforganisedcrime-relatedharmsistobecomemorecritical,comprehensiveandrigourous,aseriousexaminationofsuch

issuesisnecessary.Lawenforcementshouldmakeclearhowitdefinesandmeasuresorganised

crime-relatedharms.

FiveApproachestoAssessingHarm

Thissectionexaminesharmmethodsconstructedbyfivepolicingagencies:theMetropolitan

PoliceService(MPS)intheUnitedKingdom,NationalPolicingImprovementAgency(NPIA)inthe

UnitedKingdom,theAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers(ACPO)intheUnitedKingdom,

AustralianCrimeCommission(ACC),andtheNetherlandsPoliceAgency(inDutch,KLPD).2There

hasbeenlittlepublicdiscussionofthesemethodsastheyarepartofclassifiedassessments,

exceptthe2008Dutchassessmentthatwaspubliclyreleased.Hamilton-SmithandMackenzie([16])provideavaluablecritiqueoftwomethods:the2006-versionoftheMPSmethodology

(thisarticleexaminesthe2008amendedversion)andNPIAsmethodologythatformsthebasis

ofnationalassessmentsundertakenonbehalfofACPO.

Thesefiveagencieshavesimilargoalsintheirassessmentoforganisedcrime.Instrategicterms,

theassessmentsareintendedtoguidelawenforcementdecision-makingandgovernment

policy-makinginregardstocurrentandemergingrisksfromorganisedcrime.Inoperational

terms,theassessmentsareusedtoadvisepriority-settingprocessesinrelationtoorganised

crime-relatedissuesorcriminalnetworks.WiththeexceptionoftheMPS,thesemethodsare

designedtomeasureharmsatthenationallevel.3Althoughthemethodsvary,eachagency

takesaprimarilyqualitativeapproachtoharmmeasurementwithastrongbutnotexclusive

relianceonlawenforcementdata.Intelligencepersonnel,mostoftenanalysts,areprimarily

2Korps landelijke politiediensten.3The focus and mandate of risk assessment methodologies in relation to organised crime will likely shift in

the United Kingdom following significant changes outline by the Home Office which include replacing the

Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) with a National Crime Agency (NCA) and phasing out the

National Policing Improvement Agency and folding some of its functions within the NCA and perhaps

incorporating other functions within the Home Office ([19]).

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responsibleforconstructing,undertaking,andevaluatingtheiragencysassessments,with

limitedexternalinvolvement.

Thefiveagenciesoperationalisethemeasurementoforganisedcrime-relatedharmsbyfocusing

oncriminalnetwork-specificattributesandactivities(e.g.,offencescales),or,morebroadly,

assessingsector-relatedharms,suchasthecollectivedamagefromorganisedcrime-related

vehiclecrime.TheassessmentsthatareproducedonbehalfofACPOcombinebothapproaches.

Despitehavingsimilaraims,thefiveagencieshavedifferentapproachestoriskassessment

methodology.Asdiscussedearlierinthisarticle,riskassessmentsarecomprisedofvarious

componentsdependingupontheassessmentsaimandaudience.

Thefollowingsectionassessesthereliabilityandvalidityofeachmethodsoperationalisationof

organisedcrime-relatedharm(i.e.,howthatconceptwillbemeasured)and,indoingso,builds

uponrecentevaluationsoflawenforcementandgovernmentalriskassessmentsonorganised

crime(see[16];[51]).Reliabilityreferstotheconsistencyofmeasurement(i.e.,resultscanbe

reproduced)whilevalidityreferstotheextenttowhichaconceptfitsthemethodsusedto

measureit.

