State v. Alexander, Alaska Ct. App. (2015)

7/25/2019 State v. Alexander, Alaska Ct. App. (2015)

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NOTICE The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the

Pacific Reporter . Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other

formal errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501

Fax: (907) 264-0878E-mail: corrections@ akcourts.us

INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTHESTATEOFALASKA

STATEOFALASKA,

Petitioner&Cross-Respondent,

v.

THOMASHENRYALEXANDER,

Respondent&Cross-Petitioner.

CourtofAppealsNos.A-11423&A-11433 TrialCourtNo.3AN-09-11088CR

O PI N I O N

No.2481December18,2015

Petition for reviewfrom the Superior Court, Third JudicialDistrict,Anchorage,GregoryMiller,Judge.

Appearances:DianeL.Wendlandt,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,Office of Special Pro secutionsandAppeals,Anchorage, andMichael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the

Petitioner.SharonBarr,AssistantPublicDefender,andQuinlanSteiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Respondent.

Gordon L.Vaughan, Vaughan&DeMuro,Colorado Springs ,Colorado,foramicus curiae AmericanPolygraphAssociation.

Before:Mannheimer,ChiefJudge,Allard,Judge,andHanley,

DistrictCourtJudge. *

JudgeMANNHEIMER.

* Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska

ConstitutionandAdministrativeRule24(d).


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Thedefendantinthiscase,ThomasHenryAlexander,isfacingtrialfor

sexualabuseofaminor.ThesuperiorcourthasgrantedAlexandersmotiontointroduce

evidence that he took a polygraph examination, and that the polygraph examiner

concludedthattherewasahighlikelihoodthatAlexanderwasbeingtruthfulwhenhe

deniedcommittingtheallegedactsofabuse.

However,thesuperiorcourtplacedtwoconditionsontheadmissionofthis

polygraphevidence: First,Alexandermustsubmittoanotherpolygraphexamination,

this one administered bya qualified expert of the States choosing. And second,

Alexandermusttakethestandathistrialandsubmittocross-examination.

Bothpartiesnowseekreviewofthesuperiorcourtsdecision. TheStateasksustoreversethesuperiorcourtsdecisionthatpolygraphevidenceisadmissible.

Alexanderasksustovacatethetwoconditionsthatthesuperiorcourt placedonthe

admissionofthepolygraphevidencethathesubmittoaState-administeredpolygraph

examination before trial, and that he take the stand at trial and submit to cross-

examination.

Forthereasonsexplainedinthisopinion,weupholdthesuperiorcourts

rulingsalthough,aswealsoexplain,weleavethesuperiorcourtfreetore-evaluate

itsdecisioninlightofthefactualdevelopmentsinthiscasesincethetimethesuperior

courtissuedthatdecision.

The procedural background of this litigation

ThomasHenryAlexanderstandschargedwithseveralcounts ofsexual

abuseofaminor.

In preparation for trial, Alexandersdefense attorney hiredan expert ,

Dr.DavidC.Raskin,toadministerapolygraphexaminationtohim. Basedontheresults

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ofthisexamination,Dr.Raskinispreparedtotestifythatthereisahighlikelihoodthat

Alexanderwasbeingtruthfulwhen,duringtheexamination,hedeniedcommittingthe

actsofabuse.

Alexandersattorneyfiledamotionrequestinganevidentiaryhearing,so

thathemighthavetheopportunitytoestablishthatpolygraphtestingwasbasedon

scientificallyvalidmethodology,andthatAlexanderspolygraphresultshouldtherefore

beadmissibleathistrial. Alexandersattorneyacknowledgedthat,forty-fiveyearsago,

inPulakis v. State,1 theAlaska SupremeCourtannouncedatotalbanonpolygraph

evidence. ButthedefenseattorneynotedthatPulakis wasdecidedundertheFrye test

fortheadmissibilityofscientificevidenceatestthatwassupersededwhentheAlaskaSupremeCourtadoptedthemoreflexibleDaubert testforscientificevidence.2

Alexandersattorneyarguedthat,becauseAlaskanowusestheDaubert

test,andbecauseofsignificantimprovementsinpolygraphscienceandpracticeinthe

lastfortyyears,polygraphevidenceshouldnowbeadmissibleinthecourtsofAlaska.

WhileAlexanderscasewasbeinglitigated, a similarargumentforthe

admissionofpolygraphevidencewasbeing offeredinanotherpendingcriminalcase,

Griffith v. State,FileNo.3SP-11-103CR. Thedefendantinthatcase,JamesGriffith,

wasalsochargedwithsexualabuseofaminor,andhisattorneyalsohiredDr.Raskinto

administerapolygraphexaminationtohim. AswithAlexander,Dr.Raskinconcluded

thatGriffithwasbeingtruthfulwhenhedeniedthesexualabuse.

1 476P.2d474,478-79(Alaska1970).

2 See Daubertv.MerrellDowPharmaceuticals,Inc.,509U.S.579; 113S.Ct.2786, 125

L.Ed.2d469 (1993) (announcinganewtestforassessing the admissibilityof scientific

evidenceundertheFederalRulesofEvidence);andState v. Coon,974P.2d386,395-98

(Alaska1999)(adoptingtheDaubert testundertheAlaskaRulesofEvidence).

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ThetwojudgeswhowereassignedtoAlexandersandGriffithscases

Superior Court JudgeGregoryMillerandSuperiorCourt Judgepro tempore Daniel

Schallydecidedtoholdaconsolidated hearingto investigatewhetherpolygraph

evidencemettheDaubert standardfortheadmissibilityofscientificevidence. Atthis

hearing,Dr.Raskintestifiedforthedefendants,andanotherexpert,Dr.WilliamIacono,

testifiedfortheState. Bothexpertsdiscussedthecurrentstandardsandtechniquesfor

polygraph examinations, and they offered differingopinionsconcerningtheoverall

reliabilityofpolygraphresults.

Dr.Raskintestifiedthatifpolygraphexaminationsareproperlyconducted

usingthe controlquestiontechnique,onewouldconservativelyexpectpolygraphexaminationstobe90percent accurate(ormore)inassessingtruth-tellingandlying.

Morespecifically,Dr.Raskinpointedtostudieswhichapparentlydemonstratedthatthe

accuracyrateofpolygraphexaminationswasbetween89and98percent.

In contrast, Dr. Iacono testified that the better-conducted studies of

polygraphexaminationsshowedthattheseexaminationshadaccuracyratesofbetween

51percent(essentially,acoinflip)and98percent,withaverageresultsbeingabout70

percentaccurate.

