State-building, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia

8/8/2019 State-building, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia

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Brieing Paper1

State-building, Counterterrorism, and LicensingHumanitarianism in SomaliaMark Bradbury

The Feinstein International Center

develops and promotes operational

and policy responses to protect and

strengthen the lives and livelihoodso people living in crisis-aected and

marginalized communities. The Center

works globally in partnership with nationa

and international organizations to bring

about institutional changes that enhance

eective policy reorm and promote best

practice.

This report is available online at

c.tufts.edu

Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice

September 2010

Given the state o the war economy and our inability to account or

aid, the politicizing infuence o the UN, and the ideological natureo the opposition, and the security agenda o the US and the West,

what chance does our skinny guy in Somalia have?2

My greatest concern is the very dangerous erosion o humanitarian

principles in Somalia. They have been eroded by political decisions.

It is possibly one o the worst examples o how the politicization o

aid is aecting humanitarian work.3

Let: A displaced Somali woman is given

cooked ood during a distribution organize

by the UN World Food Programme, USAID

and other local and international NGOs, in

Mogadishu Somalia in September 2008.

Jamal Osman/IRIN
https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Feinstein+International+Centerhttps://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Feinstein+International+Center


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State-building, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia by Mark Bradbury Feinstein International Center, Tufts University 2

Background: Implications of RecentCrises for the Future of HumanitarianAction

Since the fall of 2009, researchers at the FeinsteinInternational Center (FIC) at Tufts University haveembarked on a major two-year research project on

Humanitarian Action and Politics. This project builds upon and

expands on the earlier research on Humanitarian Agenda:

Principles, Power and Perceptions (HA2015) which involved

13 country case studies of local perceptions of humanitarian

action and a synthesis report. The earlier undertaking, which

spanned the years 2006-2008, was widely disseminated and

discussed by governments and aid agencies in a series of

debriengs in North America, Europe, and the countries

studied.

Our new research is in two separate but related phases.

Phase I is policy-oriented: building on the HA2015 case studies

and subsequent eld work, it looks at the challenges faced by

humanitarian actors in recent crisesAfghanistan, Sri Lanka,

Somalia, Darfur, and Pakistanand at the policy andoperational implications for UN agencies, NGOs, and donors.

Phase II will take a historical approach and analyze in depth a

number of long-running crises, as well as some cross-cutting

themes, with a view to gaining a better understanding of

lessons relevant to the humanitarian present through a

retrospective analysis of the past. Brieng papers on

Afghanistan and Sri Lanka have already been issued (and are

available at c.tufts.edu). Papers on Darfur and Pakistan will

be issued in the fall of 2010.

Introduction

In 1992, in the wake o the collapse o the Somali state and at theheight o the civil war, Somalia set a benchmark or humanitariancrises in the immediate post-Cold War world. War and amineclaimed the lives o a quarter o a million people. 4 More than 1.5million Somalis ed the country and an estimated two millionwere displaced internally. wo decades later, as internationaleorts to restore a unctional central government continue,Somalia is again being described as one o the worst humanitariancrises in the world, with over 1.5 million people internallydisplaced, over hal a million Somalis living as reugees inneighboring countries, and humanitarian access extremelyrestricted.

Since the research or this paper was undertaken, the conict inSomalia has worsened: on July 11 over 70 people were killed intwin bombings in Kampala, which the Somali militia al-Shabaabclaimed responsibility or;5 regional governments have pledged toincrease the size o the Arican Union peace-keeping orce inSomalia;6 humanitarian access has declined urther, with al-Shabaab issuing a ban on three more international agenciesoperating in south central Somalia;7 and intensive ghting

recommenced in the capital Mogadishu aer Ramadan, in lateAugust, as al-Shabaab threatened a nal assault on the Somalgovernment, causing urther civilian displacement.

Tis paper explores the policy and operational implications othe current crises and the challenges to humanitarian action inSomalia. It examines how international state-building andcounterterrorism objectives in Somalia have compromised theability o international humanitarian actors to assist and protec

vulnerable populations.

Somaliaa Country Apart

A number o actors make the humanitarian crisis in Somaliauniquely complex:

Somalia is the longest case of complete state collapse in

modern times and is ragmented into several polities withoverlapping claims to sovereignty.

It currently has one of the largest internally displacedpopulations in the world.

SouthcentralSomaliahassomeoftheworldsworstsocialindicators, with over 43% o the population living on lessthan $1 per day, some o the worst rates o under-ve(142/1,000) and maternal mortality (1,400 /100,000), andunder-ve acute malnutrition consistently above 19%.

In the past decade, Somalia has been among the top tenrecipients o humanitarian aid, with the most UN consolidatedappeals.

SouthcentralSomaliaiscurrentlythemostdangerousplace

in the world or aid workers; two-thirds o all aid workerskilled worldwide in 2008 were in Somalia.

Humanitarian space has shrunk to the extent that sinceMarch 2010 there have been no international aid workersbased in south central Somalia, and all aid operations havebeen managed remotely rom Kenya.

Somedonorgovernmentsarebelligerentsinthewar.eUNis aligned with the government and supportive o its militaryplans, which impacts on the delivery o aid and the security oaid agencies.

edesignationofindividualsandorganizationsinSomaliaas terrorists by the UN and donor governments and moves

to license humanitarian assistance are aecting the ability oaid agencies to deliver aid to the people who most need it.


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An Endless War

Somalia is the most enduring example o modern state collapse inthe world and one o the longest-running humanitarian crises (seethe appendix or a brie chronology o key political events in the pasttwo decades). Since the regime o Mohamed Siyad Barre wasoverthrown in 1991 and the Somali state collapsed, the policy o theinternational community towards Somalia has revolved around theprovision o humanitarian assistance to meet recurrent humanitarian

need and the establishing o a viable government in order to restoreinternal order and address international security concerns. Tesetwo objectives have been in conict with each other.

In 1992, the United Nations belatedly responded to the conictand escalating amine with a multi-mandated peacekeeping andhumanitarian operationthe United Nations Operation inSomalia (UNOSOM). Tis was reinorced in late 1992 by a UN-mandated military taskorce (UNIAF) led by the United Statesthat enlarged UNOSOM to 30,000 oreign troops. Global mediacoverage o the crisis saw international NGOs ood into Somaliaand there was a massive prolieration o Somali NGOs in a countrywhere ew had existed beore. Tere were reported to be 40 INGOs

working in south central Somalia in 1995. Te scale o theintervention and poorly regulated system led to criticisms that theaid agencies were uelling the war economy, prolonging theconict, and undermining the emergence o Somali leaders.8

Despite its unprecedented scale, UNOSOM ailed to restore anational government and withdrew in 1995. With crises in Rwandaand the Balkans claiming the attention o the internationalcommunity, and with Somalia being o no strategic interest,political engagement diminished. With no acute emergency andno peacekeeping orces, oreign aid declined, rom a budget oUS$1.5 billion or UNOSOM II in 1993, and overall aid ell tobelow pre-war levels by 1997.9 Many international agenciescontracted or closed their operations. Aer the ailures o the UN-led mission, international leadership in Somalia passed to donorgovernments, coordinated through the Somalia Aid CoordinationBody (SACB) and chaired by the European Commission (EC). Asthe largest donor to Somalia, the EC exerted considerable inuenceon the direction o aid policy in the mid-1990s. In the absence oamine or large-scale conict, the country was judged to be movingtowards recovery and Somalias problems were redened indevelopmental terms. Te ocus o international aid switched romrelie to development and local solutions to avoid the earedpitalls o so-called relie dependency. Indeed, the humanitarianresponse capacity declined to the extent that the international

system in Somalia was unprepared or the El Nio-induced oodsin 1997.10

Diplomatic responsibility or managing the crisis passed toneighboring countries, who initiated a series o dialogues tomediate the conict: Ethiopia through the 1996 Sodere peaceconerence; Egypt through the 1997 Cairo conerence; Djiboutithrough the 2000 Arta peace conerence; and the regional Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the 2002-2004 Somalia National Reconciliation Conerence in Kenya.11

International disengagement rom Somalia coincided with aperiod o diminishing conict in large parts o the country, aswarring actions consolidated territorial gains, new orms oeconomic activity took root,12 and autonomous administrationsbecame established.13 Nevertheless, the country remained deeplyimpoverished. With assets severely depleted by war and the

vicissitudes o climate, humanitarian needs remained perennial inmany parts o south central Somalia. Te widespread ooding in1997 demonstrated how vulnerable the country had become to

natural disasters.14

Despite the strategic shi rom relie todevelopment, donors proved unwilling to commit adequate undsto address these structural vulnerabilities in the absence o apolitical settlement.