UnitedKingdom:MetropolitanPoliceService(MPS)

IntheUnitedKingdom,theMPSusestheCriminalNetworkHarmAssessmentMatrixtoidentify

criminalnetworks(includinggangs)causingthegreatestharm.4InSeptember2008,theMPS

amendedthe2006versionofitsmatrix5andscoreseachcriminalnetworkinthreeseparate

categories:1)harm;2)criminalcapacityandcapability;and,3)otherrisks(organisationalrisk

andcommunityharm).Harmisassessedusingthemaximum-statutepenaltiesof29offences

consideredintegraltocriminalnetworksinthreecategories:social(12offences);economic(15

offences);and,political(twoterrorismoffences).Foreachoffence,intelligenceanalystsassessa

criminalnetworksinvolvementashigh,mediumorlow(basedongivendefinitions).Highscores

receivethemaximum-statutesentence,mediumscoresreceivehalf,lowscoresaquarter,anda

lifesentenceisscoredas25years.Forexample,acriminalnetworkhighlyinvolvedinfirearmsimportation(designatedaneconomicharm)wouldscoreseven(maximumsentence),whereas

medium-levelinvolvementwouldscorefour(roundedupfrom3.5),andalowwouldscoretwo.

Themeasurementofcriminalcapacityandcapability(ameasureofthreat)isdetermined

throughsixattributes(ratedhigh,medium,orlowwithrelatednumericvalues)thatisbased

uponanabbreviatedversionoftheSleipnircapabilitymeasurementtechnique(see[38]).Each

networkisalsoscored(high,mediumorlow)forthelevelofoperationalriskitsactivitiespose

tolawenforcementorgovernment,andthelevelofcommunityimpactcaused.Criminal

networksareprioritisedforoperationalandintelligenceresourcesprimarilybasedontheir

levelsofharm;however,networkswithlowharmscoresbuthighscoresintheothertwo

categorieswillbehighlightedinthepriority-settingprocess.

UnitedKingdom:NationalPolicingImprovementAgency(NPIA)

NPIA,apolicingorganisationfundedbytheHomeOffice,developedamethodologytoassessa

broadrangeofcrimeissues,includingorganisedcrime,forthe NationalStrategicAssessment.

ThisassessmentisproducedonbehalfoftheAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers(ACPO)ina

4The MPS Criminal Network Harm Assessment Matrix Manual(2008) is a protected document.5For a detailed discussion of the 2006 version of the MPSHarm Assessment Matrix , see [16].

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collaborativeeffortbylawenforcementagenciesacrosstheUnitedKingdom.Itiscomprisedof

situationreportsassessingfactorsincludingvolume,victimgroups,andtrenddirectionand

establishesprioritieswithinabroadrangeofcrimeissues,notsolelyorganisedcrime.6Each

crimeissueisassessedinfourharmcategories:physical;economic;psychological;

social/community;and,geographicaldistribution,andscoredaslow,mediumorhighwith

correspondingnumericvalues.Extraweightingfactorscanbeappliedtoissuesthatarea

policeforceordistrictpriority,agovernmentpriority,asignalcrime,orthatgeneratepublic

concern.

UnitedKingdom:AssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers(ACPO)

ACPO,anindependentstrategicbodywhichcoordinatesthedirectionanddevelopmentof

policingservices,managesaprojectcalledorganisedcrimegroupmappingwhichdetermines

thethreatandharmlevelsoforganisedcrimenetworksintheUnitedKingdom.Thisprocesswas

developedbyNPIAandisdescribedintheNPIAsguidancemanualsanditinformstheNational

StrategicAssessmentthatisproducedonbehalfofACPO.Harmisassessedinsixcategories:

injury;community;reputation/political(i.e.,publicattitudesofpoliceimpartialityand

effectiveness);cross-border/geography;economic;andcriminalcapacity/capability(ameasure

ofthreat).7Eachcategoryisscoredasnil,low,medium,orhighwithcorrespondingnumericscoresthatareaggregatedintoatotalimpactscore.Amultiplier,basedontheprobabilityof

criminalactivitiesreoccurring(i.e.,unlikely,possible,probable,orhighlyprobable)givesatotal

numericalscoreforeachcriminalnetwork.

