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1
State-Owned Banks in Brazil and India: Recent Experiences Compared1
Maria Antonieta Del Tedesco Lins2
Paper to be presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention,
San Diego, April 1-4 2012
Panel: Challenges and Responses in the Global Financial Sector
(Sunday, April 01, 2012 1:45 PM)
Abstract
The study of the importance of state-owned banks in the dynamics of national economies,
economic development and social policies has assumed prominence especially since the 1990s
amid a diffusion of liberal policies and the opening of financial systems, particularly among
emerging markets. However, in large emerging economies, the presence of state banks remains a
key element of national financial dynamics. Brazil and India are part of this group of economies.
In Brazil, three federal financial institutions account for a significant portion of credit, and
operate according to a specific division of labor in the financial sector. In India, even after a
major liberalizing reform in the 1990s, public banks still account for more than 80% of credit
and deposits. This paper aims to compare the role, space and operation of public financial
institutions in both countries and the particular characteristics of each experience.
Next steps of the research will examine the hypothesis that public banks in Brazil and India have
functioned as instruments of the promotion of public policies - whether these policies be geared
towards development or seek to stimulate economic activity.
1. Introduction
The presence, size, and scope of state-owned financial institutions in both developed and
developing nations are a controversial subject in political and academic debates. Since the 1960s
and 1970s, there has been extensive literature that identifies the problems caused by excessive
state presence and regulation in the financial system and that defines situations as representative
of financial repression. These works have contributed to the dissemination of ideas and financial
1 This work is a preliminary version prepared for discussion at the International Studies Association Convention
2012 and is part of a wider research project. Please do not cite. For updated versions, please contact the author. Research assistance of Kevin Gatter is gratefully acknowledged. 2 Institute of International Relations, University of São Paulo, Brazil.
2
liberalization policies in both the domestic and international spheres (e.g. McKinnon and Shaw,
1973).
The study of the importance of state-owned banks in the dynamics of the economy, economic
development and the reduction of inequality have become increasingly relevant since the 1990s
in the midst of the implementation of liberalization policies and the opening of financial systems,
especially in developing countries. The 2008-2009 economic crisis gave rise to new questioning
of financial liberalization due to the consequences of excessive deregulation and financial
institutions’ limited scope of action. National governments strongly intervened and were
followed by the nationalization of financial institutions, only this time, in circumstances and for
reasons that were completely different.
This paper intends to compare – in a preliminary manner – the size, space, and the actions of
state-owned financial institutions in two large emerging economies: Brazil and India. More
precisely, the objective of this text is to briefly discuss the role played by these institutions since
the industrialization period as instruments of public policies and their respective roles within
national financial systems.
A comparative study of public banks in different emerging economies could provide
important insight for understanding their role in economic development and assessing the notion
that public financial institutions excel due to the inefficiency and prevalence of political interests
in their operations. More broadly, the research intends to examine the hypothesis that public
banks in Brazil and India have functioned as instruments of the promotion of public policies
(whether these policies be geared towards development or seek to stimulate economic activity)
as well as the notion that they were tools for countercyclical policies in different moments before
and during the global economic crisis of 2008-2009. This will be completed more thoroughly in
further studies.
The comparison between India and Brazil fits various criteria. In addition to the magnitude
of its public banking system – more than three-quarters of the banking system is under state
control, if we consider figures as total deposits, interest income or number of offices– India’s
historical experience of strong state participation in the financial system, financial reforms
implemented in the early 1990s, and its recent experiences (such as with microfinance) justify
the study. In Brazil, state participation in the financial sector is remarkable and public
3
institutions have clear specificities despite the deep transformation in the public banking
landscape in early 2000s, with the privatization of the state banks. Three Brazilian federal banks
are responsible for a considerable part of total credit and they operated according to a very
precise and logical pattern, which establishes a clear division of labor between them.
The presence of public institutions has been determinant for the evolution of the Brazilian
and Indian financial systems. Because of their size and eventual advantages, public banks bring
specific features to the functioning of the markets. At first glance, one sees more similarities than
differences between the two countries’ banking systems. But there are considerable differences
that must be explained by distinct factors such as their political history, macroeconomic stability
and precise choices concerning the liberalization process that began in the 1990s in both
countries.
Table 1 brings some general information about the two financial systems. After financial
reforms in India (initiated in 1991) and the stabilization process in Brazil, Brazilian monetary
reform happened in 1994 and a new macroeconomic policy framework was adopted in 1999.
The two economies then witnessed a deep transformation in their financial system both by
further institutional reforms and by the new dynamics in domestic markets. Nonetheless, credit
provided by the banking system remains relatively low when compared to more advanced
economies. Interest rates are charged extremely high in the Brazilian case and relatively low – as
a result of monetary and financial policies – in India. Banking market dynamics seem different in
both countries possibly due to the role assumed by public financial institutions.
