Status Coup

7/30/2019 Status Coup

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n Pakistan, when General Pervaiz Musharraf came into power on 12th October 1999 and an elected PM Nawaz Sharifwas taken in army custody under the guard of military rifles, comments of one Rodha Kumar, a Fellow of Council onForeign Relations, New York appeared in The Hindu' of 21st October, 1999 as follows:The coup was primarily a reaction to the (then) Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif's attempts to subjugate every one ofPakistan's institutions to his extraordinarily flip - flop dictate. Having looted the state and packed the executive with croniesand relatives, he tampered with the Judiciary, altered the Constitution to consolidate his power, used the peace processwith India as an opportunity for both political gain through Kargil and personal gain through sugar contracts, and finallyturned to playing divide and rule' with the army. .......Understanding this context should not, however, detract from the fact

that the coup was precipitated by the Kargil debacle, and that many in Pakistan welcomed it on the grounds that the (then)democracy ....... (was) too costly for the country.....'The army came forward with a common, but ever appealing for general Pakistani populace, slogan oferadication ofpol i t ical corrupt ion '. But was it appropriate for the army to prosecute corruption mafia who themselves kept a blurredhistory in this respect? Pakistan's army, with its record of dictatorial intervention and rule and then getting legitimacy &approval through the COURTS, hardly qualified as exceptional. However, despite its prolonged and best endeavors,Pakistan's army has not been able to entirely subjugate its civil institutions and especially the judiciary as in the militaryregimes of Spain of the past and other countries of South American continent.A survey of Gallop Pakistan (headed by known figure Dr Ejaz Shafi Gilani, who was offered a ministreal slot by GenMusharraf in his cabinet but Mr Gilani declined) on legitimacy of 12th October 1999 military coup had shown that 70% ofPakistanis had approved Gen Musharraf's take over and sending Nawaz Sharif home. The reasons for success in that

pole as per survey was firstly; chasing of Benazir Bhutto, Mr Zardari and their close associates by Ehtesab Bureau's Saifur Rehman and his team of wolves', secondly; launching attack on the Supreme Court, thirdly; launching attack on mediaoffices especially on the Jang', fourthly; getting Pakistan's foreign policy framed by America, fifthly; economicdevelopment rated coming down from 6% in 1988 to 2% in actual statistics, and lastly; the magic development of theirown family owned industrial empire at the cost of other industries in competition.In Pakistan, every dictator General' had always taken all due cares and precautions to keep reins of the government inhis hands. Gen Musharraf adopted the same methodology to extend his rule under one pretext or the other and bykeeping his guns on the shoulders of higher judiciary. PM Nawaz Sharif was detained on 12th October 1999 and the military had filed a complaint accusing him of criminalconspiracy, hijacking, kidnapping and attempted murder. Nawaz Sharif was made to appear before a Special Anti-Terrorist Court in Karachi in November 1999 without formally being charged (but alleged) with hijacking, kidnapping,

attempted murder and plotting to wage war against the state. Charge sheet was probably served on 8th December 1999.[It may be interesting to note that nabbing Nawaz Sharif and his family members, without issuing them a formal chargesheet, was not a new phenomenon in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif, when he assumed the office of Prime Minister in February1997, himself adopted the same measures for his political opponents and those members of bureaucracy who had goneagainst him in the past. He brought one of his trusted companions named Saif ur Rehman (a senator) as the Chief ofEhtesab Bureau (an organisation to implement accountability in the country) and through this bureau, immediatelysuspended 87 top bureaucrats in April 1997 who had been investigating the cases against him and his family's corruptionon mass scale when he was in power during 1991-1993. Then Nawaz Sharif and Saif ur Rehman levelled allegations of corruption against most of his political opponents speciallyAsif Ali Zardari, husband of Ex-Prime Minister Ms Benazir Bhutto and pushed them behind the bars. False cases /references were registered against their companions and high ranking officers were sent home on the basis of baseless

enquiries, and their family members were tortured through special powers given to Ehtesab Bureau.Time is the real master of fortunes. Just after 30 months of ruthless rule, Nawaz Sharif, his family members, Saif urRehman and his family members were picked up by the army authorities in the same way and subjected to same kind oftreatment, detention without warrants, trials without issuance of formal charge sheets under the same laws andregulations and by the same agency named Ehtesab Bureau (afterwards re-named as National Accountability Bureau bythe military regime) and were tried in the same military courts which were originally designated by Nawaz Sharif himself. That is a separate question that where were the higher courts then. What they felt and what were their feelings towardsrule of law.]


