STATUS REPORT 2016 Mycle Schneider › IMG › pdf › 20160713MSC-WNISR2016...A MYCLE SCHNEIDER CONSULTING PROJECT Paris, London, Tokyo, July 2016 STATUS REPORT 2016 Mycle Schneider

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STATUS REPORT 2016

Mycle SchneiderAntony Froggatt

Julie HazemannIan FairlieTadahiro KatsutaFulcieri MaltiniM.V. Ramana

Tomas Kåberger

BY

WITH

FOREWORD

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. 1 World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2016

The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2016 By

Mycle Schneider Independent Consultant, Paris, France

Project Coordinator and Lead Author

Antony Froggatt Independent Consultant, London, U.K.

Lead Author

With

Julie Hazemann Director of EnerWebWatch, Paris, France

Documentary Research, Modeling and Graphic Design

Tadahiro Katsuta Associate Professor, School of Law, Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan

Contributing Author

M.V. Ramana Nuclear Futures Laboratory & Program on Science and Global Security

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, U.S.

Contributing Author

Special Contributions

Ian Fairlie Independent Consultant on Radioactivity in the Environment, London, U.K.

Fulcieri Maltini Independent Consultant on Nuclear Power, Alairac, France

Steve Thomas Professor for Energy Policy, Greenwich University, U.K.

Paris,London,Tokyo,July2016© A Mycle Schneider Consulting Project

CoverpageandlayoutcreatedbyNoëllePapay

Additional Contributions


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Theproject coordinatorwishes to thankAntony Froggatt, all-time key contributor to this project.Many thanks also to contributing authors Tadahiro Katsuta andM.V. Ramana for their renewedprofessionalcontributions.Pleasuretoworkwithyou.

IanFairlieandFulcieriMaltiniprovidedexceptionalcontributionsthisyear.Thankyouverymuch.

AspecialthanksgoesouttoTomasKåberger,whocontributedathoughtfulforewordunderhardlyacceptabletimeconstraints.

AbigchunkofthesuccessofthisprojectisduetoitsvisibilitythroughthegraphicillustrationsbasedontheprojectdatabasedesignedandmaintainedbydataengineerJulieHazemann.Andthereismoretocomeinthenearfuture.NinaSchneiderputherexcellentproof-readingandformattingskillstoworkandcontributedfundamentalresearchforoneofthechapters.Thankyouboth.WewereluckytohaveMaxSchneiderassistwithJapaneselanguageissues.Thankyou.

Manyotherpeoplehavecontributedpiecesofworktomakethisprojectpossibleandbringittothecurrentstandard.TheseincludeinparticularShaunBurnie,whocontributedmorethaninvaluableresearchandBenoîtRozel,whoprovidedterrificsupportondatamanagement.

Thereporthasgreatlybenefittedfrompartialorfullproof-reading,editingsuggestionsandcommentsby Shaun Burnie, Nils Epprecht, Eloi Glorieux, Jan Haverkamp, Yuri Hiranuma, Iriyna Holovko,Amory B. Lovins, Jean-Marc Nollet, Olexi Pasyuk, Walt Patterson, Nina Schneider, Shawn-PatrickStensil,YuryUrbanskyandseveralanonymousreviewers.Thankyouall.

The authors wish to thank in particular Rebecca Bertram, Rebecca Harms, Amory B. Lovins,MatthewMcKinzieandSabinevonStockar,fortheirdurableandenthusiasticsupportofthisproject.

AndeverybodyinvolvedisgratefultotheMacArthurFoundation,NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,HeinrichBöllFoundationNorthAmerica,theGreens-EFAGroupintheEuropeanParliament,andtheSwissRenewableEnergyFoundationfortheirgeneroussupportforthisproject.

A big thank-you to Philippe Rivière for his solid, reliable work on the website and his generousassistanceatanytimeofthedayaswellastoNoëllePapaywhocreatedthespecialcoverpageandthenewlayout(again)forthisreport.

NOTE

Thisreportcontainsaverylargeamountoffactualandnumericaldata.Whilewedoourutmosttoverify and double-check, nobody is perfect. The authors are always grateful for corrections andsuggestedimprovements.

LEAD AUTHORS’ CONTACT INFORMATION

MycleSchneider AntonyFroggatt

45,Alléedesdeuxcèdres 53aNevilleRoad

91210Draveil(Paris) LondonN168SW

France UnitedKingdom

Ph:+33-1-69832379 Ph:+44-7968805299

E:[email protected] E:[email protected]

TheWorldNuclearIndustryStatusReport2016© 2016 Mycle Schneider Consulting (MSC)


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword.............................................................................................................................8

ExecutiveSummaryandConclusions..................................................................................10

Introduction.......................................................................................................................18

GeneralOverviewWorldwide............................................................................................19

TheRoleofNuclearPower..........................................................................................................19

Operation,PowerGeneration,AgeDistribution..........................................................................22

OverviewofCurrentNewBuild...................................................................................................27

ConstructionTimes.............................................................................................................29

ConstructionTimesofReactorsCurrentlyUnderConstruction.....................................................29

ConstructionTimesofPastandCurrentlyOperatingReactors.....................................................29

ConstructionStartsandCancellations................................................................................31

OperatingAge....................................................................................................................33

LifetimeProjections...........................................................................................................36

PotentialNewcomerCountries...........................................................................................39

UnderConstruction.....................................................................................................................40

ContractsSignedorinAdvancedDevelopment............................................................................43

“CommittedPlans”.....................................................................................................................49

“WellDevelopedPlans”...............................................................................................................54

ConclusiononPotentialNewcomerCountries.............................................................................58

NuclearFinances:CorporateMeltdown?............................................................................60

NuclearBuildersandVendors......................................................................................................71

ConclusiononCorporateFinances...............................................................................................74

Chernobyl+30StatusReport...............................................................................................75

GeneralOverviewoftheChernobylSite......................................................................................75

SequenceandOriginoftheAccidenton26April1986.................................................................76

OnsiteChallenges................................................................................................................76

DispersionofRadioactivity..........................................................................................................78

PopulationsAffected...................................................................................................................80

HealthImpacts............................................................................................................................81

The“Sarcophagus”......................................................................................................................83

G-7SupportofShutdownofRMBKandVVER440-230Reactors..................................................83



EBRDChernobylDecommissioning/SpentFuelStorageProgram.................................................84

LiquidRadioactiveWastesTreatmentPlant.................................................................................86

IndustrialComplexonSolidRadioactiveWastesManagement....................................................86

ShelterImplementationPlan/NewSafeConfinement,,...............................................................87

Fukushima+5StatusReport................................................................................................89

OnsiteChallenges,.......................................................................................................................89

DecommissioningPlan...............................................................................................................89

CurrentStatusofEachReactor..................................................................................................89

ContaminatedWaterManagement...........................................................................................90

Currentstatusofworkers...........................................................................................................92

OffsiteChallenges........................................................................................................................93

CurrentStatusofEvacuation......................................................................................................93

RadiationExposureandHealthEffects......................................................................................95

FoodandEnvironmentalContamination...................................................................................96

Costs...........................................................................................................................................98

Fukushimavs.Chernobyl....................................................................................................99

SourceTerm..............................................................................................................................101

RadiationExposures..................................................................................................................101

NuclearPowervs.RenewableEnergyDeployment...........................................................103

Introduction..............................................................................................................................103

Investment................................................................................................................................105

InstalledCapacity......................................................................................................................107

ElectricityGeneration................................................................................................................108

StatusandTrendsinChina,theEU,India,andtheU.S...............................................................109

ConclusiononNuclearPowervs.RenewableEnergies...............................................................115

Annexes...........................................................................................................................116

Annex1:OverviewbyRegionandCountry.......................................................................117

Africa.........................................................................................................................................117

TheAmericas.............................................................................................................................119

UnitedStatesFocus...................................................................................................................125

StrugglingReactors...................................................................................................................128

NewReactorProjects—Delayed,Suspended,Cancelled.........................................................136

PendingCombinedOperatingLicenseApplications(COLA).....................................................138



Asia...........................................................................................................................................138

ChinaFocus...............................................................................................................................138

JapanFocus...............................................................................................................................148

NRANuclearSafetyReview......................................................................................................155

RestartProspects......................................................................................................................160

New-buildProjects...................................................................................................................161

EuropeanUnion(EU28)andSwitzerland....................................................................................169

WesternEurope...............................................................................................................................171

BelgiumFocus...........................................................................................................................172

FranceFocus..............................................................................................................................178

CentralandEasternEurope.............................................................................................................199

FormerSovietUnion..................................................................................................................207

Annex2:JapaneseNuclearReactorStatus.......................................................................214

Annex3:Fukushima—RadioactiveContaminationandCurrentEvacuationZones...........217

Annex4:DefinitionofCreditRatingbytheMainAgencies...............................................219

Annex5:StatusofLifetimeExtensionsintheU.S.............................................................220

Annex6:AbouttheAuthors.............................................................................................223

Annex7:Abbreviations....................................................................................................226

Annex8:StatusofNuclearPowerintheWorld................................................................232

Annex9:NuclearReactorsintheWorld“UnderConstruction”.........................................234



TABLE OF FIGURESFigure1:NuclearElectricityGenerationintheWorld......................................................................................20Figure2:AnnualNuclearPowerGenerationbyCountryandHistoricMaximum..............................................21Figure3:AnnualNuclearShareinElectricityMixbyCountryandHistoricMaximum.......................................21Figure4:NuclearPowerReactorGridConnectionsandShutdowns,1954-2016...............................................23Figure5:NuclearPowerReactorGridConnectionsandShutdowns,1954-2016...............................................23Figure6:RiseandFalloftheJapaneseNuclearProgram1963–2016................................................................24Figure7:WorldNuclearReactorFleet,1954–2016..........................................................................................26Figure8:NuclearReactorsUnderConstruction................................................................................................27Figure9:AverageAnnualConstructionTimesintheWorld1954–1July2016..................................................30Figure10:ConstructionStartsintheWorld1951–1July2016........................................................................31Figure11:ConstructionStartsintheWorld/China1951–1July2016...............................................................32Figure12:92CancelledorSuspendedReactorConstructions1977–July2016..................................................32Figure13:AgeDistributionofOperatingNuclearPowerReactors...................................................................34Figure14:AgeDistributionofOperatingReactorsintheWorld.......................................................................35Figure15:AgeDistributionof164ShutDownNuclearPowerReactors...........................................................36Figure16:AverageAgeProfileofShutDownNuclearPowerReactors.............................................................36Figure17:The40-YearLifetimeProjection(notincludingLTOs).......................................................................37Figure18:ThePLEXProjection(notincludingLTOs).........................................................................................38Figure19:Forty-YearLifetimeProjectionversusPLEXProjection.....................................................................38Figure20:EDFSharePriceDevelopment2006–2016.......................................................................................64Figure21:RWE(DE)SharePriceDevelopment2006–2016...............................................................................66Figure22:SharePriceDevelopmentofEuropeanPowerCompanies...............................................................67Figure23:SharePriceDevelopmentofAsianPowerCompanies......................................................................69Figure24:CGNCoLtd.(China)SharePriceDevelopmentSinceFirstListing.....................................................70Figure25:Exelon(US)SharePriceDevelopment2006-2016............................................................................71Figure26:AREVASharePriceDevelopment2006-2016...................................................................................72Figure27:GraveyardofAbandonedHighlyContaminatedTrucksandHelicopters..........................................77Figure28:Cesium-137ConcentrationsinEuropein1996.................................................................................79Figure29:CumulativeI-131ConcentrationsinAirOverEuropeinMay1986...................................................80Figure30:CrossSectionofthe"Sarcophagus".................................................................................................83Figure31:TheNewSafeConfinementatChernobyl........................................................................................88Figure32:ParisAgreement,NationalPledgesandNuclearPower................................................................104Figure33:GlobalInvestmentDecisionsinRenewablesandNuclearPower2004–15.....................................105Figure34:Wind,SolarandNuclear,CapacityIncreasesintheWorld2000–2015...........................................107Figure35:GlobalElectricityProductionfromWind,SolarandNuclear1997-2015.........................................108Figure36:InstalledCapacityinChinafromWind,SolarandNuclear2000–2015............................................109Figure37:ElectricityProductioninChinafromNuclear,WindandSolar2000-2015.......................................110Figure38:StartupandShutdownofElectricityGeneratingCapacityintheEUin2015...................................111Figure39:ChangesinEUNuclear,SolarandWindPowerProductionSinceSigningoftheKyotoProtocol.....112Figure40:Solar,WindandNuclearProductioninIndia2000-2015................................................................113Figure41:AgeofU.S.NuclearFleet...............................................................................................................125Figure42:AgeDistributionoftheJapaneseNuclearFleet.............................................................................149Figure43:ElectricityGenerationinJapanbySource2006-2015.....................................................................153Figure44:NuclearReactorsStartupsandShutdownsintheEU28,1956–2016..............................................169Figure45:NuclearReactorsandNetOperatingCapacityintheEU28,1956–2016..........................................170Figure46:AgePyramidofthe127NuclearReactorsOperatedintheEU28...................................................170Figure47:AgeDistributionoftheEU28ReactorFleet....................................................................................171Figure48:LoadFactorsofBelgianNuclearReactors......................................................................................172Figure49:AgeDistributionofBelgianNuclearFleet......................................................................................173Figure50:AgeDistributionofFrenchNuclearFleet.......................................................................................179



Figure51:AgeoftheSwissNuclearFleet.......................................................................................................197Figure52:Fukushima:RadioactiveContaminationandCurrentEvacuationZones.........................................217

TABLE OF TABLES Table1:NuclearReactors“UnderConstruction”.............................................................................................28Table2:ReactorConstructionTimes2006–2016.............................................................................................30Table3:ConstructionSchedulesforNuclearPowerinPotentialNewcomerCountries....................................59Table4:StandardandPoor’sLong-TermCreditRatingofMajorEuropeanUtilities.........................................63Table5:StandardandPoor’sLong-TermCreditRatingofMajorNuclearVendors...........................................73Table6:PopulationsExposedtoChernobylFallout:AverageEffectiveDose....................................................81Table7:SuicidesRelatedtotheGreatEastJapanEarthquake(numberofpersons).........................................94Table8:ConfirmedorSuspectedThyroidCancerCasesandEffectiveExternalDoseEstimates........................95Table9:Compensationcost............................................................................................................................98Table10:ComparisonofSelectedParametersoftheChernobylandFukushimaAccidents...........................100Table11:ComparisonofAtmosphericReleasesfromNuclearAccidents.......................................................101Table12:AverageDosesinFukushimaandChernobyl(HighestContaminatedAreas)...................................102Table13:CollectiveDosesfromFukushimaandChernobylAccidents(over80years)...................................102Table14:Top10CountriesforRenewableEnergyInvestment2013–2015.....................................................106Table15:JapaneseReactorsOfficiallyClosed................................................................................................150Table16:ClosureDatesforBelgianNuclearReactors2022–2025..................................................................174Table17:LegalClosureDatesforGermanNuclearReactors2011-2022.........................................................188Table18:JapaneseNuclearReactorStatus...................................................................................................214Table19:SubmittedandExpectedApplicationsforLifetimeExtensionsofU.S.NuclearPowerPlants...........220Table20:StatusofNuclearPowerintheWorld............................................................................................232Table21:NuclearReactorsintheWorld"UnderConstruction".....................................................................234




Foreword by Tomas Kåberger1

TheWorldNuclearIndustryStatusReport(WNISR)isthebestcompilationofdata,trendsandfactsaboutthenuclearindustryavailable.Thisisallthemoreimpressiveconsideringthecompetitionfrom resource-rich commercial or intergovernmental institutions. It is free from the politicalconstraints,e.g. thoseleadingtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)tothefalseclaimthere are more than 40 reactors operating in Japan. Nor does it suffer from the anti-nuclearexaggerationsorpro-nuclearenthusiasmsooftentaintingdescriptionsofthisindustry’sstatus.

Thisyear,specialchaptersonChernobylandFukushimaconfirmthatnuclearaccidentsbearnotonlysignificanthumanandenvironmentalbutalsoeconomicrisks.These,however,arerisksthenuclearindustryhasbeenshelteredfrombypoliticaldecisionslimitingtheirliability.

TheWNISR this year ismore about a risk the industrywill not easily be protected from: Theeconomicandfinancialrisksfromnuclearpowerbeingirreversiblyout-competedbyrenewablepower.

Theyear2015seemstobethebestyearforthenuclearindustryinthelastquarterofacentury.Arecord10newreactorswithatotalcapacityofover9GWwereputintooperation.Thiswaslessthannewsolarandlessthanwindcapacity,whichincreasedfiveandsixtimesasmuchrespectively.In actual electricity produced, nuclear increasedby31TWh,while fossil fuels based electricitygenerationdecreased.Themainreasonwhyfossilfuelsdecreasedwastheexpansioninrenewablepowergeneration,anincreaseofmorethan250TWhcomparedto2014,seventimesmorethanthemodestnuclearincrease.

Thedevelopmentofinstallationsandgenerationisaresultofrenewableenergycostreductions.Aswemayalsoreadinthisreport,nuclearconstructionisnotonlycostly,itisoftenmorecostly,andrequiresmoretime,thanenvisionedwheninvestmentdecisionsweretaken.Solarandwind,ontheotherhand,havecomedowninpricetoanextentthatnewwindandsolarareoftenprovidingnewgenerationthatisclearlycheaperthannewnuclearpower.

Evenmorechallengingtothenuclearindustryisthewayrenewablesarebringingdownelectricitypricesinmatureindustrialcountriestotheextentthatanincreasingnumberofreactorsoperatewitheconomiclossesdespiteproducingelectricityasplanned.

Butaforewordisnotmeanttobeanothersummary.Myappreciationofthereportisalreadyclearlystated.Letmeusethefinalparagraphsonwhatimplicationsmayfollowfromthefactslaidoutinthisreport:

First:Anuclear industryundereconomicstressmaybecomeanevenmoredangerous industry.Ownersdowhattheycantoreduceoperatingcoststoavoidmakingeconomicloss.Reducestaff,reducemaintenance,andreduceanymonitoringandinspectionthatmaybeavoided.Whileastatedambitionof “safety first”anddemandsof safetyauthoritieswillbeheard, theconflict isalwaysthereandreducedmarginsofsafetymayprovetobemistakes.

1TomasKåbergerisProfessorofIndustrialEnergyPolicyatChalmersUniversityofTechnologyinSwedenandExecutiveBoardChairmanoftheRenewableEnergyInstituteinJapan.


Secondly:Theeconomic lossesofnuclearcomeas fossil fuelbasedelectricitygeneration isalsosufferingunderclimateprotectionpoliciesandcompetitionfromlesscostlyrenewablepower.Theincumbentpowercompaniesareoftenloosingnetcash-flowaswellasassetvalues.Asaresult,many power companies are downgraded by credit-rating agencies and their very existencethreatened.Electricpowercompanies'abilitytoactuallymanagetheback-endcostofthenuclearindustry is increasinglyuncertain.As theestimatesof these costsbecomemore important, andreceiveattentiontheytendtogrow.

ReadingtheWNISR2016,apremonitionappearsofwhatmaylayaheadofthisindustryandthe31governmentshostingit.

LetushopeWNISRwillhelpmanypeopleunderstandthesituationandcontributetoresponsibleregulationandmanagementoftheindustryinthecriticalperiodaheadofus.


Executive Summary and Conclusions

KeyInsightsinBrief

TheChinaEffect

• Nuclearpowergenerationintheworldincreasedby1.3%,entirelyduetoa31%increaseinChina.

• Tenreactorsstartedupin2015—morethaninanyotheryearsince1990—ofwhicheightwereinChina.ConstructiononallofthemstartedpriortotheFukushimadisaster.

• Eightconstructionstartsintheworldin2015—towhichChinacontributedsix—downfrom15in2010ofwhich10wereinChina.Noconstructionstartsintheworldinthefirsthalfof2016.

• Thenumberofunitsunderconstructionisdecliningforthethirdyearinarow,from67reactorsattheendof2013to58bymid-2016,ofwhich21areinChina.

•ChinaspentoverUS$100billiononrenewablesin2015,whileinvestmentdecisionsforsixnuclearreactorsamountedtoUS$18billion.

EarlyClosures,Phase-outsandConstructionDelays

• EightearlyclosuredecisionstakeninJapan,Sweden,Switzerland,TaiwanandtheU.S.

• Nuclearphase-outannouncementsintheU.S.(California)andTaiwan.

• Innineofthe14buildingcountriesallprojectsaredelayed,mostlybyseveralyears.Sixprojectshavebeenlistedforoveradecade,ofwhichthreeforover30years.Chinaisnoexceptionhere,atleast10of21unitsunderconstructionaredelayed.

• With the exception of United Arab Emirates and Belarus, all potential newcomer countries delayedconstructiondecisions.ChilesuspendedandIndonesiaabandonednuclearplans.

NuclearGiantsinCrisis–RenewablesTakeOver

• AREVA has accumulated US$11 billion in losses over the past five years. French government decides€5.6billionbailoutandbreaksupthecompany.Sharevalue95percentbelow2007peakvalue.StateutilityEDFstruggleswithUS41.5billiondebt,downgradedbyS&P.ChineseutilityCGN,EDFpartnerforHinkleyPointC,loses60%ofitssharevaluesinceJune2015.

• Globally,windpoweroutputgrewby17%,solarby33%,nuclearby1.3%.

• Brazil,China,India,JapanandtheNetherlandsnowallgeneratemoreelectricityfromwindturbinesalonethanfromnuclearpowerplants.

Chernobyl+30/Fukushima+5

• ThreedecadesaftertheChernobylaccidentshockedtheEuropeancontinent,6millionpeoplecontinuetolive in severely contaminated areas. Radioactive fallout from Chernobyl contaminated 40% of Europe'slandmass.Atotalof40,000additionalfatalcancercasesareexpectedoverthecoming50years.

• Fiveyearsafter theFukushimadisasterbeganon theeast coastof Japan,over100,000people remaindislocated.OnlytworeactorsaregeneratingpowerinJapan,butfinalclosuredecisionsweretakenonanadditionalsixreactorsthathadbeenofflinesince2010-11.


TheWorldNuclear IndustryStatusReport2016 (WNISR)providesacomprehensiveoverviewofnuclearpowerplantdata, includinginformationonoperation,productionandconstruction.TheWNISR assesses the status of new-build programs in current nuclear countries as well as inpotential newcomer countries. The WNISR2016 edition includes again an assessment of thefinancialstatusofmanyofthebiggestindustrialplayersinthesector.ThiseditionalsoprovidesaChernobylStatusReport,30yearsaftertheaccidentthatledtothecontaminationofalargepartofEurope.TheFukushimaStatusReportgivesanoverviewofthestandingofonsiteandoffsiteissuesfiveyearsafterthebeginningofthecatastrophe.

TheNuclearPowervs.RenewableEnergychapterprovidesglobalcomparativedataoninvestment,capacity,andgenerationfromnuclear,windandsolarenergy.

Finally, Annex 1 presents a country-by-country overview of all 31 countries operating nuclearpowerplants,withextendedFocussectionsonBelgium,China,France,Japan,andtheUnitedStates.

ReactorStatusandNuclearPrograms

StartupsandShutdowns.In2015,10reactorsstartedup(eightinChina,oneinRussia,andoneinSouthKorea)andtwowereshutdown(GrafenrheinfeldinGermanyandWylfa-1intheU.K.).Doel-1wasshutdowninJanuarywhenitsoperationallicenseranout,butwasrestartedinDecemberafteralifetimeextensionwasapproved.FinalclosuredecisionsweretakenonfivereactorsinJapanthathadnotgeneratedpowersince2010-11,andononeSwedishreactorthathadbeenofflinesince2013.Inthefirsthalfof2016,fivereactorsstartedup,threeinChina,oneinSouthKoreaandoneintheU.S.(WattsBar2,43yearsafterconstructionstart),whilenonewereshutdown.However,thepermanentclosureofoneadditionalreactorhasbeenannouncedinJapan.Ikata-1,thathadnotgeneratedanypowersince2011.

OperationandConstructionData2

ReactorOperation.Thereare31countriesoperatingnuclearpowerplants,onemorethanayearago,withJapanrestartingtwounits.3Thesecountriesoperateatotalof402reactors—excluding Long Term Outages (LTOs)—a significant increase, 11 units, compared to thesituationmid-2015,butfourlessthanin1987and36fewerthanthe2002peakof438.Thetotalinstalledcapacityincreasedoverthepastyearby3.3percenttoreach348GW4,whichiscomparable to levels in2000. Installed capacitypeaked in2006at368GW.Annualnuclearelectricitygenerationreached2,441TWhin2015—a1.3percentincreaseoverthepreviousyear,but8.2percentbelowthehistoricpeakin2006.The2015globalincreaseof31TWhisentirely due to production in China where nuclear generation increased by 30 percent or37TWh.

2SeeAnnex1foracountry-by-countryoverviewofreactorsinoperationandunderconstructionaswellasthenuclearshareinelectricitygeneration.3Unlessotherwisenoted,thefiguresindicatedareasof1July2016.4Allfiguresaregivenfornominalnetelectricitygeneratingcapacity.GWstandsforgigawattorthousandmegawatt.


WNISRclassifies36 Japanese reactors5asbeing inLTO.6Besides the Japanese reactors,oneSwedishreactor(Ringhals-2)andoneTaiwanesereactor(Chinshan-1)meettheLTOcriteria.All ten reactors atFukushimaDaiichi andDaini are consideredpermanently closedandarethereforeexcludedinthecountofoperatingnuclearpowerplants.ShareinEnergyMix.Thenuclearshareoftheworld’spowergenerationremainedstable7overthepastfouryears,with10.7percentin2015afterdecliningsteadilyfromahistoricpeakof17.6percentin1996.Nuclearpower’sshareofglobalcommercialprimaryenergyconsumptionalsoremainedstableat4.4percent—priorto2014,thelowestlevelsince1984.8The“bigfive”nucleargeneratingcountries—byrank,theU.S.,France,Russia,China,andSouthKorea—generatedabouttwo-thirds(69percentin2014)oftheworld’snuclearelectricityin2015. China moved up one rank. The U.S. and France accounted for half of global nucleargeneration,andFranceproducedhalfoftheEuropeanUnion'snuclearoutput.ReactorAge.Intheabsenceofmajornew-buildprogramsapartfromChina,theunit-weightedaverageageof theworldoperatingnuclearreactor fleetcontinues torise,andbymid-2016stoodat29years.Overhalfofthetotal,or215units,haveoperatedformorethan30years,including59thathaverunforover40years,ofwhich37intheU.S.LifetimeExtension.Theextensionofoperatingperiodsbeyondtheoriginaldesignislicenseddifferently fromcountry tocountry.While in theU.S.81of the100operatingreactorshavealreadyreceivedlicenseextensionsforuptoatotallifetimeof60years,inFrance,only10-yearextensionsaregrantedandthesafetyauthoritieshavemadeitclearthatthereisnoguaranteethatallunitswillpassthe40-yearin-depthsafetyassessment.Furthermore,theproposalsforlifetimeextensionsareinconflictwiththeFrenchlegaltargettoreducethenuclearsharefromthecurrentthree-quarterstohalfby2025.InBelgium,10-yearextensionsforthreereactorswereapprovedbutdonotjeopardizethelegalnuclearphase-outgoalfor2025.LifetimeProjections.Ifallcurrentlyoperatingreactorswereshutdownattheendofa40-yearlifetime—withtheexceptionofthe59thatarealreadyoperatingformorethan40years—by2020thenumberofoperatingunitswouldbe22belowthetotalattheendof2015,evenifallreactors currently under active construction were completed, with the installed capacitydecliningby1.7GW.Inthefollowingdecadeto2030,187units(175GW)wouldhavetobereplaced—four times the number of startups achieved over the past decade. If all licensedlifetimeextensionswereactuallyimplementedandachieved,thenumberofoperatingreactorswould still only increase by two, and adding 17 GW in 2020 and until 2030, an additional144.5GWwouldhavetostartuptoreplace163reactorshutdowns.Construction.Asinpreviousyears, fourteencountriesarecurrentlybuildingnuclearpowerplants.AsofJuly2016,58reactorswereunderconstruction—9fewerthanin2013—ofwhich21areinChina.Totalcapacityunderconstructionis56.6GW.

• Thecurrentaveragetimesinceworkstartedatthe58unitsunderconstructionis6.2years,aconsiderableimprovementfromtheaverageof7.6yearsoneyearago.Thisismainlybecausefour units with 30+ construction years were taken off the list (two started up, two weresuspended)andworkstartedonsixnewreactors.

5IncludingtheMonjureactor,shutdownsince1995,listedunder“LongTermShutdown”intheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA),PowerReactorInformationSystem(PRIS),database.6WNISRconsidersthataunitisinLong-TermOutage(LTO)ifitproducedzeropowerinthepreviouscalendaryearandinthefirsthalfofthecurrentcalendaryear.Thisclassificationisappliedretroactivelystartingonthedaytheunitisdisconnectedfromthegrid.WNISRcountsthestartupofareactorfromitsdayofgridconnection,anditsshutdownfromthedayofgriddisconnection.7Lessthan0.2percentagepointsdifferencebetweenthefouryears,alevelthatiscertainlywithinstatisticaluncertainties.8AccordingtoBP,“StatisticalReviewofWorldEnergy”,June2016.


• Allofthereactorsunderconstructionin9outof14countrieshaveexperienceddelays,mostlyyear-long. At least two thirds (38) of all construction projects are delayed. Most of the 21remainingunitsunderconstruction,ofwhichelevenareinChina,werebegunwithinthepastthreeyearsorhavenotyetreachedprojectedstart-updates,makingitdifficulttoassesswhetherornottheyareonschedule.

• Threereactorshavebeen listedas “underconstruction” formore than30years:Rostov-4 inRussiaandMochovce-3and-4inSlovakia.Asnoactiveconstructionhasbeenongoingandwiththeconstructioncontractcancelled,Khmelnitski-3and-4inUkrainehavebeentakenoffthelist.

• TwounitsinIndia,Kudankulam-2andthePrototypeFastBreederReactor(PFBR),havebeenlistedas“underconstruction”for14and12yearsrespectively.TheOlkiluoto-3buildingsiteinFinlandreacheditstenthanniversaryinAugust2015.

• Theaverageconstructiontimeofthelatest46unitsintencountriesthatstartedupsince2006was10.4 yearswith a very large range from4 to 43.6 years. The average construction timeincreasedbyoneyearcomparedtotheWNISR2015decennialassessment.

ConstructionStarts&NewBuildIssues

ConstructionStarts.In2015,constructionbeganon8reactors,ofwhich6wereinChinaandone each were in Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This compares to 15construction starts—of which 10 were in China alone—in 2010 and 10 in 2013. Historicanalysisshowsthatconstructionstartsintheworldpeakedin1976at44.Between1January2012and1July2016,firstconcretewaspouredfor28newplantsworldwide—fewerthaninasingleyearinthe1970s.Construction Cancellations. Between 1977 and 2016, a total of 92 (one in eight) of allconstruction sites were abandoned or suspended in 17 countries in various stages ofadvancement.Newcomer Program Delays/Cancellation. Only two newcomer countries are actuallybuilding reactors—Belarus andUAE. Public information on the status of these constructionprojectsisscarce.Furtherdelayshaveoccurredovertheyearinthedevelopmentofnuclearprograms for most of the more or less advanced potential newcomer countries, includingBangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Vietnam. Chile and Lithuaniashelvedtheirnew-buildprojects,whereasIndonesiaabandonedplansforanuclearprogramaltogetherfortheforeseeablefuture.

NuclearEconomics:CorporateMeltdown?

NuclearUtilitiesinTrouble.Manyofthetraditionalnuclearandfossilfuelbasedutilitiesarestrugglingwithadramaticplungeinwholesalepowerprices,ashrinkingclientbase,decliningpowerconsumption,highdebt loads, increasingproductioncostsataging facilities,andstiffcompetition,especiallyfromrenewables.

• InEurope,energygiantsEDF,Engie(France),E.ON,RWE(Germany)andVattenfall(Sweden),aswellasutilitiesTVO(Finland)andCEZ(CzechRepublic)haveallbeendowngradedbycredit-ratingagenciesoverthepastyear.Alloftheutilitiesregisteredseverelossesonthestockmarket.EDFshareslostoverhalfoftheirvalueinlessthanayearand87percentcomparedtotheirpeakvaluein2007.RWEshareswentdownby54percentin2015.

• InAsia,thesharevalueofthelargestJapaneseutilitiesTEPCOandKansaiwaswipedoutintheaftermath of the Fukushimadisaster and never recovered. Chinese utility CGN, listed on theHongKongstockexchangesinceDecember2014,has lost60percentof itssharevaluesinceJune2015.TheonlyexceptiontothistrendistheKoreanutilityKEPCOthatstilloperatesasavirtualmonopolyinaregulatedmarket,controllingproduction,transportanddistribution.Itssharevaluehasgoneupby80percentsince2013.

• IntheU.S.,thelargestnuclearoperatorExelonlostabout60percentofitssharevaluecomparedtoitspeakvaluein2008.


AREVA Debacle (new episode). The French state-controlled integrated nuclear companyAREVAistechnicallybankruptafteracumulativefive-yearlossof€10billion(US$10.9billion).Debtreached€6.3billion(US$6.9billion)foranannualturnoverof€4.2billion(US$4.6billion)andacapitalizationofjust€1.3billion(US$1.5billion)asofearlyJuly2016,afterAREVA'ssharevalueplunged toanewhistoric low,96percentbelow its2007peak.Thecompany is tobebroken up, with French-state-controlled utility EDF taking a majority stake in the reactorbuilding and maintenance subsidiary AREVA NP that will then be opened up to foreigninvestment.TherescueschemehasnotbeenapprovedbytheEuropeanCommissionandcouldturnouttobehighlyproblematicforEDFasitsriskprofileexpands.Operating Cost Increase–Wholesale Price Plunge. In an increasing number of countries,includingBelgium,France,Germany, theNetherlands, Sweden, Switzerlandandpartsof theU.S.,historicallylowoperatingcostsofrapidlyagingreactorshaveescalatedsorapidlythattheaverageunit’s operating cost is barely below, and increasingly exceeds, thenormal bandofwholesalepowerprices.Indeed,thepastfiveyearssawadramaticdropofwholesalepricesinEuropeanmarkets,forexample,about40%inGermanyandcloseto30%intheScandinavianNordPoolin2015alone.UtilityResponse.Thishasledtoanumberofresponsesfromnuclearoperators.Thelargestnuclearoperatorintheworld,theFrench-state-controlledutilityEDF,hasrequestedsignificanttariffincreasestocoveritsoperatingcosts.IntheU.S.,Exelon,thelargestnuclearoperatorinthe country, has been accused of “blackmailing” the Illinois state over the “risk” of earlyretirements of several of its reactors that are no longer competitive under currentmarketconditions. In spite of “custom-designed” tools, like the introduction of modified rules incapacity markets that favor nuclear power, an increasing number of nuclear power plantscannotcompeteandfailtoclearauctions.InGermany,operatorE.ONclosedoneofitsreactorssixmonthsearlierthanrequiredbylaw.InSweden,earlyshutdownofatleastfourunitshasbeen confirmed because of lower than expected income from electricity sales and higherinvestmentneeds.EvenindevelopingmarketslikeIndia,atleasttwounitsarecandidatesforearlyclosureastheyarelosingmoney.

Chernobyl+30StatusReport

Thirtyyearsaftertheexplosionandsubsequentfireatunit4oftheChernobylnuclearpowerplanton26April1986, thenintheUSSR,nowin independentUkraine, theconsequencesarestill feltthroughouttheregion.

Accident Sequence.A power excursion—output increased about 100-fold in 4 seconds—ahydrogenexplosionandasubsequentgraphitefirethatlasted10-daysreleasedaboutonethirdoftheradioactiveinventoryofthecoreintotheair.EnvironmentalConsequences.Thechimneyeffecttriggeredbythefireledtotheejectionofradioactive fission products several kilometers up into the atmosphere. An estimated40percentofEurope's landareawascontaminated(>4,000Bq/m2).OversixmillionpeoplestillliveincontaminatedareasinBelarus,RussiaandUkraine.A2,800km2exclusionzonewiththe highest contamination levels in a 30-km radius has been established in the immediateaftermathofthedisasterandupheldeversince.HumanConsequences.About130,000peoplewereevacuated immediately after the initialevent,andintotalabout400,000peoplewereeventuallydislocated.Around550,000poorlytrained workers called “liquidators”, engaged by the Soviet army in disaster management,receivedamongstthehighestdoses.HealthConsequences.Arecentindependentassessmentexpectsatotalof40,000fatalcancersoverthecoming50yearscausedbyChernobylfallout.Over6,000thyroidcancercaseshavebeen identified so far, another 16,000 are expected in the future. Similarly, 500 percentincreaseswereobserved in leukemia risk inbothBelarus andUkraine. Somenewevidenceindicates increased incidences of cardiovascular effects, stroke, mental health effects, birth


defectsandvariousotherradiogeniceffectsinthemostaffectedcountries.StrongevidencehasbeenpublishedonChernobylrelatedeffectonchildren,includingimpairedlungfunctionandincreasedbreathingdifficulties, loweredbloodcounts,high levelsof anemiasandcoldsandraisedlevelsofimmunoglobulins.RemediationMeasures.In1986,underextremelydifficultconditions,theliquidatorshadbuiltacoveroverthedestroyedreactorcalledthe“sarcophagus”thatquicklydeteriorated.UndertheShelterImplementationPlanfinancedby44countriesandtheEU,aUS$2billionNewSafeConfinement(NSC)hasbeenbuilt.TheNSCisagiganticmobilecoverthatwillbepushedovertheoldsarcophagusandserveasprotectionduringthedismantlingoftheruinednuclearplant.WasteManagement.ThelargestsingleriskpotentialattheChernobylsiteremainsthespentfuelfromallfourunitsthatistobetransferredtoarecentlycompleteddrystoragesitebetweenendof2017andApril2019.Constructionsofliquidandsolidwastetreatmentfacilitieswerecompletedin2015.

Fukushima+5StatusReport

OverfiveyearshavepassedsincetheFukushimaDaiichinuclearpowerplantaccident(Fukushimaaccident)began,triggeredbytheEastJapanGreatEarthquakeon11March2011(alsoreferredtoas3/11throughoutthereport)andsubsequentevents.Thisassessmentincludesanalysesofonsiteandoffsitechallengesthathavearisensinceandremainsignificanttoday.

OnsiteChallenges.InJune2015,theJapanesegovernmentrevisedthemedium-andlong-termroadmapforthedecommissioningoftheFukushimaDaiichisite.Keycomponentsincludespentfuelremoval,fueldebrisevacuationandlimitationofcontaminatedwatergeneration.

• SpentFuelRemoval.Spentfuelistoberemovedfromunit3betweenFinancialYears(FY)2017and2019,fromunit2between2020and2021andfromunit1between2020and2022.

• MoltenFuelRemoval.Radiationlevelsremainveryhighinsidethereactorbuildings(about4-10Sievertperhour)andmakehumaninterventionimpossible.Noconclusivevideofootageisavailableanditremainsunknownwherethemoltenfuelisactuallylocated.Commencementofworkonfueldebrisremovalisplannedfor2021.However,nomethodologyhasbeenselectedyet.

• ContaminatedWaterManagement.Largequantities ofwater (about 300 cubicmeters perday)arestillcontinuouslyinjectedtocoolthefueldebris.Thehighlycontaminatedwaterrunsout of the cracked containments into the basement where it mixes with water that haspenetratedthebasementsfromanundergroundriver.Thecommissioningofadedicatedbypasssystem and the pumping of groundwater has reduced the influx of water from around400m3/daytoabout150to200m3/day.Anequivalentamountofwaterisdecontaminatedtosomedegree—itcontainsstillveryhighlevelsoftritium(over500,000Bq/l)andstoredinlargetanks.Thestoragecapacityonsiteis800,000m3.AfrozensoilwallthatwasdesignedtofurtherreducetheinfluxofwaterwascommissionedatendofMarch2016.Itseffectivenessisunderreview.