Followingthishearing,thetwosuperiorcourtjudgesissuedajointdecision

inwhichtheyheldthatcontrolquestionpolygraphevidencemettheDaubert test,and

thatAlexanderandGriffithwereconditionallyentitledtointroduceevidenceoftheir

polygraphresults. Thetwoconditionsthatthejudgesplacedonthisevidencewere:

(1) that each defendant would be required to submit to an additional polygraph

examination,thisoneadministeredbyaqualifiedexamineroftheStateschoosing,and

(2) that each defendant would be required to testify at trialand submit to cross-

examination.

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Followingthis ruling, theStatepetitionedustoreviewandreverse the

superior courts holding that polygraph evidence meets theDaubert standard for

scientificevidence. Thetwodefendants,AlexanderandGriffith,filedcross-petitions

askingustovacatethetwoconditionsthatthesuperiorcourtplacedontheadmissionof

theirpolygraphevidence. WegrantedtheStatespetitionandthedefendantscross-

petitions,andweorderedformalbriefing.

Butwhile thiscasewasstillin its briefingstage,GriffithtookaState-

administeredpolygraphexaminationandheapparentlyfailedtheexam. Griffiththen

pleadedguilty,andhewithdrewhiscross-petition. ThisleavesAlexanderastheonly

defendantinthiscase.

The legal background of this litigation: the Daubert test that governs the

admissibility of scientific evidence

Formostofthetwentiethcentury,theadmissibilityofscientificevidence

inAmericancourtswasgovernedbythegeneralscientificacceptancetestthatwasfirst

announcedinFrye v. United States,293F.1013(D.C.Cir.1923).Frye was,infact,

anotherliedetectorcasealthoughthetestingmachineatissueinFrye wasa less

sophisticatedprecursorofthemodernpolygraph;itwasamachinethatonlymeasured

apersonssystolicbloodpressure.

TheFrye courtdeclaredthatscientificevidencewouldbeadmissibleonly

whenitwasadducedfromawell-recognizedscientificprincipleordiscoverywhich

thecourtdefinedasaprincipleordiscoverysufficientlyestablished[as]tohavegained

generalacceptanceintheparticularfieldinwhichitbelongs.Id. at1014.

Applyingthisgeneralacceptancetest,theFrye courtconcludedthatlie

detectorevidence was not admissiblebecause ithadnotyetgained[this levelof]

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standingandscientificrecognitionamongphysiologicalandpsychologicalauthorities.

Ibid.

Closetofiftyyearslater,inPulakis v. State,476P.2d474(Alaska1970),

theAlaskaSupremeCourtappliedtheFrye testtopolygraphevidenceandconcluded

thatthistypeofevidencewasstillnotadmissible,becausethepolygraphstillhadnot

gained general scientific acceptance as a reliable method of assessinga persons

truthfulness. The supreme court emphasized that its rulingwasnot based on an

affirmative findingthat polygraph testingwas in factunreliable. Rather, the court

explained,theproponentofthepolygraphevidencehadfailedtooffersufficientproof

that the polygraph wasgenerally accepted as reliable within the relevant scientificcommunity.Id. at479. Thus, thecourtdeclared,[j]udicialacceptanceofpolygraph

testsmustawaittheresultsofmorepersuasiveexperimentalproofofreliability.Ibid.

Butin1993,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtabandonedtheFrye test. In

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,509U.S.579,113S.Ct.2786,125

L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the Supreme Court ruled that the FederalRules ofEvidence

embodiedanewtestforscientificevidencethatsupersededFrye.

UndertheDaubert test, thequestionisnolongerwhetherthescientific

communityhasreachedaconsensusregardingthevalidityofascientificdiscoveryor

technique. Instead,theinquirynowfocusesonwhethertheproposedscientificevidence

(1)isbasedonreasoningormethodology[that]isscientificallyvalid,and(2)whether

thatreasoningormethodologyproperlycanbeappliedtothefactsinissue. 509U.S.

at592-93,113S.Ct.at2796.

TheSupremeCourtoffered anon-exhaustivelistoffactors thatcourts

shouldconsiderwhenansweringthesefoundationalquestions. Oneofthesefactorsis

theoldFrye testwhethertheproposedscientifictheoryortechniquehasattained

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generalacceptanceintherelevantscientificcommunity. Theotherfactorslistedbythe

Courtare:

whether the proposedscientific theoryor technique has been (or at least

can be) empirically tested that is, whether the theoryor technique is

falsifiableandrefutable;

whethertheproposedscientifictheoryortechniquehasbeensubjectedtopeer

reviewandpublication;and

whethertheknownorpotentialerrorrateoftheproposedtheoryortechnique

iswithinacceptable limits,andwhethertherearerecognizedstandardsand

protocolstocontrolvariationsintheapplicationofthetechnique.509U.S.at593-94,113S.Ct.at2796-97. TheSupremeCourtemphasizedthatany

inquiryunderthistestshouldbeaflexibleonewhosebasicpurposeistoascertainthe

scientific validity and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability of the

principlesthatunderlietheproposed [scientificevidence]. 509U.S.at594-95,113

S.Ct. at 2797. TheDaubert test focuses on [the] principles and methodology

underlyingtheproposedscientificevidence,509U.S.at595,113S.Ct.at2797,andon

whethertheexpertsconclusionshaveasufficientanalyticalnexustothoseunderlying

principlesandmethodology. General Electric Co. v. Joiner,522U.S.136,146;118

S.Ct.512,519;139L.Ed.2d508(1997).

TheAlaskaSupremeCourthasadoptedtheDaubert testasthegoverning

testfortheadmissibilityofscientificevidenceunderAlaskalaw. State v. Coon,974

P.2d386,395-98(Alaska1999).

(Our supreme court has rejected theDaubert test as the standard for

admittingothertypesofexpertevidence:see Marron v. Stromstad,123P.3d992,1004

(Alaska2005). But thepartiestothepresentcaseagreeandweconcur that

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polygraphevidenceisatypeofscientificevidencegovernedbytheDaubert testunder

Alaskalaw.)

The superior courts ruling on whether the control question techniqueof polygraph examination meets the Daubert standard for admissibility

Asweexplainedtowardthebeginningofthisopinion,Alexandersattorney

hiredDr.DavidRaskintoadministerapolygraphexaminationtoAlexanderusingthe

controlquestiontechnique(alsoknownasthecomparisonquestiontechnique).