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Nawaz Sharif was tried in the same Anti-Terrorist Court' at Karachi which was established by him. He got the sametreatment from his own hand-made courts which he wanted to deliver to his political opponents when he had assumedpower in 1997. Time is the real master. He was sentenced for imprisonment and was kept in Attock Fort, partly convertedinto jail, till 10th December 2000 from where he was sent to Saudi Arabia for ten years after negotiating a deal with GenMusharraf.Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif had signed a memorandum of understanding that they would not take partin Pakistan politics for ten years and would stay in Saudi Arabia. [ However, they managed to come backto Pakistan on 10th September 2007 as a result of immense combined pressure from US, Benazir Bhutto and the Royal

Rulers of Saudi Arabia.]

Gen Musharraf's NAB (name of Nawaz Sharif's Ehtesab Bureau was changed by Gen Musharraf to be called as NationalAccountability Bureau) had hired international detectives to trace an estimated 700 million in assets of Nawaz Sharif whowas allowed to go into exile. This surprise decision to free Nawaz Shariffrom a life sentence and let him and his familyflee to Saudi Arabia was perhaps taken on the advice from investigators that the only way to track down the missingfortune was to let him start spending it. While he was in prison the military government could manage to locate only $6million [4.1 million] in accounts which were confiscated.The evidence gathered till then by NAB had suggested that Mr Sharif owns seven apartments in London, including onesin Mayfair and Park Lane, and holds bank accounts in London, Liechtenstein, Austria and Switzerland. 'HussainHaqqani , then a pol i t ica l consul tant and now Ambassador of Pakistan in Washington, who had w orked for both

Nawaz Sharif and Ms Bhutto, and who was then an adviser to the military ruler Gen Musharraf also, said: This is

a phenomenal rise in wealth for a man wh o, when he started in pol i t ics in 1979, own ed one re-rol l ing factory atLahore.'Throughout this rise in graphs of wealth, the Pakistani courts kept their eyes closed, rather Sharif family's personal judgeJustice Malik Qayyum of Punjab High Court always provided them shelter, relief and mostly acquittals in all cases filed inconnection with their corruption at various times.Christina Lamb wrote in The Telegraph' of 19th June 2001 under caption Sharif is freed to leadPakistan to lost

700m 'that:Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah, who negotiated the deal, had threatened to cut diplomatic ties with Pakistan if hisfriend Mr Sharif was not freed. Mr Sharif has been accused of corruption, but was actually jailed for attempted hijacking.

Although there has been criticism within Pakistan of the decision to free him, Mr Haqqani insisted that the deal was agood thing for the military regime'.

A similar deal was also offered to Ms Benazir Bhutto whereby corruption charges against her- for which she wassentenced to five years in absentia - would be dropped if she agreed to hand over some property & foreign cash and notto participate in politics of Pakistan. Ms Bhutto had refused, arguing that this would imply guilt.

Coming back to Army's take over, the irony of fate is that every military government used to blow their brass trumpets atfull volume stating and trying to prove with facts & figures' that they have come to save Pakistan from flood of corruption,bankruptcy and lawlessness brought by dismissed political governments. Gen Musharraf had also started his rule with thesame slogans. To keep his control over the affairs of government, Gen Musharraf adopted a two way policy but mainlydepending upon the historical weak character of higher judiciary.

While doing so Gen Musharraf availed that routine opportunity of getting his rule validated by the Supreme Court ofPakistan for three years, after which the Constitution was restored (after making amendments which only suited GenMusharraf) and elections were held. The 17th Amendment was incorporated in the Constitution permitting the President tocontinue wearing the uniform of COAS up to 31st December 2004 as agreed between the government and the supportingparties in the parliament and MMA (Mothida Majlis-e-Amal, a coalition of Islam-loving parties sitting on opposition benchesin the Parliament). Gen Musharraf announced on electronic media that he would give up the post of COAS after 31stDecember 2004, which he never obliged till the end of 2007.

[In 1977, after imposing martial law, Gen Zia ul Haq had also made a similar promise on TV with the people that he, beinga simple soldier, did not have political ambitions and would hold elections within three months, but he did not keep thepromise and ruled for eleven years.]
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Gen Musharraf brought key changes in his army set-up to prolong his stay in power, moved certain known figures fromstrategic seats to comparatively ineffective places to demonstrate strength to be seen and realized by his Americanmasters and to be felt by the intelligentsia in the country as well. These changes were done at senior levels of the armyleadership and the most significant was of 31st August 2000. It was the transfer of Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz from the postof Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in the GHQ Rawalpindi to that of GOC 4 Corps, Lahore. Lt Gen M Yusaf, GOC 2Corps Multan, was moved to GHQ as the new CGS.

