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From: Heidemann & Heidemann January 22, 2009 2787 Rainbow Circle East Jacksonville, Florida 32217 Hm. Ph. (904) 733-8671 To: Mr. Gary Ford Public Defender 353 S. Ct. Street Bronson, Florida 32621-6519 Ph (352) 486-5350 RE: Florida vs. Theresa Marie Martin 08-CT-219 Dear Mr. Ford:

Let me first began by stating I have the highest regards to anyone that goes

to four years to get a BA degree then another three years to law school and then

has to endure that grilling bar examine. I say congratulations and my hat is off to

you in a good career choice for our nation. And I might add that our nation needs

good honest attorney’s who will follow our United States constitution as well as

our Florida Constitution and.

I have just got to know Theresa; when we were introduced by a mutual

friend of ours Pamela Wright, who runs a website for people who have problems

with parental alienation syndrome. http://www. allianceforsingleparents.com. I re-

ceived a call from Ms. Wright stating the legal problems of Ms. Martin and if there

was any way I could help in her defense or come up with a legal argument in order

to get her out of this driving problem she is facing in your county.

I placed a call and talked to Theresa about her legal situation and soon real-

ized the complexity of her legal problems. I have come to the realization, that these

problems were created by an unfit seated, Pasco County Circuit Court Judge John

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Renke III., who miserably failed to obey his sworn oath to uphold the United

States Constitution, the Florida Constitution, as well as Florida’s laws. It must be

under stood that as this sitting judge was already being investigated by Florida’s

Judicial Qualifications Commission and that governing body had already filed

formal charges alleging that this judge was already, being investigated by Florida’s

Judicial Qualifications Commission and the governing body had filed formal

charges in October 10, 2003 alleging that Judge Renke had engaged in improper

conduct during his campaign to become a circuit court judge.

The JQC charged him with violating Canon 7A(3)(a) and Canon (3)(d)(iii), of

knowingly and purposefully misrepresenting in a campaign brochure, that he was

portraying himself as an incumbent judge by describing himself as “John Renke, a

Judge With Our Values” when in fact, he was not at that time or ever before, a sit-

ting or incumbent judge. Then on February 18, 2005 The JQC amended their

charges to allege that Judge Renke had portrayed himself at least five or six times

as someone of great importance and with superior skills to be the next judge, in

Pasco County. This judge had full knowledge that all claims were false and mis-

leading, but was done in order to get the confidence of the citizens of this state to

vote him in office, as the next elected, Judge in Pasco County Circuit Court. Judge

Renke knew that his qualifications and experience were greatly inferior to his op-

ponents.

Judge Renke, even had the nerve to additionally report in his campaign with full

knowledge and purpose by accepting a series of “loans” totaling $95,800 which,

were purportedly made by this judge to his campaign, which were reported as such,

but in fact the funds, in whole or in sizeable amount, were not his own legitimately

earned but were in truth contributions to his campaign from John Renke, II (or his

law firm) far in excess of the $500 per person limitation on such contributions im-

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posed by controlling law in §§ 106.08(1)(a), 106.08(5) and 106.19(a) and (b), of

the Florida Statutes.

I believe that Ms. Martin should have been disclosed of these facts, in order

that she could decide, if she would want to file a motion to disqualify Judge Renke

III. It is obvious that this would later come back and haunt her in her illegal second

divorce action.

Judge Renke received the Hearing Panel’s recommendation of a public rep-

rimand. Judge Renke eventually received a somewhat of stronger recommendation

by the Florida Supreme Court in SC03-1846, which opined that the flagrant mis-

representations made to the voting public during Judge Renke’s judicial campaign

and included the serious campaign financial misconduct and violations of law

found by the Commission. The Court further added that he was presently unfit to

hold office and that removal from the bench was the only appropriate sanction in

this case.

Note* today he is a private attorney practicing in New Port Richey, Florida.

The next real problem was a Florida attorney, by the name of Arnelle L.

Strand who was hired by Theresa’s former husband, Stephen Martin to defend him

in a second divorce action filed in July 27, 2004, approximately thirty-three days

after the final judgment was signed by Judge Renke from the first divorce on June

24, 2004.

I will now try my best to make this as simple as I can, in order to prove to

you that Theresa CAN NOT BE GUILTY OF THE CHARGES that the State of

Florida has alleged as a misdemeanor offense of driving with a suspended license.

I will try my best and show you that the state is not or at the least should be in-

volved in making our citizens criminal per se. I will try and do this in a chrono-

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logical order in order to make it simpler to understand where our checks and bal-

ance went wrong in the Theresa Martins case.

First thing to be understood is that Theresa Martin in 2003 filed for Support

Unconnected with Dissolution of Marriage in Case No: 03-2537DRWS against her

husband Stephen in Pasco County Circuit Court.

Several months later Theresa filed for divorce against her husband in Case

51-2003-DR-2537WS. He was officially served a second time after he was first

served at his job but had already quit that job therefore, he wasn’t working there.

Mr. Martin never raised the issue of not being properly served EVER in that ac-

tion. Yet Mr. Martin went to a least one hearing and signed a quit claim of the

marital property to the wife.

In that final order for divorce it is very important to know that the Court ac-

cepted the general magistrates report and recommendations dated on March 6,

2003 and Judge Renke incorporated it into the Final Judgment for Dissolution of

Marriage on June 24, 2004.

It is important to understand that after the final judgment of divorce and the

filing of the second divorce action by the former husband, Stephen, several illegal

acts occurred that are VITAL to understanding the future legal problems that The-

resa will have to incur.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. NO ATTORNEY’S INVOLVED

(1). May 9, 2003 Case No: 03-2537DRWS Motion for Support Unconnected

w/Dissolution filed by Theresa. Theresa filed for child support unconnected with

dissolution of marriage. The Court’s Finding of Fact and Recommended Order was

signed by Judge Renke where he ordered Stephen to pay the wife in the amount of

$792.59 per month.

(2). May 24, 2003 On Case No: 21-2003CA- 000589WS Judge Renke had a hear-

ing pertaining to the foreclosure of the parties’ home. Judge Renke ordered that

the foreclosure sale of the parties’ home would be held on June 24, 2003. Note*

Stephen failed to appear at the hearing in order to possibly stop the foreclosure of

their home.

(3). October 22, 2003 Hearing with General Magistrate Beverly Plummer on Case

No: 03-2537DRWS Support Unconnected W/Dissolution of Marriage. Neither

party had legal counsel at the hearing nor did Stephen file a financial affidavit as

previously instructed by the Magistrate Beverly Plummer. NOTE* Stephen was

now over $5,000 in child support arrearages.

(4). December 3, 2003 General Master Beverly Plummer recommended the Mo-

tion for Support Unconnected with Dissolution of Marriage Case No: 03-

2537DRWS granted Theresa the children’s primary custodial parent and Judge

RENKE signed the Order.

