Serfino v. CA (GR L-40858, 15 September 1987)Ponente: Paras, J.Facts: On 25 August 1937, a parcel of land was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor (OCT 1839). On 14 December 1945, he sold said land in favor of Nemesia D. Balatazar (TCT No. 57-N, 18 January 1946). OCT 1839 was lost during the war and upon petition of Nemesia Baltazar, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental ordered the reconstitution thereof. Pursuant thereto, OCT 14-R (1839) was issued on 18 January 1946 in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. On that same day, TCT 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT 14-R (1839). On 15 August 1951, Nemesia Baltazar, sold said property to Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., and the latter did not present the documents for registration until 17 December 1964 to the Office of the Registry of Deeds. Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by another certificate of title, TCT 38985, in the name of Federico Serfino. On 19 November 1964, the spouses Serfinos mortgaged the land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan in the amount of P5,000.00; which was inscribed in TCT No. 38985.

The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an action to recover said land; and the lower court rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 38985; issuance of a new TCT in the name of plaintiff; and the payment of the plaintiff PNB the loan of spouses Serfinos secured by said land. Both parties appealed from this decision of the trial court. Ruling on the assignment of errors, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification in its decision setting aside the decision of the trial court declaring plaintiff liable to PNB for payment, however, ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the Serfino spouses of the sum P1,839.49, representing the unpaid taxes and penalties paid by the latter when they repurchased the property. Hence, the appeal by the spouses Serfino and PNB to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the auction sale of the disputed property was null and void.

Held: The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the prescribed procedure in auction sales of property for tax delinquency being in derogation of property rights should be followed punctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent

land owners and to the public in general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of which vitiates the sale. In the present case, Lopez Sugar Central was not entirely negligent in its payment of land taxes. The record shows that taxes were paid for the years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt therefor was obtained in its name. The sale therefore by the Province of Negros Occidental of the land in dispute to the spouses Serfinos was void since the Province of Negros Occidental was not the real owner of the property thus sold. In turn, the spouses Serfinos title which has been derived from that of the Province of Negros Occidental is likewise void. However, the fact that the public auction sale of the disputed property was not valid cannot in any way be attributed to the mortgagee’s fault. The inability of the Register of Deeds to notify the actual owner or Lopez Sugar Central of the scheduled public auction sale was partly due to the failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare the land in its name for a number of years and to pay the complete taxes thereon. PNB is therefore entitled to the payment of the mortgage loan as ruled by the trial court and exempted from the payment of costs.

The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision, with modification that PNB mortgage credit must be paid by Lopez Sugar Central.

Manahan v. ECCGR L-44899, 22 April 1981 (104 SCRA 198)First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring.

Facts: Maria E. Manahan, the petitioner, is the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of “Enteric Fever” while employed as classroom teacher in Las Piñas Municipal High School, Las Piñas, Rizal, on 8May, 1975. The deceased was in perfect health when he entered government service on 20 July 1969,and that in the course of his employment in 1974, he was treated for epigastric pain. He succumbed to enteric fever on May 8, 1975. Thus, the petitioner filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for death benefit under Presidential Decree 626. In a letter dated 19 June1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever,is not an occupational disease, and that enteric fever or paratyphoid is similar in effect to typhoid fever, in the sense that both are produced by Salmonella organisms. The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the decision of the GSIS on a finding that the ailment of the deceased, enteric fever, was not induced by or aggravated by the nature of the duties of Nazario Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. Thus, the appeal.

Issue: Whether the Workmen’s Compensation should be resolved in favor of the worker

Held: The Transitory and Final Provisions of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their accrual and under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II (Prescription of Offensesand Claims), workmen’s compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code and during the period from 1 November 1974 up to 31 December 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the laws and rules at the time their causes of action accrued Hence, this Courtapplied the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, on passing upon petitioner’sclaim.. The illness that claimed the life of the deceased may had its onset before 10 December 1974,thus, his action accrued before 10 December 1974. Still, In any case, and case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that social legislations like the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Labor Code should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain an injury. Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in this case, the presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner theamount of P6,000.00 as death compensation benefit and P600.00 as attorney’s fees, to reimburse the petitioner’s expenses incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper receipts, and to pay administrative fees.

Villavert v. ECCGR L-48605, 14 December 1981 (110 SCRA 233) First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring

Facts: Domina N. Villavert, the petitioner, is the mother of the late Marcelino N. Villavert who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis on 12 December 1975 employed as a Code Verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. The deceased also performed the duties of a computer operator and clerk typist. On 11December 1975, the deceased reported as usual to the Constabulary Computer Center in Camp Crame. He performed his duties not only as Code Verifier but also handled administrative functions, computer operation

and typing jobs due to shortage of civilian personnel. Although he was complaining of chest pain and headache late in the afternoon of said day, he was required to render overtime service until late in the day, typing voluminous classified communications, computing allowances and preparing checks for the salary of PC-INP personnel throughout the country for distribution on or before 15 December 1975. Gasping for breath, perspiring profusely, and mumbling incoherent words while asleep, and when he was not able to regain consciousness, he was rushed to the University of the East-Ramon Magsaysay (UERM) Memorial Hospital where he died at 5:30 am. The NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown, although most research data agree that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease. On 18 March 1976, she filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under PD 626, as amended, with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). GSIS denied the claim on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease and that the petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino N. Villavertand the nature of his employment. The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). On 31 May 1978, the ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS denying the claim. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to her son’s death benefits.

