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Author: LIM, P.
Esmeraldo Gatchalian Vs Comelec
Statutory Construction Concept: General words construed generally
Facts: Petitioner Gatchalian is a candidate to become a delegate in the
constitutional convention election in 1970. In his petition he is assailing
two Comelec Resolutions, RR-707 and RR-731 that allegedly violate
Sec.56 of The Revised Election Code.
Comelec Resolution RR-707 states that “donation of billboards to the
commission by foreigners or companies or corporations owned and
controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not covered by the
provision of sec.56 of the revised election code.
Comelec Resolution RR-731 likewise states that “to the effect that the
ban in sec.56 of the revised election code does not cover the projected
campaign for funds and other contributions by the advertising council of
the Philippines and others similarly situated during the 120 days
immediately preceding a regular or special election. That in line with RR-
707 donations and contributions for the above campaign may be received
from foreigners, companies wholly or partially by foreigners.
Sec.56 of the Revised Election Code states that “No foreigner shall aid any
candidate, directly or indirectly or take part in or to influence in any
manner any elections.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the comelec but was denied and
pursuant to Article 10 sec.2 of the constitution filed a case for review of
the comelec ruling. He is contending that the ruling is null and void as
being contrary to law and was a grave abuse of discretion and praying for
a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction.
Issue: WON the comelec resolutions were violative of sec.56 of the
revised election code
Held: Yes it was violative of sec.56 of the revised election code.
Ratio:
The court divided its decision into four parts or four words that clearly
showed the legislative intent in the statute:
1. The phrase any elections includes the election for the delegates of
the constitutional convention. Any election means that this includes
Author: LIM, P.
elections provided by the laws and the constitution as well as any
that may be established or required to be held pursuant to law
2. Foreigner in the statue refers to both natural and juridical persons,
associations and groups with or without legal personality. The
framers of the law intended to include juridical persons because
they have a larger base of members and are financially capable of
influencing the outcomes of elections.
3. Any candidate refers to both “some candidates” and “All
candidates” It has been held that any candidate voted for at any
election refers to candidates and the term any person is not limited
to any person in the singular but is applicable as well to two or
more persons.
4. The last word is “Aid” which refers to support , to help, to assist or
to influence the decision
Ruling: The Court ruled that if foreign donations are allowed to influence
our policy making bodies that we will in effect open the floodgates to
foreign control. The respective resolutions are therefore void.
GEOTINO V
Claudio vs. COMELEC
Petition: certiorari and prohibition
Petitioner: JOVITO O. CLAUDIO
Respondent: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and RICHARD ADVINCULA
Ponencia: MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
1) Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in
the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998.
2) Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay
City gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for
loss of confidence.
3) On May 19, 1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr. in Barangay 11, Zone
4, Pasay City, several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of
convening the PRA.
4) Richard Advincula, private respondent in G.R. No. 140560 and petitioner in G.R. No. 140714,
was designated chair.
5) On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and
sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled
RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF
PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE.
6) In a letter dated June 29, 1999, Advincula, as chair of the PRA, invited the Mayor, Vice-
Mayor, Station Commander, and thirteen (13) Councilors of Pasay City to witness the formal
submission to the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the petition for recall.
7) As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an affidavit of
service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor.
Author: LIM, P.8) Pursuant to the rules of the COMELEC, copies of the petition were posted on the bulletin
boards of the local COMELEC office, the City Hall, the Police Department, the public market
at Libertad St. and Taft Avenue, and at the entrance of the Sta. Clara Church on P. Burgos
St., all in Pasay City.
9) Subsequently, a verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the resolution was
conducted by Ligaya Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City designated by the
COMELEC.
10) Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub,
and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition.
11) In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and
dismissed the oppositions against it.
12) On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its members, the
COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more
than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the total
membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876.
13) In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had
been obtained in support of the recall resolution.
14) Based on the verification made by election officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC found the
signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient.
15) On whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of petitioner was a
prejudicial question which must first be decided before any recall election could be held, the
COMELEC ruled that it was not and that petitioner was merely using the pendency of the
case to delay the recall proceedings.
16) Finally, on whether the petition for recall violated the bar on recall within one year from the
elective official's assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the negative, holding that recall
is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on
July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, it was
held that the petition was filed on time.
17) Hence, these petitions.
