States of Conflict: A case study on peace-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina

8/14/2019 States of Conflict: A case study on peace-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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StatesofConflictAcasestudyonpeace-buildingin

BosniaandHerzegovina

BeritBliesemanndeGuevara

November2009

ippr2009

InstituteforPublicPolicyResearchChallengingideas Changingpolicy

WWW.IPPR.ORG


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ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina2

Aboutippr ............................................................................................................................. 3

Abouttheauthor.................................................................................................................. 3

Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. 3

StatesofConflict................................................................................................................. 3

Abbreviations........................................................................................................................ 4

Introduction........................................................................................................................... 6

BosniaandHerzegovinaanoverview ............................................................................... 8

TheinternationalinterventioninBosniaandHerzegovina................................................. 12

Conclusions:somethoughtsonfutureforeignpolicyformulation..................................... 23

References .......................................................................................................................... 25

Contents


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TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUKsleadingprogressivethinktank,producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticand

sustainableworld.Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.

WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible,whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogrammeextendourpartnershipsandinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.

ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:[email protected]

www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065

ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinNovember2009.ippr2009

Aboutippr

BeritBliesemanndeGuevaraisaResearcherattheInstituteforInternationalRelations,HelmutSchmidtUniversity,Hamburg,fromwhereshehasaPhD.

Thispaperisbasedontheresultsoftheauthorsfive-yearresearchproject(20032008)ontheeffectsofstate-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina,publishedinBeritBliesemanndeGuevara(2009) StaatlichkeitinZeitendesState-building.InterventionundHerrschaftinBosnienundHerzegowina, Frankfurta.M.:PeterLang.

Abouttheauthor

ipprisgratefultotheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentandtheSwedishForeignMinistryfortheirgenerousfundingofthispieceofwork.

Acknowledgements

Thispaperisoneofaseries.TheotherpaperscoverMacedonia,Kosovo,AfghanistanandHaiti.DueforpublicationinAutumn2009,theywillbeavailablefromwww.ippr.org/publicationsandreports

StatesofConflict


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AFBiH ArmedForcesofBosniaandHerzegovina

BiH BosniaandHerzegovina

CARDS CommunityAssistanceforReconstruction,DevelopmentandStabilisation

CSA CivilServiceAgency

DPA DaytonPeaceAgreement

DFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment[UK]

EUPM EuropeanUnionPoliceMission

EUSR EuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentative

FBiH FederationofBosniaandHerzegovina

GDP Grossdomesticproduct

IDC ResearchandDocumentationCenter,Sarajevo

HJPC HighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncil

HR HighRepresentative

IDP Internallydisplacedperson

ICTY InternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia

IFI Internationalfinancialinstitution

IFOR ImplementationForce

IMF InternationalMonetaryFundIPTF InternationalPoliceTaskForce

ITA IndirectTaxationAuthority

JISB JournalofInterventionandStatebuilding

NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation

NGO Non-governmentalorganisation

ODA Officialdevelopmentaid

OHR OfficeoftheHighRepresentative

OSCE OrganisationforSecurityandCo-operationinEuropePfP PartnershipforPeace

PIC PeaceImplementationCouncil

PRSP PovertyReductionStrategyPaper

RS RepublikaSrpska

SAP StabilisationandAssociationProcess

SBS StateBorderService

SFOR StabilisationForce

SFRY SocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia

SIPA StateInvestigationandProtectionAgency

Abbreviations


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UNECE UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforEurope

UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

UNHCR UNHighCommissiononRefugees

UNMIBH UnitedNationsMissioninBosniaandHerzegovinaUSAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment


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Inearly2009,BosniaandHerzegovina(BiH)1 witnessedafamiliarspectacle:duringnegotiationsonthefuturedesignofthestate,theprimeministeroftheRepublikaSrpska,

oneofthecountrystwomainpolitical-territorialdivisions,demandedtherightofsecessionforthisSerb-controlledentity,whileBosnianMuslimrepresentativeswarnedthatifthedisputeoverconstitutionalreformswasnotsettled,anewwarcouldbetheultimateconsequence.Priortothedispute,theBosnianMuslimmembersofthestatepresidencyhadthreatenedtodismantlethecountrysentitystructure,disregardingSerbianinterests.Thepoliticiansadversepositionsledtosplitswithinbothethno-national2 communities.

ThesituationboreastrikingresemblancetotheperiodbeforetheBosniancivilwaratthebeginningofthe1990s.Aftermorethan13yearsofinternationalinterventionandtenyearsofexplicitstate-building,fundamentalproblemsthatcoulddestabilisetheBosnianstateremainunsolved.

SincethesigningoftheDaytonPeaceAgreement(DPA)3 inDecember1995,Bosniahas

experiencedextensiveinterventionbywesternstatesandinternationalorganisationswiththeobjectiveofconsolidatingpeaceandbuildingastabledemocraticstate.Duringthefirstfouryearsofpeace-building,internationally-prescribedreformsfollowedthedictatesofpoliticalandeconomicliberalisationtheories.In19992000,however,thenegativeeffectscausedbypoliciesaimingtoestablishdemocracyandamarketeconomypriortostrengtheningthestateledtoastrategicshifttowardsinstitutionalisation.4 Sincethen,Bosniahasbecomethearenaforamassiveinternationalstate-buildingprojectconcentratedontheestablishmentofcentral-stateinstitutions.

Aimsandstructureofthepaper

Thispaperexplorestheeffectsofinternationalstate-buildingeffortsontheBosnianstate.It

addressesthecentralquestionofwhathappenswhenexternalideasaboutwhatconstitutesamodernstateconflictwithlocalcontexts,asking:

Whatkindofstatehastheinternationalstate-buildingprocesscreatedinBosnia?

Whatarethelimitsofthisapproach?

IstheexportoftheliberalstatemodelappropriateasameansofpromotingthesecurityandwelfareoftheBosnianpopulation?

Whatdoesthisallmeanforfutureforeignpolicyformulationregardingstate-buildingingeneral?

Toanswerthesequestions,thepapertakesastepbackfromtheexigenciesandchallenges

ofday-to-daypoliticsandlooksatthestructuraldeterminantsofstate-buildingbeyondthepracticesofsingleactors.Fromthisperspective,explanationsofthesetbacksofinternational

1.HereafterweusethenameBosniaasanabbreviatedwayofreferringtoBosniaandHerzegovina.

2.Anethno-nationalgroupusuallyreferstopopulationswhichexpressanethnicidentityandmakea

claimtobeingrecognisedasanation(Cashmore2003:148).3.Officially:GeneralFrameworkAgreementforPeaceinBosniaandHerzegovina.

4.Themainlessonlearnedregardingtheliberalisationstrategyisthatexternaldemocratisationand

marketliberalisationsetsfreemechanismsofpoliticalandeconomiccompetitionwhichareunproblematic

inconsolidatedstates.Inunconsolidatedstates,however,theytendtoendangerthepeacebecause

regulatoryinstitutionsarestillmissingorweak(Paris2004).InBosnia,theprolongingofethno-

nationalistruledespiteinternationalelectoralengineering(Belloni2004,ManningandAnti 2003),and

theappropriationofstateassetsbypowerfulelitesintheprivatisationprocess(Donais2002a,Pugh2002)werebuttwosymptomsofthisproblem.Therefore,bytheendofthe1990s,institutionalisation

cametobeseenasapreconditionforliberalisation(onthegenesisofthestate-buildingapproachsee

BliesemanndeGuevara2008a:350-1).

Introduction


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state-buildingcannotbelimitedtolocalspoilingorcorruption.Rather,localresistanceandinformalpracticeshavetobeseenasevidenceofstructurallimitstostate-buildingwhoseresultsaremuchmoreambiguousandlesscontrollablethanmightbeexpected.

Themainargumentisthatstate-buildinginBosniahascontributedtotheestablishmentof

whatresemblesaPotemkinstatetheproverbialvillagesmadeupofpaintedfaadesthatFieldMarshalPotemkinbuiltforRussianEmpressCatherineIIduringhervisittothenewly-conqueredCrimeain1787inordertohidethetrue,desolateconditionoftheregion.Inotherwords,state-buildinginBosniahasstrengthenedaformalstatefaadebymeansofaninternationally-ledprocessofinstitutionalisationbutbehindthisfaadetheBosnianstatescapacityandlegitimacyhaveremainedprecarious.

Thepaperstartswithabriefoverviewofthecountryanditsrecentexperienceofconflict,andgoesontodescribethemostimportantinternationalactorsandtheirapproachestowardspeace-buildinginBosnia.Thesubsequentsectionanalysestheeffectsofstate-buildingontheBosnianstate.Itarguesthattheinterventionhascausedsimultaneous,contradictorydynamicsofstate-strengtheningandstate-weakeningwhichhaveresultedin

anexternallysupported,butinternallyunconsolidatedPotemkinstate.Thefindingsareillustratedwithexamplesfromthethreecorestatefunctionsofprovidingsecurity,enablingafunctioningnationaleconomy,andensuringtheruleoflaw.Theyarebolsteredbytheviewsgarneredfrominterviewsbetweentheauthorandrepresentativesofinternationalandnationalagencies,organisationsandministriesinBosnia.Thepaperfinisheswithsomeconclusionsregardingfutureforeignpolicyformulationintheareaofinternationalinterventionandstate-building.


