StateIdentityDisjunctureandthePoliticsofTransitionalJustice:TheCaseofRussia

PaperpreparedfortheCEEISA-ISAJointConference,2016,Ljubljana

PanelSB01:ThePointwherethePendulumStops:RevisitingIdentity(Politics)inIR

June25,2016,11:00am-12:45pm

DrMariaMälksoo

SeniorResearchFellowinInternationalRelations

JohanSkytteInstituteofPoliticalStudies

UniversityofTartu,Tartu,Estonia

maria.malksoo@ut.ee

Workinprogress.Pleasedonotquoteordisseminate.

Abstract:

Theemergingglobalnormativeexpectationsrelatedtothestates’dutytocometotermswiththeirviolentlegacies present unique challenges to the sustenance of their continuous sense of ‘self’. This paperunpacksontologicalsecurity-seekingasagenericsocialmechanismininternationalpoliticswhichallowstoconceptualisetheconnectionbetweenstate’stransitionaljustice(TJ)andforeignpolicies.Itutilisestheexampleofpost-SovietRussia’slimitedpoliticsofaccountabilitytowardstherepressionsofitsantecedentregimeinordertoilluminatetheroleofhistoricalmemoryintheontologicalsecurity-seekingstrugglesofstatescaughtbetweentheliberalpremisesoftheglobal(ising)normofTJandtheirquestforsustainingstatusasagreatpower,regardlessofthemismatchbetweenthetraditionalandcontemporarynormativeconnotationsattachedtoit.Withsimultaneouspressuresonrevisingitsspatialandmnemonicvisionofitself,Russia’spost-Soviet,andparticularlyPutin-era,politicalhandlingofthecommunistpasthasbeenmarked by the desire to establish mnemonic security rather than embrace reflexively a range of TJmeasures.Thishashadpalpableimplicationsforthecountry’spoliciesandpracticesinthepost-Sovietneighbourhoodand international society at large.Howcanwe study theway(s)Russia’s idiosyncraticapproachtowardsTJhasproducedpreconditionsforthecountry’sinternationalaction?Thepaperputsforthanovelmethodological framework forunderstanding the linkbetweenstate’sapproachtoTJathomeanditspursuanceofspecificnotionsoforderandjusticeininternationalpolitics.

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1. ConcatenatingTransitionalJustice(TJ)andForeignPolicy(FP)

Transitional justice (TJ) isan interdisciplinaryapproach to redressingpasthuman rightsviolationsandinternational crimes in thepost-conflictorpost-authoritarian/-totalitarian setting throughavarietyofjudicialandnon-judicialmeansofaccountability,rangingfromtrialstotruthcommissions,reparationsandinstitutionalreform.Thecross-disciplinarytheoryandpracticeofTJisamajortopicinInternationalRelations(IR),InternationalLaw(IL)andComparativePolitics(CP).Yet,thelackofsystematicattentionon the connection between states’ (non-)adoption of particular TJ measures domestically and theirforeignpoliciesremainsaglaringoversightinmainstreamscholarship.Thisisespeciallyproblematicforanalysing the international behaviour of the Russian Federation (RF)whose coming to termswith itscommunistpasthasbeencomplicatedbytheconflictingdemandstheantecedentregimehaspresentedforstatecontinuityandthestabilityofitsself-conceptafterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion.Thefactthatthe sources of Russia’s sense of ontological security and insecurity are located in the same temporalbackdrophashadfundamentalimplicationsforitsforeignpolicydiscourseandpracticeinthepost-ColdWarera.Thescholarshiphasfailedtograspthesignificanceofthisconnection,remainingill-equippedandscatteredbetweendistinctdisciplinesforitscomprehensivestudy.

Atatimeofthepost-ColdWarnadirinRussia’srelationshipwiththeWest,itismostpertinenttoturntotheperennialproblemofthesourcesofRussia’sinternationalbehaviour.ThispaperfocusesonRussia’spolitical handlingof its communistpast inorder todeterminehow its idiosyncratic approachtowards transitional justice (TJ) has produced preconditions for the country’s international action,enablingcertainpoliciesandpracticesintheimmediateneighbourhood,aswellasininternationalsocietyatlarge.Inspiteofseemingaffinitieswiththeresearchagendafocusingontheimpactoftheideationalfactors in thedecision-makingofstateactorsand in theiractual foreignpolicybehaviour, thepresentresearchseekstounderstandwhycertaindevelopmentsinRussia’spost-communistTJpoliticshavetakenplaceinthefirstplace,aswellashowtheongoingdevelopmentoftherespectivepoliciesrelatestothedynamicsofforeignpolicydiscoursesandpracticesoftheRussianFederation(cf.Guzzini2012b:48).MyultimateaimistoteaseouttheinternationalimplicationsofRussia’spost-communistpoliticsoftruthandjustice-seeking(cf.PettaiandPettai2015),askingwhich(perceived)threatsRussiahastriedtostaveoffby its limited application of TJmeasures. How has ‘coming to termswith the communist past’ beenunderstoodinRussiainthecontextofthecountry’spost-communisttransition?HowhasTJrepertoirebeenapplied–ornotappliedinpost-communistRussia;whyso,andtowhateffectandresonanceforthecountry’sforeignpolicydoctrineandpractice?Thepuzzleforthisstudythusconcernsthemeaningandfunctionofstate’sreckoningwiththeantecedentregime’shumanrightsviolationsonitsforeignpolicydiscourseandpractice.

WhilekeepingtheempiricalgazefirmlyonRussia,mycentralaspirationwiththispaperis,infact,methodological – and thereforemore limited in generatingactual empirical answers to thequestionsdriving the broader research project this paper forms a preliminary part of. I seek to specify therelationshipbetweenstate’sadoptionornon-adoptionof(acoresetof)TJmeasuresanditsinternationaloutlook and foreign policy. This is, admittedly, a very ambitious aim, not short of clarifying a causalrelationshipbetweenthetwopolicies,whiletheoverallknowledgeofthestate-leveleffectsofTJhasbeendescribedas‘insufficient’(Thomsetal.2010).Nonetheless,thispaperattemptstolookevenfurther,byinvestigating the links between state’s TJ and foreign policies, and proposing a novelmethodologicalframeworkforstudyingthisallegedconnection.Atthisphase,Russiaprovidesageneralempiricalcontextformydiscussion,whereasthesystematicempiricalanalysisaccordingtotheanalyticalmodelproposedinthispaperremainsyettobeundertakeninduecourse.

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ThemethodologicalframeworkputforthheredrawsonthreewhalesinIRtheory:MiljaKurki’sAristoteliandeepenedandbroadenedunderstandingofcause(Kurki2008);StefanoGuzzini’sinterpretiveprocesstracing(Guzzini2012),andNedLebow’saccountofinefficientcausation(2014).Specifically,thispaperunpacksontologicalsecurity-seekingasagenericsocialmechanismininternationalpoliticswhichallowstoproductivelyconceptualisetheconnectionbetweenstate’sTJandforeignpolicies.Itutilisestheexampleofpost-SovietRussia’slimitedpoliticsofaccountabilitytowardstherepressionsofitsantecedentregimeinordertoilluminatetheroleofhistoricalmemoryintheontologicalsecurity-seekingstrugglesofstatescaughtbetweentheliberalpremisesoftheglobal(ising)normofTJandtheirquestforsustainingstatusasagreatpower,regardlessofthemismatchbetweenthetraditionalandcontemporarynormativeconnotationsattachedtoit.Developinganovelanalyticalframeworkinordertoexplainhowontologicalsecurity-seekingactuallyworksininternationalpolitics;howitrelatestomajortransitionsandconsequentstateidentitydisjuncture,aswellasstate’spoliciesoftruthandjusticeseeking,andwithwhatkindofresonanceforitsforeignpolicies,isthecoreaimofthispaper.

Thisisimportantaslongasontologicalsecurity(OS)theoryinIRremainsstillrelativelyschematictodate(Browning2016).OSperspectiveunderscorestheintimaterelationbetweenstateidentityanditssenseofsecurity(Mitzen2006;Steele2008;seealsoGiddens1984,1991;Huysmans1998).Accordingly,statesnotonlyseekphysicalsurvival,butimportantlyalsothestabilityandcontinuityoftheiridentities(or ‘selves’).1 The realm of dangers to the state’s existence hence also includes normative threats asspecific kind of transgression besides physical violations (Creppell 2011), generating the tendency toprotect one’s mnemonical self-narrative internationally, along with the pursuance and defence of aparticular normative order (Mälksoo 2015a). Retaining a sense of continuous state identity becomesparticularlyacute inperiodsofpolitical transformation, suchas in transitions fromnon-democratic todemocraticregimesorfromthesuppressionbyaforeignpowertoself-government.Russia’slong-timereluctance to systematically reckon with its antecedent regime’s repressive legacy is, against thatbackdrop,consistentwithitsattemptstosustainthebasicstabilityofapositivesenseofitsnationalandinternational ‘self’.TheextentofadoptedTJmeasuresandtheanalysisofaccompanyingpoliticalandpublicdebatesthusenabletoshedlightontheissueofwhatkindofsubjectRussiawantstobe.

Astheanalyticalmodelproposedinthispaperisdeeplycontextual,somecontextneedstobeprovidedbeforeitsproperintroduction.IwillsubsequentlyoutlinetheprevailingargumentonTJasanemergingglobalnorm.Whilethislineofthinkinghasbeenprevalentinthepost-conflictapplicationsoftheTJrepertoire,theapplicabilityofsuchunderstandingonthecaseofpost-communistRussiawillberelatedtotherecentdebatesonsocialisation/stigmatisationdynamicsinIRtheory(FinnemoreandSikkink1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Simmons 2009; Hafner-Burton 2013; Posner 2014; Zarakol 2011, 2014;Adler-Nissen2014).Thereafter,Iwilltakestockoftheexistingattemptstoconceptualisetherelationshipbetween TJ, memory politics, and foreign policy in comparative politics and international studies,indicatingthelimitationsandblindspotsinthecurrentliterature.Thenextsectionoffersabriefoverviewof Russia’s post-communist record of TJ, using Pettai and Pettai’s (2015) three temporalities of post-communisttruthandjusticeseeking–thatis,transitional,retrospectiveandpost-transitionaljustice–asananalyticalguideline.UnderstandingTJasaliminalrite,IdiscussthepotentialofthenotionofprotractedliminalityformakingsenseofRussia’spost-communistpredicamentinthefield.Thesebuildingblocksinplace, I delineate a methodological model for studying the link between Russia’s post-communistapproach(es)toTJanditsforeignpoliciesinanumberofkeyareas,allegedlymostaffectedbyitspolitical

1Notethatininternationallegalsense,stateidentityandcontinuityhaveanidenticalmeaning.SeeMarek(1954)andCrawford(2007).

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handlingof thecommunistpastathome.Specifically, these includeRussia’s relationswiththe formerSoviet satellites and subjugate states; Russia’s international politics on human rights and stateresponsibilityanditshistoricaljusticediscoursespursuedinvariousinternationalfora(suchastheUN,CouncilofEuropeandtheOSCE).Theultimateaimofthebroaderstudythispaperlaysthegroundworkfor is to explain both Russia’s mnemopolitics-laden international behaviour (or practices) and theoutcomes(orimplications)ofthechoicesmadebytheactorsobserved.

2. TJasaLiminalRiteandanEmergingGlobalNorm(ativeDuty)

What is generally being referred towhen talking about ‘transitional justice’? Towhat extent has‘comingtotermswithone’spast’becomerecognisedintersubjectivestandardofappropriatebehaviourin international society?Which systemicbackground factorsare important to take intoaccountwhentacklingRussia’spositionvis-à-vistheallegedlyemergingglobalnormofTJ?