ISSUES:
WHETHER, under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) . . . .
A. The word "recall" in paragraph (b) covers a process which includes the convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution.
B. The term "regular local election" in the last clause of paragraph (b) includes the election period for
that regular election or simply the date of such election.
RULING + RATIO:
1) YES. The COMELEC maintains that the process of recall starts with the filing of the petition for
recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election, and that, since the petition for recall in this
case was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner's assumption of office, the
recall was validly initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.
Both petitioner Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term "recall" as used in §74 refers to a
process. They disagree only as to when the process starts for purposes of the one-year limitation in
paragraph (b) of §74.
We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory recall
assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local
government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC,
the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the
holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of §74, "recall"
refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local
official or elect his replacement.
First, §74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On
the other hand, §69 provides that "the power of recall . . . shall be exercised by the registered voters
of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the
electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office,
Author: LIM, P.the limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the
term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA
and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least
25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.
The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the
purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1)
that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official
concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular
local election.
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an
elective local official. In the Bower case cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC, it was held
that "The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before
petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly
elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and
decisions." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the
Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed
against any officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve months." But however the
period of prohibition is determined, the principle announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to
provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this
case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to
initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official.
To construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose
of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the
constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on
the day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation
of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b)
includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly
curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such
assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the
expression of confidence in the incumbent.
Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the purpose of the one-year period in
paragraph (b) is to provide the local official concerned a "period of repose" during which "[his]
attention should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by disturbance due to political
partisanship." Unfortunately, the law cannot really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in
politics. From the day an elective official assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and
criticism, and it is not always easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically
motivated and when it is not. The only safeguard against the baneful and enervating effects of
partisan politics is the good sense and self restraint of the people and its leaders against such
shortcomings of our political system. A respite from partisan politics may have the incidental effect of
providing respite from partisanship, but that is not really the purpose of the limitation on recall under
the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient basis for evaluating and judging the
performance of an elected local official.
To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary
proceedings to initiate recall —
1. Because §74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to §69, is a power which shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such
right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the
one-year period provided in paragraph (b);
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for
judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings
would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.
As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner
assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.
Author: LIM, P.
2) The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the
campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said
so.
Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may
be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office
of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the
period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a
period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph
(b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation
must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local
government units "more responsive and accountable."
Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus
Election Code, unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90)
days before the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's
interpretation that the second limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would
emasculate even more a vital right of the people.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 140560 is DISMISSED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No.
140714 is DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic.
PILAR v. COMELEC (1995)
Petition: Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolution
dated April 28, 1994 of COMELEC
Petitioner: Juanito C. Pilar
Respondent: Commission on Elections
Ponencia: Quiason, J.
DOCTRINE: Where the law does not distinguish
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. No distinction is to be made in the application of a
law where none is indicated.
FACTS:
1. On January 13, 1992, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations
Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local
Elections on May 11, 1992) to implement the provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A. 7166 on election
contributions and expenditures.
2. On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his CoC for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. However, on March 25, 1992, petitioner
withdrew his CoC.
3. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065, COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of P10,000 for
failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.
4. Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his CoC 3 days after its filing.
Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political
contest, and should have either won or lost."
5. In M.R. No. 94-0594, COMELEC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, and deemed final
M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner then went to the COMELEC en banc, which also
denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994.
6. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Author: LIM, P.
ISSUE:
1. WoN petitioner cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures
PROVISIONS:
Sec. 14 of R.A. 7166
o “An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral
Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes”
o “Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement.
Every candidateand treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after
the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full,
true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with
the election. . .”
RULING + RATIO:
1. NO. Petitioner is liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures.
a. Sec. 14 of R.A. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner, however, argues that he is a
“non-candidate”, and such argument is without merit.
i. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish. In the case, as the law makes no
distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his
candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be
deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but
also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
b. Also, Sec. 14 of R.A 7166 uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the
word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty
which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or
where public interest is involved. We must apply the general rule.
c. The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately
expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to
pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and
compelling the publication of the same. It is not improbable that a candidate who
withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even
in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not
all too remote.
d. It is worth mentioning that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation
where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure.
Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file
a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided
that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no
expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."
e. Lastly, under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines), it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of
certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his
candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
DISPOSITION: petition DISMISSED.
Manila Herald Publishing vs Ramos (1951)
Author: LIM, P.
Petition: certiorari with preliminary injunction
Petitioner: MANILA HERALD PUBLISHING CO., INC., doing business under the name of
Evening Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc
Respondent: SIMEON RAMOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, MACARIO
A. OFILADA, Sheriff of City of Manila, ANTONIO QUIRINO and ALTO SURETY AND
INSURANCE CO., INC
Ponencia: TUASON, J.
Doctrine: Honestly, hindi ko gets. Huhu. Pero i did my best. And sana matanggap niyo yun
at magawa akong patawarin. Nagmamahal, Czar.
1.) Respondent Antonio Quirino filed a libel suit against Aproniano G. Borres (editor), Pedro
Padilla (managing editor) and Loreto Pastor (reporter) of the Daily Record, a daily
newspaper published in Manila. They were asking for damages and thus secured a writ of
preliminary attachment upon putting up a bond and the Sheriff levied an attachment upon
certain office and printing equipment found in the premises of the Daily Record. (1st case)
2.) In response, the Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. and Printers, Inc., filed with third-party
claims, alleging that they were the owners of the property attached. The sheriff required of
Quirino a counter bond to meet the claim of the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and
another bond to meet the claim of Printers, Inc. These amounts, upon Quirino's motion filed
under Section 13, Rule 59, of the Rules of Court, were reduced by the court to P11,000 and
P10,000 respectively.
3.) The Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc. commenced a joint suit against
the sheriff, Quirino and Alto Surety and Insurance Co. Inc., in which the former sought (1) to
enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the attachment of the properties above
mentioned and (2) P45,000 damages. (2nd case)
4.) The first case was being handled by Judge Sanchez which was pending. The second
case fell in the branch of Judge Pecson and he issued a writ of preliminary injunction to
desist proceeding with the attachment of the said properties.
5.) The second case was transferred to Judge Simeon Ramos granted the petition on a
bond but set aside the order on a motion for reconsideration
6.) Upon the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Ramos required the parties to submit
memoranda on the question whether the subject matter of the 2nd case should be filed in an
independent action or by means of a complaint in intervention in the 1st case. His Honor
declared that the 2nd case is "unnecessary, superfluous and illegal" and so dismissed the
case. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc., should do was
intervene in the 1st case.
ISSUES:
1.) W/N Judge Ramos has authority to dismiss the 2nd case at the stage when it was thrown
out of court
2.) W/N the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc., should come as
intervenors into the case for libel instead of bringing an independent action
3.) W/N Judge R has interfered with the actuations of Judge S
FIRST ISSUE: NOPE.
The question of dismissal in the 2nd case was suggested by Judge Ramos on a ground
perceived by him. To all intents and purposes, the dismissal was decreed by the court on its
own initiative.
Section 1 Rule 8 enumerates the grounds upon which an action may be dismissed, and it
specifically ordains that a motion to this end be filed. This is an express requirement which
does not give the court power to dismiss the case without the requisite motion duly
presented.
Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides for the cases in which an action may be dismissed,
and the inclusion of those therein provided excludes any other, under the familiar
maxim, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The only instance in which, according to said
Author: LIM, P.Rules, the court may dismiss upon the court's own motion an action is, when the "plaintiff
fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time or to comply with the Rules or any order of the court."
The Rules of Court are devised as a matter of necessity, intended to be observed with
diligence by the courts as well as by the parties for the orderly conduct of litigation and
judicial business. In general, it is compliance with these rules which gives the court
jurisdiction to act.
The court acted with grave abuse of discretion if not in excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing
the case without any formal motion to dismiss.
SECOND ISSUE: (Ito ata yung pinakaimportant kasi may fancy terms) YUP
Section 14 of rule 59 provides for the steps to be taken when the property attached is
claimed by the other person than that defendant or his agent. "Nothing herein contained
shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper
action." What is "proper action"? Section 1 of Rule 2 defines action as "an ordinary suit in
court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong," while section 2, entitled "Commencement of
Action," says that "civil action may be commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
"Action" has acquired a well-define, technical meaning, and it is in this restricted sense that
the word "action" is used in the above rule. In employing the word "commencement" the rule
clearly indicates an action which originates an entire proceeding and puts in motion the
instruments of the court calling for summons, answer, etc, and not any intermediary step
taken in the course of the proceeding whether by the parties themselves or by a stranger.