Te period o incremental recovery and consolidation ended in2000, when a national peace conerence acilitated by the Djiboutgovernment and backed by the UN produced the ransitionalNational Government (NG), the rst internationally recognizedgovernment o Somalia since 1991. A year later, the events o 9/11orced Somalia back onto the agenda o Western governmentswhich, or the second time in a decade, became exercised by thephenomenon o collapsed or ailed states. Aer the 2002 US

National Security Strategy concluded that the biggest threat toAmerican security came rom ailing states, Somaliaa countrywithout a unctional government or a decade and with a largeproportion o its population existing in a state o chronichumanitarian distressbecame identied as a potential breedingground or sae haven or transnational terrorism. Te presence inSomalia o a militant Islamist organization (Al Itihad Al Islamiya)which was accused o links to al-Qaeda, and the act that Somaliawas thought to have been a conduit or materials and personnelinvolved in the bombings o the US embassies in Nairobi and Dares Salaam in 1998 all seemed to support this thesis.15

Te events o 9/11 changed the premise or international

engagement in Somalia, rom a humanitarian imperative to protecthe security and rights o war-aected civilians, to one primarilyconcerned with international, and specically American, securityrom transnational terrorism. Some analysts suggestedcounterterrorism could provide a door through which longerterm international re-engagement in peace, reconciliation andstate reconstruction should take place.16 Tis has proven highlyproblematic. First, it has shied the international lens rom aconcern with the humanitarian protection o Somali civilians toconcerns with international security. Programmatically, this hasled to a prioritization o investment in security services overhumanitarian assistance. Second, the emphasis on reviving acentral government has simply served to perpetuate a violentconict over control o the state. Tird, linking state revivaand counterterrorism has alienated parts o the Somali populationand polarized Somalias Muslim community into moderatesand extremists. Nevertheless, the melding o oreign assistanceand counterterrorism and the view that security can only berestored in Somalia through a strong central government persistdespite the ailure o the approach and the catastrophicconsequences.


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In 2004, a two-year national reconciliation conerence, convenedin Kenya under the auspices o IGAD, produced a successor to theNGthe ransitional Federal Government (FG). Although ithad only limited acceptance among Somalis, the dogged donorsupport to the peace process meant that international policytowards Somalia was geared to turning the FG into a viablegovernment. A catalogue o military and diplomatic blunders byWestern governments ailed to stem the growing inuence o

Islamist organizations in south central Somalia.17 In 2006, thesecame together as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) against analliance o warlords nanced by the US. Te ICU succeeded inremoving the warlords rom the capital, which they hadcontrolled since the early 1990s. Tis signalled a momentouschange in the politics o Somalia. Within a year, Ethiopia, whichelt threatened by the growing inuence o the ICU, intervenedwith orce, backed by US airstrikes, and ousted the ICU.

Box 1. Key Political and Military Forces

Governmental Authorities:

eransitional Federal Government (FG) o Somalia was established in 2004 as a successor to the ransitionalNational Government (NG). Te rst FG president, Abdulahi Yusu, resigned in 2008 and was succeeded bySheikh Shari Sheikh Ahmed in January 2009, the ormer chair o the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).

Puntland State o Somalia was established in August 1998 as a non-secessionist ederal state and claims authorityover the northeastern regions o Somalia.

Te Republic o Somaliland was ounded as a secessionist state in May 1991 and claims sovereignty over thenorthern regions o Somalia. It is unrecognized by any state but has been one o the most stable areas o the ormerSomali state. It has a popularly elected government and in June 2010 held presidential elections or the second timesince 2003.

Non-Government Military Forces:

Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaa (ASWJ) is an umbrella or traditional Su orders in Somalia that were the dominantreligious group beore the war. Although ormed as early as 1992, it has only emerged as a military orce in the

past two years in response to the desecration o su shrines by al-Shabaab and with the backing o Ethiopia.It currently has a ragile alliance with the FG.

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen,aSalastjihadistorganization,hasitsoriginsintheShariacourtsthatemergedin Somalia in the late 1990s. It played a signicant role in the victory o the ICU over the warlords and won supportor its opposition to the Ethiopian insurgency. Its leadership, said to be akri Jihadists, proers support or al-Qaedasagenda.Itsradicalagendameansthatithasdevelopedasaforcethatislargelyautonomousfromclansand moderate Islamist voices. It was rst listed by the US as a terrorist organization in 2008, ollowed by Australia,Norway, and Sweden and in 2010 by Canada, the UK, and the United Nations. It is the main military threat to theFG and in early 2010 controlled large areas o south central Somalia, including parts o Mogadishu.

Hisbul IslamisaSalast-inspiredorganizationleadbySheikhHassanDahirAweys.AnarchitectoftherevolutionaryIslamist ideology in Somalia since the 1990s, and the main leader o the Union o Islamic Courts in 2006, he is

drivenbyanationalistvisiontounitetheSomali-inhabitedregionsoftheHornofAfrica.isthreattoEthiopiansovereignty has won him the backing o Eritrea. Briey allied with al-Shabaab in a united oensive against the FGin2009,thealliancecollapsedwhentheoensivefailed.HisbulIslamsubsequentlylostcontrolofthesouthernporto Kismayo to al-Shabaab in 2009, and its inuence has since declined. Sheikh Aweys is listed as a terrorist by the USand the UN.

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In January 2007, the FG was installed in Mogadishu and anArican Union peacekeeping orce (AMISOM) was deployed toprotect the government institutions in advance o an envisagedUNpeacekeepingmission.However,theTFGsattempttodisarmand paciy Mogadishu ignited a violent conict between theEthiopian-backed FG and elements o the ormer ICU and clansopposed the Ethiopian occupation, led by an Islamist militia,Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen YouthMovement) (see Box 1 or key political and military orces inSomalia). Fighting in April 2007 caused the displacement o some700,000 civilians rom Mogadishu.

When the FG was installed in Mogadishu in early 2007, the UNand oreign governments decided to extend support to the FG tostrengthen its capacity and legitimacy. Tis brought them into aclash with humanitarian agencies who came under pressure toseize the window o opportunity and respond to the humanitarianand development needs in south central Somalia.18 Tis was a timewhen the international community could have sought to reinorcehumanitarian principles. Instead, the Ethiopian invasion(unsanctioned by the UN), US airstrikes, the rendition o suspectedIslamic militants, the closure o the Kenyan border to Somalireugees, the indiscriminate shelling o civilian neighborhoods inMogadishu by Ethiopian orces, the mass displacement o civiliansrom Mogadishu, assassinations, and arbitrary detentions all

elicited very little reaction or condemnation rom oreigngovernments and multi-lateral agencies. Te FG condemned thedisplaced as terrorists and international and Somali NGOs whosought to assist them were suspected o aiding the enemy.19 Aidwas blocked, and personnel harassed, arrested, and, in someinstances, assassinated. Te international backing or the FG andmuted international response to abuses committed by it, illustratedthe extent to which the global war on terror had taken priorityover human rights, humanitarian principles, and internationallaw.

US backing or the Ethiopian military intervention and severamissile strikes against suspected terrorist targets only served togenerate support or more militant Islamic orces, such as al-ShabaabandHisbulIslamiya(IslamicParty).InMarch2008,alShabaab, which expressed afliation to al-Qaeda, was designatedas a terrorist organization by the US government. By May 2008, itsreclusive leader AdenHashi Ayro was dead, killed by a USmissile. Al-Shabaab responded by declaring American, Westernand UN ofcials and organizations to be legitimate targets. Tedirect involvement o oreign orces, including AMISOMinternationalized the crisis in Somalia to a level not seen since thetroubled UN peacekeeping operation in the early 1990s. And therenewed war in south central Somalia has also produced the mossevere humanitarian crisis since that time.

A UN-brokered deal in Djibouti to accommodate oppositionorces and to acilitate the withdrawal o Ethiopian orces produceda reormed FG in January 2009. Te appointment o a moderateIslamist head o state, Sheikh Shari Sheikh Ahmed, who threeyears earlier had headed the ICU, and the accommodation o someo the opposition appeared to oer a route out o the conict. Tenew administration was received with cautious support amongSomalis and internationally, although with only limited nancialbacking.However,elementsoftheoppositionwhofeltmarginalizedrom the Djibouti talks rejected the new government and in May

2009al-ShabaabandHizbulIslamlaunchedanoensiveagainsthe FG in Mogadishu. Te FG survived with the support o anexpanded AMISOM orce and some arms provided by the USgovernment.20 Since then, Mogadishu has suered continuousghting and urther population displacement. Outside the capitalal-Shabaab has consolidated control over large parts o southcentral Somalia, while in the central regions o Somalia a thirdsignicantmilitaryforcehasemergedAhluSunnahWalJamaa(Followers o the Prophetic Way and Consensus). Backed byEthiopia and loosely allied with the FG, it has stemmed theadvance o al-Shabaab to the north.

International Military Forces:

AMISOM is a small Arican Union peacekeeping mission deployed to Somalia in early 2007 to allow Ethiopian orcesto withdraw. Sanctioned by the UN Security Council, it is mandated to protect the ransitional Federal Institutions(FIs) and has played a key role in deending the FG against the Islamist insurgency. Originally planned to reacha maximum deployment o 8,000 troops, aer three years the mission has 6,300 troops rom Uganda, Burundi, andDjibouti, who are conned to Mogadishu and its environs. In July, regional governments pledged to boost this by aurther 2,000 troops. In deending itsel and the FG rom insurgents, AMISOM is routinely criticized by Somalis orindiscriminate shelling o civilian areas o Mogadishu.