The changes, which were made a few days before the departure of Gen Musharraf to New York in 2000 to attend the UNMillennium summit had three connotations:

The shifting of Lt Gen Aziz was a pre-emptive move by Gen Musharraf to prevent any possible threat to hisposition from him.

It was a conciliatory move to dispel US concerns over his role in assisting the Islamic extremist organizations [ThePentagon had viewed Lt Gen Aziz as the evil genius of the military regime and as a godfather of the Talibanof Afghanistan and the 300,000-strong armed jehadist militants of Pakistan belonging to different Islamic schoolsof thought].

Gen Musharraf knew that in the backdrop of US disliking for Lt Gen Aziz it might be difficult for him to secure USsupport for resumption of the IMF assistance and the re-scheduling of Pakistan's external debts.

An apparent impression conveyed to media was that it was a normal transfer to give Lt Gen Aziz an experience as aCorps Commander without which he would be ineligible for consideration as the next COAS. But the fact remains that noPakistani army chief can seize and sustain himself in power without the support of the CGS, who controls the

Directorates-General of Military Intelligence and Military Operations, and the GOC 10 Corps, Rawalpindi.

Gen Musharraf had consolidated his power base as he kicked out his three top generals known for their hard-line Islamicviews and the changes were rightly made to coincide with American and British attack on Afghanistan. It was seen as apart of Gen Musharraf's plan to bring his own liberal loyalists, who had supported his pro-west policy, into key positions.

The most significant change came with the exit of Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmed, the chief of the ISI, who (allegedly forced toget) resigned on 8th October 2001 because of differences over the reshuffling in the military high command. Consideredthe second most powerful member of the military junta, Lt Gen Mahmood was a key player in the military coup of 12thOctober 1999 that had brought Gen Musharraf to power. As the then corps commander Rawalpindi, he was one of thetwo Generals who ordered the troops to move in and arrest Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister. A highly ambitious LtGen Mahmood, Pakistan's chief spymaster, virtually ran Pakistan's Afghan policy, first supported the Taliban regime butlater on withdrew back in the light of Gen Musharraf's obligations towards US after 9/11 episode. His loyalty was above

board but not believed and trusted by Gen Musharraf.

As per views of Zahid Hussain expressed in the Newsline Karachi' of October 2001:

Despite his hardline views on other issues, Lt Gen Mahmood went along with Gen Musharraf on withdrawing supportfrom the then Taliban regime. The former ISI chief who was in America during the September 11 terrorist attack, led talkswith senior US officials on Pakistan's cooperation with the USanti-terrorism campaign. He also went to Afghanistan twicebefore his departure to persuade the Taliban government to accede to international demands to surrender Osama binLaden.'

The shake-up of 2001 in the army high command had changed the entire composition of the Pakistan army which hadruled the country since seizing power in October 1999. The reassignment of Lt Gen Aziz during the same period to aweak, feeble and largely ceremonial post of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, had consolidated Gen Musharraf'sposition that had then emerged as the sole power centre. The bearded Lt Gen Aziz was also the main player in the 1999military coup and was corps commander Lahore before being elevated to his new position which kept him out of thedecision-making process.

A firm conservative, Lt Gen Aziz had significant influence in determining Pakistan's policy on Kashmir. There had been asharp divergence of views particularly on Kashmir, Afghanistan, signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)and some other issues among the then Generals of Pakistan Army. The hardliner generals were alleged to likely blockGen Musharraf's more liberal and pragmatic policies, with Gen Aziz and some other alike generals preventing Pakistanfrom showing any flexibility in its policy of supporting Islamic militancy in Kashmir and the then Taliban regime inAfghanistan'.


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It was not surprising that some of the Islamic political parties had publicly aligned themselves with Lt Gen Aziz and otherhardliners whom they described as pro-jihad' generals. This trio formed the nucleus of the ruling junta which alsoincluded Lt Gen Muzaffar Usmani, then deputy chief of the army staff, yet another bearded general known for his Islamicfundamentalist views who had also been retired in the reshuffle. Every decision taken by Gen Musharraf's Cabinet and theNational Security Council (NSC), once had to be stamped by these generals. Gen Musharraf had felt bound to consultthese two generals in all policies and military decisions before according approval for implementation. He, however, wentsuccessful in countering the challenges from the then allegedly pro-Taliban Islamic fundamentalists, while the armyappeared to be stood united behind him.