The most liberal view that can be taken in favor of the respondents' position is that
intervention as a means of protecting the third-party claimants' right is not exclusive but
cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring a new, independent suit. It is significant that
there are courts which go so far as to take the view that even where the statute expressly
grants the right of intervention is such cases as this, the statute does not extend to owners
of property attached, for, under this view, "it is considered that the ownership is not one of
the essential questions to be determined in the litigation between plaintiff and defendant;"
that "whether the property belongs to defendant or claimant, if determined, is considered as
shedding no light upon the question in controversy, namely, that defendant is indebted to
plaintiff."
Separate action was indeed said to be the correct and only procedure contemplated by Act
No. 190, intervention addition to, but not in substitution of, the old process. The new Rules
adopted section 121 of Act No. 190 and added thereto Rule 24 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Procedure. Combined, the two modes of redress are now section 1 of Rule 13, the last
clause of which is the newly added provision. The result is that, whereas, "under the old
procedure, the third person could not intervene, he having no interest in the debt (or
damages) sued upon by the plaintiff," under the present Rules, "a third person claiming to be
the owner of such property may, not only file a third-party claim with the sheriff, but also
intervene in the action to ask that the writ of attachment be quashed." Yet, the right to
inetervene, unlike the right to bring a new action, is not absolute but left to the sound
discretion of the court to allow. This qualification makes intervention less preferable to an
independent action from the standpoint of the claimants, at least. Because availability of
intervention depends upon the court in which Case No. 11531 is pending, there would be
assurance for the herein petitioners that they would be permitted to come into that case.
Little reflection should disabuse the mind from the assumption that an independent action
creates a multiplicity of suits. There can be no multiplicity of suits when the parties in the suit
where the attachment was levied are different from the parties in the new action, and so are
the issues in the two cases entirely different. In the circumstances, separate action might,
indeed, be the more convenient of the two competing modes of redress, in that intervention
is more likely to inject confusion into the issues between the parties in the case for debt or
damages with which the third-party claimant has nothing to do and thereby retard instead of
facilitate the prompt dispatch of the controversy which is underlying objective of the rules of
pleading and practice. That is why intervention is subject to the court's discretion.
THIRD ISSUE: NOPE
Author: LIM, P.The objection suggests the motion to discharge the preliminary attachment is that by doing
so one judge would interfere with another judge's actuations.
It has been seen that a separate action by the third party who claims to be the owner of the
property attached is appropriate. If this is so, it must be admitted that the judge trying such
action may render judgment ordering the sheriff of whoever has in possession the attached
property to deliver it to the plaintiff-claimant or desist from seizing it. It follows further that the
court may make an interlocutory order, upon the filing of such bond as may be necessary, to
release the property pending final adjudication of the title. Jurisdiction over an action
includes jurisdiction over a interlocutory matter incidental to the cause and deemed
necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit or protect the parties' interests. This is
self-evident.
The petition for certiorari is granted with costs against the respondents except the
respondent Judge.
Buenaseda v. Flavier
G.R. No. 106719
September 21, 1993
Petitioners: Dra. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Lt. Col. Isabelo Banez, Jr., Engr. Conrado Rey
Matias, Ms. Cora S. Solis and Ms. Enya N. Lopez
Respondents: Secretary Juan Flavier, Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, and NCMH
Nurses Association (represented by Raoulito Gayutin)
Ponencia: Quiason, J.
Petition: petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court
FACTS:
1. Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7,
1992, directing the preventive suspension of petitioners. The petition also asks for an order
directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-
Rosero from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner.
2. The questioned order was issued in connection with administrative complaint filed with the
Ombudsman by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
3. On September 10, 1992, this court required respondents’ to Comment on the petition and
thereafter, received a “Supplemental Petition and an Urgent Supplemental Manifestation”
from petitioners dated September 14 and 22, 1992.
4. On the same day of September 22, 1992, the court “Resolved to REQUIRE the
respondents to MAINTAIN STATUS QUO pending filing of comments on the original
supplemental manifestation”.
5. On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of
Health to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 and in a Resolution dated
October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said
motion.