Held: The Medico Legal Officer of the NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis (acute inflammation with hemorrhagic necrosis of the pancreas) is still unknown despite extensive researches in this field, although most research data are agreed that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino N. Villavert had a “bout of alcoholic intoxication” shortly before he died, neither is there a showing that he used drugs; negating the association provided by Principles of Internal Medicine (by Harrison 7th Edition, p. 1571). From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino N. Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as code verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. Further, Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that “all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of

this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.”The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner deathbenefits in the amount of P6,000.00.

DIOSDADO C. TY vs. FIRST NATIONAL SURETY & ASSURANCECO. INC.G.R. NO. L-16138, April 29, 9611 SCRA 1324

Facts: Petitioner obtained personal accident policies which stipulated, among others, that for partial disability resulting to the loss e i t h e r h a n d , t h e i n s u r e r s h a l l b e l i a b l e f o r P 6 5 0 . 0 0 . I t w a s f u r t h e r s t a t e d i n t h e p o l i c i e s t h a t , “ T h a t l o s s o f a h a n d s h a l l mean the loss by amputation through the bones of the wrist.” Afire broke out which totally destroyed Broadway Cotton Factory, T y ’ s e m p l o y e r . F i g h t i n g h i s w a y o u t o f t h e f a c t o r y , T y w a s i n j u r e d o n t h e l e f t h a n d b y a h e a v y o b j e c t . A s a r e s u l t , T y s u f f e r e d a t e m p o r a r y t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y o f h i s l e f t h a n d w h i c h prevented him from performing his work or labor necessary in the pursuance of his occupation.

Issue: Whether or not the insurer is liable

Held: The insurer was not liable. We cannot go beyond the clear and express conditions of the insurance policies, all of which defined partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist. There was no such amputation. All that was found was that the physical injuries caused temporary total disability of Ty’s left hand. We might add that the agreementc o n t a i n e d i n t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c i e s a r e c l e a r , e x p r e s s a n d s p e c i fic t h a t o n l y a m p u t a ti o n o f t h e le ft h a n d s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d a s a l o s s t h e r e o f , a n i n t e r p r e t a ti o n t h a t wo u l d i n c l u d e t h e m e r e f r a c t u r e o r o t h er t e m p o r a r y d i s a b i l i t y n o t covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

Home Insurance Company vs. Eastern Shipping Lines[GR L-34382, 20 July 1983];

Home Insurance vs. Nedlloyd Lijnen [GR L-34383]

Facts: [GR L-34382] On or about 13 January 1967, S. Kajita & Co., on behalf of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation, shipped on board the SS Eastern Jupiter from Osaka, Japan, 2,361 coils of Black Hot Rolled Copper Wire Rods. The said VESSEL is owned and operated by Eastern Shipping Lines. The shipment was covered by Bill of Lading O-MA-9, with arrival notice to Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation of the Philippines at Manila. The shipment was insured with the Home Insurance Company against all risks in the amount of P1,580,105.06 under its Insurance Policy AS-73633. The coils discharged from the VESSEL numbered 2,361, of which 53 were in bad order. What the Phelps Dodge ultimately received at its warehouse was the same number of 2,361 coils, with 73 coils loose and partly cut, and 28 coils entangled, partly cut, and which had to be considered as scrap. Upon weighing at Phelps Dodge's warehouse, the 2,361 coils were found to weight 263,940.85 kilos as against its invoiced weight of 264,534.00 kilos or a net loss/shortage of 593.15 kilos, or 1,209,56 lbs., according to the claims presented by the Phelps Dodge against Home Insurance, the Eastern Shipping, and Angel Jose Transportation Inc. For the loss/damage suffered by the cargo, Home Insurance paid the Phelps Dodge under its insurance policy the amount of P3,260.44, by virtue of which Home Insurance became subrogated to the rights and actions of the Phelps Dodge. Home Insurance made demands for payment against the Eastern Shipping and the Angel Jose Transportation for reimbursement of the aforesaid amount but each refused to pay the same."

[GR L-34383] On or about 22 December 1966, the Hansa Transport Kontor shipped from Bremen, Germany, 30 packages of Service Parts of Farm Equipment and Implements on board the VESSEL, SS 'NEDER RIJN' owned by N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen, and represented in the Philippines by its local agent, the Columbian Philippines, Inc.. The shipment was covered by Bill of Lading No. 22 for transportation to, and delivery at, Manila, in favor of International Harvester Macleod, Inc. The shipment was insured with Home Insurance company under its Cargo Policy AS-73735 'with average terms' for P98,567.79. The packages discharged from the VESSEL numbered 29, of which seven packages were found to be in bad order. What International Harvester ultimately received at its warehouse was the same number of 29 packages with 9 packages in bad order. Out of these 9 packages, 1 package was accepted by International Harvester in good order due to the negligible damages sustained. Upon inspection at International Harvester's

warehouse, the contents of 3 out of the 8 cases were also found to be complete and intact, leaving 5 cases in bad order. The contents of these 5 packages showed several items missing in the total amount of $131.14; while the contents of the undelivered 1 package were valued at $394.66, or a total of $525.80 or P2,426.98. For the short-delivery of 1 package and the missing items in 5 other packages, Home Insurance paid International Harvester under its Insurance Cargo Policy the amount of P2,426.98, by virtue of which Home Insurance became subrogated to the rights and actions of International Harvester. Demands were made on N.V. Nedlloyd Lijnen and International Harvester for reimbursement thereof but they failed and refused to pay the same."