Originallyemergedas‘handmaidentoliberalpoliticaltransitions’andincreasinglyassociatedwithpostconflictpeacebuildingandreconciliationmoregenerally(Sharp2014:1),TJisaquintessentialriteofcollectivepassage.InherTJgenealogy,RutiG.Teitelassociatedit‘withperiodsofpoliticalchange’,aimedat ‘confront[ing] thewrongdoingsof repressivepredecessor regimes’ (2003: 69).According to a2004report by the then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, TJ comprises ‘the full range of processes andmechanisms associatedwith a society’s attempts to come to termswith a legacy of large-scale pastabuses,inordertoensureaccountability,servejusticeandachievereconciliation’(UNSecGen2004:3).Alongthedimensionsofcriminal,politicalandsymbolicjustice,themechanismsandreckoningpracticesofTJ includecourttrialsagainst formerdecision-makers, lustrationpolicies (that is,banningof formerofficialsandsecretagents fromoccupyingpublicpositions in thenewregime),public identificationofformeragents,enablingaccesstopreviousregime’ssecretfiles,rehabilitationandrestitutionpoliciesvis-à-visvictims,andvarioussymbolicmeasures(suchastheestablishmentoftruthcommissionsandstate-sponsoredmemorycollection,government-fundedmuseumsandotherhistoricalresearchinstitutions,victimorganisationsandreconciliationprogrammes,rewritinghistorytextbooks,variousmemorialisationinitiatives,officialapologiesandcondemnations).AstheprocessofTJpertainstofracturingandchangingidentitiesand the transgressionofboundaries in thecourseof re-gearing thecommunities fromtheirviolentlegacies,beitinthecourseoftransitioningfromundemocratictodemocraticregimeorfromwartopeace,supposedlyleadingtothehealingandreconciliationofasociety,itisariteoftransitionofitsown kind. The toolkit of TJ is indeed symbolically charged as trials, truth commissions andmemorialisations‘notonlyenactliberalidealsandsubjectivitiesbutalsosignifyapurificationofthesocialbody,whichissymbolicallymovedfromacontaminatingstateofconflictandilliberalismtoaconditionofliberaldemocraticpurity’(Hinton2010:8).EspeciallyforthedemocratictransitionsinEasternEuropeandLatinAmericaWesternliberalmarketdemocracyhasbeendeemedasanendpointofthetransitioninquestion(Sharp2013).TJishencenotonlyaboutconfrontingaviolentornondemocraticpast,butalsoa‘symbolicresourcelegitimating,directing,andconsolidatingdemocratictransitionprocesses’(Fein2005:216).Akintotheritesofre-aggregationorincorporationinthetheorisationsofliminality(seevanGennep1960;Turner1969),TJaimstoleadtothedelineationoftheviolentpastinawaythatincreasesthesocialcohesionofthefracturedsocietyaswellaslegitimatesthepostconflict/post-authoritariangovernmentthatinitiatedtheTJprocess(Osiel1997).

OnlyinrealityTJishardlyaslinear.AlthoughliberaldemocratictransitionsimplicitlyconstitutetheparadigmatictransitionofTJ(Teitel2000:5;McAuliffe2011),theunderstandingoftransitionbasedonateleologicalviewofhistorywhereofwesternliberaldemocracyconstitutestheend(cf.Fukuyama

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1992)isempiricallynotaccurate(Sharp2014:7).Forinstance,‘TJ’labelhasbeenappliedtocontextsthatdo not involve liberal political transition (Rwanda, Chad, Uganda, Ethiopia), or no significant politicaltransitionatall (Kenya,Colombia),orto liberalwesterndemocraciesthathaveusedcertainmeasuresfromtheTJtoolkit(Australia,Canada)(ibid.).Inexplicitterms,mostdefinitionsofTJactuallyleavethesupposedendpointoftransitionsunspecifiedandthequestionsofwhenandhowthetransitionreallyendsorwhodefinestheendoftransitionunanswered(Karl2014:733;Roht-ArriazaandMarieqcurrena2006:1).Indeed,untiltherecentintroductionofamorerigidtemporalcriteriabyPettaiandPettai(2015),therehasbeenhardlyanyclarityamongscholarsandpractitioners‘astowhetherthereisorneedstobeaboundedconceptof„transition”duringwhichtransitionaljusticeapplies’(Bell2009:23-24).ExploringtheTJprocesstowardsthedisappearedinMexico,Karlhasthustakenittobeanunfinishedriteofpassage(2014: 733). She builds uponHinton’s (2010) earlier adoption of liminality in analysing TJ as a rite ofpassageinthephasebetweenanoldandnewstatusofsociety.Karl’sapproachisvictim-centric,enablingonly thevictimsofviolencetodefinetheendpointof transitionor tomeasurewhenanewstatusofintegration(inaritual theorysense)hasbeenachievedandthe justiceestablished.TakingadiversionfromthebulkofliteraturethatregardsTJasaliberalgoalwithauniversaltoolkit,Karlemphasisestheconflictivecharacterofthetransitoryphasewherebyemergingconflictsandfrictionbecome‘expectedoutcomes’(Karl2014:734).SheconcludesthatintheMexicancasetheglobaldiscourseofTJwasonlyaninstrumentalisedpartofpolitical rhetoricof change, serving to legitimise thenewpowerholders andleavingthegoaloffoundingjustandpeacefulsocietyunachieved(ibid:744-745).Indeed,thelegalisticveneerofTJdoesnotchangethefactthat‘veryrealpowerdynamicsandcontestedpoliticalchoices[are]at the heart of any set of transitional justicemechanisms’ (Sharp 2014: 7). Speaking of justice in thecontextoftransitionitisthereforepertinenttokeepinmindRosemaryNagy’squestion,‘when,towhomand for what transitional justice applies’ (Nagy 2008: 279). Consequently, transition could be fairlyconceptualisedinabroaderwaythanaliberalpoliticalmouldwouldpresume(seeSharp2014:8).

Aswesee,theterm‘transitionaljustice’hasbeenambiguousfromitsinception,leadingtothreedevelopmentalaccountsof thephenomenon,rangingfromTJashumanrightsto itsunderstandingasconflictresolutionandinternationalintervention(Bell2009:15).Inregardtotheincreasinglyscatteredattempts todelimit therespective field,ChristineBellhassuggestedtoviewTJ ratheras ‘acloakthatcovers a rangeofparticularizedbargainson thepast’ (ibid.).According to this view, TJ is increasinglydelivered ‘not throughoneholisticmechanismbut througharangeof institutionalvehicles thatoftenoperatesimultaneouslywithoutaclearlegalhierarchy(ibid.:19).Inherrecentstock-takingexerciseofthedevelopmentofthefieldbyitsoriginalname-giver,RutiG.Teitelalsorefutestheideathattherecanbeonerightresponseindealingwithastate’srepressivepast,mostsupportiveofalastingdemocracy(Teitel2014:103).Instead,states’approachtoTJispoliticallycontingent,regardlessofthepresenceofaparadigmatic transitional response in the law (ibid.). Teitel nonetheless points at the emergence of a‘global’paradigmofTJwhereintheproblemofjusticeisbeingreconceptualisedthroughglobalpoliticsofaccountabilitywhichisnotpresumedonaclearorconsolidatedpoliticaltransition(ibid.:xiv).Accordingly,TJhasbecome‘normalised’,departingfromtheoriginal1980s’transitionsassociatedwithjustice-seekingforexceptionaltimesandincreasinglydisassociatedfromthepoliticsoftransition(ibid.).

TodayTJdiscoursehasgainedglobalnormativeproportionsand itsmechanismshavebecomeincreasinglyinstitutionalisedasgeneralobligationsofaccountabilityforthepast,requiredasamatterofconstitutional2and/orinternationallaw(ibid.:181;seealsoBen-YosefHirsch2014).TheUnitedNationsendorsesthe‘righttothetruth’,affirmingthat‘[e]verypeoplehastheinalienablerighttoknowthetruth

2Understoodbroadlyas‘thesetoffundamentallegalandpoliticalnormsandpracticesthatareconstitutiveofthepolity’(Teitel2014:181).

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about past events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and about the circumstances andreasons that led, throughmassive or systematic violations, to the perpetration of those crimes’ (fordiscussion,seeBen-YosefHirsch2007).3Measures,suchastruthcommissions,havespreadworldwideand become institutionalised at the international level and bymajor non-governmental organisations(e.g.,AmnestyInternational,HumanRightsWatch,InternationalCenterforTransitionalJustice)(seeBen-YosefHirsch2014foradetailedaccount).Butwhatarethepolicyimplicationsofsuchanemerginggeneralobligationofaccountabilityforthepastforindividualstatesthen?

LeadingconstructivisthumanrightsscholarsMarthaFinnemoreandKathrynSikkinkhaveofferedaconcisesocialconstructivistdefinitionofanormas‘astandardofappropriatebehaviourforactorswithagivenidentity’(FinnemoreandSikkink1998:891).Forthem,normsimplyamoralobligation,makingthemdistinct fromother kindsof rules. Yet, according to this constructivist view,whilenorms createpermissive conditions for action or constrain behaviour by offering standards of judgement and thepossibilityofdisapprovalorcondemnationbyotherstates,theydonotdetermineaction:they‘enable’ratherthan‘ensure’aparticularbehaviour(Finnemore1996:157-158).Normsnonethelessdomorethanregulatebehaviourbyalsomoulding the identitiesofactors,defining social roles,andshapingactors’understandingsoftheirinterests(FinnemoreandSikkink1998:913).Accordingly,aconvincingargumenthas been made that leaders’ legal justifications regarding particular international norms and theirfavouredprinciples‘cannotbedivorcedfromwiderconceptionsofposition,status,andrecognitionwithintheinternationalsystem’(Allison2013:10).

Contrary to Risse and Sikkink’s famous socialisation model for understanding the domesticadaptationandinternalisationofinternationalnorms(seeRisseandSikkink1999),AyşeZarakol(2014,2011)hasputforthapersuasiveargumentforfiguringoutbothnorm-complianceandnorm-rejectionbynon-Westernstates(includingRussia)throughthedynamicofstigmatisation instead.Accordingtoheraccount, modern international society has been fundamentally shaped by stigmatisation as non-Westernersallegedlyjoinedthesystematadisadvantage(regardlessoftheirformallycolonisedstatusinhistory)withmajorconsequencesfortheirmodernnationalnarrativesandstateidentities(Zarakol2014:312-313; cf. Epstein 2012). In case of stigmatisation, or the ‘internalisation of a particular normativestandardthatdefinesone’sownattributesasundesirable’(Zarakol2014:314),theresponseofthenorm-taker‘ismuchmorelikelytobefailedattemptsatcorrection,overcompensation,orastubborndenialthataproblemexists’(ibid.:317).Consequently,thepropositiontoexamineindepthtowhatextentthenormofTJisactuallysharedbyRussia(asastateaswellassocietally)ispremisedontheideathatthewayRussiahasbeenbroughtintotheframeworkofthenormativeexpectationsassociatedwithcomingto termswithone’s past hasmajor repercussions for its perceivedplace andposture in internationalsociety.ExaminingRussianperceptionsofthelegitimacyoftheTJnormshouldthereforeshedlightonitsbroaderinternationaloutlookonissuesasvariedashumanrights,4 individualaccountability5andstateresponsibility and the pursuance of ideas of ‘historical justice’ in various international formats. Theenthusiastic policy predictions of the preachers of the logic of (legal) appropriateness in IR shouldaccordinglybetemperedwithamorepragmatistemphasisonthestates’logicofconsequences(SnyderandVinjamuri2003/2004:40).Accordingly,insteadof‘supplantingthenormofsovereigntyandbolstering

3AnnieBirdpointstotheevenmorecomprehensiveapproachtoTJlaidoutinSwissForeignAffairsDepartment´sholisticframeworkfor‘DealingwiththePast’,involvingthe‘righttoknow’,‘therighttoreparation’,‘therighttojustice’,anda‘guaranteeofnon-recurrence’(seeBird2015:23).SeealsoDeBaets(2016)andRikka(2014).4TheRussianFederationratifiedtheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(ECHR)in1998.

5AsembodiedintheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC).RussiaisnotastatepartyoftheRomeStatuteoftheICC.

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thenormofhumanrightsandindividualaccountability,thenormofjusticehasmutatedindirectionsthatrecognizetherightofstates,especiallypowerfulstates,toexertcontroloverthetermsofjustice’(ibid.).

Yetanotherqualificationisinorderwhenexaminingtheadoptionoftheglobal(ising)normativedutyofTJinRussia.AsRoyAllison’s(2013)importantstudyofRussia’sapproachtomilitaryinterventionandthenormofResponsibilitytoProtect(R2P)hasdemonstrated,thegloballevelofanalysisneedstobejuxtaposedwiththeobservationoftheregionaldynamicsofaparticularnorm.Besidestheexplorationofemergingglobalstandardsofconduct(andtheircontestationthereof),itisalsoessential‘toconsiderthewaymajorstates’commitmenttoglobalstandardsmaybeinfluencedbystandardsofconductdefinedwithinandforaregion’ (ibid.:18-19).That is, statesmightwishtokeeptheirownregionalorder inadifferentregisterasfarastheparticularnorm’sglobalexpectationsandrestraintsareconcerned(ibid.:19).AsAllisondemonstrates,Russia’srhetoricoverglobalprinciplesofsovereigntyandnon-interventionis only selectively applied in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) regional order (ibid.).MoscowhasofteninterpretednormsdifferentlywhenappliedtotheCISregionalsetting(ibid.:216).Thisresonates furtherwith Ben-Yosef Hirsch’s studies on the ideational change in the content of a normfacilitating its emergence as international norm (Ben-Yosef Hirsch 2014, 2007). I take cue from hersuggestion thatwhen studying international norms,we should focus on ‘uncovering changes as theyoccur’, inorder tooffer ‘abetterunderstandingof theactualprocesses throughwhich the ideationalnormativeandinternationalenvironmentisshaped’’(Ben-YosefHirsch2014:825).

Withthesecaveatsinmind,wouldwenotbebetteroffanalysingRussia’spoliticalhandlingofitscommunistpastthroughtheperspectiveofthepoliticsofmemoryratherthanthatofTJ?Afterall,whilelegalnormsandargumentationarguablycontinuetobecentraltoTJasafield(Bell2009:23),Russia’srecordincriminal-judicial,6butalsopolitical-administrativemeasures7adoptedvis-à-vistheperpetratorsofthehumanrightsviolationsofitsantecedentregimeisatbestscant.NanciAdlerevenlaments,inherentry on Russia in the comprehensive Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice, that ‘the post-Sovietgovernmentshaveimplementednoneoftheknownand/orinstitutionalizedjusticemechanisms’(Adler2012a:406).Russia’schosenTJmodelhasindeedbeenaimedatimpunityratherthanaccountabilitywhileitsstanceonvariouskindsof‘Nazis’,pastandpresent,isstronglypunitive(cf.Bell2009:23-24).Ifindacompromiseterm-thepoliticsoftruthandjustice’(cf.BarahonadeBritoetal.2001)-ofconsiderableanalyticalvalueintheRussiancontext.Eva-ClaritaandVelloPettaihaveutilisedthisterminordertokeepthefocuson‘thestruggleswagedbypoliticalandsocialactorstoinfluencetherolethestateplays(a)insettingprevailingtruthdiscoursesaboutanon-democraticpastand(b)inpassingmeasurestoenactsomeinterpretationofjusticeinrelationtothispast’(2015:4).Ilargelyconcurwiththeircriticismabouttherelative vagueness of the politics of memory as a broad field encompassing the activities of variousmnemonicactors,withdifferentabilitiestoinfluenceandshapepublicperceptionsofthepastandleavetheirimprintonthestate’srespectivepolicy-makingprocess(ibid.:6).Eventhoughthereisconsiderableoverlapbetweenthepoliticsoftruthandjusticeseekingandwhatisgenerallyreferredtoasthepoliticsofmemory/mnemopolitics,thelatteralonewouldnotenabletoexplicitlyexaminetheaspectofjustice(beithistorical,criminal,politicalorsymbolic)inthepoliticalhandlingofastate’spast,bothdiscursivelyandpracticallyunderstood.ThatiswhyIhavechosentoalternatebetweenthenotionsof‘thepoliticsoftruthandjustice’,‘thepoliticsofTJ’and‘thepoliticalhandlingof/dealingwiththecommunistpast’ratherthanusethesignificantlybroaderandlessconcise‘politicsofmemory’inthecontextofpost-communistRussia.

6 Seeboxes1aand1binPettaiandPettai’smatrixofpost-communisttruthandjustice(2015:32). 7 Seeboxes2aand2binibid.

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3. TJandFP:StateoftheArt

Whatisthenatureoftheconnectionbetweenhistoricalmemory,TJandforeignpolicy?HowdounderstandingsandpoliticsofTJconditionparticularforeignpolicydiscoursesandpractices?DoesthechoiceofadoptedTJmeasuresentailspecificconceptionsofstate-societyrelationshipandstateidentityintheinternationalsystem?HowhasRussia’sversionofpost-communistTJproducedpreconditionsforthe country’s international action? In particular, how has Russia’s state identity disjuncture with thecollapseoftheSovietUnioninfluenceditswayof‘comingtotermswith’itsSovietlegacy–andtowhicheffectforitsforeignpolicyinthepost-Sovietera?

TheseareresearchquestionsthathavenotpreviouslybeenaddressedinasystematicmannerintheexistingliteraturesonRussia’sreckoningwithitscommunistpast,states’adoptionofaparticularsetofTJmeasuresandtheimplicationsfortheirinternationalbehaviourthereof.Myinterdisciplinaryframingof theresearchsubjectseeks tobring together thecurrentlydisconnected (andgenerally legal issues-oriented)scholarshiponTJ,criticalIRperspectivesaccountingforthecentralroleofhistoricalmemoryinRussia’s contemporary international predicament (e.g., Neumann 2013;Morozov 2015), and practicalforeignpolicyanalysis.WhiletheimpactofhistoricalmemoryontheinternationalbehaviourofGermanyandJapaninparticular,hasbeenanalysedinextensivedetail(e.g.,Berger2012;LangenbacherandSchain2010; Lind 2008; Buruma 1994), a comprehensive exploration of the Russian case remains yet to bewritten. This is a costly omission for ‘memory is clearly crucial to understanding the case of Russia’sinternational politics’ (Neumann 2013: 24). Yet, there has not been sufficient theoreticalconceptualisationofthemechanismsthathavedrivenandcontinuetodriveRussia’sidiosyncraticpoliticstowards TJ, nor their wider international implications. Generally, post-Soviet Russia remains just afootnoteintheburgeoningfieldofTJ.RussiaisfrequentlydismissedinscholarlydebatesasanexampleofTJfailuresinceitsofficialrecordinlegal,political,administrativeandsymbolicdimensionsofaddressingthe legacy of the antecedent regime has been half-hearted, if not outright revisionist during theconsolidation of the current illiberal government. Except for the rehabilitation of the victims of thecommunistpoliticalrepressions,nolegaladjudicationoftheperpetratorsofcrimesinconnectionwiththeadministrationoftheSovietjusticehastakenplace;themodestsuggestionsforlustrationbytheDumaDeputyGalina Starovoitova led to nowhere (with Starovoitova herself assassinated in 1998), and theopening of the former Soviet archives has remained severely limited, leading, at times, to thereclassificationof certain files (see furtherKramer2012).8Altogether, a clear structural, political, andsymbolicbreakwiththepasthassimplynothappenedinpost-SovietRussia.Thestate’sgeneralaversiontoassumingresponsibilityforpast-relatedclaimsandtowardsthepoliticalandlegalreassessmentoftheSovietpastisnotparticularlysurprisingconsideringthestrongdegreeofcontinuitybetweentheSovietandpost-SovietelitesinRussia(Sakwa2011;Gill2013;Nuzov2014;cf.Gjerde2015).Theoverallpost-communisttransitionofRussiahaspurportedlyproducedahybridregime(seeRobertson2011)whichisselectivelymimickingthenormativelanguageoftheWestern(particularlyEuropean)community,ratherthanfullyabidingwithdemocraticpractices(cf.Allison2013:16;Allina-Pisano2008;Shevtsova2008).TheRussiancasehasbeendescribedasagoodcounterexampleofTJforits‘faux’orpseudo-TJinterventionsthathavenotaimedatdemocratisationandtheprotectionofvictims’rightsasmuchasatlegitimisingthenewpoliticalelite(Andrieu2011).WhilethereisanumberofthoroughaccountsofRussia’schoicesinadoptingparticularTJmeasures(seeAdler2012a,b,c;Andrieu2011;Calhoun2004;Nuzov2014;Stan2009;Cole2007;Fein2007;Kritz1995),thebroaderimplicationsofthecountry’slimitedreckoningwithits antecedent regime’shuman rights violationshavenotbeenaddressed.TheexplorationofRussia’s

8 Seealsohttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/battle-in-the-archives---uncovering-russias-secret-past/563566.html(accessedJune5,2016).

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reckoningwith its communist past has been generally relegated to the scholarship on the politics ofmemory(Khapaeva2016;Sherlock2007,2011;ShlapentokhandBondartsova2009;Smith2009;Torbakov2011;Wertsch2002,2008)andculturalstudiesonRussia’s‘workingout’ofitstraumasinducedbythecommunistexperiment(e.g.,Etkind2009,2013;Satter2012;Schlögel2013).WhatiscriticallyabsentintheexistingliteratureonRussia’spost-communistVergangenheitsbewältigungistherealisationthatitisascrucialtoanalyseRussia’sreasoningsfornotadoptingcertainTJmeasuresasthemeasuresRussiahasadoptedinitspoliticalhandlingofthecommunistpast.

PreviousworkshaveacknowledgedthesymboliccentralityofTJforliberaltransition(Teitel2000),focusingonthewaysRussia’sfailedTJhasaffecteditspost-communistdemocraticconsolidation,humanrights protection and civil society development, while not necessarily problematising the universalistpresumptions and liberal teleology of the transition paradigm. While the connection between thecommemorationofvictimsofstateviolenceinthepastanddebatesoverhumanrightsinthepresenthasnot gone unnoticed in the literature on historical memory (see Huyssen 2003; Winter 2013), theimplicationsofRussia’spoliticalhandlingofitscommunistpastforitsinternationalbehaviourhavenotbeen systematicallyanalysedorunderstood in the studyof IR. Yet,Russia’swayof reckoningwith itsforebear’slegacyhasconsiderablerepercussionsforitsrelationswithitsformerSovietdependentsandforeign policies in various multilateral settings, ranging from its politics of human rights and stateaccountabilitytopursuingparticulardiscoursesofhistoricaljusticeininternationalfora,suchastheUNandtheOSCE.AsthecontinuatorstateoftheSovietUnionininternationallegalterms,theRFhasbeenpersistent in refusing toassume legal responsibility for the internationallywrongfulactsof theSovietregime, both within its current borders and beyond. Russia’s lack of political penitence towards theEasternEuropeannationsandstatesaffectedbytheSovietrepressivepolicieshasmadeitanantipodeofa‘sorrystate’,unwillingtopubliclyexpresscontritionforpasthumanrightsabusesinordertopromotereconciliationbetweentheformerrepressorstateandtherepressed(cf.Lind2008).Meanwhile,thePutinregimehascunninglyappropriatedthediscoursesofhumanrights,genocidepreventionandHolocaustremembrance for identity-politicalprojects. In2014, theStateDumapasseda ‘memory law’ targetedspecificallyagainst the ‘disseminationof false informationon theactivitiesof theSovietUnionduringWorldWar II’ and the ‘rehabilitationofNazism’, therebyexplicitly criminalisingcertainwaysofpublicdiscussionandremembranceofWorldWarIIasacrucialperiodintheSoviethistoryandRussia’srelationswith its formerdependents (seeArt.354.1.of theRF’sCriminalCode;Koposov2014).Thishasmajorimplications for its relations with the former Soviet republics and satellites, themselves seeking toconsolidatetheirpost-communiststateidentitiesininternationalpolitics(Mälksoo2015a).Mostrecently,RussianannexationofCrimeain2014anditssupportfortheseparatists ineasternUkrainehavebeenshapedbymnemonicalundercurrentsincomplexways:Russianmediahassystematicallydemonisedpro-democraticforcesinUkraineas‘Nazis’,insinuatingtheirintentiontoerasethehistoricalmemoryoftheSovietVictoryinthewaragainstNazismandperpetrategenocideagainstRussianandJewishminorities(foragoodoverviewanddiscussion,seeFedor2015). It is temptingtosuggestthatRussia’s failuretocometotermswiththepasthascontributedtoitsinterventioninUkraine.However,asthescholarshipontheissuecurrentlystands,wehavenowayofestablishingthecausalconnectionwithanydegreeofcertainty. The basic argument drawn from the literature on democratic peace about the impact ofdomesticregimetypeandpoliticalcultureonstatebehaviourin internationalpoliticsonthepeaceful-aggressive-scaleisfartoogenerictoaccountspecificallyfortheTJandforeignpolicy-linkage.