6. On September 29, 1992, respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its Comment
on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation in a pleading
entitled “Omnibus Submission”.
Author: LIM, P.7. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt
and to disbar them.
8. On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a “Manifestation and Supplement to ‘Motion to
Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with the 22 September 1992 Resolution’ “
and on November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November
10, 1992, alleging that:
xxx (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992
is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners’ preventive suspension, the
status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; xxx.
9. This court, in the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, required respondent Secretary to
comply with the said status quo order stating that:
“xxx the last peaceable uncontested status xxx was the situation xxx wherein
petitioners were then actually occupying their respective positions, the Court hereby
ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of their respective
positions xxx, and that respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their
authority desist and refrain from performing any act xxx until further orders from the
Court.”
PROVISION:
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770—Preventives Suspension. The Ombudsman or his
Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the
Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except
when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due
to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of
such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided.
ISSUES:
WoN the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and
employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the
investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.
HELD:
YES. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees
working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the
suspension: of a public official or employees, it referred to “suspension”, as a punitive
measure. All the words associated with the word “suspension” in the provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases (e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure).
Author: LIM, P.Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should be given the
same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by
considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively
suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a
procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with
the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.
DISPOSITION:
The petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
Mutuc vs. COMELEC
Petition: Prohibition
Petitioner: Amelito Mutuc
Respondent: COMELEC
Ponencia: Fernando, J
DOCTRINE: (Use of Associated Words)
Ejusdem generis - general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the
same kind or class as those specifically referred to.
FACTS:
Petitioner Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. After setting
forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, COMELEC informed him that his Certificate of Candidacy was given due
course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud
speakers citing a provision in the Constitutional Convention Act which made it unlawful for candidates
"to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as
pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,
shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin." It was the
COMELEC’s contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped
voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material and subject to confiscation.
ISSUES:
WON the usage of jingles in mobile units equipped with sound systems is prohibited by the
Constitutional Convention Act as it falls within the scope of “and the like” stated in the provision.
PROVISION:
Constitutional Convention Act which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request
or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever
nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes,
and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin."
RULING + RATIO:
NO the use of jingles is not prohibited as it does not fall within the scope of “and the like”
stated in the provision.
A well known principle is ejusdem generis which states that the general words following any
enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to.
In this case, what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to
as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
Author: LIM, P.Therefore the order of the COMELEC is not justified as the using of jingles in mobile units equipped
with loud speakers cannot be considered as a distribution of gadgets.
Also if the provision is to be construed to probity the use of a taped jingle, it would be unconstitutional
as it could be considered an abridgment of free speech or free press.
Cagayan Valley Enterprises v Court of Appeals (1989)
Petition: certiorari
Petitioner: The Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. represented by its President, Mr. Rogelio Lim
Respondent: CA and La Tondena, Inc.,
Ponencia: REGALADO, J.
FACTS:
18) La Tondena registered with the Phil. Patent Office the 350 c.c. white flint bottles used for
Ginebra San Miguel back in 1953.
19) On 1981 La Tondena filed a case against for injunction and damages at tlehe lower court
against Cagayan Valley Enterprises for using its bottles, with the mark La Tondena and
Ginebra San Miguel stamped out and filling it instead with petitioner’s product, an alcoholic
labeled “Sonny Boy”. They did this without the consent of LTI.
20) Cagayan answers: LTI has no cause of action, because it failed to comply with Sec. 21 of RA
166. This provision allegedly requires LTI to include the mark “Reg. Phil. Pat. Off.” For their
patented bottle. Further, they aver that LTI has no protection under RA 623, as amended by
RA 5700, because its product (hard liquor) is not contemplated. What IS contemplated by the
law are beverages like Coca-Cola, Sprite, and other products that have the mark “Reg Phil
Pat Off”.
a. Therefore, LTI has no defense for their product is not exactly pantented. Therefore,
Cagayan was not infringing any rights whatsoever. And as far as marks were
concerned, the bottles used by Cagayan for “Sonny Boy” was not marked with “La
Tondena” or “Ginebra San Miguel”.
21) The Lower Court finds in favor of Cagayan, and the CA reverses the decision.
22) Hence, these petitions.