Australia:AustralianCrimeCommission(ACC)

Aspartofitsannualnationalassessmentonorganisedandseriouscrime,theACCundertakesa

comparativeanalysisintendedtodeterminechangesinthenatureandlevelofharmamongst

variouscrimeissues.8Subject-matterexpertsfromlawenforcement,government,industryand

academiauseastructuredquestionnairecreatedbytheACCtoascribeanumericscoretoeach

crimeissuebasedondefinedcriteriainthreecategories:political,socialandeconomic.The

politicalcomponentanalysesthenatureandlevelofgovernmentinterest(federalandstate/territory),interestfromlawenforcementandregulatoryagencies,andlegislativeand

regulatoryefforts.Itincludesanassessmentofmediacoverage,politicalpressure,andthe

perceivedandactuallevelofcommunityconcern,alongwithrelatedactiontakenbythose

communities.Theeconomiccomponentexaminestheillicitprofitsgeneratedandthecostto

Australiansociety.Theassessmentincludesananalysisofenablingactivities,suchasidentity

theftandmoneylaundering.TheACCthenanalysestheresults,compilesanaveragescoreand

ascribesaharmlevelforeachissue.

TheNetherlands:NetherlandsPoliceAgency(KLPD)

Everyfouryears,theDepartmentofInternationalPoliceInformation(IPOL)oftheKLPD

undertakesanationalassessmentoforganisedcrimewithinvolvementfromthePolice

AcademyoftheNetherlands,regionalpoliceforcesandKLPDsNationalCrimeSquad([24]).The

KLPDsassessmentsresearchquestionsandissuesaredeterminedbyaworkingparty

comprisedoftheNationalPublicProsecutorsOffice,NationalOfficeofthePublicProsecution

6The Organised Crime Group Mapping Manual(September 2010) is a protected document produced by the

Organised Crime Partnership Board and published by the NPIA on behalf of ACPO.7Ibid.8The ACCsHarms Assessment Process (2008) is a protected document.

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Service,theMinistryoftheInterior,theMinistryofJustice,andtheIPOL.ThePoliceAcademy

producesastudyofcrime-relevantfactors(crime-generatingorcrime-inhibitivefactors)that

contextualisestheassessment.Itfocusesonmeso-leveltrends(e.g.,socio-economicfactors)

thatwillaffectlawenforcementinvestigativepractices([23]:10).

Intheassessment,organisedcrimeisunderstoodascriminalphenomenainvolvingthe

structuralcooperationbetweenpeople,withadegreeofconsistencyinthecollaboration,for

financialormaterialgain([24]:15).Consequencesaredividedintosevendirectharms:health

(physical,mentalandpublic);economic;environmental;infrastructure;disruptionofsocio-

economicrelationships;influenceoverjudicialprocedures;and,influenceofpoliticalor

administrativedecision-making.Therearethreeindirectharms:precautionarybehaviour(e.g.,

installingsecuritydevices);harmtocertaininterestsorrelations(suchaslossofreputation);

and,enablingactivities,suchidentityfraud.Therearenoobjectivecriteriafordeterminingeach

criminalactivitysharm.Theassessmentteamcollaborativelydeterminestheharmlevelina

processdescribedasinteractivesubjectivity([22]:95;see[51]).

Thearticlenowmovestodiscussingreaterdetailthevulnerabilitiesintheseharmmethods.

CritiqueoftheMethods

Measuringtheharmcausedbyorganisedcrimefirstassumesthatthephenomenoncanbe

clearlyconceptualised([48])and,secondly,thatitcanbemeasuredinavalidandreliable

manner,achallengethatisadditionallycomplicatedwhenanalysisisundertakenacrossmultiple

jurisdictionsandagencies.AsKlerks([22]:97)notesinhisobservationoftheDutchassessment

process,itisdifficulttocapturethesynthesisofmultiplereportsonabroadrangeofcrime-

relatedissuesinasinglerigourousmethodology.Toaddresstheinherentdifficultiesinvolvedin

assessingorganisedcrime,inadditiontothemethodologicalchallengesthatKlerksnotes,the

case-studyagencieshaveinstitutedseveralgoodpractices.