Workers.Between3,000and7,500workersperdayareinvolvedindecommissioningwork.Several fatal accidentshaveoccurredat the site. In September2015, theMinistryofHealthrecognized, for the first time, the leukemia developed by a worker who had carried outdecommissioningtasksasanoccupationaldisease.Offsite Challenges.Amongst themain offsite issues are the future of tens of thousands ofevacuees, the assessment of health consequences of the disaster, the management ofdecontaminationwastesandthecostsinvolved.Evacuees. According to government figures, the number of evacuees from FukushimaPrefectureasofMay2016wasabout92,600 (vs.164,000at thepeak in June2013).About3,400 people have died for reasons related to the evacuation, such as decreased physicalconditionorsuicide(allclassifiedas“earthquake-relateddeaths”).Thegovernmentplanstoliftrestrictionordersforupto47,000peoplebyMarch2017.However,accordingtoasurveyby


FukushimaPrefecture,70percentoftheevacuatedpeopledonotwishtoreturntotheirhomes(orwhatisleftofthem)eveniftherestrictionsarelifted,while10percentwishtoreturnand20percentremainundecided.HealthIssues.Conflictinginformationhasbeenpublishedconcerningtheevolutionofthyroidcancerincidence.WhileaFukushimaPrefecturalcommitteeconcludedthat“itisunlikelythatthethyroidcancersdiscovereduntilnowwerecausedbytheeffectsofradiation”,butitdidnotrule out a causal relationship. In contrast, an independent study from Okayama Universityconcluded that the incidenceof childhood thyroid cancer in Fukushimawasup to50 timeshigherthantheJapaneseaverage.Decontamination. Decontamination activities inside and outside the evacuation area inlocations,“wheredailyactivitiesoccur”throughoutFukushimaPrefecture,havebeencarriedouton80percentofthehouses,5percentoftheroadsand70percentoftheforests,accordingto government estimates. However, the efficiency of these measures remain highlyquestionable.Cost of the Accidents.The Japanese Government has not provided a comprehensive totalaccidentcostestimate.However,basedon informationprovidedbyTEPCO, thecurrentcostestimatestandsatUS$133billion,overhalfofwhichisforcompensation,withouttakingintoaccountsuchindirecteffectsasimpactsonfoodexportsandtourism.

Fukushimavs.Chernobyl

Everyindustrialaccidenthasitsownveryspecificcharacteristicsanditisoftendifficulttocomparetheirnatureandeffects.Thelargeexplosionsandsubsequent10-dayfireatinlandChernobylledtoaverydifferentreleasepatternthanthemeltdownsofthreereactorcoresatcoastalFukushima.The dispersion of radioactivity from Chernobyl led to wide-spread contamination throughoutEurope,whereasaboutfourfifthsoftheradioactivityreleasedfromFukushimaDaiichicamedownoverthePacificOcean.Radioactivityinthesoilmainlydisappearswiththephysicalhalf-livesoftheradioactive isotopes (30 years for the dominant cesium-137). Radioactive particles are greatlydilutedintheseaandmanyisotopes,includingcesium-137,arewatersoluble.Thisdoesnotmeanthatradioactivityreleasedtotheoceandoesnothaveeffects,particularlyinfishspeciesnearthecoast,butfurtherawayanyeffectsaredifficulttoidentify.

Some parameters can be compared, and some are model estimates based on calculations andassumptions:careneedstobetakenininterpretingtheirconclusions.Underpracticallyallcriteria,the Chernobyl accident appears to bemore severe than the Fukushima disaster: 7 timesmorecesium-137 and 12 timesmore iodine-131 released, 50 times larger land surface significantlycontaminated, 7–10 times higher collective doses and 12 times more clean-up workers. MorepeoplewereevacuatedinthefirstyearatFukushimathanatChernobyl.However,thenumberhastripledovertimetoabout400,000atChernobylbecausemoreandmorepeopleweredisplacedasmorehotspotswereidentified.

NuclearPowervs.RenewableEnergyDeployment

Thetransformationofthepowersectorhasacceleratedoverthepastyear.Newtechnologyandpolicydevelopmentsfavordecentralizedsystemsandrenewableenergies.TheParisAgreementonclimatechangegaveapowerfuladditionalboosttorenewableenergies.FortheParisAgreement162nationalpledgescalledIntendedNationalDeterminedContributions(INDCs)weresubmittedofwhichonly11mentionnuclearpowerintheirplansandonlysixactuallystatethattheywereproposingtoexpanditsuse(Belarus,China,India,Japan,TurkeyandUAE).Thiscompareswith144


countriesthatmentiontheuseofrenewableenergiesand111thatexplicitlymentiontargetsorplansforexpandingtheiruse.

Investment. Global investment in renewable energy reached an all-time record ofUS$286billionin2015,exceedingthe2011previouspeakby2.7percent.ChinaaloneinvestedoverUS$100billion, almost twice asmuch as in 2013. Chile andMexico enter theTop-Teninvestorsforthefirsttime,bothcountrieshavingdoubledtheirexpenditureoverthepreviousyear.AsignificantboosttorenewablesinvestmentwasalsogiveninIndia(+44percent),intheU.K.(+60percent)andintheU.S.(+21.5percent).Globalinvestmentdecisionsonnewnuclearpowerplantsremainedanorderofmagnitudebelowinvestmentsinrenewables.InstalledCapacity.In2015,the147GWofrenewablesaccountedformorethan60percentofnet additions to global power generating capacity. Wind and solar photovoltaics both sawrecordadditionsforthesecondconsecutiveyear,makingupabout77percentofallrenewablepowercapacityadded,with63GWinwindpowerand50GWofsolar,comparedtoan11GWincrease fornuclearpower.Chinacontinued theaccelerationof itswindpowerdeploymentwith31GWadded—almosttwicetheamountaddedin2013—andwithatotalof146GWwindcapacityinstalledsignificantlyexceedingits2015goalof100GW.Chinaadded14GWofsolarandovertookGermanyasthelargestsolaroperator.Chinastartedup7.6GWofnewnuclearcapacity,over68percentoftheglobalincrease.Since2000,countrieshaveadded417GWofwindenergyand229GWofsolarenergytopowergrids around the world. Taking into account the fact that 37 GW are currently in LTO,operationalnuclearcapacitymeanwhilefellby8GW.ElectricityGeneration.Brazil,China,Germany, India, Japan,Mexico, theNetherlands,SpainandtheU.K.—alistthatincludesthreeoftheworld’sfourlargesteconomies—nowallgeneratemoreelectricityfromnon-hydrorenewablesthanfromnuclearpower.In2015,annualgrowthforglobalgenerationfromsolarwasover33percent,forwindpowerover17percent,andfornuclearpower1.3percent,exclusivelyduetoChina.Compared to 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol on climate change was signed, in 2015 anadditional829TWhofwindpowerwasproducedgloballyand252TWhofsolarphotovoltaicselectricity,comparedtonuclear’sadditional178TWh.In China, as in the previous three years, in 2015, electricity production from wind alone(185TWh),exceededthat fromnuclear(161TWh).Thesamephenomenonisseen in India,wherewindpower(41TWh)outpacednuclear(35TWh)forthefourthyearinarow.OfallU.S.electricity,8percentwasgeneratedbynon-hydrorenewablesin2015,upfrom2.7percentin2007.ThefiguresfortheEuropeanUnionillustratetherapiddeclineoftheroleofnuclear:during1997–2014,windproducedanadditional303TWhandsolar109TWh,whilenuclearpowergenerationdeclinedby65TWh.

In short, the 2015 data shows that renewable energy based power generation is enjoyingcontinuous rapid growth, while nuclear power production, excluding China, is shrinkingglobally.Smallunitsizeandlowercapacityfactorsofrenewablepowerplantscontinuetobemorethancompensatedforbytheirshortleadtimes,easymanufacturabilityandinstallation,andrapidlyscalablemassproduction.Theirhighacceptancelevelandrapidlyfallingsystemcostswillfurtheracceleratetheirdevelopment.


Introduction

Theyear2016,markingthe30thanniversaryoftheChernobylcatastrophe(seetheChernobyl+30StatusReportChapter)andthe5thyearsincetheFukushimadisasterstartedunfolding(seetheFukushima+5StatusReportChapter),strangelymightgodowninhistoryastheperiodwhenthenotionofriskofnuclearpowerplantsturnedintotheperceptionofnuclearpowerplantsatrisk.Indeed, an increasing number of reactors is threatened by premature closure due to theunfavorable economic environment. Increasing operating and backfitting costs of aging powerplants,decreasingbulkmarketpricesandaggressivecompetitors.Thedevelopmentstartedoutinthe U.S., when in May 2013 Kewaunee was shut down although its operator, Dominion, hadupgradedtheplantand inFebruary2011hadobtainedanoperating licenserenewalvaliduntil2033.TworeactorsatSanOnofrefollowed,whenreplacementsteamgeneratorsturnedoutfaulty.ThenVermontYankeeshutdownattheendof2014.EarlyshutdowndecisionshavealsohitPilgrimandFitzpatrick, likely to close before the end of 2017 and2019.Utility Exelon, largest nuclearoperatorintheU.S.,hasannouncedon2June2016thatitwasretiringitsClinton(1065MW)andQuadCities(2x940MW)nuclear facilities in2017as theyhavebeen losingmoney forseveralyears.Onlydayslater,PacificGas&ElectricCo.(PG&E)inCaliforniaannouncedthattheywouldclose the two Diablo Canyon units by 2025, replacing the capacity by energy efficiency andrenewables,making the sixth largest economy in theworld (havingovertakenFrance in2016)nuclear-free.StillinthesamemonthofJune2016,theOmahaPublicPowerDistrict(OPPD)BoardvotedunanimouslytoshutdowntheFortCalhounreactorbytheendoftheyear—inthewordsonone boardmember, “simply an economic decision”.11 Nuclear Energy Institute President MarvFertel stated inMay2016 that “if thingsdon’t change,wehavesomewherebetween10and20plantsatrisk”.12

9LeMonde,“TrenteansaprèsTchernobyl,‘unaccidentnucléairemajeurnepeutêtreexclunullepart’”,(inFrench),Updated26April2016,seehttp://www.lemonde.fr/energies/article/2016/04/22/un-accident-nucleaire-majeur-ne-peut-etre-exclu-nulle-part-dans-le-monde_4907303_1653054.html?xtmc=pierre_franck_chevet&xtcr=9,accessed30June2016.10HansWanner,“UmgangmitälterwerdendenReaktoren”,SwissEnergyFoundation,aspresentedattheNuclearPhaseoutCongress,Zürich,21March2016,seewww.energiestiftung.ch/files/pdf/20160321_npc_hans_wanner.pdf,accessed30June2016.11ColeEpley,“‘SimplyanEconomicDecision’:OPPDtoCloseFortCalhounNuclearPlantbyEndof2016,”Omaha.com,17June2016,seehttp://www.omaha.com/money/simply-an-economic-decision-oppd-to-close-fort-calhoun-nuclear/article_3fe6ce02-3352-11e6-a426-a7596287dd59.html,accessed1July2016.12EENews,“NEI'sFertelsaysimminentstate,federalpolicychangescouldkeepexistingplantsopen”,17May2016,seehttp://www.eenews.net/tv/videos/2131/transcript,accessed10July2016.

Amajoraccident,likethoseofChernobylandFukushima,cannotbeexcludedanywhereintheworld,includinginEurope

Pierre-FranckChevet,PresidentFrenchNuclearSafetyAuthority

April20169

WemustnotallowpoliticalandeconomicalconsiderationstohaveanegativeimpactonthesafetyoftheSwissnuclearpowerplants

HansWanner,DirectorSwissNuclearSafetyInspectorate

March201610


“Nuclearplantsatrisk”;theexpressionhasbecomeacommonphraseinthenewsworld,notonlyintheU.S.InGermany,theGrafenrheinfeldreactorwastakenoffthegridin2015,sixmonthsearlierthanrequiredbylaw,becauserefuelingwasnotworthwhileanymore.InSweden,aftertwoyearsofworkandspendingofseveralhundredmillioneuros,upgradingwashaltedonOskarshamn-2in2015andthereactorwaspermanentlyclosed.Oskarshamn-1willfollowin2017andRinghals-1and -2will close in2020and2019 respectively.RinghalsoperatorVattenfall stated: “Sweden’snuclearpowerindustryisgoingthroughwhatisprobablythemostseriousfinancialcrisissincethefirstcommercialreactorswerebroughtintooperationinthe1970s.”13EveninAsia,nuclearplantsarecomingundereconomicpressure.ThetwoIndianunitsTarapur-1and-2arelikelytobeclosedintheshorttermbecausetheyarenotcompetitiveundercurrentmarketprices.“Wearepouringinmoneyintothereactorsratherthanmakingincomefromthem”,SekharBasu,secretaryattheDepartmentofAtomicEnergystated.14

Inadditiontotheusual,globaloverviewofstatusandtrendsinreactorbuildingandoperating,aswellasthetraditionalcomparisonbetweendeploymenttrendinthenuclearpowerandrenewableenergysectors,the2016editionoftheWorldNuclearIndustryStatusReport(WNISR)providesanassessment of the trends of the economic health of some of themajor players in the industry.SpecialchaptersaredevotedtotheaftermathoftheChernobylandFukushimadisasters.

General Overview Worldwide

The Role of Nuclear Power As of the middle of 2016, 31 countries were operating nuclear reactors for energy purposes.Nuclear power plants generated 2,441 net terawatt-hours (TWh or billion kilowatt-hours) ofelectricityin201515,a1.3percentincrease,butstilllessthanin2000and8.2percentbelowthehistoricpeaknucleargenerationin2006(seeFigure1).WithoutChina—whichincreasednuclearoutputby37.4TWh(justover30percent),morethantheworldwideincreaseof31TWh—globalnuclearpowergenerationwouldhavedecreasedin2015.

Nuclearenergy’sshareofglobalcommercialgrosselectricitygenerationremainedstableoverthepastfouryears16,butdeclinedfromapeakof17.6percentin1996to10.7percentin2015.17Over

13Vattenfall,“Wahlborg:'Thingsaretoughatthemoment'”,21December2015,seehttp://news.vattenfall.com/en/article/wahlborg-things-are-tough-nuclear-power-moment,accessed1July2016.14Bloomberg,“OldestIndianNuclearReactorsNearMumbaiMayBeShutDown”,15March2016,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-15/india-mulls-shutting-oldest-nuclear-plants-amid-mounting-costs,accessed4July2016.15Ifnototherwisenoted,allnuclearcapacityandelectricitygenerationfiguresbasedonInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA),PowerReactorInformationSystem(PRIS)onlinedatabase,seewww.iaea.org/programmes/a2/index.html.Productionfiguresarenetoftheplant’sownconsumptionunlessotherwisenoted.16+0.05percentagepointsin2015comparedto2014and+0.01percentagepointscomparedto2013.In2015,asinpreviousyears,BPappliedminorcorrectionstothe2014figure,from10.78to10.64percent.Thesedifferencesarenodoubtwithinstatisticaluncertainties.17BP,“StatisticalReviewofWorldEnergy”,June2016,seewww.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2016/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2016-full-report.pdf,accessed1July2016.


thepasttwodecades,nuclearpowerlostasmallpartofitsshareineverysingleyear,exceptfortheyears1999and2001,andprobablyinyear2015(+0.05percentagepoints),shouldthefigurebeconfirmed in thecomingyears.Themainreason for this is thestagnation in theworld'spowerconsumption (+0.9 percent, slightly below the modest increase in nuclear generation of1.3percent).

In2015,nucleargenerationincreasedin11countries(downfrom19in2014),declinedin15(upfrom9),andremainedstableinfive.18Fivecountries(China,Hungary,India,Russia,SouthKorea)achieved their greatest nuclear production in 2015, of these, China, Russia and South Koreaconnectednewreactorstothegrid.Chinastarteduparecordeightunits(seeFigure2).Onlythetwo leadingnuclearcountries in theworld, theU.S.andFrancehaveeverstartedup thatmanyreactorsinasingleyear,theU.S.in1976,1985and1987,andFrancein1981.BesidesChina,twoothercountriesincreasedtheiroutputbymorethan20percentin2015—Argentinaasitstartedupathirdreactorin2014,andMexicothatbroughtthesecondunitbackonlineafteruprating.Twocountriessawtheirnucleargenerationdropbyover20percent—Belgiumthatisstrugglingwithreactorpressurevesselissues,andSouthAfricathathassteamgeneratorissues.

Figure1:NuclearElectricityGenerationintheWorld

Sources:IAEA-PRIS,BP,MSC,201619

The“bigfive”nucleargeneratingcountries—byrank,theUnitedStates,France,Russia,ChinaandSouthKorea—generatedover70percentofallnuclearelectricityintheworldandtwocountriesalone,theU.S.andFranceaccountedforhalfofglobalnuclearproduction.

Sevencountries’nuclearpowergenerationpeaked in the1990s, among themBelgium,Canada,Japan,andtheU.K.Afurtherelevencountries’nucleargenerationpeakedbetween2001and2010including France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden. A remarkable 14 countries generated theirmaximumamountofnuclearpowerinthepastfiveyears,theseobviouslyincludenucleargrowth

18Lessthan1percentvariationfromthepreviousyear.19BPstandsforBPplc;MSCforMycleSchneiderConsulting.

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Figure2:AnnualNuclearPowerGenerationbyCountryandHistoricMaximum

Sources:IAEA-PRIS,MSC,2016

Figure3:AnnualNuclearShareinElectricityMixbyCountryandHistoricMaximum


Inmanycases,evenwherenuclearpowergenerationincreased,thedevelopmentisnotkeepingpacewithoverallincreasesinelectricityproduction,leadingtoanuclearsharebelowthehistoricmaximum(seeFigure3).

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There were three exceptions in 2015 that peaked their respective nuclear share in powergeneration:

• Chinaexceeded2014maximumof2.4percent,toreach3.0percent.The0.6percentage-pointincreasewasachievedwitha30percenthighernuclearpoweroutputin2015.

• Mexico increased its nuclear share by 1.2 percentage points to reach 6.8 percent, aftercompletingextensiveupratingofitstwonuclearreactors.

• Ukraineincreasedits2004recordby5.4percentagepointsto56.5percent.However,overallnationalpowergenerationfellby13.6percent.Sothehighersharewasachievedwithanevenslightlylower(–0.9percent)nuclearpoweroutput.

Inaddition,Russiarepeateditshistoricmaximumofthepreviousyearof18.6percent.

Operation, Power Generation, Age Distribution Since the first nuclear power reactor was connected to the Soviet power grid at Obninsk on27June1954,therehavebeentwomajorwavesofstartups.Thefirstpeakedin1974,with26gridconnectionsinthatyear.Thesecondreachedahistoricmaximumin1984and1985,justbeforetheChernobyl accident, reaching 33 grid connections in each year. By the end of the 1980s, theuninterruptednetincreaseofoperatingunitshadceased,andin1990forthefirsttimethenumberofreactorshutdownsoutweighedthenumberofstartups.The1991–2000decadeshowedfarmorestartups than shutdowns (52/29), while in the decade 2001–2010, startups did not matchshutdowns(32/35).Furthermore,after2000,ittookawholedecadetoconnectasmanyunitsasinasingleyearinthemiddleofthe1980s.Between2011and-2015,thestartupof29reactors—ofwhich18,orclosetotwothirds,inChina—didnotmakeupfortheshutdownof34unitsoverthesameperiod,largelyasaresultoftheeventsinFukushima.(SeeFigure4).

In2015,tenreactorsstartedup,morethaninanyyearsince1990.However,thisisagaintheresultofthe“ChinaEffect”,asthecountrycontributedeightoutofthetenreactorstartups(seeFigure5),whileoneeachwascommissionedinRussia(Beloyarsk-4after31yearsofconstruction)andSouthKorea(Shin-Wolsong-2after6.5yearsofconstruction).In1990,fivecountriessharedthestartups:Canada(2),France(3),Japan(2),Russia(1)andU.S.(2).

Tworeactorswereclosedin2015,GrafenrheinfeldinGermanyandWylfa-1intheUnitedKingdom.Doel-1inBelgiumwasshutdowninFebruary2015,afteritslicensehadexpired,butinJune2015,theBelgianParliament voted a 10-year lifetime extension and the reactorwas restarted on30December2015.20

The IAEA in its online database Power Reactor Information System (PRIS), in addition to theclosures in Germany and the U.K., accounts for five shutdowns in Japan. As WNISR considersshutdownsfromthemomentofgriddisconnection—andnotfromthemomentoftheindustrial,politicaloreconomicdecision—andtheunitshavenotgeneratedpowerforseveralyears,inWNISRstatistics,theyareclosedintheyearofthelatestpowergeneration.Twounitshavenotproducedanyelectricitysince2010,theotherthreeweretakenoffthegridfollowingthe3/11disaster.

20On18June2015,theBelgianParliamentvotedlegislationtoextendthelifetimeofDoel-1and-2bytenyears.AstheDoel-2licensehadnotyetexpired,itsoperationwasnotinterrupted.SeealsosectiononBelgiuminAnnex1.


Figure4:NuclearPowerReactorGridConnectionsandShutdowns,1954-2016


Figure5:NuclearPowerReactorGridConnectionsandShutdowns,1954-2016TheChinaEffect


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Inthefirsthalfof2016,threereactorsstartedupinChinaandoneeachinSouthKoreaandtheU.S.,whilenonewere shutdown.The final closureofoneadditional reactorhasbeenannounced inJapan.Thatunit,Ikata-1,hadnotgeneratedanypowersince2011.

All46reactors,exceptfortwo—Atucha-2inArgentinaandWattsBar2intheU.S.,respectively33and 43 years after construction start—that were commissioned over the past decade(2006/June2016)areinAsia(China,India,Iran,Japan,Pakistan,SouthKorea),orEasternEurope(Romania,Russia).21With25units,Chinastartedupbyfarthelargestfleet,overhalfoftheworld'stotal,followedbyIndia(6)andSouthKorea(5).

TheIAEAcontinuestocount43unitsinJapaninitstotalnumberof446reactors“inoperation”intheworld22;yetnonuclearelectricityhasbeengeneratedinJapanbetweenSeptember2013andAugust2015,andasoftheendofJune2016,onlytworeactors,Sendai-1and-2,areoperating.Athirdunit,Takahama-3,wasrestartedinOctober2015,whileTakahama-4failedgridconnectionlateFebruary2016duetotechnicalproblems.InMarch2016,bothTakahamaunitswereorderedbycourttoshutdownforsafetyreasons(seeFigure6andJapanFocussectionfordetails).

TheuniquesituationinJapanneedstobereflectedinworldnuclearstatistics.Theattitudetakenby the IAEA, the Japanese government, utilities, industry and research bodies aswell as othergovernments andorganizations to continue considering the entire stranded reactor fleet in thecountry, 10 percent of theworld total, as “in operation” or “operational” remains amisleadingdistortionoffacts.

Figure6:RiseandFalloftheJapaneseNuclearProgram1963–2016


21ThelastunitstostartupintheWesternworldwereArgentina’sAtucha-2in2014after33yearsofconstruction,Brazil’sAngra-2in2000after24years,andCivaux-2inFrancein1999after8.5years.22IAEA,“PowerReactorInformationSystem”,seehttp://www.iaea.org/pris/,accessed26June2016.

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The IAEA actually does have a reactor-status category called “Long-term Shutdown” or LTS.23UndertheIAEA’sdefinition,areactorisconsideredinLTSifithasbeenshutdownforan“extendedperiod(usuallymorethanoneyear)”andinearlyperiodofshutdowneitherrestartisnotbeing“aggressively pursued” or “no firm restart date or recovery schedule has been established”. AsillustratedinWNISR2013,onecouldarguethatallbuttwoJapanesereactorsfitthecategorythatyear.24

The IAEA criteria are vague and hence subject to arbitrary interpretation. What exactly areextendedperiods?Whatisaggressivelypursuing?Whatisafirmrestartdateorrecoveryschedule?Facedwiththisdilemma,theWNISRteamin2014decidedtocreateanewcategorywithasimpledefinition,basedonempiricalfact,withoutroomforspeculation:“Long-termOutage”orLTO.Itsdefinition:

AnuclearreactorisconsideredinLong-termOutageorLTOifithasnotgeneratedanyelectricityintheprevious calendar year and in the first half of the current calendar year. It iswithdrawn fromoperationalstatusretroactivelyfromthedayithasbeendisconnectedfromthegrid.

Whensubsequentlythedecisionistakentopermanentlycloseareactor,theshutdownstatusstartswith day of the last electricity generation, and theWNISR statistics aremodified retroactivelyaccordingly.

TatsujiroSuzuki,formerVice-ChairmanoftheJapanAtomicEnergyCommission(JAEC)hascalledtheestablishmentoftheLTOcategoryan“importantinnovation”witha“veryclearandempiricaldefinition”.25

Applyingthisdefinitiontotheworldnuclearreactorfleetleadstoconsidering36JapaneseunitsinLTO,asWNISRconsidersalltenFukushimareactorsshutdownpermanently—whiletheoperatorTokyoElectricPowerCompany(TEPCO)haswrittenoffthesixDaiichiunits,itkeepsthefourDainireactorsinthelistofoperationalfacilities.Annex2providesadetailedoverviewofthestatusoftheJapanesereactorfleet.Inaddition,theIAEAclassifiesasLTSthefastbreederreactorMonju,26becauseitwasshutdownafterasodiumfirein1995andhasnevergeneratedpowersince.ItalsomeetsWNISR’sLTOcriterion.

BesidestheJapanesereactors,theSwedishreactorRinghals-2andtheTaiwaneseunitChinshan-1fallintotheLTOcategory.ThetotalnumberofnuclearreactorsinLTOasof1July2016istherefore38;yetallbutone(Monju)areconsideredbytheIAEAas“inoperation”.

As of 1 July 2016, a total of 402 nuclear reactors are operating in 31 countries, up 11 units(+2.8percent)fromthesituationinJuly2015.Thisisaconsiderableincreasecomparedtopreviousyearsduetoconstructionstartslaunchedpriortothe3/11disasterandreactorrestartsinJapan.Since2012,whentheworld’sreactorfleethaddroppedtoitslowestlevelinthepast30years,thisisacumulatednetincreaseof19units.

23SeeIAEAGlossary,atwww.iaea.org/pris/Glossary.aspx,accessed1July2016.24FortwodaysinJanuary2013,theIAEAmoved47unitstotheLTScategoryontheIAEA-PRISwebsite,beforethatactionwasabruptlyreversedandascribedtoclericalerror.SeedetailedaccountsontheWNISRwebsite,www.WorldNuclearReport.org.25TatsujiroSuzuki,“Foreword”,WNISR2014,18August2014,seehttp://www.worldnuclearreport.org/WNISR2014.html#_Toc268768687,accessed1July2016.26TheIAEAalsoconsiderstheSpanishreactorGaroñainLTS,whileWNISRconsidersitshutdownpermanently.


Thecurrentworldfleethasatotalnominalelectricnetcapacityof348gigawatts(GWorthousandmegawatts),upfrom337GW(+3.3percent)oneyearearlier(seeFigure7).

Figure7:WorldNuclearReactorFleet,1954–2016


Formanyyears,thenetinstalledcapacityhascontinuedtoincreasemorethanthenetincreaseofnumbersofoperatingreactors.Thiswasaresultofthecombinedeffectsoflargerunitsreplacingsmalleronesand,mainly,technicalalterationsatexistingplants,aprocessknownasuprating.27IntheUnitedStates,theNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)hasapproved156upratessince1977.ThecumulativeapprovedupratesintheUnitedStatestotal7.3GW.28Onlyforonesite,thethreeunits at Browns Ferry, uprate approval request (for 14.3 percent) has been issued in 2015.Completionisexpectedin2017.29

AsimilartrendofupratesandmajoroverhaulsinviewoflifetimeextensionsofexistingreactorshasbeenseeninEurope.Themainincentiveforlifetimeextensionsistheirconsiderableeconomicadvantageovernew-build.

Theuseofnuclearenergyremainslimitedtoasmallnumberofcountries,withonly31countries,or16percentof the193membersof theUnitedNations, operatingnuclearpowerplants asofJuly2016(seeFigure2).Closetohalfoftheworld’snuclearcountriesarelocatedintheEuropean

27Increasingthecapacityofnuclearreactorsbyequipmentupgradese.g.morepowerfulsteamgeneratorsorturbines.28NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC),“ApprovedApplicationsforPowerUprates”,Updated26August2014,seewww.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/power-uprates/status-power-apps/approved-applications.html,accessed10June2015.29NRC,“PendingApplicationsforPowerUprates”,Updated24May2016,seehttp://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/power-uprates/status-power-apps/pending-applications.html,accessed1June2016.

438 reactors 348 GWe402 reactors

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Union(EU),andin2015theyaccountedforexactlyonethird(down1.2percentagepoints)oftheworld’sgrossnuclearproduction,30withhalfthatEUgenerationinFrance.

Overview of Current New Build AsofthemiddleofJuly2016,58reactorsareconsideredhereasunderconstruction,fourfewerthanWNISRreportedayearago,andninelessthaninmid-2014.Almost80percentofallnew-buildunits(46)areinAsiaandEasternEurope,ofwhich21inChinaalone.

Eightbuildingsiteswerelaunchedin2015,sixinChina,aswellasoneeachinPakistan,andUnitedArabEmirates(UAE).

Figure8:NuclearReactorsUnderConstruction

Sources:IAEA-PRIS,MSC2016

WNISR2016appliestwochangesoverpreviouseditions.First,tworeactors—OhmaandShimane-3—arereintegratedas“underconstruction”inJapan,asreportedlythereis“some”constructionactivityongoing,eventhoughthereisnoplannedofficialstartupdate(foradetaileddiscussionseeAnnex1,JapanFocus,New-build).Second,thetwoprojectsinUkraine—Khmelnitsky-3and-4—are taken off the list, as apparently no construction has been ongoing formany years and theprospects for completion have been further delayed with the cancellation of the Russianconstructioncontract(seeAnnex1,Ukraine).

Thenumberofactivebuildingsiteshasbeenshrinkingfrom67in2013to58inmid-2016.Anditis relatively small compared to a peak of 234 units—totaling more than 200 GW—in 1979.

30BP,“StatisticalReviewofWorldEnergy”,June2015.BPcorrectedthe2013valuefrom35.7percentto35.2percent.

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However,manyof thoseprojects (48)werenever finished (seeFigure8). The year2005,with26 units under construction, marked a record low since the early nuclear age in the 1950s.Comparedtothesituationdescribedayearago,thetotalcapacityofunitsnowunderconstructionintheworlddroppedagainslightly,by0.6GWto56.6GW,withanaverageunitsizeof976MW(seeAnnex9fordetails).

Table1:NuclearReactors“UnderConstruction”(asof1July2016)31

Country Units MW(nets) ConstructionStarts GridConnections DelayedUnits

China 21 21500 2009-2015 2016-2021 11

Russia 7 5473 1983-2010 2016-2019 7

India 6 3907 2002-2011 2016-2019 6

USA 4 4468 2013 2019-2020 4

UAE 4 5380 2012-2015 2017-2020

Pakistan 3 1644 2011-2015 2016-2021

Korea 3 4020 2009-2013 2017-2019 3

Slovakia 2 880 1985 2017-2018 2

Japan 2 2650 2007-2010 ? 2

Belarus 2 2218 2013-2014 2018-2020

France 1 1600 2007 2018 1

Argentina 1 25 2014 2018

Finland 1 1600 2005 2018 1

Brazil 1 1245 2010 2019 1

Total 58 56610 1983-2015 2016-2021 38


31ForfurtherdetailsseeAnnex9.


Construction Times

Construction Times of Reactors Currently Under Construction Acloserlookatprojectscurrentlylistedas“underconstruction”illustratesthelevelofuncertaintyand problems associated with many of these projects, especially given that most constructorsassumeafive-yearconstructionperiod:

• Asof1 July2016, the58 reactors currentlybeingbuilthavebeenunder construction foranaverageof6.2years.Withfourreactorsthathadconstructionofover30yearstakenoffthelist—twostartedup,twohavenoactiveconstruction—andsixnewconstructionstartsovertheyear,theaverageconstructiontimehascomedownsignificantlyfrom7.7yearsasofmid-2015.

• All reactors under construction in 9 out of 14 countries have experiencedmostly year-longdelays.Atleastabouttwothirds(38)ofallbuildingsitesaredelayed.Mostofthe20remainingunitsunderconstructionintheworld,ofwhichelevenareinChina,werebegunwithinthepastthreeyearsorhavenotyetreachedprojectedstart-updates,makingitdifficulttoassesswhetherornottheyareonschedule.UncertaintyremainsovertwoPakistanireactors.

• Threereactorshavebeenlistedas“underconstruction”formorethan30years,Mochovce-3and-4inSlovakia,andRostov-4inRussia.TheU.S.unitWattsBar-2,43yearsafterconstructionstart,wasfinallyconnectedtothegridon3June2016,butautomaticallyshutdowntwiceinthefirstthreeweeks.ConsideringincreasinguncertaintyovertherestartofconstructionworksattheRussianprojectsKhmelnitski-3and-4inUkraine,WNISRhaspulledtheunitsoffthelist,threedecadesafterconstructionstart.

• Threereactorshavebeenlistedas“underconstruction”formorethanadecade,twounitsinIndia,Kudankulam-2 and the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), have been listed as “underconstruction”for14and12yearsrespectively,andtheOlkiluoto-3reactorproject inFinlandreacheditstenthanniversaryinAugust2015.

Theactual leadtime fornuclearplantprojects includesnotonly theconstruction itselfbutalsolengthy licensing procedures in most countries, complex financing negotiations, and sitepreparation.

Construction Times of Past and Currently Operating Reactors There has been a clear global trend towards increasing construction times. National buildingprogramswerefasterintheearlyyearsofnuclearpower.AsFigure9illustrates,constructiontimesof reactors completed in the 1970s and 1980swere quite homogenous, while in the past twodecadestheyhavevariedwidely.

Averageconstructiontimeofthe10unitsthatstartedupin2015—eightChinese,oneKoreanandoneRussian that tookalmost31years to complete—was8.2years,while it tookanaverageof6.2yearstoconnectfourunits—threeChineseandoneSouthKorean—tothegridinthefirsthalfof2016,13.7yearswhenincludingtheveteranWatts-Bar-2.


Table2:ReactorConstructionTimes2006–2016

ConstructionTimes(inyears)–StartupsBetween2006andJuly2016

Country Units MeanTime Min Max

China 25 5.7 4.3 11.2

India 6 7.7 5.0 11.6

SouthKorea 5 5.3 4.0 7.2

Russia 4 28.8 25.3 32.0

Argentina 1 33.0 33.0 33.0

Iran 1 36.3 36.3 36.3

Japan 1 5.1 5.1 5.1

Pakistan 1 5.2 5.2 5.2

Romania 1 24.1 24.1 24.1

USA 1 43.5 43.5 43.5

Total 46 10.4 4 43.5


Figure9:AverageAnnualConstructionTimesintheWorld1954–1July2016

Sources:MSCbasedonIAEA-PRIS,2016

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Construction Starts and Cancellations Thenumberofannualconstructionstarts32intheworldpeakedin1976at44,ofwhich11projectswerelaterabandoned.In2010,therewere15constructionstarts—including10inChinaalone—the highest level since 1985 (see Figure 10 and Figure 11). However, in 2014, the level haddropped to three units and China did not launch a single new project. Between 2012 and1July2016,firstconcretewaspouredfor28newplantsworldwide—lessthaninasingleyearinthe1970s.Overthedecade2006–2015,constructionbeganfor79reactors(ofwhichonehasbeencancelled),thatismorethantwiceasmanyasinthedecade1996–2005,whenworksstartedat33units(ofwhichthreehavebeenabandoned).However,morethanhalf(43)oftheseunitsareinChinaalone,andeventheincreasedorderrateremainsmuchtoolowtomakeupforupcomingreactorclosures.

Figure10:ConstructionStartsintheWorld1951–1July2016


Inaddition,pastexperienceshowsthatsimplyhavinganorder forareactor,orevenhavinganuclearplantatanadvancedstageofconstruction,isnoguaranteeofultimategridconnectionandpowerproduction.FrenchAtomicEnergyCommission(CEA)statisticsthrough2002indicate253“cancelledorders”in31countries,manyofthematanadvancedconstructionstage(seealsoFigure12).TheUnitedStatesaloneaccountedfor138oftheseordercancellations.33

32Generally,areactorisconsideredunderconstruction,whenthebaseslabofthereactorbuildingisbeingconcreted.Sitepreparationworkandexcavationarenotincluded.33FrenchAtomicEnergyCommission(CEA),“Elecnuc–NuclearPowerPlantsintheWorld”,2002.Thesection“cancelledorders”hasdisappearedafterthe2002edition.

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Figure12:92CancelledorSuspendedReactorConstructions1977–July2016


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Of the 754 reactor constructions launched since 1951, at least 92 units (12.2 percent) in17countrieshavebeenabandoned,ofwhich87,accordingtotheIAEA,between1977and2012—noearlier or later IAEAdata available—at various stages after theyhad reached constructionstatus.

Overthree-quarters(71)ofthecancellationshappenedduringa12-yearperiodbetween1982and1993,11weredecidedpriortothisperiod,andonly10overthe20-yearperiodbetween1993and2012.

Close to three quarters (67 units) of all cancelled projectswere in four countries alone—theU.S. (40),Russia (15),GermanyandUkraine (six each). Someunitswereactually100percentcompleted—includingKalkarinGermanyandZwentendorfinAustria—beforethedecisionwastakennottooperatethem.

Thereisnothoroughanalysisofthecumulatedeconomiclossofthesefailedinvestments.

Operating Age Intheabsenceofanysignificantnew-buildandgridconnectionovermanyyears,theaverageage(fromgridconnection)ofoperatingnuclearpowerplantshasbeenincreasingsteadilyandatmid-2016standsat29years,upfrom28.8ayearago(seeFigure13andFigure14).34Somenuclearutilitiesenvisageaveragereactorlifetimesofbeyond40yearsupto60andeven80years.IntheUnitedStates, reactorsare initially licensedtooperate for40years,butnuclearoperatorscanrequestalicenserenewalforanadditional20yearsfromtheNRC.

As of June 2016, 81 of the 100 operatingU.S. units have received an extension,with another12 applications under NRC review. Since WNISR2015, seven license renewals (Davis-Besse,Sequoyah1-2,Braidwood1-2,Byron1-2)havebeengrantedandanadditionaloneappliedfor(Waterford3).35

Manyother countries haveno specific time limits on operating licenses. In France,where thecountry’s first operating PressurizedWater Reactor (PWR) started up in 1977, reactorsmustundergo in-depth inspection and testing everydecade against reinforced safety requirements.TheFrench reactorshaveoperated for31.4yearsonaverage, and theoldesthave started theprocesswiththeFrenchNuclearSafetyAuthority(ASN)evaluatingeachreactorbeforeallowingaunit tooperate formorethan30years.Only fewgothavepassedtheprocedureyetandtheassessmentsareyearsbehindschedule.Theycouldthenoperateuntiltheyreach40years,whichisthelimitoftheir initialdesignage.TheFrenchutilityÉlectricitédeFrance(EDF)hasclearlystatedthat,foreconomicreasons,itplanstoprioritizelifetimeextensionbeyond40yearsover

34WNISRcalculatesreactoragefromgridconnectiontofinaldisconnectionfromthegrid.InWNISRstatistics,“startup”issynonymouswithgridconnectionand“shutdown”withwithdrawalfromthegrid.InpreviouseditionsoftheWNISR,thereactoragewasautomaticallyroundedtotheyear.Inordertohaveabetterimageofthefleetandeasecalculations,theageofareactorisconsideredtobe1betweenthefirstandsecondgridconnectionanniversaries.Forsomecalculations,wealsouseoperatingyears:thereactorisinitsfirstoperatingyearuntilthefirstgridconnectionanniversary,whenitentersthesecondoperatingyear.35NRC,“StatusofLicenseRenewalApplicationsandIndustryActivities”,Updated14April2016,seehttp://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html,accessed1July2016.


large-scalenew-build.HavingassessedEDF’slifetimeextensionprojects,ASNChairmanPierre-FranckChevetstatedduringthepresentationoftheAnnualReport2015:

Thecontinuedoperationofthenuclearpowerplantsbeyond40yearscannotbetakenforgranted.Theoperating conditions for thenuclearpowerplantsbeyond40years is still a subjectof someconsiderabledebate.36

Figure13:AgeDistributionofOperatingNuclearPowerReactors


However,onlyoneofthe33unitsthathavebeenshutdownintheU.S.hadreached40yearsonthegrid—VermontYankee,thelatestonetobeclosed,inDecember2014,attheageof42.Inotherwords,atleastaquarterofthereactorsconnectedtothegridintheU.S.neverreachedtheirinitialdesignlifetime.Ontheotherhand,ofthe100currentlyoperatingplants,37unitshaveoperatedformorethan40years.Inotherwords,46percentoftheunitswithlicenserenewalshavealreadyenteredthelifeextensionperiod,andthatshareisgrowingrapidlywiththemid-2016averageageoftheU.S.operationalfleetstandingat36.2years(seeUnitedStatesFocus).

IfASNgavethego-aheadforalloftheoldestunitstooperatefor40years,22ofthe58Frenchoperatingreactorswouldreachthatagealreadyby2020.