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Historicalbackground:state-formationandwar 5

ThestateofBosniaandHerzegovinacameintoformalexistencein1992,whenitdeclared

itsindependencefromtheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SFRY),followingthelattersdemise.Yugoslaviascollapsehadbeenforeshadowedintheearly1970swhentherewasextensivetransferofstatefunctionsfromthecentralgovernmenttothesixYugoslavrepublicsthatwererunbypowerfulelites.Bytheendofthe1980s,andagainstthebackgroundofasevereeconomiccrisis,Yugoslaviasprocessofeconomicandpoliticalliberalisationfundamentallychallengedthestructuresofrule,leadingtostrugglesamongtheelitesovereverscarcerpowerresourcesandpositions.

Multi-ethnicBosniawasparticularlyaffectedbytheseevents.Intheprocessoffragmentation,andduetothelackofhorizontalstratification,afeatureinheritedfromsocialisttimes,newpoliticalpartiesweredeeplydividedalongethno-nationalistlinesduringtheirstruggleforpower.ThethreemainpartiesofBosnianMuslims(Bosniaks),Serbsand

Croatssoonstartedtocarveupthepolitical,economicandsocialinstitutionsofBosniaamongthem,creatingthreeethno-nationalistsystemsofrule.

FollowingthedeclarationsofindependencebySloveniaandCroatia,Bosniaalsoconfrontedthequestionofitspoliticalfuture.WhileBosniaks(around44percentofthepopulationin1991)andBosnianCroats(around17percent)supportedthecreationofanindependentstate,theBosnianSerbs(around31percent)boycottedthereferendumonindependenceanddeclaredtheseparationofSerb-inhabitedareasfromBosnia.

Inthespringof1992,warbrokeoutbetweenBosnianSerbs(backedbySerbiaunderSlobodanMiloevi)andaloosecoalitionofBosniaks,BosnianCroatsandCroatiaundertheleadershipofFranjoTudjman.TheSerbianobjectivewastocreateaGreaterSerbia

encompassingSerbia,MontenegroandallSerb-inhabitedareasinCroatiaandBosnia.Fromthestart,theaggressorsreliedheavilyonethniccleansingtoestablishaterritoriallinkbetweenallSerbianareasandtohomogenisethepopulation.

InApril1993theBosnianCroatsalsodeclaredanindependentrepublicwithinBosniaanditspossibleunificationwithCroatia,creatingasecondconflictlinebetweenCroatsandBosniaks.Again,expulsionsandethniccleansingwereamongthemaininstrumentsofthearmedfactions.InMarch1994,theBosniak-CroatianwarwithinawarendedwiththeWashingtonAgreement,whichformallyestablishedafederationbetweenthetwogroups.ThestateofBosniaremainedsplitintothreepara-statescontrolledbytheethno-nationalistwarparties.IttookuntilDecember1995beforethewarbetweenthefederationandtheSerbsfinallycametoaninternationallybrokeredendwiththesigningoftheDaytonPeace

Agreement.Politicaldevelopmentsafter1995:theDaytonsystemanditsconflictive

transformation

TheconstitutioninAnnex4oftheDPAestablishedafederalstatecomposedoftwoentities:theRepublikaSrpska(RS),whichismostlySerb-inhabited,andtheFederationofBosniaandHerzegovina(FBiH),whichispredominantlyinhabitedbyBosniakandCroatianpopulationsandisadditionallydividedintotencantons,eightofwhicharedominatedbyoneofthetwogroups.6 Thisconstitutionaldivisionofcompetenciescementedtheprofoundweaknessofthecentralstateandprovidedthetwoentitieswithmarkedstate-likequalities.Allmain

5.Forfurtherreadingfromdifferentperspectives,see,forexample,Bennett(1995),BurgandShoup

(1999),Cohen1995,DykerandVejvoda(1995),Ramet(1996),Schierup(1999),Woodward(1995).

6.ForcriticalassessmentsoftheDPA,seeCousens(2002),Cox(1998),OBrien(2005),SoliozandVogel

(2004).

BosniaandHerzegovinaanoverview


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responsibilitiesrestedwiththeentities,includingtherighttolevy,administerandredistributetaxes,andtomaintainseparatemilitaryandpoliceapparatusesaswellasspecialrelationswithCroatiaandYugoslavia.Thecentralstate,bycontrast,lackedthesemostbasiccharacteristicsofstates,thatis,themonopoliesofviolenceandtaxation.

Whilethisarrangementreflectedthedivisionofpowerattheendofthewar,thecreationofapoliticalsystemgearedtowardsmulti-ethniccooperationindicatedthewishofinternationalactorstorestoreamulti-ethnicBosniansociety.Theconstitutionestablishedatripartitepower-sharingsystematthecentral-stateleveltoensuretheparticipationofallethno-nationalgroupsinthepoliticalprocessandtopreventdecisionsbeingmadebyjustonegroup.Besidesethno-nationalquotasforpoliticalrepresentation,severalvetomechanismswereestablishedagainstdecisionsbelievedtoimperilagroupsvitalinterests.However,whilethesearrangementsweredesignedtopromoteconsensusandcompromise,inpracticetheyofferedethno-nationalistpoliticiansconsiderableleewayforblockingthepoliticalprocess.7

Morethan13yearson,Bosniasinstitutionalsettinghaschangedconsiderably.Relyingon

directimplementationstrategies,especiallythepowersoftheinternationalHighRepresentativeinBosnia,aswellasconditionalcarrotsandsticksfromtheEuropeanUnion,NATOandothers(seebelow),theinternationalactorshavesucceededintransferringimportantcompetencesfromtheentitiesandcantonstothecentral-statelevel.Therehavebeenvisiblesuccessesregardingthecorestatefunctionsofsecurityandtaxation,forexampleinmilitaryreform,whichhasresultedinthecreationoftheunifiedArmedForcesofBosniaandHerzegovina(AFBiH),andoftheIndirectTaxationAuthority(ITA),whichprovidesrevenuetothecentralstate.Thesereformshavereducedthestrengthoftheentitiesquasi-statequalitiesandpowersandcontributedinsteadtothestrengtheningofthecentralBosnianstate.

However,thelimitationsofotherreformprocessesmeanthatBosniaisstillfarfrom

sustainingpoliticalstability.Reformstoconstitutionalmattersandtothepolice(seeJISB2007)whichbothinvolvedsubstantialchangesoftheDaytonsystemgotwaylaidbyseverepoliticalstrugglesnotonlyamongBosnians,butalsobetweenlocalandinternationalactors,indicatingthattherearelimitstotheexternalstate-buildingapproach.ThreatsofseparationoftheRepublikaSrpska,warningsaboutthepossibilityofanewwarandattemptstoplaytheethno-nationalcardaredevicesthatarestillusedinpoliticaldiscourses,andtheBosniancentral-stateinstitutionsareapparentlystillunabletocopewithelitepowerstrugglesinthewaythatconsolidatedstatesare.

Socio-economicdevelopment:reconstructionandgrowthwithout

integrationandwelfare8

Attheendofthewar,theeconomicsituationinBosniawasdire.TheWorldBankestimatedthattotalwardamagescametoUS$5070billion.Morethanhalfofallbuildingsweredamaged,andlargepartsoftheelectricity,road,railwayandtelecommunicationsnetworkswereaffected.GDPhadsunkby80percentcomparedwith1990levels,andin1997remainedaslowasUS$500percapita.Industrialproductionhaddecreasedto90percentofthepre-warlevelandmanyassetsweredamaged(Hertietal2000,WorldBank1996).Theeconomic,financialandfiscalsystemsweredividedalongethno-nationalistlines,withdifferentcurrenciesbeingusedinthethreepara-states,therebyerectingquasi-customsborderswithinBosnia.

7.OnthepoliticalsystemandtheexternaldemocratisationprocessinBosnia,see,forexample,Bose

(2002),Chandler(2000),Perry(2005),SchwarzandHrges(2003),SoliozandDizdarevic(2003).8.Onsocio-economicdevelopmentinBosnia,see,forexample,Bojii-Delilovi,auevi andToma

(2003),InternationalCrisisGroup(2001),PughandCooper(2004),Pugh(2002,2005),UNDPBiH(2006,

2007).


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Thephysicaldislocationofpeoplecausedbythewarwasalsosevere.Morethan97,000peoplediedintheviolentconflict.9 Around2millionofthe4.4millioninhabitantscountedinthe1991censusweredisplacedfromtheirhomes,eitherseekingasyluminforeigncountriesormovingasinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)tootherpartsofBosnia(Tuathailand

Dahlman2004).In1995,unemploymentstoodat90percent,andaround90percentofthepopulationdependedonhumanitarianassistanceforbasicsurvival(Hertietal2000).