Brazil and India are large economies, with a considerably important industrial sector, large
domestic markets and, flourishing, though underdeveloped, capital markets.
4
Table 1. Some General Indicators of Brazilian and Indian Financial Sectors
Domestic credit
provided by banking
sector (% of GDP)
Lending interest rates, % Real interest rates, %
Bank
nonperforming
loans to total gross
loans (%)
Market
capitalization of
listed companies (%
of GDP)
Brazil India Brazil India Brazil India Brazil India Brazil India
1997 59,4 46,1 78,2 13,8 65,5 6,9 -- -- 29,3 31,3
2000 71,9 53,0 56,8 12,3 47,7 8,5 8,3 12,8 35,1 32,2
2005 74,5 58,4 55,4 10,8 44,9 6,3 3,5 5,2 53,8 66,3
2006 86,6 60,9 50,8 11,2 42,1 4,5 3,5 3,3 65,3 86,1
2007 92,2 60,8 43,7 13,0 35,8 6,9 3,0 2,5 100,3 146,4
2008 96,9 68,2 47,3 13,3 35,9 6,2 3,1 2,3 35,7 53,2
2009 97,5 69,4 44,7 12,2 36,8 4,3 4,2 2,3 73,2 85,4
2010 97,8 71,1 40,0 -- 30,4 -- 3,8 -- 74,0 93,5
Source: World Bank Database
After this introduction, the paper has four more sections. Section 2 briefly presents the pillars
of the debate. Section 3 looks at the role of public banks in emerging countries, more precisely in
Brazil and India, in the past two decades and during the recent economic crisis. The last section
proposes an initial reflection on the similarities and differences of the two cases.
2. The Debate Concerning State-Owned Financial Institutions
The discussion around public financial institutions’ structure, modus operandi, and
effectiveness of action has awakened a keen interest in social sciences and economics. In the
undertow of the wave of liberalization and privatization initiated in the 1990s, the restructuring
and reorganization of national financial systems occurred unevenly, even in regions with strong
economic integration, such as the European Union.
Efficiency of free markets versus state participation: the intense debate
The strong presence of the State setting and executing development policies in the majority
of developing countries is consensual, yet the debate concerning the quality of the actions of the
public sector still raises diverse opinions. Among the State institutions directly inserted into
development policies are the banks, and not simply development banks that were created
specifically to finance public and private productive investment and were responsible for the
5
transformation of national productive structures, but also specialized financial institutions linked
to determined social policies, such as rural credit, financing for housing, consumer credit, etc.
Since the 1990s, the notion that all markets should be free became increasingly accepted and
was disseminated throughout the world, acquiring a near-sacred nature in many developing
countries. Nevertheless, and until even the strongest defenders of markets agreed with this
affirmation, there exists a complex set of prerequisites for private markets to be able to function
efficiently. These include guaranteed property rights, respect for contracts, and a well-
functioning judicial system.
During the last twenty years, developing countries applied liberalization policies in varying
degrees, with mixed results. The strategies of quick privatization in countries with low
institutional solidity led to distortion and generated inefficiency, which partially neutralized the
benefits obtained from market openings. It is not strange that, given the mediocre results of
these reforms, proposals for the reassertion of state control and the defense of old populist
strategies are once again gaining strength. More recently, the debate acquired new contours due
to the strong actions of national states aimed at supporting and stimulating national economies
since the 2008-2009 international economic crisis.
Regarding financial intermediation, the discussion can acquire an even more dramatic tone,
owing to the fact that this activity is seen as a fundamental instrument in development policies,
beyond having an undeniable political weight on account of its intrinsic role in distributing
resources for the financing of certain sectors and policies. It is not by chance, therefore, that in
Brazil, the financial system was considered to be a “national security” sector and was also the
last economic sector to be open to foreign capital.
State-owned banks are present in all regions of the world despite their diminishing relative
importance, not to mention the bailout policies in advanced economies after the crisis. If the
diagnoses that led to the implementation of the reforms were correct, privatizing public banks
would lead to better efficiency in their activities, an increase in credit offered, and an improved
distribution of resources.
The existence of state-owned banks is justified by arguments related to development and,
above all, social policies. These institutions should be capable of guaranteeing access to credit to
key sectors and activities for development which could not be sufficiently supplied by the
6
market. Specifically, public institutions should be able to do the following activities: provide
banking services for regions that are far away from the most dynamic economic poles; make
credit available to sectors that are vital for development; and execute a countercyclical credit
policy during recession.
At the same time, and following arguments that favor privatization, political control over
public financial institutions would permit certain groups in power to obtain individual benefits,
sometimes to the detriment of development and macroeconomic efficiency.