Other orces: Te US military maintains a base in Djibouti that carries out surveillance in Somalia and occasionalmissile strikes against individuals there. Several regional and European governments provide training or FGsecurityforces.AotillaofUS,EuropeanUnion,NATO,andregionalnaviespatrolSomaliascoastalwaterstoprotect shipping rom piracy.

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wo decades aer the Somali state collapsed, the country isgripped by a second generation o war that pitches a oreign-backed government deended by a small Arican Unionpeacekeeping operation against a complex insurgency involvingoreign-sponsored, ideologically-driven movements, such as al-Shabaab, and clan-based militia ghting over political power,territory, and the economy. Tis hybrid war is characterized by acombination o conventional military ghting, indiscriminate

violence, criminal disorder, and military engagement by regional

and Western military orces.22

Te growing reach o al-Shabaaboutside Somalia, the inux o oreign ghters, many rom thediaspora, attacks on FG and AMISOM, proclamations o supportor al-Qaeda and a global jihad, and the threat that al-Shabaab isdeemed to present in Western countries has led several countriesto proscribe al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization.

Since February 2010, there have been persistent rumours thatthe FG is preparing a counteroensive to extend its territorialcontrol and authority, backed by Western and regionalgovernments and Somali orces trained by them. Te rumors o anoensive have themselves caused civilians to move romMogadishu.23 Te nature o the war and the political context has

seriously hampered the ability o humanitarian actors to deliverassistance to populations in need in Somalia. Tere has been nosignicant ood distribution since November 2009 to the Agooyecorridor, which has the highest concentration o internallydisplaced in the world. Some argue that the UN, donors, and aidagencies actually need a successul FG oensive to enable them tocontinue operating. Others warn that such a strategy wouldcompound an already disastrous humanitarian situation, and thatthe FG would be incapable o holding onto any territory it gained.

The Humanitarian Crisis

I the intention behind state-building in Somalia has been torestore internal order, the result has been the opposite. Teescalation of violent conict since 2006 has turned Somaliachronic humanitarian crisis into an acute one. Over 18,000civilians have been killed in the ghting since 2006. Te number odisplaced people has risen rom some 500,000 beore 2006 to 1.4million in 2010,26 including two-thirds o the population o the

capital Mogadishu. By December 2009, there were an estimated366,000 displaced people living in the Agooye corridor. BetweenJanuary and March 2010, a urther 169,000 civilians were displacedby ghting and the ear o a government military oensive, thebiggest displacement in six months.27

ens o thousands o people have also ed the country, producingover hal a million reugees in neighboring countries.28 Temajority o these are in Kenya, where Dadaab reugee camp in thenortheast o the country houses over 270,000 Somalis.29 Tis is thelargest reugee camp in Arica and one o the largest settlements oSomalis anywhere in the world.

Somalis are not only eeing the war, but also a livelihoods andood crisis caused by perennial droughts and oods, requenhyperination precipitated by the printing o money and globaood prices, and a downturn in remittances due to the globalrecession.30 Te crisis has escalated dramatically in the past threeyears. In August 2007, 1.5 million people were estimated to be inneed o humanitarian assistance.31 By early 2010, this had risen to3.2 million people, about 42% o the population in Somalia.32 Some75% o those are located in south central Somalia,33 where one in

Somali Red Crescent volunteers distribute relie goods supplied by the ICRC to amilies

displaced by fghting in the Galgadud region o Somalia. ICRC/P. Yazdi


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ve children is malnourished and 19% o under-ves acutelymalnourished, a 2% increase since 2007.34 In some IDP populationsin the Agooye corridor and Galkaiyo in the northeast, acutemalnutrition rates as high as 23.7% have been reported.

Te massive displacement o civilians is a mark o a severeprotection crisis in Somalia. Much o the recent ghting has takenplace in Mogadishu and, according to the International Committeeo the Red Cross (ICRC), urban conict is oen more dangerous

or civilians.35

Several major reports since 2006 have detailed theviolations o international human rights and humanitarian law.36Not only have these been ignored with impunity by the warringparties, but, in the eyes o many Somalis, the lack o response byinternational organizations and oreign states also make themcomplicit, a view that accorded with other analysts.37

The Humanitarian System andDiminishing Access

In the past two decades, the response o the internationalcommunity to the crisis in Somalia has been multiaceted and

oen incoherent. Te imperatives to meet, on the one hand,recurring humanitarian need and, on the other hand, to stabilizethe crisis through state-building, peace-building, or militaryintervention and counterterrorism have oen been in contradictionwith each other. International aid has also waxed and waned,reecting regional and global interests in the country.

In the early 1990s, the international community responded tothe civil war and amine with the rst major post-Cold Warhumanitarian and peacekeeping operation, o an unprecedentedscale. As international interest declined in the second hal o the1990s, so did the aid. Between 1993 and 2000, annual assistanceraised through the CAP ell rom $200 million to less than $50

million.38Humanitarianassistancealsodeclinedasaproportionofoverall aid, as more was expended on rehabilitation and aid wasused as a peace dividend and made conditional on security andgood governance. Consequently, as insecurity persisted in southcentral Somalia an increasing proportion o assistance was spent inSomaliland and Puntland.

Te events o 9/11 provoked a renewed interest and engagementin Somalia, reected in revived levels o aid. In 2000, or example,unding through the CAP was just $36 million. By 2009, this hadincreased to over $500 million (although this was only 60% orequirements), the largest proportion o which was ood aid. 39Development aid was greater than humanitarian assistance, but

the trend towards more investment in the north was reversed. In2004, or example, Somaliland received 37% o aid compared to41% or south central Somalia.40

Currently, the international aid system in Somalia comprises arange o development, humanitarian, and military actors, includingthe UN political ofce, UN technical agencies, donor governments,the EC, ICRC, INGOs, Somali NGOs, and Islamic charities.AMISOM also contributes to aid operations by securing the

Mogadishu port and airport and also provides some limitedhumanitarian assistance. International and Somali NGOs includea spectrum o agencies, rom those solely delivering humanitarianassistance to multi-mandated relie and development agencies andpeace-building organizations.

HumanitariancoordinationinSomaliaisstructuredaroundthInter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the Inter-ClusterWorking Groups (ICWG). Te IASC is the humanitarian policy

body or Somalia that brings together the UN and NGOs. Anotherimportant orum is the NGO Consortium, which has over 60members, both oreign and Somali. All o these coordinationstructures are located in Kenya, rom where the great majority ointernational aid agencies (including those in Somaliland) haveoperated cross-borderprograms sinceUNOSOMswithdrawalin1995. Tis is not only extremely costly (according to some estimatesonly 40% o assistance is actually spent in Somalia) but also meansthat many aid operations are managed remotely rom Kenya.

Tere were reported to be 40 INGOs working in south centraSomalia in 1995 when UNOSOM withdrew. By 1997, there weresome 26 operating in south central Somalia.41 Currently, some 15

international agencies provide assistance there.42

But, since January2010, there have been no international aid workers present insouth central Somalia. Tere are also very ew in Puntland(northeast Somalia) due to a spate o kidnappings in the past ewyears. Most international aid workers located in Somali territoryare in Somaliland.

As Somalis in south central Somalia ace the worst humanitariancrisis in two decades, humanitarian agencies have ound itincreasingly difcult to deliver assistance to them. Indeed, theability o humanitarian agencies to respond to the emergency inSomalia has declined in inverse relation to growing humanitarianneeds. Due to the severe environmental constraints, one leading

humanitarian agency reports that they have changed theirapproach rom needs-based programming to constraints-basedprogramming; that is, they will respond only to those needs whichare easible to address.43 Diminishing access is the main obstacle toeective protection. Tis problem has not been due to a shortage oforeignaid,buttothedisappearanceofhumanitarianspace.44

Te decline in humanitarian access and the erosion ohumanitarian space is a symptom o a changed operatingenvironment that has involved both the rise o militant Islamistmovements in Somalia and the politicization o oreign assistanceAs violence between the UN-backed FG and armed insurgentshas escalated since 2006, the neutrality and impartiality o Somaland international NGOs has not been respected. Aid agenciesthemselves have become increasingly concerned at the way aid hasbeen politicized and instrumentalized by Somali actions, the UNand donor governments. Te delivery o assistance to aectedpopulations in south central Somalia, and Mogadishu in particularis regularly impeded by hostilities and military operations, but acombination o operational and political actors also account orthe erosion o humanitarian space and declining humanitarianaccess.