In assessing the likelihood of reactors being able to operate for up to 60 years, it is useful tocomparetheagedistributionofreactorsthatarecurrentlyoperatingwiththosethathavealreadyshutdown(seeFigure13andFigure15).Asofmid-2016,59oftheworld’sreactorshaveoperated

36ASN,“Thenuclearsafetyandradiationprotectionsituationisofmajorconcern.ASNisremainingvigilant”,PressRelease,22January2016,seehttp://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Information/News-releases/The-nuclear-safety-and-radiation-protection-situation-is-of-major-concern,accessed1July2016.

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for41yearsandmore.37Astheagepyramidillustrates,thatnumbercouldrapidlyincreaseoverthenextfewyears.Atotalof215unitshavealreadyexceededage30.

Figure14:AgeDistributionofOperatingReactorsintheWorld


Theagestructureofthe164unitsalreadyshutdowncompletesthepicture.Intotal,56oftheseunitsoperatedfor30yearsandmore,andofthose,22reactorsoperatedfor40yearsandmore(see Figure 15). Many units of the first generation designs only operated for a few years.Consideringthattheaverageageofthe164unitsthathavealreadyshutdownisabout25years,plans to extend theoperational lifetimeof largenumbersofunits to40years and farbeyondseemsratheroptimistic.Theoperatingtimepriortoshutdownhasclearlyincreasedcontinuously,asFigure16shows.Butwhiletheaverageannualageatshutdowngotcloseto40years,itonlypassedthatageonce:in2014,whentheonlysuchunitshutdownthatyear(VermontYankeeintheU.S.)after42yearsofoperation.

AsaresultoftheFukushimanucleardisaster,morepressingquestionshavebeenraisedaboutthewisdomofoperatingolderreactors.TheFukushimaDaiichiunits(1to4)wereconnectedtothegridbetween1971and1974.Thelicenseforunit1hadbeenextendedforanother10yearsinFebruary2011,amonthbeforethecatastrophebegan.FourdaysaftertheaccidentsinJapan,theGermangovernmentorderedtheshutdownofsevenreactorsthathadstartedupbefore1981.Thesereactors,togetherwithanotherunitthatwasclosedatthetime,neverrestarted.Thesoleselectioncriterionwasoperationalage.Othercountriesdidnotadoptthesameapproach,butitisclearthatthe3/11eventshadanimpactonpreviouslyassumedextendedlifetimesinothercountriesaswell,includinginBelgium,Switzerland,andTaiwan.

37WNISRconsiderstheagestartingwithgridconnection,andwhilefiguresusedtoberoundedbyhalf-years,asofWNISR2016theyareroundedbythetenthoftheyear.


Figure15:AgeDistributionof164ShutDownNuclearPowerReactors


Figure16:AverageAgeProfileofShutDownNuclearPowerReactors


Lifetime Projections Manycountriescontinuetoimplementorprepareforlifetimeextensions.Asinpreviousyears,WNISR has therefore created two lifetime projections. A first scenario (40-Year LifetimeProjection, see Figure 17), assumes a general lifetime of 40 years for worldwide operatingreactors(notincludingreactorsinLTO,astheyarenotconsideredoperating).Forthe59reactors

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thathavepassedthe40-yearlifetime,weassumetheywilloperatetotheendoftheirlicensedoperatingtime.Asecondscenario(PlantLifeExtensionorPLEXProjection,seeFigure18)takesintoaccountallalready-authorizedlifetimeextensions.

The lifetimeprojectionsallowforanevaluationof thenumberofplantsandrespectivepowergeneratingcapacitythatwouldhavetocomeonlineoverthenextdecadestooffsetclosuresandsimplymaintain the samenumberof operatingplants and capacity.Evenwithall unitsunderconstructionassumedtohavegoneonlineby2021,aninstallationrateofabout10.5peryear—installednuclearcapacitywoulddropby1.7GWby2020,whichismarginal.However,intotal,22additionalreactors(comparedtotheendof2015status)wouldhavetobeordered,builtandstarteduppriortotheendof2020inordertomaintainthestatusquoofthenumberofoperatingunits.Thiscorrespondstoaboutfouradditionalgridconnectionsperyearandwouldraisetheannualstartupstoabout15.Thisinstallationratewouldbethreetimesashighastheactual46gridconnectionsoverthedecade2006–July2016.Infact,consideringeventhelowestaverageconstructiontimes,17ofthese22units(5havecomeon-lineinthefirsthalfof2016)wouldhavetobelaunchedoverthecomingyearandbecompletedwithoutdelay.

Figure17:The40-YearLifetimeProjection(notincludingLTOs)

Sources:IAEA-PRIS,WNA,varioussourcescompiledbyMSC2016

Inthefollowingdecadeto2030,187newreactors(175GW)wouldhavetobeconnectedtothegridtomaintainthestatusquo,fourtimestherateachievedoverthepastdecade.

The achievement of the 2020 targetswillmainly depend on the number of Japanese reactorscurrently in LTO possibly coming back on line and the development pattern of the Chineseconstruction program. Any major achievements outside these two countries in the given

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Net Balance

2016-20-22 reactors -1,743 GW

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- 87 GW

2031-2040-67 reactors

- 56 GW

2041-2050-28 reactors

- 22 GW


timeframearehighlyunlikelygiventheexistingdifficultfinancialsituationoftheworld’smainreactor builders and utilities, the general economic environment, the decline of powerconsumptioninmanycountries,widespreadskepticisminthefinancialcommunity,andgenerallyhostilepublicopinion—asidefromanyotherspecificpost-Fukushimaeffects.

Figure18:ThePLEXProjection(notincludingLTOs)

Sources:IAEA-PRIS,WNA,varioussourcescompiledbyMSC2016

Figure19:Forty-YearLifetimeProjectionversusPLEXProjection

Sources:IAEA-PRIS,US-NRC,MSC2016

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Reactors Added - Shut-down

Capacity Added - Shut-down

2021-2030-163 reactors - 144,5 GW

©Mycle

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2051-2061-92 reactors

- 87 GW

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Asaresult,thenumberofreactorsinoperationwillstagnateatbestbutwillmorelikelydeclineover the coming years unless lifetime extensions beyond 40 years becomewidespread. Suchgeneralizedlifetimeextensionsare,however,evenlesslikelyafterFukushima.

Also, soaringmaintenance andupgrading costs, aswell as decreasing system costs of nuclearpower’s main competitors, create an economic environment with sharply decreasing bulkelectricitypricesthatleadstothesituationofanincreasingnumberofnuclearplants“atrisk”ofearlyclosures,notablyintheU.S.,SwedenandGermany,asdiscussedbelow.

DevelopmentsinAsia,andparticularlyinChina,donotfundamentallychangetheglobalpicture.ReportedfiguresforChina’s2020targetforinstallednuclearcapacityhavefluctuatedbetween40GWand120GWinthepast.ThefreezeofconstructioninitiationforalmosttwoyearsandnewsitingauthorizationsforfouryearshasreducedChineseambitions.

Inaddition,theaverageconstructiontimeforthe25unitsstartedupinChinaoverthepastdecadewas5.7years.Atpresent,21unitswithabout21.5GWareunderconstructionandscheduledtobeconnectedby2020,whichwouldbringthetotalto51GW,farshortofthecurrent58GWtarget(seeChinaFocus).Thecontinuingcontroversyaboutwhethernewreactorsshouldbeallowednotonly at coastal but also inland sites, is restricting the number of suitable sites immediatelyavailable.

Asusual,wehavealsomodeledascenarioinwhichallcurrentlylicensedlifetimeextensionsandlicense renewals (mainly in the United States) are maintained and all construction sites arecompleted.Forallotherunitswehavemaintaineda40-year lifetimeprojection,unlessa firmearlierorlatershutdowndatehasbeenannounced.By2020,thenetnumberofoperatingreactorswouldhaveincreasedbyonlytwo(downfromanincreaseofeightintheWNISR2014projection)and the installed capacity would grow by 17 GW (down from an increase of 25 GW in theWNISR2014projection).Thisdecline reflects the recentearly closureannouncementsofunitsthat,foreconomicreasons,willnotoperateuptotheendoftheirlicensedoperationallifetime.Acontinuationofthistrendcanbeexpectedoverthecomingyears.

In the followingdecade to2030, still 163newreactors (144.5GW)wouldhave to startup toreplaceshutdowns.Inotherwords,theoverallpatternofdeclinewouldhardlybealtered:itwouldmerelybedelayedbysomeyears(seeFigure17,Figure18andthecumulatedeffectinFigure19).

Potential Newcomer Countries AttimeofthesigningoftheKyotoProtocol,in1997,theinstalledcapacityofnuclearpowerintheworldwas344GW,andbythetimeofthesigningoftheParisagreement,attheendof2015,thishadrisento378GW(including35.5inLTO).Thisequatestoa10percentincreaseincapacitywith an associated increase in electricity production of 178TWh per year, an approximately8percentincreaseinoutput.However,duetorisingglobaldemandoverthesametimeperiodnuclearcontributiontoglobalcommercialelectricitygenerationhasfallenfrom17.5percenttobelow11percent.Therefore,despitethepromotionofnuclearpowerasatechnologytoaddressclimatechangeoverthepasttwodecadesitscontributionisdiminishing.

If nuclear is to make a difference on the global level, it will need to revise this trend andsignificantly increase its production both within its current markets and expand into newcountries.


The IAEA says that, “seven countries have moved forward in actively developing nuclearprogramsandtwocountries(BelarusandtheUnitedArabEmirates(UAE))havealreadystartedconstructingtheirfirstNPP[NuclearPowerPlant].”38ThesourceofthisstatementisnotoriginalIAEAresearch,buttheWorldNuclearAssociation(WNA),whoseaimistopromoteandrepresentthenuclearindustry.WNAplacesthesevencountriescitedbytheIAEAintwocategories39:

• Contracts signed, legal and regulatory infrastructure well-developed or developing:Bangladesh,Lithuania,TurkeyandVietnam;

• Committedplans,legalandregulatoryinfrastructuredeveloping:Jordan,PolandandEgypt.

WNA,alsoclaimsthatthereareanadditional11countries inwhichnuclearpowerisplanned,which includes, thosewith “well-developedplans”, Chile, Indonesia,Kazakhstan,ThailandandSaudiArabiaandthose“developingplans”including,Israel,Kenya,Laos,Malaysia,Morocco,andNigeria.Theyfurtherlistanother20countriesinwhichnuclearisa“seriouspolicyoption”.40Thefollowingsectionreviewsthedevelopmentofnuclearpower in thosecountries inwhichWNAbelieves that there are at least “well-developed plans” for new nuclear. Table 3 provides anoverviewpercategoryandcountry.

Under Construction Construction started inNovember2013atBelarus’s firstnuclear reactor at theOstrovetspower plant, also called Belarusian-1. Construction of a second 1200MWe AES-2006 reactorstartedinJune2014.InNovember2011,thetwogovernmentsagreedthatRussiawouldlenduptoUS$10billionfor25yearstofinance90percentofthecontractbetweenAtomstroyexportandthe Belarus Directorate for Nuclear Power Plant Construction. In July 2012, the contractwassignedfortheconstructionofthetworeactorsforanestimatedcostofUS$10billion,includingUS$3 billion for new infrastructure to accommodate the remoteness of Ostrovets in northernBelarus.41Theprojectassumesthesupplyofallfuelandrepatriationofspentfuelforthelifeoftheplant.ThefuelistobereprocessedandtheseparatedwastesreturnedtoBelarus.InAugust2011,theMinistryofNaturalResourcesandEnvironmentalProtectionofBelarusstatedthatthefirstunitwouldbecommissionedin2016andthesecondonein2018.42However,thesedateswererevised,andwhenconstructionstarted,itwasstatedthatthereactorswillnotbecompleteduntil2018and2020.43InMay2016,thestartupmonthswerereportedasNovember2018and

38IAEA,“ClimateChangeandNuclearPower2015”,Vienna,September2015,seewww-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/CCANP2015Web-78834554.pdf,accessed1July2016.39WNA,“EmergingNuclearEnergyCountries”,UpdatedFebruary2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx,accessed1April2016.40Namibia,Mongolia,Philippines,Singapore,Albania,Serbia,Croatia,Estonia&Latvia,Libya,Algeria,Kuwait,Azerbaijan,SriLanka,Tunisia,Syria,Qatar,Sudan,Venezuela,Bolivia,Peru.41NIW,“Belarus,AidedbyRussiaandBroke,Europe’sLastDictatorshipProceedsWithNPP”,28September2012.42V.V.Kulik,“LettertotheEuropeanCommission”,DeputyMinister,MinistryofNaturalResourcesandEnvironmentalProtectionoftheRepublicofBelarus,dated9August2011.43WNN,“Ostrovetsplantmeetsconstructionsafetyrules”,WorldNuclearNews,7November2014,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Ostrovets-plant-meets-construction-safety-rules-07111401.html,accessed1July2016.


July2020 respectively.44AsofApril 2016, the twounitswere saidbydeputy energyministerMikhailMikhadyuktobe38percentcomplete.45

In March 2015, Atomstroyexport admitted the plant would cost over 1,400 billion roublescomparedtotheforecastfrom2014of840billionRubles.However,thefallingpriceoftheroubleagainstthedollarwillsignificantlyaffectthedollarpriceoftheproject.

Theprojectisthefocusofinternationaloppositionandcriticism,withformalcomplaintsfromtheLithuanian government.46 Belarus has been found to be in non-compliance with some of itsobligationsconcerningtheconstructionoftheplant,accordingtothemeetingofthePartiesoftheEspooConvention.47TheextentofinternationaloppositiontotheprojectwasreportedinNuclearIntelligenceWeekly,whereitsaidthatduringtheIAEA’sgeneralconference,“aslickpresentationfrom themajor government players in the Belarussian nuclear program did little to impressinternationalexpertsanddiplomats.”48ThetradejournalalsoreporteddomesticcriticismoftheprojectonthegroundsofthesigningofcontractswithaRussiancompanyofpoorreputationandthatnodetailedeconomicjustificationoftheplanthadbeenpresented.

WhileBelarusiscurrentlyanetimporterofelectricity—in2015itreceived3.6TWhfromRussiaandUkraine,afallfrom3.8TWhthepreviousyear.49Whengenerating,bothnuclearunitscouldproduceatleastdoublethisamount,sodomesticpowerplantswillhavetobeclosed,oroutputrestricted,orconsumptionorpowerexportsincreased.Thislatteroption,whichwouldalsobringimportantrevenuetoBelarus,maynotbepossibleastheLithuanianGovernmentisseekingtobanelectricityimportsfromtheBelarusnuclearpowerplantduetoitssafetyconcernsoverthereactor.

IntheUnitedArabEmirates(UAE),constructionisongoingattheBarakahnuclearproject,300kmwestofAbuDhabi,wheretherearefourreactorsunderconstruction.AtthetimeofthecontractsigninginDecember2009,withKoreanElectricPowerCorp.,theEmiratesNuclearEnergyCorp(ENEC),saidthat“thecontractfortheconstruction,commissioningandfuelloads

44WNN,“ReactorvesselassemblycompletedforsecondBelarusianunit”,26May2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Reactor-vessel-assembly-completed-for-second-Belarusian-unit-26051601.html,accessed1July2016.45NEI,“ProgresscontinuesatBelarusNPP”,20April2016,seehttp://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsprogress-continues-at-belarus-npp-4870105/,accessed1July2016.46Bloomberg,“LithuaniaUrgesBelarustoHaltNuclearProjectonSafetyIssues”,20August2013,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-20/lithuania-urges-belarus-to-halt-nuclear-project-on-safety-issues.html,accessed1July2016.47UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforEurope(UNECE),“PartiestoUNECEtreatiesadoptdeclarationonapplyingenvironmentalassessmentprocedurestonuclearenergyissues”,PressRelease,13June2014.48NIW,“Belarus—AchilledReceptioninVienna”,27September2014.49BelarusNews,“Belarus'electricityimportdownby26.3%to2.8bnkWhin2015”,27January2016,seehttp://eng.belta.by/economics/view/belarus-electricity-import-down-by-263-to-28bn-kwh-in-2015-88511-2016/,accessed1July2016.


forfourunitsequaledapproximatelyUS$20billion,withahighpercentageofthecontractbeingofferedunderafixed-pricearrangement”.50

TheoriginalfinancingplanfortheprojectwasthoughttoincludeUS$10billionfromtheExport-Import Bank of Korea, US$2 billion from the Ex-Im Bank of the U.S., US$6 billion from thegovernmentofAbuDhabi,andUS$2billionfromcommercialbanks.51However,itisunclearwhatother financing sourceshavebeenused for theproject, and it is reported that the cost of theprojecthasrisensignificantly,withthetotalcostoftheplantincludinginfrastructureandfinancenowexpectedtobeaboutUS$32billion,52withothersputtingthecostofthecontractsatUS$40billion, including fuelmanagement andoperation,53 although little independent information isavailable.

InJuly2010,asite-preparationlicenseandalimitedconstructionlicenseweregrantedforfourreactors at Barakah, 53 kilometers from Ruwais.54 A tentative schedule published in lateDecember2010, andnotpublicly altered since, suggests thatBarakah-1will start commercialoperation inMay 2017with unit 2 operating from 2018, unit 3 in 2019, and unit 4 in 2020.ConstructionofBarakah-1officiallystartedon19July2012,ofBarakah-2on28May2013,onBarakah-3on24September2014andunit4on30July2015.55InMay2016,ENECstatedthatBarakah-1isabout87percentcomplete,unit2isat68percent,unit3at47percentandunit4at29percent.56

Allofficialsourcesindicatethattheunit1willbecompletedandstartoperatingnextyear.Ifthisoccurs,itwillbearemarkableachievementforacountrytocompletetheirfirstnewcommercialscale nuclear reactor on time although the extent of conformity with the existing budget isunknown.Noindependentassessmentofquality-controlconditions—akeydriverofconstructiondelaysinmostcountries—isavailable.

50ENEC,“UAESelectsKoreaElectricPowerCorp,asPrimeTeamasPrimeContractorforPeacefulNuclearPower”,27December2009,seehttp://www.enec.gov.ae/media-centre/news/content/uae-selects-korea-electric-power-corp.-as-prime-team-as-prime-contractor-fo,accessed1July2016.51Sang-BaikKim,Jan-HorstKeppler,“CaseStudiesOnFinancingAndElectricityPriceArrangements—TheBarakahNuclearPowerPlants,TheUnitedArabEmirates”,OrganizationforEconomicDevelopmentandCo-operation(OECD),NuclearEnergyAgency(NEA),NuclearDevelopmentDivision,OECDNEAWorkshoponElectricityPricesandNuclearNewBuild,Paris,19September2013,seehttp://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/workshops/wpne/presentations/docs/4_2_KIM_%20Barakah%20presentation.pdf,accessed29March2016.52WNA,“NuclearPowerintheUnitedArabEmirates”,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/United-Arab-Emirates/,accessed29March2016.53BusinessKorea,“NuclearPowerKoreaBuildsNuclearReactorinUnitedArabEmirates”,20May2014,seehttp://www.businesskorea.co.kr/article/4728/nuclear-power-korea-builds-nuclear-reactor-united-arab-emirates#sthash.FVVVoXWp.xqt8U0nj.dpuf,accessed1July2016.54ArabianBusinesss.com,“ENECWelcomesRegulator’sLicenseApproval”,11July2010,seehttp://www.arabianbusiness.com/enec-welcomes-regulator-s-licence-approvals-306150.html,accessed1July2016.55ENEC,“ENECCompletesMajorWorkAndTestingAtBarakahUnits1NuclearEnergyPlant”,16February2016,seehttp://www.enec.gov.ae/media-centre/news/content/enec-completes-major-work-and-testing-at-barakah-unit-1-nuclear-energy-plan,accessed1July2016.56NIW,“UnitedArabEmirates”,20May2016.


Contracts Signed or in Advanced Development InNovember2011,theBangladeshGovernment’spressinformationdepartmentsaidthatitwaspreparedtosignadealwiththeRussianGovernmentfortwo1000MWunitstobebuiltby2018atacostofUS$2billion.57Sincethen,althoughnegotiationshavereportedlybeenongoing,thestart-updatehasbeencontinuallypostponedandtheexpectedconstructioncosthasrisen.

In January 2013, Deputy FinanceMinister of Russia Sergey Storchak and Economic RelationsDivision(ERD)SecretaryofBangladeshAbulKalamAzadsignedtheagreementontheExtensionofStateExportCredit for financing thepreparatorystagework for thenuclearpowerplantatRooppur(orRuppur).58Thesitewaschosenasearlyasinthe1960s,whenthecountrywaspartofPakistan,onthebanksofthelargestriverinthecountry;overthedecades,theriverhasshiftedfromitsoriginaltrajectoryandnewlandhadtobeacquiredinthelastyear.59ThedealwasonlyforUS$500million60tocoverthesitepreparatorywork.61InOctober2013,aceremonywasheldfortheformalstartofthepreparatorystage,62withformalconstructionthenexpectedtobeginin2015. At the time of the ceremony, the cost of constructionwas revised upwards and it wassuggestedthateachunitwouldcostUS$1.5–2billion.63ThesecostestimatestripledinApril2014,whenaseniorofficialat theMinistryofScienceandTechnologywasquotedassuggesting thepricewasmorelikelytobeUS$6billion.64In2015,theBangladeshiFinanceMinisterwasquotedassayingtheprojectwasnowexpectedtocostUS$13.5billion.65However,eventhisisnotlikelytobethefinalcostwithsuggestionsthatthis isnotafixedpricecontract,buta“cost-plus-fee”contract, and “the vendor has the right to comeupwith any cost escalation (plus their profitmargin) tobe incorporated intothecontractamount”andthat theeventualcostofgeneratingpower would be “at least 60 percent higher than the present retail cost” of electricity inBangladesh.66

57Bloomberg,“BangladeshtoSignDealWithRussiatoBuildNuclearPowerPlant”,2November2011,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-02/bangladesh-to-sign-deal-with-russia-to-build-nuclear-power-plant,accessed1July2016.58EnergyBangla,“Bangladesh,Russiasignnuclearpowerpact”,17January2013.59SharierKhan,“Nukepowerplantcostupthreetimes”,TheDailyStar,Updated2June2015,seehttp://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/nuke-power-plant-cost-three-times-82738,accessed1July2016.60Alldollar(equivalent)amountsareexpressedinU.S.dollarsunlessindicatedotherwise.However,theyear’sdollarsarenotalwaysclearintheoriginalreferences.61TheStar,“Russiatolend$1.5BtoBangladeshtobuildnuclearpowerstation,buyarms”,15January2013,seehttps://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/01/15/russia_to_lend_15b_to_bangladesh_to_build_nuclear_power_station_buy_arms.html,accessed1July2016.62BBC,“Bangladeshnuclearpowerplantworkbegins”,BritishBroadcastingCorporation,2October2013,seehttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24371991,accessed1July2016.63BangladeshAwamiLeague,“PMSheikhHasinainauguratesRooppurPowerPlant”,Undated,seehttp://www.albd.org/index.php/en/updates/news/281-pm-sheikh-hasina-inaugurates-rooppur-power-plant,accessed1July2016.64NewsFromBangladesh,“RooppurN-plantcosttodouble”,7April2014,seehttp://newsfrombangladesh.net/new/top-news/27087-rooppur-n-plant-cost-to-double,accessed1July2016.65NIW,“Bangladesh:NewbuildFinancingTalkswithRussiainTrickyTerritory”,6November2015.66RahmanA.,“RuppurNuclearPowerPlant:Bangladesh’sPotentialBlackhole”,BritishNuclearInstitute,TheDailyStar,Updated31December2015,seehttp://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/politics/ruppur-nuclear-power-plant-bangladeshs-potential-blackhole-194017,accessed1July2016.


Overthepastyear,thedesignselectedforconstructionhasalsochanged.Earlier,theplanwastoconstruct two VVER-1000 units but in 2015, the Bangladesh government reportedly becameinterested in the VVER-1200 design during “a high-levelmeeting in Vietnam”.67 In December2015,anagreementwassaidtobesignedbetweentheBangladeshAtomicEnergyCommissionandRosatomfor2.4GWofcapacity,withworkexpectedtobeginin2016andoperationtostartin2022and2023.68Accordingtothedeal,Russiawouldprovide90percentofthefundsoncreditataninterestrateofLiborplus1.75percent.Bangladeshwillhavetopaybacktheloanin28yearswitha10-yeargraceperiod.Asinothercountries,Russiahasofferedtotakebackthespentfuel.However, four months later, the project was delayed again, this time with a scheduledconstructionstarton1August2017.ByApril2016,sitepreparationwasreportedly80percentcomplete.69However,inlateJune2016,a“sitinglicenceceremony”washeldinDhakaallowingfor“preliminarysiteworks”.70Theobviouscontradictionbetweenthetwopiecesofinformationcouldnotbeclearedup.

In lateMay2016, negotiationswere concluded over theUS$12.65billion project,withRussiamakingavailableUS$11.385billion,witha final agreementexpected tobe signed “within twomonths”.71BytheendofJune2016,Bangladesh'scabinethadapprovedadraftoftheagreementandasignaturewasexpectedin“JulyorAugust”.72

Thedealhasbeencriticizedbymany in themedia.Oneconcernhasbeenthat theprojectwillresultinamajordebtburden.InOctober2015,Bangladesh’sFinanceMinisterAbulMuhith,wasquotedassayingthatthe“country’sdebtburdenisnowUS$18billion,whichwillgouptoUS$30billionafterfiveyearsatthecurrentpaceofexternalborrowing.TheamountwouldreachUS$42billioniftheRussianloanisaddedtoit”.73

LithuaniahadtwolargeRBMK(Chernobyl-type)reactorsatIgnalina,whichwereshutdownin2004and2009, a requirement for joining theEuropeanUnion. Since then therehavebeenongoingattemptstobuildareplacement,eitherunilaterallyorwithneighboringcountries.Themostrecentproposalwasconfirmedin2012whentheGovernment,alongwith itspartners inEstonia and Latvia, chose Hitachi together with its Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy Ltd. unit as a

67EnergyBangla,“RooppurWillBeAModern,SafeandMoneySavingNuclearPlant”,InterviewwithMaksimV.Elchishchev,NIAEPVicePresident,15October2015,seehttp://energybangla.com/rooppur-will-be-a-modern-safe-and-money-saving-nuclear-power-plant/,accessed1July2016.68WNN,“Bangladesh,Russiaink$12.65billionRooppurplantdeal”,29December2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Bangladesh-Russia-ink-12.65-billion-Rooppur-plant-deal-29121501.html,accessed31March2016.69NW,“BangladeshwillbeginconstructionoffirstnuclearunitinAugust2017:official”,NucleonicsWeek,14April2016.70WNN,“BangladeshmovesforwardwithRooppur”,28June2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Bangladesh-moves-forward-with-Rooppur-2806167.html,accessed1July2016.71NEI,“RussiainitialscreditagreementwithBangladeshforRooppurNPP”,30May2016,seehttp://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsrussia-initials-credit-agreement-with-bangladesh-for-rooppur-npp-4907672/,accessed1July2016.72WNN,“BangladeshmovesforwardwithRooppur”,op.cit.73ClickIttefaq,“$13.5billionestimatedforRooppurNuclearPowerPlant”,Updated28October2015,seehttp://www.clickittefaq.com/13-5-billion-estimated-for-rooppur-neuclear-power-plant/,accessed1July2016.


strategicinvestorandtechnologysuppliertoconstructanuclearplantbytheendof2020.74InMay2012,thepercentagebreakdownoftheinitiallyUS$6.5billionprojectwasannouncedwitha20 percent ownership for Hitachi, and 38 percent for Lithuania, while Estonia would take22percentandLatvia20percent.75

However,inOctober2012aconsultativenationalreferendumonthefutureofnuclearpowerwasheldand63percentvotedagainstnewnuclearconstruction,withsufficientturnouttovalidatethe result.76 Prior to his appointment as Prime Minister, Algirdas Butkevicius stated thatlegislationprohibitingtheprojectwouldbesubmittedoncethenewparliamentconvenesandthat“the people expressed their wish in the referendum, and I will follow the people’s will”.77 InJanuary2013,theMinistersetupaWorkingGroupontheenergydevelopmentinthecountry,whichconcludedinApril2013thatthedevelopmentofthenuclearnew-buildprojectcouldbecontinued under the condition of the involvement of regional partners, the availability of astrategicinvestorand“theuseofthemostmodernandpracticallytestednucleartechnology”.78

InMarch2014,inresponsetothepoliticalsituationinUkraineandgrowingconcernsoverenergysecurity, the seven parties represented in the Lithuanian Parliament signed an agreement onstrategicprioritiesthrough2020.Thisincludedtheconstructionofaliquefiednaturalgas(LNG)plant,thesynchronizationofthegridwithotherEUcountries,andthatthenuclearprojecttobeimplemented “in accordance with the terms and conditions of financing and participationimprovedincooperationwithpartners”.79InJuly2014theLithuaniaEnergyMinistryandHitachisignedanagreementtosetupajointventurefortheconstructionoftheVisaginasnuclearpowerplant.

Little progress was made in signing agreements with other international partners and inDecember2015,LithuanianpressannouncedthatthestaffinthepreparationcompanyVAESPBwasreducedfrom13to4people.80Inearly2016,theEnergyMinisterofLithuania,RokasMasiulis,saidthattheprojecthadbeenshelvedindefinitely,duetounfavorablemarketconditions.81

74Bloomberg,“LithuaniaSeekingLowerElectricityPricesatNewNuclearPlant”,15February2012,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-15/lithuania-seeking-lower-electricity-prices-at-new-nuclear-plant.html,accessed1July2016.75NIW,“Lithuania”,11May2012.76Reuters,“Lithuanianssendnuclearplantbacktodrawingboard”,15October2012,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-lithuania-nuclear-idUSBRE89E0BW20121015,accessed1July2016.77NIW,“Lithuania—ProspectivePMWantstoScrapeVisaginas”,9November2012.78MinistryofEnergyofLithuania,“WorkingGroup'sConclusionsforPreparationofProposalsRegardingCost-EffectiveandConsumers-FavorableSelf-ProvisionwithPowerandOtherEnergyResources”,25April2013,unofficialtranslation,distributedbytheMinistry,seehttp://www.enmin.lt/lt/naujienos/Conclusions_of_the_Working_Group2.pdf,accessed29March2016.79MinistryofEnergyofLithuania,“LithuanianParliamentaryPartiesReachedanAgreementRegardingtheKeyStrategicEnergyProjects”,31March2014,seehttps://enmin.lrv.lt/en/news/lithuanian-parliamentary-parties-reached-an-agreement-regarding-the-key-strategic-energy-projects,accessed1July2016.80VersloŽinios,“VAEprojektobendrovėmažinaapsukas”,(inLithuanian),29December2015,seehttp://vz.lt/2015/12/29/vae-projekto-bendrove-mazina-apsukas,accessed23May2016.81BalticCourse,“Masiulis:VisaginasNPPprojecthasbeenshelvedfornow”,20January2016,seehttp://www.baltic-course.com/eng/energy/?doc=115564,accessed1July2016.


InTurkey,uptothreeprojectsarebeingdeveloped,butratherthanproceedingwithasinglebuilder and design, the Government has decided to undertake at least three different reactordesignsandthreedifferentsetsoffinancialsources.Analystshavepointedoutthatthe“regulatoryframeworkfornuclearenergyinTurkeyhassevereshortcomings”.82

Akkuyu The firstproject,on the southerncoast, is atAkkuyu,which is tobebuiltunderaBuild-Own-Operate- (BOO)model byRosatomofRussia. An agreementwas signed inMay2010 for fourVVER1200reactors,withconstructionoriginallyexpectedtostartin2015,butnowdelayeduntilat least2016,andtocostUS$20–25billion for4.8GW.At theheartof theproject isa15-yearPowerPurchaseAgreement(PPA),which includes70percentof theelectricityproduced fromunits1and2and30percentofunits3and4.Therefore50percentofthetotalpowerfromthestationistobesoldataguaranteedpriceforthefirst15years,withtheresttobesoldonthemarket,wheretheaverageindustrialpricewas24.4kurus/kWh($US0.08/kWh)in2015.83

TheCEOofAkkuyuJSC(theprojectcompanysetupbyRussia’sRosatom)AlexanderSuperfin,saidinOctober2013that theprojectwasgoingtobeoperationalbymid-2020.84However, furtherdelays have occurred as there were problems with Akkuyu JSC's Environmental ImpactAssessment, which was rejected by the Ministry of Environment, when it was submitted inJuly2013.WhenitwaseventuallyapprovedinDecember2014,itwassaidthatthecommissioningofthefirstunitwaslikelytobein2021.85InJanuary2015,boththeChamberofTurkishEngineersand Architects (TMMOB)86 and Greenpeace started legal proceedings against the approval,claimingthattheAgencyhadinsufficientqualifiedstafftomakethedecisionandthattherewereno clear waste management plans or nuclear liability arrangements.87 As a result of thesedomestic developments and financing problems, it was reported in November 2015 that theoperation would now occur only in 202288 and at an estimated budget for the two units of

82İzakAtiyas,“AReviewofTurkey’sNuclearPoliciesandPractices”,SabancıUniversity,EDAM,CentreforEconomicsandForeignPolicyStudies,EDAMDiscussionPaperSeries2015/5,12August2015,seehttp://www.edam.org.tr/en/File?id=3174,accessed1July2016.83TurkishStatisticalInstitute,“ElectricityandNaturalGasPrices,II.Period:July-December,2015”,PressRelease,30March2016,seehttp://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=21585,accessed1July2016.84OrhanCoskun,HumeyraPamuk,“Turkey'sfirstnuclearplantfacingfurtherdelays-sources”,Reuters,7February2014,seehttp://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-nuclear-delay-idUKBREA160P220140207,accessed1July2016.85WNN,“AkkuyuprojectEIAgetsministryapproval”,1December2014,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Akkuyu-project-EIA-gets-ministry-approval-01121401.html,accessed1July2016.86HurriyetDailyNews,“ChambertosuestateoverabruptgreenlighttoTurkey'sfirstnuclearplant”,2January2015,seehttp://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/chamber-to-sue-state-over-abrupt-green-light-to-turkeys-first-nuclear-plant.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76419&NewsCatID=340,accessed1July2016.87NIW,“Briefs—Turkey”,9January2015.88SputnikInternational,“FirstreactorofTurkey’sAkkuyunuclearplanttostartoperatingby2022”,19November2015,seehttp://sptnkne.ws/afE3,accessed24June2016.


US$22billion.89Sitepreparationworkstarted inApril2015 90and itwasestimated thatUS$3billionhadbeenspentasofautumn2015.91InJanuary2016,AkkuyuNuclearsubmittedtotheAtomic Energy Authority its final site parameter report, which must be approved before aconstructionlicensecanbegranted.92TherearesuggestionsthatRosatommaysella49percentofitsstaketooneofTurkey’sleadingconstructionconglomerates,CengizInsaat,andthatthisispartofapoliticalmaneuvertokeepthedealalivegiventhesouringofrelationsbetweenRussiaandTurkey.93ThisclaimwaswidelypublishedintheTurkishmediabutdeniedbyRosatom.94ItwasalsoreportedinOctober2015thatTurkishPresidentRecepTayyipErdoganwarnedRussiariskedlosingtheAkkuyudealasaresultofRussianinterventioninSyria.95InJune2016,Russia’spermanentrepresentativetotheIAEAsaidthatworkonAkkuyu“islikelytoresumefollowingtherapprochementbetweenthetwocountries”,whichevidentlyindicatesthatworkissuspendedasofthetimeofthestatement.96

Sinop AnotherproposedprojectisatSinop,onthenortherncoast,wherethelatestprojectproposalisfor4.4GWusingtheATMEAreactordesign.Ifcompletedthiswouldbethefirstreactorofthisdesign,jointlydevelopedbyMitsubishiandAREVA.97InApril2015,TurkishPresidentErdoganapprovedparliament’sratificationoftheintergovernmentalagreementwithJapan.98

TheestimatedcostoftheprojectisUS$22billionandinvolvesaconsortiumofMitsubishi,AREVA,GDF-Suez (now known as Engie), and Itochu, who between themwill own 51 percent of theproject,withtheremaining49percentownedbyTurkishcompaniesincludingtheState-owned

89Vatan,“Russianpressedformoney,Akkuyudelayed2years”,24March2015,seehttp://www.gazetevatan.com/ruslar-paraya-sikisti-akkuyu-2-yil-gecikecek-752934-ekonomi/,accessed29March2016.90WNN,“GroundbrokenforTurkey'sfirstnuclearpowerplant”,15April2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Ground-broken-for-Turkeys-first-nuclear-power-plant-1541501.html,accessed1July2016.91HurriyetDailyNews,“$3billionspentonAkkuyupowerplantsofar:CEO”,29September2015,seehttp://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/3-bln-spent-on-akkuyu-power-plant-so-far-ceo.aspx?pageID=238&nID=89154&NewsCatID=348,accessed1July2016.92NIW,“Briefs—Turkey”,15January2016.93NIW,“Newbuild,MoscowEyesTurkishParntersforAkkuyu”,29April2016.94ITAR/TASS,“Russia'sRosatomdeniesplansforsaleofTurkishNPPprojectshare—CEO”,InformationTelegraphAgencyofRussia/TelegraphAgencyoftheSovietUnion,RussianNewsAgency,27April2016;seehttp://special.itar-tass.com/en/economy/872784,accessed1July2016.95AFP,“ErdoganwarnsRussiariskslosingTurkeyenergydealsoverSyria”,AgenceFrancePresse,8October2015,seehttps://www.yahoo.com/news/erdogan-warns-russia-over-turkey-nuclear-gas-deals-090402732.html?ref=gs,accessed1July2016.96SputnikInternational,“RussianNuclearPowerPlantDealWithTurkeytoProgressAfterThaw,”30June2016;seehttp://sputniknews.com/business/20160630/1042237791/akkuyu-russia-turkey.html,accessed4July2016.97WNN,“TurkishutilityeyeslargestakeinSinopproject”,12May2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Turkish-utility-eyes-large-stake-in-Sinop-project-12051501.html,accessed1July2016.98WNN,“GroundbrokenforTurkey'sfirstnuclearpowerplant”,15April2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Ground-broken-for-Turkeys-first-nuclear-power-plant-1541501.html,accessed1July2016.


electricity generating company (EÜAS).99 The ongoing problemswith the financial viability ofAREVAwillaffectitsabilitytoinvestintheproject.Constructioniscurrentlyexpectedtostartin2017.However,anEnvironmentalImpactAssessment,whichcouldtakeuptotwoyears,isstilloutstanding.100

Theprojectiscomplicatedbytheregion’slackoflarge-scaledemandandtheexistingcoalpowerstations,so1,400kmoftransmissionlineswillbeneededtotaketheelectricitytoIstanbulandAnkara.Reportsattheendof2014suggestedthattheprojectwouldbefurtherdelayed,byuptotwoyears—thefourthdelayintwoyears.Thishasledtoextremefrustrationwiththebidders,withonecompanyrepresentativesayingoftheprocess:“They’rebasicallyatthepointwherenoonebelievesthemanymore.”101

İğneada InOctoberin2015,thegovernmentsuggestedthatitwasaimingtobuildathirdpowerplant,atthe İğneada site. Themost likely bidders for the project are said to beWestinghouse and theChinese State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC), with Chinese companies“aggressively” pursuing the contract, said to be worth US$22-25 billion.102 The Daily Sabahnewspapernotedthat“theİğneadadistrictislocatedsome10kilometerssouthofTurkey’sborderwithBulgariaandfamousforitsnaturalbeautyandbeach,whichislikelytoraisequestionsastoitsenvironmentalimpact.103AdditionaldoubtshavebeenraisedbytheDeputyUndersecretaryfortheTurkishMinistryofEnergyandNationalResources,whostatedthat“havingthreedifferentprojectswiththreedifferenttechnologiesisnotsound.”104

AdecisionbythePrimeMinsterofVietnamofJuly2011statedthatby2020thefirstnuclearpowerplantwillbeinoperation,withafurther7GWofcapacitytobeinoperationby2025andtotal of 10.7 GW in operation by 2030. The previous October Vietnam had signed anintergovernmentalagreementwithRussia’sAtomstroyexporttobuildtheNinhThuan-1nuclearpowerplant,using1200MWVVERreactors.Constructionwasslatedtobeginin2014,withtheturnkey project being owned and operated by the state utility Electricity of Vietnam (EVN).However, numerous delays have occurred and in December 2015, Atomic Energy AgencyDirector-GeneralHoangAnhTuanthatconstructionwouldstartin2020,asix-yeardelayofthe

99WNN,“TurkishutilityeyeslargestakeinSinopproject”,12May2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Turkish-utility-eyes-large-stake-in-Sinop-project-12051501.html,accessed1July2016.100NW,“IEAheadvoicessupportforTurkishnuclearprogram”,1October2015.101NIW,“WeeklyReview”,27September2015.102NEI,“TurkeyfinalizessiteforthirdNPP”,18March2016,seehttp://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsturkey-finalizes-site-for-third-npp-4843161/,accessed1July2016.103DailySabah,“Turkeyrevealslocationofplannedthirdnuclearplant”,14October2015,seehttp://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2015/10/14/turkey-reveals-location-of-planned-third-nuclear-plant,accessed1July2016.104NIW,“AkkuyuEIAApproved:ANewConsortiumEmerges”,1December2014.


original plan.105 “The national electricity development plan, approved by the government inMarch2016,envisionedthe“firstnuclearpowerplantputintooperationin2028”.106

RosatomhasconfirmedthatRussia’sMinistryofFinanceispreparedtofinanceatleast85percentofthisfirstplant,andthatRussiawillsupplythenewfuelandtakebackspentfuelforthelifeoftheplant.Anagreement foruptoUS$9billion financewassigned inNovember2011withtheRussiangovernment’sstateexportcreditbureau,andasecondUS$0.5billionagreementcoveredtheestablishmentofanuclearscienceandtechnologycenter.