PhysicalreconstructionandhumanitarianassistancewerethereforetheinitialprioritiesforinternationalactorsworkinginBosnia.Thehighlevelsofofficialdevelopmentaid(ODA)10

flowingintoBosniaduringthefirstfouryearsofinterventionprovidedthefinancialbasisformaterialreconstruction.Atthesametime,themarket,monetaryandbankingsystemswerereunifiedasthebasisforeconomicgrowth.In1997,theinternationalactorsalsostartedtheprocessofprivatisingsocially-ownedassets.Theinternationalaidandliberalisationstrategiesweresuccessfulwithregardtophysicalreconstruction,humanitarianassistanceandthecreationofacommonBosnianmarketwithanationalcentralbankandcurrency.However,thestrategiesalsoenabledlocalelitestosiphonoffrevenuesforpersonalenrichmentandto

financeparallelpowerstructures,challengingtheauthorityoftheBosnianstate(Andreas2004a,2004b,Donais2002a,Festi andRausche2004,Pugh2002).

Sincethestrategicshifttoinstitutionalisationin19992000,economicintervention,mainlybytheWorldBank,theIMFandtheOHR,hasbeengearedtowardsthecreationofaresilientbusinessandinvestmentenvironmentandpromotionofmacroeconomicstabilityasthebasisforeconomicgrowth.Strictbudgetarydiscipline,effectivetaxationandstructuraladjustmenthavebeenthemainaimsguidingthepoliciesofinternationalactors.

Therehavebeenseveraltaxreforms,includingtheintroductionofavalue-addedtaxandaprogressiveincometax,whichhavecontributedtohigherandmorepredictablestaterevenues.However,theseeconomicstrategieshave,todate,beenunabletofightthehighlevelsofunemploymentandpoverty.Althoughrealgrowthbetween2001and2007reached

anaverageof5.4percent(withpeaksofalmost7percentin2006and2007),theunemploymentratewasstillmorethan47percentin2006(UNECE2009).Activitiesintheinformalsectorwereestimatedatforming43percentoftotalemploymentin2004(KrstiandSanfey2006).Officially,remittancesamountto20percentoftheGDP,withactualnumbersprobablymuchlarger(WorldBank2007).ThepovertyrateinBosniawasnearly20percentin2004(CouncilofMinistersofBiH2004)andtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)saidthataround50percentoftheBosnianpopulationwassociallyexcludedinonewayoranother,withwomen,pensionersandyoungpeoplebeingthosemostaffectedandvulnerable(UNDPBiH2007).In2008nearlytwothirdsofyoungpeoplebetween18and35yearssaidtheywouldemigrateiftheycouldduetothelackofsocio-economicprospects(EarlyWarningSystem2008:47).

Inthesocialsector,amainfocusofthefirstphaseofinterventionwasonthereturnofrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersonstotheirplacesoforigin(asprovidedforintheDaytonPeaceAgreement,Annex7)andontheimplementationofhumanandminorityrights(DPA,Annexes4and6).Bothprocesseswerehampered,however,byproblemsarisingfromweakandpoliticisedinstitutions,includingethnicisedpoliceforces,judiciariesandpublicadministrations(InternationalCrisisGroup1999a,1999b,1999c,JudicialSystemAssessmentProgramme2000).

In1999,theinternationalactorsinitiatedreformsofthejudiciaryandpublicadministrationswhichaimedtoincreaseefficiencyandeffectivenessandtopromotemoreindependence

9.PreliminaryresultofthePopulationLossProject1992-1995conductedbytheBosniannon-governmentalorganisationResearchandDocumentationCenter(IDC)(seewww.idc.org.ba).

10.OnODAleveldevelopmentsinBosnia,alsoascomparedtootherinterventions,seeSuhrkeandBuckmaster(2006).


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frompoliticalandsocialinfluences.Theseprocessesalsoledtotheestablishmentofnewcentral-stateinstitutions,suchastheHighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncil(HJPC)andtheCivilServiceAgency(CSA).

Inthematterofpropertyrestitutiontheinternationalactorswereabletogivebackalmostall

occupiedhouses,flatsandlandstotheirpre-warowners.However,althoughtheprocessofreturningpeopletotheirhomesgainedsomemomentum,propertyrestitutioncannotbeequatedwithreturn,asmanyrefugeesandIDPssoldorrentedtheirproperties(seeDonais2002b,Heimerl2005,TuathailandDahlman2004).Alltheseprocessesfellundertheheadingruleoflaw,whichbecamethecentralcatchphraseoftheinterventionandhassincebeenabenchmarkagainstwhichlocalpracticesaremeasured.Thisincluded,amongotherthings,moreemphasisonthefightagainstcorruptionandthedetentionofindictedwarcriminals(seeChandler2007,Tuathail2005forcriticalassessments).


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Who?CoreinternationalactorsinBosnia

Inthissection,whichisnotintendedtobeexhaustive,wegiveanoverviewofthemain

actorsandareasofcommitment.TheinternationalinterventioninBosniaconsistsofamilitaryandacivilcomponent.ThemilitarycomponentstartedasaNATO-ledImplementationForce(IFOR)consistingof60,000internationaltroopswitharobustmandate.In1997,itwastransformedintotheStabilisationForce(SFOR).Itsmandateincludedpreventingaresurgenceofviolence,facilitatingthesafereturnofrefugeesandIDPsanddetainingwarcriminals.DuringtheinitialphaseofinterventionSFORwasamainguarantorofpeaceandenforceroftheinternationalcivilagenciesdirectinterventionsintolocalpowerconstellations.By2004thesecuritysituationhadimprovedsignificantlyandthemilitarycomponenthadbeenreducedto7,500troops,atwhichpointSFORwasreplacedbytheEU-ledEUFOR/OperationALTHEA.Todate,thisforceamountsto2,500soldiers.11

Onthecivilside,thePeaceImplementationCouncil(PIC)12,itsSteeringBoard13 andespeciallyitsappointee,theHighRepresentative(HR),havebeenatthecentreoftheintervention.AsperAnnex10oftheDPA,theHRsinitialtasksweretomonitor,coordinateandfacilitatethepeaceprocess.Inviewoflocalblockades,however,thePICextendedtheHRspowersconsiderablybytheendof1997.Theso-calledBonnpowersenabletheHRtodivestelectedpoliticiansandotherstateofficialsofofficeandtodecreelegislature,turningBosniaintoasemi-protectorate.AsthemaincoordinatoroftheinternaleffortsinBosnia,theOfficeoftheHighRepresentative(OHR)hasbeeninvolvedinallreformprocessesinonewayoranother,buildingthegravitationalcentreoftheintervention.14

AnothermainactoristheOrganisationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope(OSCE),

whichhasbeenactiveinagreatnumberoffieldsrangingfromoperationaltaskslikeregionalmilitarystabilisationanddemobilisationandtheorganisationandoverseeingofelections,topolicyformulationandmonitoringtasksintheprocessesofmilitary,judicial,publicadministrationandeducationreforms.15

Theinternationalfinancialinstitutions(IFIs)particularlytheWorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)havebeenatthecoreofeconomicreconstructionandreforminBosnia,coordinatingtheseprocesses,providingloansandcredits,buildingcorefinancialandeconomicinstitutions,anddefiningandcontrollingeconomicandfiscalpoliciesbymeansofconditionalityandmonitoring.

TheUnitedNationsanditssub-organisationshaveplayedalesserroleinBosniathaninotherinterventioncases.Mostimportantly,theUnitedNationsMissioninBosniaand

Herzegovina(UNMIBH)deployedtheInternationalPoliceTaskForce(IPTF)whosemaintasksweretoscreenpoliceofficersandtosupportotherreformprojectsgearedtowardsdemocratic,multi-ethnicpolicingandthedepoliticisationofthepolice.IPTFwasreplacedbyaEuropeanUnionPoliceMission(EUPM)in2003.16 UNMIBHwasalsoengagedinjudicial

11.Seewww.euforbih.org12.ThePICcomprises55countriesandagenciesthatsupportthepeaceprocessviafinancialassistance,

providingtroopsforSFOR,ordirectlyrunningoperationsinBosnia,plusprovidingobservers

(www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/#pic)

13.Members:Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,Russia,UK,US,thePresidencyoftheEU,the

EuropeanCommission,andtheOrganisationoftheIslamicConference(OIC),whichisrepresentedby

Turkey(www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/#pic)14.Seewww.ohr.int

15.Seewww.oscebih.org

16.Seewww.eupm.org

TheinternationalinterventioninBosniaandHerzegovina


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reforms.TheUNRefugeeAgency(UNHCR)assistedintheprocessofrefugeereturn,whiletheUNDevelopmentProgrammehasassumedmonitoringandassistancefunctionsintheareasofdemocraticgovernance,povertyreduction,crisispreventionandrecovery,andenergyandenvironment.17

ApartfromtheirrepresentationinthePICanditsSteeringBoard,westerncountrieshavealsobeenpresentintheformofbilateraldevelopmentagencies,takingtheleadincertainreformareas.18 Inrecentyears,keyplayersprovidingbilateralaidhavebeentheUS,Sweden,Germany,theNetherlands,Austria,JapanandFrance.19 TheworkofthegovernmentalinterventionagencieswasaccompaniedbyahighbutdecliningnumberofinternationalandlocalNGOs.