Thewell-coveredGermanandJapanesecasesintheliteraturearegenerallyquotedasexamplesrevealingtheconnectionbetweencountries’wayofcomingtotermswithpastviolenceandtheprospectsforinternationalreconciliation(seefurtherGustafsson2014,2015;Hagström2015).Thisconnectionisnot straightforward, however, as Jennifer Lind’s (2008) study on international apologies and theirpotentialdomesticbacklasheshasdemonstrated.Whilecontritionis likelytoreducethreatperception

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andpromote reconciliation, apologies arenotprerequisitesof international reconciliation. Forgetting,denying, or glorifying past atrocities nonetheless tend to elevate threat perception and inhibitreconciliationininternationalrelations,assuchpracticessignalcontemptforvictimisedcountry’speople,its status in international society, and the future of the bilateral relationship between the formerperpetratorandvictimstate(Lind2008:9,13).TypicallyforIR’spredispositiontofollowthepower(ful),representationsofthepastinformerperpetratorstateshavereceivedmoreattentionthanthoseinthevictimisedstates(butcf.Gustafsson2014;Mälksoo2009).Russia’smnemopoliticalpredicamentisallthemorecomplicatedforitstickingofbothboxesconcurrently.ParaphrasingAlexanderEtkind(2009:184),Russia’spost-communistreckoningwiththeStalinistterrorhasthusasifamountedtocomingtotermswiththesuicide(cf.Viola2013).

Altogether, the effects of historical memory on international relations range from indirect(throughshapingidentitiesandvaluesthattheforeignpolicymakersbringintotheprocessofdecision-making) to concrete historical ‘lessons’ and analogies drawn on inmaking a particular foreign policydecision(Müller2002;Lebow,Kansteiner,Fogu2006;Olick2007;Langenbacher2010:38-39).MemorynonethelessremainsgenerallyunderestimatedinIRexplanationsofstatebehaviourintheinternationalsystem (Neumann 2013: 24). Anne Clunan (2009) has offered one of the few systematic attempts toincorporate temporality,historicalmemory, andaspirations into theexplanationof theemergenceofstate’snationalinterestsandstatus-seekingininternationalpoliticsontheexampleofRussia.Whileheraspirationalconstructivisttheoryremainssomewhatmarredbythepresumptionofessentiallyrationally-mindedforeignpolicymakers,theobservationthat‘thepastselfcanserveasthekeyidentitystandard,particularlyintimesofchange,andthepastbecomesthebenchmarkagainstwhichtheselfattemptstoverifyitspresentidentity’(Clunan2009:27)isinsightfulformygeneralobjectivetoestablishthecausalnexusbetweenTJandforeignpolicybywayofathickdescriptionofthepost-communistRussiancase.Promptedbythelimitationsoftheexistingliterature,myaccountfollowsthereasoningofthescholarshipemphasisingthecentralityofstatus,recognitionandinternationalstandingforstates’senseofontologicalsecurity(cf.Lebow2008;Clunan2009;Zarakol2010),inordertounpacktheuniquechallengespresentedbytheemergingglobalnormativeexpectationsrelatedtoTJonsustainingtheinternationalstateidentityinquestion.

Hence,thisstudyrelatestobroadertheoreticaldebatesinthesocialsciencesandlawabouttheinfluenceofinternationalnormsonthedomesticpoliciesandpracticesofstates(FinnemoreandSikkink1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Simmons 2009; Hafner-Burton 2013; Posner 2014). Capitalising on thestudiesofstigmatisationininternationalsociety(Zarakol2011,2014;Adler-Nissen2014)andimpelledbycallsforamodeldescribinghowsocietiesendupbeingontologicallyinsecure(seeMorozov2015:57),Iintendtomovethedebateforwardinanumberofways.BesidesseekingtoaccountforhowTJinfluencesforeignpolicy,anotherimportantquestionconcernstheinternalvsexternalsourcesofRussia’slong-timedifficultiesrelatedtoacknowledgingthecriminallegacyofitspredecessor(cf.Zarakol2010,2011,2014).Thepropositiontoexamineindepthtowhatextenttheallegedlyglobal(ising)normofTJ(seeTeitel2014)isactuallysharedbyRussia(asastateaswellassocietally)ispremisedontheideathatthewayRussiahasbeenbroughtintotheframeworkofthenormativeexpectationsassociatedwithcomingtotermswithone’spasthasmajor repercussions for its perceivedplaceandposture in contemporary internationalsociety. Interlinking the adoption of particular TJmeasures and state’s ontological security-seeking ininternational politics therefore improves the understanding of system-level conditions enabling ordisabling state’s reckoning with the antecedent regime’s legacy. I depart from the assumption thatRussia’senduringinabilitytoclearlydistinguishitscurrentpredicamentfromtheproblematicchaptersofitsSovietpasthassignificantlycontributedtothecountry’sentanglementintheroutinelyantagonisticbehaviourinitsimmediateneighbourhoodandincreasinglyvis-à-vistheWestatlarge.

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4. Post-SovietRussia:WhatKindofTransitionandPoliticsofTJ?

InordertodeterminetheinternationalimplicationsofRussia’spoliticalhandlingofitscommunistpast,theconceptualassumptionswhichhaveguidedRussia’spost-communistdealingwiththe legacyof itsantecedent regime should be established first. These include Russians’ conceptualisations of thetransitionfromcommunism(aswellastowhatexactly;thejuryisstillout)andRussia’slimitedadoptionofTJrepertoire.OnlythenitbecomespossibletoaccountforthewaysthedomesticmodelofreckoningwiththerepressivelegacyoftheSovietregimehasbeentranslatedintoRussianforeignpolicydiscourseandpracticefromGorbachevtoPutin’sthirdterm.

The study of political transitions in CP and IR tends to focus on states in transit, generallyunderstandingpoliticsthroughanarrowinstitutionalistlens,andthusdemonstratingmoreoftenthannotan alarming lack of experiential depth in making sense of what a transition really means for thecommunities inquestion (but cf.Oushakine2009). Thishasbeen thegistof criticismdirectedagainstvariousapproachesoftransitionalpoliticsdrawingonthemodernisationtheory,allegedlysubscribingtoevolutionaryWesternisation‘inthesenseofbelievingintheneedoftransitionsocietiestocatchupwithandmodelthemselvesafterWesternsocietyanditsbasicinstitutions’(Kollmorgen2013:89).Contratheassumptions of transitioning towards a fixed model as the bulk of literature on post-communistdemocratisationpresumes(seeWydra2008:14-15),adoptingaliminalperspectivetoRussia’stransitionfromcommunismenablestoaddresstheconcretepracticesofthoseintransitionwithoutdepoliticisingtheir particular historical experiences in the course of the allegedly teleological move toward auniversalisednormativeandpoliticalmodel(suchasliberaldemocracy).

Thisisimportantforlivedexperiencehasatransformativeeffectonhumanbeingsandthelargersocialcirclestheyarepartofinvariousways(Wydra2015:97).Theliminalexperiencehenceencapsulatesthetransformationofsubjectivityincourseofapassagetoan‘otherworld’(Thomassen2014:16).Regimetransitions when people are initiated into new forms of authority are therefore not just politicaltransformations but ‘total social facts, liminal situations where the twomain aspects of experiencescoincideinthe„objective”characterofamajorsuddenevent,andthe„subjective”perspectiveofhowthiseventwaslivedthroughbytheindividualsundergoingthechanges’(Wydra2009:92;seealsoWydra2007:51-54).Thetryingexperienceoftransitionbrimswithpossibledangersnotonlyforthosedirectlypartakingit,butalsopotentiallydefyingtheoverallstructureoftheexistingorder.Asliminalsubjectsfallin-betweenestablishedstructuresandhierarchies,theyinherentlychallengethem,therebyappearingasthreatening to thoseconcernedwith theirmaintenance (Turner1969;cf.Rumelili2003:219; seealsoRumelili2012).Applyingthelensofliminalityforstudyinginternationaltransitionsthereforeforcesustorethinktheroleofagencyinthepoliticsoftransitionandtakenoteoftheimplicitandexplicithierarchiesat play. It compels us to be attentive to what actually happens in the course of large-scale politicaltransitions;whoaresubjectedtothetransitionandconsequenttransformationbywhom;andwhatistheroleofthetransitionalordealinshapinganascentpoliticalcommunityinaparticularway.Anytransitionnaturallyraisesthequestionofitsultimatedirectionandtelos,aswellasthewayofitsconduct(Buckley-Zisteletal.2014,p.5).Indeed,

theverynotionoftransitionimpliesakindofteleology:wealwaystransit‘towards’something,andinthepost-ColdWarera…thepoliticalhorizonwasalwaysdefinedassomeformofliberaldemocracy:aplural,openregime,tolerantofdiversity,andnotpubliclydependentonanymetaphysicalconceptionoftruthormorality(Andrieu2014:97).

Insteadofapre-determinedvisionofapost-transitionpoliticalcommunity,liminalityrecognisesthephaseoftransitionasthefoundingpoliticalmomentwherein‘anewdemos,anewwe,iscreatedthroughtheconstruction of a new social vision and a new order’ (Renner 2013: 160; cf. Schaap 2006). Liminality

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embracesthefundamentalambiguityandunpredictabilityoflarge-scalesocietaltransitions.Thenotionof liminality entails a cyclical rather than progressive understanding of international politics and arelationalratherthanabsoluteconceptionofpower(Wydra2015:98;Mälksoo2012).AsTurner’sfamousquipgoes,liminalityimpliesthat‘thehighcouldnotbehighunlessthelowexisted,andhewhoishighmustexperiencewhatitisliketobelow’(Turner1969:83).Whetheraddressingtheshiftfromoneregimetypetoanotherorfromwartopeace,transitionsamounttotheconcentratedmomentsof‘thepolitical’wherein a new community is born (Edkins 1999: 3). Yet, adopting a liminal perspective to politicaltransitionsalsocompelsustoask‘[w]hereistheauthorityintransition’(Teitel2000:71),andtoaddresswho exactly sets the parameters of the new normality and measures the milestones of sufficienttransition.Against thatbackdrop, thenotionofprotracted,orpermanent, liminality (Szakolczai 2000;Thomassen2014: 93) should likewisebe accompaniedwith a critical discussionof forwhom the saidcommunityisperceivedaspermanentlyliminalinordernottobecompromisedinthewaythewholesalecondemnation of defective, unfinished or failed democracies remains vulnerable to criticism of theallegedly uniform application of the Western yardstick (see Wydra 2008: 2). Consequently, theattentiveness to the liminal origins of democracy (Wydra 2009) enables to unfold the particularistdemocraticprojectsoutsideofthe‘West’(cf.Morozov2013).