TheACCandKLPDbothsolicitanalysisfromexternalsubject-matterexpertsthatundoubtedlyprovidesaricherandmorediverseassessmentoforganisedcrime-relatedharmsthanasingle

policeagencycouldproduce.Thispracticeissuitedtoanalysisofbroadcrimeissues(e.g.,real

estatefraud)asinformationisavailablefrommanysources.Broadconsultationwithexternal

expertsisarelativelyresource-andtime-intensiveprocess;moreover,itisdependentondata

qualityandavailabilityandanalysisunimpededbypoliceorpoliticalinterference.TheACC,for

example,retainscontrolovertheselectionofcrimeissuesandsubject-matterexperts,

compilationoffindings,andsettingofpriorities.ObservingtheDutchassessmentprocess,Klerks

([22]:95)acknowledgesthattheinvolvementofqualifiedacademicsfurtherenhancesthe

processbutarguesthatthisconsultativeprocesscannotreplacetheopenforumofacademia.

Incontrast,criminalnetwork-focusedanalysis(e.g.,MPS)isundertakenbypoliceasitrelies

almostexclusivelyonpoliceinformationsources,thoughexternalexpertscouldbegivenaccess

topolicedatabasestodeterminehowdatacollection,collationandanalyticalprocessescould

bestrengthened.

TheNPIAcreatedmultipleguidancemanualstoensureastandardapproachintermsof

techniques,formatsandterminologyinrelationtotheassessmentprocessthroughoutthe

UnitedKingdom.IntelligenceanalystsinterviewedaboutACPOsriskassessmentprocesswere

positiveaboutthebasicutility,simplicityandpracticalityofACPOsriskassessmentmatrixand

statedthatprioritisationprocessesalignwellwithintuitivejudgments([16]:13).Despitethe

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volumeofguidancemanualsproducedandtheanalystspositivereviews,itremainsunclear

whethertheassessmentsfindingshaveagreatervalidityandreliabilitythanotherlaw

enforcementassessments.Theperceivedalignmentbetweenprioritisedrisksandanalysts

intuitivejudgmentsmayindicatethevalidityandreliabilityoftheprocess.Conversely,itmay

alsoindicateculturalandinstitutionalbiasesfromlawenforcementtowardcertaintypesof

organisingstructuresandactivities.

Akeydifficultywiththemethodsisdefinitionalrigour.Thisisanobviouschallengeasorganised

crimeisalternatelyunderstoodasacollectionofindividualsoractivities,oracombinationof

both([51]).Whereorganisedcrimeandharmaredefined,thewordingisrelativelyvagueand

opentodifferentinterpretations.Themethodsalsotendtoqualifytheirdefinitionsoforganised

crimeorharmwiththeadjectivessignificantorseriouswithoutspecifyinghowthis

characteristicisdefinedormeasured.Organisedcrimeisdifferentiatedfromseriouscrimein

severalmethodsthoughtherelevanceorutilityofsuchadistinctionisnotclear.Giventhese

definitionalchallenges,thereareproblemsofvaliditywiththeoperationalisationoftheconcept

ofharmasitisunclearwhatisbeingmeasuredandifthatisrepresentativeoftheconcept.

Moreover,themethodsalsohaveproblemswithreliabilityasdifferentinterpretationsofthe

conceptsarepossibleandthustheconceptualisationandmeasurementofharmscouldvaryamongstanalysts.

Allthemethodsconceptualiseharminbroadcategories(e.g.,economicorsocialharms)thatare

vaguelydefinedandnotmutuallyexclusive(i.e.,possibleoverlapamongstcategories).The

methodsalsolackspecifiedindicatorstomeasurethepresenceorabsenceofharm.However,

eveniftheseindicatorswereclearlydefined,VonLampe([48])arguesthatwhenlaw

enforcementandpolicymakerscontroltheselectionandanalysisofharm-relatedindicators

therearepotentialproblemsofinstitutionalandculturalbiasthatresultinpoorvalidity,

particularlyifanalysisisalsobasedprimarilyonlawenforcementsources.Theseproblems

elucidatethecase-studyagenciesdifficultiesinoperationalisingharmandillustratethe

challengesinmeasuringsuchaconceptwithanydegreeofvalidityandreliability.Thisarticlesfindingsaresimilartorecentevaluationsoflawenforcementandgovernmentalassessmentsof

organisedcrime(see[16];[51]).