Since2000,theEuropeanUnionsrolehasexpandednoticeably,resultingnotonlyintheaforementioneddeploymentofEUFORandEUPM,butalsoinadouble-functionoftheHRasEuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentative(EUSR)since2002.TheobjectiveoftheEuropeanCommissionDelegationtoBosniahasbeentoprovidethecountrywithsupportforthestabilisationandassociationprocess,includingpeaceconsolidation,ethnicreconciliation,

refugeereturn,institution-building,democratisation,ruleoflaw,humanrights,sustainableeconomicdevelopment,andfacilitationoftheharmonisationwithEUstandardsandprinciples.WithintheframeworkoftheCommunityAssistanceforReconstruction,DevelopmentandStabilisation(CARDS)programme,theEUprovided4.6billionEurostosupportinstitution-buildinginBosniabetween2000and2006;since2007furtherassistancehasbeenprovidedthoughthenewPre-AccessionInstrument(IPA).20

Finally,NATOhasalsoplayedamajorrolethroughitsPartnershipforPeace(PfP)programme.Inadditiontoprovidingassistanceforsecuritysectorreforms,aspirationstoNATOaccessionexpressedbytheStatePresidencyofBosniain2001providedtheinternationalcommunitywithconditionalcarrotsandstickstofurthertheprocessesofmilitaryreformandthedetentionofindictedwarcriminals.Indeed,accessiontalksweretied

toanumberofrequirements,suchasthecreationofunifiedarmedforcesinsteadoftwoseparatearmies,theadjustmentofequipmentandorganisationtoNATOstandards,and,mostimportantly,astrongercommitmentofBosnianSerbrepresentativestocooperatewiththeInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY). 21

How?Peace-andstate-buildingstrategiesinBosnia

TheinternationalinterventioninBosniahasbeendominatedbytwotypesofstrategies:operativeandconditional-structuralones(seeRichter2009:94-96).Operativestrategiesaredirectformsofinterferenceorprojectimplementationbyinternationalactors.InBosnia,theinterventionagencywhichhasmostfrequentlyresortedtooperativestrategiesistheOHRwithitsBonnpowers.Thetwomainadvantagesofdirectinterventionsarethatthey

facilitatecrucialreformsandinstitution-buildingprocesseswhichotherwisemightnotcomeintobeingduetoalackofcapacityorwillingnessonthesideoflocalactors,andthattheyensuretheprotectionofvulnerablegroups.TheHRsdecisiontoestablishcarlicenceplatesthatwouldnotrevealapersonsorigin,forexample,isoftencitedasacentralsuccessof

17.Seewww.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmibhforUNMIBH,www.unhcr.baforUNHCRand

www.undp.baforUNDPinBiH.

18.Forexample,theUSAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)waslargelyresponsibleforthe

privatisationprocess,theUKsDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)hasengagedinpublicadministrationreform,andtheGermanGTZhastriedunsuccessfullytoestablishadirecttaxsystemin

theBrkodistrict(seewww.usaid.baforUSAID,www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-

zentralasien/651.htmforGTZandwww.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Europe/Bosnia-Herzegovinafor

DFID).19.Ofthese,onlytheUS,Germany,JapanandFrancearealsomembersofthePICSteeringBoard.

20.Seewww.delbih.ec.europa.eu21.Seewww.nato.int/issues/nato-bosnia-herzegovina/index.html


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operativestrategies,asitprovidedforfreemovementofallpersonsalloverBosnia.Themostimportantdisadvantagesofdirectinterventionsarethattheytendtoprioritisepragmaticsolutionswhichtakealeastcommondenominatorapproachtoendingacuteconflictsbutwhichmightimpedefurtherreforms,thattheytendtopolariseconflictlinesbetween

antagonisticactorsandtohindercompromise,andthattheyfurtherlocaldependencyatthecostofownership.

Conditional-structuralstrategies,bycontrast,arebasedonthepremiseoftheexistenceofrationalactorswhichcanbeinfluencedbyconditionalitiesthatis,tyingspecificreformdemandstoaid,loansoraspiredmemberships,incentivesandmonitoring,aslongastheyarealsoprovidedwithcapacitythroughtransfersofknowledgeandtechnologies.InBosnia,suchstrategieshavebecomeastrongincentiveforreformssincetheconvergenceprocesswiththeEUstartedinthelate1990snotonlybecauseofthecarrotofpossibleEUaccession,butalsobecausetheEUsgeneralenlargementapproachinvolvesanemphasisonreformownershipaccompaniedbytechnicalassistance.

Conditional-structuralstrategiesaresupposedtoensureacomplianceofvaluesand

standardswithoutjeopardisinglocalownershipwhetherareformisimplementedideallydependsonlocalactors.InBosnia,however,conditionalitieshaveworkeddifferentlyinsofarastheyhaveinmanycasesbeenovershadowedbytheDamoclesswordoftheBonnpowers.Themostimportantdisadvantageofthesestrategiesisthatthepoliticalelitesmightgetbetweenthefrontlinesofinternationalandlocaldemands:iftheytaketheinternationalside,reformswillmostlikelylacklocallegitimacy,whilethedecisiontodefendthelocalpointofviewmightconsiderablylimitthepossibilitiesofexternalassistance.

InBosnia,thecentralisationeffortsinthecourseofthepolicereformillustratedthisproblem(seeJISB2007).Caughtinthemiddle,theSerbianrepresentativesdecidedtoignoreinternationalconditionalitiesandtodefendtheethno-nationalpositionoftheirconstituencypartlyduetomerepowerconsiderations,yetalsobecausetheywouldotherwisehavelost

theirsocialbasis.Asresearchhasshown,suchsocialconstraintsdonotonlyaffectethno-nationalistsbutallpoliticalactors:Insuchapoliticalenvironment,whichisdominatedbythesearchforprotectionofnationalrightsandinterests,moremoderatepartiesinsistthattheyhavetoadjusttotheprevailingmindsetofthevotersinordertoensuretheirownpoliticalsurvival(Kosti 2007:343).

Bothstrategytypes,operativeandconditional-structural,facethechallengeofhowtotransferinternationally-supportedstateinstitutionsintolocalhandswithoutjeopardisingtheattainmentsofstate-building.AsignificantdisputeamonginternationalactorsinBosniatodayconcernsthequestionofwhethertheHRshoulddefinitelyrefrainfromuseoftheBonnpowers.TheUShasstucktoaninterventionapproachcharacterisedbypowerfuloperativeinstruments,wishingtomaintainitsinfluenceonreformoutcomes.TheEU,by

comparison,hastendedtosupportactorswhoputmoreemphasisontheownershipofthepoliticalprocessitself,arguingthatonlyconditional-structuralstrategiescanensurethestrengtheningoflocalstatecapacityandlegitimacy.

Asthesubsequentanalysisofthesuccessesandfailuresofstate-buildinginBosniawillshow,bothinternationalstrategiesareflawedwhenitcomestothequestionoftransferringcontrolofthestateintolocalhands.Institutionsbuiltbyoperativestrategiestendtolacklegitimacybecausetheyhavenotemergedorganicallythroughagenuinepoliticalprocess,resultinginaPotemkinstate.Conditional-structuralstrategies,bycontrast,leavemoreroomforlocalinitiativeandacceptance,buttheoutcomeofreformsusuallydiffersfromtheoneenvisagedbecausereformsimplementedbylocalactorstendtobetwistedtosuittheirownpurposes,andnewformsofruleusuallymeldwitholderformsintohybridstructures.

Theoutcomemightnotbeastatethatishollow,yetitwillprobablydifferfairlysignificantlyfromthewesternmodelsunderlyingstate-building(BliesemanndeGuevara2008a,Ottaway2002).


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Internationalstate-buildinginBosnia

Internationalstate-buildingisbasedonthepremisethatastate,understoodasasetofinstitutionsandfunctionsaccordingtowesternmodelsandnorms,canbebuiltandstrengthenedviacomprehensiveinstitutionalengineeringbyexternalactors.Intheory,

thesestatesarethenabletoimplementandenforceinternationalnormsinordertocontributetothesecurityandwelfareoftheirpopulations(Bickerton2007,Ottaway2002).LookingatthecaseofBosnia,however,thequestionarisesofwhetherexportingthewesternstatemodelisthebestwaytostrengthenstatecapacityandresponsibility.

ThepeaceprocessinBosniaseemsstuckbetweenaviolent,conflictivepastandanenvisionedstateofsecurity,politicalstabilityandsocio-economicwelfarewhichhasyettobereached.WhetherBosniasglassishalffullorhalfemptydependsverymuchonthebeholderspointofview.Foradvocatesofthestate-buildingapproach,theBosnianexampleshowsthatinternationalinterventionsarecapableofendingviolenceandrebuildingstatesbasedonmoderninstitutionsandnorms;inthisview,Bosniajustneedsmoretime,internationalcommitmentandpossiblyEUaccessionprospectstoconsolidateitsstate.22

Critics,ontheotherhand,arguethatthemainaimsofstate-buildinginBosniatheconsolidationofstateinstitutions,someformofnation-buildingamongthethreeethno-nationalgroups,andeconomicdevelopmentthathaspositiveeffectsonindividualshavestillnotbeenachieveddespitetheextensiveintervention.

Thesemixedfindingshintatacentraltensioninthestate-buildingprocessinBosnia:state-strengtheningandstate-weakeningdynamicscoexist,23 creatingsomeinstitutionalisationsuccessesbutatthesametimeleavingthestateunconsolidatedanditsfutureunclear.State-weakeningdynamicsarenotpredominantlyrootedinlocalunwillingnesstocooperate,assomemightsuggest,butratherinthestructurallimitstotheinterventionitself,aswillbediscussedinthefollowingsections.