Thepresentresearchseekstoaddressthecriticismaccordingtowhich‘[e]xistingscholarshiphasnotyetcapturedtheprevailingdynamicoftransitionaljusticeoritsnexuswithongoingpoliticalchange’(Teitel2014:60).UnderstandingTJasaliminalriteofaparticularkindhasfundamentalconsequencesformakingsenseofRussia’spost-communistVergangenheitsbewältigung.Thestructureofthe(democratic)transitionisgenerallypresumedtobeofkeysignificanceinpredictingwhichTJmeasuresacountrywilladopt inthecourseof itscomingtotermswiththepast.Russia’spost-communisttransitionhasbeennotoriously difficult to categorise: it does not fit effortlessly into the categories of transformation,negotiatedtransitionorrupture(Calhoun2004:146).‘TheSoviet-Russianmodeoftransitionwasneitherimposednorpacted.Nohegemonicpowerspelledoutnewrulesofthegameforotherstofollow,’MichaelMcFaul(2001:123)similarlymaintains.Russiancasepokestheverynatureoftransitionin‘transitionaljustice’:whileRussiahascertainlyundergoneachangeofpowersincetheSovietera,itremainsanopenquestionhowsubstantive,infact,thischangehasbeen(asepitomised,inparticular,bythecontinuityandsignificance of the internal state security structures, or the KGB-FSB continuity in post-Soviet Russia).Historically,Russiahasgenerallybeenviewedasa‘landoftransition’oranintermediarybetweentwoworlds (cf. Koschmal 2008). Its postcommunist transition has incarnated its subjugation to constantmeasurementofitsEuropeancredentialsandostensibledeviancefromaliberaldemocraticmodelor‘theWest’ more generally (cf. Prozorov 2009). The 1990s, in particular, have emerged as a period ofheightenedliminalityinRussia’spostcommunisttransition,asthisdecadeisoftencharacterisedintermsof‘timelessness’(bezvremenie),‘averitableblackholeinbetweenthecollapseoftheSovietorderandthereassertionoftheRussianstateunderPresidentPutin’(Prozorov2009:40);‘aperiodofmomentouschangewithout end’; ‘an uncomfortable time out of time’ standing for ‘the revolutionarymoment offoundation’(ibid.:42-43).Indeed,

thisperiodcondensesamultiplicityoftimes,unitinginasingledecadeallthatmighthavehappened,allpossibilities of Russia’s political development, and suspending themat the verymomentwhen a singlemodelofthefuturelookedsettobecomeirreversible.The1990swerethereforealsoatimeoftrials,oftryingouteverypossiblepathwayoffuturedevelopmentatthesametime,withoutafinalcommitmenttoanysingleoneofthem(ibid.:46).

Yet, the lingering state of political rupture of the early Russian experience of postcommunismdemonstratedthat‘Russiawasnotmovinganywhereotherthanincircles’,andcertainlynottransitioningtoWestern-styledemocracyinanunequivocalsense(ibid.:45-46).

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InthecontextofTJinparticularwhichisgenerallyunderstoodasaprocessthatshouldleadtothehealingorreconciliationofasociety,thereestablishmentofhumandignityandtheruleoflawafterthe collapse of a repressive regime, the policies post-Soviet Russia has adopted have remainedconspicuouslyhalf-hearted.ConsideringtheenormityofhumanrightsviolationsandmassrepressionsoftheSovietregime,Russia’sfailureatmostmechanismsofTJafterthecollapseofthecommunistorderisrather striking. Except for the increasingly persecutedwork of theMemorial Society,9 the piecemealrehabilitationof thevictimsofmostseriouspolitical repressions, andmost recently, theguardedde-Stalinisation campaign of the Medvedev administration, Russia’s reckoning with its predecessor’srepressivelegacyhasremainedeclectic,ifnotoutrightrevisionistduringthePutinera(Khapaeva2016).Whilethecountrywentthrougharadicalpoliticaltransitionintheearly1990s,mostTJmechanismsneverreallytookholdaspartoftheRussianpoliticsoftransition.Mostconspicuously,Russiahasessentiallyignored the question of punishing perpetrators of the political repressions and gross human rightsviolationsofitsantecedentregime(seefurtherNuzov2014).Putin’spoliticalhandlingofthecommunistpast,inparticular,hasbeendenouncedasaimedatconstructinganewnationalmythologyofthepositivelegaciesof thecommunistperiod inRussianhistory, ratherthanaccounting for therepressionsof theantecedentregime.Whilehumanrightsorganisations,suchastheMemorialSociety,havedugintothesocialmemoryofcommunisminearnesteversincethegradualcollapseoftheSovietsystem,thepoliticaleliteshavegenerallyavoidedcontemplatingissuesofresponsibilityandguiltinthecontextofWorldWarII,theSovietsuppressionofRussia’sneighbouringnationsandstates,andmassrepressionsinflictedontheRussian nation itself. The preferred frameof public remembrance regarding the violent legacy ofcommunism has been the victimhood if not outright martyrdom of the Russian people.10 There is aprevalenttendencytoevadequestionsofaccountabilitybyforegroundingtheimmensityoftheRussians’own suffering under the Soviet regime (Mälksoo 2015b). The overall Russian approach to Stalinistrepressions (aswell as later human rights violations by the Soviet regime) has been characterised asvictim-based,notperpetrator-centric(seefurtherRoginski2008).Still,theprospectofbuildinganofficialcentralmonumenttothevictimsofpoliticalrepressionsinRussiahasbecomerealisticonlyrecently.11

ConsideringthelengthoftheSovietcommunistregime,thevaryingdegreeofitsrepressivenessthroughoutitsseventyyearsofexistence,andthestutterednatureofRussia’spost-communisttransitiontowardsamoredemocraticformofgovernment,theattentivenesstowardsthetemporaldimensioninRussia’spost-communistVergangenheitsbewältigung becomescrucial.While in theoryTJmechanismsaimtoestablishacleardistinctionbetween‘now’and‘then’bybridging‘aviolentorrepressivepastandapeaceful,democraticfuture’(Nagy2008:80),states’engagementwiththepasttendstobeconsiderablymurkierandmorespreadoutonatemporalscaleingeneral.PettaiandPettai(2015)haveofferedthemostrecentandanalyticallyconvincingdistinctionbetweendifferenttemporalitiesoftruthandjusticeseeking, highlighting how transitions and TJ happen in ‘bouts and waves’. They distinguish betweentransitional justice, or the immediate reckoning with the crimes, repression, and wrongdoing of theregime that has just been toppled from power, retrospective justice, referring to truth and justiceinitiativesvis-à-vistheearlywrongdoingsofthepreviousregimethatlastedformanydecades,andfurtheryet,post-transitionaljustice–thatis,theemergenceorintensificationoftruthandjusticeprocesseslongafterademocratictransitionisover(PettaiandPettai2015:22-31).IntheRussiancase,transitionaljusticewouldaccordinglydemarcatethereckoningwiththerepressive legacyoftheBrezhnevandKhruscheveras(andnotforgettingtheshort-livedAndropovandChernenko’sreigns,ofcourse)immediatelyafterthe collapse of the communist regime, while the measures of retrospective justice engage with the

9 Foranimportantgrassrootsinitiative,seealsothe‘lastaddress’project(www.poslednyiadress.ru).10AsfamouslycapturedbySergeyKaraganov’s‘RussiaisonelargeKatyn’(seeKaraganov2010,2011).11 Seefurtherhttp://konkurs.gmig.ru/(accessedJune5,2016).

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Stalinist crimesand repressions, andpost-transitional justice signifies themost recentmnemopoliticalinitiatives, such as the project on the ‘Perpetuation of theMemory of theVictims of the TotalitarianRegimeandNationalReconciliation’launchedtwentyyearsafterRussia’spost-communistregimechangebythethen-presidentDmitriMedvedev.12Suchatemporallynuancedapproachenablestosignificantlytemper thewhole-scale reduction of stalled or protracted processes of reckoningwith the past to asocietaldiagnosisof‘stuckinpermanenttransition’aswellasyieldamoregradatedanalysisoftheallegedTJ-foreignpolicy linkage.Russiaoffersaparticularlyengagingcasefortestingthesuggestiontosolidlyincorporatetemporality intotheanalysisof truthand justiceprocesses. ItsrecentlyadoptedpolicyoncondemningattemptstojustifymassSovietrepressionaddsanintriguingnewtwisttothissequence.13

TakingacuefromPettaiandPettai(2015),anattempttomakesenseoftheTJmeasuresRussiahasadoptedsincethegradualdisintegrationofthecommunistregimewouldneedtofocusonthepoliticsof their emergence, contestation and implementation. That would necessitate, first, a systematicdescriptionofthefullspectrumofhistoricaltruthandjustice-seekingmeasuresadoptedintheRussianFederationsinceperestroika.Theprocess-tracingoftherelativelymeagrelistofTJmeasuresadoptedinRussia should be supplemented with a comprehensive account of the country’s post-communistdiscourses on how to come to terms with the communist past (distinguishing between its political,academic,andpublic/popularlayers).InRussia’scase,therearenotmanyadoptedTJmeasuresalongthecriminal-judicialandpolitical-administrativeaxistoscrutinise.ThepresenceofTJhasbeenmostpalpableinregardtostate-ledpoliciesinvolvingthesymbolic-representationalacknowledgementofvictims.Yet,the reasoning given for the dismissal of particular TJ policies by the political leadership, aswell as inbroader societal debates on which measures would actually be desirable, and which allegedlycounterproductive for the society’s and state’s healing and moving on (which are not necessarilyoverlappinggoals)aremostinterestingformakingbettersenseofRussia’schoicesinregardtoitspoliticalhandlingofthecommunistpastand,consequently,theireffectsonRussianforeignpolicydiscourseandpractice.Asthesechoices illuminateRussianunderstandingsofhumanrights,ruleof law,the ‘proper’relationshipbetweenstateandsociety,thenormativeconvergenceordivergencefromtheexpectationsoftheemergingnormofTJ,andrelatedly,theperceivedplaceofthecountryininternationalsociety,theyhavefundamentalforeignpolicy implications.Thesuggestionthat`Russia’spermanentandsometimesagonizingquestforidentity’hasbeenthe‘ultimatelymostpoignantinfluence’onRussianforeignpolicy(Legvold2007:20)isparticularlyevocativeinthiscontext.

To further contextualiseRussia’s post-communist politics of TJ, international discourseon thedesiredaimsandmeansofRussia’sreckoningwiththedarkerlegaciesofthecommunistregimeshouldbe summarisednext. This step should enable tooffer a close readingof the interactionbetween thenormativeexpectationsoftheinternationalcommunity(pro‘theWest’)onaproperwayofhandlingtheviolentlegaciesofthepastregimeandRussia’sowndomesticdebatesontheissuethroughoutthe1990sand 2000s to this date.14 Russia’s hurdles with coming to terms with its communist past have been12 AnintriguingquestionfromtheviewpointofthistaxonomyconcernsthecategorisationofKhrushchev’sexposureofStalinistcrimesinthe20thand22ndCPSUCongresses(in1956and1961,respectively),aswellasthetrialsofBeriaandanumberofsecretpolicebossesandNKVDinterrogatorsin1953-1955,alongwiththeearlyrehabilitationmeasures towards the victims of Stalinist repressions (for a detailed overview, seeNuzov 2014: 284-93; for anexcellentbroaderculturaldiscussion,seeJones2006,2013).13 See http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/new-policy-on-commemorating-victims-of-repression-at-odds-with-actions/528254.html(accessedJune5,2016).14 This resonates with Vincent Pouliot’s ‘sobjectivist’ methodology, combining induction (in order to recoversubjectivemeanings),theobjectificationofmeanings intheir intersubjectivecontext,andtheirsettinginmotionthroughhistoricization(Pouliot2007:360).