Criminalnetwork-basedharmmethods(e.g.,MPSandACPO)areintendedtoassistseniorlaw

enforcementmanagementsetenforcementprioritiesbyrankingcriminalnetworksaccordingto

theirrelativelevelsofharmandthreat.ThemethodsusedbyMPSandACPOarepractical

solutionstoacomplexproblem.However,thesemethodsassumethatorganisedcriminality

canbedifferentiatedclearlyfromnon-organisedcrimeandthatorganisedillicitactivitiescan

beaccuratelyandreliablyattributedtospecificcriminalnetworks.Socialnetworks,however,

arenotstatic;networksfuzzyboundariesmakeitdifficulttodeterminewhichactorsshouldbe

includedwithinthenetwork(see[29]).Attributingillicitactivitiestoparticularnetworksis

somewhateasierwhenactorsself-identifyaspartofacriminalorganisationorareespecially

overtintheircriminality.However,evenwhenanetworkissomewhatdelineated,itis

problematictoassumethatalloffencesarecommittedaspartofortobenefitacriminal

organisation.

Criminal-offencescalespresumethatorganisedcriminalitycanbereducedtoalistofintegral

offences(seeMPS);however,thesescalestendtodemonstratelawenforcementstraditional

preoccupationwithdrug-orviolence-relatedoffencesandlesserattentiontoothertypesof

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crime,suchasfraud.Suchscalesthereforerepresentarelativelynarrowconceptualisationof

organisedcrime,anunderstandingthatislikelyattenuatedbytheprivilegingoflaw

enforcementinformationsourcesthatcontainoffence-specificdataoverotherdatasources

thatcouldofferrelevantinformation.Usingspecificoffencestomeasuredamageisadditionally

complicatedbecause,asFoxandFreiberg([13]:166)observe:thesameoffencescanvary

widelyinthemanneroftheirexecution,intheharmtheycauseandintheinterestsuponwhich

theyinfringe.Thesechallengesarecompoundedbypotentialmeasurementproblems.For

example,theMPSappearstoallowcriminalnetworksthattrafficdrugsorweaponstoalsobe

scoredforpossessionoffences,essentiallydouble-scoringtraffickingoffences.

Usingsentencestodeterminecrimeseriousness,astheMPSdoes,iswellestablishedin

criminology.Theuseofmaximumsentenceswouldappeartofacilitateconsistentscoring

throughouttheMPS,minimisethediscretionofpersonnelinscoring,andlendlegitimacyand

objectivitytotheprocess([16]:13).Theintegrityofthescoringprocess,however,dependson

thevalidityandreliabilityoftheintelligenceassessed,thequalityofanalysis,andthe

consistencyofscoringacriminalnetworkslevelofinvolvement,whichisarelativelysubjective

process(see[16]).Moreover,theuseofsentencestoestablishseriousnessassumesthatthe

seriousnessofanoffenceismatchedbyapenaltyofequivalentgravity,consistencybetweenjurisdictionsinsentencing,andsimilaritiesbetweentheorderingofoffencesaccordingto

maximumpenaltiesandtherankingofoffencesaccordingtopenaltiesimposed,whichmaynot

bethecase([13]:171).AsDornandVanderBunt([8]:35)rightlyargue,harmshouldbe

conceptualisedseparatelyfromtheresponsetocrime,asusingsentencelengthstoindicate

seriousnessiscircularinthatcurrentprioritiesaresetusinghistoricallegislativeandjudicial

judgments.