State-strengtheningdynamicsPoliticalexpropriationofstateantagonists

Theweakeningoftheethno-nationalistelites(whoatfirstmaintainedparallelprojectsofrule)bytheinterveningagencies,especiallytheOHR,wasthemostimportantpreconditionforfurtherprocessesofstrengtheningthecentralstateinBosnia.Thedismantlingofillegalfinancingchannels,thereduction,reformandcontroloflocalmilitaryandpoliceforces,aswellasstructuralreformsofpublicadministrationandjudiciarywerekeystrategiesdesignedtocurtailtheabilityofethno-nationalistelitestomaintainparallelpowerstructures,topoliticisestateagencies,andtoaccommodateclientsthroughredistributionofmoneyandposts.Theinternationalagenciespolitical,economicandmilitarypowersgavethemparticularstrengthtotargettheethno-nationalistantagonists.

Thepoliticalexpropriationofstateantagonistswasanecessarypreconditionforstateconsolidationandpavedthewayforthelaterinstitutionalisationofcorefunctionsatthecentral-statelevel.Yet,asthisdependedonthepowersoftheinternationalactors,itwasnotsufficientandledneithertoanautomaticstrengtheningofcentral-statepowerandcapacitynortotheestablishmentofsupremacyofthecentralstateoveritsconstituentparts.

22.SeeforexampleParis2004.Thetimeargumentcanoftenbereadinpolicyrecommendationsandis

convincingatfirstsightbecausestructuralreformstendtoneedgenerationstotakehold.However,from

thestructuralperspectiveontheeffectsofstate-buildingpresentedhere,therearenotmanyhintsthata

prolongationofinternationalcommitmentwouldchangethemaindilemmasofstate-buildingoutlined

below.

23.Practicesarestate-strengthening whentheyareconsistentwiththeidealofamodernstateinthattheyfavourtheinstitutionalisationofpowerandpromotetheexpansionofstaterule.State-weakening

practiceshinderstateinstitutionalisationandlegitimacyandfavourbehaviourthatescapes,resistsor

bendstherulesofthestate(MigdalandSchlichte2005).


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Institution-building

Theestablishmentofinstitutionsandfunctionsatthecentral-statelevelwasakeysuccessoftheinstitutionalisationapproachadoptedbytheinternationalactorsin19992000.Theestablishmentofnewcentral-stateinstitutionsandagenciesliketheIndirectTaxation

Authority(ITA),theStateBorderService(SBS),theStateInvestigationandProtectionAgency(SIPA),theArmedForcesofBosniaandHerzegovina(AFBiH),theHighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncil(HJPC)andtheCivilServiceAgency(CSA)testifiestotheeffectivenessofthestate-buildingapproachinbuildingformalstatestructures.

ThenewstateinstitutionswerepartlytheresultofreformprocessesinitiatedbytheOHRandotherinterventionagenciesandpartlyconnectedwiththeexigenciesoftheEUsStabilisationandAssociationProcess(SAP).Thisprocessofmember-statebuildingprovidedstrongimpetusesforinstitutionalisationandmodernisation,forexamplethroughtheEuropeanCommissionsfeasibilitystudyforBosniawhichlistedtheareasinneedofreformifBosniawantedtojointheSAP(EC2003)andthroughseveralsectorreportspreparedbytheECDelegationtoBosnia(2004,2005a,2005b).Allinall,theinternationalinstitution-

buildingeffortsbroughttheformandfunctionsoftheBosnianstateinlinewithinternationalisednorms.

Alessacknowledgedmechanismthatalsoledtothetransferoffunctionstothecentral-statelevelwaswhatcouldbetermedlocalproblem-orientedstate-building,orformsofvoluntarytransferofresponsibilitiesfromthesub-statetothestatelevelinordertosolvecommonproblems.Thisismostlyfoundinareasoflowprestigeandoutsidethemainfocusofinternationalintervention,likethevoluntarycentralisationoffunctionsinthehealthsector.Suchlocalstate-buildingeffortstendtobeoverlookedduetotheoverwhelmingimportanceoftheinternationalisedreformprocesses,buttheyhavecontributedtostate-strengtheningdynamicsinBosnia.

Staterationalisationandmodernisation

AthirdfactorcontributingtothestrengtheningofthestateinBosniawastheestablishmentofmanyinternationalreformprogrammesaimedatthecreation,modernisationandrationalisationofstateagenciesfromthecommunitytothecentral-statelevel.Thesereformprogrammes,whichincludedthecomputerisationoftaxprocessing,personneltrainingandproceduralreformsinthepolice,judiciaryandpublicadministration,ledtoincreasesintheefficiencyofstateservices.24 Theyalsocontributedtoloweringthehighlevelsofcorruption,patronageandprivateappropriationofstateresourcesthathadcharacterisedthefirstyearsofpost-conflictpeace-building.

AmongyoungerBosniancivilservants,theseeffortsalsoseemtohaveresultedinaformofmentalstate-building.Thenormativestrategiesofinterventionforexampletheinclusion

oflocalexpertsintheprocessofPovertyReductionStrategyPaper(PRSP)formulationorthemanyformsofpersonneltrainingandadvicehavehadeffectsontheformationofamodernbureaucraticculture.However,enduringcorruptionandstatepoliticisationindicatethatthequestionofwhethertherationalisedworkingroutinesandnewly-erectedcontrolagencieswillfunctionwithoutinternationalsupportandmonitoringandwhethertheycaninfiltratethegeneralbehaviourofBosnianstateagentsremainsunanswered.

State-weakeningdynamics

Structuralandpower-relateddeterminantsofstateformation

Amainproblemofthestate-buildingapproachoutlinedaboveisitstechnocraticnatureanditsneglectofthehistorical,politicalandsocialprocessesthatnecessarilybenditscourseand

influenceitsoutcome.Post-conflictstate-buildingdoesnottakeplaceinavacuumbuthas

24.Intheareaoftaxadministration,forexample,seeRozneretal (2005).


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tobuildonthesocial,politicalandeconomicstructuresinplace.Forexample,internationalstate-buildingeffortshavehadtocontendwithBosniasdependencyoninternationalisedrevenuesourcestofinanceitsrule,andwiththeworkingroutinesbasedonpersonalrelationshipsinsteadofimpersonalproceduresthatcharacteriseBosnianstatebureaucracy

bothofwhicharestructuralinheritancesfromitsYugoslavpast.Structuralpathdependenciesarenotpredeterminedorunchangeable,buttheytendtobequitepersistentandtoendureinhybridmixtureswithnewstructuresimposedfromoutside.

Internationalstate-buildingprojectsarealsoinfluencedbythereactionsoflocalactorswithspecificinterestsandrepertoiresforaction.TheBosnianstate,justasanyother,isadynamicfieldofpowerinwhichmultiplestateandnon-stateactorsfromtheinternationaltothelocallevelstruggletohavetheirrules,whetherstatelaworsomeotherimplicitcode,becometheroutinebasisuponwhichpeopleact(MigdalandSchlichte2005:15).AlthoughtheBosniakwishtostrengthenthecentralstatehasoftenconvergedwithinternationalobjectives,thispositionhasbeenasorientedtowardspowerandgroup-specificinterestsastheoftenresistingpositionsofBosnianCroatsandSerbs.Bosniakpoliticianssupporttheideaofa

Bosnianstatebecause,asthebiggestpopulationgroup,theyhopeforgreaterpoliticalinfluenceinamorecentralisedstate.

ThecongruencybetweenBosniakandinternationalobjectivesenabledtheformertotakeadvantageoftheinternationalpowersinordertofurthertheirinterestsandpowerpositionswithrespecttoothergroups.ThisisoneofthemainreasonswhytheBosnianSerbsarescepticalaboutfurtherstatecentralisationandcriticiseinternationalpartiality.AlthoughatfirstglanceitappearsthattheBosniakstacticalstate-buildingiscontributingtotheinstitutionalisationprocessinBosnia,thedownsideisthatithashinderedthelegitimacyofnewstateinstitutionsamonglargepartsofthenon-Bosniakpopulation.TheapproachestakenbyinternationalactorsinBosniahaveprovedunsuccessfulinresolvingthesestructuralandpowerdilemmasofstate-building.

Theresourcedilemma

Thereductionofresourcescentraltotheprocessofpoliticalexpropriationofstateantagonistsalsohadstronglynegativeeffectsoncentral-stateinstitutions.After1999,internationalaidtoBosniafelldrastically.In1999officialdevelopmentaid(ODA)stillamountedtooverUS$1billion;by2000ithadshrunktoaround$737millionandtoonly$565millionin2002.Thesumofinternationalgrantsandloans,includingexternally-financedstateinvestmentprojects,hadstoodatnearly27percentofBosniastotalstateincomein1998butdecreasedsteadilytoaround10percentin2005(OECD.stat,DatasetDAC2aandIMF2003,2005,2006).