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Operational Constraints to HumanitarianAction

Violence against Humanitarian Aid Workers

Violence against aid agencies led to a total absence ointernational aid workers in south central Somalia in early 2010.Tere were very ew instances o targeted killings and hostagetakings o humanitarian aid workers in Somalia in the early 1990s,but, since 2006, international and Somali aid workers and theiragencies have been increasingly subject to violence. In 2008,Somalia accounted or two-thirds o aid workers killed worldwide.45In 2008 and 2009, 45 aid workers were killed in Somalia and 24abducted. As o January 2010, ten aid workers were being heldhostage. Te attrition rate has declined since 2008, due to thereduced presence o international UN and NGO sta in southcentral Somalia and stricter security measures.

Te increase in attacks on aid workers is due to several reasons.First, ransoms paid by donor governments or the release o theiroreign nationals have created an internal market or hostage-

taking.46

Although violence against aid workers and agencies hasdeclined since 2009, there has been a reported increase in lootingo the property and assets o humanitarian agencies.47 Tis alsosuggests that attacks on aid agencies are, in some instances,motivated as much by nancial as by ideological interests.

Second, humanitarian aid workers and aid operations havebecome victims o the conict between Islamic militants andcounterterrorism operations o Western governments. In 2008, inresponse to the assassination o the then-leader o al-Shabaab,AdenHashiAyro,byaUSmissileandotherUSairstrikesagainstIslamist orces,48 al-Shabaab accused aid ofcials o collaboratingwith oreign orces and gave notice that they would be considered

legitimate targets in the war. In 2009, threats against agenciesorced two large INGOs to withdraw rom south central Somalia,in one case ending a decade-long ood aid pipeline. Te ood aidpipeline was urther cut when WFP suspended its delivery o oodto south central Somalia, reportedly or a mixture o security andunding reasons (as discussed urther below). Tis has also led tothe suspension o humanitarian air services managed by the UN,urther reducing access or aid agencies.

Tird, attacks against aid workers have been linked to politicalprocesses in Somalia. Te highest number o attacks in 2008occurred at the time o the Djibouti peace talks, a period whensplits occurred within the warring actions and old scores were

being settled. A ourth actor contributing to attacks on aid workershas been the accountability-ree zone49 created in Somalia by thesilence o donor governments and the UN over the human rightsabuses perpetrated by the FG in 2007 and 2008. A h reason isthe lack o political or humanitarian dialogue with groupsproscribed as terrorists, which limits any possibility or reinorcinghumanitarian principles.

Bureaucratic Restrictions on Operations

As Islamist orces have extended their control over territory, aidagencies relations with communities have changed. Instead oworking with known clan institutions and nascent governmentadministrations, agencies need to engage with ideologically-drivenauthorities who have introduced new regulatory procedures oraid agencies. Te rules and their enorcement vary rom onedistrict to the next, but can require agencies to submit lists o sta

and vehicles hired, to obtain travel clearances, and to payregistration ees and taxes.50 Te latter has been a long-termpractice that agencies have had to negotiate over or years withwhatever administration is in charge. Te most difcult places areaccording to some agencies, those where an alliance o actions isincontrol,ratherthanthoseunderal-Shabaabsauthority.Sinc2009, however, the stance o an increasingly hard-line al-Shabaableadership has led to the introduction o more stringent regulationsagainst hiring emale sta, the sharing o compounds, and directcommunication with parties in the community. National sta arealso subjected to increased pressures, and in some cases arethreatened with violence unless they resign rom an agency,51 andin many places, are subjected to systematic taxation.52 It is also

reported that in some places the local community and localemployees o aid agencies are pressured to pay armed groups inorder to allow the agency to continue to operate in theircommunity.53 Tis all requires agencies to engage in time-consuming negotiations to maintain or open access, which candelay the delivery o assistance.54

Checkpoints and axation

Te use o checkpoints to assert territorial control and raiserevenue has long been an obstacle to the delivery o humanitarianassistance in Somalia.55 Islamist authorities have generally beenagainst them. During their brie period o control in Mogadishu

the ICU cleared most checkpoints rom the city, but theseprolierated again aer they were ousted. When the FG took overMogadishu in 2007, there was a prolieration o roadblocks createdby reelance militia. Some 336 were recorded, 15 alone along the 15km. Agooye corridor, where the displaced rom Mogadishu areconcentrated.56 As al-Shabaab has gained territory, they haveremoved most checkpoints, easing the movement o both aid andtrade; livestock traders in Kenya report that transaction costs havediminished because o ewer checkpoints. Te exception isMogadishu, where checkpoints demarcate zones o control by thewarring parties.

Attitudes towards Humanitarian Agencies

Negative attitudes among Islamist authorities towardshumanitarian organizations have aected access and the deliveryo certain types o assistance. Some aid agencies have beenconronted by al-Shabaab over their association with oreigngovernments and their political agendas. Several recipients o USand UN unds were orced to withdraw. Food aid carrying a USag has been barred, while in some places school textbooksdelivered by the UN have been banned. An assertive nationalism is


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apparent in the rhetoric o some al-Shabaab statements. For example,when explaining the rejection o WFP assistance, it declared:

Communities rom South o Somalia should wake upand start helping themselves to avoid dependency onhumanitarian support.57

Some aid workers believe that the negative attitude towards aidagencies is compounded by the multi-mandated nature o those

agencies that do not separate development and advocacy romhumanitarian action and become politically engaged by attemptingto work on the causes o conict as well as responding to itsconsequences. Tey assert that aid agencies with a singular ocuson humanitarian assistance, such as medical care, have been moresuccessul in protecting their access.58 Te evidence or this isdifcult to substantiate. Some orms o assistance, such as medicalcare, may be perceived as less value-laden than education, but, inthe last ew years, medical agencies have experienced threats,attacks, and killings. Other agencies that work in more than onesector and engage in public advocacy have been able to maintainaccess, although care is taken in weighing up the potential impacto advocacy. Te key actor would appear to be the association o

agencies with donor governments and their actions in Somalia,which may mean that agencies that have independent sources ounding are less vulnerable.

Security Management

When UNOSOM withdrew rom Somalia in 1995, the securityarchitecture that had acilitated international aid operations wasdismantled and replaced by a civilian-managed system under theUN Security Coordination (UNSECOORD) (later renamed theUnited Nations Department o Saety and SecurityUNDSS).When UNOSOM ended, many international agencies establishedofces in Nairobi, where, over time, they have also become

bunkered behind elaborate security structures. Since 9/11, thegrowing bureaucratization o security management amonghumanitarian agencieswhich is a worldwide phenomenonhasgiven UNDSS great inuence over humanitarian access. For UNand or donor agencies in particular, it has served to restrict, ratherthan acilitate, access in Somalia. Aer the UNDSS was banned byal-Shabaab rom areas it controlled, WFP stepped in to maintain asecurity service until it too withdrew. Since then, the UN has beenunable to send internationals outside FG-controlled areas.International sta have been able to visit Mogadishu and stay inUN compounds and AMISOM-protected areas, but UNinternational sta have not been able to access the Agooyecorridor or two years.

International NGOs, who have relied on their own securityassessments or those o the NGO Consortium, have been lessconstrained and more able to respond to shiing dynamics andneeds.However,manyhavereliedonUNorECHO(EuropeanCommission Humanitarian Oce) ights to Somalia for theircross-border operation. Since WFP withdrew, these have ceasedying to south central Somalia, so that by March 2010, INGOswere dependent on chartering their own ights.

Remote Management

Te loss o humanitarian space has orced agencies to withdrawrom Somalia or adjust their strategies, rom short-term hit andrun interventions to orms o remote management throughnational sta or local organizations. Remote management (calledshared management by some) involves national sta or locapartners implementing a program managed by international starom the saety o Kenya. Te dependence on local partners has

stimulated a growth in Somali NGOs, which had declined in thelate 1990s. Tis can complicate unding, accountability, andtransparency. It also transers risks to national sta and makes itharder or agencies to ensure that standards o assistance aremaintained.59 But several agencies, including those that wouldnormally insist on the presence o international sta, reporsatisaction with the quality o work o national sta. 60 Some haveconcluded that remote management is likely to become morecommon practice among humanitarian agencies in the uture inenvironments other than Somalia and are taking the opportunityto embrace this way o working and to learn rom the experience.

Political Constraints to HumanitarianAction

einternationalcommunityspreoccupationwithrestoringagovernment in Somalia took on greater urgency aer 9/11, whenunruly, ragile, and collapsed states and territories that weredeemed ungoverned were seen as a principal threat to USsecurity. Since then, international diplomatic and security policyhas ocussed on utilizing available resources and policy instrumentto re-establish a Somali government. In the view o many aidagencies, the erosion o humanitarian space and the operationaconstraints aced by them in Somalia are directly linked to theinstrumentalization o humanitarian assistance to meet this

security agenda, oen at the expense o humanitarian needs. Tishas several aspects: the ailure o donors to hold warring partiesaccountable under InternationalHumanitarian Law (IHL); theintegration o humanitarian assistance with political processes; theuse o aid to support military strategies; the licensing ohumanitarian aid; the centralization o humanitarian unding; thelack o robust humanitarian diplomacy; and the ailures ohumanitarian accountability.