ThiswasapparentlyAlexanders secondpolygraph test. Accordingto

pleadingsfiledbythedefense,Alexanderalsopassedanearliertestadministeredbya

polygraphexaminerwhooftenworkedasanindependentcontractorfortheDepartment

ofCorrections(butwho,inthiscase,wasworkingprivatelyforAlexandersattorney).

But when this earlier examiner was unwillingto turnover the raw data from the

examination,thedefenseretainedDr.Raskin.

Dr.Raskinasserted(basedontheresultsofhisexamination)that,inhis

scientificandprofessionalopinion,Alexanderwasspeakingtruthfullywhenhedenied

the allegations of sexualabuse. Dr. Raskin added that [his] confidence in these

conclusions exceeds90percent, and hedeclared thathe holds this opinionto a

reasonabledegreeofscientificcertainty.

Dr. Raskinmadesimilarassertionswithrespecttohis testingofJames

Griffith i.e., thattherewas a greaterthan90percentcertaintythatGriffithwas

speakingtruthfullywhenhedeniedcommittingthechargedsexualabuse.

ThesuperiorcourtheardthecompetingtestimonyofDr.WilliamIacono,

whodeclaredthatpolygraphexaminations,evenwhenproperlyrun,do notyieldthis

levelofcertainty.

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The courtalsoheardextensiveevidencepertainingto thepracticeand

scientific validity of the controlquestion polygraph examination technique the

techniqueusedbyDr.RaskinwhenheexaminedAlexanderandGriffith.

Thetheorybehindthecontrolquestionformofpolygraphtestingisthat

apersonsphysiologicalreactionstorelevantquestionsquestionsthatrelatedirectly

totheallegedcrimewilldiffer fromtheirreactionstodeliberatelyvagueoropen-

endedcontrolquestions. Thesecontrolquestionsareformulatedso thattheyraise

ethicalissuesthatposedifficultiesformostpeoplequestionssuchas,Haveyouever

stolensomethingof significant value?orHave you ever lied togain a personal

advantage?Thetheoryorassumptionbehindthistechniqueisthataninnocentperson

willhavegreateremotionaldifficultyansweringthissortofcontrolquestionand

willthereforedemonstratemorepronouncedphysiologicalreactionswhenanswering

these controlquestions compared to the straightforward, honest denials that an

innocentpersonwillbeabletoofferwhenansweringdirectquestionsaboutthefactsof

theallegedcrime. Conversely,thetheorygoes,aguiltypersonsphysiologicalreactions

willbemorepronouncedwhentheyarecalledontoanswerquestionsaboutthealleged

crime, while their reactions willbemore subdued (in comparison) when theyare

answeringthecontrolquestions.3

Withrespecttothescientificvalidityofpolygraphexaminationingeneral,

Dr.RaskinandDr.Iaconoagreed on thevalidityofthebasicscientific theorythat

underliesallpolygraphtesting: thetheorythatmostpeoplewillnormallyexhibitphysio

logicalreactionswhentheysaythingsthattheybelievetobefalse. Thetwoexpertsalso

See WilliamG.Iacono andDavidT.Lykken,TheCase AgainstPolygraphTests,

inModern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony (DavidFaigman

et alia,editors,2009),pp.342,344-46.

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agreed that modern polygraph machines are capable of detecting and accurately

measuringsomeofthesephysiologicalresponses.

Butthetwoexpertsvigorouslydisagreedastowhetheritwaspossibleto

accuratelydiscern,fromthephysiologicaldatacollectedduringapolygraphexamina

tion, whether apersonwasbeingtruthfulin theiranswersduringtheexam. Aswe

explained earlier, Dr. Raskin put the accuracy rate of a well-conducted polygraph

examinationatsomewherebetween89and98percent,whileDr.Iaconotestifiedthatthe

accuracyratewasconsiderablylowersomewherecloseto70percent,onaverage.

Thetwoexpertsalsodisagreedconcerningthedegreetowhichapersons

physiologicalresponses(and,thus,thetestresults)canbeinfluencedbythemannerinwhichtheexaminerphrasesthequestions,andbythemannerinwhichtheexaminer

personallyinteractswiththepersonwhoistakingthetest.

Dr. RaskinandDr. Iaconoalsodebatedwhethertherewasareliable,

standardizedmethodofevaluatingorscoringpolygraphresultsorwhether,instead,

theoutcomeofapolygraphexaminationdependedtoanunacceptabledegreeonthe

examinersmethodofscoringtheresults.

Finally,Dr.RaskinandDr. Iaconodisagreedontheextenttowhichthe

accuracyofpolygraphtestingcouldbeunderminediftest-takersemployedcounter

measurestomasktheirphysiologicalresponses tothequestions for instance,by

surreptitiously bitingtheir tongue, or by mentally performingdifficult mathematical

calculationswhiletheyweretakingtheexam.

Afterhearingthisevidence,JudgeMillerandJudgeSchallybothconcluded

thatpolygraphevidencequalifiedforadmissionundertheDaubert test.

The two judges found that the controlquestion form ofpolygraph

examinationhadbeen empirically testedandsubjectedtoextensivepeer review,as

demonstratedbythevariousstudiespublishedinprofessionaljournals.

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Thejudgesacknowledgedthatexpertopinionwassubstantiallydividedon

theissuesofwhetherthecontrolquestiontechniqueofpolygraphexaminationyielded

anacceptableaccuracyrate,andwhethertherewererecognizedstandardsandprotocols

thatcouldcontrolthevariationsamongexaminationtechniquesandpractitioners.

ThejudgespointedoutthatDr.RaskinandDr.Iaconodisagreedastothe

achievable accuracy rate of a properly conducted control question polygraph

examinationwithDr.Raskinputtingtheexpectableaccuracyrateat89to98percent,

whileDr.Iaconodeclaredthattheaccuracyratewassignificantlylower: onaverage,

closeto70percent.