Like Turkey, Vietnam has also signed an intergovernmental agreement with Japan for theconstructionof a secondnuclear powerplant,with two reactors projected to comeon line in2024–25.Theagreementcallsforassistanceinconductingfeasibilitystudiesfortheproject,low-interest and preferential loans, technology transfer and training of human resources, andcooperationinthewastetreatmentandstablesupplyofmaterialsforthewholelifeoftheproject.

Thedelayintheorderingofthenewnuclearunitsisnotofconcernduetoaslowerthanexpectedincreaseinelectricitydemand,accordingtotheDirectorGeneraloftheAtomicEnergyAgency.However,otheranalystshavesuggestedthattheslowdownindemandhasgivenVietnamareasontoabandonitsnucleardevelopmentprogramaltogether.NguyenKhacNhan,whoformerlytaughtnuclearengineeringattheGrenobleInstituteofTechnologyinFranceandwhohasadvisedFrenchstateutilityEDFforthreedecades,statedin2015:“Thenuclearpowerprojectswillmostcertainlybestopped.”107

“Committed Plans” InEgypt,thegovernment’sNuclearPowerPlantsAuthoritywasestablishedinthemid-1970s,andplansweredevelopedfor10reactorsbytheendofthecentury.DespitediscussionswithChinese,French, German, and Russian suppliers, little development occurred for several decades. InOctober2006,theMinisterforEnergyannouncedthata1000MWreactorwouldbebuilt,butthiswaslaterexpandedtofourreactorsby2025,withthefirstonecomingonlinein2019.Inearly2010, a legal frameworkwas adopted to regulate andestablishnuclear facilities; however, aninternationalbiddingprocessfortheconstructionwaspostponedinFebruary2011duetothepoliticalsituation.Sincethen,therehavebeenvariousattemptsandreportsthatatenderprocesswould be restarted, all of which have come to nothing. But Russia’s Rosatom determinedlypursued its strategyofpushing “througha seriesofbilateral agreements,witheachonemoredetailedthantheprevious”sothat“acommercialcontractisultimatelyinevitable”.108Asaresult,inFebruary2015,RosatomandEgypt’sNuclearPowerPlantAuthoritysignedanagreementthatcould lead to theconstructionand financingof tworeactorsandpossibly twoadditionalones.

105NIW,“Vietnam”,11December2015.106VietNamNet,“VietnamneedsUS$148billiontodevelopnationalelectricityuntil2030”,20March2016seehttp://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/society/152739/vietnam-needs-us-148-billion-to-develop-national-electricity-until-2030.html,accessed7June2016.107BeyondNuclear,“NguyenKhacNhan:‘theVietnamesepersonwhoismostwell-informedaboutnuclearenergyandmostvehementlyopposedtoit’”,28April2015,seehttp://www.beyondnuclear.org/other-region/2015/4/28/nguyen-khac-nhan-the-vietnamese-person-who-is-most-well-info.html,accessed1July2016.108NIW,“Egypt:Moscow’sPushtoLockInNuclearContract”,16October2015.


However, Rosatom highlighted the “need to prepare for signing two intergovernmentalagreements—oneonnuclearpowerplantconstructionandoneonfinancing”.109

In November 2015, an intergovernmental agreement was signed for the construction of fourVVER-1200 reactors at Dabaa. The deal, was apparently worth €20-22 billion with Russiaprovidingupto90percentofthefinance,110tobepaidbackthroughthesaleofelectricity.ReportssuggestthataspokesmanforRosatomsaidthefirstplantcouldbecompletedby2022111,whichistechnicallyimpossible,giventhatconstruction,ifatall,wouldnotstartforanothertwoyears.InMay2016,itwasannouncedthatEgyptconcludedaUS$25billionloanwithRussiafornuclearconstruction.112AccordingtotheEgyptianofficialjournal,theloanistocover85percentoftheprojectcost,withthetotalinvestmentthusestimatedataroundUS$29.4billion.The3percent-annual-interestloanistobepaidbackover22yearsstartingin2029.113

InfluentialpolicymakersinJordanhavelongdesiredtheacquisitionofanuclearpowerplant.In2007,thegovernmentestablishedtheJordanAtomicEnergyCommission(JAEC)andtheJordanNuclearRegulatoryCommission. JAECstartedconductinga feasibilitystudyonnuclearpower,including a comparative cost/benefit analysis.114 In November 2009, JAEC awarded anUS$11.3millioncontracttoAustralianengineeringcompanyWorleyParsonsforpre-constructionconsultingforJordan’sfirstnuclearpowerplant.115WorleyParsonswas“toevaluatethenuclearpower plant technologymost suitable for Jordan (…) conduct a feasibility study and financialassessment of the project, aswell as assist in [issuing] the tender for the plant vendor”.116 InJordanian energy plans from that period, the timeline assumed for starting nuclear powerproductionwasasearlyas2015.117

JAECandWorleyParsonsnarroweddownthechoicestotheATMEA-1designfromAREVAandMitsubishi(asprojectedinTurkey);theEnhancedCandu-6(EC6)fromAtomicEnergyofCanadaLimited;theAPR-1400118fromKoreaElectricPowerCorporation,andtheAES-2006andAES-92variantsof theVVERdesign fromRosatom.119Eventually, theabilityofRosatomtopotentially

109Rosatom,“RussiaHelpsEgyptToExploreOpportunitiesOfNuclearPowerPlantConstruction”,10February2015,seehttp://rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/124-russia-helps-egypt-to-explore-opportunities-of-nuclear-power-plant-construction/,accessed1July2016.110NIW,CairoandMoscowInkDealforFour-UnitDabaaPlant,20November2015.111Reuters,“Egypt,Russiasigndealtobuildanuclearpowerplant”,19November2015,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-russia-egypt-idUSKCN0T81YY20151119,accessed1July2016.112Reuters,”RussiatolendEgypt$25billiontobuildnuclearpowerplant”,19May2016,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-russia-nuclear-idUSKCN0YA1G5,accessed1July2016.113NIW,“EgyptApproves$25BillionLoanFromRussiaforNuclearProject”,20May2016.114MarkHibbs.,“Jordanreactorsitingstudytobedonein2009,JAECsays”,NW,xlviii,2007.115AnnMacLachlan,“WorleyParsonstoHelpJordanRunProgramforFirstNuclearPowerPlant”,NW,2009.116WNN,“WorleyParsonsawardedJordaniancontract”,16November2009,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Worley_Parsons_awarded_Jordanian_contract-1611094.html,accessed1July2016.117EnergyTribune,“JordanWantsNuclearPower,SignsAgreementswithSpain,France”,2February2010,seehttp://www.energytribune.com/3375/jordan-wants-nuclear-power-signs-agreements-with-spain-france,accessed1July2016.118APR=AdvancedPowerReactor119AnnMacLachlan,“WorleyParsonstoHelpJordanRunProgramforFirstNuclearPowerPlant”,NW,2009.


finance,aswellasitsoffertotakebackspentfueltoRussia,120seemstohavetrumpedallotherconsiderations and Jordan decided on twoVVER lightwater reactors. According to the initialannouncement, Russia was to finance 49.9 percent of the nuclear power plant.121 InSeptember 2014, JAEC andRosatom signed a two-year development framework for a project,whichwasprojectedtocostunderUS$10billionandgenerateelectricitycostingUS$0.10/kWh.Itis now envisaged the earliest that construction start would be 2019,122 which would makecompletionby theoriginalobjectiveof2021123 impossibleandeven thereviseddatesof2023highlyunlikely.

ThisfinancingarrangementisbeingrevisedbecauseJAECisfindingitveryhardtocomeupwithitspartof costof the reactor.Thiswas suggestedby JAECChairmanKhaledToukanwho toldAssociatedPressthattheprobabilityofthetworeactorsbeingbuiltis“70to75(percent)...itisnot90percent”inarecentinterview.124Earlier,inOctober2015,ToukantoldthepressthatJAECis“nowintrilateraldiscussionsandseekingstrategicpartners—technologyprovidersaswellasfinancepartners”.125AmongthepartnersmentionedbyToukanaretheChinaNationalNuclearCorporation(CNNC),which isbeingapproached to takeonapotentialequitystake,aswellasparticipationintheconstructionphasefortheturbineislandsandotheraspectsoftheplant,theIndustrialandCommercialBankofChina,which isbeingapproachedfornon-equity financing,and Rolls-Royce about potentially providing cooling systems for the plant.126 JAEC’s currentpreferenceisfortheequitystakeintheprojectdividedthreewayswithRosatomandCNNC,andJordanitselftakingthelastthird.Elsewhere,ToukanhassuggestedthatChinamightfundanevenhighershare,“notlessthan50percent”,accordingtoonereport.127FortheJAECpart,Toukanhasset up the JordanNuclearPowerCo.,which is to raise fundson the tradingmarketby sellingshares.128OnereasonthatthisarrangementmightbeattractivetoRosatomisuncertaintyaboutitsownfinances.Over thepastyear, itsbudgethasbeencutandtheRussiangovernmentwas

120Rosatom,“RussiaandJordansignedIntergovernmentalAgreementonNPPconstructioninJordan”,24March2015,seehttp://www.rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/highlights/russia-and-jordan-signed-intergovernmental-agreement-on-npp-construction-in-jordan-5/;andArielBenSolomon,“JordanandRussiatosign$10bnucleardealthismonth”,JerusalemPost,22March2015,seehttp://www.jpost.com/landedpages/printarticle.aspx?id=394732,bothaccessed1July2016.121AFP,“JordanagreesdealforRussiatobuildnuclearplant”,Yahoo!News,25March2015,seehttps://www.yahoo.com/news/jordan-agrees-deal-russia-build-nuclear-plant-231404790.html,accessed1July2016.122NIW,“Briefs—Jordan”,18April2014.123NIW,“Newbuild—JordanandRussiaMoveCloseronNewbuildPlans”,26September2014.124KarinLaub,“APInterview:JordanEagertoReachNukeDealwithUS,”TheHerald,4July2016,seehttp://www.heraldonline.com/news/business/technology/article87545887.html,accessed4July2016.125AnthonyMcAuley,“JordanclosesinondealwithRussiatobuildtwonuclearreactors”,TheNational,31October2015,seehttp://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/jordan-closes-in-on-deal-with-russia-to-build-two-nuclear-reactors,accessed1July2016.126Ibidem.127Nuclear.Ru,“Toukan:Chinacanfundnotlessthan50%ofnuclearbuildinJordan”,16September2015,seehttp://en.nuclear.ru/news/97045/?sphrase_id=3655595,accessed1July2016.128ChaffeeP.,“JordanLookstoChinaforFinancing”,NIW,2015.


reportedlyconsidering“suspendingloanstoothercountries”.129Butinthemeanwhile,JAECandRosatomhavesignedacooperationagreementonnuclearsafety.130

ThereisoppositioninJordan'sparliamentandlocaloppositionisbuildingupatthepre-selectedAlAmrasite.On30May2012,theJordanianparliamentapprovedarecommendationtoshelvetheprogram,asitwassaiditwould“drivethecountryintoadarktunnelandwillbringaboutanadverseandirreversibleenvironmentalimpact”.Theparliamentalsorecommendedsuspendinguraniumexplorationuntilafeasibilitystudyisdone.131Priortothevote,theParliament’sEnergyCommitteehadpublishedareportaccusingtheJAECofdeliberately“misleading”thepublicandofficialsovertheprogramby“hidingfacts”relatedtocosts.132TheJAECrespondedbysayingitwouldn’tbeabletoproduceafullevaluationuntilthestartofconstructionoftheplant.133Atleastonemember of the royal family, Princess Basma bint Ali, has publicly spoken out against thenuclearprogram.134

LocaloppositioncomesinparticularfrommembersoftheBeniSakhertribethatlivesaroundtheAlAmraarea.135Onememberofthetribe,HindFayez,isaprominentparliamentarianandanotedopponent.136Sheisquotedassaying:“Iwillnotallowtheconstructionofthenuclearreactor,notevenovermydeadbody(…).TheBaniSakhertribealsorejectstheconstructionofthenuclearreactorinQusayrAmra”.137Aparticularconcerniswaterrequirementsforthereactor,whichisto come from theAl-SamraWasteWater Treatment Plant in nearby Irbid.138 If andwhen thereactoriscommissioned,over20percentofthetotalcapacityoftheTreatmentPlantwillbeusedtosupplywater to thereactors.Theoutputof theTreatmentPlant iscurrentlybeingused forirrigation;139diversionofwatertothereactoris,naturally,ofpublicconcern.Thetreatmentof

129TheMoscowTimes,““RussiaConsidersSuspendingLoanstoOtherCountries”,18January2016,seehttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-considers-suspending-loans-to-other-countries/556181.html,accessed1July2016.130JordanTimes,“Jordan,Russiasignnuclearsafetydeal”,16April2016,seehttp://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-russia-sign-nuclear-safety-deal,accessed1July2016.131JordanTimes,“Deputiesvotetosuspendnuclearproject”,Updated30May2012,seehttp://vista.sahafi.jo/art.php?id=5cc50fcb54819dcb7c741cc651bb71531178b08e,accessed1July2016.132Ibidem.133MonitorGlobalOutlook,“Jordanclingsontonuclearambitions,despitedelays”,10January2014.134On28June2011,PrincessBasmagaveastinginganti-nuclearspeechinapubliceventinAmman,Jordan,entitled“ProsandConsofNuclearEnergy”;seealsoAaronMagid,“TimetoReconsiderJordan’sNuclearProgram,”MiddleEastInstitute,20June2016,seehttp://www.mei.edu/content/article/time-reconsider-jordan-s-nuclear-program,accessed23June2016.135AliceSu,“Jordanfacesno-nukescampaign”,Al-Monitor,12November2013,seehttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/jordan-nuclear-rosatom-environment-energy.html;andAreejAbuqudairi,“Jordannuclearbattleheatsup”,AlJazeeraEnglish,14April2014,seehttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/02/battle-heats-up-over-jordanian-nuclear-power-201422685957126736.html,bothaccessed25June2016.136DavidSchenker,“TheMiddleEast’sNextNuclearPower?”,WashingtonInstituteforNearEastPolicy,Politico,28January2015,seehttp://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/jordan-nuclear-power-114712.html,accessed25June2016.137JordanTimes,“Nuclearprogramme‘tolowerelectricitycostsby70%’”,30October2013.138ElisaOddone,“RussianNuclearEnergyDealSigned”,VentureMagazine,19May2015,seehttp://www.venturemagazine.me/2015/05/russian-nuclear-energy-deal-signed,accessed25June2016.139WaterTechnology,“As-SamraWastewaterTreatmentPlant(WWTP),Jordan”,Undated,seehttp://www.water-technology.net/projects/as-samra-wastewater-treatment-plant-jordan/,accessed1July2016.


wastewaterwill alsoadd to thealreadyhighcostsofgeneratingnuclearpower.140 Ithasbeensuggestedthat“itmaywellbewater,theMiddleEast’smostpreciousresource,ratherthanfiscalissuesthatshovesthecountry’snuclearhopesfartherintothefuture”.141

Polandplannedthedevelopmentofaseriesofnuclearpowerstationsinthe1980sandstartedconstruction of two VVER1000/320 reactors in Żarnowiec on the Baltic coast, but bothconstructionandfurtherplanswerehaltedfollowingtheChernobylaccident.In2008,however,Polandannounced that itwasgoing to re-enter thenucleararenaand inNovember2010, theMinistry of Economy put forward aNuclear Energy Program.On 28 January 2014, the PolishGovernmentadoptedadocumentwiththetitle“PolishNuclearPowerProgramme”outliningtheframeworkoftheplan.142TheProgammewassubjecttoaStrategicEnvironmentalAssessment(SEA), which was also approved in January 2014. In April 2014, Greenpeace started legalproceduresagainsttheAssessment,allegingitspublicparticipationprocesswasinadequate.TheSEAdrewaround60,000submissions,amajoritycomingfromneighboringGermany.Theplanincludesproposalstobuild6GWofnuclearpowerwiththefirstreactorstartingupby2024.Thereactor types under consideration include AREVA’s EPR, Westinghouse’s AP1000, andHitachi/GE’sABWR(AdvancedBoilingWaterReactor).

InJanuary2013,thePolishutilityPGE(PolskaGrupaEnergetyczna)selectedWorleyParsonstoconductafive-year,US$81.5millionstudy,onthesitinganddevelopmentofanuclearpowerplantwithacapacityofupto3GW.143Atthattime,theprojectwasestimatedatUS$13–19billion,siteselection was to have been completed by 2016, and construction was to begin in 2019.144 Anumber of vendors, including AREVA, Westinghouse, and GE-Hitachi, all lobbied Warsawaggressively.145PGEformedaprojectcompanyPGEEJ1,whichalsohasatenpercentparticipationeachoftheotherlargePolishutilities,TauronPolskaEnergiaandEnea,aswellasthestatecopper-mining firm KGHM. In January 2014, PGE EJ1 received four bids from companies looking tobecome the company’s “Owner’s Engineer” to help in the tendering and development of theproject, which was eventually awarded to AMEC Nuclear UK in July 2014. The timetabledemandedthatPGEmakeafinal investmentdecisiononthetwoplantsbyearly2017.146Finaldesignandpermitsforthefirstplantwereexpectedtobereadyin2018,allowingconstruction

140SteveThomas,“Jordan’sNuclearPowerPlans”,Istanbul,2013.141JohnC.KDaly,“WatershortagesmayendJordan’snuclearpowerhopes”,oilprice.com,18June2013,seehttp://www.mining.com/web/water-shortages-may-end-jordans-nuclear-power-hopes/,accessed25June2016.142MinisterstwoGospodarki,“PolishNuclearPowerProgramme”,January2014.Apparently,anupdatedversionoftheProgramwaspublishedinthePolishMonitorMPon24June2014.143NIW,“Briefs—Poland”,8February2013.144Economist,“PolishEnergy,Goingnuclear”,31January2014,seehttp://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/01/polish-energy,accessed29March2016.145NIW,“PotentialandExistingGlobalNuclearNewbuildProjects”,25April2014.146NucNet,“AmecWinsUSD430MillionContractToSupportPolishNew-Build”,9July2014,seehttp://www.nucnet.org/all-the-news/2014/07/21/amec-wins-usd-430-million-contract-to-support-polish-new-build,accessed1July2016.


start in 2020 and commercial operation in 2025. That schedule has slipped to commercialoperationbeginningin2030-31.147

However,inApril2014,itwasreportedthatPGEhadcancelleditscontractwithWorleyParsonstoresearchpotentialsites.Itwasthoughtthatthiswoulddelaytheprocessbyatleasttwoyears,withtheSupremeAuditOfficesuggestingthattherewasahighriskoffurtherdelaysorthattheplantwouldn’tbecompletedatall.148AnindependentcriticalassessmentstatedinlateMay2015:“At this point, it is central to highlight that neither the Polish administration, nor PGE haveannounced so far any realistic or even detailed financing plan for the NPPs’ scheme.”149Furthermore,coal,andinparticularsupportingcoalminers,remainsapoliticalpriority.150

InDecember2015,thePolishGeneralDirectoratefortheEnvironment(GDOS)startedthescopingphasefortheEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentforthefirstPolishnuclearpowerstationwithanotificationtostateswithin1,000kmfromtheproposedthreesites.Directlyafterthestartofthisscopingphase,PGEEJ1informedGDOSthatitwaswithdrawingoneofthethreeproposedsites,at Choczewo, because of the potential impacts on protected nature areas.151 In January 2016,Poland’s newly formed government further slowed down nuclear plans with the head of theEnergyMinistry admitting that the 2020 target for commissioning a first unit was no longerviable.152

“Well Developed Plans” There seems little to indicate thatChile is actively developing nuclear power. The WorldNuclearAgency(WNA)statedthatin2010theEnergyMinisterhadsaidthatthefirstnuclearplantof1100MWeshouldbeoperatingin2024,joinedbythreemoreby2035andthatapublic-privatepartnershipisproposedtobuildthefirstplant,withatendertobecalledin2016.153However,planshavenotdevelopedsignificantlysincethen.PublicopinioninChileturnedstronglyagainstnuclear power after the Fukushima accident and a poll conducted in April 2011 showed thataround84percentofthosesurveyedwereagainstthedevelopmentofanuclearpowerprograminChile,withonly12percentinsupport.154

147NW,“Polishnuclearprogramfacingadditionaldelaysofatleastoneyear:analyst”,21April2016.148Reuters,“Poland'snuclearprojectpushedbackatleastanothertwoyears:sources”,14April2015,seehttp://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/04/14/uk-poland-energy-nuclear-idUKKBN0N512M20150414,accessed29March2016.149HarembskiM.,“PlanforNuclearPowerinPolandvs.NuclearEnergyProjectApplication”,21May2015.150PiE,“Tchorzewskiaffirmscoal’skeyrole”,1February2016.151RynekInfrastruktury,“PGEEJ1rezygnujezlokalizacji‘Choczewo’”,2February2016,(inPolish),seehttp://www.rynekinfrastruktury.pl/wiadomosci/elektrownia-jadrowa-nie-powstanie-w-choczewie-52648.html,accessed23May2016.152NIW,“WeeklyRoundup”,22January2016.153WNA,“EmergingNuclearEnergyCountries”,Updated31May2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx,accessed2June2016.154HydroWorld.com,“PublicincreasinglyopposedtoHidroAysén,nuclearpower–Ipsos”,13April2011.


AccordingtotheChileanNuclearEnergyCommission,theycontinuetoevaluatethefeasibilityofbuildinganuclearpowerplantalthougha“politicaldecisionhasbeenpostponed”.155Atthesametime,inJanuary2016,PresidentMichelleBacheletsignedanewenergystrategythatsetsagoalofrenewableenergyproviding70percentofthecountry’spowerneedsby2050.156Overthepastfiveyears,solarcapacityhasquadrupledto770MW.157

Sincethemid-1970s,Indonesiahasdiscussedandbroughtforwardplanstodevelopnuclearpower, releasing its first studyon the introductionofnuclearpower, supportedby the Italiangovernment,in1976.Theanalysiswasupdatedinthemid-1980swithhelpfromtheIAEA,theUnitedStates,FranceandItaly.Numerousdiscussionstookplaceoverthefollowingdecade,andby1997aNuclearEnergyLawwasadoptedthatgaveguidanceonconstruction,operation,anddecommissioning.Adecadelater,the2007LawonNationalLong-TermDevelopmentPlanningfor 2005–25 stipulated that between2015 and2019, fourunits shouldbe completedwith aninstalledcapacityof6GW.158InJuly2007KoreaElectricPowerCorp.(KEPCO)andKoreaHydro&NuclearPowerCo.(KHNP)signedamemorandumofunderstandingwithIndonesia’sPTMedcoEnergiInternasionaltoundertakeafeasibilitystudyforbuildingtwoOPR-1000unitsatacostofUS$3billion.TheOPR-1000isaGenerationII1000MWPWR,developedjointlybyKEPCOandKHNP. However, the actual construction plans are much more modest and envisage theconstructionofa10MWreactorintheSerpongarea,tobeoperationalin2021159,withatendertoprepareblueprintswonbyRosatominApril2015.Aswithalargenumberofcountries,therehavebeenreportsofongoingco-operationwithRussia,includingwithproposalsforthesaleof

155JersonR.Reyes.,“TechnologyAssessmentforEmbarkingCountries”,ChileanNuclearEnergyCommission,24June2013,PresentationattheTechnicalMeetingonTechnologyAssessmentforEmbarkingCountries,IAEA,Vienna(Austria),seehttps://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2013/2013-06-24-06-28-TM-NPTD/6-chile.pdf,accessed24June2016.156PV-tech,“ChileintroducesnewEnergy2050renewable-energygoals”,6January2016,seehttp://www.pv-tech.org/news/chile-introduces-new-energy-2050-renewable-energy-goals,accessed1July2016.157VanessaDezem,JavieraQuiroga,“Chilehassomuchsolarenergyitsgivingitawayforfree”,Bloomberg,2June2016,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-01/chile-has-so-much-solar-energy-it-s-giving-it-away-for-free,accessed1July2016.158HananNugroho,“DevelopmentofNuclearPowerinIndonesia:StoporGo?”,StateMinistryofNationalDevelopmentPlanning,Bappenas,JakartaPost,5May2010,seehttp://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/05/05/development-nuclear-power-indonesia-stop-or-go.html,accessed1July2016.159HendroTjahjono,“RecentstatusofnuclearpowerandassessmentinIndonesia”,NationalNuclearEnergyAgency(BATAN),RepublicofIndonesia,aspresentedattheTechnicalmeetingonTechnologyAssessmentforNewNuclearPowerPrograms,IAEA,September2015,seehttps://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2015/2015-09-01-09-03-NPTDS41894/DAY1/3_Recent_Status_of_NPP_Assessment_in_Indonesia.pdf,accessed25June2016.


floatingreactors.160Thereisalsotalkabout“on-land”reactors,with“breakingofground”tostartin2024/5.161

TheninDecember2015,theIndonesiangovernmentpulledtheplugonallnuclearplans,evenforthelongertermfuture.EnergyandMineralResourcesMinisterSudirmanSaidstated:“Wehavearrivedattheconclusionthatthisisnotthetimetobuildupnuclearpowercapacity.Westillhavemany alternatives and we do not need to raise any controversies.” The Minister made thatstatementafter theNationalEnergyCouncil,apresidentialadvisorybody,completed its latestNational Energy Plan.Nuclear Engineering International comments: “This effectively cancels aprevious[US]$8bnplantooperatefournuclearplantswithatotalcapacityof6GWeby2025.”162Indonesia plans to achieve an ambitious build-up of electricity generating capacity—fromcurrently less than50GWto137GWby2025and430GWby2050—withoutnuclearpower.PlanningdocumentsandIndonesianofficialsconsidernuclearpowertobemerelya“lastresort”option.

Kazakhstanistheworld’slargestproducerofuranium,with40percentoftheglobaltotal.It had a small fast breeder reactor, BN 350,which operated at Aktau, between 1972-1999. Anumberofcountries,includingRussia,Japan,SouthKorea,andChinahaveallsignedco-operationdealsforthedevelopmentofnuclearpower.In2014,PresidentNursultanNazarbayev,usedhisState of the Nation address to highlight the need to develop nuclear power. Since then,negotiationshavecontinued,particularlywithToshiba-Westinghouseof JapanandRosatomofRussia,withanintergovernmentalagreementexpectedbysomein2016.163However,othersarelesspositiveaboutthetimetableand,inOctober2015,theViceMinisterofEnergyBakhytzhanDzhaksaliyev said that finding a suitable site and strategic partner might take two to threeyears.164InDecember2015,adraftAtomicEnergyLawwasreferredtotheSenate, inordertoaddresslicensing,security,environmentalprotectionrulesandstandards.165AnApril2016jointdeclarationby theenergyministersofKazakhstanand theU.S.notes that the2016workplan

160RussiaInsider,“RussiatoBuildFloatingNuclearPowerPlantsforIndonesia”,22September2015,seehttp://russia-insider.com/en/business/russia-build-floating-nuclear-power-plants-indonesia/ri9854,accessed25June2016.161JakartaGlobe,“Russia-IndonesiaPartnershiptoBuildFutureofIndonesianNuclearSector”,7October2015,seehttp://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/russia-indonesia-partnership-build-future-indonesian-nuclear-sector/,accessed1July2016.162NEI,“Indonesiarulesoutnuclearasmajorpowersource”,14December2015,seehttp://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsindonesia-rules-out-nuclear-as-major-power-source-4752814,accessed1July2016.163WNN,“RussiaandKazakhstantoinknuclearpoweraccordthisyear”,2March2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Russia-and-Kazakhstan-to-ink-nuclear-power-accord-this-year-02031601.html,accessed1July2016.164TengriNews,“Kazakhstantodefinelocationandstrategicpartnersforitsfirstnuclearpowerplantin2-3years”,23October2015,seehttp://en.tengrinews.kz/industry_infrastructure/Kazakhstan-to-define-location-and-strategic-partners-for-its-262679/,accessed1July2016.165GovernmentoftheRepublicofKazakhstan,“Draftlawonuseofnuclearenergy,asamended,referredtoSenate”,21December2015,seehttp://www.government.kz/en/novosti/29961-draft-law-on-use-of-nuclear-energy-as-amended-referred-to-senate.html,accessed1July2016.


“encourages the use of alternative energy sources in Kazakhstan, reduces emissions, andenhancesnuclearsafety”.166

TheNationalEnergyPolicyCouncilofThailandin2007proposedthatupto5GWofcapacitybeoperationalbetween2020and2028.However, this targetwill notbemet for anumberofreasons, importantly local opposition on the proposed sites. The latest proposal from theElectricityGeneratingAuthorityofThailand(EGAT)isfortwo1GWunitstobeoperationalby2036, althoughno locationhas beennamed.167 Thailand’s largest private power companyhasannouncedthatitwillinvestUS$200millionfora10percentstakeoftheChinaGeneralNuclearCorporation (CGN) and Guangxi Investment Group’s Fangchenggang nuclear power plant inChina.168CGNobviouslyeyesaroleinthepotential2GWnuclearprojectinThailand.However,asNuclearIntelligenceWeekly(NIW)putsit,“intheneartermCGNmayhavetocontentitselffirstwithrenewableopportunitiesintheregion”.169

In2012,theIAEAsuggestedthatin2013theKingdomofSaudiArabiamightstartbuildingitsfirstnuclear reactor.170This confident predictionwas based on the fact that in April 2010 a royaldecree said: “The development of atomic energy is essential to meet the Kingdom’s growingrequirementsforenergytogenerateelectricity,producedesalinatedwaterandreducerelianceon depleting hydro-carbon resources.”171 The King Abdullah City for Atomic and RenewableEnergy(KA-CARE)wassetupinRiyadhtoadvancethisagenda,andinJune2011,thecoordinatorofscientificcollaborationatKA-CAREannouncedplanstoconstruct16nuclearpowerreactorsover thenext 20 years at a cost ofmore than300billion riyals (US$80billion). The first tworeactorswereplannedtobeonlineintenyearsandthentwomoreperyearuntil2030.However,theKA-CAREnuclearproposalhasstillnotbeenapprovedbythecountry’stopeconomicboard,thenheadedbythelateKingAbdullah,andinMarch2013,itwasreportedthataKA-CAREofficialhas said that a tender is now unlikely for seven or eight years. In November 2013, it was

166U.S.DOE,“Kazakhstan-UnitedStatesSpecialCommissiononEnergyPartnership”,6April2016,seehttp://www.energy.gov/articles/kazakhstan-united-states-special-commission-energy-partnership,accessed28May2016.167WNA,“EmergingNuclearEnergyCountries”,Updated31May2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx,accessed1April2016.168WNN,“ThaipowercompanybuysintoFangchenggangII”,25January2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Thai-power-company-buys-into-Fangchenggang-II-2501164.html,accessed1July2016.169NIW,“CGNPairsNuclearwithRenewablesinGlobalPush”,1April2016.170LucasW.Hixson,“IAEA–Vietnamand4othercountriestoincorporatenuclearenergyafterFukushima”,Enformable.com,24February2012,seehttp://enformable.com/2012/02/iaea-vietnam-and-4-other-countries-to-incorporate-nuclear-energy-after-fukushima/,accessed24June2016.171WorldPoliticsReview,“SaudiArabia’sNuclearAmbitionsPartofBroaderStrategy”,16June2011,seehttp://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9186/saudi-arabias-nuclear-ambitions-part-of-broader-strategy,accessed24June2016.


nonetheless suggested that the project would be put back on track faster than this, with asuggestionthatKA-CAREcouldbringforwardproposalsfornew-buildin2015.172

HashimYamani,presidentoftheKingAbdullahCityforAtomicandRenewableEnergyhassaid:“Recently,however,wehaverevisedtheoutlooktogetherwithourstakeholderstofocuson2040asthemajormilestoneforlong-termenergyplanninginSaudiArabia.”173Noreasonwasgivenforthedelayorwhenthefirstnuclearandsolarplantswouldbeoperational.Thefallingoilpriceandsubsequentdrop inGovernmentrevenues is likely todelayorcurtail capital intensiveproject,suchasnuclear.

During2015,newco-operationagreementsweresignedwithFrance,Russia,ChinaandSouthKorea.ThelastseemedtobethemostadvancedandincludesproposalsforthebuildingoftwoSMARTsmallmodularreactorsandongoingresearchandcollaboration.174

Conclusion on Potential Newcomer Countries Historically,theexpansionofnuclearpowerintonewcountriesisextremelyslow;inthelasttwodecadesonlytwocountries,Romania(1996)andIran(2011),startedpowerreactorsforthefirsttime,whileoverthesametimeperiodtwocountries,KazakhstanandLithuania,closedtheirs.Inthenextfewyears,twocountriesareexpectedtostartgeneratingelectricityfromnuclearreactorsforthefirsttime,buttheirexperiencesareextremelydifferent.OntheonehandistheUAE,whichif it starts the first unit at the Barakah nuclear power plant next year, will be a remarkableachievement,asitwillbecompletedontime.InBelarus,attheOstrovetssite,projectcostsseemtohaverisen,andofficiallytheconstructionphaseisonschedule,butwithoutanyindependentverification,thereisconsiderableskepticismoverthevalidityoftheclaim.Asthesummarytableshowsinalloftheemergingnewcountriestheirprogramshaveexperiencedsignificantdelaysandmostareexhibitingrisesinexpectedcosts.Inreality,beyondTurkeyitisdifficulttoimagineanyofthecountriesthataresofarnotyetbuildinganynuclearpowerplants,completingnewreactorsbeforethe2030s.

Furthermore, it is important to note the dominance of Russian technology in the proposedprojects.Most,ifnotall,oftheseproposedsalesarebackedbyRussianfinance.However,giventheeconomicproblemsinRussiainparticularrelatingtothelowerglobalfossilfuelpricesandongoingeconomicembargoes,itislikelythatmanyofthesearetobefurtherdelayedorcurtailed.

172NIW,“Briefs—SaudiArabia”,15November2014;andAhmadA.,RamanaM.V.,“Toocostlytomatter:EconomicsofnuclearpowerforSaudiArabia”,EnergyJournal,1May2014.173Reuters,“SaudiArabia'snuclear,renewableenergyplanspushedback”,19January2015,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/19/saudi-nuclear-energy-idUSL6N0UY2LS20150119,accessed24June2016.174NIW,“SaudiArabia,WillWaterScarcitySpurNuclearGrowth?”,31July2015.


Table3:ReactorConstructionSchedulesinPotentialNewcomerCountries

CountryReactorName ProposedVendor

InitialStartupDate

LatestSuggested

ConstructionStart

LatestStartupDate

IAEACategory:UnderConstruction

Belarus Ostrovets Rosatom 2019/20 2019/20

UAE Barakah KEPCO 2017/18/19/20 2017/18/19/20

IAEACategory:ContractSignedorAdvancedDevelopment

Bangladesh Rooppur Rosatom 2018 2016

Lithuania Visegrade Hitachi 2020 Suspended

Turkey Akkuyu Rosatom 2015 2022

Sinop Mitsubishi/Areva 2017

Ingeada SNPTC/Westinghouse 2019

Vietnam NinhThuan

Rosatom 2020 Suspended

Egypt Rosatom 2019

Jordan Rosatom 2019

Poland 2020

IAEACategory:WellDevelopedPlans

Chile 2024 Suspended

Indonesia Rosatom Abandoned

KazakhstanRosatomorWestinghouse

?

Thailand 2020-28 ? 2036

SaudiArabia 2020 ? 2040

Sources:Various,compiledbyWNISR,2016


Nuclear Finances: Corporate Meltdown? Nuclearpowerhasasignificantlydifferentfinanceprofiletotheotherconventionalpowerplanttechnologies,with,undernormalcircumstances,largeupfrontconstructioncosts,relativelysmallfuel costs and at the end of operational life, increasing operational costs aswell as significantdecommissioningandwastemanagementcosts.Furthermore,asothersectionsofthereporthaveshown,nuclearconstructionprojectshaverecentlydemonstratedanalmostinherentinabilitytobebuilttotimeandcost.Underthesecircumstances,theviewsandactionsofthemarkets,credit-ratingcompaniesandanalysistscanbedecisiveforthecompetitivenessofnuclearpower.

Someyears ago,many saw the call fordecarbonizationas anopportunity fornuclearpower toexpand,giventhatnogreenhousegasesareemittedduringoperation—althoughsignificantCO2emissions are generated during other parts of the fuel and operational chain. However, asillustrated in the nuclear vs renewables chapter, this has not occurred and it is renewables,particularly solar and wind power, that have over the last decades been deployed at scale.SteveKidd,long-termnuclearindustrystrategist,hasgoneasfarassuggesting“toabandonclimatechangeasaprimeargumentforsupportingamuchhigheruseofnuclearpowertosatisfyrapidly-risingworldpowerneeds”.175Thereason:

Thenuclearindustrygivingcredencetoclimatechangefromfossilfuelshassimplyledtoastrongerrenewablesindustry.Nuclearseemstobe“toodifficult”andgetssidelined-asithaswithintheentireprocesssincetheoriginalKyotoaccords.Andnowrenewables,oftenthoughtofasusefulcomplementstonuclear,begin to threaten it inpowermarketswhen there isabundantpower fromrenewableswhenthewindblowsandthesunshines.

Indeed, there is growing conflict between thepowerproducedbyvariable renewables, such aswindandsolarpower,andthelargecentralizedcapacityoperatingaroundtheclock(traditionallyknown as base-load capacity), such as nuclear power and coal. In particular, many renewableenergy sourceshavepriorityaccess to thegrid systemand/orhave loweroperating costs thanconventionalsourcesandtherefore,whentheyareabletogenerate,itistheirelectricitythatentersthegridsystem.Asmoreandmoresolarandwindisdeployed,theyaretakingagreaterandgreatershareofthemarketatparticulartimes,therefore,restrictingtheproductionsalesofotherpowersources176, especially inNorthAmericaandWesternEurope, regionswhere there isalso flatorfallingpowerdemand.On15May2016, inGermany,theworld’s4thlargesteconomy,forafewhoursover80percentofthecountry’spowerwasprovidedforbyrenewables177;acountrywith10.8GWofinstallednuclearand48GWofcoalandlignitecapacity.

Therefore,itisclearthatasrenewablesmakeaneverincreasingcontributiontothepowermix,thenanyconventionalpowercapacitywillneedtobesmaller,moreflexibleunitsthatcompliment

175SteveKidd,“Isclimatechangetheworstargumentfornuclear?”,NEI,21January2015,seehttp://www.neimagazine.com/opinion/opinionis-climate-change-the-worst-argument-for-nuclear-4493537/,accessed1July2016.176ElaE.,MilliganM.,etal.,“EvolutionofWholesaleElectricityMarketDesignwithIncreasingLevelsofRenewableGeneration”,NationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory,U.S.DOE,OfficeofEnergyEfficiency&RenewableEnergy,September2014,seehttp://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/61765.pdf,accessed12June2016.177Renewablesinternational,“Reportsof100%renewablepowerinGermanyvastlyoverstated”,17May2016,seehttp://www.renewablesinternational.net/reports-of-100-renewable-power-in-germany-vastly-overstated/150/537/95397/,accessed1July2016.


ratherthanconflictwiththeincreasinglycheaprenewables,aswellasinteractrapidlywithotherbalancing options, such as energy storage or flexible demand. This view is shared by manypoliticians,178financiers179,andindustryexperts, includingSteveHolliday,thenCEOoftheU.K.’sNationalGrid,whichownsandoperatestheinfrastructureandisresponsibleforgridbalancing,whostated:

Froma consumer’spointofview, the solaron the rooftop isgoing tobe thebaseload.Centralizedpowerstationswillbeincreasinglyusedtoprovidepeakdemand180.