Te Failure o Protection and Erosion oInternational Humanitarian Law

Troughout the twenty years o conict in Somalia, the warring

parties have shown no regard or humanitarian principles andIHL. In recent years, international donors have also failed todemonstrate support for IHL.When erce ghting erupted inMogadishuin2007,reportsbyHumanRightsWatchandAmnestyInternational that detailed repeated violations o humanitarian lawby all parties elicited little response rom international bodies anddonor governments, who were themselves complicit in uelling theghting by backing the FG.61


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Te unbalanced response by the UN and donor governments tothe military action o the parties and lack o regular calls or aceasere is evidence that the international community has takensides in Somalia. International condemnation o assassinations omembers o the government and attacks on AMISOM by theinsurgents is not matched by criticism o the behavior o FG andAMISOM. e latters retaliation has at times involved thecollective punishment o civilians, such as the indiscriminateshelling o Bakara market in Mogadishu.62

Underlying the lack o criticism o the FG is an unwillingnessamong the international bodies and governments that created it asa successor to the NG to accept that it could ail or to conceive oan alternative. Foreign governments and internationalgovernments have need o a government in Somalia or reasons oregional and international security. Te FG is treated as a ullysovereign authority rather than as a transitional administration.Diplomatic resources and oreign aid is tied to it and it provides alegal justication or a continuing oreign military presence inSomalia.

Using Humanitarian Assistance to Support Political Processes

Humanitarian action has been subjugated to Westerngovernmentsprioritiesofstate-building,inpursuitofstabilizationand the war on terror. Since the FG was installed in Mogadishuin January 2007, aid agencies have regularly come under pressurerom the UN and donor governments to support the FG in itsdierent maniestations. In January 2007, ollowing the overthrowof the ICU, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator called onhumanitarian agencies to seize the window o opportunity to re-engage in Mogadishu.63 International NGOs responded by

insisting instead on the need to draw a clear distinction betweenhumanitarian aid and political agendas in Somalia. Te ollowingextractfromanopenlettertotheincumbentUNHumanitarianCoordinator reected the position taken by aid agencies:

Humanitarian aid must be solely based on the needs of

the population and strictly guided by humanitarianprinciples, especially impartiality and independence.One could expect that, given its specic mandate, OCHAand the Humanitarian Coordinator could strengthen thenecessary distinction between humanitarian activitiesand any political agenda.64

In 2008, humanitarian NGOs again resisted attempts by theSpecial Representative o the Secretary General (SRSG)65 toengage humanitarian agencies in support o peace talks betweenthe FG and the opposition Alliance or the Re-liberation oSomalia (ARS); some nonhumanitarian Somali and internationaNGOs did engage.

Humanitarianagencies continue to feel pressure fromdonogovernments to work with the FG, who criticize them or their

unwillingness to engage with political and development agendasIn part, this appears to arise rom the ignorance o donorgovernments in their capitals and the UN headquarters about therealities in Somalia. Most aid agencies, however, have no condenceintheTFGsabilitytocontrolterritory.Moreover,theTFGhasshown no interest in providing assistance to the people it claims togovern. Such collaboration would leave agencies open to attackrom opposition elements. Furthermore, the emphasis on state-building also means that priorities are driven by donor priorities osecurity and reconstruction, rather than humanitarian need. For

A soldier rom the Somalias transitional government pushes back a crowd that awaits much neededmedical treatment on the edge o the Arican Union (AU) peacekeeping military base in Mogadishu.

Siegried Modola/IRIN


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example, while donors und the salaries o MPs, ministers, andassistant ministers, teachers and health workers go unpaid.

Using Foreign Aid to Support MilitaryAction and Stabilization

Since the FG was ormed in 2004, the international communityhas sought to turn the FG into a viable government that controlsterritory and provides security as a bulwark against anti-Western

Islamist orces. Tis has involved supporting the training o FGsecurity orces, backing the Ethiopian intervention, the provisiono weapons66 and training, and support or AMISOM.67 Tere is noaccurate record o the number o FG security orces that havebeen trained since 2004 with international support. Despitecredible criticisms since 2007 o the transparency and accountabilityo such support and doubts about the loyalty o trained orces, theinternational training o FG security orces continues.

Te US government has denied reports68 that it has been directlyinvolved in planning and supporting o an anticipated FGcounteroensive. However, the European Union and someWestern and regional governments have been providing training

to FG orces; in May 2010, Spanish, German, Irish, French, andHungarianmilitarytrainersbegantraining2,000SomalitroopsinUganda on behal o the European Union.69 Furthermore, theSRSG made little secret o his support or a FG militarycounteroensive. In March, he was described as doing eventplanning,briengdonorsontheTFGsplans,andencouragingaid agencies to prepare quick impact projects (QUIPs) to stabilizeand win hearts and minds in areas that would be secured by thegovernment.70 In Somalia, the oensive is also perceived as anAMISOM oensive.71 Securing Mogadishu would be o greatsymbolic as well as practical value and clearly demonstrate theauthority o the FG. Some donor governments also rationalize acounteroensive on humanitarian grounds, that gaining control o

the city and the surrounding region would allow aid to reach manyo the displaced people. At the same time, antiterrorism legislationhas been used to prevent the delivery o assistance to oppositionareas.

With donors providing both military and humanitarian aid, theboundaries between military and humanitarian assistance becomeincreasingly blurred. Some belligerents view aid agencies simply asextensions o Western governments. Al-Shabaab monitorsinternational news and has demonstrated an awareness o therelationship between aid agencies and donor countries. For theirpart, aid agencies are acutely aware o the impact that oreignmilitary support or the FG can have on their access; ollowingUS air strikes against terrorist targets in Dhobley and Dusamarebin 2008, INGO sta were accused o coordinating the airstrikes.European NGOs voice concern about the impact that the trainingo FG soldiers by their governments will have on their operations.As one manager noted, they [al-Shabaab] are looking to nd aultwith us, so it is dangerous or sta and community interaction.72

In 2005, a review was undertaken o how donors were applyingthe Organisation or Economic Cooperation and Development-

Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) Principles orGood International Engagement in Fragile States in Somalia. Itound consensus among donor governments that state-buildingshould be the central objective o their assistance, but no agreemenon a common approach.73 It also concluded that a comprehensiveapproachtotheprincipleofdonoharmwasvital.Howeverthere has never been a comprehensive evaluation o donorhumanitarian and development assistance to Somalia.7

Furthermore, while there are ongoing discussions about the

coordination o humanitarian nancing, there has been no reviewo the extent to which donor governments in Somalia are upholdingthePrinciplesandGoodPracticeofHumanitarianDonorship.7

Given that some donors have become belligerents in Somalia, sucha review is overdue.

Muddying the Waters with For-prots

o urther complicate the situation, USAID tenders or QUIPshave attracted the attention o or-prot contractors and privatesecurity companies, as well as INGOs. Donor unding onontraditional aid actors to undertake developmental and nationbuilding activities has become commonplace in Iraq and

Aghanistan, but is new to Somalia. Te increased number andvariety o organizations involved in delivering assistance increasescompetition, uncertainty, and insecurity. Te or-prot agenciesare not bound by humanitarian principles and their objectives areless ocused on meeting need and more on winning hearts andmindsthroughaidprovision.HumanitarianNGOshaveexpressedconcern that the presence o or-prot agencies could aect locaperceptions o humanitarian actors and that their unprincipledand uninormed behavior could jeopardize the operations andsecurity o already existing programs. I humanitarian principlesare compromised urther in avor o stabilization, some INGOsbelieve that the presence o or-prot contractors will makeSomalia more dangerous or aid workers.76

Te Licensing o Humanitarian Assistance

Perhaps the most challenging development or humanitarianagencies in Somaliaand one that potentially will haveconsequences beyond Somaliais the increased regulation ohumanitarian assistance through more stringent licensing regimesas a consequence o the designation o organizations andindividuals in Somalia as terrorists.

In 2009, US humanitarian assistance to Somalia ell aoul o USdomestic antiterrorism legislation. Over US$50 million o UShumanitarian assistance programmed or Somalia through USAIDand the Ofce or Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) wassuspendedontheordersoftheUSTreasuryDepartmentsOceo Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), out o concern that it was atrisk o beneting al-Shabaab, which had been proscribed by the USgovernment as a terrorist organization.77 US legislation prohibitsany contact with a listed terrorist group, regardless o intentthereby making the distribution o ood to people living in regionscontrolled by such a group impossible.78 Any individual, includingthe USAID Administrator, could, in theory, be held accountable


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or assistance that was diverted by or seen to benet al-Shabaab.Te inormal taxation and diversion o aid that was tolerated bydonors and aid agencies or years as the price o doing businessin Somalia thereore became illegal where those proscribed asterrorists were seen to be beneting.

US-unded humanitarian agencies thereore ace a newconstraint to access in parts o south central Somalia where al-Shabaab has gained control. In order to distribute assistance, they

have to work with local authorities, but by doing so they riskcriminal prosecution under US antiterrorism laws. Tis appliesnot only to the primary contractors but also to sub-contractorsand local partners. Te suspension o USAID impacted particularlyhard on WFP, because the US government was its biggest donorand ood diversion was difcult to stop entirely.