However,thejudgesconcludedthatevenifDr.Iaconosfigureswereclosertothetruth,theaccuracyrateforthecontrolquestionformofpolygraphexamination

wasstillinlinewiththeaccuracyratesofothercommonlyadmittedformsofscientific

evidenceevidencesuchasfingerprintanalysis,handwritinganalysis,andeyewitness

testimony.4

Moreover, bothDr. Raskin and Dr. Iacono agreed that, to the extent

controlquestionpolygraphexaminationsyieldinaccurateresults,theinaccurateresult

wasmorelikelytobeafalsepositivethanafalsenegative. Thatis,acontrolquestion

polygraphexaminationismorelikelytofalselyindicatethatatruthfulpersonisbeing

deceptive,ratherthanfalselyindicatingthatadeceptivepersonisbeingtruthful. Thus,

Thecourtcitedonestudyestablishingthatfingerprintevidencewas100%accurate,

polygraph testing 95% accurate, handwriting analysis 94% accurate, and eyewitnesstestimony64%accurate. See JanWidacki&FrankHorvath,An Experimental Investigation

of the Relative Validity and Utility of the Polygraph Technique and Three Other Common

Methods of Criminal Identification,23J.ForensicSciences596,596-600(1978). See also

United Statesv.Scheffer,523U.S.303,334n.24(1998)(Stevens,J.,dissenting)(discussing

this study). The superior court acknowledged,however, that Dr.Iacono hadestimated

polygraphaccuracyratestobeconsiderablylower,51-98%,withanaverageof70%.

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apolygraphexaminationwasmorelikelytofalselyinculpateaninnocentpersonthanto

falselyexculpateaguiltyperson.

Astowhethertherearerecognizedstandardsandprotocolstoensurean

acceptable levelof uniformity in theadministration of polygraph examinations, the

judges noted that there are published protocols and training criteria for polygraph

examiners,includingthoseusedbythe FBI, theNationalSecurityCouncil,andother

agencies. (ThejudgesalsofoundthatDr.Raskinhadfollowedestablished protocols

whenheadministeredhispolygraphexaminationtoAlexander.)

In their decision, the judges discussed the problem of the friendly

examineri.e.,therecognizedproblemthatapersonsphysiologicalresponsesduringthe test can be different, or can be interpreted differently, if the examination is

administeredbyanexpertwhohasbeenretainedbythepersonbeingtested.

Thejudgesconcludedthatthisproblemremainedunresolvedwithrespect

toGriffith,butthejudgesmistakenlyconcludedthattherewasnofriendlyexaminer

problem with respect to Alexander because the judges believed (falsely) that

Alexanderhadalreadysubmittedtoapolygraphexaminationadministeredbyanexpert

employedbytheState. Infact,aswealreadyexplained,Alexanderhadtakenanother

polygraph examination that wasadministered by someone who often workedas a

contractorfortheDepartmentofCorrectionsbut,inAlexanderscase,thispolygraph

examinerwashiredbyAlexandersattorney.

Ontheissueofcounter-measuresi.e.,strategiesthatapersoncanuseto

mask their physiologicalresponsesduringthetestthejudgesacknowledgedthat

Dr.Raskinsownstudyshowedthattheaccuracyrateofapolygraphexaminationcan

bereducedbyasmuchas50percentifthepersontakingthetestistrainedintheuseof

counter-measures. The judgesalso noted the States claim that a person can be

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5

effectivelytrainedintheuseofcounter-measuresinlessthanhalfanhour,basedon

informationthatisreadilyavailableontheInternet.

However,thejudgesconcludedthattheefficacyofcounter-measuresmust

beoverblown,giventhat somanystateandfederalgovernmentagencies (including

agenciesoftheState of Alaska)spendsubstantialamountsofmoneyeachyearon

polygraphtesting.5

Inanyevent,thetwojudgesultimatelyconcludedthatthepotentialuseof

counter-measures went totheweightofpolygraphresults,nottotheadmissibilityof

thoseresultsundertheDaubert standard. Thejudgesalsoconcludedthatiftheissueof

counter-measureswasraisedinaparticularcase,thetrialjudgecouldaddressthisissuebyevaluatingtheevidenceunderAlaskaEvidenceRule403toseeifthepossibility

Intheirdecision,the judgesmentionedaletterwhichstatedthat,as of 1997, the

federalgovernmentemployed500polygraphexaminersandspentapproximately$25million

ayearonexaminersalaries. See also KennethS.Brounet alia,McCormick On Evidence

(7thed.2013),206,Vol.1,p.1205&n.34(notingtheexplosivegrowthofpolygraphyinAmericangovernmentandbusiness).

Althoughgovernment reliance on polygraphexaminationsmaybewidespread,we

notethatthefederalgovernmenthascriminallyprosecutedpeopleforteachingotherpeople

howtousepolygraphcounter-measures. See Indianamanaccusedofteachingpeopleto

beatliedetectortestsfacesprisontime,anarticlethatappearedintheWashingtonPoston

August31,2013. Thisarticlecanbefoundat:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/indiana-man-accused-of-teaching-people-to-be

at-lie-detector-tests-faces-prison-time/2013/08/31/a7cbe74a-08ea-11e3-9941-6711ed662e71_story.html

The fact that the federal government has act ivelypursuedcriminal prosecutions

againstpeoplewhooffertotrainothersinthesecounter-measuressuggeststhatthefederal

governmentknowsoratleastbelievesthattheavailablepolygraphcounter-measures

are effective.

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ofcounter-measuresoutweighedthepurportedprobativevalueofthepolygraphevidence

underthefactsofthatspecificcase.

RegardingtheremainingDaubertfactorwhetherpolygraphexamination

hasattainedgeneralacceptance in the relevant scientific community the judges

concluded thatAlexander had failed to establish this factor. However, given their

findingsontheotherDaubert factors, the judgesconcludedthatthislackofgeneral

scientificacceptancewasnotfataltotheadmissionofpolygraphevidence.

Insum,thetwojudgesruledthatthecontrolquestionformofpolygraph

examinationsatisfiedthethresholdrequirementforadmissibilityundertheDaubert test.

Thatis,thejudgesruled(1)thatthisevidenceisbasedonscientificallyvalidreasoningandmethodology,and(2)thatthisreasoningandmethodologycouldproperlybeapplied

tothefactsofAlexanderscase.

However,aswehavealreadyexplained,thejudgesplacedtworestrictions

onadefendantsabilitytointroducethisevidence: thedefendantmustsubmittoan

independentpolygraphexaminationadministeredbyanexpertchosenbytheState,and

thedefendantmusttakethestandattrialandsubmittocross-examination.

The standard of review that applies to our assessment of the superior

courts decision

UndertheformerFrye test,whenanappellatecourtansweredthequestion

ofwhetheraparticulartypeofscientificanalysisormethodologyhadgainedgeneral

acceptancewithintherelevantscientificcommunity,theappellatecourtsanswerwas

treatedasauthoritativeuntilalaterlitigantsucceededindemonstratingthatthescientific

communitysattitudetowardtheevidencehadchanged.