DecliningODAandstrictbudgetconstraintshaveleftthecentralstatewithlittlefinancialleewaytoinitiatepoliticalprogrammesofitsown.Furthermore,theIFIshaveconstrictedthestatesfinancial,economicandfiscalpolicies.AlthoughtheaimoftheIFIsneoliberalpoliticsistoimpedecorruption,budgetaryrestrictionshavedeprivedthestateoftheresourcesnecessarytoaddresssocietalproblemsanddemands,andtogeneratebasiclegitimacythroughmaterialredistributionandthecreationofindividualeconomicopportunities.Theneoliberaladjustmentofstateinstitutionsandtheoftentechnocraticformsofeconomicinterventionhavealsohinderedlocalinitiatives.LackofmoneyandtheneedtoeconomisehavethereforelimitedtheBosnianstatescapacityandlegitimacy.25

Localinformalpractices

Localactors,caughtbetweeninternationalreformdemandsandresourceconstraintsontheonehand,andtheirsocio-historicalembeddednessinlocalcontextsontheother,have

resortedtoinformalinstitutionsandpracticestocopewiththesituation.Whilethehigh

25.FormoredetailseeBliesemanndeGuevara(2008b).


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levelsofprivateappropriationofstateresourcesthatdominatedthefirstphaseofpeace-buildinginBosniaweresuccessfullycurtailedbyinternationalactors,otherformsofinformalstatestructuresaremoreenduring,Persistingformstodayconsistmainlyofpettycorruptionlikethepolicesillegalroadchargesystemsandpracticesofbriberyinthestatebureaucracy.

Thecircumventionofthestateinthiswayhasparticularlycometotheforeintheeconomicsphere,wherethestatesystemoftaxationandredistributionissystematicallyunderminedbyactivitiesintheinformalsector(seeBliesemanndeGuevara2008b).

Internationalisedfaade,unconsolidatedcontent

Soitappearsthatstate-strengtheningdynamicsespeciallytheestablishmentofnewcentral-stateagenciesandthemodernisationandrationalisationofexistinginstitutionshaveledtostructureswhich,atleastformally,areverysimilartomodernwesternstates.However,atthesametimestate-weakeningeffectsofstate-buildingaremakingthemselvesfelt,creatingformalstateinstitutionsthatlackthecapacitiesandlegitimacycharacteristicofaconsolidatedmodernstate.Themaintenanceofthestatestilldependsinmanywaysoninternationalsupport,andtherearefewsignsoftherebeinganysustainableconsolidationof

statecapacityandlegitimacy.Understandingthesehurdlesiscrucialtounderstandingthelimitsofinternationalstate-building.

Internationalisation

State-buildinginBosniahasledtoanextensiveinternationalisationofthestatethatis,adeepembeddednessintoanddependenceoninternationalstructuresandactorswhichpersiststoday,eventhoughtherehasbeenachangeintheformofinternationalisationoverthecourseofintervention.

Intheareaofstaterevenuesandnationaleconomy,thischangecanbedetected,firstly,inthereducedamountofODAflowingintoBosnia,andsecondly,inalteredinterventioninstruments.InthecontextoftheIFIsgeneralstrategyshiftawayfromtheorthodox

neoliberalWashingtonConsensus,andrelyingonthenewcentral-stateinstitutions,theinternationalagenciesnowresortmoretoinstrumentsbasedonlocalparticipationandahigherdegreeofownership,suchastheWorldBanksPovertyReductionStrategyPapers.However,thewayinwhichtheBosnianstateisinternationalisedhasremainedlargelyunchanged.Bosniaisstilldependentoninternationalcreditandloanstofinancebudgetdeficits,foreigndebtsandpublicinvestmentprojects.Furthermore,theunderlyingneoliberalideologywithitsemphasisonbudgetarydisciplineandsustainabilityhasremainedlargelyinplace.Despitemoreparticipatoryformsofeconomicstrategyformulation,IMFandtheWorldBankstillhavethefinalsayoneconomic,fiscalandfinancialpolicyissues,andthereislittleroomfornationalpolicyinitiativesintheeconomicsector.

Inthesecuritysector,theevidenceregardingstateinternationalisationisambiguous.For

instance,thepolicehaveremainedrelativelyresistanttointernationalinfluences.ThankstointernationalreformprojectsbyIPTFandEUPM,therehasbeenanadaptationofworkingroutinestointernationalpolicingstandards.Thecreationofnewcentral-stateinstitutionssuchastheStateBorderServiceandtheStateInvestigationandProtectionAgency,whicharecompatiblewithinternationalstructures,canalsobeseenasformsofinternationalisationofthepoliceinBosnia.However,localinterestsandresistancehavelimitedreformsofthecorepoliceapparatusesintheentitiesandcantons.Theinternationalactorshavebeenunabletoenforcethemodel,envisionedbytheHR,ofcentralisedpoliceforceswithentity-crossingoperationaldistricts.

Themilitarysector,bycontrast,isalmostcompletelyinternationalised.Theformofthemilitaryapparatusitsoperationalorganisation,equipment,trainingandsoonhasbeen

adaptedtoNATOstandardsinthecourseoftheaccessionprocesstothePartnershipforPeaceprogramme.Theroleofthemilitarywithinthestatehasalsobeeninternationalised:ithaschangedfromthatofanethno-nationaldefendertothatofapost-modern,multilateral


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peacebuilder.Internationalandlocalactorsalikepromotethisnewrole,theformerbecausetheyhopeforpositiveeffectsfromthecommonparticipationofsoldiersfromallthreeethno-nationalgroupsininternationalinterventions,thelatterbecausetheywanttoshowthatBosniaisreadyforequalandresponsiblemembershipintheinternationalcommunityof

sovereignstates.Thethirdformofinternationalisationinthemilitarysectoristheoutsourcingofitssecurityanddefencefunctiontointernationaltroops.Althoughlessthanonequarterofthepopulationfearsanotheroutbreakofwariftheinternationalsecurityforceswithdraw(EarlyWarningSystem2007),mostlocalactorsstilldonotseethestateasacentralguarantorofsecurityinthecountry,preferringtorelyontheinternationalcivilandmilitaryagenciesinthisrespect.

Intheareaoflaw,theinternationalisationoftheBosnianstatecanbedetected,firstly,inthefunctionoflawproduction.AccordingtotheDaytonPeaceAgreement,theEuropeanHumanRightsConventionisdirectlyapplicabletoBosniaandhaspriorityoverallotherlaws.Additionally,Bosniahassigneduptootherinternationalhumanrightstreaties,makingthe

stateformallyaccountabletothehigheststandardsofinternationallyrecogniseduniversalrights.Furthermore,theinternationalagenciesinBosniahaveinfluencedthelaw-makingprocessbydraftingoradvisingonthecreationofnewlaws.Inthefirstphaseofintervention,theOHRwasthemostimportantlocusofsuchactivities;latertheEUanditsCopenhagencriteriacametobeastrongincentiveforlawproduction,leadingtoahighdegreeofinternationalisationofthelaw-makingprocess.

Secondly,thefunctionoflawimplementationandenforcementhasbeeninternationalised.ThisisnotonlythecaseinareassuchasinternationalcriminallawwheretheindictmentofwarcriminalsbytheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY)inTheHagueisavisibleformofinternationalinterference.Thedeploymentofjudges,prosecutorsandjudicialexpertstoBosniascourtshasalsoensuredanatleastpartialinfluenceof

internationalactorsandnormsonthefunctioningofthejudicialsystem.Leewayforlocalinterpretationsandroomformanoeuvreremainlimited.

Fromaninternationalstatebuildersperspective,theinternationalisationoftheBosnianstateisapositivething,aslongasitleadstotheestablishmentofstateinstitutionswhosecapacityandlegitimacycontributetoaconsolidationofthestateasanintermediarybetweentheinternationallevelandthelocalsociety,abletoproceedandimplementinternationallyproducednormsandvalues.ButtheinternationalisedBosnianstatescapacityandlegitimacyhaveremainedhighlyprecarious,callingintoquestionthesebasicpremisesofstate-building.

Limitedstatecapacity

Statecapacitymeansbeingabletosetandenforcebindingrules.Theidealforamodern

stateistohavesupremacyover,andautonomyfrom,allgroupsofsociety,withanall-encompassingregulatorycapacityandnoparticulargroupsareabletoeludestateregulations.Acorepreconditionforstatecapacityisresourcesrevenues,aboveall,butalsotrainedpersonnelandfunctioningworkingroutines.

StatecapacityinBosniahasremainedlimitedbyactorsatboththeinternationalandthelocallevels.Inareasinwhichthestateishighlyinternationalisedandhastosubmittotherulesoftheinterventionagencies,thestateisdecoupledfromthelocalpoliticalprocess.Thisisespeciallyvisibleintheshiftofthestatesreferenceofaccountabilityfromthesocietaltotheinternationallevel.TheconsentandcontrolofpublicbudgetsbytheIFIsonthepremiseofeconomicneoliberalism,theinternationalisationoftheformandfunctionsofthemilitaryanditsdefinedroleaspost-modernpeacebuilder,andthepriorityofinternationalover

nationallawsandcustomsareexamplesofthisdynamic.Theseinternationallydeterminedrulesdonotleavemuchleewayforalternativenationalpolitics.