(5). January 9, 2004 Theresa filed for Dissolution of Marriage in Case No: 04-

101DR.

(6). January 29, 2004 Stephen voluntarily quite his job.

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(7). March 30, 2004 Ford Motor Credit was in the act of a repossession on Ste-

phen’s F150 Ford Truck from his address at 8816 Mike Street in Port Richey,

Florida. The address was provided by Theresa after the Ford Motor Credit repre-

sentative came to Theresa’s residence looking for her husband’s truck and she gave

them the address of the vehicle. Note* It was the same address as the process

server used in serving the first divorce papers to him.

(8). May 11, 2004 Stephen fled the jurisdiction of Florida seeking refuge with

his mother, Ms. Helene Ottinger in Roseville, Michigan. The reason Stephen fled

Florida’s jurisdiction was that there was a hearing on the motion for civil con-

tempt/ enforcement & dissolution of marriage to be held on May 26, 2004 and he

didn’t want to be there and answer to the court, so he deliberately chose not to at-

tend the hearing therefore; fled to mother’s arms for safety.

(9). May 26, 2004 Dissolution of Marriage Case No: 04-101DR and the Con-

tempt/Enforcement hearing Case No: 03-2537DRWS were consolidated into one

case, which was now referred to as Case No: 04-101DR. Stephen failed to appear

at this hearing and now was $10, 303.00 behind in child support.

(10). June 1, 2004 Stephen quit claimed the parties’ home over to Theresa and

this allowed Theresa to acquire a loan remodification from Midfirst Bank. This

was vital based on the former husband’s failure to provide any money for the past

several months mortgage payments on the parties’ home. When Stephen refused,

to pay his share of the mortgage and other financial obligations, this put Theresa in

a bad financial position, which resulted in a foreclosure status back in January of

2003. Since Stephen was failing to pay his child support obligation this forced

Theresa in defaulting on chapter 12 and ultimately made Stephen to grant the Quit

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Claim to her. This put Theresa in the position that required her to refinance the

home with a loan thru Midfirst Bank. This would allow Theresa later in the early

part of August to receive a certificate of no sale that would be ordered by Judge

Renke.

(11). June 11, 2004 Judge Renke issued a $1,000 warrant for Stephen due to the

fact he was in the arrears of over $10,000.00 based on the civil enforcement mo-

tion filed. Judge Renke this on General Master, Beverly Plumber’s recommenda-

tions.

(12). June 17, 2004 Theresa calls 911 due to physical confrontation with her

daughter Stephanie at home. Stephanie was throwing a temper tantrum. Theresa

had been told by children in need of services & family in need of services that

when your children get out of hand that she was to call the police and they would

take the problem child to the Rap House (a place of time out for troubled teens).

Theresa was advised by CINS/FINS that this was the proper course of action as she

had been taught by youth & family services. Theresa was involved in the program

CINS/FINS and they had previously instructed her that if one of her children hit

their mother, threatened her, refused to go to school, and missed a city curfew to

call the local police.

(13). June 17, 2004 June 17, 2004 Theresa is arrested in her home for child ne-

glect for not having enough food. This all came about because Theresa called the

local county sheriff’s office for the reason that, her daughter Stephanie was throw-

ing a tantrum in the home. After Officer Chuck Kepel, Jr. arrived from the sheriff’s

office and talked to the mother and daughter on what was the problem between the

two of them. Theresa explained “that her daughter was refusing to do things that

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she was told to do by her”. Stephanie told Officer Chuck Kepel, Jr. and along with

his riding partner that her mother had not went grocery shopping in three weeks

and hardly ever cooks for her.

Officer Kepel determined that the daughter’s story was more credible, especially

after looking into the mothers cabinets and finding that there wasn’t that much

food in them. Officer Kepel made the determination that even though the mother

made the 911 call, that there was a case of child neglect by the mother and arrested

her. Theresa was in jail for approximately 20 hours and then was released on her

own recognize.

Note* It is interesting to note here, that Deputy Kepel had been to this residence

about sixty (60) days earlier on another call made by Theresa against her daughter

Stephanie who was cutting her mother’s clothes up with a pair of scissors. In that

incidence Officer Kepel made a police report and then Theresa filed charges

against her daughter for destruction of property. Later below you will see that a

judge orders Stephanie to make restitution to her mother.

(14). June 19, 2004 Stephen kidnaps two of the parties’ children across State lines

to Michigan. Theresa was at work at Price Waterhouse and Stephen came with Mi-

chael Nichols who was 24 years old at the time and was living with Theresa’s other

daughter Jennifer Nichols and few other people I believe also lived with her at her

residence. Stephen went and met with Theresa’s other children Jessica and Stepha-

nie both were under eighteen at this time and illegally took them out of the State of

Florida to Michigan with his mother’s car. NOTE* These two children were not

legally his, based on the fact that he was not listed on the children’s birth certifi-

cates as the biological father nor were the parties’ married when the children were

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born therefore, by Florida Law they were not legally his and had no legal basis to

take them out of Florida.

(15). June 24, 2004 Judge Renke signs the Final Judgment for Dissolution of

Marriage.

(16). July1, 2004 Judge Renke signs the warrant for Stephen’s arrest on con-

tempt/enforcement for refusing to pay court ordered child support.

II. ONLY STEPHEN HAS ATTORNEY

(17). July 27, 2004 Theresa served with new Petition of Dissolution of Marriage

filed by Stephan’s new attorney, Arnelle Strand. Stephen Martin claims to be the

better parent for the temporary and permanent care of children. Claims wife was

arrested and children’s father called to get children. Debts and property to be equi-

table divided between both parties. No mention of previous divorce action in the

petition.

(18). July 28, 2004 Theresa files an answer in response stating that they were al-

ready divorced a month earlier in June 24, 2004.

(19). August 2, 2004 Judge Lowell Bray signs the Pick-Up Minor Children Order

pertaining to Case No: 04-101-DR/03-2537DRWS.

(20). August 4, 2004 Former family home no longer listed as foreclosure status.

Theresa signs a loan that was given by Midfirst Bank as a result of former husband

giving former wife a quit claim deed.

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(21). August 9, 2004 Theresa receives Notice of Emergency Temporary Custody

Hearing to be held in two days pertaining to Case No: 51-2004-DR-4764-WS/E.

(22). August 11, 2004 In that hearing the Court decide temporary custody of the

children should be awarded to Stephen Martin mainly on attorney Arnelle Strand

arguing that the arrest of Theresa for child neglect back in June of 2004. This per-

tained to the incident over Stephanie cutting her mother’s clothes, with a pair of

scissors and further alleging that Jessica & Stephanie were afraid of their mother

due to the mother’s abusive physical altercations with these two children on sev-

eral occasions. Judge Renke awarded custody to Stephen Martin while living in

Michigan. The Court further granted the responsibility of decision making to Ste-

phen, based on claims of alleged abuse by Theresa and that the two minor children

are in constant fear of their Mother. Mother had been denied contact with children

until Ordered to facilitate 51-2004-DR-4764-WS/E.