When the insurance contracts which formed the basis of these cases were executed, Home Insurance had not yet secured the necessary licenses and authority; but when the complaints in these two cases were filed, Home Insurance had already secured the necessary license to conduct its insurance business in the Philippines. In both cases, Home Insurance made the averment regarding its capacity to sue, as that it "is a foreign insurance company duly authorized to do business in the Philippines through its agent, Mr. Victor H. Bello, of legal age and with office address at Oledan Building, Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal." The Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, however, dismissed the complaints in both cases, on the ground that Home Insurance had failed to prove its capacity to sue. Home Insurance filed the petitions for review on certiorari, which were consolidated.

Issue: Whether Home Insurance, a foreign corporation licensed to do business at he time of the filing of the case, has the capacity to sue for claims on contracts made when it has no license yet to do business in the Philippines.

Held: As early as 1924, the Supreme Court ruled in the leading case of Marshall Wells Co. v. Henry W. Elser & Co. (46 Phil. 70) that the object of Sections 68 and 69 of the Corporation Law was to subject the foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines to the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among countries. The objectives enunciated in the 1924 decision are even more relevant today when we commercial relations are viewed in terms of a world economy, when the tendency is to re-examine

the political boundaries separating one nation from another insofar as they define business requirements or restrict marketing conditions. The court distinguished between the denial of a right to take remedial action and the penal sanction for non-registration. Insofar as transacting business without a license is concerned, Section 69 of the Corporation Law imposed a penal sanction — imprisonment for not less than 6 months nor more than 2 years or payment of a fine not less than P200.00 nor more than P1,000.00 or both in the discretion of the court. There is a penalty for transacting business without registration. And insofar as litigation is concerned, the foreign corporation or its assignee may not maintain any suit for the recovery of any debt, claim, or demand whatever. The Corporation Law is silent on whether or not the contract executed by a foreign corporation with no capacity to sue is null and void ab initio. Still, there is no question that the contracts are enforceable. The requirement of registration affects only the remedy. Significantly, Batas Pambansa 68, the Corporation Code of the Philippines has corrected the ambiguity caused by the wording of Section 69 of the old Corporation Law. Section 133 of the present Corporation Code provides that "No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency in the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws." The old Section 69 has been reworded in terms of non-access to courts and administrative agencies in order to maintain or intervene in any action or proceeding. The prohibition against doing business without first securing a license is now given penal sanction which is also applicable to other violations of the Corporation Code under the general provisions of Section 144 of the Code. It is, therefore, not necessary to declare the contract null and void even as against the erring foreign corporation. The penal sanction for the violation and the denial of access to Philippine courts and administrative bodies are sufficient from the viewpoint of legislative policy. Herein, the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contracts was cured by the subsequent registration is also strengthened by the procedural aspects of these cases. Home Insurance averred in its complaints that it is a foreign insurance company, that it is authorized to do business in the Philippines, that its agent is Mr. Victor H. Bello, and that its office address is the Oledan Building at Ayala Avenue, Makati. These are all the averments required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the

Rules of Court. Home Insurance sufficiently alleged its capacity to sue.

Benjamin Co vs. Republic of the Philippines GR L-12150, 26 May 1960Facts:Petitioner was born in Abram and his parents are both Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the Nationalist Government of China. He is married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated in the Catholic Church of Bangued. He speaks and writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from theAbram Valley College, and finished his primary studies in the “Colegio” in Bangued, both schools being recognized by the government. He has a child two months old. He has never been accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to organized government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization. He does not believe in, nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. Hemingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of government and stated that if his petition is grantedhe would serve the government either in the military or civil department. He is a merchant dealing in the buyand sell of tobacco. He also is part owner of a store in Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a workingcapital of P10, 000.00 which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes to civic andcharitable organizations like the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes the customs of theFilipinos because he has resided in the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he claims to have earned P1, 000.00 in his tobacco business. With respect to the store of which he claims to be a part owner, hestated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3, 000.00 representing one-fourth of the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120, 00as a salesman therein. He took a coursein radio mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He claims that he has neverbeen delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not file his income tax return when heallegedly received an amount of not less than P3, 000 from his father which he claims to have invested in histobacco business.A petition for naturalization was filed before the trial court in which after hearing was granted. Courtordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date thedecision becomes final and all the requisites provided for in Republic Act 503 have been complied.

Issue:Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the petition for naturalization.Decision: Philippine law requires that an alien must conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner duringthe entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well aswith the community in which he is living. In the case at bar, petitioner’s failure to comply with his obligation toregister his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien Registration Act as well as hisfailure to file his income tax return despite his fixed salary of P1, 440.00 a year and his profit of P1, 000.00 in histobacco business indicates that he failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in hisrelation with our government. It is also claimed that he has not stated (during the cross-examinations) that hebelieves in the principles underlying our Constitution.In construction, Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the governmentand against the applicant.Hence, the petition appealed from is reversed without pronouncement as to cost.

Lee Cho alias Sem Lee vs Republic of the PhilippinesGR. No. 12408 December 28, 1959FACTS:Lee Cho alias Sem Lee filed a petition for naturalization. He was born in Amoy, China of Chinese parentsand came to the Philippines in 1921. He was given alien certificate of residence and registration and settled inCebu up to the present time, managing his business. He is married and has 13 children. Though he had hisprimary and secondary education in Cebu Chinese High School, most of his children are studying on privateschools and college recognized by the government and were given alien certificate of registration, exceptWilliam who is not of school age, Angelita who is out of school, that of Lourdes Lee who married to a naturalizedFilipino and Angelita Lee who stopped at her Third year in secondary school. Petitioner Lee Cho by far possessesall qualifications prescribed by the law and is residing in the Philippines for more than 30 years now. Thus heargued exemption from filing declaration of intention to become a Filipino and should be entitled to a Filipinocitizenship.ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Lee Cho failed to comply with the requirement of the Naturalization LawRULING: The petition was denied by the affiliate court and found merit in the contention that he fail to complywith the requirements of the Naturalization Law hence, fail to qualify to become a Filipino citizen. For one,Naturalization requires filing declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year prior to the filing of application which Lee Cho did not