The contribution of La Porta et al (2002) has been widely cited and discussed as an empirical
confirmation of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of public banks’ ownership to economic
development. The study deals with data from the 1970s to mid-1990s and does not address the
changes occurred from the processes of privatization and financial liberalization. Its main
objective is not to analyze the public banks’ goals amidst the different development strategies
adopted by less developed countries in this period.
Along with the various political and theoretical considerations and against the backdrop of
fiscal imbalance that many developing countries had been suffering since the mid-1980s, the
privatization of public banks should promote a profound restructuring of financial systems and
give them better efficiency while offering them more credit. However, empirical studies (Micco
and Panizza, 2005 and Yeyati et al., 2005) do not show that in all cases there was a consistent
improvement in these parameters. However, these studies argue that public banks do not
guarantee access to credit to sectors that are deemed necessary for development, such as small-
and medium-sized businesses and the agricultural sector, among others.
The privatization process in Latin America was stimulated and accelerated by events that
originated in the rupture of the established system. These crises began in the period that
preceded the privatizations and were caused by the breakdown of the models of financing
development that had been adopted until the 1980s, installing severe macroeconomic imbalances
and opening up a new era of stabilization policies throughout the continent. The failure of these
stabilization policies deepened the financial dilemma during the 1990s and opened another round
of reforms, including the privatization and opening of national financial systems (Mexico,
Argentina, and Brazil in the early 1990s).
7
The experiences with the nationalization of financial institutions vary considerably between
the large emerging economies. Despite not being a central objective of this study, it is
interesting to remember the Mexican case, in which policies of nationalization, privatization, and
“foreignization” were put in place, above all, by macroeconomic urgencies that stemmed from
the economic crises that Mexico suffered during the 1980s and 1990s (Turrent Díaz, 2009).
Faced with deepening macroeconomic crises, development mandates and ‘classical’ public
banks’ functions simply disappear. Sandoval (2011) goes beyond the economic approach,
proposing that banking and financial policies in Mexico from the early 1980s to 2000 responded
primarily to governments’ political needs of specific support and alliances with private sector
groups.
Liberalization policies were established in India in the context of a more general political
reorientation. The scope of the liberalization process was quite broad and inspired by the desire
to make the banking system more market-oriented by reducing restrictions and rules on credit
operations and widening the entrance of new players, namely new private and foreign banks. At
the same time, public banks were allowed to raise money from markets. The measures would
necessarily lead to enhancing competition and increasing public financial institutions’
profitability. The financial reforms in India were gradual and, according to many authors (Shah
et al, 2008; among others), incomplete.
In Brazil, the decrease in the number of public financial institutions was, above all, an
inevitable response to inefficiencies and corruption in the state banks. From 1994 to 2002, the
Brazilian government privatized state banks in Brazil.3 The entrance of foreign banks occurred
around the same period, during which a profound transformation was in course in the national
financial system as a consequence of monetary stabilization and its effects on the functioning of
banks in a lower inflation situation.
Although a general liberalizing wave could be seen in the emerging world during the 1990s,
diverse national characteristics in both the political and economic trajectories of the countries
must be analyzed to understand the space occupied by state-owned banks and their
transformation since that moment.
3 Each Brazilian state had, traditionally, its commercial and development bank.
8
In this way, clearly, even considering that there is still a long way to go in terms of research
work, the study of the importance of public banks in large emerging economies reveals important
particularities of each case, many of which are a result of the political evolution of each country.
3. Recent Public Banks Experiences in Emerging Economies: Brazil and India
As briefly reviewed above, there exists vast literature on the contribution of public financial
institutions to economic development – in terms of the reduction of the differential of credit
opportunities between big businesses and small- and medium-sized ones, in financing low-rent
sectors, and in social policies – and on the impact of privatizations on the efficiency of the
banking system. Nonetheless, there is still ample space to expand on studies related to this
subject, especially in the wake of the financial crisis that started in 2008 and led to a series of
state interventions. This action reignited this debate, especially in the case of India and Brazil,
whose public banking and state regulation systems are very significant determinants of financial
sector dynamics.
Important requisites for the functioning of a financial system – of any type and with any
degree of private participation – include the rules and practices of supervision and the guarantee
of deposits. Public banks are subject to these rules, which can vary deeply according to the share
of public institutions in the banking sector and government policies.
In India, the politics of so-called ‘social responsibility of banks’ gave the tonus to the credit
markets since the 1970s. In Brazil, the three federal banks were at the center of all
industrialization and development policies in all times. The dynamics of financing, however,
were profoundly determined by inflation and debt crises, as in other Latin American countries. In
fact, the political and inflationary histories of almost all Latin American countries did not allow
for the creation during the second half of the 20th
century of the institutional bases for the
implementation of solid– and essentially private – financial systems, although with numerous
differences among them. In the absence of desired institutional guarantees, the price charged by
financial intermediaries should incorporate the risk of operating in these markets.