Thefallingmanufacturingcosts—thesolarPVmodulecostshavefallen80percentsince2008—and the subsequent lower operating cost of renewables—the levelized costs of onshore windpowerhas fallen50percentsince2009181—isalsoreducingthemarketprice forpower.This ismost starkly seen in Europe, with major utilities seeing this not as a cyclical trend but as apermanentchange.“Ithinkthatthepriceofelectricityhasnoreasontorise.Itwillneverbelikeitwasbefore,”statedIsabelleKocher,chiefexecutiveofFrenchcompanyENGIE,theworld'slargestnon-state-ownedproducerofelectricity.182

Most traditional utility companies have been slow to invest in renewable energies and mostonshorewindandsolarPVarenotownedbythe incumbentutilities.Giventhatsolarandwindhavebeenandareexpected,bytheInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA),amongstothers,tobethelargestsourceofnewcapacitytobedeployedonthemediumterm183,manyutilitiesarechangingtheir business focus. In Germany, two of the largest power companies, E.ON and RWE, haveannouncedthattheywillbothsplitintwoanddevelopaconventionalbusinessarmandanotherdeal with renewable energy and energy services. While in France, the bastion of large scale,centralizedelectricityplanning,ENGIE,formallyknownasGDF-Suez,hasalsoannouncedthatittoowillfocusonenergyservices.184

Inadditionto,andinpartasaresultof, thesechangestheshort-termpricesof fossil fuelshavefallenconsiderably,withcoalpricesinEuropein2008wereapproximatelyUS$200/ton,whileinAsia achieved only about US$175/ton, but both fell to less than US$75/ton in 2015185 and areexpectedtofalltoUS$50/tonduring2016inEurope.186Globallynaturalgaspriceshavealsofallen

178GilesParkinson,“Theendofbaseload?Itmaycomesoonerthanyouthink”,RenewEconomy,20February2012,seehttp://reneweconomy.com.au/2012/the-end-of-baseload-it-may-come-sooner-than-you-think-29425,accessed19May2016.179FrankWouters,“Inflexiblebaseloadpowerisjustwhatwedon’tneed”,GoreStreetCapital,LetterintheFinancialTimes,20April2016,seehttps://next.ft.com/content/311ac492-0250-11e6-99cb-83242733f755,accessed19May2016.180KarelBackman,“SteveHolliday,CEONationalGrid:‘Theideaoflargepowerstationsforbaseloadisoutdated’”,EnergyPost,11September2015,seehttp://www.energypost.eu/interview-steve-holliday-ceo-national-grid-idea-large-power-stations-baseload-power-outdated/,accessed1July2016.181MichaelLiebreich,“Insearchofthemiraculous”,BloombergNewEnergyFinance(BNEF)Summit,5April2016,seehttp://about.bnef.com/content/uploads/sites/4/2016/04/BNEF-Summit-Keynote-2016.pdf,accessed31May2016.182MichaelStothard,“LowEuropeanpowerpriceshertostay,saysutilityCEO”,FinancialTimes,15May2016.183IEA,“RenewableEnergy,Medium-termmarketReport2015—MarketAnalysisandForecaststo2020”,2015.184GeertDeClercq,“UPDATE3-Engieshiftsfocustoregulatedpowerasoilandgastaketoll”,Reuters,25February2016,seewww.reuters.com/article/engie-results-idUSL8N1641DY,accessed8July2016.185IEA,“CoalInformation2015”,2015.186Bloomberg,“EuropeanCoalPricesSlumptoaRecordLevel”,22September2015,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-22/coal-for-2016-declines-below-50-in-europe-as-glut-persists,accessed1July2016.


intheU.S.in2013fromUS$5/MBTU187tolessthanUS$2/MBTUin2016,whileinAsiaandEurope,overthesametimeperiodthey,respectively,fellfromUS$20/MBTUandUS$11/MBTUtolessthanUS$5/MBTUin2016.188Thefallingpricesoffossilfuelsarelikelytofurtherdrivedownthemarketpricesforelectricity,particularlyaffectingtherelativeeconomicsfornuclearpower.

Lowinterestratesareofhugesignificanceforlargecapitalintensiveprojectslikenuclearpower.AstudypublishedbytheOakRidgeNationalLaboratoryintheU.S.,suggestedthathalvingtheannualinterestrateforanuclearpowerplantthatcostUS$6000/kW,from10to5percent,wouldreducethefinalproductioncostofpowerbyaround40percent.189ThisapproximateassessmentisinlinewithfindingsfromtheIAEA,thatnotesthatinterestrateandconstructionperiodarefundamentaltotheeconomicsofaprojectandthat:

thiscanbeshownbycomparingtherelativeamountsofinterestduringconstruction(IDC)incurredbytwoprojectsofidenticalvalue([US]$5.75billion)intermsofovernightcosts(costsofmaterials,equipment,labour,etc.),butwhichdifferintermsofprojectdurationandtherateofinterestpaidonfinancing.Thetotalamountsof IDC incurredbythesetwoprojectswasalmost [US]$2.8billion ifa7yearconstructiondurationand10%rateofinterestwasassumed,versus[US]$1billionifa5yeardurationata5%rateofinterestwasassumed.190

Giventhatinterestratesareatahistoriclowandhavebeenforsometime,fromacostofborrowingmoneyperspectivetherehasneverbeenabettertimeforbuildinganuclearpowerplants.Despitethis,andtheavailabilityofcapital,thereisverylittleprivatesectorinvestmentinnuclearpower.

Giventhiscombinationofcircumstances,itisnotsurprisingthattheviewsofthefinancialsectortowardslargeincumbentpowerutilitiesandthenuclearindustryinparticularremainsasnervousandunforgiving.

Creditratingscompaniesassignratingsoncompanies’orgovernment’sexpectedabilitytopaybackdebt,inatimelymannerandtherefore,“canandshouldprovidearobustforwardlookingindicationof relative credit risk.”191Thereare threemain ratingsagencies,Moody's InvestorsServiceandStandard & Poor's (S&P), which together control 80 percent of the global market, while FitchRatingscontrolsafurther15percent.Theviewsoftheratingagencieshavealargeimpactonthefinancialsituationofcompaniesandstates.Itwassaid,in2011,ofheadofS&P,“DavidBeersmightbethemostpowerfulmanintheworldyouhaveneverheardof.”192

The rating companies assign score cards to companies or governments. S&P's long-term ratingsystemhas10categories:AAA,AA,A,BBB,BB,B,CCC,CC,CandD.Theratingisgivena+or-toindicate that the company is in the upper or lower end of the category. All of the ratings aresupplementedwithan “outlook”; this is theratingagency’sopinionon theprobableshort-term

187MBTU=millionBritishthermalunits188FinancialTimes,“Gaspricetumblecomesasmarketsareincreasinglyinterlinked”,10March2016,seehttps://next.ft.com/content/3bc0116c-e681-11e5-a09b-1f8b0d268c39,accessed15May2016.189TJayHarrison,“EconomicConditionsandFactorsAffectingNewNuclearPowerDeployment”,OakRidgeNationalLaboratory,DOE,October2014,seeinfo.ornl.gov/sites/publications/files/Pub52713.pdf,accessed1July2016. 190IAEA,“ClimateChangeandNuclearPower2015”,October2015.191PaulTaylor,“TheroleofcreditratingsagenciesintheInternationalfinancialsystem”,PresidentandCEOofFitchGroup,UnitedNationalGeneralAssemblyThematicDebate,10September2013.192StephenFoley,“S&Pspowerchiefstepsoutoftheshadows”,7August2011,TheIndependent,seehttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/sampps-powerful-chief-steps-out-of-the-shadows-2333592.html,accessed1July2016.


trendinthecompany’screditquality.Theoutlooksarepositive(up),stableornegative(down).ThehighestratingisAAA,downtoBBB,whicharealsosaidtobeasafeinvestment.However,BBdowntoCisdescribedasspeculativeor“junk”.193

Table4:StandardandPoor’sLong-TermCreditRatingofMajorEuropeanUtilities

Company LatestRating Outlook 2016

May2015May

2014June

2013June

2012June

2011April 2010 2009 2008 2007

CEZ Oct.2006 Stable A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A-

EDF May2016 Negative A A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ AA- AA- AA-

ENEL July2013 Stable BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A

E.ON May2015 Negative BBB+ BBB+ A- A A A A A A A

ENGIE April2016 Negative A- A A A A A A A A A

RWE Aug.2015 WatchNeg BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A A A A+

TVO May2016 Stable BB+ BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB

Vattenfall Sept.2015 Negative BBB+ A- A- A- A- A- A A A- A-

Sources:Standard&Poor’s;Companies’FinancialReports

Table4,showsthetrendsinratingfromS&Pforaselectionofmajorelectricityutilities.Whatisclear,isthatS&PrecognizestheprevailingconditionsinthepowersectorinEuropewithnegativeorstablereviewsofthecompaniesand,indeed,alloftheassessedoneshavinglowercreditratingthannineyears ago. InFebruary2016, S&Ppublisheda summaryof its viewson16Europeanparentcompaniesofpowerutilities,whichconcludedthatfallingpowerprices,structuralchanges,including a newmarket design across Europe, and falling earnings could result in downgradesacrossthesectorthisyear.194

AsshownintheFranceFocussectionofthisreport,EDFhasparticularfinancialtroubles.Thisisrecognizedbytheratingagencies.InMay2016,Moody’sissuedacreditopinion,whichhighlightedthreekeyproblemsforEDF;exposuretodecliningmarketpricesinFranceandtheU.K.;increasedcompetition in itsdomesticsupplymarket;andthesubstantial investmentprogramrequiredtoupgrade its nuclear reactors. Moody’s also noted that the “rating could be downgraded ifHinkleyPointCweretogoahead”andthat“theoutlookcouldreturntostableprovidedthatEDF

193RebeccaMarston,“Whatisaratingagency?”,BBC,20October2014,seehttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10108284,accessed1July2016.194S&P,“WeakPowerPricesAndRegulatoryRisksTriggerMainlyNegativeRatingActionsOnEuropeanUtilities”,24February2016.


decidesnottoproceedwithHinkley.”195Thisisallthemoreremarkableasduringthesameweek,Jean-BernardLevy,EDFchiefexecutivetolditsshareholdersthatHinkleywas“essential”,adding:“WithoutHinkley Point, the groupwould have no credibility to reachnewnuclearmarkets.”196Duringtheyear2015,EDF’scompanydebtrosebynearly€3billion(US$3.6billion)to€37.4billion(US$40.9billion).AsEDF'scredit-ratingwasdowngraded,thedebtloadwilllikelyincreasefurtherasdebtbecomesmoreexpensive.

Figure20:EDFSharePriceDevelopment2006–2016

Source:YahooFinances,July2016197

ThisisasimilarviewtoS&P,whichinMay2016lowereditslong-termcorporatecreditratingbyS&P to A from A+, which “reflects the increasing share of revenues that EDF derives fromunregulatedactivitiesfollowingthepartialliberalizationoftheFrenchenergymarket.Thiscomesat a time of a sharp decrease in power prices.”198 In June Fitch ratings also downgraded itsassessmentofEDFfromAtoA-,oneofthekeyreasonsforthiswas“inviewoffurtherpotential

195Moody’s,“ElectricitedeFrance–updatefollowingrecentdowngradetoA2negative”,CreditOpinion,17May2016.196EmilyGosden,“HinkleyPointcostscouldriseto£21bn,EDFadmits”,TheTelegraph,12May2016,seehttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/05/12/hinkley-point-costs-could-rise-to-21bn-edf-admits/,accessed1July2016.197DataextractedfromYahooFinancereferstoEDF’ssharevalueperformanceontheParisStockMarket(EDF.PA).Percentagechangesarecalculatedonthebasisoftheclosingpriceon2January2006.198S&P,“France-BasedIntegratedEnergyCompanyEDFDowngradedTo‘A/A-1’OnWeakerBusinessProfile;OutlookNegative”,13May2016.

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50

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200

PercentageChangeSince20

06

EDF (FR) Share Price Development Since 2006(in %)

SharePriceasof 2 January2006:

€32.1

22November2007:€86.45

20April2010:€41.95

2 April 2014:€29.73SharePrice

asof4 July 2016:€11.25


majorcommitments,itsbiggestchallengewillbetoreduceunderlyingnegativefreecashflow.”199EDFshareslost87percentoftheirvaluesincetheypeakedin2007(seeFigure20).

While EDFhas sought and achieved increased government support and finance tomaintain itsstructure,GDF-SUEZ,hastakenadifferentroute,byredefining itsbusinessmodelandrenameditselfasENGIE,inApril2015andindoingsoitstated200:

That’swhyGDFSUEZisnowENGIE.Theworldofenergyisundergoingprofoundchange.Theenergytransitionhasbecomeaglobalmovement,characterizedbydecarbonizationandthedevelopmentofrenewableenergysources,andbyreducedconsumptionthankstoenergyefficiencyandthedigitalrevolution.

TheratingagencyS&Pwasreceptivetothisrestructuring,saying:

WeviewENGIE'srecentlyannouncedassetrotationplanasapositive,albeitambitious,strategicshift.Weexpectthiswillchangethegroup'sbusinessmixovertime.201

Despite this, the prevailing conditions in the European market have resulted in an overalldowngrading of the company by S&P and Moody’s.202 During the 2015/16 financial year thefinancialdebtofENGIErosefrom€38.3billion(US$42.5billion)to€39.2billion(US$43.4billion).Furthermore,despite this rebranding,ENGIE still describes itself as a “player in theworldwidenuclearrevival”,withprojectsincludingintheU.K.;withpartownershipofNuGen,whichtogetherwithToshibaplantobuild3.4GWofcapacity;inTurkeyitisinvolvedintheSinopproject;andisactiveinprojectsinBrazil,SaudiArabiaandPoland.203

OfallcountriesinEurope,theincumbentcompaniesinGermanyareexperiencingthemostvisibletransformation. On 1 January 2016, E.ON completed its restructuring,whereby itwill focus onrenewables,energynetworksandcustomersolutions,whileaseparatecompany,Uniperwillfocusonconventionalpower(hydro,naturalgas,coal)andglobalenergytrading.However,somewhatsurprisingly,E.ONretainedresponsibilityforitsremainingfournuclearpowerplants,whichwassaidtoavoiddelayintheestablishmentofUniper.204S&Psstated,priortothefinalagreementonnuclearpower,thatthenewstructureofE.ONwouldstrengthentheirriskprofile,butthatitwasstillbeingdowngraded.205

RWE,havetakenasimilarapproachseparatingitsrenewables,gridsandretaildistributionintoasubsidiary, floating 10 percent in an initial public offering in 2016, which “allows RWE to tap

199Fitch,“FitchDowngradesEdFto‘A-’;Stableoutlook”,7June2016.200ENGIE,“Astheworldchanges,allenergieschangewithit”,24April2016seehttp://www.engie.com/en/journalists/press-releases/gdf-suez-becomes-engie/,accessed1July2016.201S&P,“France-BasedEnergyCompanyENGIEDowngradedTo'A-/A-2'OnWeakerBusinessProfile;OutlookNegative”,29April2016.202Moody’s,“Moody'sdowngradesENGIEtoA2;stableoutlook”,27April2016.203ENGIE,“NuclearEnergy”,Undated,seehttp://www.engie.com/en/businesses/electricity/nuclear-energy/,accessed26May2016.204E.ON,“E.ONmakinggoodprogressimplementingitsstrategy:retainingitsnuclearpowerbusinessinGermanymeansspinoffcanremainonschedule”,PressRelease,9September2015,seehttp://www.eon.com/en/media/news/press-releases/2015/9/9/eon-making-good-progress-implementing-its-strategy-retaining-its-nuclear-power-business-in-germany-means-spinoff-can-remain-on-schedule.html,accessed1July2016.205UtilityWeek,“Eon’screditratingdowngradedaheadofspin-offplans”,28May2015,seehttp://utilityweek.co.uk/news/eon's-credit-rating-downgraded-ahead-of-spin-off-plans/1135702#.V0cF7PkrIZg,accessed1July2016.


market capital for renewable energy while winding down conventional operations”.206 InMay2016,Moody’sdowngradedRWE,asits“generationfleetisprimarilyfixed-costinnature,withover half of output represented by lignite and nuclear, making it exposed to movements inwholesalepowerpricesasRWE'shedgesrolloff”aswellasconcernsovertherisksassociatedwithnuclearliabilitiesandpoliticalexposetoitscoalandlignitegeneration.207RWEshareslostabout85percentoftheirvaluesincetheypeakedinJanuary2008(seeFigure21).

Figure21:RWE(DE)SharePriceDevelopment2006–2016

Source:YahooFinance,July2016208

Vattenfall,whichownssignificantcapacityinSwedenandGermany,isalsosufferinganditsoutlookaccording toMoody’s and S&P is negative. This is in part due to lower fuel prices, but also, toexposuretocarbonpricing,givenitsownership,althoughitistryingtosellit,ofsignificantlignitecapacityinGermanyanduncertaintyovernucleardecommissioningpolicyalsoinGermany.209

The fragility of the European utilities and the impacts of nuclear construction are extremelypronouncedinFinlandwiththeimpactofOlkiluotoonTeollisuudenVoimaOyj(TVO).Thereactorshould have been completed in 2009, but is now scheduled for completion in 2018 and hasexperiencedaconsiderablecostover-run(seeFinlandsectioninAnnex1forfurtherdetails).As

206NikkiHouston,“RWE’sSupervisoryBoardApprovesCompany’sSplit”,WallStreetJournal,11December2015,seehttp://www.wsj.com/articles/rwes-supervisory-board-approves-companys-split-1449840584,accessed1July2016.207Moody’s,“Moody'sdowngradesRWEtoBaa3/P-3;stableoutlook”,13May2016.208DataextractedfromYahooFinancereferstoRWE’ssharevalueperformanceontheFrankfurtStockMarket(RWE.F).Percentagechangeiscalculatedonthebasisoftheclosingpriceon2January2006.209Moody’s,“Moody'sconfirmsVattenfall'sA3rating;negativeoutlook”,13May2016.

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06

RWE (DE) Share Price Development Since 2006(in %)

SharePriceasof 2 January2006:

€62.50

7 January2008:€100.26

15 April 2010:€67.68

SharePriceasof4 July 2016:

€14.84


thisnewsemergedyearonyear,ithashadanegativeimpactonthecompany’screditratings.InMay2016,S&Plowereditsratingforthecompanyto'BB+/B'from'BBB-/A-3.ThiswassaidtobebothasaresultofthedeteriorationintheFinishpowerpricesandmostdamningly:

FuturepricesarecurrentlypredictedbythemarkettobebelowTVO'sexpectedcostsofproductionwhenthethirdnuclearpowerplantOlkiluoto3(OL3)iscommissionedin2018/2019.210

In2009,theFitchLongtermratingwasA-,butbyMay2016ithadfallentoBBBwithanegativeoutlook.211FitchalsoreviseditsoutlookforTVOfromstabletonegativeinMay2016andsaidthatitmaydowngradetheratinginthenext12to18monthsdependingsupportfromtheshareholderswithparticularconcern“whentheOlkiluoto3(OL3)nuclearpowerplantwillbecommissionedinlate2018,leadingtosubstantiallyhigherelectricityproductioncosts”.212TVO'sratingbyFitchandS&Pisnowjusttwonotchesabove“junk”.

Figure22:SharePriceDevelopmentofEuropeanPowerCompanies

Source:Yahoo-Finance,GoogleFinances,2016213

Thisnewsshouldbeparticularlytroublesomeforthosebuildingorconsideringbuildingnuclearpowerplants,astheperceivedwisdomwasthatthemainfinancialriskwasduringconstructionand that once operational, the financial risks would decline. However, these agencies arehighlightingadangerthat,oncecomplete,thereactorsareunlikelytobeprofitable,whichmaywell

210S&P,“Finland-BasedNuclearPowerProducerTVODowngradedTo'BB+'From'BBB-'OnReducedCostCompetitiveness;OutlookStable”,23May2016.211Fitch,“FitchRevisesTeollisuudenVoimaOyj'sOutlooktoNegative;Affirmsat'BBB'”,18May2016.212Ibidem.213Sharepricesrepresentedhereareingeneralclosingpricesandbasedonthefollowingstockmarkets:ENEL:“ENEL.MI”MilanStockMarket;ENGIE:“ENGIE.PA”Paris;EDF:“EDF.PA”,Paris;RWE:“RWE.DE”,XETRAmarket;E.ON:“E.OAN.DE”XETRAmarket

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150

Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16

Percen

tageChangeSince2006

Share Price Development of European Power Companies(in % since 2006)

ENEL (IT) ENGIE (FR) EDF (FR) RWE (DE) E.ON (DE)


applyacrossthewholeEuropeanmarketandthereforeraiseconcernsfortheotherconstructionprojects,inFrance,SlovakiaandevenBelarus,whoplanstosellintotheBalticmarket.

ENEL,whichisprimarilyanItaliancompany,butwithotherEuropeanassetsincludinginSpainandSlovakia, isoneof the fewEuropeanpowercompaniesdeemedbythecreditagenciestohaveastableoutlook.Thisisprimarilybecausedespitefallingpowerprices,“Enel'searningsexposedtomerchantgenerationinEuropeislowrelativetootherEuropeanutilities”.Moody'sestimatesthatapproximately70percentof groupEBITDAcomes froma combinationof regulated/contractedactivitiesthatsupportcashflowstability’.214

In Central Europe, the large centralized utilities are also suffering. In April 2016, Moody’sdowngradedtheCzechUtility,CEZ,asitsaiditsgeneratingfleetwas“predominantlyfixed-costinnature,witharound90percentofoutputrepresentedbylignite,nuclearandhydro,thusmakingitparticularlyexposedtomovementsinwholesalepowerprices”.215

Thefallingrevenuesandnegativeoutlookfromtheratingagenciesismirroredinthestockmarket,withEuropeanstockmarketpricesformajorutilitiesfallingsincetheturnofthedecade,ascanbeseeninFigure22.Ofthefiveselectedcompanies,onlyENELofItalyhasretainedmostofitsvalue,stilllosingonethirdofitsvalueadecadeago.

InJapanthepowercompaniesarefinanciallysuffering,whichisnotsurprisinggiventheimmediateimpactthatFukushimahadonthepowercompanieswiththeclosureofallofthecountry’snuclearpowerstations.However,whatisnowalsoclearisthatthelongertermpoliticalimpactswiththeintroductionofmarketliberalizationmayaffectthelongertermviabilityoftheincumbentutilities.This raises concerns over the longer term viability of the companies, asMoody’s notes on theproposed reforms that, “the utilities' relatively high ratings have been underpinned by theirprotected monopoly position, and a supportive and relatively predictable regulatoryframework”.216

InApril2016,thenextwaveofJapaneseelectricitymarketliberalizationenteredintoforce,thisenablednon-commercialcustomerstochoicetheirelectricitysupplyforthefirsttime.Inresponsetothissomeofthepreviouslymonopolisticregionalpowercompaniesareproposingrestructuring.For example, Tokyo Electric Power Corporation (TEPCO), has adopted a new business slogan“EnergyforEveryChallenge”,andestablishedaholdingcompany,whichwillcontinuetoownthenuclear,hydroandotherrenewables,withthreeadditionalsubsidiaries;fuelandthermalpowergeneration, general power transmission and distribution and retail electricity.217Moody’s havestatedthattherestructuringwillhavenoimpactontheirratings.218However,astheoperatorofFukushima, TEPCO’s credit rating and financial outlook in general has experienced massivedownwardturnasaresultoftheaccident.

Thesituation isverydifferent inKorea,wheretheKoreanElectricPowerCorporation(KEPCO),remains inastrongpositiondueto itsvirtualmonopolyofgeneration(85percent), through its

214Moody’s,“Moody'saffirmsEnel'sBaa2ratings;outlookstable”,13February2016.215Moody’s,“RatingAction:Moody'sdowngradesCEZ'sratingtoBaa1;outlookstable”,6April2016.216Moody’s,“Moody's:ProposedreformsforJapan'selectricsectorcouldweakentheutilities'creditquality”,30September2015.217Metering&SmartEnergyInternational,“TEPCOreadiesitselfforJapan’selectricitymarketderegulation”,23May2016,seehttp://www.metering.com/magazine_articles/tepco-readies-japans-electricity-market-deregulation/,accessed1July2016.218Moody’s,“Moody's:NoratingimpactfromTEPCO'scorporaterestructuring”,1April2016.


ownershipofthesixgeneratingcompaniesaswellasitsmonopolyoperationofthetransmissionanddistributionsystems.Furthermore,withfallingfossilfuelcostsandtheabsenceofanautomaticpass-throughtocustomers,itsearningalmostdoubledin2015.Consequently,Moody’shavenotedthatthestrongoperatingresultssupportastableoutlookrating.219

ThedifferencebetweentheJapaneseandKoreanutilitiescanbeseeninFigure23,whichtracktheshareoftoptwoJapanesecompaniesTEPCOandKansaiElectricandtheKoreavirtualmonopolyKEPCO. The impact on the share prices of the Japanese companies of the beginning of theFukushima catastrophe inMarch2011 is clear and expected.However, the failure to showanyrecovery in the intervening fiveyears isremarkable.This is likely tobe foravarietyofreasonsincluding:thefailuretorestartasignificantnumberofreactorsandtheongoinguncertaintyoverthe future role for nuclear power; the introduction of new electricity market liberalizationlegislation, opening up the market to new actors; and the development of new technologies,enabling decentralized power production and storage. InKorea, KEPCO remains in a regulatedmarketandhasbeenabletoincreaseitsrevenuesignificantlyinthepast12months,henceitsrapidupturninitssharevalue.

Figure23:SharePriceDevelopmentofAsianPowerCompanies(in%since2010)

Source:YahooFinances,GoogleFinances,2016220

China General Nuclear Corporation (CGN), one of the three nuclear operators in China, wasestablished in 1994 and is wholly owned and directly supervised by the State-owner Assets

219Moody’s,“Moody's:KEPCO'srobust2015resultsupholdcompany'screditquality”,5February2016.220Sharepricesrepresentedhereareingeneralclosingpricesandbasedonthefollowingstockmarkets:KEPCO:“KEP”NewYorkStockExchangemarket;TEPCO:“TKECF”;andKansai:“KAEPY”,OtherOTCmarket.

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40

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Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16

Share Price Development of Asian Power Companies(in % since 2010)

KEPCO (KR) TEPCO (JP) Kansai (JP)


Supervision and Administration Commission under China’s State Council. A CGN subsidiary,CGNCoLtd,wasestablished inMarch2014and inDecember2014, thecompanymade its firstpublic listing, which raised US$3.16 billion and was deemed credit positive by Moody’s. Theownership of the company is 64 percent by CGN, 24.56 percent by Hong Kong Shareholders,7.54percentbyHengjianInvestmentand3.70percentbyChinaNationalNuclearCorporation.221In May 2015, Moody’s said of CGN, when reviewing its proposed bond for a wholly ownedsubsidiary:“CGN'sstandalonecreditmetricswillremainweakforthenexttwotothreeyears,givenits massive capital expenditure pipeline, potential delays in projects and slowing electricitydemand growth in China.” The rating agency also stated that CGN’s outlook remained stable,reflecting that “the companywill not undertake further aggressive debt-funded acquisitions orexpansion”.222InJuly2015,Moody’sassignedadefinitiverating,ofA3,totheUS$600millionbond,whichwassaid tobe for “refinancingshort termborrowings, replenishworkingcapitaland forgeneralcorporatepurposes.”223ThesharepriceofCGNCorporation’ssubsidiary,CGNCo.Ltd,ontheHongKongstockexchange,hasfallenby60percentsinceJune2015,ascanbeseeninFigure24.

Figure24:CGNCoLtd.(China)SharePriceDevelopmentSinceFirstListing

Source:YahooFinance,July2016

In June 2016, Exelon, announced that it was going to shut down the reactor at Clinton PowerstationsinJune2017andthetworeactorsatQuadCitiesstationinJune2018sinceithadfailedtoget the financial support from the State of Illinois, as the power plants had lost a total ofUS$800millionoverthepastsevenyears.Oneutilityanalystwasquotedassaying:“The lesson

221CGN,“AnnualReport2014”,March2015.222Moody’s,“Moody'sassigns(P)A3toChinaGeneralNuclear'sproposedUSDbond“,6May2015.223Moody’s,“Moody'sassignsdefinitiveA3toChinaGeneralNuclear'sguaranteedbonds”,31July2015.

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40

60

80


4

CGN (CN) Share Price Development Since First Listing in 2014(in %)


HKD2.18

SharePriceasof 10 December2014:

HKD3.31

5 June 2015:HKD5.43

19 October 2015:HKD3.65


hereisthatthere’snotgoingtobemuchsubsidizingofmerchantnuclearplants.”224Exelonshareslostabout40percentcomparedtotheirleveladecadeagoandtheyareover60percentbelowtheirpeaklevelin2008(seeFigure25).

Figure25:Exelon(US)SharePriceDevelopment2006-2016

Source:YahooFinances,July2016225

AllfourreactorsunderconstructionintheU.S.arebeingbuiltinregulatedmarkets.TwoofthesearebeingbuiltbyGeorgiaPowerattheVogtlesite.InMay2016Moody’sdowngradeditsparentcompany,SouthernCompanyfromBaa1toBaa2—justtwonotchesabove“junk”—asaresultofitsacquisitionofAGLResourcesandtheadditionaldebtitwastakingon.However,Moody’snotedthatSouthern'sfinancialpositionhadbeenweakenedoveranumberoffactors,includingtheVogtlesite“thathasexperiencedcostsincreasesanddelays,withcommercialoperationcurrentlythreeyearsbehindschedule.”226

Nuclear Builders and Vendors Inadditiontotheutilities,thenuclearbuildersandvendorsaresufferinginpartasaresultofthechangesinthepowermarket.Thetraditionalreactorsuppliers,namely,AREVA,AtomicEnergyofCanadaLimited(AECL),WestinghouseandGeneralElectrics(GE),arelosingwhatremainsofthe

224Bloomberg,“ExelonShuttingTwoNuclearPlantsAfterLegislationFails”,2June2016,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-02/exelon-closing-2-illinois-nuclear-plants-after-legislation-fails,accessed1July2016.225DataextractedfromYahooFinancereferstoExelon’ssharevalueperformanceontheNewYorkStockExchangeMarket(EXC).Percentagechangeiscalculatedonthebasisoftheclosingpriceon3January2006.226Moody’s,“Moody’sdowngradesSouthCompanytoBaa2stable;affirmssubsidiaryratingsandoutlooks”,14May2016.

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06

Exelon (US) Share Price Development Since 2006(in %)


US$36.41

2 July 2008: US$90.54

SharePriceasof 3 January 2006:

US$54.62


export market to countries such as China, Russia and South Korea, (see Potential NewcomerCountries),whichispartlyduetotheirgreaterabilitytopotentiallyaccess(cheaper)finance.

Over the past few years, AREVA has experienced wide-ranging financial problems, which arereflectedinitscreditrating.S&PdowngradedAREVAto“junk”(BB+)inNovember2014227,andbyanother two notches in March 2015, deep into the speculative domain (BB-).228 Then inDecember 2015, following further revelations on the extent of its financial problems S&P’sdowngradedthestockfurthertoB+.229

Figure26:AREVASharePriceDevelopment2006-2016

Source:Investing,June2016230

The rising debt—from€4.47 billion (US$5.4 billion) in 2014, to €6.32 billion (US$7 billion) in2016—and lack of financial credibility has led the Government to propose that the company'sreactorconstructionarm,AREVANP,becomeincorporatedintoEDF231,thedetailsofwhicharestilltobefinalized(seeFocusFrancesection).However,theimpactofthesedevelopmentscanbeseen

227S&P,“FrenchNuclearGroupAREVADowngradedTo‘BB+/B’OnExpectedMoreNegativeCashFlows;OutlookNegative”,20November2014.228S&P,“FrenchNuclearGroupAREVADowngradedto‘BB-’onFurtherProfitChallengesandCashBurn;OutlookDeveloping”,5March2015.229Reuters,“S&PsaysArevadowngradedto‘B+’–RTRS”,22December2015,seehttp://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/AREVA.PAp/key-developments/article/3314652,accessed1July2016.230DataextractedfromInvesting.comreferstoAREVA’ssharevalueperformanceontheParisstockmarket.Percentagechangeiscalculatedonthebasisoftheclosingpriceon2January2006.231Areva,“AnnualResults”,PressRelease,26February2016,seehttp://www.areva.com/finance/liblocal/docs/2016/PR%20AREVA%202015%20annual%20results%20%20VUK.pdf,accessed26May2016.

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06

AREVA (FR) Share Price Development Since 2006(in %)

SharePriceasof5 July 2016

€3.56

SharePriceasof 3 January2006

€40.53

6 June2008:€81.25

17 February2011:€37.8

17 February 2014:€21.2

%


intheevolutionofAREVA’sshareprice,which,asofearlyJuly2016,is96percentlowerthanitwasinJune2008(seeFigure26).

ThenuclearindustryisRussiaislargelystateownedandoperated.However,RosatomStateAtomicEnergy Corporation of Russia is the 100 percent owner of the joint stock company JSCAtomenergoprom,whichisratedbythemajorcreditagencies.InJanuary2015,S&BdowngradedthecompanytoBB+(“junk”).InApril2016,itwasgivenanegativeoutlookbyMoody’s,primarilyin response to thesovereigncredit ratingsof theRussianFederationasawhole,but the ratingcompany warned that “the lack of adequate liquidity could put pressure on the company'srating.”232 This is particularly important given that Rosatom stated that it is currently buildingninereactors inRussiaandanadditional11overseas(withsaid toa totalof29reactors in theportfolio).TheyfurtherstatedthattheoverseasorderportfolioisworthUS$101.4billion.233

Table5:StandardandPoor’sLong-TermCreditRatingofMajorNuclearVendors

Company LatestRating Outlook 2016

May2015May

2014June

2013June

2012June

2011April 2010 2009

Atomenergoprom(Rosatom)

January2015 Negative BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB-

AREVA May2016 Developing B+ BB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB+ BBB+ A

Sources:Standard&Poor’s,Companies’AnnualReports

ToshibapurchasedWestinghousefromBritishNuclearFuelsLimitedin2006forUS$5.4billion.InApril2016,itannouncedthatitexpectedtohaveUS$2.3billioninimpairmentlosses,inrecognitionthatithadoverpaidforthecompanyandfallingrevenues.Toshiba’scurrentfiscalyearestimateforsalesrevenuefromthenuclearfirmisUS$3.1billionin2015/6—US$540millionbelowwhatitwasinNovember2015andUS$180millionbelowwhatthecompanyprojectedinMarch2016.234Evenbeforethelatestfinancialsituationhadcometolight,Toshibaadmittedthatitwaslookingforapartnersothatitwouldreduceit87percentownershipofWestinghouse.235

AtomicEnergyofCanadaLimited, is oneof theworld’s largestnuclear constructors,with salesacrosstheworld,includinginEurope,AsiaandtheAmericas.However,AECL,isafederalCrowncorporationandsoisnotlistedonstockexchangesorgivenratingbytheAgencies.

232Moody’s,“Moody'sconcludesratingsreviewson12RussianutilitiesandinfrastructureGRIandsubsidiaries”,27April2016.233Rosatom,“AnnualPublicReport2014”,seehttp://www.rosatom.ru/upload/iblock/661/661e5b99fa4ad0eca00bfde76055b503.pdf,accessed13June2016.234PowerSource,“Westinghouseworth$2.3billionless,Toshibasays”,PittsburghPost-Gazette,26April2016,seehttp://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/companies/2016/04/26/Westinghouse-value-now-2-3-billion-less-Toshiba-says/stories/201604260158,accessed30May2016.235Reuters,“Amidaccountingprobe,ToshibamaysellWestinghouseshares:sources”,9July2015,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-toshiba-accounting-divestiture-idUSKCN0PI2UA20150709,accessed1July2016.


Conclusion on Corporate Finances Thepowersectorisinaperiodoftransformationastheneedfordecarbonizationisleadingtothelargerdeploymentofrenewableandgreaterenergyefficiency.This,coupledwithfallingfossilfuelprices,isreducingtherevenuesofthetraditionalutilities,thatuntilrecentlyhadremainedfocusedonmaximizingprofitsfromitsexistinginfrastructure.

Furthermore,already,insystemswithhigherlevelsofdeploymentofsolarandwindpowerandothervariablerenewablestheoperationalregimeandeconomicprofileofthepowermarkethaschanged.Thishasbeenincreasingtheneedforflexiblegenerationandreducedtheneedforbase-load capacity such as nuclear and coal. Further reducing the opportunities for further nuclearpowerdeployment,asillustratedbythetechnicaland/oreconomicproblemsoftheworld’smostexperiencednuclearexporters.

Thesefactorsarerecognizedby,andbeingacteduponbythefinancialcommunity,withnegativeoutlooks for many power companies particularly for those without regulated prices forconventionalpower.However,eveninregulatedmarket,theonwarddriveofnewtechnologiesisexpected, by analysists, investors and the industry itself, to be only a temporary block of thedevelopmentofanewpowermarket,drivenbynewmarketactorsandtechnologiesandgreatercustomerengagement.

In some countries, the extent of these have been recognized and the existing incumbents arerestructuringtodevelopbusinessmodelstosell;energyservices,ratherthanjustkWhs;balancingservices;andsmaller,oftendecentralizedgenerationunits.However,thisisnotalwaysthesecaseandmanyareretrenchingandareunwillingtoreform,whichislikelytothreatentheireconomicstability.


Chernobyl+30 Status Report

“The magnitude and scope of the disaster, the size of the affected population, and the long-term consequences make it, by far, the worst industrial disaster on record. Chernobyl unleashed a complex web of events and long-term difficulties, such as massive relocation, loss of economic stability, and long-term threats to health in current and, possibly, future generations….”

IAEA/WHO; 26 July 2005236

General Overview of the Chernobyl Site TheChernobylPowerComplex,(ChNPP)ownedandoperatedbythestatecompanyEnergoatom,issituatedabout130kmnorthofKiev,Ukraine,andabout20kmsouthoftheborderwithBelarus,andconsistedof fourRBMK-1000(reaktorbolshoymoshchnostykanalnyorhigh-powerchannelreactor) a1000MWepressurized light-water cooled reactorwith individual fuel channels, andusinggraphiteasmoderator.

Thefirstunit,commissionedin1977,wasfollowedbyunit2in1978,unit3in1981,andunit4in1983.Unit1wassubject toapartialcoremeltdownon9September1982andwasrepaired.237Contamination was observed in the area within 14 km radius but no public information wasdisclosedabouttheaccidentatthetime.

Twomorereactors,units5and6,wereunderconstructionatthetimeofthe1986accident.Unit5wasthenabout70percentcompleteandwasscheduledtostartoperationon7November1986.However,constructionworkwashaltedandeventuallycancelledinApril1989.Unit6wasnevercompleted.

Thethreeremainingunits,resumedoperationafewdaysafterthe1986accident.Unit2wasshutdownin1991followingamajorfireintheturbinehall.238Unit1wasshutdowninNovember1996,andunit3in2000.

236IAEA/WHO,“HealthEffectsoftheChernobylAccidentandSpecialHealthCareProgramsReportoftheUNChernobylForum”,ExpertGroup“Health”(EGH),Workingdraft,26July2005.237In2001,theSecurityServicesofUkraine(SSU)publishedareportonthe1986nuclearaccidentinChernobyl,whichincludeddocumentsconcerningthepartialmeltdownoftheChernobylnuclearpowerreactornumber1on9September1982.ThereportconsistedlargelyofdocumentsfromthefilesofSovietKGBarchives.ThereportwrittenbyVoldymyrTykhyywasentitled“FromArchivesofVUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGBChernobylTragedyinDocumentsandMaterials”.InMay2008,aSummarywaseditedandfeaturedpp.252-263:T.Imanaka,“Many-sidedApproachtotheRealitiesoftheChernobylNPPAccident:Summing-upoftheConsequencesoftheAccidentTwentyYearsAfter(II)”,KyotoUniversity,ResearchReactorInstitute.See:VolodymyrTykhyy,“FromArchivesofVUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGBChernobylTragedyinDocumentsandMaterials(Summary)”,seehttp://www.rri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/NSRG/reports/kr139/pdf/tykhyy-2.pdf,accessed5June2016.238TheNewYorkTimes,“FireReportedinGeneratorAreaAttheChernobylNuclearPlant”,12October1991,seehttp://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/12/world/fire-reported-in-generator-area-at-the-chernobyl-nuclear-plant.html,accessed1July2016.


