STATCON Plain Meaning Rule

7/28/2019 STATCON Plain Meaning Rule

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Michael Padua vs People of the Philippines GR 168546 (July 23, 2008)

Facts:

Petitioner, who was then 17 years old, was involved in selling illegal drugs.

Initially in his arraignment he pleaded not guilty but re-entered his plea of guilty to avail the benefits of firs timeoffenders. Subsequently, he applied for probation but was denied. In his petition for certiorari, the court

said that probation and suspension of sentence are different and provisions in PD 603 or RA 9344 cannotbe invoked to avail probation.

It is specifically stated that in drug trafficking, application for probation should be denied. As aside issue,the court discussed the availment of suspension of sentence under RA 9344.

Issue

WON suspension of sentence under RA9344 can still be invoked given the fact that the accused is now 21 years old.

Held

NO. The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactivelyapplied for petitioners benefit.

Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offensecharged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with

the law under suspended sentence.

Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the courtshall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended

sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximumage of 21 years.

Petitioner has already reached 21years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child forpurposes of applying Rep.Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and40 appears moot and academic

as far as his case is concerned.

Kapisanan ng mga Mangagawa v Manila Railroad Company

Facts

The union seeks reversal of the decision of the lower court dismissing its petition for mandamus.

The court determined RA 2023 was enacted to compel the employer to make the deduction from the salary

employee who has debt and turn this over to the employees credit union

But it does not convert the credit unions credit into a first priority credit

Issue

WON the law does not give first priority in the payment of the employees in favor of their credit union

Held

When the statute is clear and unequivocal, the court does not but to apply the law. The express provisionsof NCC Art 2241,2242 ans 2244 show the legislative intent on credits.

In the case, the RA 2023 speaks for itself, there is no ambiguity, therefore it must be applied.

There is nothing in the provision of the RA 2023 that provides that obligation of employees payable to

credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction of of their wages, if there was, the law would have

expressly declared.

Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision


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Secretary of Justice v Koruga

Paras v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

Facts

A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay.

The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that underSec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall

shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately

preceding a regular local election.

Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be

instituted.

Issue

W/N the SK election is a local election.

Held

No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered

together and kept subservient to its general intent.

The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as

provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction.

Thus, interpreting the phrase regularlocal election to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the

Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision.

In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should

be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or

nugatory.

FACTS:

Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the last regular barangay election. A

petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. At least

29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by

law. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to

approve the petition and set recall election date. To prevent the holding of recall election, petitioner filed

before the Regional Trial Court a petition for injunction which was later dismissed. Petitioner filed petition

forcertiorariwith urgent prayer for injunction, insisting that the recall election is barred by the

Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code (LGC) which states

that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or

one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.


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ISSUE:

Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections, where the recall

election is for Barangay post.

HELD:

NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.

RATIO:

Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating

additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately

preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election

for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the officials

replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected

through a recall election.

It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe

regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official

sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation stated under the same

Section 74(b) now referred to as Barangay Elections.

Documents

STATCON Plain Meaning Rule