Threeofthecasestudiesformallyincorporatestateormediapressureascriteria(ACC,MPSand

NPIA).Thesecriteriaareanexplicitacknowledgementthatthesefactorsinfluencebut(ideally)

donotdominatedecision-making.However,thesecriteriaarequestionableintermsofvalidity

becauseoftheclearpotentialforpoliticisationandthetroublesomeproblemofcircularityinwhichpastconcernsandexpendituresdictatefutureefforts.Moreover,itisunclearwhat

indicatorsareusedtomeasurestateormediapressureorhowlawenforcementwouldmeasure

thesecriteriawithanydegreeofvalidityandreliability.

Usingpublicconcernasafactorinmeasuringcrimeseriousnesshasclearprecedentin

criminology(e.g.,[39])and,asCohen([4]:269)pointsout,surveyingthepublichasresultedin

relativelyconsistentrankingsovertimeandacrosspopulations.Publicopinionresearch

regardingcrime,however,hasclearlimitationastherearemisperceptionsaboutcrime

frequencyandinjuryseverity(see[4])andmuchofthisresearchdoesnotconcentrateon

organisedcrime(foranexception,see[3]).Moreover,asdecadesofcriminologicalresearch

demonstrates,thepublicperceptionoforganisedcrimeisoftensensationalised,imbuedwith

racismandanti-immigrantrhetoricandpronetothecreationoffolkdevils(e.g.,[25]),making

accurateandreliablemeasurementdifficult.Thepublicmayvieworganisedcrimeasserious

dependinguponhowthephenomenonisconceptualisedandthemoralpanicandfolkdevilsde

jourhowever,asLevi([25]:53)arguesinrelationtowhite-collarcrime,viewingsomethingas

beingseriousisnotthesameaswantingitprioritisedbypoliceorwantingitmoreheavily

sentencedthanothercrimes.

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Severalofthecasestudiesmakereferencetothereputationalharmtolawenforcement,

governmentorparticularinterests,suchasthefinancialsector.Likestateandmediapressure,

lossofreputationisaproblematiccriterionintermsofvalidity.Itisunclearifreputational

damage(tostateorcommercialinterests)canandshouldbecategorisedasharmcausedby

criminalsandhowsuchalosscouldbereliablyvalued([8]:32;seealso[16]).Reputationallossis

intheeyeofthebeholder:whatsomeinstitutionsmaydecryasdamagetoreputation,others

mayregardasawell-deservedrebukeforineffectivepoliciesorpoorperformanceordismissas

politicalin-fighting.AsDornandVanderBunt([8]:32)observe,thereisnoclearorobjective

arbitrationbetweenopposingviewsofreputationaldamageand,inanycase,theyarguethatit

isoftenreactionfrompolicy-makers,mediaandthepublicthatcausessuchdamage,not

criminalsperse.

Conclusions

Despiteitscritiqueoftheharmmethods,thisarticlefullyrecognisesthattheyareintendedto

operatewithinassessmentprocessesthathaveanambitiouslybroadscope(bothintermsof

criminalityandgeography)andavariedclientelewithdiverserequirements.The(mostly)

civilianintelligenceanalystsresponsibleforthemethodsarelikelyawareofthemethods

methodologicalshortcomings.However,theconstruction,implementationandevaluationofthesemethodsrequirededicatedtimeandmanagerialsupportandsuchresourcesareoftenin

shortsupplywithinthereactiveenvironmentoflawenforcement.Thisarticlealsoappreciates

thedifficultyofapplyingriskassessmentmethodologytotherathernebulousandinherently

controversialconceptoforganisedcrime.

Thereareseveralkeyproblemswiththemethods:themainconceptsaregenerallyill-defined,

theoperationalisationoftheseconceptsisproblematic,andtheseparationoforganisedand

seriouscrimeisnotclearnoristhesignificanceorutilityofsuchadistinction.Thesefindings

aresimilartothoseinrecentstudies(seeespecially[16];[51]).Thereareseveralproblematic

harmcriteria,inparticularpolitical/lawenforcementinterest,media/publicattention,and

reputationalharmthatcanpotentiallypoliticiseanddistortharmmeasurementandpriority-settingprocesses.Thecase-studyagencieseachhavevaryingprocessestostrengthenanalysis

andfacilitateconsistentmeasurement;however,themeasurementandsubsequentrankingare

largelysubjective.