Looking back a bit earlier, one of the first acts of Gen Musharraf, after his appointment as the COAS by the then PrimeMinister Mr Nawaz Sharif in October 1998, was to move Lt Gen Aziz from the post of Deputy Director-General ISI dealingwith Kashmir and Afghanistan, to the GHQ as the CGS. He then shifted Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed (the then CommandantNational Defense College) to command GOC 10 Corps. However, Gen Musharraf could not succeed in having hisnominee selected as DG of ISI. PM Nawaz Sharif instead appointed Lt Gen Ziauddin, belonging to a family of PML(N)'sloyalists, as the DG.

Gen Musharraf did not want Lt Gen Ziauddin, an engineer by profession, to handle Kashmir and Afghanistan affairs as anISI Chief. He disliked the later immensely and distrusted him as Mr. Sharif's mole in the Pakistan Army. Gen Musharraf,therefore, transferred the Kashmir and Afghanistan operations of the ISI to the DG MI and made Lt Gen Aziz as the CGSto handle these sensitive affairs. The entire Kargil operation of 1999 was handled by Lt Gen Aziz and Lt Gen Ziauddinwas not capable enough to have an air of its implementation.

The insiders also held that with the posting of Gen Ziauddin as DG ISI, the COAS, Gen Musharraf had immediatelywithdrawn the whole wing of internal / political affairs from ISI HQ and placed it with MI wing in the GHQ. The surveillanceof political people, serving and otherwise, has been the main source of tension between the rulers and COAS since thelast three decades. Nawaz Sharif had nothing to do much with Kashmir or Afghanistan affairs. The only strength of ISInear a political ruler is the department's role in the political coercion.

The appointment of Lt Gen Aziz as the CGS had attracted considerable attention in ranks because he was the junior-mostLt General that time. It was a reflection of Gen Musharraf's trust in him. Previously, the tradition in the Pakistan army hadbeen to appoint one of the seniors, if not the senior-most, Lt Generals as the CGS. Lt Gen Aziz's friendship with GenMusharraf dated back to the days of Gen Zia-ul-Haq in 1980s, when the two along with Maj. Gen. Mehmood Durrani,afterwards a dearest adviser of Gen Musharraf and his number one person in the United States, played an active role intraining and arming of the Afghan Mujahideen in Afghanistan where they were blocking way of Russians.

Lt Gen Aziz was Ziaul Haq's Deputy Military Secretary then and, like Gen Musharraf, had also served in the SpecialServices Group (SSG), a commando force. The friendship between Gen Musharraf and Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed datedback to the days of their career as young officers of an Artillery Regiment. All of them were close protgs of Lt GenHamid Gul, the then DG ISI, under Ms Benazir Bhutto during her first tenure as the Prime Minister. The idea of keepingthe Indian security forces bleeding on Jammu & Kashmir borders by employing various military tactics was their brain-child. This working relationship brought them close to the Islamic political parties and soon they were labelled as Mulla'Generals by the force.

It was Lt Gen Aziz, Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed and Lt Gen Usmani, who refused to accept Lt Gen Ziauddin as the COAS andstaged a coup against Nawaz Sharif and seized power before Gen Musharraf's plane landed at Karachi on 12th October1999. The other Lt Generals approved their action ex-post facto. Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed and Lt Gen Aziz continued toenjoy the confidence of Gen Musharraf till the visit of President Clinton to Pakistan in March 2000. Thereafter, there werepersistent reports of differences with Lt Gen Aziz, who strongly opposed any pressure on the then Taliban regime or

Osama bin Laden issue and any action against the Pakistan-based activities of organizations such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Al Badr etc.

Despite all, Gen Musharraf continued to enjoy the support of Lt Gens Yusaf and Usmani. There had been a speculation inhigh circles that Gen Musharraf wanted to displace Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed from ISI and wanted to adjust Lt Gen Usmanias the DG ISI. This proposed move was perhaps based on the fact that when Gen Musharraf went to New York, he hadasked Lt Gen Usmani to look after routine work of the COAS in the GHQ, indicating his confidence in the officer.