USAID attempted to obtain a waiver or humanitarian assistance,but was reportedly rejected by the US State Department. As oneaid worker remarked, Political considerations outweigh needs.79International agencies have ound the new conditions or grantsdrawn up by USAID with enhanced due diligence practices to beimpossible to work with. One aid worker commented:

It is not possible to work with OFAC unding conditions insouth central Somalia. Whatever group is in control o anarea requires some payback. Te problem arises when they[the US government] say they are a terrorist group.80

eUNHumanitarianCoordinatorhasalsopointedoutthatlisting al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization politicizeshumanitarian assistance,81 because US legislation eectively limitsthe delivery o humanitarian assistance provided by the USgovernment to those populations in areas controlled by its allies.

USAID has long been one o the biggest donors in Somalia and

the main donor to WFP.82 Te suspension o US assistance in 2009thereore le a serious unding gap that threatened to underminehumanitarian relie eorts. In January 2010, while OFACnegotiations were ongoing, WFP suspended ood distributions inmost regions o south central Somalia, reportedly due to escalatingthreats and attacks against its sta and unacceptable demands byarmed groups.83 Al-Shabaab rejected the claim that WFP had leor security reasons or that they had been ordered to leave, assertingthat they had simply asked WFP to purchase grains rom localarmers.84 Subsequently, they did issue a ban on WFP operations inSomalia and warned Somalis working with WFP to terminate theircontracts.85Someaidworkers,however,believeWFPsdecisiontosuspend assistance was the direct consequence o a US governmentstrategy to weaken al-Shabaab:

Te view among Hawks in the [US] administration isthat humanitarian assistance is part o the war economy,and i you cut aid you deprive al-Shabaab o income.Tis is an economic war against al-Shabaab.86

Te status o humanitarian assistance became more precariousin March 2010 when the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia

delivered its report to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Aerinvestigating acts prohibited by UN resolution 1844 (2008) thaobstruct the delivery o humanitarian assistance to Somalia, oraccess to, or distribution o, humanitarian assistance in Somalia,8

the Monitoring Group reported that the diversion o humanitarianaid was uelling a war economy in Somalia. Specically, it reportedto the UNSC that substantial quantities o ood aid delivered byWFP through a cartel o local contractors had been diverted andthatoneofthesecontractorshadlinkstoHizbulIslam,agroup

ghting the FG and proscribed by the US government.88

Inresponse, UN Security Council resolution 1916 in March 2010:

condemned the misappropriation and politicizationo humanitarian assistance by armed groups in Somaliaand called upon all Member States and United Nationsunits to take all easible steps to mitigate such practices.89

Unusually, the resolution requires the UN Resident andHumanitarianCoordinatorinSomaliatoreportevery120daysonthe delivery o humanitarian assistance, to assure the UNSC that iis not being misused or misappropriated or is beneting listedindividuals or entities. Te implication is that i this is not the case

humanitarian assistance could be suspended.

A month later, on April 13, 2010, the US president signed anexecutive order Blocking Property o Certain PersonsContributing to the Conict in Somalia, and introduced sanctionagainst designated individuals considered a particular threat to USinterests. At the same time, the UN designated al-Shabaab as athreat to peace and security in Somalia and urged member states toestablish sanctions against them.90 Te British and Canadiangovernments had proscribed al-Shabaab in early March 2010ollowing similar actions by the Australian, Norwegian, andSwedish governments. Aid agencies are earul the licensing regimeon humanitarian assistance will be urther tightened i

humanitarian assistance becomes subject to the domestic terrorislegislation o these states. Canada has reportedly ollowed the USby suspending urther humanitarian assistance to Somalia, whilethe UK Department or International Development is examiningthe implications or UK humanitarian assistance in Somalia.91 Ithis policy is replicated in Germany and France, EC unding maysimilarly be aected.

Te new regulations on humanitarian assistance have had theaect o eroding humanitarian space and restricting humanitarianaccess.WFPs suspensionof assistancein south central Somaliaaected other humanitarian actors who relied upon it orsupplementary ood and on the UN air services and securityinrastructure it managed. Aid agencies with independent sourcesoffundsarenotdirectlyaectedbydonorssuspendingassistancebut may be indirectly aected by other agencies reducing orceasing operations. O most concern will be the impact on thewell-being o 3.2 million people identied by the UN to be in needof food aid in 2010. WFPs suspension followed the earlierwithdrawal o CARE rom Somalia, leaving ICRC as the onlyagency distributing ood aid in south central Somalia, and in muchsmaller quantities than either agency. Better- than-expected


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harvests in 2010 may oset the loss o ood aid in the short term. Inthe longer term, it may well have serious livelihood and nutritionalconsequences in regions such as Gedo, which depend greatly onood aid. In March, ood prices are reported to have risen and therewere high numbers o children in eeding centers.92 Curbs onunding and the uncertainty o longer-term unds also orced otheragencies to adjust their programs, thus depriving more people oassistance. Oxam reported that they have cut amily rations orchildren attending therapeutic care centers due to the unreliability

o the ood pipeline.94

At the same time, very little assistance is goingto FG-controlled areas because there are ew people living there.

Te restrictions on humanitarian unding are causingconsternation and divisions among aid agencies. While some have

voiced concern that they have become an impediment toindependent humanitarian action, others take the view that donormoney raised rom US taxpayers should not benet anti-Westerngroups.95 Some agencies have responded by opting to negotiatenew contracts with USAID. Others preer to assert theirindependence by not taking US unds, arguing that it is impossibleto work in many areas o south central Somalia without negotiatingwith al-Shabaab commanders and that the urgent needs o the

population outweigh US concerns over collaboration withproscribed groups.96

Humanitarian Funding

HumanitarianagenciesinSomaliahaverarelylackedresources.Available data shows that levels o aid to Somalia since the late1970s have remained consistently high compared with otheremergencies.97 Although the UN consolidated appeals (CAP)have never been ully unded, Somalia between 2000 and 2008 wasamong the top ten recipients o humanitarian aid and has been thesubject o eight CAPs, more than any other country. As noted, thepossibility that donor governments may ollow the examples o US

and Canada in restricting humanitarian assistance to Somalia iscausing uncertainty about uture humanitarian unding.Furthermore, the preerence among donors or pooled undingmechanisms to channel resources to Somaliasuch as theHumanitarianResponseFund(HRF)andUNCentralEmergencyResponse Fund (CERF)makes it more difcult or INGOs toaccess humanitarian unds. Te UN has been consultative in thedesignoftheCHF(CommonHumanitarianFund)but,givenitspolitical positioning, some NGOs question whether they shouldseek unding through UN common unding pools at all. As anINGO member o sta commented:

Are we selling our souls to cover our core costs? I youare a partner with the UN you compromise your rightto say anything.99

Furthermore, as the UN has now designated al-Shabaab as aterrorist organization, NGOs operating in areas controlled bythem may be unable to take unds rom the UN.

Antiterrorism legislation in donor countries also has an impacton other sources o assistance or people in Somalia, including

overseas remittances and assistance rom Islamic charities, thaare, in many respects, more critical or sustaining livelihoods thanhumanitarian aid. In 2001, such legislation was used to reeze theassets o the Somali money transer company Al Barakat and itcontinues to inuence this critical pillar o the economy. In timeso acute humanitarian stress, the ow o remittances rom overseasincreases. But the possibility that remittances could inadvertentlybenet armed groups like al-Shabaab, or be perceived as supportor them, is reportedly making Somalis more cautious in remitting

money to Somalia.

Humanitarian Leadership and Diplomacy

HumanitarianNGOs link theerosion of humanitarian spaceand diminishing access in Somalia to the absence o robusthumanitarian leadership rom the UN to negotiate access andpromote humanitarian principles. Many INGOs would not wantthe UN to negotiate on their behal or ear o association, but theabsence o such leadership rom the UN, they argue, has allowedthe warring parties and oreign governments to manipulate andpoliticize humanitarian assistance.