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Inareasthatarelessinternationalised,bycontrast,thereareindicationsofstaterulebecominglessformalisedandofthestate-buildingprojectbecomingderailedinthecourseofconflicts,negotiationsandcompromisesbetweenthediverseinternationalandnationalactors.Thecircumventionofrigidbudgetaryreformsviainformalfinancingpractices,political

actorsinformalstrategiestokeeptheircontroloverthepolice,aswellasthenumerouspracticesbystateagentstointerprettheofteninternationally-dictatedrulesandcategoriesofadministrationintheirfavouraresomeexamplesofthetendenciesofstateinformalisation.26 Theeffectoftheseinformalpracticesisthatthestatesautonomyfrompoliticalandsocialinfluenceshasremainedlimitedandtheinternationallysupportedstatefaadehasnotbeenbackedupwiththelegal-rationalformsofrulethataretheprimarysourceoflegitimacyinamodernstate.

Thelimitsofstateautonomywithregardtopowerfulelitesaremostvisibleregardingthepoliceatthelevelofentitiesandcantons.Despitevisibleadvancementsinpoliceperformanceandalthoughtheyarenolongerasethnicisedasduringthewar,thepolicearestillpoliticisedandtendtoservepoliticalleadersratherthancitizens,providingpowerful

politicalandeconomicactorswiththeleewaytocircumventthelaw.Thisalsohasimplicationsforthejudicialsystem.Althoughrelativelyautonomousfrompoliticalandsocialinfluencestoday,thejudiciarysabilitytotakeactionagainstpowerfulpoliticalandeconomicactorsremainslimitedbythelattersinfluenceonpoliceandpublicprosecution.

Itisnotonlypowerfuleliteswholimitthestatesautonomy.Thereisamutualdependencybetweenassociationsofwarveterans,invalidsandfamiliesoffallensoldiersontheonehand,andpoliticalpartiesontheother,thatwasestablishedduringthewartoensuretheinternalcoherenceofthewarparties.Thismutualdependencyisthereasonwhybigpartsofthestatessocialexpendituresflowtowardstheseclientswho,duetotheirnumericalstrengthandmoralweight,areabletoexertinfluenceonpoliticalelites.Althoughthesekindsofnetworkshavebeenweakened,theproblemisthattherearefewalternativestofill

thevoidthisleaves.27

Aslongasthesocio-economicsituationinBosniaremainsprecarious,anysocialreformsmightdestabilisethenascentandstillpoliticallyandsociallycontestedstate.Policiescushioningthemid-termnegativeeffectsofnecessarystructuralreformsinthesocialsector,suchastheprovisionofworktounemployedwarveteransbylocalcommunitiesinordertocushioncut-backsinwelfaretransfers,arefeasiblebutcostlyandwoulddependontheconsentoftheinternationalactorsinBosnia.Unsurprisingly,theIFIscoreprioritiesuntilnowhavebeen:economicgrowth,realisedbyrelyingalmostentirelyoncreatingastablebusinessenvironment,andstrictdisciplineoverthepublicbudgetastrategythathasprovedtobeinsufficientasameansofexpandingthelabourmarket(Pugh2007);thereductionofpoverty(UNDPBosnia2007);andstrengtheningofthewelfaresystem.

Localpolicyinitiativessuchas(limited)protectionismorstateemploymentintheindustrialandagriculturalsector(seePugh2008)havebeensystematicallyblocked.Forexample,anattemptbyBosnianactorstoincludeaninterimtariffprotectionforagriculturalgoodsinthePovertyReductionStrategyPaperinordertostrengthentheprecariousagriculturalsectorwhichisanimportantpartoftheBosnianlabourmarketwasblockedbytheIFIs.Likewise,Bosnianparliamentariansconcernsthattheintroductionofasingle-ratevalue-addedtaxwouldadverselyaffectthepoorweredismissedbytheinternationalactors(BliesemanndeGuevara2008b).ThisdeepinternationalisationoftheeconomicspherehasstronglylimitedtheBosnianstatesroomformanoeuvre.

26.Onthepowergamesevolvingaroundbureaucraticcategorisations,seeVetters2007.

27.Ontheroleofwarveterans,seeBojii-Delilovi (2006),Bougarel(2007),Grandits(2007),Gregson

(2000).


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Lackofstatelegitimacy

Aseconddimensionofthemodernstateisitssocialembeddednessandlegitimacy.Functionally,statesgenerateacertaindegreeoflegitimacybyprovidingbasicformsofsecurityandwelfare.Beyondthat,themodernstateisideallycharacterisedbyaservice-

oriented,impersonalbureaucracyandastrongandimpartiallegalsystem.Fromthislegal-rationalfunctioningitcanthenderivefurtherlegitimacy.Indeed,onlyifpeopleacceptandmakeuseofstateinstitutionscantheinstitutionalisationofstaterulebeenduring.

Intheinternationalisedsecuritysector,thecontainmentofethnicviolencehasbeenconducivetoacertainbasiclegitimacyofthestateregardlessofthequestionofwhethernationalorinternationalactorsprovidefortheenforcementofthemonopolyofviolence.Beyondthisverybasiclevelhowever,itisdifficulttojudgetheextenttowhichthereformedandpartlycentralisedapparatusesofthemilitaryandpoliceareseenaslegitimatebyBosniancitizensandthesecurityforcesthemselves.Enduringethno-nationaldifferenceswithinthecentralisedArmedForces(AFBiH)aswellasthelastingpoliticisationandpettycorruptionofthepolicegivereasontosupposethattheconsolidationprocessofthesecurity

apparatusesofBosniahasnotyetbeencompleted.Thecurrentchancesoftheeconomicsectorservingasapossiblesourceoflegitimacyforthestatearenothigh.Forthemajorityofthepopulation,internationalstate-buildinghasnotresultedintheirpersonaleconomicsituationsimproving,andsocio-economicprospectsremainlimited.Atthesametime,therehavebeencutbacksinthewelfaresectorwhich,despiteitsdeficienciesandinequalities,hadatleastservedasamomentarycushionagainstdistress.TheIFIshaveespeciallycriticisedtransferstodisabledwarveterans,whichin2004amountedto66percentoftotalwelfarespending(althoughsinglepaymentsweresmallandoftenirregular),therebyconstrainingthebudgetsofsocialprogrammesforotherneedybutlesspoliticallyimportantgroupssuchaschildrenandtheelderly(UNDPBosnia2007,WorldBank2002).

Asoutlinedabove,Bosniaseconomic,financialandfiscalpolicieshavebeendeterminedbyinternationalactors,theneoliberalinterventionsfiscalfocushasbeenonadjustmentsandausterity,andthemodusofreformshasoftenbeentechnocraticanddecoupledfromlocalconcernsandinitiatives.ThishasleftthestateofBosniawithlittleleewayfornegotiationprocesseswithlocalinterestgroups,fortheconsiderationofsocietysdemandsorthedevelopmentofalternativeeconomicstrategies,contributingtotheimpressionofapowerlessstateanddecreasingthelegitimacythatflowsfromastatesgoodeconomicperformance.

Regardingthelegal-rationalfunctionofthestate,itappearsthattherearestructurallimitstostate-building.Firstly,theconsolidationofamodernpublicadministrationhasremainedincomplete.Despitetheall-encompassinginternationalreformproject,personalrelationshipsarestillveryimportanttoeverydaybureaucraticpracticeshavinginfluentialconnectionsremainsthemostimportantcriterionintheinteractionbetweencitizensandthestate.Theenduranceofpersonalrelationsindicatesthefailureofattemptstoseparatethepublicandprivatespheres.Thereasonsforthisarestructuralratherthanpersonal:thelegal-rationalformsofstate-societyinteractiondonotresonatewithallstateofficialsyet,notleastbecauselowpaymentsencouragecorruptionandrecruitmentquotasputethnicityovermerit.Thenegativedailyencountersthatcitizenshavewithcorruptorinefficientstateofficials,ontheotherhand,fostertheirimpressionthatpersonalconnectionsremainthebestwayofensuringthattheirdemandstothestateareprocessedintheirfavour.28

State-societyrelationsinBosniaarealsocharacterisedbythelastingsignificanceofthethreeethno-nationalcollectives.Thishaspersistedinpost-wartimesandhasbeenfurther

28.OncorruptioninBosniaseeDivjakandPugh(2008),TransparencyInternational(2004),Transparency

InternationalBosnia(2004).


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institutionalisedbytheinternationalactorswhohavebasedtheDaytonpower-sharingsystemandmanyoftheirlaterreformsonthefundamentalideaofthreeseparatepopulationgroups.Throughtheinternationally-backedconstitutionalcourtsdecisiononthethreeconstituentpeoplesofBosnia,ethno-nationalquotasbecamethegeneralprincipleofstate

organisation(Bieber2004,InternationalCrisisGroup2002).ThebackgroundtothisistheinternationalactorswishtorestoreamultiethnicsocietybutitignoresthefactthateveninYugoslavtimesBosniasallegedmulticulturalismcameclosertoapluralmono-culturalism(Sen2006)thatwaslargelylimitedtoaneighbourlycoexistence,givingwaytoamodern,individualisedidealofnationalcitizenshiponlyinthesmallurbanmiddleclassandsmallpartsoftheworkingclass(Bougarel1996,2003).