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exacerbatedbythelackofaclearlydistinguishable‘self’towhichRussiacouldhavereturnedafterthecollapseof theSovietUnion inorder to sustain theconsistencyof its collective ‘selfhood’. It ishardlysurprising, against that backdrop, that contemporary Russia’s state-sanctioned politics vis-à-vis itsrelationshiptotheSovietpastmightbedescribedasambivalent,tosaythe least.Victory intheGreatPatrioticWarandthemasscrimesoftheveryStalinistregimethatgovernedandledthecountrythroughthat war sit uneasily together in the modern Russian mnemonical template, marking the poles ofontologicalsecurityandinsecurity,respectively.Russia’sdifficultiesinreckoningwiththecommunistpasthavebeenmagnifiedbythecomplicateddemandsoffacingthe‘otherinoneself’asunliketheCentralandEastEuropeannations,Russianshave lacked theoption to lay theblameonsomeoneother thanthemselves. As Zarakol (2010: 4) has suggested in the context of Japan and Turkey, intersubjectivepressurestohandleone’spastinaparticularwaymattermoreattimeswhentraditionalself-routinesarebroken–andaremorelikelytocreateontologicalinsecurityoutsidetheWest.Againstthatbackdrop,itmight be reasonable to claim that Russia’s difficulties in fully reckoningwith its forebear’s legacy arerelated to thecomplicateddemandsofontological securitydue to the still continuingopennessof itsinternationalbelonging(cf.Zarakol2010:6).Russia’sgeneralnon-compliancewiththeWesternnormofTJreflectsitssensitivitytowardstheparticularoriginofthatnorm(cf.Zarakol2014:313).Atthesametime,itsoccasionalemulationoftheTJdiscourserevealsanequalobsessionwiththecountry’sperceivedpositioninthesociallystratifiedinternationalsocietyofestablishedandstillliminalmembers.

Grounding Russia’s international behaviour in the analysis of the political handling of itscommunistpastdovetailswitharecentargumentmadeinthecontextofRussianapproachtomilitaryintervention,accordingtowhich‘theRussianviewofglobalnormsandlaw…interactsinsignificantwayswithconceptionsof regionalanddomesticstateorder’ (Allison2013:18;cf. L.Mälksoo2015).Asanypolicyastatepursuesinternationallyislikelytobeatleastinformedby,orreflectiveof,thecareforitsontologicalsecurityoraconsistencyofits‘self’,itisimportanttoavoidgettingcaughtinthetautologicaltrapandtryingtocoveressentiallyeverything.Iwillthereforeconcentrate,inmyfurtherstudy,onthreecoreforeignpolicyareas.Theseinclude:(i)Russia’srelationswithitsformerSovietsubjugatestates;(ii)Russia’sinternationalpoliticsonhumanrightsandstateresponsibility,and(iii)Russia’shistoricaljusticediscoursespursuedinvariousinternationalfora.ThefirstsphereenablestoaddressRussia’sreflexesofimperialoversight intheformerSovietspace, including itsattemptedcontroloverthemnemopoliticaldevelopmentsincountrieslikePoland,theBalticstates,UkraineandGeorgia.Russia’sbehaviourtowardsitsformerSovietsubjugatestatesinEasternEuropeoffers,inturn,potentiallyinterestinginsightsaboutitsself-positioningvis-à-vistheWest.IfwearetofollowOrlandoFiges(2002:415),accordingtowhomthereis‘theRussiantendencytodefinetheirrelationswiththeEastinreactiontotheirself-esteemandstatusintheWest’,Russia’srefusaltoparticipateintheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicyonparwithitsformerimperialperiphery(suchasUkraineorGeorgia)issymptomaticofitsontologicalinsecurityvis-à-visitspost-Sovietstatusininternationalsociety.TheanalysisofRussia’sbilateralrelationswithitsformerSovietsubjugatestatesfurtherallowstodemonstrateitscasualinheritingoftheusefulbitsoftheUSSRfor its international presence, and the concurrent strategic silences (cf. Knutsen 2016) on the moreproblematic chapters of the Soviet past, including theMolotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the consequentoccupationandannexationofcertainEasternEuropeanstatesinthecourseofWorldWarII.AsTJpertainsdirectly to the norm of accountability, its way of adoption has potentially intriguing implications forRussia’spoliticsofhumanrightsandstateresponsibilityat large.The latter is, inRussia’scase,mainlyunderstood geopolitically, with reference to special international responsibilities of great powers incomparisontotheinsignificanceofsmallstates,ratherthanviaendorsingcertaininternationalnorms.Inaddition to investigating Russia’s little-studied perspective on the ICC, I will pay special attention toRussia’shistoricaljusticediscoursesaspursuedinvariousinternationalfora(e.g.,theUN,OSCE).Thelogicofthischoicedepartsfromtheassumptionaccordingtowhichgreatpowersareparticularlymotivatedto

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reproduceattheinternationallevelthevaluesenshrinedintheirdomesticpoliticalcultures(seeMorris2005).

The international implications of Russia’s political handling of its communist past couldconsequently be delineated on bilateral, regional, and global levels. The first dimension would, forinstance,refertoRussia’sguardedlyregretfulstanceadoptedtowardstheKatynmassacreinitsrelationswithPolandsince2010,aswellasanumberofbilateral‘historycommissions’establishedinrecentyearswith Poland, Ukraine, Latvia and Lithuania. Russia’s state commission to counteract attempts of‘falsification of history to the detriment of Russia’s interests’, legislation on the legitimate frames ofremembering the roleof theUSSR inWorldWar II (i.e.Art.354.1.of theRussianCriminalCode),andhandlingoftherelevantcasesattheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(ECtHR)(e.g.,Kononovv.Latvia)havetheirwiderresonanceintheEasternEuropeanregionaswellasa‘backlooping’effectforRussia’sdomesticpolitics(e.g.,considertherecentrulingoftheRussianConstitutionalCourtontheprecedenceof theRussian constitutionover the decisions of the ECtHR) (Mälksoo forthcoming). These ‘mini-casestudies’willthusbeanimportantpartofthebroadercasestudyontheRussianTJ-foreignpolicylinkage.Atthegloballevel,IwillinvestigatethewaysRussia‘translates’itsexperienceswithcomingtotermswiththecommunistpasttointernationalinstitutions,bypursuingparticularideasofhistoricaljusticeinvariousinternationalfora,rangingfromtheOSCEandtheCouncilofEuropetotheUnitedNations.Theseinclude,forexample,Russia’sfightagainstneo-NazismintheUNanditsrefutationoftheEastEuropeanpoliciescallingfortheinternationalcondemnationof’communistcrimes’inOSCEandtheCouncilofEurope(seefurtherMälksoo2014). IlyaPrizel’s (1998: 246) verdict that ‘[m]ostRussianshave found it difficult toacceptcomparisonsbetweentheUSSRandthedefeatedfascistpowers’stillholds,asillustratedbythereactiontotheUkrainiancrisisperhapsmorefirmlythaneversincethecollapseoftheSovietregime.Itthusbecomesurgentto investigatehowprecisely thepracticesofTJathomehavebeenconnectedtospecificnotionsofsecurity,justiceandorderininternationalpolitics.15

5. UnpackingtheTJ-FPNexus:WhichCausality?

How shouldwe then best examine the conditioning causal power of state’s truth and justice-seekingpoliciesover its foreignpolicydiscourses and international action?A cursoryoverviewof theexistingliteratureconfirmsthatatheoryconnectinghistoricalmemoryandstate’sconsequentpracticeofTJtoitsforeignpolicyisclearlyoverdue.Mymainaimistocontributetoourunderstandingofthewayinwhichthe (lack of) reckoningwith the antecedent regime’s human rights violations affects foreign policy. Iunderstandthelatterasacombinationofstate’sself-visionanditsvisionofitsplaceintheworld;thatis,as entailing a foreign policy or security imaginary (Weldes 1999; Mälksoo 2010; Guzzini 2012b), arespective foreign policy doctrine, and state’s consequent international practice. ‘Foreign policy’ thusrefersbothtothebasicdefenceofaparticularnotionofstate’s‘self’withininternationalsocietyaswellasthenormativeprojectionofitsvaluesandideasattheinternationallevel.Isuggestthatanalysingthereasonsprovidedfortheadoptionornon-adoptionofspecifictruthandjustice-seekingmeasuresenablestotracktheemergenceofRussia’spost-communiststateidentitywhich,inturn,contributestowardsasociologicallyrichandthickunderstandingofthesourcesofstate’sinternationalconduct(cf.Campbell1998;Hansen2006).Studyingtheimpactofstate’sTJpolicyonitsforeignpolicyconsequentlyallowsforengagingwithdeepercausalontologyoftheemergenceandevolutionofstateforeignpolicy.Itakethe

15Think, for instance,ofGorbachev´spoliciesofglasnost and ´new thinking´–andhis ideaofa comprehensivesecurityinEurope.

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domestic and international levels to be ontologically intertwined, or fundamentally connected, andthereforealsoanalyticallynotsoclearlyseparablelevelsofanalysisininternationalpolitics(cf.Kurki2008:252).Thehypothesisedcausalrelationshipbetweenstate’sTJandforeignpoliciesisnotunderstoodasasinglemono-causalityintheempiricist-positivisttraditionofconceptualisingcausation.InsteadofastrictHumeanunderstandingofcause, I followMiljaKurki’s (2008)Aristotelian ‘deepened’and ‘broadened’conceptualisationofcauseinmyexplorationofthecausallogicsgoverningstate’sTJandforeignpolicies.

Kurkiexemplifiesheraccountofcausationininternationalpoliticsviaacriticaldiscussionofthecore question animating the extensive literature on ‘Democratic Peace’ (i.e. ‘does democracy causepeace?’).Contratraditionaltaxonomicalindexationoftheconceptofdemocracythroughachecklistofquantifiablecharateristicsandagainstthegrainoftheassumptionaboutdemocraciesbeingessentiallythesamethroughtime,Kurkiproposestostartwithasking‘detailedquestionsabouthowdemocracieswork institutionally, socially and historically’ (2008: 271). In the context of the present research, thistranslatesintonotmerelycheckingRussia’sfittingornon-fittingwiththevariousmatrixesofTJmeasures,but providing a thick, multi-level description, how reckoning with the communist-era human rightsviolationsandinternationalcrimeshasbeenactuallyunderstoodinRussia;howthisunderstandinghaschangedthroughoutthepost-communistperiod(includingperestroikayearsasaparticularlyvolatileanddiscursivelyilluminatingstageofimmediatetransitionbetweentheSovietregimeandthenewRussianstate); and which reasonings have framed various TJ-related moves? Coupling Russia’s respectiveunderstandings and state- and society-led truth and justice-seeking initiatives with its historicalsensitivities towards (alleged)Western stigmatisation and orientalisation of Russia (cf. Zarakol 2011;Neumann1999)recognisesthecomplexinternational-domesticdynamicsatplayinboththeemergenceofthecountry’struthandjustice-seekingpoliciesathomeandtheirinternationalreverberations.Inthespiritof‘how’causality(cf.Vennesson2008:232),thisstudyisinterestedindetermininghowtheadoptionornon-adoptionofvariousTJmeasuresiscausalforstate’sinternationaloutlookandbehaviour,aswellas concrete foreign policies in particular areas, and how the reckoningwith the antecedent regime’shuman rights violations interacts with other causal forces affecting state’s foreign policy. How weinterpretactors’motivesandperceptionsintheprocessisclearlyofkeyhere–whichiswhytheresearchapproachadoptedinthisstudyfallsunderhistoricallyinformedinterpretivemethodology.