(23). August 25, 2004 Case No: 51-2004-DR-4764-WS/E was transferred from

Judge Renke to the Honorable Judge, William Webb.

(24). August 28, 2004 NOTE* In late AUGUST OF 2004 Helene Ottinger

(Stephen’s mother) of Roseville, Michigan paid the $1,000 Court ordered purge

order this had to be done in order to quash the warrant, that had been issued by

Judge Renke back in July 1, 2004 due to Stephen’s willful failure to pay any court

ordered child support. Detective Brush was overseeing the warrant that had been

issued by Judge Renke and told Theresa Martin that $1,000 Purge child support ar-

rearage payment was sent by the way of Helene Ottinger from Michigan, in order

to stop the arrest warrant on Case No: 04-101DR pertaining to the first divorce ac-

tion.

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(25). Late August or early September of 2004 Theresa’s children Jennifer and

Michael Nichols decided to move back with their mother, because there lease was

up on their house. This is IMPORTANT, based on the fact Stephen was alleging

that Theresa, was an abusive mother to all of her children.

(26). September 1, 2004 Judge Webb signs an order allowing Stephanie & Jessica

to remain with their father in Michigan. One can only argue that the Court agreed

with the arguments of Stephen’s attorney, Arnelle Strand arguing that the mother

was facing a trial over the charge of child neglect by failing to feed her children as

Stephanie had previously alleged in June when the police were called to Thereas’s

residence. Judge Webb was also made aware of the pertinent facts of the divorce

action that was now before him 51-2004-DR-4764-WS/E (the second divorce ac-

tion) in August this judge was assigned to be hear the second divorce case.

(27). November 1, 2004 Thereas’s daughter Jennifer allowed former husband,

Stephen Martin into Theresa’s home that was now her home by order of the first

divorce action since, he had signed his rights away by a quit claim deed early in

June of 2004. Stephen while he was there in Theresa’s home removed several

items while the former wife was picking a jury for her upcoming trial on child ne-

glect in Pasco County. Theresa after learning from Jennifer that Stephan had taken

certain items immediately called the Pasco County Sheriff’s Department and re-

ported the illegal taking of personal property. A sheriff’s deputy from the Pasco

County Sheriff’s Department came to Theresa’s residence and made notes as

Theresa explained to him exactly what her daughter Jennifer had told her earlier.

Theresa along with her daughter told the deputy what motel that Stephen was

staying at. The deputy went over to the motel where Stephen was staying and

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Stephen admitted to the illegal taking of her property and agreed to return all the

items to the deputy and the deputy returned them immediately back to Theresa’s

residence. Jennifer was with her mother, when the deputy returned the items from

Stephen.

(28). November 3, 2004 In Case No: 04-05172MMAWS-17 Theresa had her jury

trial for the ALLEGED CHILD NEGLECT CASE tried in Pasco County. Ms.

Kemba Johnson was assigned by the court to be Theresa’s defense attorney. There-

sa was informed by her that the state had to prove every element in the charge of

child neglect, and further beyond any reasonable doubt to the jury. After the jury

was seated, both sides made opening statements to the six member jury. After the

state presented their case with all their witnesses’ attorney, Kemba Johnson knew,

that the state failed to prove, each and every element required in a child neglect

prosecution case and immediately moved the Court, for a direct verdict. The Court

agreed that the state failed to prove all the necessary elements and granted the de-

fenses motion for acquittal.

The IRONY of this is that, the State of Florida had to have the two children of

Theresa’s testify against their own mother and since, they were minors and lived in

Michigan, they had to be accompanied by their father to Florida. The State of Flor-

ida had to pay for all three of them to fly here and then put them up in a motel until

after the trial was over, then fly them back to Michigan. The tax payers of Florida

took a hard hit on that case, especially when the state couldn’t prove all the neces-

sary elements it took to convict the children’s mother of child neglect. The police

officers who originally came to Theresa’s residence in June testified for the state as

well as two of Theresa’s minor children and yet the state had no valid case against

Theresa Marie Martin.

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III. BOTH PARTIES’ HAVE ATTORNEY’S

(29). November 12, 2004 Case No: 04-01349DLAWS Judge William Webb of

the Unified Family Court referred the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage back to

Judge Renke. The Court ordered Stephanie to pay restitution for the clothes that

she had cut with her mother’s scissors back in April of 2004. And the Court further

ordered a letter of apology to be written to her mother for the acts she committed

against her back in April of 2004.

(30). December of 2004 Theresa’s children Michael & Jennifer Nichols go to

Michigan to visit their father Stephan and while they are visiting with their father,

he (and his mother, Helen Ottinger) show and explain to them, his case against

their mother. This results in the children no longer wanting to live with their moth-

er, but rather stay living with the father who had illegally kidnapped them from the

State of Florida’s jurisdiction back in June of 2004.

(31). January 2005 The Pasco County Family Court orders Stephanie to make

restitution to her mother for destroying her clothes incident.

(32). February 1, 2005 Michael and Jennifer leave Thereas’s home, after trying to

convince their mother to go along with their fathers plan to keep Stephanie and

Jessica with Stephen in Michigan and just drop everything else. Theresa keeps ex-

plaining to them, that is not just that simple anymore and that it is not their deci-

sion or choice to make, but it is her decision based on “the best interest of the chil-

dren” based on a minor child’s future to be productive citizens in society When

Michael and Jennifer realize, that they cannot convince their mother that Stephen’s

way is a better alternative for everyone, (when Stephen had been doing all along by

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using the older children to instill his private illegal plan). I Theresa told her adult

children, Michael and Jennifer that they had to leave the family home due to the

fact that they were being used by Stephen to get information in order for him to

win in court at all costs.

(33). March 2005 Stephen Martin files chapter 7 bankruptcy, in a Detroit, Michi-

gan Federal District Court Case No: 05-4888-mbm. Note* so how is Stephen pay-

ing his Florida attorney if he has no funds, of course his mother is paying his

enormous legal fees?

(34). June 2005 Theresa is allowed her first court ordered visitation with the par-

ties’ minor children. Theresa pays her children’s round trip tickets to Florida. The

two teenage girls were allowed by Stephen to travel approximately 1200 miles

with two teenage boys accompanying them. Theresa refused to allow her daugh-

ter’s boyfriends to stay at her home.

(35). June 13, 2005 Arnelle Strand files an amended petition for divorce removing

all statements referring to Theresa’s former criminal charges as an unfit mother.

(36). June 25, 2005 Peter O. Brick deposes Stephen Martin and Theresa attends

the deposition in the second divorce action.

(37). July 12, 2005 Judge Renke heard the motion on the Final hearing for Disso-

lution of Marriage. Stephanie and Jessica traveled with Stephen from Michigan to

Florida. The Court heard testimony from Stephanie, Jennifer, and Michael and not

one of these three children ever stated to the Court that they had occurred child

abuse, child neglect, or that they had fear of their mother’s actions towards them.

Michael did testify that he had just seen his mother in the mall and further stated

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that it had ruined his day. Jennifer had testified that “ Theresa was vindictive”. All

three of the children said “that they loved their mother but wanted to stay in Mich-

igan with their father.

(38). October 20, 2005 Theresa filed notice of appeal to the Second District Court

of Appeals appealing the trial court’s order on the Final Judgment of Dissolution of

Marriage.

(40) October 25, 2005 Theresa given notice of a hearing date on Stephen’s Mo-

tion for Contempt/Enforcement for Child Support.

(41). November 2, 2005 Judge Renke issues his order on the trial on July 12,

2005. It was almost four (4) months later that the Court’s order was finally signed

and Stephen was granted primary custody of the two children and Theresa was or-

dered to pay child support to Stephen payable, though the state disbursement unit

which was to send payments to Stephen Martin’s Michigan address.

(42). November 2, 2005 Judge Renke hears Stephen’s Motion for Con-

tempt/Enforcement against Theresa Martin, alleging that she was not complying

with the Court’s previous hearing for dissolution of divorce on July 12, 2005. The

Court, had ordered Theresa to pay Stephen the sum of $766.42 per month. The

Court at the end of the hearing found that Theresa Martin was not in compliance

and was guilty of civil contempt.

HOW WAS THIS ALLOWED TO HAPPEN?

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I will know try in my feeble attempt to show, by the legal doctrine of stare de-

cisis, how this case was sabotaged by failing to follow this doctrine which has

COMMON LAW roots . Stare decisis has in its clearest sense, a meaning that “the

rule of adherence to judicial precedents finds its expression in this doctrine. This

doctrine is simply that when a point or principle of law has been once officially de-

cided or settled by the ruling of a competent court in a case in which in which it is

directly and necessarily involved, it will no longer be considered as open to exami-

nation or to a new ruling by the same tribunal by the same tribunal, or by those

which are bound to follow its adjudications, unless it be for urgent reasons and in

exceptional cases.” William M. Life et al. Brief Making and the Use of Law

Books 321 (3ed. 1914).

This fundamental doctrine was NEVER ALLOWED in Judge Renke’s Court to

be applied in the Theresa Marie Martin case. The Renke Court, willfully failed to

follow his own oath to uphold the United States Constitution, the Florida Constitu-

tion, as well as Florida Laws and last but least, violated the Canons that Florida

Judges are to follow in their Code of Judicial Conduct. And this should be ad-

dressed, is the lawyers that were in this case are just as guilty, Ms. Strand failed to

ADHERE to Florida & Federal laws in order to protect the parties’ children, and

she failed to adhere to the Code of Professional Conduct. Theresa’s Attorney, Pe-

ter O. Brick, I feel had an obligation (also to his client) to report Ms. Strand to the

Florida Bar for ethical violations and a motion to recuse Judge Renke as soon as he

noticed that he was violating numerous state statutes and the mandates as the Su-

preme Court had set out for family court judges In Re Report Of Comm. Fam. Ct.

794 So2d 518 (2001). Mr. Peter O. Brick as Theresa’s attorney after realizing that

this judge was not even remotely going to follow the laws and dictates as set out by

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the Supreme Court in family matters for judges to abide by had a duty to file the

motion to recuse knowing that this case involved a four (4) convicted child moles-

ter in order to protect the children that were in this courts hands.

This case has revealed that this was really a “MOCKERY OF JUSTICE IN

FLORIDA’S COURT’S” and exposed corruption that is present in our court sys-

tem and all for the sake of a PERVERTED, Michigan individual who was willing

to win at any cost, to use his own children to his advantage, to subvert the laws of

Florida, subvert the United States laws, and especially to violate Theresa Martin’s

rights.

I will address the ensuing issues that need to be addressed in this case in order

to better understand what legal principles and/or arguments of jurisprudence were

not adhered to in Theresa’s case and what should be be done, that might cure The-

reas’s case and help fix our corrupt judicial system. I will put forth a good attempt

for some good positive case law, on several issues there were raised and some that

have not been raised to cure this problematic case of Theresa’s.

I will start with addressing the issue of Res Judicata and how that directly ap-

plied in her first divorce action. Then move to the issue of the doctrine of unclean

hands and how important that is in any case that is before the court. I will then ex-

plain the issue of child custody in Florida and what court’s look for in deciding

custody issues. I will touch on the area of Federal law in child custody problems

and what the Federal legislatures have done regarding support and kidnapping

problems. What a Pasco County Grand Jury’s role should be in this case. And

what duty is owed by the public defender’s office in representing Theresa Martin,

accused of driving with a suspended license by the State If Florida.

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DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA

All this really means is that an issue or a case that has been settled in judicial sys-

tem. And can be used as an affirmative defense barring the same parties from try-

ing the same claim all over again in the same court system. In other words you

couldn’t sue me for $600 in Duval County Small Claims Court and have the judge

or jury rule that I don’t have to pay you, because the facts as the jury or judge, said

you failed to prove that you even ever loaned me the $600. The court ruled that I

did not owe you the debt and you lost. You can’t go back to small claims court six

(6) months later and file the same case all over again. If you did after I was served

the legal papers, I would file my answer stating an affirmative defense that this

case was already tried and that you lost six (6) months ago in a Duval County

Court case and cite the case and docket number in my answer and ask the court to

dismiss the action and the court would under the doctrine of Res Judicata.

In applying this to Theresa’s case it is very simple she filed a divorce action in

January 9, 2004. Stephan was served the summons by a process server authorized

under Florida Law. Stephen signed over the parties’ home to her by a quitclaim,

(during the divorce action on his own free will) which now gave Theresa, sole

ownership of the family home.

In June 24, 2004 Judge Renke grants a final judgment of divorce and now both

parties are single again. It is obvious that Stephen did not like having to pay the

former wife child support, based on the fact that he fell way behind, then decides

that just because Judge Renke made her the custodial parent and the children were

to live with Theresa, he decides on his own on June 19, 2004, to leave Michigan

and comes to Florida using his mother’s car and he kidnaps the parties’ minor chil-

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dren without notifying Theresa (THE CUSTODIAL MOTHER) and drives them

back to Michigan. The problems further escalates for Stephen, because Judge

Renke signs a warrant for Stephen’s arrest on July 1, 2004, on a motion filed by

Theresa for contempt/enforcement for refusing to pay court ordered child support.

Now that Stephen did as stated in the preceding paragraph, he has to know that

he is in a whirlwind of trouble. What does Stephen do, he hires Arnelle Strand an

attorney located in New Port Richey, Florida. What does Ms. Strand do, but file a

new divorce cause of action approximately thirty three (33) days after the first di-

vorce was granted a final judgment by Judge Renke.

Mr. Martin argues to the court, that he was not properly served. The record

showed that the process server had failed once to serve him at his job but he had

already quit. Theresa then has the process server, serve Stephen at his residence

and that time he was legally served and the process server files his affidavit of ser-

vice on Stephen at his residence in the court file. And since Mr. Martin had previ-

ously signed the quitclaim rights of the family home over to his wife (at the time

period not divorced yet), and she was taking and picking up the children at his

home, it is pretty safe to say, that Theresa knew where to tell the process server to

go a second time to serve the her husband. at that time and the fact that he never

raised the issue of not being properly served at any time in the first divorce action.

It is well established that a challenge of a default made before the entry of

judgment is generally found to be timely and easier to vacate. After a final judg-

ment is granted, then the factors weigh greater towards setting aside the default.

The defendant has to meet a higher standard of proof in order to have any success

in vacating/set aside a default.

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It is accepted that a court has personal jurisdiction over a person through a valid

service of process; however, is a fundamental issue that may be raised by a de-

faulted party at any time. In the instant case because of the doctrine of unclean

hands and the past sexual criminal record, it would be very hard to convince a

Florida Court that the past few years of Stephen Martin, his character and credibil-

ity would be central in a court setting aside/vacating a motion to vacate the final

judgment.

If Stephen was to allege that the service of the summons by the process server

never happened, and in the courts file the process server states in his affidavit as

filed, that he did personally served Stephen, at the time stated and at a the address

listed on the affidavit. Stephen would now have a very high standard of proof to

overcome the affidavit of a NON INTERESTED party. Stephen would have to

prove where he did live and where he was at the time as specified in the affidavit,

filed by the process server therefore; the process server is the main witness in this

issue to vacate/set aside the default in the first divorce action. This if true, that Ste-

phen could prove that he was not legally served and that the process server, did in

fact file a fraudulent affidavit, this then could allow Theresa to seek legal action

against that company who attempted the original service on Stephen Martin.

Florida case law establishes that, after a final judgment has been issued, in order

to have a valid default judgment set aside, the defendant must show (1) excusable

neglect, (2) the existence of a meritorious defense, (3) and due diligence in seeking

relief after learning of the default. It should be noted that excusable neglect is gen-

erally the most common basis used to vacate under Fla. R. Civ. P 1.540, but fraud

can be used to set aside a default.

21

If the judgment has been authentically entered, then all three (3) grounds must

be affirmatively shown. The defendant has to establish all three (3) elements or it

will result in a denial of the motion to vacate/set aside the default.

The question that needs to be answered was this first divorce legally brought to

its final judgment? In Wade V. Hirschman, 903 So.2d 928 (Fla. 2005) the Florida

Supreme Court further clarified that after the trial court enters its final judgment

decree, it is res judicata within child custody matters. And there is a favor of the

reasonableness of the original decree. Relying on Wade a prior custody and as well

as any support issues can only be modified according to the substantial change test.

What this does is it completely prohibits Stephen from filing a second divorce

action and if he should file another with the clerk of court, the Court h as a legal

obligation to dismiss the action under the doctrine of res judicata. And require

him to file a Supplemental Motion to Modify Visitation or Modify Support.

Stephen is also prohibited from filing a second divorce action based on the ar-

gument he is not a Florida resident and fails to come under the exceptions in

§48.193(1) – (5). Stephen Martin and his attorney committed fraud upon the Court

and Judge Renke allowed at to go on and knew that it was illegal but just didn’t

care and I believe it is because he was bought off.

DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS

When this petitioner, Stephen Martin filed a second divorce action, he was re-

quired to do it with clean hands. Adams v. Reynolds, 101 Fla. 271, 134 So. 45

(1931). This legal maxim is one of the oldest most fundamental principles of eq-

uity jurisprudence in our legal system. Town of Howey-in-the-Hills v. Graessle,

22

160 Fla. 638, 36 So. 2d 619 (1948); City of Fort Meyers v. Heitmann, 148 Fla. 432,

4 So. 2d 871 (1941). This maxim of equity jurisprudence is founded upon con-

science and good faith. City of Sarasota v. Dixon, 146 Fla. 369, 1 So. 2d 198

(1941). The simple truth is since equity is a court of CONSCIENCE; it demands

fair dealings in all who seek relief and requires decency, good faith, fairness, and

justice. Henry v. Ecker, 415 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. APP. 5th Dist. 1982). There-

fore, any person filing an action in equity cannot be invoking it for a selfish or ulte-

rior purpose. Losey v. State ex rel. Giblin, 158 Fla. 381, 28 So. 2d 604 (1947).

Theresa understood that the doctrine of clean hands, rested in the sound discretion

of Pasco County Circuit Courts. Cain v. Cain, 436 So. 2d 367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

4th Dist. 1983). However, that Pasco County Circuit Court should have carefully

considered the issue, since Theresa had invoked the doctrine to be applied in her

case. Hauer v. Thum, 67 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1953).

Theresa understood that by her filing her motions to correct the injustice in the

Pasco Court, she knew she didn’t need to have a blameless life; by the mere fact

that the doctrine of clean hands is not a judicial strait jacket. Pennington v. Pen-

nington, 390 So. 2d 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1980). For this doctrine to be

effective, Stephen’s improper actions must be one that existed at the time the relief

was sought. Pilafian v. Cherry, 355 So. 2d 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1978).

Stephen’s improper actions were multitude in nature 1. When he ILLEGALLY

kidnapped the children and took them to Michigan. 2. By failing to pay Theresa

her Court ordered child support as was required in the first divorce action. 3. Ste-

phen mislead the court by not living in this state, did not and could not have legal

standing to file a divorce action, since he lived in Michigan, but could have filed in

that state, if he thought that he needed to file for divorce. 4. Stephen had a legal

23

duty not to commit misdemeanor and felony crimes in order to file for a second di-

vorce and to file motions to challenge the validity of the default, before the Court

granted a Final Judgment. 5. Stephen at the very least had a legal duty to disclose

the fact, that he is forbidden to have right to any child, by the very nature of his

four felony convictions and should have filed a motion to appoint a guardian ad li-

tem in order to protect the parties two remaining minor children. There are others

worth mentioning but too time consuming to go into great detail on this issue here.

Based on the motions filed on Theresa’s behalf, such as the motion that included her

three (3) affirmative defenses that showed that Court the severe credibility issues of

the Petitioner, Stephen Martin. The Court should have concluded, that the doctrine of

unclean hands should have been honored, because of Stephen’s misconduct was con-

nected with the matter in that litigation. McCollem v. Chidness, 832 So. 2d 194 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2002). In McCollem, the Court stated a party must prove that

he or she was injured in order for the unclean hands doctrine to apply. Id. at 196. It

can be well argued, that Theresa was greatly injured by the mere fact, that Stephen re-

fused to pay court ordered child support, kidnapped the two minor children and took

them to Michigan, and his attorney refused, to really address his felony convictions as

a major problem in protecting the children from his record of FOUR CHILD MO-

LESTATION CONVICTIONS, which is in direct violation of our Supreme Court’s

idea of thought was to instill, the safeguards to make sure that problems like this don’t

happen to injured parties, by using the Supreme Court’s Committee’s Case Manage-

ment Recommendations and one of the recommendations that the Supreme Court

adopted was 4(c) that that court should monitor the continued needs of the par-

ties’ two children. In order to protect Theresa and the two children from the father’s

continued indoctrination of trying to convince them, that he needed custody of the

children was paramount to Stephen not having to pay support to Theresa and/or allow-

24

ing her to be the custodial parent, and additionally trying to prove that Theresa was a

neglectful parent as charged by the state. This in turn would have promoted public

trust and confidence in the judicial system for Theresa. And our citizens deserve a

court system with the necessary resources to protect our children and their families.

In Re: Report of Committee on Fam. Ct.794 So.2d 518 (2001) at 535-536.

The Renke Trial Court should have separately tried the question of whether the

doctrine of unclean hands should have been efficiently used against Stephen Mar-

tin. Hauer, supra at 196. That court in determining if the doctrine was applicable

should have been disturbed, when Thereas’s claims were supported by substantial

evidence as outlined in several of her court documents, including the one that gave

Stephens’s complete history of four (4) felony convictions of child molestation.

Roberts v. Roberts, 84 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1956). The doctrine is also applicable,

when the court concludes that the evidence as presented WAS NOT CLEARLY

ERRONEOUS. Terex Trailer Corp. v. McIlwain, 579 So. 2d 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1st Dist. 1991).

The principle that a party cannot seek equitable relief or assert an equitable de-

fense if that party has violated an equitable principle, such as good faith. Such a

party is described as having “unclean hands.” For example § 8 of the Uniform

Child Custody Jurisdiction Act contains an unclean-hands provision that forbids a

court from exercising jurisdiction in a child-custody suit in certain situations, as

when ONE PARTY has improperly retained custody of a child after visitation, or

has wrongfully removed a child from the person with custody. The clean-hands

doctrine evolved from the discretionary nature of equitable relief in English courts

of equity, such as Chancery. Black’s Law Dictionary 127 (8th Ed. 2000); and as

acts by a party that have been vexatious, wanton or carved out for oppressive rea-

25

sons. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1943, 35 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1973). Theresa

firmly believes that Stephen Martin’s willful and deliberate actions, by kidnapping

the minor children, by secret without telling Theresa (the custodial parent that he

owed a large amount of child support) that he was taking them out of state, which

violated her Constitutional right to raise the minor children as she saw fit, and as

the Florida custodial parent were vexatious, wanton, and carved out to fit his op-

pressive reasons.

This long established legal maxim that a “suitor in equity must come into court

with clean hands and must continually keep them clean after entry and throughout

ALL THE PROCEEDINGS” must apply here. Theresa came into that Pasco Coun-

ty Circuit Court with “clean hands” and has continued with “clean hands” through-

out that entire case. The petitioner, Stephen Martin on the other hand, from the

time of the petitioner filing his motion for a second divorce in order to go around

the final judgment in the first divorce action already had “unclean hands” and has

continued even during that entire case with “unclean hands” based on his filing an

illegal divorce petition, kidnapping the children, violating many Florida Laws as

well as Federal laws in order for Stephen’s scheme to win at all costs.

COURT’S SECOND FINAL JUDGMENT

I will now address the real problem in Judge Renke’s Order for Final Judgment

that was issued on November 2, 2005. Judge Renke’s order contains thirty one (31)

paragraphs and in paragraph (1) ordered and adjudged section of the order, the

Court deals with the issue of Theresa’s Martin first divorce action. The Court

found that the default from the Court’s Final Judgment ENTERED on June 24,

2004 as to the children, needed to be set aside based on “the best interest of the

26

children” as stated by facts, testimony, and argument of counsel presented at the

final hearing on the dissolution of marriage. Judge Renke further states that the

husband waives any right to the marital assets and wishes to proceed only on cus-

tody issues pertaining to the first section of the order.

The real problem aside from my argument above on the doctrine of res judicata,

is a Florida Court, cannot piece meal an order pertaining to the former final judg-

ment. When a court finds that a former final judgment is to be vacated for what-

ever legal reason, it is to vacate the whole former action and allow a new action to

be filed if desired by either party. This Court had apparently found that Thereas’s

process server failed to serve the former husband at his residence but never states it

in any part of the order.

The Renke Court should not use the language as stated in ¶ 5 of the first section

by referring that has been a substantial and material change in circumstances since

the entry of the 2004 default judgment. If the Court was really vacating the first

divorce action then language should be used primarily in Supplemental Motions to

Modify Custody or Support after a Final Judgment has been entered. I believe that

the Court never legally vacated the whole first divorce action as found in the lan-

guage of its final judgment on the second divorce. If the Court truly found that the

first judgment needed to be vacated based on Stephen’s argument of law then the

Court has to start all over again by vacating the whole first action, as if there was

never a divorce action filed. Judge Renke had no legal basis or legal authority to

set aside a final judgment based on the “best interest of the children” standard. This

legal standard is not a legal reason to vacate a final judgment and the Court had no

legal precedent for this unconsciousable judicial act from the pen of former Judge

Renke.

27

In paragraphs 6-9 of the first section the Court stated the issue who and why

would have primary custody of the children based on its witnesses, evidence, and

arguments of counsel, the Court stated that it had great concerns for the physical

safety of the parties’ children, to be with their mother, and that the age of the chil-

dren would soon be reaching the age of eighteen (18) that the children might cause

her harm due to their rebelliousness.

The Court fails to explain, pertaining that the former husband had illegally kid-

napped the children, in direct violation, from his previous court order of June 2004,

that he is only PARTIALLY vacating, which had to mean that it was still in effect

when he wrote that final order in November of 2005.

It needs to be argued that, Stephen right before the first divorce action was final

and he also kidnapped the children from Florida to his and /or his mother’s resi-

dence in Michigan that this was clearly in violation of Florida Law. In

§61.13001(3) he was at least required to file a notice to relocate with child form, if

he wanted to allow the court to see if he could allowed that permission. If Theresa

knew that her husband was going to take the children out of Florida’s jurisdiction

she should have been at the very least allowed to file a Writ of Ne Exeat in order to

prohibit him from taking the two minor children. I know because I have filed one

these writs for ne exeat back in the late 80’s.

When Stephen kidnapped the children without any approval from Theresa or the

Court Stephen violated Federal Law as titled “The Parental Kidnapping Act”, a

Federal Statute title 42 §11601et Seq.; 28 USC §1738 and since 1980 It has been

used when one parent kidnaps the child or children. This law is to be used in all

states to recognize and enforce the custody and visitation decisions of courts in

28

other states rather than making new, possibly contradictory rulings on custody or

visitation. And both the UCCJEA and the PKPA provide for jurisdiction in the

“home state” of the child. Department of Children & Family Servs. v. D.N., 858 So

2d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). In other words Stephen had a lot to lose since he

took them from Florida, (without court approval) and was taking them to live in

Michigan.

Florida has a particular statute that deals with Interference of custody in

§787.03 (1) Whoever, without lawful authority, knowingly or recklessly takes or

entices, or aids, abets, hires, or otherwise procures another to take or entice, any

minor or any incompetent person from the custody of the minor's or incompetent

person's parent, his or her guardian, a public agency having the lawful charge of

the minor or incompetent person, or any other lawful custodian commits the of-

fense of interference with custody and commits a felony of the third degree, pun-

ishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(2) In the absence of a court order determining rights to custody or visitation

with any minor or with any incompetent person, any parent of the minor or incom-

petent person, whether natural or adoptive, stepparent, legal guardian, or relative of

the minor or incompetent person who has custody thereof and who takes, detains,

conceals, or entices away that minor or incompetent person within or without the

state with malicious intent to deprive another person of his or her right to custody

of the minor or incompetent person commits a felony of the third degree, punish-

able as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

The Court in the first section does state in ¶ nine (9) that the children are doing

well in school and have better attitudes since (being kidnapped from their Florida

29

residence) June of 2004. The Court never states how or why they are doing better,

that can be understandable, because there was no custody evaluator or guardian ad

litem in any of the hearings to prove to the Court that a four (4) times convicted

child molester would be having the children all by himself. Yet the Court in its or-

der in the second part in ¶ two (2) grants the primary responsibility of the minor

children to Stephen. This directly contradicts the law as codified in § 39.0139

when our legislature allowed it to be titled as "Keeping Children Safe Act." In this

statute it is the LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND INTENT to protect children that

are at risk of suffering from further harm during visitation or other contact from

sexual abuse §39.0139 1&2. In ¶ 3 it goes on to state that visitation with a person

who has abused children may use that time to color the child’s testimony. And any

time there is any hearing in a divorce action relating to a person in chapter 39,

there is a rebuttable presumption of detriment to a child is created when a parent or

caregiver has been convicted (such as Stephen was in Michigan four (4) times) of

molestation charges, a MANDATORY hearing MUST BE held to determine if

they are allowed any type of visitation and the court at the hearing MUST appoint

an attorney ad litem or a guardian ad litem for the child(ren) if one has not already

been appointed. Any attorney ad litem or guardian ad litem appointed shall have

special training in the dynamics of child sexual abuse as in §39.0139(4)(a). Where

was Judge Renke on this law? Ms. Martin had filed his criminal Michigan records

with the clerk of court, given a copy of his record to Stephen’s attorney Arnelle

Strand, also a copy to her attorney Peter O. Brick And various other people.

In commenting on this, I would argue that this judge blatantly and willfully vio-

lated Florida’s Supreme Court mandates that they ordered to be implemented IN

RE: Report of Comm. On Fam. Ct. 794 So.2d 518 (2001) Having reviewed the

30

Committee's recommendations, we strongly endorse the guiding principles and

characteristics of the model family court developed therein and we reaffirm our

commitment to the principles we espoused in In re Report of Commission on Fam-

ily Courts, 588 So. 2d 586, 587 (Fla. 1991) (Family Courts I) and Family Courts II.

In so doing, our goal continues to be the creation of "a fully integrated, compre-

hensive approach to handling all cases involving children and families," Family

Courts II, 633 So. 2d at 17, while at the same time resolving family disputes IN A

FAIR, timely, efficient, and cost-effective manner. (EMPAHASIS ADDED). In

Theresa’s case there was nothing fair or just about that case.

Family Ct. IV also emphasized that our endorsement of these guiding principles

in no way changes our view that the primary role of the judge is to enforce and

uphold the rule of law. Id. 13. Based upon that directive, the Committee devel-

oped the recommendations proposed here, which represent the Committee's con-

cept of the best practices for a model family court in accordance with its study of

nationwide trends in this area. The Court adopted the twelve principles from the

committee and I will list some of the relevant principles that Judge Renke violated

in Thereas’s Divorce from Family IV decision (1) Children should live in safe and

permanent homes. (2) The needs and best interests of children should be the pri-

mary consideration of any family court. (3) All persons, whether children or adults,

should be treated with objectivity, sensitivity, dignity and respect. (4) Therapeutic

justice should be a key part of the family court process. Therapeutic justice is a

process that attempts to address the family’s interrelated legal and non legal prob-

lems to produce a result that improves the family's functioning. The process should

empower families through skills development, assist them to resolve their own dis-

putes, provide access to appropriate services, and offer a variety of dispute resolu-

31

tion forums where the family can resolve problems without additional emotional

trauma. (5) The court's role in family restructuring is to identify services and craft

solutions that are appropriate for long-term stability and that minimize the need for

subsequent court action. (6) Court services should be available to litigants at a rea-

sonable cost and accessible without economic discrimination. Id 8-9. As I have al-

ready stated Judge Renke violated the mandates that were given him by the Florida

Supreme Court and none of the lawyers in that case forced the judge’s hand to fol-

low those rules.

In the Courts third set of recommendations that are essential elements or funda-

mental to a family court model (1) Guardian ad Litem – Utilizing guardian ad li-

tems in all family cases involving abused abandoned or neglected children, and

children at risk of harm. (2) Custody Evaluation – Providing the court with evalua-

tive information in proceedings involving custody disputes. Where was this judge

in following these guidelines when he spells these problems out in the order? Id

20. The only thought here is this judge was not interested in Theresa, her children,

only in making sure that Stephen won his case through his lawyer by hook or crook

and forget all the safe guards that this Supreme Court put in Place to protect people

and children.

In Judge Renke’s ordered & adjudged section, in paragraphs 10-14 states that

the wife will now pay Stephen $766.42 per month in child support and retroactive

child support for the past 11½ months. He further found that Theresa had the abil-

ity to pay Stephen court ordered child support and cancels all previous amounts

owed to Theresa by Stephen as the Court found evidence from witnesses and ar-

guments of counsel that this was also to be in the “best interest of the children”.

This again violates all similitude of Florida Law as in reduction of child support,

that is already owed may not be made absent a finding of extraordinary or compel-

32

ling circumstances. Niblack v. DOR, 32 FLW D1429 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (unpaid

child support payments remain a vested right of the child and cannot be canceled

or reduced retrospectively absent extraordinary or compelling circumstances);

Ulander v. Ulander, 824 So 2d 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); D.O.R. v. Thomas, 675

So 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (if trial court wishes to reduce past due child sup-

port arrearages, it must be guided by law that, absent extraordinary or compelling

circumstances such as waiver, latches, estoppel or reprehensible conduct on part of

custodial parent, trial court cannot retrospectively reduce amount of past due in-

stallments owed). The trial court made no finding that extraordinary and compel-

ling circumstances were shown by the record as stated by the evidence, testimony,

or argument of counsel in order to apply a legal argument of a waiver, latches, es-

toppel or reprehensible conduct on part of custodial parent therefore; the trial court

cannot retrospectively reduce or totally eliminate husband’s past arrearages. The

Court stated the arrearages would be set aside because, the Court by its own deter-

mination found it would be better for “the best interest of the children”. This does

not meet the extraordinary and compelling circumstances test as held

Niblack and Ulander.

It further violates that Federal law as written in 42 U.S.C. §6669(a)(9)(c). In §

666 is the requirement of statutorily prescribed procedures to improve effective-

ness of child support enforcement. In §(a) describes the types of procedures re-

quired in order to satisfy section 654 (20)(A) of this title. And in paragraph (9)

Procedures which require that any payment or installment of support under any

child support order, whether ordered through the State judicial system or through

the expedited processes required by paragraph (2), is (on and after the date it is

33

due). And finally § (c) is not subject to retroactive modification by such State or by

any other State;

These statutes were designed that once support obligations were granted by a

state court to an individual, that these child support payments were not in any form

to be dismissed through bankruptcy or any other means, but were not subject to ret-

roactive modification. They were a permanent debt that could not be vacated or

waived away and states were to uphold this federal law by incorporating into their

statutes.

When Judge Renke, wiped out this approximately $10,000 child support debt

which; Stephen Martin willfully and blatantly refused to pay and was legally owed

to Theresa for past child support, for his children, the Court violated the United

States Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich 545 U. S. 1(2005). The Su-

premacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between fed-

eral and state law, federal law shall prevail. id 29. Judge Renke failed to state why

he was willing to vacate this retroactive modification, but only found it was in “the

best interest of the children” standard which fails the Gonzales Court’s test. One

can only say, what more could have Judge Renke done to violate the rights of The-

resa and her two minor children Jessica and Stephanie in a Pasco County, Florida

Family Court proceeding?

CONCLUSION

What more could Theresa Martin do on her own in this previous two divorce

cases? If a court system of attorneys and Judges of this State are willing to violate

the rules of civil, criminal procedure, laws of Florida. The U. S. & Florida Consti-

34

tutions, The Judicial Canons for judges, and the Rules of Professional Conduct for

lawyers what hope is there for anyone in the State of Florida to be able to have a

court case where they will receive a fair and constitutional treatment of their di-

vorce action in a circuit court of law in Florida. What more is a pro se person such

as Theresa Martin supposed to do, as she legally filed her first divorce action and

received a lawful default judgment; only later find out that the same judge allows a

non resident, in violation of state law to file a second action divorce action.

Then the same Judge strips her of her lawful child support order, and as the cus-

todial primary parent status, then reverses everything by using the “best interest of

the children” test rather than applying the facts of the case to Florida established

law. If a court in this State fails to uphold the law, as a judges sworn oath requires

he/she to do how can anyone respect the court system in this state? If a judge now

makes a lawful resident into a criminal how are we going to have any hope of jus-

tice in this country, if justice is for sale as apparent it was in this case?

When Judge Renke ordered that Stephen no longer owed Theresa back child

support by invalidating the first final judgment in direct violation of state and fed-

eral laws, it is quite obvious to anyone taking an honest look at the facts as re-

corded in the second divorce case that is a classic case of a miscarriage of justice.

I feel it is your offices legal and constitutional mandate to help correct this

problem, which can only be done by a thoroughly deposing former judge Renke,

Ms Arnelle Strand (Stephen’s lawyer) and Mr. Peter O. Brick (Thereas’s attorney)

as to why and how they willfully and blatantly violated Florida and Federal Laws

in Theresa’s and her children’s Constitutional rights to be protected from a four (4)

time convicted child molester. I also believe that it is very hard to get across to ju-

ries the idea of jury nullification but much easier to use the necessity defense in or-

35

der to show that she was trapped and forced by the State of Florida in becoming an

alleged violator of having a suspended driver’s license.

I just spoke to Nicky in the traffic division, of the clerk of court’s office and she

has informed me that there have been no subpoenas issued for depositions, no dis-

covery by the public defender’s office, or any other recent motions filed in There-

sa’s defense I find this hard to believe. How can any attorney with the facts that are

in this case not have a valid defense to present, especially if there has been no dis-

covery of any kind?

Sir, I find this very appalling, that your office I believe is failing to abide by

Strickland v. Washington 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). In Strickland they agreed that the

Sixth Amendment imposes on counsel a duty to investigate, because reasonably

effective assistance must be based on professional decisions and informed legal

choices can be made only after investigation of options. The court observed that

counsel's investigatory decisions must be assessed in light of the information

known at the time of the decisions, not in hindsight, and that "[the] amount of pre-

trial investigation that is reasonable defies precise measurement." The Court fur-

ther stated most states have now adopted the "reasonably effective assistance"

standard in one formulation or another. For that reason, the Court has recognized

that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel

In Strickland a two prong test is to be used (1) criminal defendant may not ob-

tain relief unless he can show that counsel's performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness, (2) and that counsel's performance gives rise to a rea-

sonable probability that, if counsel had performed adequately, the result of the pro-

ceeding the trial, the sentencing hearing, the appeal would have been different. In

this case I feel that by your recent e-mail to Theresa that you feel the State has al-

ready won and that there is nothing you can do based on your legal training. I

36

simply do not agree based on all the facts of this case, and since there has been no

discovery in her case, I fail to see how you can comply with Strickland based on

performance and prejudice of your office in her case.

I will now leave the rest up to you and Theresa, but I feel she should file a mo-

tion to immediately remove you as her legal counsel and file a complaint against

your office and petition the court for private counsel citing a conflict of interest

AGAINST YOUR OFFICE whether the judge agrees with the motion or not it will

be on the record, if she would ever have to appeal her case IT WILL BE NOTED

FOR THE RECORD.

May you find it in your heart to reconsider your legal options in this case and if

I can be of any assistance please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely yours,

P. H. Heidemann