Others argue that the problem does not lie with the UN, but thatthe nature o the conict in Somalia makes it very difcult topromotehumanitarianprinciples.eHumanitarianCoordinatois not barred rom negotiating with proscribed entities, and theact that the UN in Somalia is not an integrated mission preservessome distance between the UN technical agencies and the UNPoliticalOce.However,thenatureofthebelligerentsandthelack o clear leadership and command and control structures limitthe opportunities or meaningul humanitarian diplomacy. It isunclear that the hard-line leadership o al-Shabaab would haveany interest in dialogue. Tus, according to one UN employee:

In Somalia we are less able to promote principles than

anywhere in the world.100

eUNHumanitarianCoordinatorsroomformanoeuverinnegotiating humanitarian space is constrained by the politicapositioning o the UN. Te stance taken by the UN SRSG inSomalia in the past two years means that the lines between thehumanitarian, military, and political objectives o the UN areblurred. As one aid worker interviewed commented:

Te UN is seen as biased. It is unable to lead onhumanitarian negotiations, side with the humanitariancommunity and advocate or humanitarian principles ina more robust way because o the political process.101

Furthermore, some INGOs argue that the combined ofce oResident and Humanitarian Coordinator does not allow for asufciently clear distinction to be made between the developmentand humanitarian roles o the UN; roles that would become moreblurredifanintegratedmissionweretobeestablished.How,itisasked, can the ofce that supports government security orces beindependent and impartial? INGOs are not convinced by theargument that the belligerents in Somalia do distinguish between


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Some humanitarian aid workers in Somalia bemoan the lack oa basic comprehension o humanitarian principles among aidactors and call or a more robust adherence to the principles to re-establish the distinctiveness and neutrality o humanitarianaction.107However, establishingagreement ona common set ooperational principles among humanitarian agencies hashistorically proven to be difcult in Somalia.108 In the mid-90s, orexample, the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) drew up aCode o Conduct that made security or aid agencies a

precondition or assistance. While the pressure o this may haveimproved conditions in some locations, its application wasinconsistent and it was not sustained by the SACB. Ground ruleswere also developed to ease access negotiations during the 1997oods in Somalia, but were rarely applied. Most recently, agencieshave sought to improve humanitarian access and reinorcehumanitarian principles through agreements on operationastandards. In 2009, the UN produced the IASC Ground RulesAdvisory Note on Practical Considerations or Negotiations as astep towards shared principles on access negotiations in SomaliaHowever,manyINGOswerescepticalaboutcollectiveactionandinstead agreed to a series o red lines beyond which INGOs werenot prepared to continue working in the country.

Tere are two weaknesses with these operational agreementsFirst, they have been negotiated among humanitarian agenciesonly and have not been discussed or agreed with belligerents, whoneed to provide guarantees o acceptance and saety or aid workersin all parts o the country. Second, maintaining the agreements justamong the aid agencies has proven difcult. Te suspension oWFPsactivitiesinsouthcentralSomaliainDecember2009,foexample, provoked a complaint rom the NGO consortium thatWFPsfailuretoconsultwitheithertheUNCountryTeamortheInter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Somalia prior to itssuspension in South/Central Somalia transgressed the mosundamental and jointly agreed operating principlethat o

sharing inormation.109

Lack o Shared Analysis

Te dierent political agendas in Somalia mean there is a lack oshared analysis among humanitarian agencies on the nature o thecrisis and what to do about it. Although the sophisticated analysismapping, and tracking units that exist or Somalia (such as theFood Security and Nutrition Unit) are among the best in anyemergency, it remains hard to gauge the scale o the humanitariancrisis. Agency sta who manage operations remotely rom Nairobrarely visit the country and thereore gain little understanding o it

Tere is general consensus among humanitarian agencies thathe difculty o access is a crucial obstacle to humanitarian actionin south central Somalia. But views dier on how severe theproblem is. UN agencies are largely restricted to government-controlled or allied areas, while INGOs can work in someopposition-controlled areas and endeavor to distinguish theiroperations rom those o the UN. Te number o parties to theconict and the inconsistencies within each group means thatmuch analysis is localized and varies in quality depending on the

the UN political and technical agencies. Some point to the bombingo the UNDP ofces in Somaliland by al-Shabaab in October 2008as evidence that the agency is viewed by Somalis as a politicalplayer.

Te Absence o a Coherent Humanitarian Framework

Te community o humanitarian actors in Somalia is dividedand relations between them can be acrimonious. Tis is not new. It

is debatable whether there has ever been a humanitarian systemor a community o humanitarian actors with shared goals andprinciples. I it did ever exist, then it has dissipated with the globalprolieration o aid agencies in the two decades since the end o theCold Wara period that coincides with the crisis in Somalia.

Aid agencies are split on the need or a coherent ramework andthe means to create one. Some agencies argue or strongercoordination and collaboration, although there is no shortage oormal and ad hoc coordination orums or Somalia. Somehumanitarian actors believe that collaboration and coordinationleave them less vulnerable to manipulation by the warring partiesand donors. Te OFAC issue, or example, is being negotiated on a

bilateral basis by agencies and some argue that the lack o collectivenegotiation weakens the humanitarian community. Otheragencies, however, see eorts to enhance coherence as challengingthe integrity o humanitarian action. Eorts by donors to bringcoherence to the system have created new tensions around thepoliticization o aid.102

International humanitarian NGOs are divided on theirrelationship with the UN. Some have sought to constructivelyengage with it in the belie that it should take a leadership andcoordinating role in humanitarian response. However, thecriticism that the UN has ailed to uphold basic principles oimpartiality and neutrality, the lack o humanitarian leadership,

the unswerving support to the FG, coupled with the impact oUN reorm, have created an adversarial relationship with the UN.Tese INGOs report that they spend more time lobbying the UNrather than working with it and are increasingly choosing to actindependently o it.103 Tey criticize the UN and donors orprioritizing the survival o the FG over humanitarian needs.Consequently, as one aid worker commented:

Te UN or donors never ask what they can do to ensurethat we can keep operating here.104

While they accuse the UN o ailing to hold the FG to account,these INGOs are also criticized by the UN or being insufcientlycritical o antigovernment orces.105

Other INGOs who have their own sources o unds choose toreinorce their neutrality by establishing their distinctiveness andavoiding association with the UN and the numerous coordinationorums that exist.106 Tey preer to undertake their ownhumanitarian diplomacy in Somalia and in the Somali diaspora.


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agency. Some INGOs report that it has become easier to work inal-Shabaab areas; others report that their work is at an all-timelow.110 Agencies have dierent theories as to why some nd iteasier to negotiate access than others, noting such variables as thetype o assistance provided, the level o independence o theagency, the historic relationship with the community, and thequality o sta. Without a shared analysis between the UN andINGOs, the possibilities o identiying common workable strategiesare slim.

Humanitarian Accountability

Tere is a long history o misuse, misappropriation, andobstruction o humanitarian aid in Somalia that dates back tobeore the war.111 In the early 1990s, aidand the intendedbeneciaries o that aidbecame resources that were ought overby rival actions and led to criticisms that humanitarian agencieswere uelling a war economy.112 wo decades later, in March 2010,the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia exposed how oreign aidremains entwined with the conict.113 Investigations by theMonitoring Group concluded that humanitarian assistance hadbeen obstructed by the substantive diversion o ood aid, some o

which had been used to support the eorts o armed groupsopposed to the FG. Te largest Somali NGO in south centralSomalia, which partners with several INGOs, was also accused obeing complicit in the diversion.

Humanitarianagenciesare,again,dividedovertheimplicationsoftheMonitoringGroupsreport.eWFP,theUNResidentandHumanitarian Coordinator, and some INGOshave refuted theaccuracyoftheMonitoringGroupsndingsonthescaleoffoodaid diversion. In March, the Humanitarian Coordinator alsoexpressed concern that the report was adversely aecting ows ohumanitarian assistance and will inevitably make it more difcultto sustain a humanitarian lieline to central and Southern Somalia

at a time when there are increasingly high levels o childmalnutrition.114 Te humanitarian consequences o the suspensiono WFP assistance or the 3.2 million people identied by the UNto be in need o ood aid is yet to be seen. Indeed, it may be difcultto demonstrate impact empirically because numerous variablessuch as remittance ows, ood production, climate, and securitycan positively or adversely aect livelihood vulnerability.

For other humanitarian actors, the Monitoring Group report isa wake-up call or all humanitarian agencies in Somalia, or whileWFP is singled out or investigation, the report raises questionsabout the entire humanitarian system in Somalia. As one aidworker commented:

For NGOs the arms Monitoring Group has broken theshell o presumptive accountability that agencies areoperating honestly in SomaliaIt is incumbent on us toexplain what we are doing.115

Aid agencies dier in their views on the extent to which all ormso aid are diverted and what is acceptable. Some take the view that:

Any agency delivering aid in Somalia has to pay oraccessindirectly through contractors, directly throughextortion, or by commanders taking a cut rom local aidworkers salaries.116

Others are adamant that they rigorously monitor the assistancethat they deliver and do not pay or access. It is likely, howeverthat the UNSC will deal with aid diversion more harshly than it hasdone so with arms ows to Somalia, because humanitarian aid

remains within the control o individual member states o the UNSince the arms embargo on Somalia was established in 1992, it hashad little or no impact on containing arms ows to SomaliaSuspending humanitarian assistance on the grounds o domesticsecurity is much easier. Some humanitarian agencies are thereoreconcerned that the Monitoring Group may have seriously damagedhumanitarian action in Somalia:

Humanitarianism as an abstract concept o compassionis in tatters in Somalia and the Monitoring Group reportis the latest shot at that.117

Conclusions and Recommendations

Te resurgence o conict in south central Somalia since 2006hascreatedoneoftheworldsworsthumanitariancrises.Atthesame time, humanitarian agencies have experienced a catastrophicdeterioration in access. Tis paper has highlighted reasons or thisand some o the challenges and dilemmas aced by the humanitariancommunity.