Theproposedapproachthusreachesbeyondestablishingregularitiesbetweenindependentanddependentvariablesandseeks toengage inmoresociologicallyandhistoricallygrounded interpretiveanalysisofcausalrelations(seefurtherKurki2008:272).Itdepartsfromanunderstandingthatdifferentcausesofstate’sforeignpolicyconductaredeeplyintertwined.Therefore,theactivepowersofagents(ortheso-calledefficientcauses)needtoberelatedtofinalcauses(purposesandreasoningsprovidedbyactors,theanalysisoftheirintentionality)andcontextualisedwithinthe‘constitutive’conditioningcausalpowersofrulesandnormsaswellasmaterialconditions(ibid.:296-7).Thecausaleffectofstate’struthand justice-seeking policies on its foreign policy are hypothesised to followmost closely the logic ofAristotelian formal causes, that is, structures, ideas, rules, norms, or generally ‘ways of thinking’‘accordingtowhich’sociallifeismade’(forinstance,bytheagents’formingoftheiridentities,intentions,decisions,andactions).Thiseffectisthusdistinctfromthatofmaterialconditions(‘outof’)aswellasfromtheextrinsiccauses,suchasefficient(actor/action‘bywhich’)andfinalcauses(reason/purpose‘forthesake of’) (ibid.: 220-4). Following the Aristotelian conception of formal cause, the causal relationshipbetweenstate’sTJandforeignpoliciesisaccordinglysuggestedtobeof‘constrainingandenabling’type,ratherthananactive‘pushingandpulling’-kindofcause(ibid.:225).Russia’spoliciesofreckoningwithitsantecedent regime’s human rights violations and international crimes is consequently taken to be acontextualcauseconditioningthecountry’sinternationaloutlookandpracticesinaparticularwayratherthanactivelybringingaboutconcreteeffects.By‘constrainingandenabling’Russia’sforeignpolicymaking

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agents, the country’s post-communist politics of truth and justice-seeking has provided a specificcontextualcontext,meaningandconditionsofpossibilityforparticularempiricalpatternsinthecountry’sforeignpolicy(cf.WeldesandDuvall2001:196).Theaccountofthecausaleffectsstate’sTJpolicyhasonitsforeignpolicythereforeneedstobedeeplyandthicklycontextual,payingalsoattentiontoalternativechainsofcausation,theirmechanisms,processesandenablingconditions.Moreover,theconstitutivepartofcausation(astraditionallydubbedinconstructivistliterature)whichistheprimarysourceofidentitiesandvalues(which,inturn,aremaindeterminantsofhumanbehaviour)needstobeaccountedforaswell(seeLebow2014:148-9).

In terms of social scientific approach, the present endeavour is located within the criticalconstructivist and poststructuralist traditions in IR which are interested in the constitution of actoridentitiesandthe intersubjectiveconstructionof theenablingconditions for their internationalaction(e.g.,Weldes1999;Neumann1999).Theresearchapproachfallsunderhistoricallyinformedinterpretivemethodologywhichinvolvesacarefulreconstructionofhistoricalcontextandactors’narratives(Pouliot2007).Asinterpretivismseekstounearththemeaningofhumanexperience,including‘thevariationsinpossiblemeaningsforgivenevents,howmeaningismadethroughknowledgeconstruction,howpowerandethicsconstitutemeaning,the implicationsofmeaningforpoliticalandsocialphenomena’ (Lynch2014: 2), it is particularly well-suited for the current study. I take agency to be located within theconstraints imposed by the structural space, and social action to be contingent on time, space, andcontext.Theapproachunderliningtheanalysisofthisprojectmovesbackandforthbetweeninductiveanddeductivereasoning,16pinpointingthesocialcontextoutofwhichpolicyoutcomesarise.Ibegin,ontheonehand,withasetoftheoreticalassumptions,analysedthroughempiricalevidencesubsequentlygenerated,andturnthenbacktogeneratingbroadertheoreticalclaimsonthebasisofthecase-studymaterial.Myanalytical‘toolbox’combinespoststructuralistdiscourseanalysis(Hansen2006;Hopf2002;Milliken 1999; Torfing 1999, 2005) and interpretive process-tracing (Guzzini 2011, 2012; see also Ish-Shalom’s2006modelofdiscourse-tracing;17cf.BennettandCheckel2015;GeorgeandBennett2005).Theformerenablestoavoidanthropomorphisationofthestateandthenecessitytotranslateemotionsfrom the individual to state level (Morozov 2015: 60). The latter, meanwhile, takes the diverseinterpretations actors themselves give to their state identity disjuncture (shaping consequently bothstate’s truthand justice-seekingand foreignpolicies) as the startingpointof theanalysis (see furtherGuzzini2012,fullvolume).Carefulempiricalcheckingofhowparticularinputshavebecometranslatedintopolicyresponsesenablestocontroltheriskofequifinality18andspuriousrelationships(Guzzini2012a:4). This is done by adopting Lebow’s model of inefficient causation – a multi-step searching forconnectionsbetweenandamongcausesatmultiplelevelsofinquiry(Lebow2014:65).Asanelaborationofsingularcausation,Lebow’sapproachoffersadetailedvariationonthethemeofhow-causality,seekingtoaccountforhowvariousframesofreference,processes,mechanisms,andotherfeaturesofcontext(suchasconfluences,actorgoals,and interactions)mayberesponsibleforparticularoutcomes(ibid.).Importantly, this kind of causal analysis is wary of determining a single, original cause for specificoutcomes. Causes remain hypothesised as, at the end of the day, ‘there is no way of effectively

16 Foragoodrecenttakeoncombiningthetwo,seeBlagden(2016).17 Thatis,analysingtheprocessinwhichonekindofdiscoursetransformsintoanother,orhowtheacademicandtheoreticdiscoursebecomesapublicandpoliticalone‘shapingtheunderstandingofworldpolitics,thusframingthemenuofacceptablepolicies’(Ish-Shalom2006:566-7).18 Equifinality refers to the possibility that the same outcome may have been reached by following ‘severalexplanatorypaths, combinationsandsequences’ (GeorgeandBennett2005:20).Theoretically, inorder tokeepequifinalityundercontrol,allpossiblealternativecausalpathsthatcouldhaveproducedthesameoutcomewouldhavetobechecked(seeGuzzini2015).

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establishing causation’ (ibid.: 144; emphasismine). Inefficient causation therefore aims at developing‘layeredaccountsofhumanbehaviourinlieuoflaw-likestatements’,highlightingthatoutcomes(alongwiththeirmeanings)arecontextdependent(ibid.:146;cf.Guzzini2015).FollowingLebow,IhypothesiseRussia’s idiosyncratic approach to TJ to be a necessary but insufficient condition for explaining thecountry’spost-Sovietforeignpolicydynamics.

SinceRussia’spost-SovietTJandforeignpoliciesshareaconstitutivecrisisaboutcontinuousstateidentity, I propose to examine the alleged linkage between TJ and foreign policy from an ontologicalsecurity perspective. Ontological security concerns the sense of confidence the self has in its owncontinuity(Browning2016;Kinnvall2004:746).ThissensewasobviouslysignificantlyshakeninRussia’scasewith thecollapseof theSovietUnion, leading toamajordisjuncture in state identitydue to theinterruption of previously taken-for-granted self-understandings and foreign policy role positions (cf.Guzzini2012a:3).CombiningandrefiningelementsoftheontologicalsecurityresearchprogrammeinIR,mymaintheoreticalaimwiththepresentstudyistomoreclearlydefineandoperationaliseontologicalsecurity-seekingontheexampleofthemeetingpointofRussia’slimitedpoliticsofaccountabilitytowardstherepressionsofitsantecedentregimeanditspost-Sovietforeignpolicy.ItakeRussia’spoliticalhandlingof its communist past as a theory-generative case for making sense of the condition of protractedliminalityincontemporaryinternationalsociety.19Thecase-studyapproachenablestofocusonempiricaldetailwithoutreducingthesocialscientificambitiontoonlytheobservable.Whileanyforeignpolicymove(and even more so its outcomes) is overdetermined, my analytical framework does not claim tofundamentally challenge the existing explanations of Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policies, but rathersupplement theexisting literaturewithanoverlooked,yet substantivelyhighlyyieldingperspective. Itcombinestheconceptsofnarrativeidentity,mnemonicsecurity,andprotractedliminalityensuingfromthestate’slimitedengagementwithTJanditsconsequentforeignpolicypracticeintoanovelconceptualandmethodologicalmodel(Figure1).

19 WhilemyempiricalfocusdoesnotaccommodatesystematiccomparisonwithcaseslikeJapan,China,TurkeyorIsrael,Iintendtodrawonrelevantsecondaryliteratureforcomparativeinsightstosupportmytheorygenerationambitioninspe(e.g.,Gustafsson2014,2015;Hagström2015).

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Letme now dissect each element in the suggestedmatrix in turn. First, some parameters of

ontologicalsecurityneedtobeclarifiedinordertomaketheconceptmoreoperative.Delineatingthemnemonicdimension instate’sbiographicalnarrative (which, in turn, constitutes thebackboneof itsontologicalsecuritynarration)anddrawingattentiontothenarrativesoftransitioninparticularwillyieldamorecomprehensiveandconvincinganalyticalframeworkforexaminingtheinternationalimplicationsof a state’s domestically adopted TJ package than the existing accounts. To operationalise state’sontological security-seeking in international relations,or thequest for its continuous senseof ‘self’ ininternationalsociety,Iwillturntotheanalysisoftheformationandrepresentationsofstate’sbiographicalnarrativeinpolitical,academicandpublicdiscourses(Steele2008:10;Berenskoetter2014).Itakestate’sbiographical narrative to combineboth the internal dynamics of the formationof its so-called ‘I’ andexogenously induced production of its so-called ‘Me’, or its social ‘self’ in international society(Berenskoetter2014:266).TakingmycuefromBrentSteele(2008)whoseaccountofontologicalsecurity-seekingininternationalpoliticsremainsthemostdetailedtodate,Iconsiderthebiographicalnarrativetobeofcentral importanceforstateidentity‘becauseit isthelocusthroughwhichagents„workout”theirunderstandingofsocialsettingsandtheplacementoftheirSelvesinthosesettings’(Steele2008:7).As endogenous identity formation processes at the domestic level are deeply intertwined with theengagementandreflectionoverthepertinentdiscursiveframingsbytheoutsideactors,theconfigurationofastate’s‘I’and‘Me’isentangledtotheextentnottowarrantanattemptattheiranalyticaldistinction(cf.Hopf2002).Thestoriesstatestellaboutthemselveshavebehaviouralconsequences:identitiesarenotonlytold,theyarealsoenacted.Sincestatesallegedlyseekconsistencybetweentheirself-identitynarrativesandtheirbehaviourininternationalpolitics,toincreasetheircredibilityandtodefendthemfrom threats to that identity, foreign policy is expressive of state identity (Steele 2008: 11). State’sbiographicalnarrativeconstitutesandmaintainsits‘self’,givinglifetoroutinisedforeignpolicyactions(Steele2008:3).Affirmingone’sbiographicalnarrativeisparamountforstates,happening,attimes,at

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the expenseof states’material interests, or in extreme cases, even their physical survival (cf.Mitzen2006).Narratives andpractices send signals about state’s intentions to its international counterparts.Accordingly,weneedtoanalysebothdiscourseandpractice;bothwhatisbeingsaidandactuallydone.Thereadingoftextsshouldthusbecarefullycombinedwiththeprocess-tracingofparticularpolicymovesandthelinkingofdiscoursesandpolicychoicesinthefieldofTJtospecificdiscursivecounterpartsandpracticaloutcomesinthatofforeignpolicy.