Theproblemsevidentintheharmmethodsraiseseveralcriticalquestions,specificallywhether

measuringandrankingorganisedcrime-relatedharms(eitherfromspecificcriminalnetworks

or,morebroadly,fromcrimeissues)areempiricallyfeasibleand,ifso,canbeundertakenina

mannerthatmeaningfullyinformslawenforcementsdecision-makingandlimitspoliticisation.A

relatedquestionisthecomprehensivenessofharmmeasurement,particularlyifmethodstend

tofavourdata-richorformerhigh-priorityissuesoverlesser-known,data-poorissues.The

circularityoftheseinformationprocessesresultsinself-perpetuatingpriority-settingprocesses

inwhichcertainissuesororganisationsarerepeatedlytargetedbecausemoreisknownabout

them([36])orbecausethestateallocatedconsiderableresourcesinthepastbutdidnotachieve

itsgoals([8]:15).Someissuesdesignatedasprioritiesaresobroadandgeneric(e.g.,financial

crime)thattheyareundisputableaspriorities([17]:497)butarerelativelymeaninglessinterms

ofdirectingdecision-makingandshouldthereforebetreatedwithsomeskepticism([9]).

Whiledetermininghowmethodscanbestrengthenedforpracticalapplicationwithinlaw

enforcementispartofamuchlargerdiscussion,thisarticleconcludeswithafewsuggestions.

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Keyconcepts,particularly,organisedcrime,harm,threat,seriouscrimeandsignificantcrime,

shouldbeclearlydefinedinalldocuments,evenifsuchconceptshavebeenpreviouslydefined

internallyorinearlierdocuments.Suchdefinitionsshouldaccordascloselyaspossibletosocial

sciencestandardsofreliabilityandvalidity(see[51]).Giventhechallengesinvolvedindefining

andmeasuringpolitical/lawenforcementinterest,media/publicattention,andreputational

harm,andthegeneralweaknessofthesecriteria,policingagenciesshouldmoveawayfrom

measuringtheseareas.Instead,itwouldbemoreeffectivetofocusondevelopingstrong

indicatorstomeasurethenatureandmagnitudeofspecifictypesofharmthatuseinformation

frommultiplestateandnon-statesources.Intermsofstrengtheningtheimplementationand

useoftheanalysisofharm,theNPIAsguidancemanualsofferapracticalandusefulwayto

establishminimumstandardsandensureconsistentusagebymultiplepolicingagenciesacrossa

broadgeographicalarea.Policingagenciesshouldalsolooktoothercomponentsofrisk

assessmentmethodologythatwouldprovideamorecomprehensiveriskanalysisoforganised

crime.Lawenforcementsriskassessments,forexample,wouldbestrengthenedbythe

inclusionofmeasurestodetermineprobabilityofspecificthreatsandharmsoccurringandthe

vulnerabilityofcertainpopulationsorinstitutionstoorganisedcrime(see[1];[46]).

Thecurrentinterestfromboththescholarlyandlawenforcementcommunitiesinapplyingriskassessmentmethodologytoorganisedcrimeispromising.Thereisagreatdealoftheoretical

andpracticalresearchtobeundertakenintermsofconceptualisingandoperationalising

organisedcrime-relatedharmsanddevelopingrigourousmethodologiesthathaverealpractical

utilitytolawenforcementdecision-makingandpriority-settingprocesses.Suchresearchis

essentialifwearetodevelopfurthercriminalintelligenceanalysis(see[12];[20])and

strengthenlawenforcementsuseofriskassessmentmethodology.

Acknowledgements

TheMPS,ACCandNPIAgraciouslygrantedtheauthorpermissiontodiscussthesemethods

providedthatrestrictedinformationwasnotreleased.WhileACPOleadstheOrganisedCrime

GroupMappingproject,theunderlyingmethodologywascreatedbyNPIAwhichgrantedpermissiontodiscussthisproject.TheinformationontheDutchNationalThreatAssessment

waspubliclyavailable.

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