accomplished. He will then be exempted from complying with saidrequirement only (1) if he is born in the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in anyschool recognized by the government; or (2) if he has continuously resided in the Philippines for a period of 30years or more provided that he has given primary and school or in private schools recognized by thegovernment. The petitioner was unable to fulfill any of the two exempting condition. Basis for contention wassignified by the case of his children Angelita Lee and Lourdes Lee. While Angelita Lee was deprived withsecondary education limiting her exposure to Philippine Civics and History, Lourdes Lee was enrolled on aChinese School with strict Chinese curriculum. This contradicts petitioner’s desire to embrace Filipino citizenshipthat comes along with appreciating Philippine History, Civics and Government. This circumstances questionedhis sincerity become a Filipino citizen as he have tolerated such deviation from the educational requirement of the law and its nationalistic purpose.R I C H A R D V E L A S C O V S R E P U B L I C O F T H E PH I L I P P I N E S (108 PHIL 234, L-14214 25 MAY 1960)F A C T S : T h e c a s e i f a p e t i t i o n f o r n a t u r a l i z a t i o n w h i c h w a s d e n i e d b y t h e C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e o f M a n i l a d u e t o t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e petitioner to meet the requirements of the law.Petitioner and appellant Richard Velasco was born to spousesP e t e r V e l a s c o a n d M i g u e l T i u o n 1 2 M a y 1 9 3 2 a n d h a s s i n c e resided, finished school and worked in the Philippines. Althoughhis father has been naturalized as a Filipino citizen, petitioner didnot follow his father’s citizenship as he was already 23 years olda t t h e t i m e o f n a t u r a l i z a t i o n a n d c o n t i n u e s t o b e a c i t i z e n o f Formosa, Republic of China. He earns P150.00/month from hisc u r r e n t e m p l o y m e n t a t W i l s o n D r u g S t o r e , w h i c h w a s p a r t l y owned by his mother, and has savings in Philippine banks andshares of stocks in two Philipppine companies.I n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e t r i a l , p e t i t i o n e r ’ s m o r a l c h a r a c t e r w a s a t t e s t ed b y S a n t i a g o M a r i a n o , a s e r g e a n t a t t h e M a n i l a P o l i c e Department and who was also a character witness in the petitionfor naturalization of petitioner’s brother, and, Mrs. Paz Eugenio, ah o u s e k e e p e r a n d s o o n - t o - b e m o t h e r - i n -l a w o f t h e p e t i t i o n e rw h i c h l e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r h a

s a l i m i t e d c i r c l e o f F i l i p i n o f r i e n ds . T h e t r i a l c o u r t a l s o f o u n d d i s c r ep a n c i e s i n t h e d o c u m e n t a r y e v i d en c e p r e s e n t e d b y petitioner with regards to his full name, Richard Velasco, RichardC h u a V e l a s c o , a n d R i c h a r d C . V e l a s c o . N o e v i d e n c e w a s submitted to prove that all three names are one and the sameperson. His income of P150.00/month was also not substantial tomeet the requirement of the naturalization law considering thelow purchasing power of the peso and high cost of living in thePhilippines.I S S U E : W h e t h e r o r n o t p e t i t i o n e r / a p p e l l a n t s h o u l d i s q u a l i f i e d t o b e c o m ea naturalized Filipino Citizen.H E L D : T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t a f f i r m e d t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e o f M a n i l a d e n y i n g t h e p e t i t i o n f o r n a t u r a l i z a t i o n o f petitioner/appellant Richard Vealsco. The Court averred that his employment was merely a convenientarrangement planned by the petitioner and his family in order tocomply with the requirement of the law that to become a Filipinoc i t i z e n , o n e m u s t h a v e a l u c r a t i v e i n c o m e o r o c c u p a t i o n . T h e c o u r t f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t“ n a t u r a l i z a t i o n l a w s s h o u l d b e r i g i d l y e n f o r c e d a n d s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d i n f a v o r of t h e government and against the applicant”.

Manuel Guerrero and Maria Guerrero vs Hon. Court of Appeals and Apolinario Benitez GR No. L-44570, May 30, 1986

FACTS: In 1969, Apolinario Benitez was asked by spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60heads of cows and to clean the already fruit-bearing coconut trees and burn dried leaves and grass and, duringharvest time, which is usually every three months, to pick coconuts and gather the fallen ones from a 16-hectare portion of the 21-hectare plantation and process the meat of the coconut in the copra kiln of thedefendants. He had a 1/3 share of the proceeds from the copra that he processed and sold in the market and aP500 a year salary for attending the cows. In 1973, Benitez was keep from doing the job he had always done foralmost four years. Thus, he brought the matter to the attention of the Office of Special Unit in the Office of thePresident in Malacanang, Manila, where spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero agreed to let Benitez continueworking on the 16-hectare portion