PROVISIONS:
RA 623, as amended by RA 5700:
SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the manufacture, bottling, or selling of soda water, mineral or aerated
waters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels and other similar containers, or in
the manufacturing, compressing or selling of gases such as oxygen, acytelene, nitrogen, carbon dioxide ammonia, hydrogen,
chloride, helium, sulphur, dioxide, butane, propane, freon, melthyl chloride or similar gases contained in steel cylinders, tanks,
flasks, accumulators or similar containers, with the name or the names of their principals or products, or other marks of
ownership stamped or marked thereon, may register with the Philippine Patent Office a description of the names or marks, and
the purpose for which the containers so marked and used by them, under the same conditions, rules, and regulations, made
applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of trademarks.
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the manufacturer, bottler, or seller, who has
succesfully registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such
bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators or other similar containers so marked or stamped, for
the purpose of sale, or to sell, disposed of, buy or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not, to use the
same, for drinking vessels or glasses or drain pipes, foundation pipes, for any other purpose than that registered by the
manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos or
imprisonment of not more than one year or both.
SEC. 3. The use by any person other than the registered manufacturer, bottler or seller, without written permission of the latter
of any such bottle, cask, barrel, keg, box, steel cylinders, tanks, flask, accumulators, or other similar containers, or the
possession thereof without written permission of the manufacturer, by any junk dealer or dealer in casks, barrels, kegs boxes,
steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators or other similar containers, the same being duly marked or stamped and registered
as herein provided, shall give rise to a prima facie presumption that such use or possession is unlawful.
Author: LIM, P.ISSUES:
WHETHER, under RA 623 as amended by RA 5700, there is apparently no need to place the term
“Reg Phil Pat Off”, since the law only requires that this phrase be printed on the CONTAINER.
WHETHER there is no need to distinguish between bottles that state “PROPERTY OF La Tondena”
and those simply marked as “La Tondena”
WHETHER the mark “La Tondena” and “Ginebra San Miguel” constitute sufficient notice to Cagayan
that the bottles were property of LTI
WHETHER the product of LTI is not within the contemplated beverage protected by RA 623 when it
cites “other lawful beverages”, as Ginebra is alcoholic thus not necessarily lawful.
RULING + RATIO:
1) YES. According to RA 623, there is no need for there to be strictly any literal indication that
the bottles are patented. All that is required is that they are labeled with the name of the
manufacturer. The phrase “Name or Mark of Ownership” simply means the name of the
applicant or his principal. That the law only protects the containers of the bottles is specious.
Why would congress pass a law with the title that reads below for the CONTAINERS of the
bottle?
2) YES. There is no need. To omission of the phrase “Property of” does not remove the bottles
from the ambit of protection that RA 623 provides.
3) YES. They constitute sufficient notice. So long as the name of the manufacturer is present, it
is in compliance with the law.
4) NO. Ginebra, thus the bottles of LTI, are indeed within the protection of RA 623. The title of
the law reads: An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks,
Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers. Thus, the contemplated intent of the legislature
is to provide protection for the VESSELS of these beverages. When the law discussed “other
lawful beverages”, it meant beverage in a general sense. And although alcohol is regulated it
is not prohibited.
a. The court ruled in Destileria Ayala Inc. vTan Tay & Co. that the whole point of RA 623
was for people to be able to immediately identify the make and the manufacturer of
the beverage he is partaking in. Thus, he may ascertain and identify if the beverage
is congruent with the company’s product.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, Petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner is held in CONTEMPT OF COURT and ordered to pay a fine of 1000 pesos.
SO ORDERED.
Sarmiento v. Mison
Petition: Petition for prohibition
Petitioners: Ulpiano Sarmiento
Respondent: Salvador Mison
Ponencia: Padilla
DOCTRINE:
By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments
to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments.
FACTS:
Author: LIM, P.1. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the appointment of respondent Salvador Mison as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, alleging that his appointment was without the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments, in accordance with Section 16 of Article VII.
2. The respondents counter by saying that the confirmation of the Commission of Appointments
in this case was not needed, an appointment to his position does not require the confirmation of the
COA but is vested solely on the President alone.
3. Looking at the historical background, the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments
required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our
political history that the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935
Constitution, transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar
malpractices.
4. On the other hand
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was
molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the
President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Hence this issue
ISSUE:
WoN the appointment of the respondent needed the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments as provided for in the 1987 Constitution?