SeeVan Meter v. State,743P.2d385,387-88(AlaskaApp.1987),where

this Court upheld a trial judges refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on the

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admissibilityofpolygraphevidence: wereachedthisconclusionbecausethedefendant

madenoofferofproofthatthescientificcommunitysattitudetowardpolygraphtesting

hadchangedsincetheAlaskaSupremeCourtdecidedPulakis.See also Nelson v. Jones,

781P.2d964, 968&n.5(Alaska1989) (declaringthatlegalauthorityfromother

jurisdictions wasa proper source of information for assessingtheadmissibility of

scientificevidenceundertheFrye test).

ButunderDaubert,everytrialjudgesdecisionregardingtheadmissibility

ofaparticular form of scientificevidenceis reviewedforabuseofdiscretion. See

General Electric Co. v. Joiner,522U.S.136,146;118S.Ct.512,519;139L.Ed.2d508

(1997). The Alaska Supreme Court has likewisedeclared that, under Alaska law,appellatecourtsmustemploytheabuseofdiscretionstandardofreviewwhenthey

reviewtrialjudgesrulingsontheadmissibilityofscientificevidence. Coon,974P.2d

at398-99.

Astandardofreviewisthelegalrulethatspecifieshowmuchdeference

an appellate court must give to a decision made by a lower

court.6 Andtheabuseofdiscretionstandardofreviewisquitedeferential: underthis

standard,anappellatecourtisauthorizedtoreverseatrialjudgesdecisiononlyifthe

trial judges reasons for reaching that decision are clearly untenable and

unreasonable.7

Althoughweareboundbythesupremecourtsdecisiononthispointof

law,thefactsofthepresentcaseillustratetheproblemsthatcanbecreatedbyapplying

anabuseofdiscretionstandardofreviewtorulingsontheadmissibilityofscientific

evidence.

6 Booth v. State,251P.3d369,372(AlaskaApp.2011).

7 Sylvia L. v. Office of Childrens Services,343P.3d425, 430-31(Alaska2015);Bailey

v. Lenord,625P.2d849,854(Alaska1981).

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Asweexplainedearlier,thepresentcaseoriginallyinvolvedtwodefendants

(AlexanderandGriffith), andthesuperiorcourtdecisionthatwearereviewingwas

issuedjointlybytwojudgestwojudgeswhoheldacombinedevidentiaryhearing,

and who heard exactly the same testimony concerning the scientific validity and

reliabilityofcontrolquestionpolygraphexaminations.

Asithappened,thesetwojudgesreachedthesameconclusionregarding

thescientificvalidityofpolygraphexaminations. But, asillustratedbythecompeting

testimonyofferedbyDr.Raskinand Dr. Iacono, thisisclearlyamatteronwhich

reasonablepeoplecandifferandonwhichtheydo differ.

Thus, the two judges in this case mighteasily have reacheddifferingconclusionsregardingthescientific validityofpolygraphexaminations, eventhough

theyheardexactly thesameevidence. Andif thetwojudgeshadreacheddifferent

conclusions,weapparentlywouldhavebeenrequiredtoaffirmbothoftheconflicting

decisionsundertheabuseofdiscretionstandardofreview.

Thatis,wewouldhavebeenforcedtotellAlexanderandGriffiththatone

of them would be allowed to introduce the results of Dr. Raskins polygraph

examination,whiletheotheronewouldbeprohibitedfromdoingsoandthattheonly

reasontheircaseswerebeingtreateddifferentlywastheidentityandviewpointofthe

judgemakingthedecision.

Thisresultseemsillogicalandunfairandinherpartialdissentin Coon,

JusticeDanaFabeadvocatedanotherapproachtothisproblem.

AsJusticeFabepointedout,therearetwoprongstotheDaubert test. The

firstprongiswhetherthereasoningormethodologyunderlyingthe[proposedexpert]

testimonyisscientificallyvalid,whilethesecondprongiswhetherthatreasoningor

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methodologyproperlycanbeappliedtothefactsinissue[intheparticularcase].Coon,

974P.2dat403.8

JusticeFabeproposedthatdifferentstandardsofreviewshouldapplyto

thesetwoprongs: anappellatecourtwouldnotdefertoatrialcourtsdecisionregarding

thescientificvalidityoftheprinciplesandmethodologyinvolved( i.e.,theappellatecourt

would decide this matter de novo), but the appellate court would defer (usingan

abuseofdiscretionstandard)tothetrialcourtsdecisionastowhethertheproposed

scientifictheoryortechniquecouldproperlybeappliedtothefactsoftheparticularcase.

Ibid.

AsJusticeFabenoted,[t]hedeterminationofwhetherageneralscientificpropositionorprocessisreliable shouldnotvaryfromcasetocaseorfromjudgeto

judge.Ibid. TheCoon majorityapparentlyagreedwiththispropositionbecausethe

majority opinion also declared that [t]he abstract validity of a scientific technique

shouldnotvaryfromcourttocourt. Coon,974P.2dat399.9

ButtheCoonmajorityneverthelessrejectedthenotionthatweshouldhave

oneuniformruleofdecisionregardingthe validityofparticularscientific theoriesor

principles. The majorityoffered tworationales for this conclusion i.e., for its

endorsementofallowinginconsistenttrialcourtrulingsonthesameissue.

Themajoritysfirstrationalewasthatthelevelofadvocacywillvaryfrom

casetocase:

[Whilethe]abstractvalidityofascientifictechniqueshould

notvaryfromcourttocourt,...[themannerinwhichthis]

validityiscommunicatedwilloftenvaryfrompresentationto

presentation. Some experts are more skillful and more

8 QuotingDaubert,509U.S.at593-94,113S.Ct.at2796-97.

9 QuotingState v. Alberico,861P.2d192,205(N.M.1993).

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well-informedthanothers[,]justassomelawyersaremore

skillfulandmorewell-preparedthanothers.

Coon,974P.2dat399.10

Themajoritysobservationisundoubtedly true: expertwitnesseshave

varyingdegreesofknowledge,insight,andarticulatenessjustlikethelawyerswho

offertheexpertstestimony,orthelawyerswhocross-examinethem. Butoneofthe

maingoalsofourjudicialsystemistohavethelawapplyequallytoallpeople. Andthe

pointofhavingrulesistotrytoensurethattheoutcomeoflitigationdoesnotwholly

turnonwhichsidehasthebetterexpertwitnessorthebetterlawyer.