of the plantation as tenant and that their relationship will be guided by theprovisions of RA No. 1199, known as The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. However, on July of 1973,he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare and was threatened if he persists. Benitez fileda case for reinstatement with damages. The lower court decided in favor of Benitez, ordering spouses Manueland Maria Guerrero to reinstate Benitez to the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare coconut plantation. Hence,this petition, claiming that Benitez is a mere farmhand and not a tenant. The petitioners contend that the courtsapplied erroneous definitions of “tenancy” found in repealed laws. They assert that the Agricultural Tenancy Actand the Agricultural Land Reform Code have been superseded by the Code of Agrarian Reforms, Rep. Act 6389,which the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to cite and apply.ISSUE: Whether a tenancy relationship exists between Manuel Guerrero et al and Apolinario Benitez et al as todetermine their respective rights and obligations to one another. RULING: Although Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and replaced it with the agriculturalleasehold system and Republic Act 6389 amending Republic Act 3844 declared share tenancy relationships ascontrary to public policy, the Court contends that the phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to meana reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or hired laborers with no tenurial rights. Thus, the respondent hasbeen unlawfully deprived of his right to security of tenure. Therefore, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The decision of the appellate court is affirmed.Bello vs. Court of Appeals G. R. L-38161 (March 29, 1974)FACTS: The petitioner falsely appealed a case to the court of first instance. and taken directly to respondentcourt. The prosecutor filed a petition to dismiss appeal. Petitioner did not notified the dismissal of their appeal. They filed with the city court their "motion to elevate appeal to Court of Appeals". Respondent city court deniedpetitioners' motion. Petitioners spouses filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against people andrespondent to prohibit the execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent Court. They dismissedthe petition. Although the respondent recognized that the Court of First Instance may have exercised itsinherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court, it held that Petitioners did not implead the Court of FirstInstance as “principal party respondent” and thus it could not

“grant any relief at all even on the assumptionthat Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities”.ISSUE: Whether or Not the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite the finality of judicial decision.RULING: The Court acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court cautions against narrowlyinterpreting a statute, defeating its purpose and stressed that “it is the essence of judicial duty to construestatutes as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity”. The provision should also be taken withinthe context and spirit of Rule 50, Sec. 3 as an analogous provision. The Supreme Court finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and justice to be boundby the same rule.T h e C i t y o f M a n i l a , p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t , v s . C h i n e s e C o m m u n i t y o f M a n i l a , e t a l . , d e f e n d a n t s - appellees.G. R. No. L-145355 October 21, 1919

FACTS: On December 11, 1916, the City of Manila filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila prayingthat certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing public improvement--extension of RizalAvenue. The Chinese Community of Manila, defendants answered the petition and denied that it was eithernecessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes; and that the land in questionwas used for cemetery purposes. The Court of First Instance decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particularstrip of land in question. The plaintiff then filed an appeal on the grounds that under the law, it has authority to expropriate anyland it may desire and that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings.

ISSUES: Whether or not in expropriation proceedings of the City of Manila, the courts may inquire into, andhear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation.RULING: When the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trialwhether there exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, andhere proof upon, those questions.It is not alleged and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, when in fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make thecemetery in question public property. If that is true, then of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied,for the reason that City of Manila has no authority or right under the law to

expropriate public property. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.In the matter of the TESTATE ESTATE of PETRONILA TAMPOY vs. DIOSDADA ALBERASTINEG.R. No. L-14322. February 25, 1960Facts:This concerns the probate of a document which purports to be the last will and testament of Petronila Tampoy. After the petition was published in accordance with law and petitioner had presented oral anddocumentary evidence, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that the left hand margin of the firstpage of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioners contend that the will expresses thetrue intention of the testatrix to give the property to her whose claims remain undisputed. She wishes toemphasize that no one has filed any opposition to the probate of the will and that while the first page does notbear the thumbmark of the testatrix, the second however bears her thumbmark and both pages were signed bythe three testimonial witnesses. Moreover, despite the fact that the petition for probate is unopposed, the threetestimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the document expresses the true and voluntarywill of the deceased.Petitioner appealed from this ruling but the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court as itinvolves purely a question of law.Issue: Petition to probate a will on the ground that the left hand margin of the first page of the document doesnot bear the thumb mark of the testatrix.Ruling: Section 618 of Act 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the will and each and every pagethereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in thepresence of the testator and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in the attestation clause. This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will (Rodriguez vs.Alcala, 55 Phil., 150). Thus, it has been held that "Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in theexecution of wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, 'A will must be executed inaccordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void.' All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will. No power ordiscretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or dispense with those enumerated in thestatutes" (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 407; See also Saño vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs.Gorecho 50 Phil., 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil., 481).Since the will in

question suffers from the fatal defect that it does not bear the thumbmark of thetestatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, the same still fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot be admitted to probate.The order appealed from is affirmed.CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PARDES, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARDOF CANVASSERS OF DOLORES, QUEZON, VIVENCIO G. LIRIO respondents.G.R. No. L-54718 December 4, 1985 Facts: On January 25, 1980, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores for the January30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. Petitioner won in the election but the respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimedrespondent candidate as the winner on the presumption that petitioner’s candidacy was not duly approved byrespondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation but was dismissed by respondentCommission on the grounds that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it waseffective, petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4.ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical defects.RULING: No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which should not be used tofrustrate the people’s will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on the verysame day that he filed his candidacy should be considered as having been made substantially and in truth afterthe last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by respondent Commission. The spirit of the lawrather than its literal reading should have guided respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minutewithdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates.