The critical moment in Gen Musharraf's presidency was 9/11 of 2001, when Washington suddenly and direly needed hissupport in the international anti-terrorism campaign and to crush the Taliban in Afghanistan. Thus he became a pivotalplayer on the world stage and a close ally welcomed in Washington and London alike as a statesman of internationalstanding.


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Getting benefit of this 9/11 situation and in the backdrop of American support Gen Musharraf had also played some of hishidden cards at home front. What he did with his closest companion generals who brought him in power on 12 th October1999 can be judged from an article captioned as: Pakistani leader's attempt to rein in militants is met with defiance',written by Rory McCarthy appeared in The Guardian of 25 th May 2002:

Hours after the September 11 attacks Washington had ordered Islamabad to halt unconditionally its long-criticisedsupport for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Within days General Pervez Musharraf,Pakistan's straight-talking militarydictator, called together his 12 or 13 most senior officers. Although he expects his generals to speak freely at thesemeetings they rarely oppose the army chief's decisions.

This time the atmosphere was cold. Gen Musharraf laid out his proposal to support America in the imminent war againstthe Taliban and Osama bin Laden. There was, he told them, simply no other choice. Officially the public was told theofficers supported Gen Musharraf unanimously. But now it has emerged that four of his most senior generals opposedhim outright. ...... the four openly challenged the president's pro-US stance. In military terms it was a stunning display ofdisloyalty.

......... the angriest among the four that night was Lieutenant General Mehmood Ahmed, the religious hardliner whoheaded the ISI ....... and was once Gen Musharraf's closest ally. Three other lieutenant generals joined his protest:Muzaffar Usmani, a corps commander (at Karachi) who was instrumental in orchestrating the coup of October 1999 thatbrought the army back to power; Jamshaid Gulzar Kiani, commander of the powerful Rawalpindi corps; and MohammadAziz Khan, the Kashmir-born Lahore corps commander and a former ISI deputy chief.

Within a month the dissenters were silenced. Gen Ahmed and Gen Usmani were sacked. Gen Kiani lost his corps tobecome Adjutant-General while Gen Khan was promoted to the theoretically powerful, but largely ceremonial, position ofchairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee.

It was exactly what Washington wanted - firm leadership against the militant wing of the army.'

This event was better described by Eric Margolis, a famous defense analyst and columnist, in his communication that:

I've felt certain sympathy for Gen. Musharraf, who overthrew ....... Then came 9/11. The Bush Administration put a gun toMusharraf's head, ordering him to ditch Pakistan's Afghan ally, Taliban, open Pak bases to US forces, arrest anti-American militants, and fire the capable nationalist officers - and close friends - who put him into power, generals Aziz andMahmoud.

Obey, Washington warned Islamabad, or we will foreclose your loans, impose trade sanctions, cut off spare parts, andgive India a green light to go after you. Tough Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan's last military ruler, would have stood up to Americanbullying. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto would have cleverly managed to somehow finesse Washington's threats.But Musharraf, with a near-bankrupt nation, and faced with what he viewed as a Hobson's choice between obedience andruin, caved in to Washington's demands and became, overnight, its compliant servitor.' (Soldier of the RAJ by EricMargolis appeared on 30th June 2003 in http://www.eric/ Margolis.com / Archives)

In nut shell, to keep his control over the affairs of government, Gen Musharraf adopted a two way policy but mainlydepending upon the historical weak character of higher judiciary. Gen Musharraf availed that routine opportunity of gettinghis rule validated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan for three years, after which the Constitution was restored (aftermaking amendments which only suited Gen Musharraf) and elections were held. The 17th Amendment discussed above,was incorporated in the Constitution permitting the President to continue wearing the uniform of COAS up to31st December 2004 as agreed between the government and the supporting parties in the Parliament and MMA ( MothidaMajlis-e-Amal, a coalition of Islam-loving parties sitting on opposition benches. Gen Musharraf announced on electronicmedia that he would give up the post of COAS after 31 st December 2004, which he never obliged till the end of 2007.

[In 1977, after imposing martial law, Gen Zia ul Haq had made a similar promise on TV with the people that he, being asimple soldier, did not have political ambitions and would hold elections within three months, but he did not keep thepromise and ruled for eleven years]

Days and nights passed, the decisions were taken as per speculations but went un-implemented. Gen Musharrafcontinued to hold strength in the close army circles and had secretly opted to change his team one by one so that thestake-holders of politics would remain satisfied. General elections were announced but under strict supervision andcontrol of military sponsored teams.
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Status Coup