In this context, the private participants in the Latin American financial systems did not
always contribute to the development of the national economies. The public sector maintained
its banks, implementing public policies and accounting for the main development financing,
9
namely in the Brazilian case through its development bank, BNDES. At the same time, and in
the case of commercial public banks, they had to reconcile public policies and operations within
the logic of their private counterparts.
The Indian example has many interesting characteristics. According to Armijo (1997), the
nationalization of intermediaries and financial activities was a central policy of the state and was
put into practice shortly after independence and dictated by the ideological orientation of the
parties in power. Policies were defined by the necessity to build national cohesion and loyalty
through use of financial markets as central instruments in development policies. At the same
time, the policy reflected the desire to limit the power of the private sector.
Therefore, it is possible to observe, from the outset, distinctions in relation to the experiences
of Latin America related to the political orientation of their governments. Nevertheless, as in
Brazil, financing of the economy by state-owned institutions in India occurred largely during
periods of industrialization beyond all the possible distortions and problems that this could bring
to the financial system.
During the last decade, the effects of financial liberalization and privatization that many
developing countries had put into place brought the validity of these policies into question. This
paper does not seek to evaluate the main results of the wave of reforms that occurred in the
developing world starting in the 1990s; rather, it seeks to study the role played by state financial
institutions during this period in two countries with industrial economies – even if the degree of
industrialization and the share of public institutions in total banking activities are very different –
dealing with large inequalities and social deficits. In both these countries, public banks
traditionally had primary importance in both development policies and in political relations.
The importance of public banks in developing countries
Despite the fact that their participation has declined since the 1990s, public banks still play
an important role in the financial activities of developing economies. After the financial crisis
began in 2008, keeping in mind the bankruptcy and restructuring of big banks in the most
industrialized countries, the financial institutions of the developing countries assumed better
relative positions in the international financial system. Among the largest banks of the
developing countries were the state banks of the countries under study, as shown in the table
below.
10
Table 2. Banks of Developing Countries and Western Banks Present in Developing Countries
Bank
Market
capitalization
(US$ billion)
Global
ranking Country
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 226 1 China
Construction Bank of China 187 2 China
HSBC 176 5 United Kingdom
Bank of China 145 7 China
Citigroup 126 8 USA
Itaú Unibanco 84 11 Brazil
Sberbank 58 20 Russia
Bradesco 54 24 Brazil
UniCredit 50 29 Italy
BBVA 47 32 Spain
Banco do Brasil 42 34 Brazil
Al Rajhi Bank 33 43 Saudi Arabia
State Bank of India 32 44 India
Bank CITIC China 32 45 China
VTB Bank 27 48 Russia
Standard Bank 23 54 South Africa
ICICI Bank 23 55 India
Source: Selected institutions in The Economist. A special report on banking in emerging markets, 15/05/2010.
Original Source: Bloomberg
The study of state financial institutions requires a previous characterization of these
institutions according to the type of activities that they perform: commercial banks, development
banks, banks devoted toward specific policies such as rural credit, housing, etc. Logically, it
would be expected that state presence would be concentrated in the financing of development
and social policies. In Brazil three main federal financial institutions act as much in commercial
banking activities (Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econômica Federal - Brazilian Savings Bank) as
in social policies (Caixa Econômica Federal, Banco do Brasil in housing, agriculture,
microcredit, small and medium enterprises) and in the most substantive part of investment
financing (BNDES). In the case of India, public institutions (State Bank of India and associates,
plus nationalized banks) are present in various segments of the banking sector and there is not a
clear ‘division of labor’ among specific institutions, although there has been, during the period of
industrialization, a stricter design for some institutions. According to Shah et al (2008):
“In India, financial sector policy has traditionally forced a silo model. Unit Trust of India
(UTI) was a pure (government-owned) mutual fund. Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) was a
11
pure (government-owned) insurance company. State Bank of India (SBI) was a pure
(government-owned) bank. Each firm did only one business. In addition, each firm faced
only one regulator. The silo model is in force even today. (…) The effort of the government
has been to reorganize the financial sector into pieces which fit conveniently into the
structure of government agencies.” (p. 166)
The authors affirm that the largest institutions succeeded to grow and built financial
conglomerates with diverse activities and then escaped what proved to be a restraining structure.
The institutions that form the Brazilian financial system were organized following a logic of
specialization by a deep financial reform led by the military regime in 1964. At that moment, the
Brazilian financial system was clearly repressed by limits on interest rates and official credit
policies, which discouraged savings formation and market lending in a context of increasing
inflation rates. Moreover, a lack of specialization and segmented operations of the existing
financial institutions limited credit markets’ development. The ‘economic miracle’ (1968-73)
benefited intensively from the reforms, and credit was a crucial element of household
consumption during the period. The slowdown in economic activity, the end of the ‘miracle’,
and the chronic inflationary process worsening since early 1980s, combined with the external
crisis subverted what could be a normal functioning of financial intermediation.