PROVISIONS:
ARTICLE VII, Section 16
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
RULING + RATIO:
No, the President need not get the confirmation of the COA in appointing the respondent. From the
aforquoted provision it may be surmised that there are four groups of officers contemplated. The first
group clearly provides that their appointments need confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. The second, third, and fourth group of officers, to which the respondent belongs to,
are the ones contented in this case. By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory
construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow
that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover looking at the intent of the
constitutional framers, it may be seen that except as to those officers whose appointments require the
consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art.
VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the
foreseable effects thereof.
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or
qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED.
Without costs.
Author: LIM, P.
PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs SECRETARY OF
LABOR (1999)
Petition: Certiorari related to 3 cases filed with the Med-Arbiter
Petitioner: Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc.
Respondent: Secretary of Labor, Med-Arbiter Napoleon Fernando, Pepsi-Cola Supervisory
Employees Organization – UOEF (GR 96663); Office of the Secretary Department of Labor and Hon.
Celenio N. Daing, In His Capacity as Med-Arbiter Labor Regional Office No. X, Cagayan De Oro City,
Cagayan de Oro Pepsi Cola Supervisors Union (UOEF) (GR 103300)
Ponencia: Purisima
DOCTRINE:
Necessary implication may be invoked if an unreasonable construction of the provision of the law with
regard to people/items who/which are or are not included in said provision results in a “withdrawal”
from the clear purpose and intent of the law
FACTS:
1. Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (PCEU) filed a petition for certification election
with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-
Cola Philippines (Pepsi).
2. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition, but with the explicit statement that PCEU was affiliated
with Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (UOEF) and 2 other rank-and-file unions, the
PCLU and the PEUP.
3. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines then filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to Set
Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union, entitled PCPPI v. PCEU-UOEF
on the grounds that
a. The members of the Union were managers
b. A supervisors’ union cannot affiliate with a federation whose members include the
rank and file union of the same company
4. Pepsi also filed an urgent ex-parte motion to suspend the certification election
5. PCEU argued that Art. 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, did not prohibit a
local union composed of supervisory employees from being affiliated to a federation which
has local unions with rank-and-file members as affiliates.
ISSUES:
1. WoN a supervisors’ union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two (2) rank and file
unions are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code (PD 442), as
amended, by Republic Act 6715
2. WoN confidential employees can join the labor union of the rank and file
PROVISION:
Article 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by, RA 6715
o Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees.
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in
a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or
form separate labor organizat ions of their own
RULING + RATIO:
1. NO. A supervisors’ union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two (2) rank
and file unions are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code
(PD 442), as amended, by Republic Act 6715
a. Despite a resolution of the Union withdrawing from the Federation, the Court still
decided to provide a guideline for future reference
b. In Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, the court ruled that “if the intent of
the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file
Author: LIM, P.or where the supervisors’ labor organization would represent conflicting interests,
then a local supervisors’ union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national
federation of union of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively
participates in union activity in the company”
c. The limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors’ wanting to join a rank-and-file
union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors’ local union applying for membership
in a national federation the members of which include local unions of rank and file
employees
d. The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this case at bar, the supervisors
will be co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own
bargaining unit
2. NO. Confidential employees cannot join the labor union of the rank and file
a. In the case of National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) “A confidential employee
is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or
care and protection of the employer’s property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code
singles out managerial employee as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are
similarly disqualified”
b. In the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on
the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interests
are well protected
c. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are
union members
d. It is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential
employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the
disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision
DISPOSITION: Petitions in consideration DISMISSED
- Subject Decision, dated October 4, 1991, of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is
MODIFIED in that Credit and Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are highly
confidential employees not eligible for membership in a supervisors’ union
PEOPLE vs MANANTAN
Petition: appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the
information against the defendant
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent: GUILLERMO MANANTAN
Ponencia: REGALA, J law library
FACTS:
1.) Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged for violating Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Section 54 of
the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no
member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer
or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein,
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
2.) A preliminary investigation resulted in the finding a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by
defendant.
3.) He pleaded not guilty, and moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the
defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
4.) The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54.
However, defense counsel cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, where
it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the
authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.
ISSUE: W/N a justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code law library
1.) Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers enumerated in
Section 54. He submits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
provided the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. - No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace,
or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or
Author: LIM, P.any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any
manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace," the omission revealed the intention
of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.