The majoritys secondrationaleforendorsinginconsistent trialcourt rulings

isthatthestateofscienceisnotconstant;itprogressesdaily.Ibid. Butthisisanover

statement. Whileitmaybetruethatscientificknowledge progressesdaily,thepace

ofchangeisfarlessrapidwhenitcomestothevalidityofunderlyingscientifictheories

andmethodology.

Moreover,appellatecourtshavealwaysacknowledged thepotentialfor

fundamentalchangeinscientificunderstanding, evenwhenthosecourtswereissuingrulingsofgeneralapplicabilityunder theFrye test. Forinstance, when the Alaska

SupremeCourtruledinPulakis thatpolygraphevidencewasnotadmissibleinAlaska,

the supreme court was carefulto emphasize that it was not saying that polygraph

evidencecould never beadmittedinAlaska,butonly that[j]udicialacceptanceof

polygraphtestsmustawaittheresultsofmorepersuasiveexperimentalproofof[their]

reliability.11

10 QuotingState v. Alberico,861P.2d192,205(N.M.1993).

11 Pulakis,476P.2dat479.

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Asthingsstandnowthatis,undertheabuseofdiscretionstandardof

review mandated byCoonourdecisionin thepresentcasewillnot resolvethe

questionofwhetherpolygraphtestinghassufficientscientificvaliditytobeadmissible

inthecourtsofAlaska. Eventhoughweareaffirming the superiorcourtsrulingin

Alexanderscase,ourdecisiononlystandsforonenarrowproposition: thatgiventhe

evidencepresentedat thepre-trial hearinginthisparticularcase, itwasnotclearly

unreasonableforthejudgetoconcludethatpolygraphtesting hadsufficientscientific

validitytosatisfytheDaubert test.

Ourdecisiondoesnotbindjudgeswhofacethisissueinfuturecases

evenifthosejudgesarepresentedwithexactlythesameevidencethatwaspresentedinthiscase. Indeed,ifthosejudgesweretoreachtheoppositeconclusion(i.e.,iftheywere

todecidethatpolygraphevidencedoesnotsatisfytheDaubert test),wewouldprobably

berequiredtoaffirmtheirdecisionstoo.

Thisessentiallymeansthatthescientificvalidityofpolygraphevidencewill

neverbejudiciallyresolvedatanappellatelevel: itwillremainanopenquestion,and

itwillneedtobelitigatedaneweachtimetheissueisraised.

(SeeGoeb v. Tharaldson,615N.W.2d800,814(Minn.2000),wherethe

MinnesotaSupremeCourtpointstothisproblemasoneoftheprincipaldefectsinthe

Daubert rule.)

Forallofthesereasons,weurgetheAlaskaSupremeCourttorevisitthis

issueandtoadopttheapproachadvocatedinJusticeFabespartialdissentinCoon.

Why we affirm the superior courts rulings

UndertheDaubert test,whenalitigantoffersscientificevidence,atrial

judgemustanswertwoquestions: (1)whetherthereasoningormethodologyunderlying

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the proposed evidence is scientifically valid, and (2) whether this reasoning or

methodologycanproperlybeappliedtotheissuesraisedintheparticularcase.

Inthepresentcase,thesuperiorcourthadtoanswerthesetwoquestions

withspecificregardtothecontrolquestionformofpolygraphexaminations.Thecourt

answered the first question yes finding that the reasoning or methodology

underlyingthecontrolquestion form of polygraph examination was scientifically

valid. Thecourtansweredthesecondquestionwithaconditionalyesfindingthat

thereasoningormethodologyofthecontrolquestionformofpolygraphexamination

couldproperlybeappliedtothefactualissuesraisedinAlexanderscaseif thedefendant

submittedtoaState-administeredpolygraphexaminationbeforetrial,andalsosubmittedtocross-examinationattrial.

The scientific validity of the reasoning or methodology underlying

the control question form of polygraph examination

Withregardtothescientificvalidity of thecontrolquestion formof

polygraphexamination,wehavealreadydescribedtheevidencepresentedtothesuperior

court. There is little dispute that most people will normally exhibit physiological

reactionswhentheysaythingsthattheybelievetobefalse. Thereisalsolittledispute

thatmodernpolygraphmachinesarecapableofdetectingandaccuratelymeasuringsome

of these physiologicalresponses. The realissue is whether the controlquestion

techniqueisavalidmethodofelicitingphysiologicalresponsesthatcanbemeaningfully

comparedandanalyzedtodistinguish(1)peoplewhobelievetheyaretellingthetruth

from(2)peoplewhobelievetheyarelying.

(Toclarify,apersonsphysiologicalresponsesdonotshowwhetherthe

personisgivinganswersthatareactually true,orthatareactually false. Rather,the

theorybehindpolygraphexaminationsisthatthepersonsphysiologicalresponsesreveal

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thepersonsstateofmindthepersons belief astowhethertheiranswersaretrueor

false.)

Theevidencewasconflictingastowhetherthephysiologicalresponses

elicitedbyacontrolquestionpolygraphexaminationcanbemeaningfullycompared

and analyzed to distinguish (1) people who believe theyare tellingthe truth from

(2)peoplewhobelievetheyarelying. Aswehaveexplained,Dr.RaskinandDr.Iacono

offeredcompetingassessmentsoftheaccuracyofthecontrolquestiontechnique. Dr.

Raskintestifiedthattheaccuracyratecouldbeashighas98percent,whileDr.Iacono

testifiedthattheaccuracyratecouldbeaslowas51percent( i.e.,nomoreaccuratethan

chance).Thus,ifwearescrupulousinapplyingtheabuseofdiscretionstandard

ofreviewtothesuperiorcourtsresolutionofthisissue,itisobviousthatwewouldhave

toaffirmthesuperiorcourtsanswerregardlessofwhetherthatanswerwasyesor

no. Reasonablejudgescoulddifferastowhethertheevidenceinthiscaseestablished

thefirstprongoftheDaubert test. Thatbeingso,weholdthatthesuperiorcourtdidnot

abuse itsdiscretionwhen,inthepresentcase,itruledthatthefirstprongwasestablished.

(Norwouldthecourthaveabuseditsdiscretionifithadruledtheopposite.)