Sequence and Origin of the Accident on 26 April 1986 TheChernobylnuclearaccidenthappenedon26April1986at01.23a.m.inthecourseofatechnicaltestinunit4.The“beyonddesign-basisaccident”wascausedbyinappropriatereactoroperationat low-power level. The reactor was under extremely unstable conditions because of thewithdrawalofalmostallcontrolrods.ThiswasaverydangerousoperationinRBMKreactorsasthesehadpositivevoidcoefficients,meaningthatrunawaynuclearreactionscouldtakeplace.Thisdulyoccurredwiththeresultofasuddenpowersurge,and,whenanemergencyshutdownwasattemptedbyinsertingtheremainingcontrolrods,amuchlargerspikeinpoweroutput—outputincreased about 100-fold in about four seconds—which led to at least twomassive steam andhydrogenexplosionsandtheruptureoftheentirereactorvesselandamajorconflagration.Thisreleased a large volume of radioactive gases, aerosols and particulates into the atmosphere.Radionuclides released from the explosion included very short-lived fission products, whichresultedinveryhighdoseratesinadjacentareas.

Theseeventsexposedthereactor’sgraphitemoderator(1600tons)toair,causingittoignite.Afterthe initialrelease, largerreleasesofradionuclidesoccurredoveraperiodof10daysdueto thecontinuousgraphitefire.Ithasbeenestimatedthattheexplosionsandfiresreleasedaboutathirdofthereactor’sradioactiveinventoryintotheatmosphereandacrossmuchofEurope.

The accident was classified as a level 7 event (the maximum classification) of the IAEA’sInternationalNuclearEventScale(INES).

Onsite Challenges Followingtwoexplosions,thefirstbeingtheinitialsteamexplosion,followedafewsecondslaterbyasecondexplosion,possiblyfromthebuild-upofhydrogenduetozirconium-steamreactions,asignificantpartofthefuel,thegraphiteandstructuralmaterialswereejected.Oneworker,whosebodywasneverrecovered,waskilledintheexplosions,andasecondworkerdiedinhospitalafewhourslaterasaresultofinjuriesreceivedintheexplosions.

Firesstartedinwhatremainedoftheunit4building,givingrisetocloudsofsteamanddust,andfiresalsobrokeoutontheadjacentbitumencoveredturbinehallroof.Thechimneyeffectoftheten-day-lastinggraphitefireejectedsmoke,radioactivefissionproductsanddebrisfromthecoreand the building several kilometers into atmosphere.Theheavierdebriswasmostly depositedwithin5kmofthesite,butlightercomponents,includingmostfissionproductsandnoblegases,andwereblownby theprevailingwinds tocreate theradioactiveplumes,whichcontaminatedover40percentofthelandareaofEurope.

Afirstgroupof14firemenarrivedonthesceneoftheaccidenton26April1986at01:28.Over100firefightersfromthesiteandcalledinfromPripyatweredeployed,anditwasthisgroupthatreceivedthehighestradiationexposures.Reinforcementswerebroughtinuntilabout04:00,when250 firemenwere available and 69 firemen participated in fire control activities. According tocorroboratingreportsfromvarioussources,239thefiresontheroofsofunits3and4werelocalized

239SeeforexampleWNA,“SequenceofEvents—ChernobylAccidentAppendix1”,UpdatedNovember2009,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/appendices/chernobyl-accident-appendix-1-sequence-of-events.aspx,accessed4June2016;andINSAG-7,“TheChernobylAccident:UpdatingofINSAG-1”,InternationalNuclearSafetyAdvisoryGroup,IAEA,SafetySeriesNo.75-INSAG-7,1992.


at02:10and02:20respectively,andthefirewasquenchedat05:00.Unit3,whichhadcontinuedtooperate,wasshutdownatthistime,andunits1and2wereonlyshutdowninthemorningof27April.

Themainchallengesweretopreventthefirefromspreadingtounit3,tolocalizethefireontheroofofthecommonmachinehallofunits3and4,toprotecttheundamagedpartsofunit4(thecontrolroom,insidethemachineroom,themaincirculatingpumpcompartments,thecabletrays),andtoprotecttheflammablematerialsstoredon-site,suchasdieseloil,storedgasandchemicals.

Figure27:GraveyardofAbandonedHighlyContaminatedTrucksandHelicopters

Source:chnpp.gov.ua

On28April1986,amassiveaccidentmanagementoperationbegan.Thisinvolveddroppinglargeamountsofdifferentmaterials,eachonedesignedtocombatadifferentsourceofthefireandtheradioactive release. The first measures taken to control fire and the radionuclides releasesconsistedofdumpingneutron-absorbingcompoundsandfire-controlmaterialintothecraterthatresultedfromthedestructionofthereactor.Thetotalamountofmaterialsdumpedonthereactorwasabout5,000tincludingabout40tofboroncarbide,2,400toflead,1,800tofsandandclay,and800tofdolomite.About1,800helicopterflightswerecarriedouttodumpmaterialsontothereactor(seeFigure27).

During the first flights, the helicopter remained stationary over the reactor while dumpingmaterials.Asthedoseratesreceivedbythehelicopterpilotsduringthisprocedureweretoohigh,itwasdecidedthatthematerialsshouldbedumpedwhilethehelicopterstravelledoverthereactor.This procedure caused additional destruction of the standing structures and spread thecontamination.Boroncarbidewasdumpedinlargequantitiesfromhelicopterstoactasaneutronabsorberandpreventanyrenewedchainreaction.Dolomitewasalsoaddedtoactasheatsinkand


asourceofcarbondioxidetosmotherthefire.Leadwasincludedasaradiationabsorber,aswellassandandclay,whichitwashopedwouldpreventthereleaseofparticulates.

Asystemwasinstalledby5Maytofeedcoldnitrogentothereactorspace,toprovidecoolingandtoblanketagainstoxygenthusavoidingfurtherhydrogenexplosions.By6Maywhenmostofthegraphitehadburned, the core temperatures fell and therewasa sharp reduction in the rateofradionuclidereleases.Inaddition,workbeganonamassivereinforcedconcreteslabwithabuilt-incoolingsystembeneaththereactor.Thisinvolveddiggingatunnelfromunderneathunit3.About400peopleworkedonthistunnel,whichwascompletedin15days,allowingtheinstallationoftheconcreteslab.Thisslabwouldnotonlybeofusetocoolthecoreifnecessary,itwouldalsoactasabarriertopreventpenetrationofmeltedradioactivematerialintothegroundwater.

Inadditiontothetwoworkersthathaddiedfromtheexplosionsonthedayoftheaccident,bytheendofJuly,sixfiremen,afurther21plantstaffandavisitorhaddiedofacuteradiationpoisoningasaresultoftheaccident.

Following the accident and the large contamination by the radioactive cloud, a 2,800 km2exclusionzonedesignatedforevacuationhasbeenestablishedandplacedundermilitarycontrol.More than 130,000 people were moved out of their homes and villages in the immediateaftermathoftheaccident.Butmanymorepeoplewereeventuallydisplaced.TheU.N.Office fortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs (OCHA)stated in2004: “Nearly400,000peoplewereresettled butmillions continued to live in an environmentwhere continued residual exposurecreatedarangeofadverseeffects.”240

While units 1, 2, 3, unaffected by the explosions, resumed operation a few weeks later, theSoviet armyengaged (andpoorly trained)more than550.000workers called the “liquidators”,whowereengagedinthedisastermanagement.Theirtasksincludedevacuationofcontaminateddebris,cleaningemergencyareas,repairingequipmentandbuildingsetc.

Dispersion of Radioactivity Thegraphitefireatunit4causedtheejectionofradioactivegases,aerosolsandparticulateshighintotheatmosphere.TheseweredistributedinplumesbyprevailingwindsandrainfallthroughoutEurope and eventually across the northern hemisphere. The consequent caesium-137 falloutpatternsinEuropewerelatermeasuredbytheEuropeanCommission(seeFigure28).

Intotal,40percentofEurope’s landareawascontaminatedsignificantly(>4,000Bqperm2)byChernobyl’s fallout.241 The most seriously affected countries (ranked bymagnitude of Cs-137fallout)were the formerUSSRRepublics adjacent to the stricken reactor—Belarus, Russia andUkraine.

Otherseriouslyaffectedcountrieswere, inareasizeorder, formerYugoslavia,Finland,Sweden,Bulgaria,Norway,Romania,GermanyandAustria.AlthoughformerYugoslaviawasnotmeasuredbytheECteams(becauseoftheBalkancivilwar),earliermeasurementshadbeenmadebytheU.S.DepartmentofEnergy.

240UN-OCHA,“Chernobyl:Needsgreat18yearsafternuclearaccident”,26April2004,seehttp://reliefweb.int/report/belarus/chernobyl-needs-great-18-years-after-nuclear-accident,accessed1July2016.241IanFairlie,“TORCH-2016—Anindependentscientificevaluationofthehealth-relatedeffectsoftheChernobylnucleardisaster”,31March2016,seehttps://www.global2000.at/sites/global/files/GLOBAL_TORCH%202016_rz_WEB_KORR.pdf,accessed4June2016.


Intermsofthepercentagesoftheirlandareas,whichwerecontaminated,Austria,Finland,Sweden,Slovenia,andSlovakiawerealsosignificantlyaffectedoutsidetheformerUSSR.

Figure28:Cesium-137ConcentrationsinEuropein1996(in1,000Bqperm2)

Source:DeCortetal.,1998242

IntermsofaverageCs-137concentrations(Bqperm2),Austria,Slovakia,Slovenia,andMoldovawerealsoaffected.ThemostrelevantparameterforhealthwastheaverageconcentrationofCs-137indietduringtheyear1986to1987andthecountries(outsideformerUSSR)withthehighestlevelswereAustria,Moldova,Bulgaria,Croatia,Liechtenstein,FinlandandRomania.243

AsshowninFigure29,radioiodinedistributionpatternsinEuropewereverydifferentfromthosefor caesium-137. This is because the iodine isotopes were distributed largely in gaseous andaerosolformsandnotasparticulates.

242DeCortM,DuboisG,etal.,“AtlasofCaesiumDepositiononEuropeaftertheChernobylAccident.EURReport16733”,OfficeforOfficialPublicationsoftheEuropeanCommunities,Luxembourg.243V.Drozdovitchetal.,“RadiationexposuretothepopulationofEuropefollowingtheChernobylaccident”,RadiationProtectionDosimetry,Volume123,Issue4,2007,pp515–528.


Figure29:CumulativeI-131ConcentrationsinAirOverEuropeinMay1986(inBq*d/m³)244

Source:C.Seideletal.,2012245

Populations Affected According to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation(UNSCEAR)246, over six million people still live in contaminated areas of Belarus, Russia andUkraine.Overhalfamillionclean-upworkerswereexposedtohighdosesatanaverageof120mSv(seeTable6).

244Bq*d/m³=becquerelsxdayspercubicmetreofair245ClaudiaSeideletal,“25JahreTschernobyl—Kurzfassung;GesundheitlicheFolgeninOberösterreich25JahrenachTschernobyl–neueBetrachtungenhinsichtlichderInhalations-undIngestionsdosisdurch131Iund90Sr”,LowLevelCountingLaborArsenal,UniversityofNaturalResourcesandAppliedLifeSciencesofVienna,(inGerman),15March2016,seehttp://www.atomfreie.eu/fileadmin/Daten/Studiathek/2012_03_15_Tschernobylstudie_Kurzfassung_2012.pdf,accessed7July2016.246UNSCEAR,“2008ReporttotheGeneralAssembly,withscientificannexes—AnnexDHealthEffectsDuetotheChernobylNuclearAccident”,UnitedNations,NewYork.Note:AlthoughUNSCEAR’spublicationdatewasstatedas2008,thereportwasnotreleaseduntil2011.


Table6:PopulationsExposedtoChernobylFallout:AverageEffectiveDose

Population Number AverageDoseinmSv

Clean-upworkers 530,000 120.0

Evacuees 130,000 31.0

Inhabitantsofcontaminatedareasof

Belarus,RussiaandUkraine6,400,000 9.0

InhabitantsofBelarus,RussiaandUkraine 98,000,000 1.3

InhabitantsofWesternEurope 500,000,000 0.3

Source:UNSCEAR2008

Health Impacts TheChernobyl accident resulted in epidemics of thyroid cancer inBelarus,Ukraine andRussiastartingafter1990.Over6,000thyroidcancershavearisensofar247andatleastanother16,000248are expected to arise in future decades. It is notable that radiogenic thyroid cancers are stilloccurringamongtheJapanesebombsurvivorsnearly60yearsaftertheirexposures.249

In 2015, continuing increases in thyroid cancer cases were seen among adults in Belarus andUkraine.Theestimatedthyroidcancerriskspergray(Gy)250inthemostcontaminatedareasarehigh,withrelativerisksof8.7perGy inBelarusand8.0perGy inUkraine.This translates into770percentto700percentincreasesrespectivelyoverthebackgroundratesinthesecountries.Theraisedincidencerates foradultsareexpectedtopeakinthenearfuture inBelarusbutwillcontinue above the pre-accident rates for many years. Similarly, 500 percent increases wereobserved in leukemia risk in both Belarus and Ukraine.251 These are extraordinarily high riskincreases,perhapsthelargestincreasesinriskevermeasuredafterexposurestotoxicsubstances.

247Ibidem.248IanFairlie,“TORCH-2016—Anindependentscientificevaluationofthehealth-relatedeffectsoftheChernobylnucleardisaster”,31March2016,seehttps://www.global2000.at/sites/global/files/GLOBAL_TORCH%202016_rz_WEB_KORR.pdf,accessed5June2016.249ImaizumiM.etal.,“RadiationDose-ResponseRelationshipsforThyroidNodulesandAutoimmuneThyroidDiseasesinHiroshimaandNagasakiAtomicBombSurvivors55-58YearsafterRadiationExposure”,TheJournaloftheAmericanMedicalAssociation,1March2006,Vol.295,No.9,seehttp://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=202461,accessed5June2016.250Thegray(Gy)isaderivedunitofionizingradiationdoseintheInternationalSystemofUnits.Itisdefinedastheabsorptionofonejouleofradiationenergyperkilogramofmatter.Itisgenerallyusedforlargedoseassessments.251IvanovVK,TsybAF,etal.,“LeukemiaincidenceintheRussiancohortofChernobylemergencyworkers”,RadiatEnvironBiophys.,May2012.


Intotal,TORCH-2016(TheOtherReportonChernobyl)estimatedthat40,000fatalcancerswillariseoverthenext50yearsfromChernobyl,abouteighttimesgreaterthantheexpectednumberoffatalcancersfromarisinginfuturefromFukushima.

TORCH 2016 revealed new evidence of increased thyroid cancer cases in Austria, similar toprevious indicativestudiesof increased thyroidcancers in theU.K.,CzechRepublic,PolandandSlovakia.TORCH2016estimatedthatbetweeneightand40percentofincreasedthyroidcancercasesafter1986inAustriamaybeduetoChernobyl.

Afterthirtyyears,sufficienttimehaselapsedfordoseregistriestoobservestatisticallysignificantincreasesinothersolidcancersincludingbreast,colon,lungandkidneycancers.However,theirrelativerisks,20percentto50percentperGy,areaboutanorderofmagnitudelowerthanthoseobservedforthyroidcancerandleukemia.ThenewevidenceinTORCH2016indicatesincreasedincidencesofcardiovasculareffects,stroke,mentalhealtheffects,birthdefectsandvariousotherradiogeniceffectsinthemostaffectedcountries.

Recent studiesprovide strongevidenceofdecreasedhealth indicatorsamongchildren living incontaminatedareasinBelarusandUkraine,including

• impairedlungfunctionandincreasedbreathingdifficulties252

• loweredbloodcounts253

• highlevelsofanemiasandcolds254and

• raisedlevelsofimmunoglobulins255

252SvendsenE.R.,KolpakovI.E.,etal.,“ReducedLungFunctioninChildrenAssociatedwithCaesium137BodyBurden”,July2015,AnnalsoftheAmericanThoracicSociety,Vol.12,No.7,pp1050-1057,seehttp://www.atsjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1513/AnnalsATS.201409-432OC?journalCode=annalsats,accessed6June2016.253LindgrenA,EugeniaStepanova,etal.,“Individualwhole-bodyconcentrationof137CaesiumisassociatedwithdecreasedbloodcountsinchildrenintheChernobyl-contaminatedareas,Ukraine,2008-2010”,JournalofExposureScienceandEnvironmentalEpidemiology,May/June2015.254McMahonD.M.,VdovenkoV.,etal.,“Dietarysupplementationwithradionuclidefreefoodimproveschildren'shealthfollowingcommunityexposureto137Caesium:aprospectivestudy”,EnvironmentalHealth,22December2015,seehttps://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12940-015-0084-x,accessed6June2016.255McMahonD.M.,VdovenkoV.Y.,etal.,“Effectsoflong-termlow-levelradiationexposureaftertheChernobylcatastropheonimmunoglobulinsinchildrenresidingincontaminatedareas:prospectiveandcross-sectionalstudies”,EnvironmentalHealth,10May2014,seehttps://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1476-069X-13-36,accessed6June2016.


The “Sarcophagus” Asitwasimpossibleintheimmediateaftermathoftheinitialexplosionstoworkonthedestroyedstructure of the reactor, containing 200 tons of highly radioactive corium, 30 tons of highlycontaminateddustand16tonsofuraniumandplutonium,threeweeksaftertheaccidentitwasdecidedas the first andurgentaction tobuildaprotection structureabove the reactor to limitradioactivecontaminationandprotectingitfromclimateexposure.

Figure30:CrossSectionofthe“Sarcophagus”

Source:chnpp.gov.ua

Thestructurewascalled“sarcophagus”(seeFigure30)andwasbuiltbythousandsofliquidatorswho participated in the construction mostly made of concrete slabs covering the entirestructure.256However, the sarcophagus was put together in haste under severe conditions andrapidlydeterioratedinthefollowingyears.

G-7 Support of Shutdown of RMBK and VVER 440-230 Reactors In1993,theG7launchedaninitiativeonthepreventionofnuclearaccidentsatRussianbuiltplantsandagreed that theEuropeanBank forReconstructionandDevelopment (EBRD), establishesafundaimedattheclosureanddecommissioningoftheoldestRussianbuiltnuclearpowerplantsoftheRBMKandVVER440-230types.TheinitiativeinitiallyincludedtheplantsofIgnalina-1and-2

256Greenpeace.org,“WhathappenedinChernobyl”,20March2006,seehttp://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/nuclear/nomorechernobyls/what-happened-in-chernobyl/,accessed1July2016.


in Lithuania, Kozloduy units 1 to 4 in Bulgaria, Saint Petersburg units 1 to 4 in the RussianFederationandBohunice-V1-1and-2intheSlovakRepublic.In1996,Chernobyl-4wasaddedtothescope.ThefundcontributorsincludedtheG7countries,theEU,Belgium,Denmark,Finland,theNetherlands,Norway,SwedenandSwitzerland.Initialcontributionswereinexcessof€285million(then about US$330 million). As of 2016, 45 countries and the European Community arecontributinggrantsforsafetyupgradesanddecommissioningoftheabovenuclearpowerplants.Theconceptincludedforeachplantanuclearsafetyassessment,theimplementationofessentialshort- andmedium-term safety improvements and the final closure of the plants. Later on, anadditionalspecialfundwasestablishedforthedecommissioningofeachunit.257,258

TheNuclearSafetyAccountteamwascreatedatEBRDwiththepurposeofestablishingthesafetyassessmentforeachplant,identifyinganddesigningthesafetyfacilitiestobebuiltaswellasthedecommissioningprocedures,draftinggrantsagreementsbetweentheEBRD,ChernobylNuclearPowerPlantandthesupplierandfinalizingconstructioncontracts.Theteamremainsinchargeofmonitoringtheprojectsandofverifyingtheircompliancewiththecontracts.

EBRD Chernobyl Decommissioning/Spent Fuel Storage Program This programhas beendevelopedby theNuclear SafetyAccount team in cooperationwith theEuropeanCommissionTACIS programand following the grant agreements signedbetween theBankandtheChernobylNuclearPowerPlant.259 It includes theconstructionofan intermediatespent fuel storage facility, liquid and solid nuclear waste treatment plants and a long-termprotectionstructuretocoverunit4.

Anin-depthsafetyassessmentwascarriedoutofthelocalIntermediateSpentFuelstoragebuilding(ISF-1),whichwaspartoftheoriginalplant,andhostedmostofthespentfuelassembliesfromthefourreactorspriortothe1986accident.ISF-1wasfoundinpoorconditions,judgedunsafeandnotsuitableforthelong-termaswellasunabletomeetingtoday’ssafetystandards.Consequently,thedecisionwasmadetobuildasecond,intermediatedrystoragefacility,calledISF-2tobelocated2.5kmsoutheastoftheChernobylplant,12kmnorth-westfromChernobylcity.Aturnkeycontractto design andbuild the entire ISF-2 facilitywas signed in June1999betweenEnergoatomandFramatomeANP(nowAREVANP),jointlywithFrenchconstructiongiantsVinciandBouygues.ThesystemisbasedontheTransnuklearNuhomsdrycaskssystem.260

ISF-2includesaSpentFuelProcessingFacility(SFPF)andtheSpentFuelStorageArea(SFSA),madeof 232 above-ground Concrete Storage Modules (CSM). The storage employs 4,000 tons ofreinforcedsteel,2,700tonsofstainlesssteeland26,000cubicmetersofconcrete.Thestructurewasdesignedtostoredryfuelforaperiodof100years.Acentralgeologicalrepositoryforspentfuel and high-level waste is planned to be built after 2030. This plan also envisages the

257StateSpecializedEnterprise(SSE)ChernobylNPP,“ChNPPDecommissioningStrategy”,MinistryofEcologyandNaturalResourcesofUkraineandStateAgencyofUkraineforanExclusionZone,seehttp://chnpp.gov.ua/en/the-main-aspects-of-decommissioning,accessed1July2016.258EBRD,“NuclearSafetyAccount”,Undated,seehttp://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/sectors/nuclear-safety/chernobyl-nuclear-safety-account.html,accessed5June2016.259EBRD,“NuclearSafety”,February2011,seehttp://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/factsheets/nuclear.pdf,accessed5June2016.260JayantBondre,“ACompleteNUHOMS®SolutionforStorageandTransportofHighBurnupSpentFuel”,TransnuclearInc.(AREVAGroup),14thInternationalSymposiumonthePackagingandTransportationofRadioactiveMaterials(PATRAM2004),Berlin(Germany),20-24September2004,seehttp://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/37/088/37088556.pdf,accessed5June2016.


decontamination of 1,500 hectares of land containing over 5,550 terabecquerel of activity. Arailwaywasbuilttotransportthespentfuelbytraincarriages.

Followingtheshutdownofthethreeoperatingplants,thetotalinventoryaccountedfor21,300fuelbundlesforaweightof2,700tonsofuraniumand2,000absorbers,partlystillinthethreeunits'cores,partlykeptinthereactorcoolingpoolsaswellastransferredtotheinterimstoragefacilityISF-1. The fuel bundles and absorbers are inserted into a transfer flask and carried by a traincarriagetotheSFPFattheISF-2site.Theretheyareintroducedintoahotcellwherethefuelbundleandabsorbersaredriedbymeansofagasdehydrationsystemandcutbymeansofaspeciallybuiltcuttingmachine.

The Nuhoms system consists of an enclosure vessel comprising canisters forming separateconfinementstopreventthespreadofradioactivematerials.Spentfuelbundlesareintroducedinaninternalbasketthatisthenincludedintoacanister.EachcanisterisplacedhorizontallyintheNuhomscasksthatarethenintroducedinindividualcompartmentsoftheheavyconcretestoragemodulebuiltattheISF-2site.261

ConstructionwasduetobecompletedbyMarch2003.However,constructionwentonforaboutsixyearsofconstructionuntil2006andseveralproblemshadarisen.Despitethenear-completionoftheprocessingbuildingandtheconcretehousingstructuresfortheNuhomscasks,theworkwasinterruptedduetodesignerrorsandnegligenceofthefactthatwaterhadpenetratedthroughthecladdinginmorethan10percentofthefuelassemblies.Itwasalsofoundthatthefuelincludedsomereprocesseduraniumandplutonium,forwhichadifferentneutronspectrumwouldrequireredesignofthestorageshielding.Additionalproblemswerecausedbyconsiderablecostoverruns,which raised the investment into the project from an original €68 million (US$64 million) to€275million(US$326million).

InMarch2006,US-basedHoltecInternationalsubmittedtoChNPPafeasibilitystudyfordryingthespentfuelthatcontainedwaterand,inNovember2006,conductedsuccessfultestingofthedryingfacilitymodel.EBRD'sSafetyReviewGrouprecommendedthatthedonorscontinuefundingtheprojectwithHoltecasthemaincontractor.

TheFramatomeANPcontractwasterminatedinApril2007262andfollowinganinternationalauditand arbitration, the company was requested to pay the client a compensation of €45 million(US$59.4million).InSeptember2007,HoltecsignedacontracttocompletetheISF-2.Thefacility'sfinaldesignwasapprovedbytheUkrainianRegulatorinOctober2010.

While stillmaking use of theNuhoms system, the project implements several Holtec technologiesincludinganinnovativedouble-wallcanister,anadvancedforcedgasdehydrationsystem,andahotcelltodismantletheRBMKfuelassemblies.Thefirstphaseofwork,whichlasted100weeks,valuedatslightly over €30 million (US$41 million) involved the preparation of safety and environmentalqualificationdocumentsincompliancewithUkrainiannormsandstandards.

The entire work, scheduled to span nearly eight years, involves the supply of 231 canistersmanufacturedatHoltec'splant inPittsburghtobedeliveredbetween2016andApril2019.Thecontractincludestheconstructionoftheprocessingfacility,numerousphysicalmodificationstothesite,andissuanceoftheintermediateandfinalsafetyanalysisreports.

261SSEChernobylNPP,“InterimSpentNuclearFuelDryStorageFacility(ISF-2)”,Undated,seehttp://chnpp.gov.ua/en/decommissioning-projects/ongoing-projects/isf-2,accessed1July2016.262LeJournaldel’Énergie,“Areva’sincrediblefiascoinChernobyl”,17February2016,seehttp://journaldelenergie.com/nucleaire/arevas-incredible-fiasco-in-chernobyl/,accessed1July2016.


TheISF-2hasbeencompleted,pre-commissioningisscheduledtostartinSeptember2016andfull-scale operation is to begin in the fourth quarter of 2017. The fuel loading will most likely becompletedby2022.Thetotalcostofthefacilityisestimatedat€400million(US$446million).

Liquid Radioactive Wastes Treatment Plant TheLRWTP263isaprocessingplantforliquidradioactivewastesstoredduringoperationinfive5,000m3andnine1,000m3tanks,aswellasduringthedecommissioningoperations.Theliquidsinclude perlites, resins and evaporator concentrates. The LRWTP also processes the liquidsproducedduringtheentireoperationsonsite.Theplant,designedbyBelgiancompanyTractebel,wasbuiltbytheconsortiumBelgatom(Belgium),Ansaldo(Italy),SGN(France)andbyUkrainiancontractors.Constructionhasbeencompletedin2015andhasstartedoperation.Totalcostwasabout€35million(US$39million).

Industrial Complex on Solid Radioactive Wastes Management The Industrial Complex on Solid Radioactive Wastes Management (ICSRWM)264includes theTemporary Solid and LiquidWaste Storage (SLWS) and SolidWaste Processing Plant (SWPP),comprisingaplantforthesortingandsegregationofallcategoriesofsolidradioactivewasteandtheprocessingof the solidwaste generated from theprevious retrieval activities and from theroutineoperationalanddecommissioningactivitiesofunit4.Short-livedwasteswillbepackagedandimmobilizedforfinalstorageatanearsurfacedisposalfacility,whilsthighercategorywasteswillbepackaged,over-packedandstoredinatemporarystoragefacilityawaitingtheconstructionofafinaldisposalfacility.

Anearsurfacerepositoryforthedisposalofshort-livedwaste,inaccordancewiththerequirementsof theUkrainianNuclearRegulatoryAuthoritiesand in the formofanEngineeredNear-SurfaceSolidRadioactiveWasteDisposalFacility(ENSWDF)islocatedattheVektorComplexlocatedintheExclusionZone.ThisfacilityhasbeenbuiltforthefinaldisposalofconditionedLILW-SLandforwastesfromtheLiquidRadwasteTreatmentPlant(LRTP).Thestoragecapacityis55,000m³andthedesignlifetimeis300years.

ThecomplexwasdesignedandbuiltbyRWENUKEMGmbH(Germany)withUkrainiancontractors.ItwasfinancedbyUkraineandtheEuropeanCommissionandhasstartedoperating.Thetotalcostis€33.5million(US$37.3million).

263SSEChernobylNPP,“LiquidRadioactiveWasteTreatmentPlant(LRWTP)”,Updated1February2016,seehttp://chnpp.gov.ua/en/decommissioning-projects/ongoing-projects/28-2010-09-13-07-21-32436,accessed5June2016.264SSEChernobylNPP,“IndustrialComplexforSolidRadioactiveWasteManagement(ICSRM)”,seehttp://chnpp.gov.ua/en/decommissioning-projects/ongoing-projects/icsrwm,accessed5June2016.


Shelter Implementation Plan/New Safe Confinement265, 266, 267

Followingtheconstructionofthe“sarcophagus”abovethedestroyedunit4,someadditionalworkhas been carried out in 1997 to minimize the risk of its collapse. A limited stabilization wasachievedwithgreatdifficultiesinhigh-radiationlevelsinsideandoutsidethestructure.Safetyandprotectionofpersonnelandtheenvironmenthasbeenimprovedsince.AFireProtectionSystemandanIntegratedAutomatedControlSystemhavebeeninstalledwiththepurposeofmonitoringthestatusoftheshelter,includingthe“fuelcontainingmaterial(FCM)”i.e.thecorium,collectedinthelowersectionofthereactor.

Additionalworkwascarriedoutfortheclearingofthesite,thedemolitionofnearbybuildingsaswellasconstructionofan“engineeringbuilding”forthemanagementandcontrolofallworks.Alsoacomputer-basedsystemwasintroducedintegratingradiationdata,informationonthestructuralintegrityoftheoldshelter,measurementsofseismicactivitiesandotherparametersimportantforthesafetyonsiteandforthefutureoperationoftheNewSafeConfinement(NSC).

Anewchange facilitywitha capacity for1,430workershasbeenbuiltwhichprovidesmedicalscreening,training,radiationmonitoring,supplyofprotectionequipmentaswellasanambulance.

However,thesemeasureswouldstillhavenotsecuredthelong-termintegrityofthestructureaswellassitesafety.Itwasthendecidedtobuildanadditionalandmajorprotectionstructureabovetheunit4.ThishasbeencalledtheNSC.

TheentireShelterImplementationPlanhasbeenfinancedseparatelybyanewfund(ChernobylShelterFund)createdin1997andsupportedby44countriesplustheEuropeanUnion.Aswiththeotherfund,itisadministeredbyEBRDandtheprojectismanagedbytheNuclearSafetyAccountteam.

The word “confinement” is used instead of the traditional “containment” to emphasize thedifferencebetween the “containment”of radioactivitygenerated in caseof anaccident, and the“confinement”ofradioactivewastethatistheprimarypurposeoftheNSC.

TheNSCwasdesignedandisbeingbuiltbytheFrenchconsortiumNovarkawith50/50partnersVINCIConstructionGrandsProjects andBouyguesTravauxPublics.The contractwas signed inAugust 2007 for an estimated amount of €1.4 billion (US$1.9 billion). Due in particular to thecomplexityofthetaskinaradioactiveenvironment,thebudgetforcompletionwasincreasedto€1.54billion(US$2.2billion)inApril2011.Itislikelythatthefinaltotalcostwillexceed€1.8billion(US$2billion).

TheNSC design is an arch-shaped steel structure that has been designed to cover entirely theexistingsarcophagus(seeFigure31).RequirementsincludedtheNSC’sresistancetotheimpactofseismiceventsofamagnitudeof level6, totornadoclass3andtootherheavywindsandsnowloads.ThedimensionsofthearchweredefinedbasedupontheneedtooperateequipmentinsidetheNSCandtodismantletheexisting“sarcophagus”.Alargecraneandotherremotelycontrolledequipmentare installedinsideandwillbeusedtodismantlethesarcophagusandtoattemptto

265EBRD,“TheChernobylShelterImplementationPlan”,Undated,seehttp://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/sectors/nuclear-safety/chernobyl-shelter-implementation.html,accessed1July2016.266SSEChernobylNPP,“Project‘NewSafeConfinementConstruction’”,Undated,seehttp://chnpp.gov.ua/en/project-nsc-construction,accessed1July2016.267EBRD,“Chernobyl’sNewSafeConfinement”,seehttp://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395236547173&d=Default&pagename=EBRD%2FContent%2FHublet,accessed1July2016.


removethefuel-containingmasses(corium)fromthedestroyedreactor.NSCisbeingassembled600metersawayfromthedamagedreactorwhere,thankstotheremediationworkoverthepasttwodecades,therelativelylowground-levelradiationlevelsallowstafftoworkforupto40hoursaweek.ItisplannedtomovetheNSCabovethesarcophagusandtocommissionitin2017.

ThedimensionsoftheNewConfinementStructureareimpressive.Theinternalheightis92.5m,theexternalspanis257mandtheoveralllengthofthestructureis162m.Theexternalcladdingcoversanareaof85,000m2.TheNSCincludestwobridgecranesof50tcapacitysuspendedfromthe arch which have the purpose to carry out the deconstruction of the sarcophagus and thestructureoftheremainingreactoraswellashandlingofradioactivematerial.ThecranesandothermechanicalscrappingandremovalequipmentwillberemotelyoperatedfromoutsidetheNSC.AllelectricalandcontrolsoftheNSCareinstalledinthe“engineeringbuilding”builtnearby.

TheNSCwillbeslid into its finalpositionona300-meterrailsystemby116remote-controlledsynchronizedjacks.Theslidingoperationataspeedof10mphisexpectedtotaketwodays.Thefinal phase will include the sealing operations and interconnections between the NSC and theshelter. The New Safe Confinement has been designed and built for a 100-year lifetime. Totaldecommissioningmay take several decades as the environmental contaminationwill last evenlonger.

Figure31:TheNewSafeConfinementatChernobyl

Source:chnpp.gov.ua


Fukushima+5 Status Report Five years have passed since the Fukushima accident began in March 2011. The JapanesegovernmenthaslaunchedareconstructionplantorecoverfromtheGreatEastJapanEarthquakeover the next five years. This chapter attempts to describe onsite and offsite challenges of thegovernment'splan,includingitsimpactonthepeoplemostaffectedbythedisaster.

Onsite Challenges268,269

Decommissioning Plan InJune2015,thegovernmentrevised,forthethirdtime,themedium-andlong-termroadmapfordecommissioning, followingthesecondrevisionmade in June2013.At that timeapproximately800m3/dayof groundwaterwas flowing fromanearbymountain into theFukushimanuclearpowerplantsite;specifically,about400m3/dayofthisflowwasrunningintothebuildingsandtheremaining400m3/daywasrunningintotheocean.Accordingtothenewroadmap,theplanwas,duringFY2016,toreducethisinflowtothesiteby75percent.

As for theplans for theremovalofspentnuclear fuel fromthestoragepools, theremoval fromunit4wascompletedin2014.Accordingtothenewroadmap,spentfuelremovalfromunit3isplannedtobecarriedoutbetweenfinancialyears2017and2019.Removalfromunit2isplannedforFY2020butcouldstretchintoFY2021.Itisproposedthattheremovalofusedfuelfromunit1willalsobegininFY2020,butitscompletionisnotexpectedbeforeFY2022.

As for the removal of fuel debris, it is planned in the roadmap to start theworkwithin 2021althoughonwhichunitisnotyetdetermined.Intermsofthemethodtoremovethefueldebris,ithad been planned in the previous edition of the roadmap to fill the entire interior of thecontainmentvesselwithwaterandthenremovethedebris.However,duetotheconcernsaboutwater leakage from the containment vessel and the possible implications in a seismic event, adecisionwasmadeinthenewroadmaptolaunchacomprehensive,comparativestudyonseveralmethods,includingimplementingthetaskafterpartiallyfillingthecontainmentwithwaterorintheairwithoutusinganywater.Theplanistodecideonthemethodtwoyearslater.

Current Status of Each Reactor

Thetemperaturesinthereactorandcontainmentvesselhasdroppedtoabout15to30degreesCelsius.However,radiationdosesinsidethecontainmentvesselshaveremainedhighat4to5Sv/h.Asof23June2016,theamountofwaterinjectedintoeachofthereactorcoresofunit1,2and3is

268Inter-MinisterialCouncilforContaminatedWaterandDecommissioningIssues,“Mid-and-Long-TermRoadmaptowardstheDecommissioningofTEPCO’sFukushimaDaiichiNuclearPowerStation”,MinistryofEconomics,TradeandIndustry,(ProvisionalTranslation),12June2015,seehttp://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/20150725_01b.pdf,accessed3June2016.269SecretariatoftheTeamforCountermeasuresforDecommissioningandContaminatedWaterTreatment,“SummaryofDecommissioningandContaminatedWaterManagement—ProgressStatusandFutureChallengesoftheMid-and-Long-TermRoadmaptowardtheDecommissioningofTEPCO’sFukushimaDaiichiNuclearPowerStationUnits1-4(Outline)”,25February2016,seehttp://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/20160225_e.pdf,accessed3June2016.


around4.4m3/hour.270Therefore, fiveyearsafterthebeginningoftheaccident,everyday,over300m3ofwaterhavetobeinjectedintothethreereactorcores.

Atunit1,thebuildingcoverforpreventingradioactivematerialdiffusionisbeingdismantledtoenable the removal of spent fuel from the storage pool. According to current planning, debrisremovalworkwillcontinueuntilFY2018,andthencranesandhandlingequipmentwillbeinstalledforspentfuelremovalbyFY2020.

Atunit2,preparationfordismantlingthebuildingroofbeganinApril2016.Themethodofspentfuelremovalhasnotbeendeterminedyet.

Atunit3,debris isbeingremoved fromthebuildingroofandspent fuelpool.Similar tounit1,cranesandhandlingequipmentwillbeinstalledforspentfuelremoval.

Thespentfuelremovedfromunit1through3willbestoredinthecommonstoragepoolasinthecaseofunit4.Thelong-termstoragemethodisplannedtobedeterminedaroundFY2020.

A large number ofworkers had been exposed to radiation in order to get video footage of theconditionsinthecontainmentvessels.271However,fromApril2015,radiationsurveysusingrobotsbegan.Forexample,9.7Sv/hwasmeasuredinunit1duringthefirstsurvey.272Severaloftheserobotshaveonlylastedforafewminutesbeforetheirelectronicsincludingcomputerchipsweredestroyedbytheintenseradiationfluxes.

As for the measurement of fuel debris, the data obtained from the survey implemented inMarch2015atunit1revealedthatthereisnosignificantvolumeoffuelmaterialinthereactorcoreandnoprogresshasbeenmadeincollectingdetaileddataofthefueldebris.

Inotherwords,itremainsunknownwherethefuelis.

Contaminated Water Management Adedicatedbypasssystemhasbeenoperationalsince2014withpumpsundergroundwaterintothe sea after analyzing its quality subsequent to storage in temporary storage tanks.273 As ofMarch2016,theinflowofundergroundwatertothereactorbuildingwasreducedfromaround400m3/daytoabout150to200m3/day.274

Since 2 September 2015, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) has also started pumpinggroundwaterusingsubdrains—41wellsaroundthebuildingsand5wellsontheseaside.Similarly,

270TEPCO,“TheparametersrelatedtotheplantsinFukushimaDaiichiNuclearPowerStation”,seehttp://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/pla/2016/images/table_summary-e.pdf,accessed23June2016.271Forexample,51workerswereneededfortheapprox.3-hourvideo-tapingcarriedoutin2012.Thisismostlikelybecausealargenumberofworkerswererequiredtoreducetheradiationdoseperpersonamidstimplementingthetaskinvolvinghigh-levelexposurestoradiation.Source:TEPCO,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_121011_08-j.pdf,accessed12April2016.272TEPCO,“Thedevelopmentofthereactorcontainmentvesselinteriorinvestigationtechnology”,30April2015,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2015/images/handouts_150430_01-j.pdf,accessed12April2016.273Forexample,followingaretheresultsofthepre-dischargestoragetanksamplescollectedon5April2016:NDforcaesium134andcaesium137and180Bq/lfortritium.SeeTEPCO,“Thesamplingresultsregardingthegroundwaterbypassdrainage”,7April2016,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/2016/images2/pump_well_16040701-j.pdf,accessed12April2016.274TEPCO,“Currentconditionsofsubdrainandotherwatertreatmentfacilities”,31March2016,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/committee/osensuitaisakuteam/2016/pdf/0331_3_1h.pdf,accessed12April2016.


to the bypass system,water pumped up from the subdrains is discharged into the ocean afterassessingradioactivitylevelsinstoragetanks.275Similarlytothebypasssystem,waterpumpedupfrom the subdrains is discharged into the ocean after assessing radioactivity levels in storagetanks276.Thesedischargeshavebeencarriedoutwiththeconsentof theFukushimaPrefecturalFederation of Fisheries Co-operative Associations that is concerned about further radioactivecontaminationandnegativepublicity.