The court however points out that the above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. Under Section 449, the word
"judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code, no such modification exists. In other words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified. In Section 54, however, there was
no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of
the more generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to
comprehend all kinds of judges, such as justices of the peace.
A justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is
indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority.
2.) Based on a narration of the legislative development or history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, the first
omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the
present code. However, in the two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357
and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the
First Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the
words "justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace"
were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion that when the
legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer
from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
3.) The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the
said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If
that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and
deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the
omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature
did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan
political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but
rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has
only been a substitution of terms.
When the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and justice of the peace", found in Section 449
of the Revised Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the
scope of the term not just one class of judges but all judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special
courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations.
4.) The Courts applied the rule of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that
justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its
provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not
so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the
maximexpressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked. The legislature had not intended to exclude a
justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54 for there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule
of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is
remanded for trial on the merits.
The People of the Philippines v. Teodoro Tamani
Petition: Appeal the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Teodoro Tamani
DOCTRINE: REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS
"referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object"
FACTS (Procedural):
Author: LIM, P. Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of
appeal was forty-seven days late which appellant's counsel did not oppose.
Lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was served on his counsel
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.
A copy of the order of denial was served by registered mail to defendant's counsel through
his wife.
He had eleven days within which to appeal. He filed his notice of appeal only on September
10, 1963 or 48 days after.
Defendant's counsel, filed a sworn statement that the court's order was never brought to his
attention and averred that his wife must've lost the envelope containing the order.
The trial court opined that the wife's affidavit should have been submitted but the trial court
gave due course to the appeal
FACTS (Substantive): *sorry mejo magulo ito*
Two different set of facts were presented to the Court.
Tamani:
o At the time of the murder he was at the house of his cousin
o A confession was forced out of him by NBI Agent Almeda
o According to the father of the deceased, Francisco Siyang, it was Gaspar Ibarra and
Melchor Tumaneng who fired the shots and killed Jose Siyang
o Ibarra and Tumaneng were hired by Mayor Domingo to kill Siyang
Prosecution:
o Villamor Tamani, respondent's cousin, functioned as acting mayor when Domingo
was suspended.
o When Domingo came back, Villamor Tamani returned to his position as Vice Mayor
and summoned Tamani and one Cadawan to liquidate the Mayor.
o Tamani and Cadawan crossed the Mrs. Ibarra's yard, where Mrs. Ibarra saw Tamani
carrying a gun.
o According to Mrs. Ibarra, they were headed to Pua's store where Mayor Domingo
was.
o Tamani fired two volley's hitting Siyang with through and through gunshot wounds
and hitting Mayor Domingo on his palm
o Tamani signed and thumbarked two sworn statements before the NBI agent
wherein he confessed that he was the one who shot Siyang and Mayor Domingo
ISSUES:
Procedural:
2. WoN the appeal should be effected only within the 15-day period after promulgation
Substantive:
3. WoN Tamani's alibi can be given serious consideration
PROVISION:
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
o SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.—An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period
for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is
filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the
defendant or his attorney.
RULING + RATIO:
Procedural Issue: The clear terms mentioned in the specific provision in the Rules of Court
leaves no room for doubt that the appeal should be affected within 15 days from promulgation
of the judgment.
Author: LIM, P. In Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court the word "must" is synonymous with "ought" which
connotes compulsion.
The word "promulgation" should be construed in the same section as referring to
"judgment"; "notice" as "order"
The construction is sanctioned by the rule REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS meaning
"referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object" or "let
each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively"
When the order was served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had
only 1 day to file his notice of appeal, and not eleven days
That kind of construction is an application by analogy of the rule governing appeals in civil
cases (Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court)
However, considering that appellants right to seek a review of his case was lost by reason of
his counsel's inadvertence and considering further that the briefs have been submitted, the
Court has resolved to review the record to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice
Substantive Issue: No. It cannot be given serious consideration.
The settled rule is that an alibi, to be tenable, must be such as to preclude the possibility of
the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of
its commission.
Appellant's alibi does not satisfy that basic requirement. Moreover, it was not corroborated
by Vice-Mayor Tamani or by any other person. Its concocted character is manifest.
Disposition: the appeal is dismissed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.