Abellana V. Marave – independent civil actionsCase: Petition for certiorari from the decision of the Judge of RTC of Ozamiz City was issuedwith grave abuse of discretion, to dismiss the Independent civil action filed bydefendants for failure to reserve their right to institute it separately, when thecriminal case for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was commenced.Facts: • Abellana while driving his cargo truck hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in injuriesto its passengers,

private respondents, Lamason, Gurrea, Flores, Nemeno resulting inthe crime of physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.• RTC of Ozamis found Abellan guilty of the said crime in the criminal case, damageswas in favor awarded to the offended parties. Abellana appealed this decision.Likewise, the offended parties filed a separate and independent civil action fordamages allegedly suffered by them for reckless driving of Abellana. CrispinAbellana, as employer of Francisco was included as defendants in the complaint.• Both Crispin and Francisco sought the dismissal of such action principally on theground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis. They argued it was not allowable at the stage where the criminal case wasalready on appeal.Issue:•W/N respondent judge’s decision was of grave abuse of discretion?Ruling:•Petition for Certiorari is Dismissed.• Their motion to dismiss and MR was rejected by the court, stating that, petitionersstand was anchored on the thought that, “the civil action for recovery of civil liabilityfrom the offense charge is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless theoffended party reserves his right to institute it separately”. The legal proposition –that a separate civil action can be legally filed and allowed by the court only at theinstitution, or the right to file such separate civil action reserved of waived, at such institution of the criminal action, and never on appeal to the next higher court. Thiswas the stand of the petitioners.•Such interpretation, as noted, ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts. On appeal to this court, the judgment of the city court was vacated and a trial de novo will have to be conducted.• Section 7 of Rule 123 of RC, “an appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew inthe CFI as if it had been originally instituted in that court”. Respondent judge wasduly mindful of such norm. • Art 33 of the Civil code states that, in cases of physical injuries, a civil action fordamages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, maybe brought bythe injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminalprosecution and shall require only preponderance of evidence.

AQUINO, C.J., dissenting:

Vivencio G. Lirio of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan was the candidate for vice mayor of Dolores, Quezon Province in the election held on January 30, 1980.

The other candidate for vice mayor was Narciso L. Mendoza, Jr., who filed as certificate of candidacy on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. But at 7:27 in the evening of that day, Mendoza withdrew his candidacy by means of a handwritten letter of withdrawal which was not under oath. He handed that letter to the election registrar of Dolores.

Five days before the election or on January 25, 1980, Crisologo Villanueva filed his certificate of candidacy for vice mayor in substitution for Mendoza. On January 26 the election registrar transmitted Villanueva's certificate of candidacy and Mendoza's withdrawal letter to the provincial election registrar who, in turn, indorsed the same to the Commission on Elections. These papers were received by the Comelec Law Department only on February 11, 1980 or after the election and after the proclamation of Lirio as the duly elected vice mayor.

Villanueva's name was not included in the official list of candidates. However, on the eve of the election or on January 29, he addressed a letter to all chairmen and members of the board of election inspectors of Dolores wherein he informed them of his candidacy in substitution for Mendoza. He requested them to count the votes cast in his favor.

The municipal election registrar asked the provincial election registrar to clarify the status of Villanueva's candidacy. On election day, the provincial election registrar replied that since Villanueva's name was not included in the official list of candidates it could be legally presumed that the Comelec did not approve his certificate of candidacy.

On January 31, 1980 the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Lirio as the duly elected vice mayor. The votes cast for Villanueva were not counted because he was not an official candidate. They were regarded as stray votes. It cannot be assumed that he received 3,112 votes as against 2,600 votes for Lirio.

Villanueva filed a petition to annul Lirio's proclamation. The Comelec dismissed it on the grounds (1) that Mendoza's withdrawal had no legal effect because it was not under oath as required in section 27 of the Election Code and (2) that even assuming that it was effective, Villanueva's substitute candidacy was not valid under section 28 of the Election Code since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4 but on that very day.

Any votes cast for Villanueva were stray votes under section 155 (15) of the Election Code. It cannot be said that Villanueva obtained more votes than Lirio, a reelectionist.

It is dangerous to rely on the so-called spirit of the law which we cannot see nor handle and which we do not know very much.

The Comelec resolution was affirmed by this Court. Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration. I vote to deny said motion.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, C.J., dissenting:

Vivencio G. Lirio of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan was the candidate for vice mayor of Dolores, Quezon Province in the election held on January 30, 1980.

The other candidate for vice mayor was Narciso L. Mendoza, Jr., who filed as certificate of candidacy on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. But at 7:27 in the evening of that day, Mendoza withdrew his candidacy by means of a handwritten letter of withdrawal which was not under oath. He handed that letter to the election registrar of Dolores.

Five days before the election or on January 25, 1980, Crisologo Villanueva filed his certificate of candidacy for vice mayor in substitution for Mendoza. On January 26 the election registrar transmitted Villanueva's certificate of candidacy and Mendoza's withdrawal letter to the provincial election registrar who, in turn, indorsed the same to the Commission on Elections. These papers were received by the Comelec Law Department only on February 11, 1980 or after the election and after the proclamation of Lirio as the duly elected vice mayor.

Villanueva's name was not included in the official list of candidates. However, on the eve of the election or on January 29, he addressed a letter to all chairmen and members of the board of election inspectors of Dolores wherein he informed them of his candidacy in substitution for Mendoza. He requested them to count the votes cast in his favor.

The municipal election registrar asked the provincial election registrar to clarify the status of Villanueva's candidacy. On election day, the provincial election registrar replied that since Villanueva's name was not

included in the official list of candidates it could be legally presumed that the Comelec did not approve his certificate of candidacy.

On January 31, 1980 the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Lirio as the duly elected vice mayor. The votes cast for Villanueva were not counted because he was not an official candidate. They were regarded as stray votes. It cannot be assumed that he received 3,112 votes as against 2,600 votes for Lirio.

Villanueva filed a petition to annul Lirio's proclamation. The Comelec dismissed it on the grounds (1) that Mendoza's withdrawal had no legal effect because it was not under oath as required in section 27 of the Election Code and (2) that even assuming that it was effective, Villanueva's substitute candidacy was not valid under section 28 of the Election Code since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4 but on that very day.