Radioactive isotopes except for tritiumare removed from thehighly contaminatedwaterusingmulti-nuclideremovalequipment(AdvancedLiquidProcessingSystem,ALPS).Theperformanceof ALPS is under review. However, the disposalmethod of this processedwater has not beendetermined yet. The Federation of Fisheries Co-operative Associations has commented thatreachinganyfurtheragreementondischargewouldbedifficultandthattheyareconcernedaboutthe release of large amounts of tritium.277 The tritium concentrations are very high, over500,000Bqperlitre.

The operation of the frozen soil wall as a land-side impermeable barrier was started on31 March 2016278; this is a controversial measure whose cost and effectiveness have beenquestioned in the review process of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA). Although theoperationhasstarted,theNRAhasnotyetfullyrecognizedtheeffectivenessofthismeasure.Sincethegroundwaterflowmaybealteredbythefrozensoilwall,theareatobefrozenwillneedtobecontinuallyexpanded.Itwasassumedthattheeffectsofthiswallwouldbeseeninmid-May2016.However,on25April2016,TEPCOreportedtotheNRAthatthetemperaturenearthefrozenpipeshad decreased and that the underground water level had changed.279 On 2 June 2016, TEPCOadmittedthat,whileabout97percentofthesoilwallshowedtemperaturesbelow0°C,otherspotsremainedat+7.5°Cduetofastgroundwaterflow.TEPCOconcludedthatadditionalwork,suchasinjectingcement,wasneeded.280

275Forexample,followingaretheresultsofthepre-dischargestoragetanksamplescollectedon2March2016:NDforcaesium134andcaesium137and630Bq/lfortritium.SeeTEPCO,“Thesamplingresultsregardingthesubdrainandgroundwaterdrain”,5April2016,(inJapanese),seehttps://www4.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/2016/images/sd_discharge_16030401-j.pdf,accessed12April2016.276Forexample,followingaretheresultsofthepre-dischargestoragetanksamplescollectedon2March2016:NDforcaesium134andcaesium137and630Bq/lfortritium.SeeTEPCO,“Thesamplingresultsregardingthesubdrainandgroundwaterdrain”,5April2016,(inJapanese),seehttps://www4.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/2016/images/sd_discharge_16030401-j.pdf,accessed12April2016.277KahokuSimpo,“Thisisthelasttimeweconsenttodischargingcontaminatedwater”,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.kahoku.co.jp/tohokunews/201509/20150915_63013.html,accessed12April2016.278TEPCO,“Land-sideImpermeableWall(FrozenSoil)”seehttp://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommision/planaction/landwardwall/index-e.html,accessed12April2016.279TEPCO,“Currentstatusofland-sideimpermeablewall(Firststep,Phase1)”,25April2016,seehttp://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2016/images1/handouts_160425_03-j.pdf,accessed21May2016.280TEPCO,“Closingofthelandsidewatershielding(Firstphase)andtransitiontoSecondphase”,2June2016,(inJapanese),seehttps://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000152044.pdf,accessed10June2016.


Current status of workers

Thegovernmentisinsistingthattheyareensuringthatthisareasufficientnumbersofworkersfordecommissioning Fukushima Daiichi and that they are properly managing the workers.281 Forexample, according to TEPCO, about 3,000 to 7,500 workers per day are engaged in thedecommissioning work as of September 2015,282 and their average monthly radiation dose ismaintainedatalowvalueof0.51mSvaccordingtodatafromFebruary2016.283

But reportedly, the reality of the labor environment can be different. In March 2015, a localnewspaperofFukushimaPrefecturereportedthat174workerswerelegallyforbiddentocontinueworkingatthesitebecausetheirtotaldoseexceeded100mSv.284

In September2015, the FukushimaBureauofMinistry ofHealth, Labour andWelfare (MHLW)demandedthatTEPCOfullyimplementlabordisastercountermeasuresinresponsetosuccessivefatal accidents285 that occurred at the site.286 In addition, the bureau reported that as ofSeptember 2015, there had been 656 cases of violation of regulations concerning thedecommissioningworksuchasproblemswithwagepaymentsanddosimeterdeficiency287.

On20October2015,MHLWrecognized,forthefirsttime,asanoccupationaldiseasetheleukemiadeveloped by a worker who had carried out decommissioning tasks after the Fukushimaaccident.288Theworker,whowasinhisthirtiesatthetime,hadperformedtasksinvolvingradiationexposurefor18months,startinginOctober2011.Duringthatperiod,hehadworkedforaboutoneyearattheFukushimaDaiichisite,beginninginOctober2012.Accordingtomediareports,hewasexposedtoa totalofabout20mSv;specifically,hewasexposedtoabout16mSvatFukushimanuclearpowerplantsiteandabout4mSvatGenkaiNPPsiteofKyushuElectrics.289

281VolodymyrTykhyy,“FromArchivesofVUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGBChernobylTragedyinDocumentsandMaterials(Summary)”,May2008,seehttp://www.rri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/NSRG/reports/kr139/pdf/tykhyy-2.pdf,accessed5June2016.282TEPCO,“Effortstoimprovetheworkingenvironment”,1September2015,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/129927.pdf,accessed18April2016.283Forworkers,exposuredoselimitisregulatedat100mSv/5yearsand50mSv/year.Namely,100mSv/5yearsisconvertedto20mSv/yearand1.71mSv/month.Seehttp://www.tepco.co.jp/decommision/principles/people/index-j.html,(inJapanese),accessed12April2016.284FukushimaMinpo,“Successivecasesofworkersexposedtodosesabovelimits”,26March2015,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.minpo.jp/pub/topics/jishin2011/2015/03/post_11693.html,accessed12April2016.285On19January2015,aworkerfellfromatankanddiedlater.Alsoon8August2015,aworkerdiedfrombeingcaughtbetweenaconstructionvehicle’stankanditslid.286FukushimaLabourBureau,“Requestforthoroughimplementationoflaboraccidentpreventionmeasuresfordecommissioningactivities”,MHLW,15September2015,(inJapanese),seehttp://fukushima-roudoukyoku.jsite.mhlw.go.jp/library/fukushima-roudoukyoku/anzen/pdf/1509rousaiboushi_yousei.pdf,accessed12April2016.287FukushimaLabourBureau,“ResultsfromthesupervisionoftheoperatorofdecommissioningworkforFukushimaDaiichinuclearpowerplant”,MHLW,20November2015,(inJapanese),seehttp://fukushima-roudoukyoku.jsite.mhlw.go.jp/library/fukushima-roudoukyoku/kantoku/pdf/1511genpatsujigyousha_kantokukekka.pdf,accessed12April2016.288MHLW,“Resultofreviewatthe‘reviewmeetingonoccupational/non-occupationalionizingradiationdisease’andapprovalasoccupationaldisease/injury”,20October2015,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/05-Shingikai-11201000-Roudoukijunkyoku-Soumuka/kouhyousiryou.pdf,accessed3June2016.289AsahiShimbun,“Firstworker'scompensationforleukemiaasoccupationaldiseasefromexposureafterFukushimaaccident”,20October2015,(inJapanese),seehttp://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASHBJ7DNSHBJULBJ014.html,accessed12April2016.


Althoughthestandardforrecognizingaworker’sleukemiaasanoccupationaldiseaseisexposureto more than 5 mSv/year of radiation, MHLW stated that “this recognition does not provescientificallythecausalrelationshipofradiationexposureanditshealtheffects”.290

Offsite Challenges

Current Status of Evacuation

TheReconstructionAgencyset the fiveyears followingtheearthquakeof2011as the intensivereconstruction period, and the term fromApril 2016 toMarch 2021 as the reconstruction andrevitalizationperiod.291However,therehavebeenmanydelayswiththereconstructioneffortsoverthepastfiveyears.

AsofMay2016,92,600FukushimaPrefectureresidentshadbeenforcedtoevacuatefromtheirhomes:Specifically,50,600peoplehadevacuatedtootherareaswithinFukushimaPrefecture.Theremaining42,000peoplehadevacuatedtootherprefecturesacrossJapan.292

As of September 2015, which are the latest available figures, about 70,000 people have beenevacuatedfromthedesignatedevacuationzonesduetotheFukushimaaccident:specifically,about24,000 peoplewere evacuated from the difficult-to-return zone, about 23,000 people from therestricted-residencezone,and24,000people from thezone inpreparation for the liftingof theevacuationorder.293

AsoftheendofSeptember2015,thetotalnumberofdisaster-relateddeaths—i.e.deathsthatwerenot caused directly by the earthquake and tsunami but were due to indirect causes such asdeteriorationofphysicalconditionsasaresultofevacuation—was3,407people.ThesepeoplehadbeenlivinginnineprefecturesandTokyo.Ofthese,FukushimaPrefecturehadthehighestnumberwith1,979deaths.294ThisfigureisparticularlyhighamongpeoplewhoevacuatedfromcitiesandtownswithinevacuationzonessuchasMinami-soma,TomiokaandNamie.

Moreover,accordingtothestatisticscollectedbytheCabinetOffice,thenumberofsuicidesrelatedtotheGreatEastJapanEarthquakehasdecreasedeverywhereelsebutFukushimaPrefecture(seeTable7).295

290MHLW,“Resultofreviewatthe‘reviewmeetingonoccupational/non-occupationalionizingradiationdisease’andapprovalasoccupationaldisease/injury”,20October2015,seewww.mhlw.go.jp/english/policy/employ-labour/labour-standards/dl/151111-01.pdf,accessed5June2016.291ReconstructionAgency,“TheProcessandProspectsforReconstruction”,March2016,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/Progress_to_date/image/20160307_process_and_prspects.pdf,accessed12April2016.292FukushimaPrefecture,“Immediateupdateonthedamagesituationof2011Tohoku-PacificOceanearthquake(ReportNo.1642)”,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/life/206010_465920_misc.xls,accessed21May2016.293ReconstructionAgency,“Currentstatusofreconstruction”,4March2016,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat7/sub-cat7-2/20160304-4_sankousiryou1-1.pdf,accessed21May2016.294ReconstructionAgency,“Thenumberofdisaster-relateddeathsduetotheGreatEastJapanEarthquake”,25December2015,(inJapanese)seehttp://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat2/sub-cat2-6/20151225_kanrenshi.pdf,accessed12April2016.295CabinetOffice,“NumberofsuicidesrelatedtotheGreatEastJapanEarthquake”,13March2016,(inJapanese),seehttp://www8.cao.go.jp/jisatsutaisaku/toukei/pdf/h27joukyou/jishin.pdf,accessed12April2016.


Thegovernment isaggressivelyseekingto liftevacuationorders. In June2015, thegovernmentannouncedthattheywillenabletheliftingofevacuationordersforallrestrictedresidencezonesand zones in preparation for the lifting of the evacuation order byMarch 2017296. If this planmaterializes,47,000peoplewillbeallowedtoreturntotheirhomes.

Table7:SuicidesRelatedtotheGreatEastJapanEarthquake

Year[1] IwatePrefecture

MiyagiPrefecture

FukushimaPrefecture

OtherPrefectures

[2]

2011 17 22 10 6

2012 8 3 13 0

2013 4 10 23 1

2014 3 4 15 0

2015 3 1 19 0

Notes: [1]Thevalueof2011isatotalfromJunetoDecember.Thevaluesfrom2012onwardsarethetotalfromJanuarytoDecember.

[2]Totalnumberofthreeprefectures(Ibaraki,Saitama,Kanagawa)andOsaka,KyotoandTokyo.

Source:CabinetOffice,“NumberofsuicidesrelatedtotheGreatEastJapanEarthquake”,13March2016.

However, evacuees have mixed feelings. In February 2016, the government held a briefing inMinami-somacityandstatedthattheyhopetolifttheevacuationorderinApril.Inresponsetothis,numerousresidentscommentedthatitistoosoontolifttheordersinceprogresshasbeenslowinimplementing decontamination activities.297 InMarch2016, FukushimaPrefecture released theresultsofitsquestionnairesurvey.AmongthepeoplewhohadevacuatedtootherprefecturesandhadnohometoreturntoinFukushimaPrefectureafterApril2017—whentheprogramforofferingrental houses free of charge will be terminated—about 70 percent did not wish to return toFukushima while about 10 percent wanted to return to the prefecture and about 20 percentrespondedthattheyarestilldebatingonwhetherornottoreturn.298

296NuclearCountermeasuresHeadquarters,“Acceleratingpost-nucleardisasterFukushimarecoveryefforts”,(Revisedversion),12June2015,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/kinkyu/pdf/2015/0612_02.pdf,accessed12April2016.297TokyoShimbun,“ResidentsopposeplantoliftevacuationorderinAprilatanexplanatorymeetinginMinami-somacity”,21February2016,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/national/list/201602/CK2016022102000126.html,accessed12April2016.298FukushimaPrefecture,“Interimreportontheresidenceintentionssurvey”,25March2015,(inJapanese),seehttps://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/158116.pdf,accessed12April2016.


Radiation Exposure and Health Effects FukushimaPrefectureiscontinuingitshealthsurvey,whichincludesassessmentsofexternalandinternaldosesandthyroidexaminations.299Inregardtothethyroidexamination,thepreliminarysurvey—ultrasoundwaveexaminationforresidentswhowereunder18yearsoldoryoungerandlivedinFukushimaPrefectureatthetimeoftheaccident—wasconductedfromOctober2011toMarch2014.AsoftheendofJune2015,113peoplewerediagnosedwithconfirmedorsuspectedthyroidcancer.300Ofthese,99peopleunderwentsurgery.

However,thePrefecturalOversightCommitteeMeetingforFukushimaHealthManagementSurveyconcluded:

As a judgment based on a comprehensive assessment of the following facts, it is unlikely that thethyroidcancersdiscovereduntilnowwerecausedbytheeffectsofradiation:theexposuredosesweregenerallysmallercomparedtothoseoftheChernobylaccident,theperiodfromexposuretocancerdetectionwasshortrangingfromaboutoneto fouryears,cancerwasnot foundinthoseagedfiveyearsoldoryoungeratthetimeoftheaccident,andtherewasnosignificantdifferenceintheregionaldetectionrates.

Thefirstfull-scalesurveywasconductedfromApril2014toMarch2016,involvingthesubjectsofthepreliminarysurveyandchildrenwhowerebornaftertheaccidentincludingthoseinuteroatthetimeoftheaccident. Ifnodulesorcyststhatarelargerthanapredeterminedsizearefoundintheprimaryfirstexamination,thosepeopleundergoaconfirmatoryexamination.

Table8:ConfirmedorSuspectedThyroidCancerCasesandEffectiveExternalDoseEstimates

Effectivedose[mSv]

Ageatthetimeoftheaccident

0-5 6-10 11-15 16-18 Total

Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female

Lessthan1 0 0 3 0 1 4 2 0 6 4

Lessthan2 0 0 0 1 3 4 3 3 6 8

Lessthan5 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 2 3

Lessthan10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Lessthan20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

20andabove 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 0 0 4 1 4 10 6 4 14 15

Source:PrefecturalOversightCommitteeMeetingforFukushimaHealthManagementSurvey,“ThyroidUltrasoundExamination

299FukushimaMedicalUniversity,“ReportoftheFukushimaHealthManagementSurvey(FY2011-2013)”,(revisedversion),12June2015.seehttp://fmu-global.jp/?wpdmdl=1032,accessed30June2016.300PrefecturalOversightCommitteeMeetingforFukushimaHealthManagementSurvey,“Interimreportontheprefecturalcitizenshealthsurvey”,March2016,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/158522.pdf,accessed12April2016;andShinichiSuzukietal.,“ComprehensiveSurveyResultsofChildhoodThyroidUltrasoundExaminationsinFukushimaintheFirstFourYearsAftertheFukushimaDaiichiNuclearPowerPlantAccident”,THYROID,Volume26,Number6,2016,seehttp://online.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/thy.2015.0564,accessed10June2016.


(Full-scaleThyroidScreeningProgram)”,15February2016.

AsoftheendofDecember2015,51peoplewerediagnosedwithconfirmedorsuspectedmalignantthyroidcancerinthesecondexamination.Unfortunately,only29ofthemsubmittedabasicsurveyquestionnairethatprovidesdataontheirexposuredoseatthetimeoftheaccident.Amongthesevalues,thehighestdosewas2.1mSv(seeTable8).301

In October 2015, a research group at Okayama University published an epidemiological studyrelatedtothehighoccurrenceofchildhoodthyroidcancer.302Accordingtothegroup,basedontheresultsofthescreeningtestsofFukushimaPrefecture,atthemaximum,theincidenceofthyroidcancerinacertainareaofFukushimaPrefecturewasupto50timeshigherthanJapan'saverageannualincidenceofthyroidcancerincidences.Accordingly,thegroupconcludedthattheexcessiveoccurrenceofthyroidcancerhasalreadybeendetected.However,themethodologyofthispaperhasbeencriticizedandtheacademicdebateonthisissueiscontinuing.303

Food and Environmental Contamination Theintakeandshipmentofcertainediblewildplantsandfreshwaterfishhavebeenrestrictedduetothecontaminationrisk.304Althoughfishermenhaveplacedavoluntaryrestrictiononfishinginthewaterswithin20kmfromtheFukushimapowerplantsite,astudy isbeingconducted thathopestorestartfishinginthatarea.

Most food samples analyzed for radioactive contamination were non-contaminated orcontaminatedatlevels“belowthedetectionlimit”,exceptforrarecasesinprefecturesadjacenttoFukushima.Forexample,263cases(0.09percent)exceededthestandardlimitsinthemonitoringfromApril2015toJanuary2016.305

Itshouldbenotedthatregardingtheterm“NotDetected(ND)”,whichhasbeenfrequentlyusedingovernmentreports,arecentstudyproposesareviewofthedetectionlimit.306

TheMinistryoftheEnvironmenthascontinuedtomonitorwildanimalsandplants.Forexample,atascientificmeetingheld inFebruary2016,astudyconducted inFY2014waspresented thatevaluatedtheexposure-doseratesofabout40typesofanimalsandplants.Accordingtothisstudy,

301PrefecturalOversightCommitteeMeetingforFukushimaHealthManagementSurvey,“ThyroidUltrasoundExamination(Full-scaleThyroidScreeningProgram)”,15February2016,seehttp://fmu-global.jp/?wpdmdl=1563,accessed10June2016.302Tsuda,Toshihideetal.,“ThyroidCancerDetectionbyUltrasoundAmongResidentsAges18YearsandYoungerinFukushima,Japan:2011to2014”,Epidemiology,Volume27,Issue3,May2016,seehttp://journals.lww.com/epidem/Citation/2016/05000/Thyroid_Cancer_Detection_by_Ultrasound_Among.3.aspx,accessed12April2016.303Takahashi,Hidetoetal.,“Re:ThyroidCancerAmongYoungPeopleinFukushima”,Epidemiology,Volume27,Issue3,May2016,seehttp://journals.lww.com/epidem/Fulltext/2016/05000/Re___Thyroid_Cancer_Among_Young_People_in.36.aspx,accessed12April2016.304FukushimaPrefecture,“Resultsofemergencyenvironmentalradiationmonitoringofagriculture,forestryandfisheryproducts”,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/site/portal/mon-kekka.html,accessed12April2016.305FoodIndustryAffairsBureau,MinistryofAgriculture,ForestryandFisheries(MAFF),“Ensuringfoodsafety”,March2016,seehttp://www.maff.go.jp/j/export/e_info/pdf/160401_eigo_part1.pdf,accessed10June2016.306HiroshiOkamuraetal.,“RiskassessmentofradioisotopecontaminationforaquaticlivingresourcesinandaroundJapan”,ProceedingoftheNationalAcademyofScienceoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,Volume113,seehttp://www.pnas.org/content/113/14/3838.abstract,accessed12April2016.


thereisanundeniablepossibilitythatreproductiveratesloweredandlifeexpectancyshortenedinsome species in certain areas.307 Another study demonstrates that the closer the area is to theFukushima nuclear power plant, the lower the number of habitats and species of invertebrateorganisms.308

Thegovernmenthassettwodecontaminationgoals:

1. Toincrementallyreducethesizeoftheareas,butassoonaspossible,withlevelsat20mSv/yearorhigher;

2. Reducetheexposuredoserateto1mSv/yearorlessoveralong-termperiodfortheareaswithlevelsatlessthan20mSv/year.309

Decontaminationworkinthedesignatedareastobedecontaminatedunderthedirectcontrolofthe government was completed in six municipalities among the 11 designated municipalitieswithin Fukushima Prefecture and the plan is to finish decontamination in the remainingmunicipalities by the end of FY2016310 However, little progress has been made in thedecontaminationactivitiesimplementedbyeachlocalgovernmentforthewiderareathatcoverssevenprefecturesincludingFukushima311.

As for the rates of progress made in the decontamination activities for the entire FukushimaPrefecture,80percentofhouses,5percentofroads,and70percentoftheforestsinareas,wheredailyactivitiesareconducted,havebeendecontaminated.312However,itshouldbepointedoutthatby “forest” ismeant in general a small band aroundhouses and roads, rather the actual denseforests, that cannot be decontaminated at all. In December 2015, theMinistry of Environmentannounced that theywill notdecontaminate areasmore than20kmaway fromdaily-activitiesareasinFukushimaPrefecture.313However,asaresultoflocalopposition,theministrychangedthepolicytocarryingoutdecontaminationinsatoyamaareas—borderzonesofagriculturallandandforestedlandtraditionallyregardedasonearea—wherepeoplemayentereasily.314

307NatureConservationBureau,MinistryoftheEnvironment,“MOE’sresearchontheeffectsofradiationonwildfaunaandfloraBiodiversityPolicyDivision”,Researchreportmeetingonradiationeffectsonwildanimalsandplants,19February2016,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.env.go.jp/jishin/monitoring/results_wl_d160219.pdf,accessed12April2016.308ToshihiroHoriguchietal.,“Declineinintertidalbiotaafterthe2011GreatEastJapanEarthquakeandTsunamiandtheFukushimanucleardisaster:fieldobservations”,ScientificReports,seehttp://www.nature.com/articles/srep20416,accessed12April2016.309MinistryofEnvironment,“OutlineoftheImplementationoftheActonSpecialMeasures”,seehttp://josen.env.go.jp/en/framework/,accessed21May2016.310MinistryoftheEnvironment,“Progressmapofdecontaminationactivitiesimplementedunderthedirectcontrolofthegovernment”,4March2016,(inJapanese),seehttp://josen.env.go.jp/material/pdf/josen_gareki_progress_201603.pdf,accessed12April2016.311MinistryoftheEnvironment,“Progressmadeinareasbeingdecontaminatedbymunicipalities”,(inJapanese),see http://josen.env.go.jp/zone/index.html,accessed12April2016.312Ibidem.313Environmentalrecoveryreviewmeeting,“Directionofradioactivematerialsmanagementmeasuresforforests(draft)”,21December2015,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.env.go.jp/jishin/rmp/conf/16/mat05.pdf,accessed12April2016.314ProjectteamofrelevantministriesandagenciesforrecoveringforestsandtheforestindustryinFukushima,“ComprehensiveapproachforrecoveringforestsandtheforestindustryinFukushima”,9March2016,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat1/sub-cat1-4/forest/160309_3_siryou1.pdf,accessed12April2016.


Costs315 TEPCO continues to pay compensation for damages causedby the Fukushima accident. Legallyrequired compensation costs have been increasing and the total reached about 7.1 trillion yen(US$71billion)asoftheendofMarch2016.Table9showsthelegallyrequiredcompensationcostsandtheamountofagreed-uponcompensationpaymentsthathadbeenpaidasofMarch2016.

Table9:CompensationCosts

Completedagreed-uponcompensationpayments[US$1million][1]

Legallyrequiredcompensationcosts[US$1million][2]

I. Amountsconcerningindividuals 18,674 21,203

Medicalexaminationcosts,etc. 2,383 3,235

Psychologicaldamage 10,164 11,441

Voluntaryevacuation,etc. 3,628 3,681

Incapacitydamage 2,498 2,844

II. Amounts concerning corporations and soleproprietorships

23,152 25,631

Loss of business, damage and reputationaldamagecausedbyshippingrestrictionorders

19,601 20,554

One-timecompensation(Lossofbusiness,reputationaldamage)

909 2,383

Indirectdamage,etc. 2,639 2,693

III. Commonorothercosts 13,547 17,577

Lossordecreaseinpropertyvalue,etc. 11,575 12,612

Damages concerning residence at evacuateddestinationoruponreturning

1,721 4,715

Fukushimacitizenshealthmanagementfund 250 250

IV. Decontamination,etc. 3,900 12,173

Total 59,275 76,585

[1]AsoftheendofFebruary2016

[2]AsoftheendofMarch2016

Source:TEPCO,“NewComprehensiveSpecialBusinessPlan”,31March2016.

315TEPCO,“NewComprehensiveSpecialBusinessPlan”,31March2016,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.meti.go.jp/press/2015/03/20160331005/20160331005-1.pdf,accessed12April2016.


Accordingtotheestimationof theBoardofAudit inMarch2015, itwill takeupto30years forTEPCO to repay the financial subsidies of 9 trillion yen (US$90 billion) it received from thegovernment.316

BasedontheinformationfromTEPCO,thetotalcostofdamagescausedbytheFukushimadisasterhasbeenestimatedtobeat13.3trillionyen(US$133billion),basedonthefollowingitems:

(1) Decommissioning and contaminated water treatment costs of 2 trillion yen. Although TEPCO already set aside a reserve of 1 trillion yen (US$ 10 billion), the government asked the utility to secure another 1 trillion yen (US$ 10 billion) within 10 years.

(2) Compensation costs of about 7.1 trillion yen (US$ 71 billion). The total of the legally required compensation costs according to the latest data is about 7.7 trillion yen (US$ 77 billion), see Table 9.

(3) Decontamination costs of 3.6 trillion yen (US$ 36 billion): The Ministry of the Environment has estimated the decontamination cost at about 2.5 trillion yen (US$ 25 billion) and the interim storage facilities cost at about 1.1 trillion yen (US$ 11 billion).

Fukushima vs. Chernobyl “We knew, with certainty, with arrogant certainty, that we were in control of the power we were playing with. We could make the forces of nature bend to our will. There was nothing we could not do. This was the day, of course, when we learned we were wrong.”

Sergiy Parashyn Engineer at the Chernobyl plant

from 1977 to the day of the disaster317

Although the Fukushima disaster in 2011 remains very serious, according to some criteria, itseffectsseemtopaleincomparisontotheChernobylnucleardisasterin1986.However,itmustbenotedthatallofthesenumbersarebasedonmodellingwithlargerangesofuncertainties.

According to Japan’s Science Ministry,318 the Fukushima accident contaminated an area of30,000km2inJapantoalevelabove10,000Bqperkm2ofCs-137.Chernobylcontaminatedanareaofanestimated1,437,000km2inEuropeandtheformerUSSRabovethislevel,a50timeslargerarea.319 The Japanese Science Ministry also stated that 8 percent of Japan’s land area wascontaminatedtothislevel.320Incomparison,37percentofEuropewasaffectedtothesamelevel.

Table10indicatesthatitwasnotjustthelandareascontaminatedandcollectivedosesbutalsotheradionuclideamountsreleased to theair,and thepopulationsaffected thatwere largerby land

316BoardofAuditofJapan,“Reportontheresultsoftheaccountingauditregardingtheimplementationstatusofgovernment'sassistanceprovidedtoTEPCOforcompensationfornucleardamage”,March2015,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.jbaudit.go.jp/pr/kensa/result/27/pdf/270323_zenbun_01.pdf,accessed12April2016.317MiamiHerald,“RuinedChernobylnuclearplantwillremainathreatfor3,000years”,24April2016,seehttp://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/article73405857.html,accessed23June2016.318ClimateProgress,“RadiationCovers8%ofJapan,FukushimaCrisis‘StuntingChildren’sGrowth’(ThoughNotDirectlyDuetoRadiation)”,28November2011,seehttp://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/11/28/377120/radiation-japan-fukushima-stunting-childrens-growth/accessed30June2016.319IanFairlie,“TORCH-2016—Anindependentscientificevaluationofthehealth-relatedeffectsoftheChernobylnucleardisaster”,31March2016,seehttps://www.global2000.at/sites/global/files/GLOBAL_TORCH%202016_rz_WEB_KORR.pdf,accessed4June2016.320ClimateProgress,op.cit.


contamination.Inallparameterslisted,Chernobyl’seffectsweregreaterthanthoseatFukushima.Little is known about total discharges to the sea, from aerial disposal and from direct liquidreleases.

Table10:ComparisonofSelectedParametersoftheChernobylandFukushimaAccidents

Chernobyl Fukushima Factor

Areacontaminated(>10,000Bq/m2Cs-137) 1,437,000km2** 30,000km2^ ~50x

Percentageoflandmass 37%ofEurope** 8%ofJapan^ ~5x

Cs-137sourceterm 85PBq* 12PBq* ~7x

I-131sourceterm 1,760PBq* 150PBq* ~12x

Collectivedose 320,000-480,000**person-Sv321

48,000*person-Sv ~7-10x

Collectivedosetothyroid

2,240,000**person-Gray322

112,000*person-Gray

~20x

Evacuees(firstyear) 130,000** 170,000+ ~0.8x

Clean-upworkers(firstyear) 130,000** 12,000+ ~12x

Sources:*UNSCEAR2013323;**TORCH-2016324;^JapaneseScienceMinistry325,+Fairlie(2016)326

321Person-sievertisaunitofcollectivedoseforwholebodyexposures322Person-grayisaunitofcollectivedoseforspecificorganexposures.323UNSCEAR,“UNSCEAR2013Report—VolumeI,ReporttotheGeneralAssembly;ScientificAnnexA:Levelsandeffectsofradiationexposureduetothenuclearaccidentafter2011greateast-Japanearthquakeandtsunami”,UnitedNations,April2014,seehttp://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/2013/13-85418_Report_2013_Annex_A.pdf,accessed5June2016.324IanFairlie,“TORCH-2016”,31March2016,seehttps://www.global2000.at/sites/global/files/GLOBAL_TORCH%202016_rz_WEB_KORR.pdf,accessed4June2016.325ClimateProgress,“RadiationCovers8%ofJapan,FukushimaCrisis‘StuntingChildren’sGrowth’(ThoughNotDirectlyDuetoRadiation)”,28November2011,seehttp://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/11/28/377120/radiation-japan-fukushima-stunting-childrens-growth/,accessed30June2016.326IanFairlie,“SummingtheHealthEffectsoftheFukushimaNuclearDisaster”,August2015,seehttp://www.ianfairlie.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Summing-up-the-Effects-of-the-Fukushima-Nuclear-Disaster-10.pdf,accessed6July2016.


Source Term Therearevariousestimatesoftheamountsofradioactivityemittedtoair,theso-calledairsourceterm,fromChernobylandFukushima.

Table11providesestimatesforthemainnuclidesreleasedaccordingtoFairlie327,Imanakaetal.328andUNSCEAR329.

Table11:ComparisonofAtmosphericReleasesfromNuclearAccidents(inPBq)330

Accidents Authors I-131 Cs-137 Xe-133

ChernobylImanakaetal.2015 1,760 85 6,500

UNSCEAR2008/11 1,700 86 6,500

FukushimaImanakaetal2015 120 8.8 7,300

UNSCEAR2008/11 100-500 6-20 14,000

Thekeypointshereare:

• BroadagreementaboutsourcetermsonCs-137andXe-133.WiderangeofI-131estimatesbyUNSCEARatFukushima.

• Release estimates for Chernobyl aremuch larger than those for Fukushima, about ten timesgreaterforCs-137andI-131whicharethemainvolatilenuclides.ForthenobleinertgasXe-133, the situation is reversed, as releases from Fukushima were about double those fromChernobyl.ThemainreasonisthatatChernobylonereactorexplodedwhereasatFukushima,meltdownsoccurredatthreeunits,witheachreactorreleasingitsentiregaseousinventory.

Radiation Exposures Thecalculationofradiationexposureisbasedoncomplexmodellingofexposurepaths(external,internal,air,foodpath,etc.),astheactualdosesdeliveredtothebodyhavebeenmeasuredonlypartiallyforasmallnumberofpeople.Therefore,theexposurenumbersindicatedthroughoutthischapterhave tobe consideredwith circumspection.Also, radiation risksbetweena fetusandagrown-up adult vary by two orders of magnitude, and risks show high variability betweenindividuals.

indicatesthat,inthehighestcontaminatedareasresultingfromChernobyl,theaveragedosewas9mSv in the firstyearafter theaccident.This issimilar to theaveragedosereceived in themostcontaminatedareaofJapaninFukushimaprefecture.

327IanFairlie,“TORCH-2016”,31March2016,seehttps://www.global2000.at/sites/global/files/GLOBAL_TORCH%202016_rz_WEB_KORR.pdf,accessed4June2016.328ImanakaT.etal.,“Comparisonoftheaccidentprocess,radioactivityreleaseandgroundcontaminationbetweenChernobylandFukushima-1”,JournalofRadiationResearch,14November2015,seehttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4732534/,accessed5June2016.329UNSCEAR,“2008ReporttotheGeneralAssembly;AnnexDHealthEffectsDuetotheChernobylNuclearAccident”,UnitedNations,NewYork.Note:AlthoughUNSCEAR’spublicationdatewasstatedas2008,thereportwasnotreleaseduntil2011.3301petabecquerel(PBq)=1015becquerels


However, the average thyroiddose inBelarus andUkrainewas about20 times greater than inFukushima prefecture. This is because the I-131 release was about 10 to 12 times greater atChernobylthanFukushimaandbecauseanestimated(~80percent)oftheplumesatFukushimawereblownouttosea.331

Table12:AverageDosesinFukushimaandChernobyl(HighestContaminatedAreas)

FukushimaPrefecture

HighlyContaminatedAreasofBelarus,RussiaandUkraine

Europe/Japan

AverageDose 10mSv 9mSv ~1

AverageThyroidDose

35mGy332560333-640334mGy

(range50to5,000mGy)16-18x

Source:UNSCEAR2008,2013

Asregardscollectivedose,theUNSCEAR2013reportstates:

The collective effective dose to the population of Japan due to a lifetime exposure following theFukushima accident is approximately 10-15 percent of the corresponding value for Europeanpopulationsexposed to radiation following theChernobylaccident.Correspondingly, thecollectiveabsorbeddosetothethyroidwasapproximately5percentofthatduetotheChernobylaccident.

ThisisshownintabularforminTable13.

Table13:CollectiveDosesfromFukushimaandChernobylAccidents(over80years)

Europe JapanFactor

Difference

CollectiveDose320,000-480,000

Person-Sv48,000Person-Sv x7-10

CollectiveDosetoThyroid

2,240,000Person-Gy 112,000Person-Gy x20

Source:UNSCEAR2008,2013

331UNSCEAR,“UNSCEAR2013Report—VolumeI,ReporttotheGeneralAssembly;ScientificAnnexA:Levelsandeffectsofradiationexposureduetothenuclearaccidentafter2011greateast-Japanearthquakeandtsunami”,UnitedNations,April2014,seehttp://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/2013/13-85418_Report_2013_Annex_A.pdf,accessed5June2016.332LeGrayisaunitofcollectivedoseforspecificorganexposures.333ZablotskaL.B.,RonE.,etal.,“ThyroidcancerriskinBelarusamongchildrenandadolescentsexposedtoradioiodineaftertheChornobylaccident”,BritishJournalofCancer,2011,Editionn.104,publishedonline23November2010,seehttp://www.nature.com/bjc/journal/v104/n1/full/6605967a.html,accessed5June2016.334LikhtarovI.,KovganL.,etal.,“ThyroidcancerstudyamongUkrainianchildrenexposedtoradiationaftertheChornobylaccident:Improvedestimatesofthethyroiddosestothecohortmembers”,HealthPhys.,March2014,seehttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4160663/,accessed5June2016.


Nuclear Power vs. Renewable Energy Deployment

Introduction TheDecember 2015UnitedNational Framework Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC) inParis is rightly seen as an importantmilestone in the global fight to avoid dangerous climatechange. The foundation of the conference’s outcome was the national pledges for mitigationactionsthroughuntil2030;whilevoluntary,theyhaveaformalreportingandreviewmechanism.TheParisagreementnotedthatthesepledges,whenaggregated,didnotmeettheobjective“withholdingtheincreaseintheglobalaveragetemperaturetowellbelow2°Cabovepre-industriallevelsandpursuingeffortstolimitthetemperatureincreaseto1.5°Cabovepre-industriallevels”.

FortheParisAgreement162nationalpledgescalledIntendedNationalDeterminedContributions(INDCs)weresubmittedtotheUNFCCCcoveringaround95percentofglobalemissionsin2010and98percentoftheglobalpopulation.Theextenttowhichnuclearpoweris includedwithinthese plans is limited as just 31 countries currently operating nuclear power, therefore, onlyaroundoneinfiveParispledges.Furthermore,expansionofthesector,throughconstructionofnew reactors, is only taking place in 12 of these countries with an additional two countries,BelarusandUnitedArabEmirates,buildingforthefirsttime.

WithintheactualINDCsonlyelevencountriesmentionedthattheywereoperatingorconsideringtooperatenuclearpoweraspartoftheirmitigationstrategyandevenfewer(six)actuallystatethattheywereproposingtoexpanditsuse(Belarus,India,Japan,TurkeyandUAE).Thiscompareswith144thatmentiontheuseofrenewableenergyand111,whichexplicitlymentiontargetsorplans forexpanding itsuseasshown inFigure32.Thishighlights theextent towhichnuclearpower is a niche carbon abatement strategy, compared to the use of renewables which isuniversal.

The limiteduseofnuclearpower to address climate change concerns, especially compared torenewableenergiesisfurtherdemonstratedintheongoingreviewoftheParisAgreement.Thismandatesmeetings every five years, starting in 2018, to review progress, and assess how toincreasetheemissionsreductionplansinordertomeettheinternationalagreedtargetsfor2030.However, it is highlyunlikely thatmany, if any, countrieswill be able to increase theiruseofnuclearpoweroverandabovethelevelalreadyincludedintheirexistingpledges,giventhelengthoftimethatnuclearpowertakestoplan,licenseandbuild.Therefore,despitetheneedforgreateraction to reduce emissions through until 2030, nuclear power is unable to accelerate itsdeployment—infact,asotherpartsofthereportillustrate,moreunitsmightclosethanstartup—andfurtherdecarbonizationwillheavilyrelyonenergyefficiencyandrenewableenergy.

In the longer term, whilemost globalmodels assume that a decarbonized energy sector willincludeacombinationofnuclear, fossil fuelswithcarboncaptureandstorageandrenewables,thereareasignificantnumberofwell-respectedstudies thatassumeanuclear-and fossil-freeenergyfuture.Theseinclude:


• TheGlobalEnergyAssessment2012,publishedbytheCambridgeUniversitypress,states,“thatitisalsofeasibletophase-outnuclearandstillmeetthesustainabilitytargets”.335

• TheSpecialreportoftheInternationalPanelandClimateChange(IPCC)onrenewableenergyfrom2011,reviewsatanumberofscenarios,whichlimittheuseofdifferentsupplyoptions,includingrenewables,nuclearpowerandCarbonCaptureandStorage.Someofthesescenarios,show no additional cost associated with the nuclear-free option, while meeting globalmitigationtargets.336

• Global Energy (R)evolution, published and regularly updated by Greenpeace, is acomprehensive100-percentrenewableenergyscenario.337

Figure32:ParisAgreement,NationalPledgesandNuclearPower

Source:INDCsUNFCCC338

Therefore,itisnotsomuchaquestionofhavingtodeploynuclearinordertodecarbonize,butwhetherornotGovernments choose to actively supportnuclearpower as ameansof climatemitigation.

Whilenoenergysourceiswithoutitseconomiccostsandenvironmentalimpacts,whathasbeenseen clearly over the past decade, and particularly in the past few years, is that choosing todecarbonize with nuclear turns out as an expensive, slow, risky and potentially hazardous

335GEAandInternationalInstituteforAppliedSystemsAnalysis,“GlobalEnergyAssessmentTowardsaSustainableFuture”,CambridgeUniversityPress,2012.336IPCC,“RenewableEnergySourcesandClimateChangeMitigation,SpecialReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange”,InternationalPanelonClimateChange,figure10.11.337GreenpeaceInternational,GlobalWindEnergyCouncil,andSolarPowerEurope,“Energy[r]evolution—AsustainableWorldEnergyOutlook2015”,September2015,seehttp://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/publications/Campaign-reports/Climate-Reports/Energy-Revolution-2015/,accessed30June2016338UNFCCC,“IntendedNationallyDeterminedContributions”,UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange,2015,seehttp://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php,accessed3June2016.