Fundamentaltransitions(betheypolitical,economic,ideological,orallatonce,ashasbeenthecasewithRussia’semergencefromtheUSSR)presentspecificchallengesformaintainingstatecontinuity20andtheconsistencyofitsself-concept.21Tounderstandstate’sontologicalsecurity-seekingagainstthebackdropofamajorregimetransitionandtherelatedexpectationsto‘cometotermswiththepast’,weneed to break state’s biographical narrative22 further down, considering the particular challengespresentedforitstemporalandspatialcontinuity,inturn.Ifthepurposeofabiographicalnarrativeis‘toprovidetheSelfwithknowledgeofitsplacein„theworld”,specificallytomeaningfullysituatetheSelfanddelineateitsexistenceintimeandspace,toprovideuswithanecessarysenseoforientationaboutwherewecomefrom,andwhereweare,orcouldbe,going’(Berenskoetter2014:269),themaintenanceof themnemonic backbone linking state’s former andemerging ‘self’within its biographical narrativebecomesofkeysignificance.‘Comingtotermswiththepast’callsfortherevisionofthestate’smnemonicvision of itself, thus destabilising its identity and potentially endangering its continuous agency ininternationalpolitics (Mälksoo2015a:224). Thenormativeexpectations related to theadoptionof TJmeasurescansubsequentlyemergeasidentitythreatsofaspecifickind.Thestatus-relatedcostsentailedwith coming to terms with the past are not just emotionally charged, but have concrete politicalconsequences.InRussia’scase,theunqualifiedrenouncingofthecommunistregimewouldhavemadeitdifficulttoconcurrently‘inherit’thedesirablelegacyoftheUSSRintheinternationalsystemasa‘statecontinuator’ (gosudarstvo-prodolzhitel’) of the Soviet Union (i.e. Russia’s privileged position in theinternationalsystemthroughthepermanentmembershipoftheUNSC,aswellasitsgreatpowerstatusingeneral).Againstthatbackdrop,Russia’snotoriousunarticulation,orstrategicsilence,aboutcertainproblematic chapters in the life of this antecedent ‘self’ is not particulary inconsistentwith the basicpremises of the OS theory (cf. Fivush 2010, Knutsen 2016). For Russia, the political handling of itscommunistpasthasbeenfurthercomplicatedbytheadditionalchallengesthecollapseoftheantecedentregimehaspresentedfor itsspatialcontinuity. It is inthiscontextweshould interpretPutin’s famouswordsonthecollapseoftheSovietUnionbeingthegreatestgeopoliticalcatastropheofthetwentiethcentury(‘PoslaniePrezidenta’2005;seealsoTsygankov2013).Losingaconsiderablejunkoftheformerlyinhabitedspace,aswellasmillionsofRussiancompatriotstothenewlyindependentstatesatRussia’sbordershasforcedthecountrytofundamentallyreconsider(andthusfarnotparticularlysuccessfully)itshistoricalself-definitionasanempireratherthananation-state.

Subsequently,thestoriesstates(andsocieties)tellabouttheirexperiencesofthefundamentaltransitionsinthelifeofthecollective‘self’,comeintofocus.Narrativesoftransitionareimportanttoconsiderfortheyilluminatethestrugglesrelatedtotherevisionofthecorebiographicalnarrativeofthestateinthecontextofamajorupheavalandchange.TheyalsoshedlightontheTJchoicesthestatemakesastheybuildaconnectionbetweenapoliticalcommunity’spastwithitsfuturebyconstructingaparticular

20State‘identity’and‘continuity’areunderstoodasidenticalininternationallaw,whileIRtheoreticalschoolsassignconcretepropertiestostateidentities,suchasrationalego-drivenness,orvariousrolecharacteristics.
 21Ontherelationshipbetweenpolicychangeandstatenarrativecontinuity,seeSubotić(2015).22 Cf.theunderstandingofidentityasacoherent‘narrativerepresentation’oftheself(BiallyMattern2005:129).

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normativerelation.Inthatsense,‘[t]ransitionalhistoriesarenot„meta“-narrativesbut„mini“-narratives,alwayssituatedwitinthestate’spreexistingnationalstory’(Teitel2014:109).TakingstockoftheRussiannarrativesofpost-communisttransitionneedstofactorintheeliteandpopularaccountsofthebroadershiftthatoccurredintheinternationalcontext,settingontheRussiantransition.RussianaccountsoftheendoftheColdWar(andthenatureofitsallegeddefeatthereof)willthusbeofparticularresonanceforthe country’s contemporary foreign policy reasonings and choices, ranging from Russia’s position onNATOenlargementtoitsassessmentofthegeneralnormativedynamicsininternationalsociety.HowhasthemeaningofRussia’s transition from theUSSRbeenarticulatedwithin the country’s foreignpolicydiscussionswillthusbetheguidingquestionforthisstageofanalysis.

Establishingthelinkbetweenstate’stransitionalnarrativesanditsapproachtowardsTJlogicallyfollows. It is my core assumption that unpacking state’s application of particular TJ measures incombinationwith a close examination of its transitional narratives provides an excellent window for‘reading’ the said state’s identity, discursively and in practice. As the bottom-line poststructuralistargumentgoes,identitiesarebestrevealedattheirlimits,orborders.Consequently,itisfairtopresumethat the delineation of Russia’s transition from communism, both discursively and in practice,wouldrevealthe(intended)limitsofits‘self’,withfundamentalconsequencesforthecountry’sforeignpolicy(which,asweknowfromthetrail-blazingworkofCampbell,1998,isaboundary-producingexerciseofaspecifickind)inturn.

The empirical analysis should consequently delve into an extensive background research ofRussian government sources (policy documents, speeches by political leaders and elites, publicannouncements, political memoirs), academic sources and the media (following in particular suchnewspapers and periodicals as: Argumenty i fakty, Izvestiya, Kommersant-Daily, Moscow News,Moskovskie novosti, Nezavisimaya gazeta, Novaya gazeta, Rossiiskaya gazeta, Russia Profile, RussiaToday,Vedomosti,Voenno-promyshlennyykurier).Themainprimarysourceswouldaccordinglyincludeofficialstatements,speechesanddocumentsbyRussianpolitical leadersandpublicofficials inRussianandEnglish,mostlyreadilyaccessibleonline.Thiswouldprovidethestartingpointfordeterminingthenodalpointsofthediscoursebyrelyingonthemostauthoritativetexts(Milliken1999:229),whichsatisfythecriteriafortextselectionspecifiedbyHansen(2006:85):‘theysetoutclearconstructionsofidentityandpolicy;theyarewidelyattendedtobyotherpoliticians,thepublicandbygovernmentsthroughouttheworld;and theyarearticulatedbya formalpoliticalauthority’. Theaimwould thusbe to seek todiscern a set of historically determined signifiers that relate to TJ (such as the accountability of thegovernment to the people), examining the ways discourses and technologies of government areintertwined in theRussian case.Havingdone this, thepoolof sourceswouldbe furtherexpandedbyaddingmaterialsfromthemedia,especiallytextswrittenbyleadingpublicintellectualsonthetopic.ThereisabundantpublicopinionpolldatarelatedtothetopicavailableinRussianwhichwouldalsobeconsultedforthisstudy.

Combiningmyoriginal readingof the scholarly literature, the analysis of primary sources andsemi-structured interviews with Russian lawyers, sociologists, civil society activists, policy analysts,journalists, political scientists and historians on the subject, I seek to provide a deep qualitativereconstructionofRussia’sevolutioninthefieldofTJ.Thefocusofthestudyisonthemeaningsthatagentsattachtothesocialreality:thatis,whenanalysingforeignpolicyactionsandstate’sinternationalpractice,we try tounderstand them through theactors’own justificationsof their conduct.Consequently, theemphasiswillbeonthemeaningandlegitimationprovidedforparticularchoicesbythecorestateactors.TheunderlyingmethodologyisinformedbyGuzzini’sinterpretivist,historicalandmulti-layeredapproachtoprocesstracingwherebylinksbetweenpossiblecausesandobservedoutcomesaremappedoutinawaythattaketheactors’understandingsofeventsandphenomenainquestionasthestartingpointof

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analysis,ratherthantheeventsandphenomenathemselves(seeGuzzini2012a:4;GeorgeandBennett2005:6,176).Adoptinganinterpretiveversionofprocess-tracingwithinasingle,complexcase(Guzzini2012;cf.GeorgeandBennett2005),IwillexaminetheadoptedTJmeasures,institutionalisationsofstateTJpoliciesinlaws,commemorativeandeducationalpractices,andrespectivepositionspursuedbyRussiaintheUN,OSCE,CouncilofEuropeaswellasinbilateralrelationswithRussia’sEastEuropeanneighbours.IintendtofocusontheRussianpost-communistdebatesoverthe(non-)prosecutionoftheperpetratorsof the Soviet violators of human rights (and the related definitional difficulties thereof), but also payparticularattentiontotherevisionofofficialnational-historicalnarratives(incl.inhistorytextbooksandrelated‘patrioticeducation’policydocuments),varioushistorycommissionsinRussia’sbilateralrelationswithitsformerSovietsatellites;theprevailingattitudestowardsofficialapologiesforthecriminallegacyof the Soviet regime in Russia’s public diplomacy, and related commemoration and memorialisationpractices(includingtheso-called‘monumentalpolitics’vis-à-visrememberingthecommunistregime).

Takingfurtherupthesuggestiontobreaktheanalyticalproblemintotwostepsinordertoexplainpoliticaloutcomes,Iwillconsider,first,thebehaviourofactors,andthen,itsconsequences(seeLebow2014: 4). The analysis of reasons actors give for their choices and behaviour needs accordingly besupplemented with the identification of the mechanisms and processes that turn behaviour intooutcomes. Lebow’smodel of inefficient causationwhich entails amulti-step process of searching forconnections between and among causes at multiple levels of inquiry (ibid.: 65) provides the thirdmethodological sourceof inspiration for this study.Tomeaningfully ‘activate’ themethodofprocess-tracingandtomakeaseriousattemptatlookingfor‘causesofcauses,tracingbackcausallinksasfaraspossible’ (ibid.:144), itwouldbe important to interviewalsopolicy-makers inorder todetermine theactors’ownviewsofhowRussiaendedupwhereitcurrentlyis intermsofitspoliticalhandlingofthecommunistpast.WhileitisunlikelyforanEstonianscholartoreceivetopicalinterviewsfromthemembersandadvisorsofthePutinadministrationinthecurrentpoliticalatmosphere,itmightstillbepossibletogetaccess to themembersof theStandingCommitteeonHistoricalMemory,23andpossiblyeven thefunctionariesoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs.

TheanalyticalmodelforeseestwobasicwaysofengagingwithTJ:thatis,(i)areflexiveand(ii)amnemonicsecurity-orientedapproach.Whilethepursuitofontologicalsecurityisarguablycentraltothehuman condition (Browning 2016), the strategies of aspiring a sense of ontological security cansignificantlyvary,withmajorconsequencesforstate’spredispositionforcooperationorconfrontationinitsforeignpolicies.Isuggestthatareflexiveapproachinstate’sreckoningwithitsantecedentregime’shuman rights violations and international crimes tends to contribute towards amore systematic andcomprehensiveadoptionofarangeofTJmeasures.Showcasingadaptabilityandadevelopedabilitytocopewithchangeinreckoningwiththelegaciesofthepast‘self’(cf.Craib1998:72)indicates,inturn,aheightenedcapacityforaself-reflexive,creativeandinnovativeengagementwiththechangingworld(cf.Giddens1991:40-1),andlaysthebasisforamorecooperativestanceinstate’sforeignpolicy.Meanwhile,if state’s approach towards coming to terms with its repressive legacies is geared towards thesafeguardingandsecuritisationofitsgloriousmemoriesand‘usefulpast’attheexpenseofengagingwiththemoreproblematic chapters in its history, self-interrogation and self-reflexivity tend to be activelydiscouragedandtheadoptionofTJremainaccordingly limitedorhighlyselective (tothedegreeof itssubstantivedismissal).Thecallstorevisitstate’spast‘self’arethusresisted,thealternativeapproachesdepictedasdangerousandunderminingforthestate’ssenseofontologicalcontinuity,leadingeventually

23 This is a subcommittee on the Presidential Council of Human Rights. See http://president-sovet.ru/about/comissions/permanent/read/5/(accessedJune5,2016).

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to a more confrontational stance vis-à-vis the perceived challengers of the state’s mainstream self-narrativeininternationalsociety.

My main hypothesis is that Russia’s ambivalent settlement of its relationship towards therepressiveSovietlegacy,exacerbatedbytheconflictbetweentheemergingglobalnormati