Since the success of the macroeconomic stabilization programs enacted in 1994, the
Brazilian financial system underwent profound transformations started by the radical change in
its own logic of functioning since the control of the sharp inflationary process. Banks had to
redefine their set of operations, their administrative and institutional size. This movement also
led to the opening of markets to foreign institutions during the 1990s. Differently from the Indian
case, Brazil did not implement a somewhat articulated set of financial reforms in the 1990s. The
changes were being implemented as the necessity arose.
In the wake of the restructuring of the system as a whole, the public banks were also
transformed. They needed to adapt themselves to the new competitive dynamic and reduce
costs. The study of the participation of the public banks in the Brazilian financial system since
1994 clearly demonstrates the reduction of their relative importance in terms of banking capital
and granting credit, among other indicators. These figures illustrate the privatization of an
important group of public institutions, namely state banks, as mentioned above.
Despite the broad movement of reducing direct state participation in the economy which
started since the financial and fiscal crisis of the public sector during the 1980s, the main federal
12
banks continued under state control and gradually adapted to the new reality of markets and
maintained the primary positions among the financial institutions operating in the country.
The waves of liberalization had diverse effects in various developing countries as a whole
and particularly so in Latin America. Whereas Chile witnessed decreasing state participation in
the economy, with only 12% of the banking system in state hands by 2000, in Brazil public
banks possess approximately one-third of total net assets in the country’s banking institutions. In
India, this amount remains impressive: public banks possessed, in 2010, about three-quarters of
all net assets in the banking system.
As was mentioned above, most of the Indian banking system remains under state control.
State Bank of India and its associates, for example, have more than eighteen thousand branches,
more than 280 thousand employees, and widen their branches’ net with impressive speed
throughout national territory. The space occupied by the institution in Indian social life is huge.
The institution is among the top 100 worldwide in terms of size of net assets, as is illustrated in
Table 2.4
India possesses a large financial system with different types of institutions.5 Despite having
been relatively developed prior to independence in 1947, the Indian financial system flourished
and solidified following the nationalization of the two largest commercial banks, a process which
occurred in two waves: the first occurred post-independence, during the 1950s, and the second
started in 1969, under the rule of Indira Gandhi (Armijo, 1997).
Since independence, the Indian financial system was the subject of strong control by the
government, embodied by direct control over markets and institutions, programs of public credit,
and intervention in the determination of the prices of financial assets. Common interpretations
affirm that this institutional structure contributed to the establishment of a segmented financial
system and to the exiguity of important markets, such as that of public bonds and foreign
exchange operations. Despite the presence of these inefficiencies, the system grew significantly.
In early 1990s, a wide package of reforms of the financial system was implemented in India.
Many changes were introduced with the aim of bringing greater allocative efficiency to the
markets and to create a large integrated market through the actions of pre-existing institutions.
4 O’Neill, Dominic. India’s state-owned banks compete with private firms. Euromoney, September 08, 2008.
5 Shah et al (2008) propose a classification of firms operating in financial market as fund-based, transaction
oriented and infrastructure financial firms.
13
Concretely, India sought to liberalize the different sectors of the financial markets through the
deregulation of interest rates and by stimulating a more market-oriented focus among existing
institutions. Compared to other large emerging economies, the reforms in India were quite timid.
Despite the fact that there was a unanimous perception of the advances introduced by the
institutional changes in terms of financial regulation and diversification, existing literature also
presents an undeniable skepticism relating to the real extent and effectiveness of these reforms.
Bhattacharya and Patel (2003) argue that these reforms were unable to eliminate the inherent
fragility of the system, as inefficiencies remained a dangerous element of systemic risk. The
banking system still has an important volume of non-performing loans, which exposes financial
institutions to the occurrence of crises and demands interventions from the government. Jena et
al. (2004) identify low integration between markets, especially as regards the flow of external
resources.
One must keep in mind that Indian financial institutions, as in almost every country, operate
according to the rules determined by the central bank (Reserve Bank of India – RBI). In the
Indian case, the regulatory framework has been traditionally rigid and has brought considerable
restrictions to the functioning of the financial markets (Shah et al., 2008). Sen and Vaidya (1997)
discuss the background of the early 1990s reforms and show how rules on direct credit restrained
the operation scope of banks – in the majority public at the time – and also reduced degrees of
freedom on the classic monetary policy execution. The establishment of the policy of “priority
sector lending requirements” (PSLR) meant that a large part of the banks’ resources had to go to
specific sectors on precise interest rates. In short, despite the financial reforms and their goal to
make a more market-oriented financial system, numerous restrictions remain in place: reserve
requirements are high, directed credit still represents a considerable part of the banks’ lending,
and barriers to entering the banking sector are high.
Table 3 describes the relative importance of Indian banks by ownership structure. The share
of public institutions is extremely high. There is also a lower profitability of public banks in
relation to private national and foreign ones. A more general look, however, is unable to capture
the specificities of the performance of these institutions. It is true that the State Bank of India,
present in all segments of banking intermediation and throughout the country, shows a
differential in profitability and efficiency in the different activities in which e it participates.
14
This institution deserves a more careful study and particularly a comparison to the Banco do
Brasil.
Table 3. Profile of Indian Banking Institutions by Origin of Capital
State Bank of
India and
Associates
Nationalized
Banks
Private
Banks
Foreign
Banks Total
Number of offices 18114 43187 10387 310 71998
Number of agencies (as % of total) 25.2% 60.0% 14.4% 0.4% 100.0%
Number of employees 267332 467262 182284 27742 944620
Number of employees (as % of total) 28.3% 49.5% 19.3% 2.9% 100.0%
Businesses by employee (billions of rupees) 735.52 947.40 798.37 1445.87 873.32
Profit by employee (billions of rupees) 4.65 5.74 7.19 17.09 6.05
Capital and Reserves and Surplus 19.5% 36.6% 27.9% 16.1% 100.0%
Deposits 23.3% 54.4% 17.3% 5.0% 100.0%
Investments 22.0% 48.2% 20.6% 9.3% 100.0%
Interest revenue 23.6% 50.2% 19.9% 6.3% 100.0%
Other revenue 23.4% 38.2% 25.7% 12.7% 100.0%
Interest expenditures 24.3% 53.6% 18.8% 3.3% 100.0%
Operational expenditures 25.3% 40.9% 22.7% 11.1% 100.0%
Wages as a % of total expenditures 17.03 13.65 12.76 23.48 14.83
Return on Assets 0.91 1.00 1.28 1.26 1.05 Source: Reserve Bank of India
Empirical works such as Koeva (2003) show the effects of financial reforms on the actions of
Indian financial institutions. The results point to reductions in market concentration, decrease of
spreads and profitability. In the same way, relationships between profitability, bank ownership,
and institutional restrictions are observed: operations with priority sectors would lead to worse
performance for the financial institution.
Even recognizing the presence of various inefficiencies caused by the public sector
participation in India’s financial system, it is important to study and identify the effects of this
participation in social and development policies. On the side of the boisterous chorus advocating
the reduction of the role of the state in financial activities, it seems pertinent to understand the
extent of these actions and the political forces that legitimize them. Naastepad (2004) points to
15
the positive effects of these credit policies that, while imposing lower profitability to the
financial institutions, are responsible for changes in demand, investment, production conditions
and revenue in the whole system.
Goyal (2012) argues that reforms brought some room to improve competition through
interest rate policy and product differentiation. But regulation on interest rates remains high, as
do spreads on banking operations.
Brazilian financial history differs at the origin from the Indian one. It is true that the three big
federal banks were created and changed through times according to political priorities. They
were also pillars of development policies. Nevertheless, Brazil never experienced a process of
bank nationalization like in India.
The reorganization of the Brazilian baking system as noted above led to a very concentrated
market, in which public sector banks detain a very large share, as show Tables 4 and 5. Among
the five largest financial institutions in Brazil – considering the amount of total assets in
September 20011 – three are federal banks.
16
Table 4. Size and Performance of the 15 Largest Brazilian Financial Institutions,
September 2011
(in R$ million)
Institution Ownership type Total Assets
Total Credit
Operations
(all types)
Total
deposits Net profit
Number
of
branches
Basel
Index
BB Public Federal 907.743.033 377.138.941 420.159.382 2.917.937 5.156 14,5
ITAU Private National 810.464.986 279.459.945 236.857.142 3.820.013 3.796 15,1
BRADESCO Private National 636.399.735 229.307.022 225.352.433 2.820.175 3.953 15
BNDES Public Federal 567.894.785 195.871.993 21.163.632 2.587.126 1 21,6
CEF Public Federal 507.306.734 227.029.335 256.713.185 1.291.175 2.252 13,4
SANTANDER Private Foreign Contr 422.407.010 165.838.701 119.942.787 880.656 2.449 24,2
HSBC Private Foreign Contr 152.265.999 46.936.409 75.681.770 469.435 868 13,4
VOTORANTIM Private National 127.354.340 59.516.740 24.965.585 -85.313 34 12,7
SAFRA Private National 89.106.267 39.546.969 16.936.365 303.689 103 12,7
CITIBANK Private Foreign Contr 62.329.592 12.981.270 16.609.709 354.698 128 17,5
BTG PACTUAL Private Foreign Partic 59.516.071 4.983.623 14.782.056 173.372 6 21,3
BANRISUL Public State 36.785.420 19.058.166 21.176.742 239.270 440 15,5
DEUTSCHE Private Foreign Contr 33.511.938 1.292.377 2.816.224 93.365 2 13,4
CREDIT SUISSE Private Foreign Contr 28.214.734 2.511.012 3.411.411 124.268 2 22,4
BNB Public Federal 25.641.894 11.051.439 8.816.123 119.103 187 17,3
Total Brazilian Financial System 5048139484 1919704141 1658517543 21347432 20389
Source: Brazilian Central Bank
In relative terms, the three federal banks represent circa 40 per cent of the whole financial
system in total assets, credit and total deposits.
Brazil did not undergo a formal financial reform to reduce state participation in the financial
system. As noted before, the transformations were mainly the result of market adjustment to the
post super-inflation period, together with a non-aggressive opening to foreign institutions.
Federal banks consolidated their space in a more concentrated market and gained from their
relative advantages compared to private banks.
17
Table 5. Relative Importance of the Ten Largest Brazilian Financial Institutions
(percent of total financial system)
Institution Ownership type Total Assets Total Credit
Operations (all types) Total deposits
BB Public Federal 18,0 19,6 25,3
ITAU Private National 16,1 14,6 14,3
BRADESCO Private National 12,6 11,9 13,6
BNDES Public Federal 11,2 10,2 1,3
CEF Public Federal 10,0 11,8 15,5
SANTANDER Private Foreign Contr 8,4 8,6 7,2
HSBC Private Foreign Contr 3,0 2,4 4,6
VOTORANTIM Private National 2,5 3,1 1,5
SAFRA Private National 1,8 2,1 1,0
CITIBANK Private Foreign Contr 1,2 0,7 1,0
BTG PACTUAL Private Foreign Partic 1,2 0,3 0,9
BANRISUL Public State 0,7 1,0 1,3
DEUTSCHE Private Foreign Contr 0,7 0,1 0,2
CREDIT SUISSE Private Foreign Contr 0,6 0,1 0,2
BNB Public Federal 0,5 0,6 0,5
Source: Brazilian Central Bank
Given the structure of the Brazilian and Indian financial systems, the relative importance of
state financial institutions and the dynamics of their actions as promoters of public policies, the
further steps of this research should seek to understand the comparative analysis – with the
support of empirical exercises – of the relations between their respective political systems,
governments, and some of the banks. Differences between the two political systems and the
recent economic history of both countries should indicate various specificities in the actions of
public banks. In Brazil, the program of reorganization of public institutions in early 2000s led to
the disappearance of state banks and, consequently, a redistribution of their old activities. In
India, state institutions are still greatly important despite being objects of criticisms relating to
inefficiency and corruption.6
6 The subject of corruption, despite present in the history of financial institutions in both countries, will not be a
subject of discussion of this paper, remaining instead as one of the factors for the evaluation of the degree of efficiency of these institutions.
18
Brazilian and Indian Banks since the International Crisis of 2008
As everywhere in the world, the financial crisis of 2008-09 affected Brazil and India in two
major areas: international trade and credit restrictions. The liquidity crunch in international
financial markets affected both large companies with the capacity to collect funds in these
markets and financial institutions with operations abroad and with credit portfolios bound to
international markets. It is natural that countries with deeper financial opening would be more
affected by the credit crunch than countries with lower exposure to worldwide markets.
Even with different degrees of financial opening abroad, Brazil and India belong to a group
of developing economies that are relatively less vulnerable to the crisis of liquidity caused by the
collapse of financial institutions in the United States and in other industrialized nations.
Both countries suffered a considerable reduction in economic production/activity in 2008 and
2009, but India did not have a recession and maintained growth rates relatively higher to those
registered in emerging economies during these years. Growth in Brazil is traditionally more
modest, but the speed of recovery was notable.
In this way, lower international exposure and the strong presence of public financial
institutions acted as crucial elements in the reaction to the effects of the crisis. In the two cases,
the presence of certain restrictions and controls on the foreign capital flows – which was much
more accentuated in India than in Brazil – prevented the domestic financial systems from
suffering stronger contamination from the global crisis.7
Besides this, both relatively
conservative financial management and regulation and the unique historical evolution of the
financial systems prevented the financial institutions in both countries from having taken
excessive risks. Goyal (2012) argues that some characteristics of the ‘repressed’ financial
systems in emerging markets acted as a protection for these countries during the crisis. In both
Brazil and India, little external exposure and indebtedness and quite conservative financial
regulation limited risks and allowed the state to pursue more aggressive countercyclical policies.
State-owned banks were key elements of countercyclical policy in both countries. In Brazil,
in spite of some political reactions, federal banks carried out a policy of expansion of credit,
7 It should be noted, in the Indian case, that a source of vulnerability was established not through banking
operations, but through the exposure of Indian transnational companies in the market of London. Large Brazilian companies suffered a similar impact as a result of exchange operations in future markets, yet this phenomenon was not determinant to the economy as a whole.
19
especially to the activities of the domestic market, such as household consumption. In India,
public financial institutions did better during the crisis, lending more than their counterparts
throughout the crisis. Another interpretation could be that deposits were directed towards public
banks knowing that these banks could count on government support in any circumstance (Prasad,
2011).
Issues surrounding the presence, the scope of action and the efficiency of public banks
remain on the agenda. Twenty years after the liberalization reforms began, and with lessons
learned from the recent crises, the financial system is always seen as a key element to support
and long-term growth.
4. Concluding Remarks: Initial Elements of Comparison
Despite their respective crucial importance in national economies, several differences
between the Brazilian and Indian public banks trajectories are perceptible. Not only in terms of
their respective size in domestic financial markets but also their significance and weight in
economic and political life, Brazilian and Indian public banks are remarkably different.
From the point of describing the main characteristics of the two countries on the subject, the
research must now proceed to the specific comparison of the issues that could be identified from
the steps made so far.
The dissimilarities are present in various aspects. They deserve a more accurate – and
eventually quantitative – analysis, but it is already possible after literature review and
observation of row indicators to briefly present some of them.
1. Functions within broader policies of development and sectorial stimuli
In both Brazil and India public banks played precise roles in supporting the finance of
strategic sectors. In India, the task of lending to priority sectors has been spread more broadly
among financial institutions and not concentrated only on public banks. In Brazil, although
policies of direct credit are still in place for agriculture and housing, the margin of operation of
private banks is still broader than the one left for the Indian ones.
20
2. Relations of policies at both the national and subnational levels (definition and
defense of regional interests)
After the privatization of Brazilian state banks, regional credit policies are less clearly
identifiable. Federal banks generally design and implement national policies, with no regional
direction.
3. Relations with private financial intermediaries.
In both countries, public banks share the different market segments with private and market
institutions. The operational framework in the different markets requires a more cautious
analysis of public-private relations and competition.
The Brazilian development bank, BNDES, does not collect funds from markets and runs
separated credit policy, determined by central government. The bank has had, since its creation, a
mandate to promote infrastructure, industry and growth. It has used federal funds, i.e.
compulsory savings federal funds, transfers from Treasury, among others to lend to private
sector companies, according to priorities defined by the federal government. BNDES thus is
unique and does not compete nor share parts of the long term credit markets with private
investment banks. Caixa Econômica Federal and Banco do Brasil combine specific official
credit mandates with typical private credit operations. They compete with their private
counterparts and perform extremely well.
The broad presence of public institutions in Indian financial markets makes the discussion of
their relations with private institutions more complicated. First, there are various types of public
institutions and they are spread out in almost all segments of the different markets. Second,
regulations and restrictions imposed on private financial intermediaries are high and, in many
cases, similar to the ones applied to the public ones. Third, most of these banks are listed in
capital markets. Finally, the transfers of funds from the government to the banks, in the Brazilian
case, give them undeniable advantages compared to the private institutions.
The State Bank of India’s wide presence in Indian banking is comparable to Banco do
Brasil’s presence. Their relative advantages due to size, localization, multiplicity of operation
‘fronts’ show that a comparison between the two institutions may be very relevant.
4. The role of financial regulation and rules of national financial systems
21
Brazil and India have very regulated financial systems. There are deep differences, especially
regarding banking system operations and the institutional form and mandate of the respective
central banks.
***
Summarizing the initial efforts for a comparison, some ideas for discussion are presented in
the following table.
The political environments in Brazil and India were extremely different if we consider the
period 1950-2010 in the analysis. India had always been a democracy during this period and
Brazil had twenty five years of military dictatorship. Efforts for the construction of a national
project for development were made in both countries, although within very different ideological
orientations.
Some of the economic features of the public banks activities were already presented above.
Some more reflections need to be made with the support of data and using a ‘political filter’.
Brazil India
Political orientation
Developmentalism / “National”
project military governors/
remain important during
democratization
Electoral socialism/
Multipartyism /
“Dynastic” democracy (Armijo
2011)
Segmentation and
specialization Clear division of labor
Public banks dominate all
sectors
Financial federalism Preponderant federal action National and subnational action
Efficiency Competition with private
institutions/ “Market reserves”
Smaller than the private sector
Low efficiency
Financial repression?
Arguable and less because of the
actions of public banks than for
other credit policies and
economic features.
Yes. Financial system with
spaces in which to deepen and
diversify transactions scopes
22
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