Giventheinstitutionalisationofethnicdivisionsthroughtheprocessofstate-building,itislikelythatcollectiveorganisationwillcontinuetostandinthewayofanindividualisationofsocietyasthebasisforlegal-rationalstaterule.Attemptsbyinternationalactorstocontributetoanintegrationofthethreeethno-nationalcollectivesthroughsymbolicpoliticsthrough,forexample,thecreationofBosniasstatesymbolssuchastheBosniannational

flagandanthemhavenotsucceededinovercomingtheethno-nationaldifferences(Kostic2007).Ina2005survey,only9.8percentoftheBosnianCroatsand2.5oftheBosnianSerbssaidtheywereproudofBosniasnationalsymbols,comparedwith79.2percentoftheBosniaks(ibid).Thesefindingsconfirmtheimpressionthatnation-buildingthecreationofaffectivebondsbetweenstateandpopulationcannotbeinitiatedbyexternalactorsbutmustcomefromwithin.


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Afteradecadeofstate-buildinginBosnia,itishightimeweassessedtheadvantagesandlimitationsofthisinternationalapproach.Theanalysispresentedherepointstothe

importantstructurallimitstostate-buildingthatshouldbetakenintoaccountinfutureforeignpolicyformulationandtothegenerallessonsthatcanbelearnedfromthecaseofstate-buildinginBosnia.

Firstly,thetransferofnewinstitutionsbuiltupbytheinterveningagenciesintolocalhandsexposesthemaindilemmaofinternationalstate-building,regardlessofthestrategyapplied.Manyoftheoperativestrategiesareveryeffectiveandexercisegoodcontrolofreformsbuttheyalsoimpedelocalownership,hinderingthedevelopmentofstatecapacityandlegitimacy.Meanwhile,conditionalstrategiesaredesignedtofacilitatelocalinitiativeandcapacityandtogeneratelegitimacybylettinglocalactorstakethefinaldecisionsbutwheretheyinvolveconditionalitiesthatarestrongandinflexible,theireffectsonstatecapacityandlegitimacytendtobejustlikethoseofoperativestrategies.Theymayevenhelpwestern

statebuilderstoevaderesponsibilityfortheoutcomeoftheirinterventions(e.g.Chandler2006).Whereconditionalitiesareweak,bycontrast,localactorscandecidetoignorethem,whichmeansthatlegitimacymightbehighbutstatestructureswilldivergefrominternationalmodels.Inanycase,theresultsofstate-buildingwillfallshortofnormativeexpectationswhichshouldthereforebeadjustedtothestructurallylimitedpossibilitiesofstate-building.

Thiscouldbeachievedthroughaparadigmshiftinwesternpeace-buildingpoliciesawayfromtheconcentrationonmeans(thatis,institution-buildingandliberalisationaccordingtowesternmodels)towardsafocusonends:theglobalprovisionofsecurityandeconomicwelfare.Fromthisperspective,theremightbeseveralwaystoreachthesameeffectapossibilitythathasbeenexcludedfromthestate-buildingdiscoursesofar(seePughetal

2008).Ascriticalstudiesonwar-torncountriessuggest,forexample,non-stateactorsprovisionsofsecurityandeconomicwelfaremightinsomecasesorareasbebettersuitedtomeetthesocio-economicneedsofthepeoplethaninternationally-dictatedstatestrategies.Insuchsituations,insistingontheestablishmentofcentralisedstatestructuresaccordingtothewesternmodelimperilsexistingsocialarrangements,leadingtomoreuncertaintyandinsecurityandunderminingtheinterventionsaimofstabilisingthestate(seeKhn2009).Whilethehistoricalprocessofstate-formationintheWesthasledtoapacificationofsocietalrelationsonlyaftersocialhardshipswereinstitutionallyovercome,contingentmodernisationprocessesinothersocietiesmightwellopposetheideaofauniversalisationofthewesternstate.

Secondly,economicandfinancialinterventionstrategies,andtheireffectsonthesocio-

economicsituationofthecountryconcerned,arearguablyacruxofstate-building.Ontheonehand,theweakeningofpowerfulelitesbylimitingtheavailabilityoffinancialresourcescreatesthebasisforformalstateinstitutionalisation.Ontheotherhand,however,thestatespossibilitiesforbuildingupcapacityandautonomyarelimitedbyinternationally-definedbudgetconstraints.Yetheavilysubsidisingthecentralstatewouldnotofferawayoutofthisdilemmabecausethiswouldfostertheproblemsofrent-basedstaterule,ascaseslikeAfghanistansuggest.Thetax-orientedapproachtakeninBosniaisalsolimited:althoughtheinternationalinterventionhasbeenabletoerectcentral-statetaxagencies,theeconomicinterventionhasnotachievedasustainedstrengtheningofthestatesextractionanddistributioncapacity.TheBosnianstateistrappedinaviciouscircleoflimiteddomesticrevenuesources,acostlywelfaresysteminneedofreform,adisappointedpopulationandatightfinancialandpoliticalframeworklargelycontrolledbytheinternationalcommunity.

Therecentglobalfinancialcrisisandrecessionhaveclearlydemonstratedthatwar-tornsocietiesareespeciallyvulnerabletotheupsanddownsoftheworldeconomy.Althoughthe

Conclusions:somethoughtsonfutureforeignpolicyformulation


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Bosnianfinancesectorwasnotdeeplyaffectedbythecasinocollapseduetoitslimitedintegrationintotheglobalfinancialmarket,thetradeandservicesectorsexperiencedtheeffectsofrecessionintheformoffallingdemand.Remittancesformanyfamiliesafinanciallifelinearealsoexpectedtofall.RethinkingtheEUsvisaregimefortheSoutheast

Europeancountrieswouldbeagoodfirststepinaddressingthelatterpointtoincludeallcountriesintheregioninthemid-terminordertoavoidfurthereconomicdisparitiesandpoliticalanimositiesintheregion.

Theaimofareformedpeace-buildingpolitics,notleastfromanethicalangle,shouldbetosavepost-conflictsocietieswhosevulnerabilitytotheupsanddownsoftheworldmarketis,atleastpartially,aneffectoftheveryliberaleconomicstructuresdictatedbytheinterveningagenciesfromtherisksinherentintheglobaleconomy.Therefore,areformedpeace-buildingstrategywillhavetofocusnotonlyonconcreteinterventionstrategies,butalsoonstructuralconstraintstothedevelopmentandsecurityofpost-warsocietiesposedbythecontemporarystructuresandinstitutionsoftheworldeconomy.AsPughetalstate:

Aparadigmshiftwouldinvolveinterrogationofthewayinwhichthe

globalsystemexacerbatesthesubalternstatusofwar-tornsocieties(alreadyreinforcedbyovertviolence)andadvocateacommensurately

greaterfocusontheoutsideofthepost-conflictsociety,ontheneedfor

far-reachingtransformationofthestructuresandinstitutionsthat

determinewhatmightbetermedthelimitsofpotentialforhuman

securityinwar-tornsocietiesasawhole.(2008:395)

Thatmeanssubstitutingthepoliticsofliberalstate-buildingwithapoliticsofwelfare-state-building.

Therearenumerouspolicymeasuresthatmightpromotesuchawelfare-stateapproach.Howappropriatetheyareultimatelydependsonthespecificcase.Forexample,oneofthekeysto

breaktheviciouseconomiccircleinBosniadescribedabovecouldbemassivejobcreationthroughlong-termemploymentstrategiesbyanactivestate.Throughanexpansionoftheformallabourmarket,unemploymentandinformalsectoractivitiescouldbereduced,thetaxpayerbasisenhanced,andconsumptionandtherebyindirecttaxlevelslifted.Thatwouldresultinanexpansionofstatecapacity,andtheoutputefficiencywouldproducediffusesupportofthepoliticalsystemonthesideofthepopulationinthelongrun.

TheinternationalagenciesinBosnia,bycontrast,havemerelyfocusedonthecreationofafavourableprivatebusinessenvironment.Yetitisthecountrysoligarchythatwouldhavethemeanstoinvest,andtheyhavebecomeuninterestedintheproductionandinfrastructuresectors.Insuchasituation,moreactivestateinvolvementseemsnecessarytospureconomicdevelopmentandcreateworkingopportunities.Internationalpeace-buildingstrategies

shouldconsidernon-neoliberalmeasuressuchasinterimformsofprotectionismorthefosteringofstateenterprisesandcommunitypropertyaspossiblealternativestotheneoliberalapproach.Inwar-tornsocieties,suchpoliciespromisetobemoresuitablethantheIFIsneoliberalone-size-fits-allmodels.

Finally,policymakersshouldbeawarethatstate-buildingisfacedwith,andcauses,manyproblemswithoutsolutions.Understandingthesestructuraldilemmasisthebasisonwhichtoconsciouslydecidewhichofseveralsub-optimalpoliticalalternativestochooseunderwhichpremises,andwhatconsequencestobear.Takingthelessonsofstate-buildinginBosniaseriouslydoesnotmeandisengagementfromzonesofcrisis.Itmeansrealisticallyrethinkingtheunachievablenormativeaimsofinternationalstate-buildingandsubstitutingthemwithpoliticalalternativesthatarelessself-referentialandmoregearedtothesecurity

andwelfareoflocalpopulations.Thiscouldmeanthatthestatesbeingbuiltdifferfromthewesternmodel;however,itmightbeworthdeliberatingonalternativelocalgovernancemodelsthatcouldprovetobemorelegitimateandeffectiveintheeyesoftheirsocieties.


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