Whether the control question form of polygraph examination can

properly be applied to the resolution of the factual issues in this

case

This brings us to the second prong ofDaubert whether control

questionpolygraphevidencecanproperlybeappliedtotheresolutionoftheissuesthat

thejurywillhavetodecideatAlexanderstrial.

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Thissecondquestionissignificantlymorecomplexthanthefirst. Thefact

thatparticularscientificevidencepassestheDaubert testforscientificvaliditydoesnot

meanthattheevidencecanorshouldbeadmittedinjudicialproceedings.

Here,thesuperiorcourtwasrequiredtoconsidernotonlythereliabilityand

accuracyratesofcontrolquestionpolygraphresults,butalsothepotentialthatjurors

wouldbeconfusedbythepolygraphevidence,orwouldmisunderstanditssignificance,

orwouldusethepolygraphevidenceforimproperpurposes,orwouldotherwisebeled

astraybythisevidence. Thatis,thejudgewasrequirednotonlytoassessthescientific

validityofthisevidence,butalsotoassesstheevidenceunderEvidenceRule403and

EvidenceRule705(c).Indeed,thegreatmajorityofappellatecourtswhoemploytheDaubert test

forscientificevidencehaveruledthat,despiteitsarguablescientificvalidity,polygraph

evidence is inherently soprejudicialto the fairness of a criminaltrialthat it is not

admissible, or that it is admissibleonlyupontheexpressstipulationof theparties.12

These appellatecourtshaveessentiallyruled that,giventhedifficultiespresentedby

polygraph evidence,itisalways anabuseofdiscretionforatrialjudgetoadmitthis

evidence(or,insomejurisdictions,toadmitthisevidencewithouttheexpressstipulation

oftheparties).

12 Ingeneral,seetheappellatedecisionslistedinState v. A.O.,965A.2d152,161-62

(N.J. 2009). InA.O., the New JerseySupreme Court noted that twenty-eight statescompletelybanpolygraphevidence,whileanothereighteenstatesallowtheadmissionof

polygraphevidenceonlyifbothpartiesstipulatetoitsuse.See also State v. Porter,698A.2d

739,758-59(Conn.1997)(continuingtobanpolygraphevidenceevenafterConnecticuts

adoptionoftheDauberttest);Fagan v.State,894So.2d576,580(Miss.2004)(holdingthat,

evenundertheDaubert test,polygraphresultscontinuetobeinadmissible); United States

v. Prince-Oyibo,320F.3d494,501(4thCir.2003)(same).

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We also note that, even though polygraph evidence might satisfy the

Daubert test for scientific validity, jurisdictions may nonetheless enact statutes or

evidentiaryrulesthatprohibittheuseofthisevidence.

InUnitedStates v. Scheffer,523U.S.303,118S.Ct.1261,140L.Ed.2d413

(1998), the United States Supreme Court upheld a military rule of evidence that

categorically excluded polygraph evidence in court-martialproceedings. The Court

concludedthat,giventhecurrentlackofconsensusregardingthereliabilityofpolygraph

results,acategoricalexclusionofpolygraphevidencewasarationalandproportional

meansofadvancingthelegitimateinterestinbarringunreliableevidence:

Althoughthedegreeofreliabilityofpolygraphevidencemay

dependuponavarietyofidentifiablefactors,thereissimply

no way toknowinaparticularcasewhetherapolygraph

examinersconclusionisaccurate,becausecertaindoubtsand

uncertainties plague even the best polygraph exams.

Individual jurisdictions therefore may reasonably reach

differing conclusions as to whether polygraph evidence

shouldbeadmitted. Wecannotsay,then,thatpresentedwith

suchwidespreaduncertainty,thePresidentactedarbitrarilyordisproportionatelyinpromulgatingaper se ruleexcluding

allpolygraphevidence.

Id.,523U.S.at312,118S.Ct.at1266. TheCourtfurtherconcludedthatthiscategorical

exclusionofpolygraphevidencedidnotabridgeanaccusedsconstitutionalright to

presentadefense.Id.,523U.S.at315-17,118S.Ct.at1267-69.

Becauseof thesignificantdifficultiesposedby polygraphevidence,we

havegivenseriousconsiderationtothedecisionsfromtheseotherjurisdictions,andto

theoptionofadoptingajudicialruleofexclusionliketheonesadoptedinthemajority

ofDaubert statesessentially,aruledeclaringthatthepotentialofpolygraphevidence

forcreatingunfairprejudicealwaysoutweighsitsprobativevalue.

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Weare neverthelesstroubledbythepossibilitythat,insomecriminalcases,

an exculpatorypolygraph result might be theonly realistic way fora defendant to

establishareasonabledoubtastotheirguilt. And(asweareabouttoexplain),weare

convincedthattheparticularsolutionadoptedbythesuperiorcourtinAlexanderscase

providesadequatesafeguardsagainstthedangersofunfairprejudice.

Undertheabuseofdiscretionstandardofreview,thequestionwemust

answer iswhetherthesuperiorcourtactedunreasonablywhenitconcluded that the

dangersposedbypolygraphevidencecould be adequatelynegatedby (1)requiring

AlexandertosubmittoaState-administeredpolygraph and(2)requiringAlexanderto

takethestandathistrialandsubmittocross-examination.ThefirstconditionimposedbythesuperiorcourtthatAlexandershould

notbeallowedtointroducetheresultsofDr.Raskinspolygraphexaminationunless

AlexandersubmitstoapolygraphexaminationadministeredbyanexpertoftheStates

choosingconformstoafamiliarlegalprinciple: Wheneveralitigant(whetherincivil

orcriminallitigation)seekstoofferanexpertsevaluationofsomeaspectofthelitigants

mentalorphysicalcondition,thecourtisempoweredtorequirethelitiganttosubmitto

asimilarevaluationbyanindependentexpert.13

Thesecondconditionimposedbythe superiorcourtthatAlexander

shouldnotbeallowedtointroducetheresultsof Dr.Raskinspolygraphexamination

unlessAlexandertakesthestandattrialandsubmitstocross-examinationismore

unusual,butweconcludethatitisnonethelessjustifiableunderEvidenceRules403and

705(c).

13 See AlaskaCivilRule35andAlaskaCriminalRule16(c)(5);AS12.47.070;Lewis

v. State,195P.3d622(AlaskaApp.2008),Nelson v. State,874P.2d298(AlaskaApp.

1994).

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There are twoaspectsofpolygraphevidencethatpresentthegreatest

potentialforconfusionandmisuse. Thefirstoftheseisthedangerthatjurorsmaybe

overlyswayedbytheevidence;theymayviewitashavingadegreeofscientificrigor

andinfallibilitythatitdoesnotpossess. Thisdangercanbeeffectivelycounteredbythe

firstconditionimposedbythesuperiorcourti.e.,havingtheopposingsidepresentthe

resultsofitsown independentpolygraphexamination aswellas byallowingthe

opposingsidetopresentexperttestimonythatpointsoutthepotentialweaknessesand

deficienciesofpolygraphexaminationproceduresandtechniques.

Buttheseconddangerposedbypolygraphevidenceishardertodealwith.

Thisseconddangerarisesfromthefactthatexperttestimonydescribingtheresultsofapolygraphexaminationwillinvariablyincludea recitationofout-of-courtstatements

madebythepersonwhowasexamined. Theseout-of-courtstatementswillordinarily

consistof the personsassertions about what did ordid not happen, coupledwith

assertionsaboutwhatthepersonknew(ordidnotknow)atthetime,orwhattheperson

intended(ordidnotintend)todo.

Technically,perhaps,theseout-of-courtstatementscouldbeadmissiblefor

anon-hearsaypurpose,sincetheyserveaspartofthebasisforthepolygraphexaminers

opinion. SeeAlaskaEvidenceRule703,whichstatesthatexpertwitnessesarenormally

allowedtotestifyabouttheunderlyingdataorinformationthatprovidesthebasisfor

theiropinion,evenwhenthatunderlyinginformationwouldnototherwisebeadmissible

i.e.,eventhoughitwouldnototherwisesurviveahearsayobjectionorachallenge

basedonthewitnessslackofpersonalknowledge.14

14 See also EdwardJ.ImwinkelriedandJamesR.McCall,Issues Once Moot: The Other

Evidentiary Objections to the Admission of Exculpatory Polygraph Examinations,32Wake

ForestLawRev.1045,1072-74(Winter1997)(analyzingthisissueunderthenearlyidentical

provisionsofFederalEvidenceRule703).

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Butwhenapolygraphexpertdescribesthestatements thatadefendant

made during the examination (as part of the experts analysis of the defendants

polygraph results), it will often be impossible for jurors to treat the defendants

statementsasmerelythefactualdataunderlyingthepolygraphexpertsopinion. Instead,

thejurors willusethedefendantsstatementsforanimproperhearsaypurposeas

substantiveevidenceofthetruth ofthefactualmattersassertedbythedefendantinthose

out-of-courtstatements.

We addressed this general problem (expert testimony that relies on

otherwiseinadmissibleevidence)inBorchgrevink v. State,239P.3d410,419(Alaska

App.2010),andVann v. State,229P.3d197,208-09(AlaskaApp.2010).15

Inthosecases,wenotedthatAlaskaEvidenceRule705(c)offersawayfortrialjudgestodeal

withthisissuebygivingjudgesthegeneralauthority to prohibitanexpertwitness

fromtestifyingaboutthedataorinformationthatunderliestheiropinionwheneverthe

dangerthat[thisunderlyingdataorinformation]willbeusedforanimproperpurpose

outweighs[its]valueassupportfortheexpertsopinion.

Butinthecontextofpolygraphevidence,ifacourtwere to excludeall

evidence oftheexamineesout-of-courtstatementstothepolygraphexaminer, this

wouldessentiallydestroytheevidentiaryvalueofthepolygraphexaminerstestimony.

InAlexanderscase,thesuperiorcourthituponadifferentsolutionone

thatallowsDr.Raskintofullydescribehowheconductedthepolygraphexamination,

andtofullyexplainhisinterpretationofthetestresults,whileatthesametimesolving

15 SeealsoGuerre-Chaley v. State,88P.3d539,543-44(AlaskaApp.2004),andthe

CommentarytoAlaskaEvidenceRule705(c),whichidentifytheproblemasthepossibility

thatthejurymight...usethefactsordata[recitedbytheexpertwitness]asthebasisforan

independentjudgmentonissuesin[the]case.

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the problem that the jury will likely use Alexanders out-of-court statements for

prohibitedhearsaypurposes.

Even though the jury may inevitably view Alexanders out-of-court

statementstoDr.Raskinassubstantiveproofofthemattersassertedinthosestatements,

thiswillmakelittledifferencetothejurysconsiderationofthecaseifAlexandertakes

thestandattrial,makesthosesameassertionsinfrontofthejury,andiscross-examined.

The superiorcourt thereforeruledthat ifAlexanderwishes topresentDr. Raskins

testimony,Alexandermusttakethestandandsubmittocross-examination.

We conclude that the superior courts resolutionof this matter was a

reasonableexerciseofthecourtsdiscretionunderEvidenceRules403and705(c),andwethereforeupholdthisaspectofthesuperiorcourtsruling.

Concluding matters

Forthereasons explainedinthisopinion,weconcludethatthesuperior

courtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionwhenitruledthatthepolygraphevidenceofferedinthis

casemeetsthethresholdtestforscientificevidenceestablishedinDaubert. Wefurther

concludethatthesuperiorcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionwhenitruledthatAlexander

can introduce the exculpatory polygraph evidence only if he submits to a State-

administeredpolygraphexamination,andonlyifhetakesthestandandsubmitstocross-

examinationathistrial.

AlthoughweareaffirmingthesuperiorcourtsrulinginAlexanderscase,

wewishtoclarifythatthesuperiorcourthastheauthoritytore-examineitsrulingifit

seesfit. Wesaythisbecauseofthedevelopmentsthatoccurredafterthesuperiorcourt

issueditsruling. Aswehaveexplained,whilethisappellatecasewasstillinitsbriefing

stage, the other defendant involved in this litigation, JamesGriffith, tooka State

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administeredpolygraphexamination. DespiteDr.Raskinstestimonythattherewasa

90percentchance(orbetter)thattheexculpatoryresultsofhisexaminationofGriffith

wereaccurate,GriffithapparentlyfailedtheState-administeredpolygraphexamination.

Followingthis secondpolygraphexam,Griffithpleadedguilty, and he subsequently

withdrewfromthiscase.

Weexpressnoopinionastowhetherthesuperiorcourtshouldre-assessits

decisioninlightofthesedevelopments,andwedonotretainjurisdictionofthiscase.

Documents

State v. Alexander, Alaska Ct. App. (2015)