For two decades, the international community has responded tothe crisis o state collapse and war in Somalia with a mixture odiplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and state-building programsSince 2001, Somalia has oen been described as the next

Aghanistan, being a collapsed state and ungoverned land romwhere militant groups and individuals espousing militant Islamistideology threaten regional and international security. As theinterests o both al-Qaeda and the West in Somalia have grown, itappears that the country is becoming a site where Western militarystrategies and aid policies developed in Aghanistan and in Iraqare being transerred to Arica.118 Counterterrorism andcounterinsurgency strategies combining military orce and aidstabilization packages and the use o or-prot companies todeliver assistance are being deployed in Somalia. Tis has notproven eective in Aghanistan, where there has been no shortageo unding.119 ranserring such template approaches to Somaliawhich takes no consideration o the context and is backed by ewer

resources, seems unlikely to be any more successul.

HavingsponsoredthecreationoftheTFGin2004asSomaliaslegitimate authority, the international community is locked intosupporting it, seemingly at any cost. Primacy is given to securityand transitional issues o recovery and state-building overinternational legal and human rights accountability andprotectiona move that is indicative o a wider policy shi in thecontext o the war on terror. Some governments have become


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belligerents, either through direct military action or indirectlythrough support or FG security orces. Te use o humanitarianassistance to urther political and security agendas is a urthermaniestation o this and suggests that some donors have lost sightof theprinciplesof GoodHumanitarianDonorshipwhichtheysigned up to.

Te with us or against us mentality o the war on terror hasaected the nature o the security threats aced by Somali civic

actors and oreign aid workers, leaving them vulnerable to attacksrom both pro- and anti-FG elements. In response to diminishinghumanitarian space, the UN and INGOs have sought to reafrmthe principles that are seen to underlie their work through agreed-upon operating standards and red lines. But their deence ohumanitarian space is on somewhat shaky grounds.

First, the UN is not perceived as neutral or impartial in Somalia,due to its support or the FG. Second, there are difculties inmonitoring the delivery and uses o aid, and pragmatic solutionsto aid delivery have allowed humanitarian assistance to becomepart o the war economy. Tird, the concept o a humanitarianspace is difcult to operationalize in Somalia, where the distinction

between political, military, and civil actors is blurred, and notionso neutrality and impartiality sit uneasily with espoused ideologies.HumanitarianactorsinSomaliahavebecometargetsofkidnappingand killing, partly because o the resources they control and partlybecause their neutrality and impartiality is not respected. Groupssuch as al-Shabaab are knowledgeable about the national origins oaid agencies and their sources o unding, and, in the eyes o manySomalis, these agencies are linked to the policies o Westerngovernments.

In this context, the biggest challenge to independenthumanitarian action in Somalia is, arguably, the moves towardsgreater regulation and licensing o humanitarian aid by donor

governments. Tis has implications or humanitarian actionbeyond Somalia because it opens the door or increased politicalmanagement o humanitarian aid and its use to urther politicalends. Globally, humanitarian aid has become one o the policytoolsalongside diplomacy, military intervention, and tradethat Western donors can deploy to contain the threat o ragilestates, to transorm conicts, and to establish stability and globalsecurity. In order to deliver assistance to populations in need insouth central Somalia, aid agencies have to negotiate with localauthorities, who, in many places, are allied to antigovernmentforcessuch as al-Shabaabor Hisbul Islam.rough legislation,donors can enorce greater policy coherence. Actions byhumanitarian actors that would previously have been consideredgood eldcra or essential humanitarian diplomacy, involvingsome compromise or the greater good, can be determined to beillegal under some orms o antiterrorist legislation. For aidagencies, the danger in the licensing o humanitarian assistance isthat it removes any pretence o independence. It contractuallybinds agencies into a with us relationship with donorgovernments. Assistance that is policy-driven, rather thanprovided on the basis o need, is no longer humanitarian.

Recommendations

Humanitarian Principles: In Somalia, where humanitarian accessand humanitarian space is being eroded, it is essential thathumanitarian agencies seek to hold a neutral and impartiahumanitarian line. Humanitarian agencies should continue torestate and raise awareness among all actors about humanitarianprinciples and international humanitarian law and work towards aconsensus on humanitarian ground rules. Tese need to be

agreed with the belligerents, not just among the aid agenciesIdeally,UNOCHAmightbeexpectedtotakealeadonthis.Intheabsence o this leadership, humanitarian principles should ormthe basis o individually negotiated local-level access agreements.

Donor governments should reafrm the distinction betweenhumanitarian action on the one hand, and development aid andpolitical engagement on the other, and support the principled andimpartial delivery o humanitarian aid. For this reason, anintegrated UN mission in Somalia should be avoided.

Protection: Civilians are under re by all sides in the conict, asevidenced in their mass displacement. Te imperative to protec

civilians during conict means that every eort should be pursuedto end the armed conict in Somalia through peaceul meansDonor governments and the UN should not be silent on abuses bymilitary orces in Somalia. Tey must apply the same standards toall inrespecttoIHLandbe preparedtocommentonTFGandAMISOM actions that do harm to civilians. Silence by politicaactors reinorces a culture o impunity.

UN leadership: Te humanitarian crisis in Somalia requires stronghumanitarian leadership rom the UN to orge a humanitarianconsensus. For the UN to play this role eectively, there needs tobe a clearer distinction between its political, developmental, andhumanitarian roles. Separating the UN Resident Coordinator and

theHumanitarianCoordinationfunctionswouldbeonewaytocreate this distinction.

Licensing o Humanitarian Aid: Humanitarian assistance toSomalia should be exempt rom sanctions against individuals andentities proscribed by the UN and the domestic antiterrorismlegislation o member states. Proscriptions themselves are a bluninstrument or resolving the crisis in Somalia. Stoppinghumanitarian action to avoid giving succor to such groups risksbeing counterproductive by denying the right to assistance andprotection to hundreds o thousands o civilians in need in Somaliaand strengthening the hands o those being targeted.

Humanitarianactorsneedtodevelopaconsensusaroundtheissue o the licensing o humanitarian assistance in SomaliaEvidence o its humanitarian impact should be monitored and theissue addressed through common advocacy at the UN and indonor capitals.


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18 IRIN, Somalia: UN Calls or Immediate Re-engagement, RelieWeb, January 18, 2007.

19 IRIN,Somalia:DisplacedPeopleBrandedTerroristsbyMogadishuMayor,ReliefWeb,August22,2007.

20 In June 2009, the US government shipped 40 tons o weapons and ammunition to the FG.

21 Eritrea has sponsored and armed opponents o the FG and Ethiopia in Somalia. Al-Shabaab includes oreign jihadistsamong its orces and has received support rom sympathizers overseas, including among the Somali diaspora.

22 United Nations Security Council, Report o the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution

1853 (2008), March 10, 2010, 6.

23 InsecurityandViolence,MayorSuggestsPeopleLeaveMogadishu, http://www.relieweb.in.

24 InterviewwithUNsta,March2010.eAfgooyecorridorisa15kilometerstretchofroadbetweenMogadishuandAgooye town to the southwest.

25 Somalia NGO Consortium, Statement o Concern Regarding an Upsurge in Fighting in Mogadishu (March 19, 2010).

26 UNHCRSomaliaFactSheetMarch2010.

27 IASCSomaliaPopulationMovementTrackingsystem,RegionalUNHCROces.

28 UNHCRBriengSheet,June2010.

29 AlertNet,KenyatoExpandAfricasBiggestRefugeeSettlementUSOcial,April1,2010.

30 Since the state collapsed, overseas remittances have become one o the biggest parts o the Somali economy.

31 FoodSecurityAssessmentUnit,SpecialBriefPostGu07Analysis(Nairobi,August24,2007).

32 Tis estimate was revised downwards due to better-than-expected dyerseason harvests.

33 UNOCHA,UnitedNationsConsolidatedAppeal2010(NewYork/Geneva,2010).

34 Ibid.,15.

35 http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.ns/html/violence-interne-240708.

36 HumanRightsWatch,Shell-Shocked:CiviliansUnderSiegeinMogadishu(August2007);AmnestyInternational,Routinely argeted Attacks on Civilians in Somalia (May 2008).

37 ChrisTomlinson,EUComplicitinSomaliWarCrimes,Te Independent, April 7, 2007.

38 UNDP,SomaliaHumanDevelopmentReport(Nairobi,2001),119-120.

39 UN Consolidated Appeal or Somalia (2009), 15.

40 see SACB (2004) Donor Report (Nairobi),145-148.

41 See Bradbury and Coultan, Somalia Inter-Agency Flood Response.

42 Interview with NGO consortium, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2010.

43 Personal communication, June 2010.

44 S.Hansch,CrisisReport:Somalia,ineHumanitarianResponseIndex2009(2010),1.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 In February 2010, or example, al-Shabaab administrations are reported to have looted aid agency assets in Baidoa andWaajid. OCHA Weekly Humanitarian Bulletin 12-19 February 2010, issue 7.
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Documents

State-building, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia