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Forms of States, Governance, and Regimes: Reconceptualizing the Prospects for DemocraticConsolidation in AfricaAuthor(s): Staffan I. LindbergSource: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol.22, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 173-199Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601185

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InternationalPoliticalScienceReview 2001), Vol 22, No. 2, 173-199

Forms of States, Governance, and Regimes:

Reconceptualizing the Prospects for Democratic

Consolidation in Africa

STAFFAN . LINDBERG

ABSTRACT.uilding on the growing body of literature bridginginternationalrelationsand historicalsociology,this article argues that

consolidologists have something to learn from this field. Thediscussion'spoint of departure s contemporarywritingson sovereignty,security,and state formation in the African context. In an effort to

synthesize nsightsfrom internationalrelationsand historicalsociologywith neo-institutional

theory,a heuristic mode that

suggestsan

alternativeconceptualizationof different forms of states,governance,andregimes s developed.The authorargues hat thismodelcan be usedto better understand he relationshipbetween formsof states,variationsin the institutions of governance, and transitions between regimes.Taking the model to be fruitful, the article finally suggests some

hypothesesregarding he prospects or consolidationof democracy hatcan be testedin futureempiricalresearch.

Keywords:fricansovereignty* Forms of states* Typesof governanced

Transitions f regimes

Some Africanists says that five' of the (then) 47 countries in sub-SaharanAfrica,hereafter referred to as Africa,2 had some sort of democratic regime at the

beginning of 1989 but that 38 countries subsequently held competitive electionsbetween 1989 and 1994 (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997: 218-219). Anothereleven states followed suit and held founding elections between 1995 and 1997,while sixteen states embarked on a second elections run (Bratton 1998: 54-55).This kind of outlook on Africa has become common.

I prefer a slightly different story,which has less about the seductive numbers ofelections to go with it. In terms of political rights,3 seventeen states made no

substantial gains in the 1990s; another eight states made some improvements from1989 to 1992 but then fell back and showed no substantial improvement in 1999 in

0192-5121 (2001/02) 22:2, 173-199; 016356 ? 2001 International Political Science AssociationSAGE ublications (London, Thousand Oaks, CAand New Delhi)



International oliticalScienceRevie 22(2)

comparison to 1989.4 Seven states made good gains between 1989 and 1992 but

then stalled (some admittedly with a fairlyhigh standard of political rights) while

another nine states remained unchanged between 1989 and 1992 but gained

momentum between 1993 and 1999.5 The remaining four states made incrementalimprovements throughout both periods.6 At the end of 1999, out of 48 states,sixteen states were democracies in more than a mere formal electoral sense and

five were on the verge of belonging to this group.Whatever story one prefers, the common direction of change and almost

simultaneous timing of these transitional processes force us to address two basic

questions: first, are the winds of change best accounted for by a focus on domesticor on international factors? Many comparative studies carried out on Africa andother regions hold that the outburst of increased political freedom and

democracy in Africa can be sufficiently explained in terms of domestic factors.7

Yet, African transitions from military or civilian authoritarianism to democraticrule or liberalized oligarchies display strong indices of international determinantsin the timing as well as the direction of these changes. I will attempt in this articleto suggest conceptual tools that can be used to better understand the interna-tional linkages of democratization. The key question is When do international

pressures have the opportunity to fundamentally transform states? In order to

approach this issue, I discuss the Janus face of sovereignty and the double securitydilemma. In conjunction, these two analytical complexes provide an entry to theintersection of the international and the national. Three structural layers of thestate are conceptualized in ascending terms of changeability: forms of states,

governance, and regimes.

The second and interrelated basic question is, do we better explain the courseof events by looking at actors or at structures?The wave of political liberalizationin Africa during the early 1990s inspired many Africanists to become

transitologists and as such, to propose models, analogies, ideal types, andtheories based on the new empirical material thrown up by the winds of change.These authors seem to have followed the general move from structural

determinants of democratization towards actor-oriented analyses (see Osaghae,1995; Schmitter and Santiso, 1998: 61). It is not argued here that this move has

been inappropriate, only that it is unsatisfactory. Actors do have room to

manoeuvre and their subjective interests, goals, and calculations matter for

outcomes. Not every ourse of action is possible, however, neither for old nor newrulers in transitionalstates.8

Opening the Case

Mybasic rationale is the assertion that the approach in international relations thatis concerned with forms of states and their institutional expressions has a

significant contribution to make to the study of political transitions and

possibilities for the consolidation of democracy. This particular dimension of the

potential in international relations theory has been ignored so far. Herbst (1990)discusses the insights of both international relations and historical sociology in

this field, but with an eye primarily to state consolidation, in particular withreference to a somewhat reified Westernstate. He does not, however,studywhatthe implications for transitions to, and consolidation of, democracy might be. Thisarticle attempts to do that. Furthermore, I dispute the implication of Herbst's

reasoning that only the Western type of state can be consolidated. State

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LINDBERG:ormsofStates,Governance, nd Regimes

consolidation may occur within many different forms of states, but is best

conceptualized as a never-ending living process that has to be continuouslyattended to by rulers.

I focus on state structures in terms of politico-economic institutions that

provide the framework for international as well as domestic actors. My argument is

that a focus on the logic inherent in different forms of state institutions displays

potentially strong constraints on domestic actors' range of choice and external

actors' leverage during the present transitional phase in Africa. Structural

constraints inherent in state institutions may well be judged to have been more

important than actors in both starting off the transitions in Africa and in shapingthe main tracks of various outcomes. If these relatively die-hard nstitutions did

affect the timing and trajectories of transitions, they can arguably be assumed to

be equally important for the prospects of consolidation. Hence, I also argue that

the framework here may contribute to understanding the prospects forconsolidation of democracy in African states.

Institutions generally have in-built incentives for actors occupying and usingthem, to extract and then use resources of various kinds in such a way as to

rearticulate, adapt, or restructure the same institutions. At the same time,established institutions as such increase the cost of setting up new ones. This is theessence of path-dependency which informs this study. Thus, a newly established

government in an African state may find it very hard to fulfil all its goodintentions9 when the informal as well as formal institutions are geared to function

within a system of governance that builds on patronage, corruption, tribute-takingand coercive extraction of resources. Therefore institutions and forms of state

matter. My approach may perhaps be labelled a structural-Weberianinstitu-tionalist framework. With the focus on institutions, the trajectories of transitions

may be analyzed in terms of outcomes of cost-benefit calculations producedlargely by the incentives created by institutions.

I seek to provide some insights into the circumstances not of their own

choosing, to use the standard phrase, under which actors make their choices. Byfocusing on the institutional expressions of the three layers of states proposedhere, it may be possible tojudge when international factors and pressures have the

opportunity and possibility to impinge on long-term transformations of Africanstates. The article is theoretical and speculative rather than empirical and

evaluative.'1Yet a few empirical examples are used to illustrate the theoreticalpoints and corroborate their fruitfulness for further testing.

What I seek is not a general theory of history,but rather a theoretical framework

applicable to a specific period in history. I acknowledge the suggestion byFerguson and Mansbach (1996) that polities rather than states s a better labelfor the group which includes Westphalian states, sovereign tribes, empires, semi-

sovereign feudal systems.Yet, I limit myself to only the historical period, which ischaracterized by a system constructed by Westphalian states based on claims of

equal and exclusive, territorially-based, sovereignty. I suggest a framework that canbe useful in examining various institutional arrangements that shape and directAfrican rulers' way of relating to (1) political change, that is, liberalization and

democratization; (2) the networks of social groupings within their territories, thatis, society; and (3) the external environment. This understanding is crucial for

comprehension of current developments and of prospects for democraticconsolidation in Africa.

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International oliticalScienceReview22(2)

The Double Dilemma of Sovereign States

Sovereignty is central to this discussion for several reasons. First, my focus on

moder states as organizations dominating political space requires a theoreticaldiscussion on the notion of sovereignty on which these states are founded.

Second, at the heart of the discussion between neo-realism, structural realism and

their opponents, lies the issue of sovereignty.When Waltz (1979) asserted that the

international system has always been anarchic and units always alike, he was

referring to an equal and exclusive distribution of sovereignty among units.Socialization and inter-unit competition were the mechanisms whereby anarchy

impinged on polities, forcing them to adhere to the structural imperative of self-

help. We know this conclusion to be wrong. History teaches us that many

examples of systems that consist of unlike units that do not converge on a singleform have persisted for long periods of time (see Buzan,Jones, and Little, 1993;

Hall, 1986; Ericson and Hall, 1998; Ferguson and Mansbach, 1996: 393-395). Yetin the last 500 years or so of world history,like political units (in terms of claimson

equal and exclusive sovereignty) have come to cover the entire globe (Krasner,1988: 66-67). The double security dilemma induces a specific logic for sovereign

polities, which can be analyzed with particular reference to Africa and

international influences on the recent wave of democratization. As Reno (1998)has shown in four cases, sovereignty may be severely contested and highlycircumscribed, yet the claim on sovereignty induces a particularcost and benefits

calculus even for warlords. This article attempts to situate insights such as Reno'sin a more comprehensive theoretical framework.

My third reason is that potential contenders always accompany claims tosovereignty.Like and unlike organizations may challenge states both from outsideand from within. This is the logic of the double securitydilemma as spelled out byBuzan (1991). The nature of the dilemma has been opened for debate, however.

Mann (1986, 1996) and Ericson and Hall (1998) argue that the dilemma arisesfrom threats of units drawingon different resources,ot only from threats arising in

different contexts. It is not the inside/outside that matters, but rather the natureof the resources actors mobilize for the reproduction, redefinition, or terminationof political organizations. This clarification is particularly helpful vis-a-visAfricasince African states have generally been threatened by units drawing on different

resources in the domestic as well as the international realm. Again, Reno (1998:

30) finds that warlordism s not implosion of a state but a new technique for

building political authority where both rulers and private foreign firms profitfrom the creation of disorder. The new partnerships in these states between

private military service firms and weak-state rulers (warlords) drive strongmenaway from valuable resources and replace old patronage networks with

commercial partnerships. Chabal and Daloz (1999) make a similar point about an

even wider range of cases in Africa. In their analysis, the instrumentalization of

disorder as a way of managing neo-patrimonial systems in times of changingincentives is central to contemporary African politics. It blocks strongmen from

aggregating resources needed to threaten incumbents and insulates the state from

being penetrated by society. This is an example of what I call a capstone form ofstate. Chabal and Daloz have provided highly valuable insights into an evolvingalternative for African rulers in the adaptation and reconfiguration of stateinstitutions. They have not, however, put this insight into the context of atheoretical formulation of other alternatives.

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LINDBERG:Forms of States, Governance, and Regimes

Finally,sovereignty also lies at the heart of democratization. Rule by the peopledemands a spatial unit to be identified containing the people and juridicalautonomy in political space. Democracy, as we know it, makes little sense if there is

no clearly defined state and few issues for the people's political representatives todecide on. Sovereignty and the double security dilemma, in sum, are central todemocratization.

Sovereignty n Africa

Sovereignty in Africa is a contested issue. Different conceptions pervade theliterature and, hence, the nature of the security dilemma, the principalcontenders for the state, and African state formation and rearticulation arematters of scholarly dispute. Jackson's (1987, 1990) formulation of quasi-states,building on conclusions inJackson and Rosberg (1982), has been very influential,

however. His well-known notion of quasi-states is similar to Buzan's (1991: 100)formulation of weakstates characterized by (1) high levels of political violence;

(2) a significant role by the political police in everyday life; (3) major politicalconflict over ideology; (4) lack of coherent national identity; (5) lack of clear

hierarchy of political authority; and (6) a high degree of state control over themedia. Jackson adds the personalistic, or neo-patrimonial, character of thedomestic political systems in Africa. He argues that most African states are soweak in terms of negative (as opposed to 'juridical ) sovereignty that theywould not exist were it not for the international norms of juridical sovereignty.

Inspired by Bull and Watson's (1984) discussion of nascent, quasi, and

pseudo states, Jackson (1987: 528) argues that African polities are not statessince they obviously are not yet substantial realities in the conduct of publicofficials and citizens.

Paying his respects to Jackson, and Jackson and Rosberg, Clapham (1996a, b;1998a, b) pursues essentially the same argument even if his is somewhat moreelaborate. Elites in African countries adopted the norms of sovereignty because itsuited their purposes for wealth extraction from the inside (revenue and rent) aswell as the outside (aid, loans, preferential trade treatment, and militaryassistance), while the international system of states recognized the new states as a

consequence of system maintenance. Clapham (1996a: chap. 11) argues that the

negative sovereignty regime developed in the post-World War II period to

preserve African states in the absence of empirical viability since preservationcoincided with the interests of African, Western, and Eastern political elites.Recent African writings on this point, such as those by Ofuho (1998), seem to

agree with Jackson and Clapham, disagreeing only on the origin of the presentsituation. Ofuho (1998: 16) argues that the major cause was colonialism giving riseto would-be nation-states in Africa, which have remained fractured, ridden bycrises of identity and authority and lack of governmental control.

To these authors, African states' measure of sovereignty is to a large extent amatter of international juridical convention, while the essential quality of

sovereignty, its empirical manifestation, is lacking. The argument tends to slip intoa reversed definitional

fallacy (see Holden, 1993) reifyingthe notion of

sovereignty. It undoubtedly remains true that African states do not fulfil the

requirements of empirical statehood. Yet neither do many Western states (see

Ferguson and Mansbach, 1996: 12; Thompson, 1994: 3). Jackson, Clapham, andOfuho all commit the fallacy of measuring sovereignty with an absoluteability to

177




regulate and control flows of activities within and across borders that states neverhad (see Thompson, 1995: 213-215; Ruggie, 1983: 276). Furthermore, historicalnarrativeson state formation during the rise of the West by scholars such as Tilly

(1992, 1993), Mann (1986), Hobson (1994), Spruyt (1994), and Skocpol (1979),make quite clear that neither becoming nor failed-to-become Western nation-states at the time had the empirical requirements spelled out in the sovereigntydoctrine. Control over territorial borders, military defence capacity, domesticcoercive control, national identity, and resource mobilization-these are all

empirical variables and not constants. Historically,war certainlymade manystates,

particularly the dominating ones, yet less important states have always been

accepted at the fringes of the system as long as conquest or sovereignsubordination did not have a considerable pay-off for dominant states. Theexistence of sovereign states, despite lack of objective mpirical/positive criteria,has

longbeen a fact. The notion of a

Westphalianstate has

alwaysbeen an ideal

type of construction and its empirical actualization has varied. One must not

equate international juridical norms of sovereignty with the empirical conditionsof Western,or other, states.

Second, the above authors seem to assume that states in Africa,unlike Western

states, were created from above. It is indisputable that almost all African states

(save Eritrea and Ethiopia) originated from colonial conquest. It is not true,however, that Western states were characterized by some sort of organic growthfrom nations to states. The European state-formation project was carried out

top-down with few, if any, exceptions. Modern states were formed and developedto make war and to build power vis-a-visother states and their own societies

(Thompson, 1995: 216). I need perhaps only take my own country as an example.Sweden is considered to be one of the most home-grown, homogeneous, andconsolidated nation-states in the world. Yet our borders varied considerably fromthe beginning throughout the eighteenth century, sometimes including Norway(another home-grown, homogeneous, and consolidated nation-state), Finland,and parts of today'sPoland, the Baltic states, Russia,and Germany.At other times,Sweden has consisted only of the middle and central partsof today'sterritory.Ourdefence and control over borders was less than firm for many decades and

governmental coercive control, however firm today, was probably weaker on theeve of the twentieth century than it is in manyAfrican states today.

Young's(1994) seminal

studyon the historical traces of the African

post-colonial state provides a variation on this theme. Using a complex definition ofthe state borrowed from Dyson (1980) as a guiding tool for an extremelyambitious comparison between the African colonial and post-colonial state, andboth the earlymoder European states and other Third Worldpost-colonial states,

Young certainly makes a compelling case that the African heritage was differentfrom others.'2 On the issue of creation from above versus growing from below heis somewhat ambiguous, however. His basic thesis is that the African state's distinctcreation from above during colonialism molded the contemporary state and

shaped its behavioral imperatives and that its main problem is that it did not groworganically from within civil society (ibid.: 6, 9). Yet,borrowing from Oakeshott

(1975), he simultaneously recognizes the fact that European states were apieceof inhabited territorywith a government, land (often ill-defined), people (oftenmiscellaneous) and a ruling authority.... Referring to Mann (1986), Young goeson to say that society was effectively caged in the territorial grid of the state

system (Young, 1994: 15-19). Young thus acknowledges the similarity in how

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modem European states and African states were created, while emphasizing the

specific attributes of the colonial period that according to him significantly shapedsubsequent developments. My interest is not so much in these specifics but rather

in the development of a conceptual framework that can be used to categorize suchspecific variations and make structured comparisons possible. In other words,whereas Young's is a historiographic narrative of his view of the prime movers andmain traits of the African colonial state '3and its post-colonial successors, mine isa theoretical formulation of the logic of state rearticulation, adaptation and

restructuring. As I hope to demonstrate, my model moves beyond Young's insightsin that it can both account for the African particularities in state forms and

governance and provide theoretical suggestions on how to redirect institutional

path-dependencies in Africa.To reiterate, most African states, like most Western and other states, were

created top-down and not bottom-up. Or, as Herbst has argued (1989: 692),Borders are always artificial because states are not natural creations. This

argument, however, is limited to the creation of, as opposed to the continuedexistence or development of, states. Modern Western states subsequently had to

bargain with their societies in order to achieve consolidation of the state anddifferent structures of governance. Central to this venture were methods of

extracting resources for both external security and to achieve domestic legitimacy,which dismantled internal threats. That bargaining was about men, money, and

land, and arguably led to democratization in the West. The question is what sort of

bargaining-if this notion can be transplanted to the African context-hasoccurred and will still occur in Africa.

Sovereigntyand the Double SecurityDilemma

I have discussed some conceptions of sovereignty above. Adding Herbst'sexternal-internal labels to the two dimensions, sovereignty may be displayed as

follows:

Sovereignty

Author First Second

Herbst external internal

Jackson negativepositive

Clapham juridical empiricalThompson constitutive functional

What this table shows is that despite various labels, there seems to exist an

agreement on the double nature of sovereignty, or rather, itsJanus-faced nature.'4

Juridical-negative-constitutive sovereignty constitutes the modem international

system of equally sovereign units and hence, the units as such. It rests on a claim,not actual capabilities. Moder history shows that units frequently merge, expand,dissolve, and are redefined in the course of adapting to-or failing to adapt to-the international and domestic environments.

Many scholars would contest this argument. They would stress the stabilityofstates as political constructions worldwide within the ideal framework of the

Westphalian state. What is threatened is not the state but the ruler who is often the

argument. Why be so interested in forms of states that do nothing? Why not focuson state actors, rulers, and non-governmental organizations instead?

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My reply to such objections departs from the understanding of the state as a

political organization in its own right, that is, as a set of institutions with different

layers. Institutions, it has been argued, either constrain actors' capabilities and

scope of choice (see North, 1990; Moe, 1990; Bates, 1989) or expand individualchoice by influencing availability of information (see Ostrom, Schroeder, and

Wynne, 1993). I argue that we may fruitfully discuss three structural layers in

polities: forms of states, forms of governance, and forms of regimes. Each layer is

expressed through certain institutions. And although each set of institutions, I

argue, either enables or constrains different actors at any given point in time, inwhichever way is an empirical question not to be pre-determined analytically.All

these institutions, or structural layers of the state, must continuously bedefended in terms of rearticulation, adaptation to changing conditions, or

restructuring.If the chosen method does not succeed-as it frequently does not-these institutions will fail to exist. In all three layers, the preservation, adaptation,or restructuring of state institutions costs resources. Therefore the mostfundamental activity of state, governance, and regime institutions is to extractresources and then make use of them to preserve its continued existence.'5

These three layers should be understood hierarchically in one sense: forms ofstates are harder to transform than forms of governance. Forms of states asdelineated here express the deepest functional logic of any given state in terms ofits extraction and use of resources. A state may historically or geographically be

geared to extract resources (through taxation or other means) coercivelyand from outside its territory while another state might extract its resources

cooperatively and from the domestic sphere. In terms of governance, different

forms are expressed in the institutionalized patterns of bargaining and coercionamong rulers, other elites, and societal organizations such as those found in

corporatist or patrimonial systems. These institutionalized patterns of

relationships, however stubborn and long-lived, are less unchangeable than

deeper structures of the state. On the third and most shallow level are regimes-the formal institutions of government. As formal institutions, these are the leastresistant to change.

This framework is not static, however. Change may be induced by exogenoustrends in the environment of states, altering the costs and benefits of certainmodes of resource extraction and use. In Africa, external extraction of resources

through trade monopolies, aid, assistance, and loans dramatically changed

between the late 1980s and early 1990s. Likewise, costs and benefits in thedomestic sphere changed. As the prevalent neo-patrimonial systemsof governancewere increasingly threatened by the decline in available resources that maintainedthe system, internal warsbecame more attractive and less costlyfor some rulers (asin Congo and Rwanda), while outright destruction of state institutions seemed tobe a major alternative for others (such as Sierra Leone and Liberia) and

reconfiguration in the form of decentralization was pursued by still others (for

example, Ghana).There are many different stories on African politics. Let us stay with a few

examples from contemporary writings. Young (1994) focuses on continuity.Chabal and Daloz

(1999)and

Joseph (1998) exemplify the manystories of

stateand rulers' adaptation. Then there are the analyses that capture the

discontinuities, such as that by Bratton and van de Walle (1997). They all tell us

something about African politics, yet they analyze different levels of the state andits politics. The framework here can be used to integrate analyses like these in a

180




coherent way that will provide a more comprehensive view of what is actuallytaking place in Africa.

Modelling Three Structural Layers of State

Overstating the case, in the same waythat neo-realism reified the decontextualizedstate as an unchangeable, undifferentiated unit of the system (Hall, 1998: 260),theories of democratization tend to reify and decontextualize the state but interms of passive and ahistorical empty shells. States are made up of actors ofdifferent kinds filling the state with a particular content. While it certainly remainstrue that certain actors occupy the state at any given moment, this does not

preclude there being other significant aspects of the state/polity as well, notablythe most basic need to preserve, adapt, or restructure the state as a politicalorganization.

Forms of States

This is the essence of the double security dilemma: upon forming a politicalorganization like the state with a claim on sovereignty, external political bodies will

potentially either be threatened by its powers, or be attracted by the resourcesaccumulated within this state and hence threaten to overtake it in order to gainaccess to these resources. Similarly, domestic actors will want either to join and

penetrate the state, or to alter its form, occasionally even to terminate it, to betterfulfil their interests as a group. The great majorityof African states never faced any

serious military threats from external powers in the post-independence period(Clapham, 1996a: chap. 3). Since independence, the most immediate threats toAfrican states have come from inside. Most often these threats have not beendirected towards the state, but rather towards the rulers. Yetdisintegration of somestates and substantial threats to the viability of many others show that this is not

alwaysso. External threats have mainly been economic (which are not necessarilyless serious) and come from international financial institutions, military partners,and aid donors.

Faced by the double security dilemma, a state must use resources for internal aswell as external reproduction. Resources can be extracted either from its own

society or from outside its

territory,

and in different

ways.Historically,it seems that

absolutism was necessary to extract resources without consent. If it was possibleand more efficient to make populations pay for wars voluntarily through some

bargaining, then absolutism was not necessary. It [the state] must thus decide

whether, on balance, it is more efficient to extract resources from its own civil

society or from abroad. Furthermore, there is the issue of whether it is more

opportune for the state to extract the resources in a predatory manner or in a co-

operative manner (Hall, 1998: 268).In whatever form it takes, the process of upholding the state as a political

organization takes resources. War, defence, propaganda, social benefits, and

patronage all have costs. To extract revenue and then use it for, among other

things, the rearticulation or adaptation of themselves, constitutes states' most basicfunction and the logic of state formation and continued existence might hence berendered through, in Hobson's (1997) terms, a fiscal-sociological approach.Resources must be extracted from someone and somehow. Categorically speaking,revenues can be extracted ither by means of coercion (as in typical monarchies

181




and dictatorships) or by bargaining (as in corporative and democratic states), andeither primarilyin the domestic (most common) or in the international context

(through imperialism, trade, or intergovernmental aid and loans).

Second, resources necessary for the sustaining of states must be used.A basicconceptual distinction can be made between blocking or mobilizing social groups.Coercive blockage is used to label concerted efforts made in order to preventother groups of actors, domestic or external, from constituting alternative and

competing centres of dominant political power. Several opportunities suggestthemselves for this blockage, such as war, imperialism, terror, imprisonment of

potentially disruptiveindividuals,propaganda, corruption, and buying loyaltywith

patronage. Alternatively, the lion's share of revenues might be spent on

management of society and mobilization of social groups for state purposes. Social

groups can be organized and empowered within the framework of the state bymeans of education and socialization, economic management and control,

support to civil organizations, and administration of state functions by semi-autonomous groups. This kind of organization amounts to penetration of societywhich increases a state's influence and control over civil society and individuals atthe same time as it provides an effective feedback channel, or what Mann (1986)called infra-structuralpower. 16Yet, penetration must be mutual to some extentto be accepted by social groups (see Smith, 1993). Thus state and society become

more of an integrated whole rather than two distinct parts. Hence, a useful

analytical distinction can be made between coercive extraction and use of

resources, and participatoryextraction and use for societal management. Such a

distinction is the first level in the heuristic model suggesting four forms of states

shown in Figure 1.

Extract bycoercion bybargainUse \̂ or byforce orbyconsent

to blockor Capstone Penetrativeto subordinate state coercive tate

to manageor Capstone Penetrativeto mobilize management tate state

FIGURE. FourMethodsofResource xtraction nd Use:FormsofStates.

The notions of capstone and penetrative states are adopted from John Halland Martin Hall, who have both employed these terms for analytical purposes. A

capstone state implies that the state is sittingover society, and in the words of

John Hall (1986: 35) has strong blocking but weak enabling powers and its

concern, consequently, was less with intensifying social relationships than in

seeking to prevent any linkages which might diminish its power (ibid.: 52). A

penetrating state is more part of society and has the power to reorganize it for

societal purposes. (J. Hall, 1986, 1994; M. Hall, 1998). This distinction echoesMachiavelli's distinction between rule by force and rule through consensusembraced by Gramsci and his followers (Gill and Law, 1995; Cox, 1995: 18). It alsorelates to Mann's (1986) despotic versus infrastructural state power.John Hall hascommented on the latter in arguing that Mann is mistaken to consider

182




infrastucturalpowerto be held oversociety.Hall insiststhat whilefreedomfromsocietal pressures increases state autonomy in one sense, state autonomy canactually be increased by the state working through independent social groups in

the sense of being free to generate the largest possible sum of social energy(Hall and Ikenberry, 1989: 14), a standpoint which is shared by MartinHall (1998)and reaffirmed in this article. The problem withJohn Hall's categories, which laterwere slightly modified by Martin Hall, is that they do not allow a distinctionbetween extraction and resource use. While they acknowledge the significance ofuse, their two-category models can only display one part of the game (extraction).Both sides of the coin are equally necessary, however. A state's relationship to its

society is equally determined by the use of resources. Waging war, suppression ofcivil rights and domestic terror,mobilization of civil organizations and educationalservices matter as much as waysof taxation, confiscation of private property, use oftrade barriers, and the like. Furthermore, resource use

mayeither

strengthenor

harm a state's future possibilities of extracting such resources from its society.Resources can be used in two ways:first, state resources can be used to mobilize

society by providing services (such as waging war to protect the nation or

constructing welfare systems) that key groups find attractive and legitimategenerally and that can be assumed to increase society's willingness to contribute toa state's budget. This willingness makes higher levels of taxation possible while itdecreases the transaction cost of revenue collection. Second, resources can beused (with or without success) to enhance production, by increasing productiveoutcomes within a state's territory. Thus, the revenue base can be widened andtransaction costs for extraction lowered and gains doubled.

One advantage of this formulation is that it makes it possible to see that apenetrative, and to some extent penetrated, state implies that state's greaterfreedom to generate conditions favourable to its continued existence. The need toachieve consent through bargaining with its own society is a two-wayprocess thatmay strengthen the power of the state. Capstone and penetrative in this sense

obviously relate to the classical distinction between coercion and consent, whichare often used to distinguish between authoritarian and democratic rule(Remmer, 1996: 616, 1995: 117-119; also see Pridham, 1991). Consent is then

usually assumed to imply less state strength and capacity. My approach highlightsthe opposite relationship: a penetrative state works through and with society andsocial organizations to accomplish its tasks. A mutual, yet

asymmetrical,relationship enables the state to reorganize and mobilize society to create betterincentives for its continued rearticulation, adaptation, or restructuration. Hence,the penetrative state has greater potential for flexible response to changes in itsenvironment. The power and ability to reorganize stems from the process of co-operative extraction, which may increase material resources as well as lowertransaction costs. Relative consent through bargaining entails legitimacy, which

spills over to reorganizing. Legitimacy means that implementation is less costlyand tends to be more successful, which in turn helps to expand the resource baseif reorganization succeeds in increasing state revenues.

What must be added to this discussion is the distinction between resource

extraction that is largely based on border-crossing activities and/or externalsources and state resources from domestic activities. The principal difference isthat if resources mainly come from external sources and trade, the state must not

bargain or wage war with its own population (society) but with external actors inits quest for survival, maintenance, development, reformulation, or whatever

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seems fruitful for the adaptation of the state to the type of environment it faces at

any time. That is exactly what Reno (1998) seems to have found in the cases of

Congo, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, although in these cases, resources

primarily came from private foreign firms and not from overseas developmentassistance or loans.

It may, for example, be easier to remain a capstone state when a state'sresources are mainly external, since blockage of society without triggeringrevolutionary forces may be easier when no substantial amounts of revenues are

squeezed from a population. In that case, external providers of resources must beindifferent or favourable to a capstone state, as was arguably the case with the

major powers' interests in Africaduring the cold warperiod.The reverse is true if resources mainly come from domestic sources. Tripp

(1997: 25) has shown that in Tanzania, for example, the informal economy in

Dar-es-Salaamaccounted for 90percent

of urban household incomes in 1988. The

power resources inherent in this sector could subsequently be used in interactions

between the state and civil society to put pressure on the state for economic and

political liberalization. Contrary to that of such scholars as Azarya and Chazan

(1987), Chazan (1988), and Bayart (1986), Tripp'sconclusion is that engagementin an informal economy does not necessarilyentail disengagement from the state

(see Emizet 1998: 128-129). It may actually strengthen both people's interest in,and incentives for, cooperation with the state in constructivereciprocities, to use

Hyden's (1992) terminology. Such a state may be forced to enter into co-

penetrative relationships with its society when the external resources are

withdrawn.

The real catch of this reasoning is as follows: the rulers of states must respondto the double security dilemma. The way they choose to do this-the method

used-is on a fundamental level a matter of utilizing, adapting, or restructuring

existing institutions that are set up to extract and use state resources in a

particularmanner. Variationsin method (hypotheticallystated) affects:

* the structure of the state and its accompanying institutional set-up as

discussed in the four forms of states;* the structure of the society since societies-different networks of social

groups-respond to changing incentives within the state. Incentives here

includes the costs and benefits of interacting with the state in alternative

ways, such as through corporative or pluralist means, or by exiting frominteraction;

* the relationship between the state and its society through the interaction

of state and social institutions;* the state's external relations with the environment consisting of other

states and dissimilar bodies such as international financial institutions,multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations.

These four relations in turn define the incentives for states' continuingrearticulation, adaptation, or restructuring. Once again, failure should be

considered an open option. The institutional pattern of states' rearticulation as

described above provides a way of understanding the most basic kind ofinstitutional constraints confronting any ruler in such a state. Such structures

may be transformed, and indeed have been throughout history,but that generallyis a long-term process. The link to democratization and the prospectsfor consolidation of democracy becomes obvious: indirectly, a capstone state

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dependent on the external environment for the resources it needs in order toremain capstonian is hardly democratic by default. Yet its method of

rearticulation makes it wide open for external pressures such as for political

liberalization. This was arguably the case when donors, for example, attacheddemands for political reform to aid which financed up to 80 percent of Tanzania's

development budget in the 1990s. Yet such a move would still not automaticallytransform the capstonian character of the state since these institutional patterns ofbehaviour are deep-rooted and provide strong incentives for the actors to maintaina capstonian state. The incumbents who come to power in a capstonian state do sobecause they have used the logic of its method of revenue collection and dispersalto get and stay in power. Changing this method of reproduction endangers aruler's grip on power. This type of deduction, however, is premature at this point. Ineed first to consider the intermediate level of governance before I can discuss theissue of regime transitions appropriately.

Forms of Governance

The issue here is whether the above forms of states relate to different forms of

governance.Forms of governance are the second level in our heuristic model.17Governance here means various institutionalized practices in how holders of

power in the government actually relate to civil organizations and the public. In

Joseph's words (1997: 376) it represents a particular system of rule [that] hasbecome consolidated.... Like forms of states, forms of governance must be

rearticulated, adapted, or restructured. Empirically, these processes are

intrinsically linked and perhaps cannot alwaysbe distinguished from each other.Conceptually there is a point in making the distinction, however. Forms of

states and forms of governance must be compatible if a system is to be stable. That

is, the methods of extraction and use of resources that are employed must

basically be the same. Hence, if empirical evidence shows that methods ofextraction and use are disparate and counter-active within the same state, thereare signs of incompatibility between state and governance. In those cases one can

expect either the form of state or the form of governance to change. One must,however, remember that each form of state is theoretically compatible with morethan one type of governance even if the account below does not make much of aneffort to highlight that particular aspect. Neo-patrimonialism is one form of

governance while other forms (non-exclusively) include totalitarianism, pluralism,and corporatism. For my purposes these examples are sufficient to consider.

The primary institutional heritage in Africa is neo-patrimonial rule.18 Neo-

patrimonialism is a form of governance which seems to be closely related to a

capstone state and is based on personalized rule. It is organized through clientnetworks of patronage, personal loyalty, and coercion. To sustain themselves,leaders of neo-patrimonial institutions must regularly extract resources from theirfollowers in a largely coercive and predatory manner (see Lewis, 1996: 100;

Clapham, 1985, 1993). Neo-patrimonial systems tend to monopolize material

resources, turning the political game into a zero-sum struggle for control of the

state. The middle class has not been compelled to align with the ruling elite sinceit has often been the primary object of state predation.From this perspective, then, is it reasonable to discuss neo-patrimonialism as a

method, a form of governance? Obviously, it is easy to argue that neo-patrimonialinstitutions function in order to enrich political leaders and maintain their

185




personal rule. This seems to be the conventional interpretation (see Callaghy,1984;Jackson, 1987, 1990;Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; LeVine, 1980). Yet the neo-

patrimonial system of rule displays significant continuity over time and with

different rulers. As manifested in Africa, this indicates that neo-patrimonialismmaintains something more persistent than just temporal leaders, namely the

political organizations headed by these leaders. In other words, there are reasonsfor taking a closer look at neo-patrimonialism as an institutionalized structure of

governance. Neo-patrimonial governance in Africa has employed a particular

strategyfor resource extraction and use. Resources have been extracted through(1) monopolized structures of economic management whereby all surpluses have

been effectively removed from productive entrepreneurs, (2) state control over

trade surpluses, and/or (3) external sources in the form of militaryor civilianaid,

loans, and concessions (Broad, Cavanagh,and Bello, 1990; Forrest, 1988: 431-434;

Joseph, 1997: 368; Kennedy, 1994). Domestic taxation has stayed comparativelylow apart from trade revenues although some states such as Ghana have achieved

higher levels than others. Yet, in the literature on other parts of the world we find

that domestic taxation has been deemed crucial in several respects. Taxation of

the domestic population has been essential to European state formation (Tilly,1992; Hobson, 1997), for shaping the relationship between the state and civil

society (Levi, 1988; Moore, 1998), and for developing state capacity to deliver

services in the West (Sembodja and Therkildsen, 1995). Moreover, comparativestudies (see Steinmo, 1993) have shown that variations in taxation systems reflect

long-lived political institutions.Certain policies such as a general income tax is in many African states

unthinkable until the transaction costs of tax collection are lowered by anappropriate economic structure and administrativecapacity (Therkildsen, 1998).Therefore a tight grip over other material and coercive resources has been

necessary for African rulers using neo-patrimonial institutions to govern so as to

prevent competitive patronage networks from rising up and threatening the state

from within. What is important is that not only the leadership but also the state as

a political organization has been maintained by neo-patrimonial institutions.

Framedwithin their capstonian states, the power of African rulers came to dependon these particularstructures of governance. To reiterate, the capstonian state and

neo-patrimonial governance methods for coercive and arbitrary extraction of

resources as well as in their use of revenues serve primarily to block social

mobilization.If we return to the essentials of Young's thesis (1994: 292) we find that his

empirical observations may be ordered in this framework. The legacy of the

colonial order was essentially that of a capstone state (with tendencies towards

capstone management in francophone states). This form of state was elevated bythe domination of indigenous elites who subsequently found that control of

society was most effectively achieved through patronage. Neo-patrimonialism was

not, however,a heritage of colonialism but it nevertheless went well with the logicof the capstonian state. So while we find a colonial influence in state formation, itdoes not show in terms of the form of governance.

Another distinct form of governance is totalitarianism. As with neo-patrimonialism, rulers using totalitarian institutions do not have to bargain aboutresource extraction. Totalitarianism is, however, distinguished from neo-

patrimonialism by significantly more efficient control over resources and the

capacity to perform substantial managerial tasks in reorganizing society. Unlike

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LINDBERG:ormsofStates,Governance, ndRegimes

neo-patrimonialism, totalitarianism therefore does not have to use the bulk of

resources on domestic blockage of social pressures. Instead it directs resources

either to restructure society or to territorial expansion and/or mobilization of

social groups inside or outside its borders. Totalitarianism thus is most functionalin a capstone management form of state.

Pluralist institutions, on the contrary, are characterized by open but relatively

unregulated competition between social groups and actors for influence over the

state. The state performs only basic functions that take fewer resources and will

therefore not have to rely heavily on coercion for extraction of resources.

However, pluralist governance does not go well with institutions to penetrate and

mobilize society. Pluralist governance presumes a distinction between the social

sphere governed by civil organizations and the limited sphere of the state where

organizations do not have a say.This form of governance is most clearly related to

the penetrative-coercive form of state. The institutions in a pluralist system of

governance are not set up to promote any particular group or even stabilitybetween certain groups and the state. Pluralist governance presumes a multitude

of social groups counter-weighing state institutions and acting as checks and

balances. The competition between social groups is primarily a competition of

influence over social blockage. This competition does not necessarily take the

form of democratic practices. Reno's (1998) warlordism seems to me like a

pluralist form of governance pursued in a penetrative-coercive state. The

resources are extracted through bargaining (although few are involved) and are

used primarily to block other social groups from asserting enough power to

threaten the present form of governance and the regime. Warlordpluralism has

at times taken place in democratic regimes in Liberia and Sierra Leone, but not inthe Democratic Republic of Congo.

A fourth type of governance can be described as corporativist. Corporatism has

strong historical links with fascism (Levine, 1995; Mansbridge, 1995) as it is often

associated with participatory governance in modem welfare states such as

Sweden.19One may conclude that corporativist institutions do not in themselves

imply a particular form of regime but do provide different options. Corporatism

may be conceived of as an institutionalized system where the state shares both

extractive and executive powers with institutionalized interest groups in what

might be labelled co-governance. The state is empowered by this arrangement, as

it strengthens its ability to co-opt and mobilize great parts of society for

reproductive ends (see Smith, 1993: 29-32). It institutionalizes a flow ofinformation from society to the state from which the latter can benefit. When

corporatist systems of mediating interests and policies between the state and civil

organizations are used to both extract and decide on the use of resources,

organizations are compelled to have vested interests in the continuation of such

corporatist arrangements. That is the very meaning of co-option, which

circumvents the power of integrated organizations. Yet some real influence by the

organizations is necessary to maintain bargaining. In other words, collaborative

institutions of corporatism are often sectional and longlasting compared to

pluralist issue-based networks in state-society cooperation. This sort of bargaining

(mediation of conflicting interests) may be the outcome when the state needs toincrease its resources through widening the taxation base (Etheshami and

Murphy, 1996: 764-765). The state bargains over the means for rearticulation,

adaptation, and restructuring through corporatist institutions, yet other stake-

holders have vested interests in the continuous reproduction of corporativist

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InternatonalPoliticalScienceReview22(2)

governance. It seems safe to say that with established corporativistinstitutions of

governance a state has the upper hand.20 Resources can be used to maintainmobilization of society partly through institutionalized interest groups so as to

strengthen corporativist governance. Hence, corporativist governance is bestperformed in a penetrative state.

Formsof Regimesand theModel

I have discussed above four forms of governance, each one relating heuristicallytoa particularform of state by means of similar methods of resource extraction anduse. I suggest that regimes are the third and most shallow structural layer in themodel. There are many potential regimes one might consider. I will stick to a fewfor the sake of clarity:two forms of democracy, liberal and social democracy,21 ndcivil or military regimes based on single rulers or oligarchies. The latter two are

similar to various forms of perverted democracy in terms of the aspects I aminterested in here. In Figure 2, I have added this third level to the model.

Formof state: Capstone Capstone Penetrative Penetrative

Management CoercionI I I I

Formof Totalitarian Neo-patrimonial Corporatist Pluralist

governance: I I I IFormof Civil/military Civil/military Social Liberal

regime: singleruler oligarchy democracy democracyora

pervertedora

pervertedrisk

diminishingrisk

diminishingdemocracy democracy into into

e.g.virtual e.g.pseudo- controlled delegativedemocracy democracy democracy democracy

FIGURE. FormsofStates,Governance,ndRegimes.

A note on the reading of the model: or perversion does not imply that the

civil/military single ruler/oligarchy regimes are transformed into a diminished

subtype of democracy. On the contrary, the model exemplifies the possible resultof degeneration of a formally democratic regime in a capstone state with a neo-

patrimonial system of rule. By perverted democracy I mean a form of regime thatis inherently undemocratic but usually is labelled as a form of democracy with an

adjective negating the democratic nature, as in pseudo-democracy. Such regimesdo not share the defining characteristicsof the root concept of democracy andhence cannot be conceived of as subcategories (see Collier and Levitsky,1997). I

see democracy itself as a phenomenon best conceived of as an expanded-minimum procedural22requirement presuming contested elections, full electoral

suffrage, and the absence of substantial fraud in combination with full andeffective civil liberties (ibid.). Beyond that definition, democracy as a concept hasvaried meanings for people even in Western countries. Social and liberal

democracies fulfil these root criteria, but run the risk of losing or seriouslyweakening a defining characteristic:in the case of social democracy particularlyfull contestation may not be achieved. In that case the result will be a controlled

democracy. With liberal democracy the risk is perhaps more evident that

participation and the accountability of leaders will fail, turning a democracy to

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something like the diminished subtype, delegative democracy.23Finally, far fromall possibilities are displayed in the model. For example, a warlord/disordervariant of pluralism may be pursued in conjunction with a liberal democratic

regime for a shorter period of time. In the long run, such a combination wouldprobably not be viable and either the warlord/disorder kind of pluralism wouldhave to transform itself or democracy would become a facade. What is important isthat the model and its logic can be used to interpret and make systematic sense of

insights such as these even though not every articulation is included.When considering regimes one must recognize that for short periods almost

any set of formal institutions of a particular regime is workable in nearly all stateseven if they pursue different modes of reproduction. Differences show in the

longer term. This article does not present a structured empirical analysis onlybecause of lack of space, but also because the time-span 1988-1998 is too short fora

proper

assessment of the

theory.Furthermore, the combinations in the model

are only a few of the possible suggestions for stablecombinations. The catch is toconsider the methods of rearticulation and adaptation of regimes, as well as formsof governance and states. Structural tensions are then expected in combinationssuch as capstone state, pluralist governance, and representative democracy. Insuch cases, one expects the tensions to pave the wayfor changes in at least one ofthe other layers. Under unchanging conditions, the shallow layer(s) have to givein to the deeper structures. However, when the incentives for actors occupyingthese institutions change, this logic may be reversed and a change in regime mayfacilitate transformation in governance and state structures.

Results: Starting Hypotheses

A few hypotheses regarding African neo-patrimonial states can now be suggested:

* A capstone state using a patrimonial strategy for reproduction incombination with a one-party regime, military oligarchy, or virtual

democracy will remain quite stable. That is, it will be stable as long as theresources needed to maintain neo-patrimonial governance can beextracted through trade, aid, tribute-taking, or limited domestic taxation.The state will remain patrimonial and a capstone one.

* If the incentives for neo-patrimonialism change, for example, through

absent external resources such as aid, less income from trade throughliberalization, the break-up of economic monopolies, or through populardisengagement from the formal economy, the state must try to adjust itsmethods of rearticulation and adaptation and restructuring to the newcircumstances. This reformation may be successful or not. Failures are

rampant and levels of adaptation vary.* When meeting an economic crisis the neo-patrimonial state may try to

redefine and adapt itself by merely changing its regime into, for example,a representative democracy. If that succeeds in securing necessaryresources for continued existence of neo-patrimonial institutions, thesewill

prevail.Prevalence of

neo-patrimonialism will pervert representativedemocracy through patronage networks where spoils are distributed and

loyalty attained. A virtual democracy will be produced which reinforces the

neo-patrimonial strategy and the capstone form of state. Neo-patrimonialgovernance remains.

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* If a regime of social democracy succeeds in redirecting extracted resourcesfrom patronage networks, and instead supports mobilization of societythrough unified and cohesive interest groups, a corporativist strategywill

result. Corporatism provides an opportunity for the state to betransformed into a penetrative form. A penetrative state will benefit from

benign corporatism and a corporativist strategy will benefit fromaccountable representative democracy. A new form of state, pursuing anew strategy for rearticulation, adaptation and restructuring with a newconstitutional set-up, will be produced. The risk is that new patrimonial-like structures will appear in the form of a controlled democracy, which

might initiate a return to neo-patrimonialism.* If a liberal democratic regime succeeds in redirecting extracted resources

from patronage networks and to strengthen the basic institutions insuringthe rule of law

(Rechtstaat)ocial

relations will change butin

directionsimpossible to predict. If this process involves the isolation of leadershipfrom other important socio-economic groups or if the political leadershipestablishes a partnership with a few essential resource providers, the risk is

that it will become a delegative democracy governed by a new form of

strongman, via decrees. If this happens, the risk for reversal to a civilian or

military single ruler-regime and new neo-patrimonial institutions in a

capstonian state is rampant. Another option is that the state willrearticulate itself as a minimal state with commercialized relations to a fewresource providers. This would open the wayfor multi-layeredauthoritiesin semi-feudal systems. Such a development would pervert democracy by

compromising accountabilityas well as transparency.

To spell out the logic, a new regime, such as representative democracy, mightnecessitate alteration of the existing form of governance, for example, from neo-

patrimonialism to something else, if the new form of regime is to survive.If such a

change succeeds and both regime and governance are reconstituted,transformation in the form of state becomes necessary. Transformation has

consequences for the international system as it builds on the forms of states that

occupy spatial extensions within it. Hence, there is a conceptual as well as an

empirical link between the internal structure of states and the function of the

international system. If the international system changes, incentives for different

forms of states, governance, and regimes alternate according to the reverse logic.24By this logic, not all forms of states or governance and regimes are attainable at

every historical conjuncture. Thus, the international system impinges on the

internal structure of its states.With the end of the cold war, incentives for the rearticulation, adaptation, or

restructuringof the African states changed dramatically.Their external extraction

of resources through aid flows, military and other assistance, loans and

concessions sometimes, was transformed. Rulers of capstonian states using neo-

patrimonial structures of governance could no longer rely on external supportwhen the Soviet Union withdrew economically during the mid-1980s and the Westredirected its interest from anti-communist defensive action to

pro-democraticprogressive action between 1989 and 1994.25Bythe late 1980s, according to van deWalle (1994: 135), More than half of the nations in sub-Saharan Africa were

effectively bankrupt, and most of the others were propped up by Western publiccapital. Yet, the total amount of aid to Africa declined during the 1990s, which in

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turn increased these states' dependence on domestic resource extraction throughtaxation or rent. The trend towards deregulation of trade reinforces suchdemands and the move towards democracy potentially may help to induce

accountability into these systems by challenging both the neo-patrimonial systemof governance and the capstonian character of these states.The combination of globalization and trade liberalization, fiscal crises and

democratization may force a dramatic institutional revolution in Africa, inducing adifferent kind of bargaining over the extraction as well as the use of stateresources. It remains to be seen what form these shifts will take. Here Reno's (1998,1999) analyses are important correctives to the hope that less neo-patrimonialismwill equal more democracy. There is the possibility that rulers will find newalliances in the global political economy and create entirely different forms of

governance within penetrative or penetrative-coercive forms of states, which mayor may not be compatible with democracy. The theoretical framework suggestedhere provides the opportunity to avoid the teleology of many other accounts (with

exceptions of course, such asJoseph, 1998) in that a particularform of state, gover-nance, or regime is not assumed to be the necessary result. t makes it quite clearthat several stable combinations may, or may not, be the most desirable outcome.

The model I have proposed, and my hypotheses, of course need elaboration.No empirical indicators have been suggested. Political institutions, or rather the

institutions that make politics possible and take on specific routes according to a

specific logic in different cases, must be clearly outlined and specified so as to be

empirically discernible. Yet,with regard to neo-patrimonialism (which I take to bethe one entity without subtypes, for the sake of simplicity) one crude indicator-

corruption-is provisionally an indicator of the extent to which neo-patrimonialsystems are still in place. Myobjective is not to present a test of the theory but onlyto indicate its empirical validity.

Corruption does not necessarily indicate a neo-patrimonial system, of course.But with a neo-patrimonial system still in place, a state will definitely rank high on

any corruption index. Even if many key practices, such as distributing seats in

parastate bodies, patronage, nepotism, and uneven distribution of state-sponsoredinfrastructure, do not show in corruption indexes, other practices that are

commonly considered as corrupt do show up to a sufficient degree. Thealternative is to use various qualitative accounts of the level and extent of current

neo-patrimonial practices in a range of African countries. The methodologicalproblems of comparability and reliability would be enormous, however.

Aggregation of case studies using divergent approaches and organized by distinctinterests generally is extremely difficult and risks being seriously misleading.Hence, I provide the following quantitative and somewhat empirical analysisalongthe lines of a probability test. (See Figure 3.)

Politicalrights Politicalrights Politicalrightsrating7 and6 rating5 and4 rating3, 2 and 1

Corruptionhigh 4 2(indexrating1-3)

Corruptionmedium 3 5

(indexrating3-5)Corruptionow 2(indexrating5-7)

FIGURE. Relationshipbetween oliticalRightsand Corruptionn Africa.

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TransparencyInternational's (TI) index of corruption has become one of the

leading sourcesof information on levels of corruption.ForAfrica,the data existonlyfor sixteen states,which introduces a potential selection bias.26This concern maybe

somewhat reduced, however,when we look at the following distribution of cases.The distribution shows that there is a correlation between the level of corruptionand the level of political rights in these sixteen states. If the level of neo-

patrimonialism corresponds somewhat to the TransparencyInternational index of

corruption, there may by a case for saying that to sustain democracy in Africa we

need to get rid of the neo-patrimonial form of governance. The table above says

nothing, however, about the operative logic suggested in this article. The

theoretical frameworkdeveloped here suggests that to throw out neo-patrimonialforms of governance, the form of state needs to be fundamentally transformed as

well. The key to this transformation is the way resources are extracted and used.For the relevance of this suggestion to be examined there needs to be a number of

similarly structured case studies, however. That will ultimately determine the

empirical soundness and utilityof this approach, although it is partlycorroborated

by historical case studies done by Levi,J. Hall, M. Hall, and Hobson.

Conerhsion

The real catch is threefold: first, with this approach we can begin to understandhow the basic imperative of self-help translates into multiple forms of governanceand institutional set-ups that directly affect domestic politics. Second, we acquiretheoretical tools whereby we can conceptualize the relationship between forms of

state, types of governance, and different regimes. With these tools we can begin tosystematicallystudywhy a shift in regime does not necessarilyinvolve a shift in the

form of governance or the form of state. Conversely, a shift of regime maycontribute to transformation of both governance and form of state. Third, we cannow ask how different regimes and forms of governance are linked to particularpossibilities and constraints for playing the externalgame, and can systematicallystudy the theoretical implications of international factors manifest in the

workings of the capitalistworld economy.A common trait of all states is the need to reproduce themselves continuously

by rearticulation, adaptation, or transformation. Throughout history, two mainexternal activities of states have been war and trade. Trade has been conducted

either by private merchants or by state companies. Either way,the state generallyhas raised revenues from this activity.War has had many purposes, which can be

organized into two categories: physical and strategic survival,and extraction ofresources and wealth. In the former case, war exploits significant state resourceswithout giving anything in return except security. In the latter case, war bringsrevenues to the state, such as land, gold, slaves, trading routes, and other valuable

goods. States' basic domestic activities have been centred on the same issues:

security and acquisition of revenues through taxation, tribute, labour acquisition,services, and access to land. What has varied has been the means by which theseactivities of the state have been accomplished. Often states have failed to

accomplish these taskssufficiently effectively and have ceased to exist.One task is to clarify the value of this framework. Does it reveal a previouslyneglected aspect of democratic transition and consolidation? Does it spell out

logical relationships that have not been properly understood before? Obviously,Itend to answerYes to these questions. More empirical examples would, of course,

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LINDBERG: orms of States, Governance, and Regimes

make my argument stronger. Second, given the legitimacy and desirability of

integration of previous theories merging traditionally distinct fields of research is

ajustifiable path to take.

Third, many comparative and qualitative accounts fail to explain whathappened, that is, there is an inherent risk of detheorising explanations. Actor-oriented analyses that stress contextual factors in their explanations of outcomescontribute little to theory-building even if such studies can inform good theory(George, 1979). Studies of democratization typically conclude that actors'freedom is greatest in the transitional phase characterized by uncertainty. Myargument is that transitional processes in Africa have been characterized bystructural and institutional constraints, in other words, room for manoeuvre aswell as rulers' perceptions of possibilities have been strictly constrained. Bymerging international relations theory and comparative politics, manydomestically oriented findings in traditional studies of democratization can be

made more meaningful. Having said that, I must emphasize that this reasoningdoes not imply the predetermination or simple reductionism prevalent in olderinternational relations theory. The framework here-correctly read as non-determinate and non-exclusive-provides structural logic, as opposed to causality.

In this article, my reasoning has been highly theoretical. The model I proposeshould be understood in a heuristic sense, despite the somewhat formalistic

approach. In reality,methods of extraction and use of resources tend to be mixed,and at best, display tendencies in one direction or another. Perhaps the most

important lesson to draw here, originally developed by Hall (1998), is thatincentives for states' rearticulation, adaptation, or transformation, vary with

historical time. Furthermore, they vary not only with traditional conceptions ofsecurity threats but also, and perhaps more importantly, with institutionallyconstrained abilities and possibilities of collecting and using state revenues withinand outside the state.

Incentives for state action originate from two sources: the international and thedomestic. Not only international factors often referred to in comparative studiesof regime change can be discussed and understood in this theoretical framework;so can domestic processes that constitute internal incentives for state repro-duction. Hence, the two spheres of international and national politics can bestudied as parts of oneprocess where states rearticulate or fail to rearticulate, adaptor fail to adapt, transform or fail to transform themselves.

Arguably, in state-society relationships, traditional comparative accounts from

sociology as well as political science have much experience to draw upon. Weshould not reinvent the wheel. There has been much concern about institutionalreform in Africa during the last fifteen years or so. Perhaps there is still somethingto learn from history, and temporal as well as spatial comparisons. This article

suggests that what should be compared is not so much concrete events as the

operative logic of institutions. It may be that the logic of the neo-patrimonial formof governance in the typical African state is not that far from the logic of

governance in earlier, as well as contemporary, European political formations.

Notes

1. Botswana,Gambia,Mauritius, enegal,andZimbabwe.2. The label Africa as more and more come to denote what is properlycalled sub-

SaharanAfricawith48 states.In economic analysesSouthAfrica s normallyexcluded

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form this group because of its exceptional (with regard to African conditions)economic resources and development. In this article, however,South Africa is includedbut Africa sed to mean sub-SaharanAfrica.

3. Politicalrights

here refer to theratings

of Freedom House's annualsurveys.

Substantial

improvement as well as fallbacks means that the change is greater than +/-1. To saythat

any meaningful improvement has been made with a change from let's say 7 to 6 (as for

Angola) or from 5 to 6 (as for Swaziland)in these ratingsis mere fiction.4. The first seventeen states are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea,

Guinea, IvoryCoast,Mauritania,Nigeria, Rwanda,Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland,Tanzania,

Togo, Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire), and Zimbabwe. The second

group of eight states are Comoros, Congo, Gabon, Gambia,Kenya, Niger, and Zambia.5. The first seven states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome,

Seychelles. The second group of nine states are Central African Republic, Djibouti,Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi,SierraLeone, South Africa,and Uganda.

6. These four states were Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar,and Mozambique.

7. See also scholars who have discussed other areas than Africa: O'Donnell and Schmitter(1986), Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992), Hadenius (1992), Diamond,Linz, and Lipset (1990).

8. Recently many have argued for variationson the theme of structurationtheory,followingthe lead of Giddens (1984, 1994). While both structures and actors obviously interact

and playimportantroles in everyform of social change (Sztompka,1993), good thinkingmay also be produced by tryingto separatethe two andjudge their distinct contributionsat different points. This is, for example, often the main taskof historians (Carr,1990).

9. However, old incumbents, even if now elected, may not have been interested in

transforming old structures since their rule, even as leaders of democratically elected

governments, rests on old structuresof governance.10. I have been

temptedto follow the

procedureof Bull (1977: x) in this

regard:to deal

with a large and complex subject by simply thinking it through.11. Or, rather, units will have to become alike immediately as the system is constituted

because of the pressure of self-help. WhatWaltzwould have to argue happened almost

instantaneously, scholars like Tilly (1992) and Spruyt (1994) see as long-term

developments. Yet the two latter tell the same storyof convergence on sameness in form

among spatiallyextended polities (Ericson and Hall 1998: 6-7).12. Young uses a different conception of the state as a concept than the one used here. The

definition borrowed from Dyson is highly complex and allows for relaxation of the

defining characteristicof moder states, a claim to exclusive sovereignty.On the other

hand, this characteristic is somewhat confusingly found in Young's conceptualdiscussion of attributesof states.

13. I dispute the use of state to refer to the colonized territories in Africa since theseentities never had the necessary attributes, or claimed such attributes during thecolonial period. Using Young's own eight attributes (1994: 25-34) they not only lacked

sovereignty, nation, and a role as an international actor (ibid: 43) but also their own

power, independent (as opposed to imperial master's) control over territory,and mostof the time the state as an idea was not there. Hence, these colonial entities never had toconfront the key dilemmas of states such as the double security dilemma, which

arguablyimprints a distinct logic on states as different from other social formations and

political organizations.14. There is not, however, complete agreement. Herbst's external-internal divide is

territorial-spatial n nature and based on the borders of the given unit. Thompson's,Jackson's, and Clapham's notions of sovereignty rest not on territorial, but on legalclaims versus realized capabilities to enforce such claims which, in principle, may bediscussed in both the international and domestic realms. While external and

juridical/negative/constitutive sovereignty often coincide empirically as states are

recognized as legal, in sovereign units there is no reason to conflate the two analytically.15. The language used here should not be misunderstood to mean that institutions are

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given the ontological status of purposive actors. Individual human beings are alwaysthelocus of purposive action, but the institutions that mould these actors' interests as the

holders of power in existing institutions are powerful partly because of the existence ofthese institutions. The institutions are thus

necessaryconditions for their

present powerand status.16. However, Mann's position differs from my proposal in that infra-structuralpower in his

conception is held over society, whereas I imply power through or in conjunction with

society.17. The understanding of governance in this article is distinct from Hyden's (1992)

proposal in that governance here is exclusively focused on the systemwith which the actof governing is performed by whatever institutional regime is in place, whereas Hyden'suse of governance is much wider. Hyden's concept of regime is very similar to

Sandbrook's (1996: 85) and these two roughly translate to my use of governance.18. The characteristics of the African states have been labelled in many ways, among these

lame Leviathan and patrimonial administrative (Callaghy, 1995), soft (Forrest,

1988; Rothschild, 1987), kleptocracy (Andreski, 1968), accountable authoritarian(Barkan, 1993), parasitoral (Kennedy, 1994) and patron-clientistic (Kanyinga,1995). These all address basically the same thing labelled here as neo-patrimonialism.

19. Sweden has been judged one of the most corporativist states in the world by manydifferent kinds of measurement: Schmitter (1974), Cawson (1986), Williamson (1989),Rothstein (1994), Levine (1995).

20. If the state does not hold the upper hand, governance is no longer corporativist by thisdefinition but rather something like the bureaucratic authoritarian governance often

referred to in studies on Latin America.

21. Liberal democracy is understood as Dahl's (1979) minimal procedural criteria of a

polyarchy summarized in demands for (formally) full suffrage, unrestricted competitionand civil liberties. Social democracy is understood here in the sense of a polyarchy but

in combination with serious attempts to secure real equal opportunities via state

intervention, as for example in the modern Nordic and to a lesser degree, in

continental European welfare states.

22. For a discussion of procedural definitions, see Schumpeter, 1994: 155-164; Huntington,1991: 7-9; Hadenius, 1992; Dahl 1971; 1989: 218-222; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:

chap. 2; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 1989: preface.23. Which diminished subtype is most likely to follow from particular subtypes of

democracy is impossible to specify at this point. More than regime obviously plays a

part. The proposed logic only concerns the relations between different institutions, as

analytical ideal-type constructions. Delegative democracy as defined by O'Donnell

(1994), controlled democracy as discussed by Bagley (1984), virtual democracy as

defined byJoseph (1997), and discussed, very tellingly, as semi-authoritarian regimes byCarothers (1997).24. This part of my argument obviously relates to the second-image-reversed discussion

(see Gourevitch, 1977, 1978), which cannot be taken up here for reasons of space.25. It may be said to start with the announcement by Barber Conable, president of the

World Bank, in 1989 that private sector initiatives must go hand in hand with good

governance (WorldBank, 1989: xii) and ended when France in 1994 finally joined the

international consensus on withdrawing support for autocratic rulers.

26. These were Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius,

Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and

Zimbabwe.

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Biographical Note

STAFFAN I. LINDBERG is a doctoral candidate at Lund University, his doctoral

dissertation being on the relationship between methods of revenue extraction and

its use, the external game of sovereign states, and the prospects for democratic

consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa. He has contributed to Democratization in

the Third World, (1998), and has also published a study on UN world conferences

in the 1990s (1999). During 1999/2000 he worked as an international consultant

in the parliament of Ghana. ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, Lund

University, Box 52, S-22100 Lund, Sweden. [e-mail: [email protected]]

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States Governance Africa