Any votes cast for Villanueva were stray votes under section 155 (15) of the Election Code. It cannot be said that Villanueva obtained more votes than Lirio, a reelectionist.

It is dangerous to rely on the so-called spirit of the law which we cannot see nor handle and which we do not know very much.

The Comelec resolution was affirmed by this Court. Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration. I vote to deny said motion.

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES L-2877 (38 SCRA 284); March 31, 1971

FACTS: In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.

HELD: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.

As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.

The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.

Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

People of the Philippines v. Moro MacarandangCase No. 211G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959)Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.87FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms inLanao. Defendant,admitting the ownership and possession of thefirearm andammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him byGovernorDimakuta as secret agent shown in theGovernors letter which he presented asandevidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by previously surrenderingto the office of the Governor a firearm. He has thenbeenappointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on themaintenance of peace and ordercampaigns and isauthorized to hold and carry in his possession 1Riot shotgun.ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in themaintenance of peace and order falls among thoseauthorized to possess firearms.HELD: Yes. It may be true that the Governor has noauthority to issue any firearmlicense or permit

butsection 879 of the Revised Administrative Codeprovides thepeace officers are exempted fromthe requirements relating to the issuance oflicenseto possess firearms. The appointment sufficientlyput him in the category ofpeace officerequivalent even to a Municipal Police expresslycovered by section879. Wherefore the decisionappealed from is reversed and theDefendant acquitted.People of the Philippines v. Mapa Case No. 213G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967)Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.89FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possessionof firearms. He invokes in hisdefense that he wasan appointed Secret Agent of the provincialGovernor ofBatangas. He sought to be acquitted asthe case of People v. Macarandang usedthe samedefense providing evidences of his appointment.ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms.HELD: No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to aprosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore theconviction of the accused must stand. TheCourt ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang.

People v. Santayana Case No. 115No. L-22291 (November 15, 1976)FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms andsentenced to anindeterminate penalty from one year and one dayto two years,and to pay the costs.ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the Appellant as aspecial agent of the CIS, whichapparentlyauthorizes him to carry and possess firearms,exempts him from securing alicense or permitcorresponding thereto. HELD: Yes. At the time of appellants apprehension,the doctrine then prevailing wasenunciated in thecase of People vs. Macarandang wherein it washeld that theappointment of a civilian as secretagent to assist in the maintenance of peaceandorder campaigns and detection of crimessufficiently puts him within the category ofa peaceofficer equivalent even to a member of themunicipal police expresslycovered by Section 879.People v. Estenzo GR L-35376, 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA 651)First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concurFacts: In a decision dated 28 September 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastrewas

declared public land. Respondent Aotes filed on23 February 1972 a petition to reopen the decisionof the Cadastral Court under Repuplic Act 931 as amended by Republic Act 6236. Aotes claim that sincethe time limit for filing applications for free patents and applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles have been extended up to 31 December 1980, the reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until 31 December 1980. The judge denied the opposition for lack of sufficient merit on 9 May 1972, and rendered decision on 22 July 1972 after due hearing, declaring Lot4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor of the Aoetes in undivided interest in equal share of ¼each. Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, petitioners filed the instant petition.Issue:Whether the extension provided for under RA 6263 also applies to Re-opening of CadastralProceedings.Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (ExpressMention is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one thing in a law, as a general rule, means theexclusion of others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is basedupon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. If RA 6236 had intended that theextension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so provided in thesame way that it provided the extension of time to file applications for free patent and for judicialconfirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The intention to exclude the reopening of cadastralproceedings or certain lands which were declared public land in RA 6236 is made clearer by reference toRA2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases, but not so included in RA 6236. Thus, RA 6236,the very law on which Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply anybasis for respondents contention. It will be noted that while RA 2061 fixed the time to reopen cadastralcases which shall not extend beyond 31 December 1968, no similar provision is found in RA 6236expressly extending the time limit for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declaredpublic land. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension as provided for by the RA 6236 makesno reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law, RA2061, expressly did. Truly, theextension provided for by RA 6236 applies only to the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral proceedings likethe instant case, a proceeding entirely different from filing an application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation

of imperfect or incomplete titles.The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July 1972 decision of the respondent Judge and reiterating the 28September 1940 decision of the Cadastral Court; without pronouncement as to costs.Mutuc v. Comelec GR L-32717, 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA 228)First Division, Fernando (p): 7 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate opinionFacts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate forthe position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using jingles in his mobile unitsequipped with sound systems and loud speakers on 22 October 1970. Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however contended that the prohibitionwas premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful forcandidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgetssuch as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin. It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singerand therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase and the like.Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase and the like.Held:Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumerationare applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quiteapparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred toas a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition on the distribution of gadgets of thekind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible forits distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters,fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, andconcluding with the words and the like.). Taped jingles therefore were not prohibited.The Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind the minute resolution of 3November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently restrained and prohibited the Comelec fromenforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its order banning the

use of political taped jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970; without pronouncement as to costs.People v. Manantan GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leaveFacts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised ElectionCode. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable causethat the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendantsplea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of thepeace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purviewof Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decisionof the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace isexcluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions andpleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of theruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the RevisedElection CodeHeld: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted froman enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim casus omisus canoperate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of therule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but ratherfrom a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislativeenumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term judgeincludes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justiceof the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did notexclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised AdministrativeCode, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term

judge, includingtherein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of AgrarianRelations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case fortrial on the merits. Lopez vs. CTA; GR L-9274, 1 February 1957 (100 Phil 850)En Banc, Montemayor (p): 10 concurFacts: Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular andsupplier invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently,however, the Collector reassessed the dollar value of the cost and freight of said wire netting and as aresult of the reassessment, additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied andimposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the reassessment and levy of additionalcustoms duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss theappeal, filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its resolutionof 23 May 1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground hat it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of theCollector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of RA 1125, creating said tax court. From said resolutionof dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking reversal of said resolution of dismissal.Issue: Whether the decision of the Collector of Customs is directly appealable to the Court of TaxAppeal.Held: Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifically provides that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) hasappellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. On the other hand, section11 of the same Act in lifting the enumerating the persons and entities who may appeal mentions amongothers, those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Customs, and fails to mention theCommissioner of Customs. While there is really a discrepancy between the two sections, it is morereasonable and logical to hold that in section 11 of the Act, the Legislature meant and intended to say,the Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of Customs. If persons affected by a decision of theCollector of Customs may appeal directly to the Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and controlof the Commissioner of Customs over his Collector of Customs, under the Customs Law found in sections1137 to 1419 of the Revised Administrative Code, and his right to review their decisions upon

appeal tohim by the persons affected by said decision would, not only be gravely affected but even destroyed.The Courts are not exactly indulging in judicial legislation but merely endeavoring to rectify and correct aclearly clerical error in the wording of a statute, in order to give due course and carry out the evidentintention of the legislature.The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, holding that under the Customs Law and RA 1125, theCTA has no jurisdiction to review by appeal decision of the Collector of Customs; with costs. Sanciangco v. Rono GR L-68709, 19 July 1985 (137 SCRA ___)En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 took no partFacts: Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the 17 May 1982Barangay elections. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the President of the Association,petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a member of the Citys SangguniangPanlungsod. On 27 March 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 14 May 1984 BatasanPambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance. He was notsuccessful in the said election. Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of BP 697, petitioner informed Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was resuming hisduties as member of that body. The matter was elevated to the Minister of Local Government Jose A.Roño, who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed to have resigned from hisappointive position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.Issue: Whether the accused is considered resigned from the latters filing of a certificate of candidacyfor the Batasan.Held: Although it may be that Section 13(2), Batas Pambansa 697, admits of more than oneconstruction, taking into sconsideration the nature of the positions of the officials enumerated therein,namely, governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislativeintent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive positions insection 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause reading any person holding public appointive office orposition, is clear. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that construction which gives effect to the

evidentpurpose and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole, must be followed.A statutes clauses and phrases should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the wholeand every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. The legislativeintent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1), and officials mentioned in subsection (2)which should be construed to refer to local elective officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of theBatasan Pambansa. Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the SangguniangPanlungsod of Ozamiz City, as he was appointed by the President as a member of the Citys SangguniangPanlungsod by virtue of his having been elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils, he isdeemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the14 May 1984 Batasan elections.The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the writs prayed for, holding that there was nograve abuse of discretion on the part of the officials; without costs.

In RE exemption from SSS coverage: Archbishop of Manila v. SSC [ GR L-15045, 20 January 1961] En Banc, Gutierrez-David (p): 5 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 reserves voteFacts: On 1 September 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with theSocial Security Commission a request that Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutionsand/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the RomanCatholic Archbishop of Manila, be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, as amended (SocialSecurity Law of 1954). Acting upon the recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social SecurityCommission in its Resolution 572 (s. 1958), denied the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The request, however, was denied by the Commission in its Resolution 767 (s. 1958);hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of section 5 (c) of RA 1161, as amended.The Supreme Court affirmed Resolution 572 and 767, s. 1958 of the Social Security Commission, withcosts against appellant.1. Definition of employer, employee, and employment (as defined in law) The term employer as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or juridical, domestic orforeign, who carries in the Philippines any trade,

business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kindand uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except theGovernment and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporationsowned or controlled by the Government (par. [c], sec. 8), while an employee refers to any personwho performs services for an `employer in which either or both mental and physical efforts are usedand who receives compensation for such services (par. [d] sec. 8). Employment, according toparagraph [j] of said section 8, covers any service performed by an employer except those expresslyenumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any of its political subdivisions,branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the Government,domestic service in a private home, employment purely casual, etc.2. Ejusdem generis applies only if there is uncertainty The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plainpurpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. In the case at bar, it isapparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds exceptthose expressly excluded. The definition of the term employer is, thus, sufficiently comprehensive asto include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit within its meaning. Hadthe Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, itwould not have defined an employer in such a way as to include the Government and yet make anexpress exception of it.3. Intent of legislature: exemption excluded in new law When RA 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious orcharitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par.[j], subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express provision of RA1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to includecharitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law.4. Intent of law limited to corporations and industries The discussions in the Senate dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily explained by the fact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law arecorporations

and industries which are established primarily for profit or gain.

5. Valid exercise of police power; Social justice The enactment of the law is a legitimate exercise of the police power, pursuant to the policy of theRepublic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system whichshall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection toemployees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death. It affords protection to labor,especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on thepromotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all the people.6. Inclusion of religious organization does not violate prohibition on application of public funds forthe benefit of a priest; does not violate right to disseminate religious information The funds contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to themembers which are merely held in trust by the Government. Even assuming that said funds areimpressed with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement, death or disability benefitswould not constitute a violation of the cited provision of the Constitution, since such payment shall bemade to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee. Further, the contributionsare not in the nature of taxes on employment. Together with the contributions imposed upon theemployees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against thehazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promotesocial justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.