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pathway,andonewhichfewcountriesarepursuing.Incontrast,somerenewableenergysources,particularly wind and solar PV, are being deployed at rates significantly in excess of thoseforecastedeveninrecentyears,339entailingrapidlyfallingproductionandinstallationcosts.

Thissectionhighlightsthedifferencesbetweenthedeploymentratesofnuclearpowerandsomerenewableenergytechnologiesonthegloballevelandinkeyregionsandmarkets.

Investment Theinvestmentdecisionstakenarenotonlyanimportantindicatorofthefuturepowermix,butthey also highlight the confidence that the technologyneutral financial sector has in differentpower generation options. Consequently, they can be seen as an important barometer of thecurrentstateofpolicycertaintyandcostsoftechnologiesontheglobalandregionallevels.

Figure33:GlobalInvestmentDecisionsinRenewablesandNuclearPower2004–15

Sources:FS-UNEP2015andWNISRoriginalresearch

According to data published by Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) and United NationsEnvironment Programme (UNEP), global investment in renewable energy—excluding largehydro—wasUS$285.9billionin2015,upfromUS$273billionin2014andexceedingthepreviousrecord of US$278.5 billion achieved in 2011.340 Figure 33 compares the annual investment

339KarelBeckman,“Renewables:doestheIEAunderestimatethem?,EnergyPost,6October2015,seehttp://www.energypost.eu/renewables-iea-underestimate/,accessed30June2016.340FS-UNEP,“Globaltrendsinrenewableenergyinvestment2016”,FrankfurtSchool-UNEPcollaborationCentre,BloombergNewEnergyFinance,March2016.

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decisionsfortheconstructionofnewnuclearwithrenewableenergyexcludinglargehydrosince2004.2014sawasharpdropinnewnuclearinvestment,withconstructionstartingononlythreeunits, which were the Barakah-3 in the UAE, Belarus-2 in Belarus and the Carem reactor inArgentina,butin2015eightnewconstructionstartstookplace,withsixofthesewereinChina,withtheotherstarts,thefinalunit,attheBarakahstationintheUAEandK-2inPakistan,withatotal investment cost of US$28 billion. In the absence of comprehensive, publicly availableinvestmentestimatesfornuclearpowerbyyear,andinordertosimplifytheapproach,WNISRincludesthetotalprojectedinvestmentcostsintheyearinwhichconstructionwasstarted,ratherthan spreading them out over the entire construction period. Furthermore, the nuclearinvestmentfiguresdonot includerevisedbudgets, ifcostoverrunsoccur.However,despiteallthese uncertainties, it is clear that over this period the investment in nuclear constructiondecisionsisaboutanorderofmagnitudelowerthanthatinrenewableenergy,withnearlyfivetimesmoreinvestmentinsolarandfourtimesmoreinwind.

Table14:Top10CountriesforRenewableEnergyInvestment2013–2015

Source:FS-UNEP2016,2015,2014

The past few years have seen the significant rise of investments into small (less than 1MW)distributed generation and in 2015, they accounted for a quarter of all renewable energyinvestments,US$67.4billion,up12percentfromthepreviousyear,butstilldownfromtherecordhighofUS$79.3billionin2012.ThefallinglobalinvestmentisaresultofslowingdownofsolarprogramsinEurope,andparticularlyGermany,aswellasdramaticallylowercosts.Interestingto

2015

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China 102.9 81.0 54.2

UnitedStates 44.1 36.3 33.9

Japan 36.2 34.3 28.6

UnitedKingdom 22.2 13.9 12.1

India 10.2 7.1 6.0

Germany 8.5 11.4 9.9

Brazil 7.1 7.4 3.0

SouthAfrica 4.5 5.5 4.9

Mexico 4.0 2.1 1.5

Chile 3.4 1.4 1.6


noteistheriseofinvestmentinJapan,US$36.2billionin2015,up0.1percent.341Theincreasedinvestmentinsolar,anditsimpactonloweringglobalprices,remainsoneoftheunderestimatedglobalimpactsoftheFukushimaaccidentin2011.

Globally,theimportanceofEuropeforrenewableenergyinvestmentsisdiminishing,withtheriseofAsia,andinparticularChinaandJapan.Tenyearsago,in2005,totalinvestmentinChinawasjustUS$8.3billionandisnowanorderofmagnitudelarger.Table14showsthetop10countriesfor renewableenergy investment in2015andhowthesehavechangedover theprevious twoyears.Thediversityofrenewableenergydevelopment isnowclear,and2015sawMexicoandChile,enteringthetop10forthefirsttime,withbothcountrieshavingapproximatelydoubledtheirannualrenewableinvestment.

Installed Capacity Globally, renewable energy continues todominatenew capacity additions. In total 147GWofrenewablescapacitywasaddedin2015,accordingtheREN21,whichwasthelargestincreaseever.

Figure34:Wind,SolarandNuclear,CapacityIncreasesintheWorld2000–2015

Sources:WNISR,BPStatisticalReview2016

In2015,renewablesaccountedforanestimatedmorethan60percentofnetadditionstoglobalpower generating capacity. Wind and solar PV both saw record additions for the second

341FS-UNEP,“Globaltrendsinrenewableenergyinvestment2016”,FrankfurtSchool-UNEPcollaborationCentre,BloombergNewEnergyFinance,March2016.

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consecutiveyear,makingupabout77percentofallrenewablepowercapacityaddedin2015.342BPfiguresindicateanincreasein2015overthepreviousyearof63GWinwindpowerand50GWofsolar,343comparedtoa6.5GWincreasefornuclearpower.

Figure34illustratestheextenttowhichrenewableshavebeendeployedatscalesincethenewmillennium,anincreaseincapacityof417GWforwindandof229GWforsolar,comparedtothestagnationofnuclearpowercapacity,whichoverthisperiodincreasedbyonly27GW,includingallreactorsinLTO.Takingintoaccountthefactthat35GWofnuclearpowerarecurrentlyinLTOandnotoperating,thebalanceturnsnegativeand8GWnuclearlessareinoperationthanin2000.

Electricity Generation Thecharacteristicsofelectricitygeneratingtechnologiesvaryanddifferentamountsofelectricityareproducedperinstalledunitofcapacity.Ingeneral,overtheyear,nuclearpowerplantstendtoproducemoreelectricityperMWofinstalledcapacitythanrenewables.

Figure35:GlobalElectricityProductionfromWind,SolarandNuclear1997-2015

Sources:BP,MSC,2016

342REN21,“Renewables2016GlobalStatusReport”,RenewableEnergyPolicyNetworkforthe21stCentury,June2016.343BP,“StatisticalReviewofWorldEnergy”,June2016.

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However, as can be seen, since 1997, the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, there has been anadditional829TWhperyearofwindpower,252TWhmorepowerfromsolarphotovoltaics,andjustanadditional185TWhofnuclearelectricity(seeFigure35).

In2015,annualgrowthratesforthegenerationfromwindpowerwasover17percentglobally,whileitwasover33percentforsolarPVand1.3percentfornuclearpower.Intermsofactualproduction, nine of the 31 nuclear countries—Brazil, China, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico,Netherlands,SpainandU.K.—nowallgeneratemoreelectricityfromnon-hydrorenewablesthanfromnuclearpower.

Status and Trends in China, the EU, India, and the U.S. Chinacontinuestobeagloballeaderformostenergytechnologies.In2015,Chinainstalledmorewindpowerandsolarphotovoltaicsthananyothercountry(seeFigure36),soworldwide,itnowhasthelargestcapacitiesofboth,windpowerandsolarPV.In2015,ChinahasovertakenGermanyindeployedPVcapacity.Havingstartedupeightoftheworld'stenreactors,Chinaalsoinstalledmorenuclearcapacityin2015thananyothercountry.

Figure36:InstalledCapacityinChinafromWind,SolarandNuclear2000–2015

Sources:BPStatisticalReview,IAEAPRIS2016

InvestmentinrenewablesinChinawasbyfarthelargestintheworldwithatotalofjustunderUS$103 billion up fromUS$83 billion the previous year. In 2015, investment in solar PVwas

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US$43billionandwindpowerwasUS$42billion,344thatcomparestothestartofconstructiononsixnewnuclearpowerplants,withCapexofanestimated,basedongovernmentfigures,ofaroundUS$18billion.345

The13thFiveYearPlan(2015-2020)proposesnewtargetsforenergyefficiency,thereductionofcarbonintensityaswellasdiversificationawayfromfossilfuels,wherebynon-fossilfuelsaretoprovide 15 percent of primary energy consumption by 2020, up from 7.4 percent in 2005.346Consequently,theexplosivegrowthofrenewablesisexpectedtocontinuewithalikelyincreaseofinstalledcapacityofapproximately19.5GWofsolarPVin2016.OfficialsfromChina’sNationalEnergy Administration (NEA) are considering raising the 2020 solar target from 100 GW to150GW,whichwouldbringabout21GWofannualinstallationbetween2016throughto2020.347

Figure37:ElectricityProductioninChinafromNuclear,WindandSolar2000-2015

Sources:BPStatisticalReview,IAEA-PRIS2016

344FS-UNEP,“Globaltrendsinrenewableenergyinvestment2016”,FrankfurtSchool-UNEPcollaborationCentre,BloombergNewEnergyFinance,March2016.345WNA,“NuclearPowerinChina”,25May2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/china-nuclear-power.aspx,accessed19June2016;andWNA,“NuclearPowerinChina”,January2015.346ChinaDialogue,“Climate,energyandChina’s13thFive-YearPlaningraphics”,18March2016,seehttps://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/8734-Climate-energy-and-China-s-13th-Five-Year-Plan-in-graphics,accessed23May2016.347JunkoMovellan,“The2016GlobalPVOutlook:US,AsianMarketsStrengthenedbyPoliciestoReduceCO2”,25January2016,seehttp://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2016/01/the-2016-global-pv-outlook-u-s-and-asian-markets-strengthened-by-policies-to-reduce-co2.html,accessed23May2016.

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The13thFiveYearPlanisalsoproposingtoincreasetheinstalledcapacityofwindto250GWby2020.348Chineseofficialsenvisagethattherewillbe58GWofnuclearcapacityinoperationby2020,349upfrom29.4GWinmid-2016.However,the21unitswith21.5GWunderconstructionwillnotbesufficienttoreachthetarget.Andtheaverageconstructiontimeofthe25unitsthatChinabroughtonlineoverthepastdecadewas5.7yearsandmanyoftheunitsunderconstructionencountersignificantdelays.Itappearsthereforepracticallyimpossibleforthecountrytoreachits2020nucleartarget.

WhilethepowersectorinChinacontinuestobedominatedbycoal,thegrowthrateofnon-fossilfuelsisstillimpressive.Thisincreaseinelectricityproductionisdeliveringchangesinthepowermix.WhileChina'sthenuclearbuildupisfast—productionincreasebyafactorofoverthreein10years,afactoroftenin15years—therenewableenergydeploymenthasbeenbreathtaking.InadecadeWindpowerincreasedgenerationfromvirtuallynothing,thatislessthan0.1TWhin2006 to 185 TWh in 2015. Solar PVwent from less than 1 TWh in 2010 to 39 TWh in 2015(seeFigure37).

IntheEuropeanUnion,between2000and2015,thenetchangesinthecapacityofpowerplantsareestimatedtobeanincreaseof129GWinwind,99GWinnaturalgasand96GWinsolar,whiletherehavebeendecreasesinnuclearby14.8GW,coal28.3GWandfueloilby28.2GW.350

Figure38:StartupandShutdownofElectricityGeneratingCapacityintheEUin2015

Source:EuropeanWindEnergyAssociation(EWEA)2016351

348GWEC,“GlobalWindReport,AnnualMarketUpdate2015”,April2016,seehttp://www.gwec.net/wp-content/uploads/vip/GWEC-Global-Wind-2015-Report_April-2016_22_04.pdf,accessed30June2016.349Reuters,“Chinaoncoursetomeet2020nuclearcapacitytargets-official”,27January2016,seehttp://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/27/reuters-america-china-on-course-to-meet-2020-nuclear-capacity-targets-official.html,accessed23May2016.350EuropeanWindEnergyAssociation,“WindinPower,2015Europeanstatistics”,February2016.351EWEA,“WindinPower,2015Europeanstatistics”,February2016.

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Figure39:ChangesinEUNuclear,SolarandWindPowerProductionSinceSigningoftheKyotoProtocol

Sources:BPStatisticalReview352,IAEA-PRIS2016

EU2015renewableelectricityproductionhighlightsincluded:

• InGermany, renewableenergy sources– solar,wind,hydropower, andbiomass–provided30.1percentofgrossnationalelectricityconsumption.

• Denmark had another record year,withwind power providing a 42 percent of the Danes’electricityconsumption.353

• InSpain,moreelectricitywasproducedbysolarPVandwindpower,thannuclear.Whileallrenewablescombinedproducedmoreelectricitythanthetotalfromfossilfuels.354

• In the U.K., renewables’ (including hydro) share of electricity generation increased to24.7 percent, from 19.1 per cent in 2014. In total 83.3 TWh of power were produced byrenewables,comparedto63.9TWhfornuclear(18.9percent).355

352Figuresincludingdatafrom:Austria,Belgium,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Denmark,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Italy,Lithuania,Netherlands,Poland,Portugal,Romania,Slovakia,Spain,Sweden,U.K..353Energinet.dk,“Newrecord-breakingyearforDanishwind”,15January2016,seehttp://energinet.dk/EN/El/Nyheder/Sider/Dansk-vindstroem-slaar-igen-rekord-42-procent.aspx,accessed30June2016.354RedElectricadeEspana,“TheSpanishElectricitySystemPreliminaryReport,2015”,January2016.355U.K.Government,“EnergyTrends:renewables”,14April2016,seehttps://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/energy-trends-section-6-renewables,accessed8May2016.

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ComparedtoKyotoProtocolYear1997,in2015windadded300TWhandsolar108TWh,whilenuclearpowergenerationdeclinedby80TWhacrosstheEUascanbeseeninFigure39.

Thisgrowthininstalledrenewablescapacityissettocontinuebeyondthecurrent2020targets,as in preparation of theUN climatemeeting in Paris inDecember 2015, the EU has agreed abindingtargetofatleast27percentrenewablesintheprimaryenergymixby2030,whichislikelytomean 45 percent of power coming from renewables. Thiswill require an escalation of thecurrentrateofrenewableelectricitydeployment.ThereisnoEU-widenucleardeploymenttargetandthenuclearsharehasbeenshrinkingfordecades.

India hasoneof theoldestnuclearprograms, startingelectricitygeneration from fission in 1969.Itisalsooneofthemosttroublednuclearsectorsintheworldandhasencounteredmanysetbacks(seeIndiasection)

Figure40:Solar,WindandNuclearProductioninIndia2000-2015(TWh)

Sources:BPStatisticalReview,IAEA-PRIS2016

This is in stark contrast to themore recent but steady development of the renewable energysector.Figure40shows,how,sincetheturnofthecentury,thewindsectorhasgrownrapidlyandhasovertakennuclear’scontributiontoelectricityconsumptionsince2012,whilesolarisalsogrowingrapidly.Indiahasmoveduptheleagueofcountriesofglobalimportanceforrenewableenergyinvestmentasawhole,withUS$10.2billionin2015.Itisalsoonthe5thpositionfornon-

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hydro renewables power generation and the fourthmost important for installed capacity forwind.356

Furtherincreasesinthegrowthinrenewablesareexpectedinthecomingdecade;in2014a2022target of 175 GW of renewable-based power capacity (excluding large hydropower) wasannounced.Of this total, 100GW is to be solar (compared to731MW in2014), 60GWwind(compared to 22.4 GW in 2014), 10 GW biomass-based power, and 5 GW small hydropowerprojects.

IntheUnitedStates,powerdemandremainedlargelystaticin2015asithasforthepastdecade,howeverunderlyingthisaresignificantchangesinthesupplymix.In2007,thehistoricpeak forconsumption,coalaccounted for48percentof thepowermix,butsincecoal’spowerproductionhasfallenbynearly500TWh,to1,356TWhin2015orjust33percentofthetotal.Thelargestpartofthisdeclinehasbeenmetbytheincreaseduseofnaturalgas—essentiallyshalegas—producinganadditional347TWhcomparedto2007andequalingtheshareofcoalforthefirsttimein2015.However,non-hydrorenewables,havealsogrownconsiderably,increasingby143TWh,providing2.7percentin2007and7.9percentin2015.Overthesameperiodtheoutputfromthecountry’snuclearpowerplantsremainedapproximatelyconstant.Withthecurrentrateofincreaseofrenewablesandflatorfallingproductionfromnuclearpower,bytheearlypartofthenextdecaderenewables,includinghydro-power,arelikelytoexceedproductionfromnuclearpower.357

In2015,atotalof16GWofnewrenewablecapacitywasinstalled,ofwhich8.5GWwaswindand7.3GWwassolarPV358,themajorityofnewinstalledcapacitywithlittlechangeinthenuclearsector.This trend is likely tocontinueas theU.S.CleanPowerPlanwill regulate thecountry’spowersector,aimingtocutemissionsby32percentrelativeto2005levelsby2030,acceleratingthecurrenttrendsofclosureofcoalandtheinstallationofsolarandwindandaswehaveseeninthecountrysection,littlenewconstructionofnuclearandalikelyaccelerationoftheclosurerateofreactorsinunregulatedpowermarkets.

356REN21,“Renewables2016GlobalStatusReport”,RenewableEnergyPolicyNetworkforthe21stCentury,seewww.ren21.net/GSR-2016-Report-Full-report-EN,accessed30June2016.357USEIA,“AnnualEnergyOutlook2016”,USEnergyInformationAdministration,17May2016.358BNEF,“2016SustainableEnergyinAmericaFactbook“,BusinessCouncilforSustainableEnergy,2016.


Conclusion on Nuclear Power vs. Renewable Energies The gulf between thedevelopment of new renewables, primarilywind and solar, andnuclearpowerisgrowingwideryearbyyear.Thiscanbemeasured,bythenumberofcountriesactivelysupportingtheexpansionofthetechnologies,forclimate,energyaccessoreconomicreasons,orbythesubsequentlevelsofinvestment,capacityincreasesornewgenerationputintothegrid.

Furthermore, with rising nuclear construction costs contrasting rapidly decreasing prices forrenewabletechnologythistrendislikelytoaccelerate,inparticularifdecarbonizationobjectivesagreedinParisinDecember2015areadheredtoo.Nuclearpower,evenincountriesthathaveorare considering todeploy it,will increasinglyplay a junior role to renewable energywhich isalreadythecaseinmanyoftheworld’slargesteconomies,suchasBrazil,China,Germany,JapanandtheU.K..However,inthe163U.N.MemberStatesthatdon’tusenuclearpower,renewablesarelikelytoflourishevenfasterinthecomingdecades,whichwillbringfurthertechnologicalandsubsequenteconomicimprovements,furthermarginalizingnuclearpower.


Annexes

Annex1:OverviewbyRegionandCountry 117

Annex2:JapaneseNuclearReactorStatus 214

Annex3:Fukushima—RadioactiveContaminationandCurrentEvacuationZones 217

Annex4:DefinitionofCreditRatingbytheMainAgencies 219

Annex5:StatusofLifetimeExtensionsintheU.S. 220

Annex6:AbouttheAuthors 223

Annex7:Abbreviations 226

Annex8:StatusofNuclearPowerintheWorld 232

Annex9:NuclearReactorsintheWorld“UnderConstruction” 234


Annex 1: Overview by Region and Country This annex provides an overviewof nuclear energyworldwide by region and country. Unlessotherwisenoted,dataonthenumbersofreactorsoperatingandunderconstruction(asofearlyJuly2016)andnuclear’sshareinelectricitygenerationarefromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency’sPowerReactorInformationSystem(PRIS)onlinedatabase.Historicalmaximumfiguresindicatetheyearthatthenuclearshareinthepowergenerationofagivencountrywasthehighestsince1986,theyearoftheChernobyldisaster.

Africa South Africa has two French (Framatome/AREVA)-built 31- and 32-year old 900 MWreactors.TheyarebothlocatedattheKoebergsiteeastofCapeTownandgenerated11TWhin2015,adeclineof26percentoverthepreviousyear,thelargestdropworldwide.Nuclearpowerprovided4.7percentofthecountry’selectricityin2015(thehistoricalmaximumwas7.4percentin1989).

TheKoebergsitehoststheonlyoperatingnuclearpowerplantontheAfricancontinent.

TheKoebergreactorsareincreasinglystrugglingwithageingissues.Thedecisiontoreplaceallsix steam generators of the two units has been taken as early as 2010. The plant had beenoperating formanyyearsat low temperatures inorder to reduce thepaceof corrosion in thesteamgenerator tubes.Replacementworkwastobegin in2018.But,sinceSeptember2014,alegal conflict between two competing supplier firms, French AREVA and Toshiba-ownedWestinghouse, isdelayingimplementation.Bothindustrialgroupsareinfinancialtroublesandbadly need the 5 billion rand (US$324 million) business. In addition, AREVA reportedly hasalready startedworkingon steamgenerator fabricationat itsChinese subcontractorShanghaiElectric.359 In December 2015, South Africa’s Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor ofWestinghouse,whichhadarguedthatthecontracthadnotbeenallocatedaccordingtofairnessrules. Both companies have appealed to the Constitutional Court, the country’s highest court.Hearings started on 18May 2016.360 The outcome is uncertain. Further delays could lead tomissingthenextscheduledrefuelingoutageandpreventtheplantstobebackonlinewhenpowersourcesaremostneeded.

The state-owned South African utility and Koeberg operator Eskom has considered acquiringadditional large Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) and had made plans to build 20 GW ofgenerating capacity by 2025. However, in November 2008, Eskom scrapped an internationaltenderbecausethescaleofinvestmentwastoohigh.InFebruary2012theDepartmentofEnergy(DOE)publishedaRevisedStrategicPlanthatstillcontaineda9.6GWtarget,orsixnuclearunits,by2030.Startupwouldbeoneunitevery18monthsbeginningin2022.361

359NIW,“SouthAfricanCourtUpendsKoebergSteamGeneratorContract”,11December2015.360ConstitutionalCourtofSouthAfrica,“ArevaNPIncorporatedvEskomHoldingsSOCStdandAnother,andWestinghouseElectricBelgiumSociétéAnonymevArevaNPIncorporated&Another–MediaSummary”,18May2016.361DOE,“RevisedStrategicPlan–2011/120-02015/16”,February2012.


TheNovember2013editionoftheIntegratedResourcePlanforElectricity,whichhasnotbeenupdatedsince,concludes:

The nuclear decision can possibly be delayed. The revised demand projections suggest that no newnuclearbase-loadcapacityisrequireduntilafter2025(andforlowerdemandnotuntilatearliest2035)andthattherearealternativeoptions,suchasregionalhydro,thatcanfulfiltherequirementandallowfurtherexplorationoftheshalegaspotentialbeforeprematurelycommittingtoatechnologythatmayberedundantiftheelectricitydemandexpectationsdonotmaterialise.362

However,DOE’sStrategicPlan2015–2020,releasedinApril2015,maintainsthe2030objective,butstatesthattheinvestmentinthe9.6GWeNuclearNewBuildProgram“requiresaninnovativefinancingmechanismtoprovideafirmbasistolaunchprocurement”.363ANuclearCooperationAgreement(NCA)signedwithRussiainSeptember2014allowsforthedeliveryofVVERreactors“with total installed capacity of up to 9.6 GW”, in otherwords potentially covering the entireprogram.Thisraisedsomeconcernsfortheoverallprocurementprocess364andinOctober2015,environmentalorganizationEarthlifeAfricawenttocourtagainsttheentirenew-builddecision-makingprocess, arguing that “thegovernment isnot complyingwith the constitutionbecausethey’redoingthisinaverysecret,non-transparent,non-costeffectivemanner”.365

Whateverthepoliticalandlegaldisputes,themainstumblingblockremainsfinances.StateutilityEskomwithdrew the 2008 call-for-tender, because credit-rating agencies had “threatened” todowngrade the company, if it went ahead. In November 2014, Moody’s downgraded Eskomnevertheless to “junk”.366 In the latest rating actionofMay2016,Moody's confirmed theBa1-ratingassociatedwithanegativeoutlook.367Eskomremains incriticalconditionasgeneratingcosts are increasing, consumption is falling, investment requirements are increasing andcompetitorsarereportedlyferocious.368

Thecurrentnew-buildplanwouldseethegovernmentlaunchingtheprocurementprocess.Thisinturncouldthreatenthecredit-ratingofthecountry.Initsrationaletothelatestcredit-ratingaction inMay 2016,Moody’s confirmed South Africa Baa2 rating (outlook negative), just twonotchesoff“junk”,andstressed:

Theauthoritieshavealsostated thatexpensivenewprojectssuchas theconstructionofmassivenuclearpowerfacilitiesandnationalhealthinsurancewillbedevelopedonlyatthepaceandscalethatthebudgetallows.369

362DOE,“IntegratedResourcePlanforElectricity(IRP)2010-2030”,UpdateReport2013,21November2013.363DOE,“StrategicPlan2015–2020”,April2015,seehttp://www.energy.gov.za/files/aboutus/DoE-Strategic-Plan-2015-2020.pdf,accessed15May2015.364NIW,“RussiaDealUnleashesFuryOverProcurementProcess”,26September2014.365NIW,“SouthAfrica–BattlesBehindthe9.6GWNewbuild”,19February2016.366Moody's,“Moody'sdowngradesEskomtoBa1;outlookstable”,7November2014.367Moody's,“Moody'sconfirmsEskom'sBa1ratings;negativeoutlook”,9May2016.368EEPublishers,“Eskom:fromacrisisofcapacity,toacrisisofrisingprices,decliningdemandandfunding”,15November2015,seehttp://www.ee.co.za/article/eskom-crisis-capacity-crisis-rising-prices-declining-demand-funding.html,accessed4June2016.369Moody's,“RatingAction:Moody'sconfirmsSouthAfrica'ssovereignratingatBaa2andassignsanegativeoutlook”,6May2016,seehttps://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-confirms-South-Africas-sovereign-rating-at-Baa2-and-assigns--PR_348291,accessed16June2016.


An overwhelming majority of participants from government, banking sector, academia andindependent expert community concluded during an NGO-convened March 2016 “TechnicalWorkshop on the Economics of Nuclear Energy” in Johannesburg that there was no viablefinancing scheme for newbuild in sight.370 It is therefore difficult to conceive that the nuclearnewbuildprogramwouldfitintoSouthAfrica’sstrainedbudgetformanyyearstocome.

Thefive-yeartargetasoutlinedintheStrategicPlan,istohavecompletedtechnologyandvendorselection,theprocurementprocessandtohavebegunconstructionofthefirstunitby2020;withconnectionofthefirstunittothegridby2023andthesecondonein2024.Thisappearstobeanoverlyambitioustimeline,byanystandards.

The Americas Argentina operates threenuclear reactors that in2015provided6.5TWh (a24percentincreaseover2014,withAtucha-2reaching100percentpowerinFebruary2015)or4.8percentofthecountry’selectricity(downfromamaximumof19.8percentin1990).

HistoricallyArgentinawasoneofthecountriesthatembarkedonanambiguousnuclearprogram,officially for civil purposesbut backedby a strongmilitary lobby.Nevertheless, the operatingnuclearplantsweresuppliedbyforeignreactorbuilders:Atucha-1,whichstartedoperation in1974,wassuppliedbySiemens,andtheCANDU(CANadianDeuteriumUranium)typereactoratEmbalsewassuppliedbytheCanadianAtomicEnergyofCanadaLimited(AECL).Aftercloseto30yearsofoperation,theEmbalseplantwasshutdownattheendof2015formajoroverhaul,includingthereplacementofhundredsofpressuretubes,toenableittooperateforupto30moreyears.Reportedly,contractsworthUS$440millionweresignedinAugust2011andatthetime,the work was expected to start by November 2013.371 According to some reports, therefurbishment is planned to take about two years, with restart scheduled forMarch 2018.372However,NuclearEngineeringInternationalestimatedtheprojectcouldtakeuptofiveyearsandcost about US$1.5 billion, warning: “It must be noted, however, that the various CandurefurbishmentprojectsinCanada(Bruce,PickeringandNewBrunswick)havetendedtooverrunonbothtimeandbudget.”373

Atucha-2hadbeenorderedin1979andwasofficiallylistedas“underconstruction”since1981.Finally,on3June2014,thefirstcriticalityofthereactorwasannouncedandgridconnectionwasestablishedon27June2014.Ittookuntil19February2015fortheunittoreach100percentof

370AsummaryoftheworkshopwithlinkstothepresentationscanbefoundatHenrichBöllFoundation,SouthernAfrica,“WorkshopReport:TheEconomicsofNuclearEnergyinSouthAfrica”,9May2016,seehttps://za.boell.org/2016/05/09/workshop-report-economics-nuclear-energy-south-africa,accessed1July2016.371ResearchandMarkets,“NuclearPowerMarketinArgentina”,May2012.372SCNLavalin,“EmbalseNuclearGeneratingStationLifeExtension”,Undated,seehttp://www.snclavalin.com/en/embalse-nuclear-generating-station-life-extension,accessed5June2016.373NEI,“Argentina—apossiblereturntonewnuclear?”,15October2013,seehttp://www.neimagazine.com/opinion/opinionargentina-a-possible-return-to-new-nuclear/,accessed16June2016.


its ratedpower374 anduntil 26May2016 to enter commercial operation.375Thedelays in thestartupproceduresechothe33-yearconstructiontime.

InearlyMay2009,JuliodeVido,thenArgentina’sMinisterofPlanningandPublicWorks,statedthatplanningforafourthnuclearreactorwouldbeginandthatconstructioncouldstartwithinayear.376Sevenyearslater,workhasnotstarted.InFebruary2015,ArgentinaandChinaratifiedanagreementtobuildan800MWCANDU-typereactorat theAtuchasite.Construction is to takeeight years, but it hasnotbeenannounced,whenworkwill start.377 InOctober2014,NuclearIntelligenceWeeklynotedthat“whileit’sunclearwhenconstructiononAtucha-3mightstart,thegoalistocommissionthereactorbyJuly2022”.Atucha-3isexpectedtocostUS$5.8billion.378InNovember2015,acontractwassignedbetweenstate-controlledNucleoelectricaandCNNCforassistance onbuildingAtucha-3.While only supplying about 30percent of thework, CNNC isexpectedtobringalong85percentofthefinancingandNucleoelectricawouldactasdesigner,architect,engineer,builderandoperatoroftheplant.Thisisquiteanovelarrangement.

A frameworkagreementwasalsosignedbetweenthetwocompanies fortheconstructionofaHualongOnereactor,China’snew,andasyetuntested,Generation IIIdesign.379Acommercialcontractwasscheduledtobesignedbytheendof2016.380ButinMay2015,asaresultofdelaysintheHualongOneconstructionatFuqinginChina,itwasreportedthatsignaturewaslikelytobepushedinto2017.381

After repeated delays, construction of a prototype 27 MWe PWR, the domestically designedCAREM25(atypeofpressurized-waterSmallModularReactorwiththesteamgeneratorsinsidethepressurevessel)beganneartheAtuchasiteinFebruary2014,withstartupplannedfor2018.ThereactorissaidtocostUS$450million,382oraboutUS$17,000perinstalledkWe,arecordforreactorscurrentlyunderconstructionintheworld.

Braziloperatestwonuclearreactorsthatprovidedthecountrywith13.9TWhor2.8percentofitselectricityin2015(downfromamaximumof4.3percentin2001).

Asearlyas1970,thefirstcontractfortheconstructionofanuclearpowerplant,Angra-1,wasawardedtoWestinghouse.Thereactorwentcriticalin1981.In1975,BrazilsignedwithGermany

374WNN,“Atucha2reaches100%ratedpower”,19February2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Atucha-2-reaches-100-percent-rated-power-19021502.html,accessed16June2016.375WNN,“Atucha2receivesfulloperatinglicence”,31May2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Atucha-2-receives-full-operating-licence-3105165.html,accessed4June2016.376Marketwire.com,“ArgentinatoReinforceNuclearEnergybyAdding700MWandBuildingFourthNuclearPlant”,7May2009.377WNN,“ArgentinaandChinaplanfourthreactor”,3February2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Argentina-and-China-plan-fourth-reactor-03021501.html,accessed16May2015.378WNN,“Argentina-Chinatalksonnewnuclearplants”,8May2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Argentina-China-talks-on-new-nuclear-plants-08051501.html,accessed16June2016.379NIW,“MovingclosertoAtucha-3andHPR1000Newbuilds”,6November2015.380WNN,“HualongOneselectedforArgentina”,5February2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Hualong-One-selected-for-Argentina-0502154.html,accessed16May2015.381WNN,“Argentina-Chinatalksonnewnuclearplants”,8May2015,op.cit.382NIW,“CostOverrunsPutMobileBreederProjectinQuandary”,7November2014.


whatremainsprobablythelargestsinglecontractinthehistoryoftheworldnuclearindustryforthe construction of eight 1.3 GW reactors over a 15-year period. However, due to an ever-increasing debt burden and obvious interest in nuclear weapons by the Brazilian military,practically the entire program was abandoned. Only the first reactor, Angra-2, was finallyconnectedtothegridinJuly2000,24yearsafterconstructionstarted.

The construction of Angra-3 was started in 1984 but abandoned in June 1991. However, inMay2010,Brazil’sNuclearEnergyCommissionissuedaconstructionlicenseandtheIAEAnotedthat a “new” construction started on 1 June 2010. In early 2011, the Brazilian nationaldevelopmentbank(BNDES)approveda6.1billionReais (US$3.6billion) loan forworkon thereactor.383 Reportedly, in November 2013, Eletrobras Eletronuclear signed a €1.25 billion(US$1.425 billion) contract with French builder AREVA for the completion of the plant.384According toAREVA, in the firstquarterof2015,13percentof the“workpackages”hadbeenapprovedfordeliverytoBrazil.“Progressontheprojectisdependentonthesecuringofprojectfinancing by the customer”, AREVA added.385 Commissioning was previously planned forJuly2016buthasbeendelayedtoMay2018.Noreasonsweregivenforthenewdelays.386

The position on nuclear power of the incoming government under President Mauricio Macriremainsunclear.TheissuedidnotplayanyroleintheDecember2015election.

Canada operates 19 reactors, all of which are CANDU (CANadian Deuterium Uranium),providing95.6TWhor16.6percentofthecountry’selectricityin2015(downfromamaximumof19.1percent in1994),but60percentof theProvinceofOntario’sprovincialpowersupply.However, in Ontario, the role of wind power is rapidly expanding and already represents10percentoftheProvince'sinstalledcapacity—versus36percentfornuclear—andhasdoubleditsshareinthegenerationmixfrom3to6percentinjusttwoyears.387

TheCanadianCANDUreactordesigntypicallyrequiresextensiverepairandupgradingworktooperatebeyond25years.Thiswork—oftenreferredtoasre-tubingorrefurbishment—involvestheremovalandreplacementofhundredsofhighlyradioactivepressuretubesfromthereactorcore,aswellasthereplacementofotherlife-limitingcomponents,suchassteamgenerators,andtheupgradingofplantsystemstomeetmodernregulatoryrequirements.

TheestimatedcostofextendingthelifeofaCANDUreactorhastripledoverthepastfifteenyears.In2002,thecostofrefurbishingNewBrunswick’ssingleunitPointLepreaunuclearstationwasestimatedatCAD840million(US$533million).388In2012,Hydro-Quebecestimatedthecostof

383However,itissurprisingtonotethatAREVA’s400-pageReferenceDocument2012doesnotevencontaintheword“Angra”.384NucNet,“BrazilReleasesProductionFiguresForAngraNuclearStation”,20January2014,seehttp://www.nucnet.org/all-the-news/2014/01/20/brazil-releases-production-figures-for-angra-nuclear-station;andWNN,“ArevacontractedtocompleteAngra3”,8November2013,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Areva-contracted-to-complete-Angra-3-081134.html;bothaccessed16June2016.385AREVA,PressRelease,29April2015.386NIW,“Briefs—Brazil”,9January2015.387IESO(IndependentElectricitySystemOperator),“SupplyOverview”,seehttp://www.ieso.ca/Pages/Power-Data/supply.aspx,accessed5June2016.388NBPower,“ProjectExecutionPlan—AppendixA-4,Table1-1”,February2002.


rebuildingitsGentilly-2nuclearatoverCAD3billion(US$3billion).Thecompanyestimatedthecostofelectricitypostlife-extensionwouldbe10.8CADcents/kWh.Asresult—alsogivingintopoliticalpressure—Hydro-Quebecdecided to close theGentilly-2 reactor insteadof rebuildingit.389

In 2010, Ontario Power Generation (OPG, formerly Ontario Hydro) announced it would notrebuildthefourPickering“B”reactorsattheendoftheirdesignlife.OPGestimatedthecostofelectricitypostrebuiltatapproximately10CADcents/kWh.390Previously,OPGhadannouncedin2005,itwouldpermanentlyshutdowntworeactorsatthePickering“A”nuclearstationdueto“thecostsandtherisks”ofrestartingthem.391

Intotal,nineofCanada’s22CANDUGenerationIIreactorshavebeenclosed,oraresetforclosure,duetothehighcostofCANDUlife-extension.

TheOntario government’s 2013 Long TermEnergy Plan (LTEP) committed to rebuilding andextendingthelivesoftenreactorsattheDarlingtonandBrucenuclearstations.TheLTEPalsostatedthesixoperatingPickeringunitswere“expectedtobeinserviceuntil2020”butwithanearliershutdown“possibledependingonprojecteddemandgoingforward,theprogressofthefleetrefurbishmentprogram,andthetimelycompletionoftheClaringtonTransformerStation”.392

InDecember2015,theOntariogovernmentannouncedithadreachedanagreementwithBrucePower,aprivatecompanythatleasestheBrucenuclearsitefromstate-ownedOPG,torebuildandextendthelivesofsixreactorsattheBruceNuclearGeneratingStation(NGS).393Commencementofworkonthefirstreactorwasdelayedfrom2016to2020comparedtothe2013LTEPschedule.BrucePowerreceivedafive-yearlicencefortheBruceAandBnuclearstationsin2015,butinmakingitsdecisiontheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission(CNSC)noted:“Refurbishmentwasnotconsideredinthecontextofthishearing.TheCommissionwishestobeclearthat,intheeventofanapplicationforrefurbishmentattheBruceNGS,thisapplicationwillbeconsideredatapublicproceedingwithpublicparticipation.”394

In January2016, theOntariogovernmentannounced, itwouldallowOPG toproceedwith theCAD12.8billion(US$18.5billion)life-extensionplanforthefourDarlingtonunits,withworkto

389Hydro-Québec,“ProjetderéfectiondelacentralenucléaireGentilly-2”,2October2012,seehttp://nouvelles.hydroquebec.com/media/filer_private/2012/12/17/etat_de_situation_1.pdf,accessed9June2016.390OPGresponsetoquestionsposedbyShawn-PatrickStensilafteramediationheldon28July2010,inFreedomofInformationrequestno.100007,EnergyAnalyst,GreenpeaceCanada.InformationquotedinPembinaFoundationandGreenpeaceCanada,“RenewableisDoable”,September2013,seehttp://www.greenpeace.org/canada/Global/canada/report/2013/09/GPC_ENERGY_PLAN2013.pdf,accessed6July2016.391OntarioPowerGeneration,“AnnualReport2006”,p.22,seewww.opg.com/about/finance/Documents/2006_Annual_Report.pdf,accessed6July2016.392MinistryofEnergy,“AchievingBalance—Ontario’sLong-TermEnergyPlan”,December2013.393GovernmentofOntario,“OntarioCommitstoFutureinNuclearEnergy”,MinistryofEnergy,PressRelease,3December2015,seehttps://news.ontario.ca/mei/en/2015/12/ontario-commits-to-future-in-nuclear-energy.html,accessed16June2016.394CNSC,“RecordofProceedings,IncludingreasonsforDecisionintheMatterofApplicationtoRenewthePowerReactorOperatingLicencesforBruceAandBruceBNuclearGeneratingStations”,2015,p.5,seehttp://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/the-commission/pdf/2015-04-14-CompleteDecision-BrucePower-e-edoc4798838.pdf,accessed9June2016.


startinOctober2016.395AccordingtoOPG’sschedule,rebuildingallfourDarlingtonreactorswilltakeoveradecade.

Notably,thegovernmentofOntariohasrequiredBrucePowerandOPGtoplan“offramps”—asortof Plan B—if life-extension work is delayed or goes over-budget. For the life-extension, theofframpallows“thegovernmenttoassessBrucePower'scostestimatesforeachreactorpriortoits refurbishment and stop the refurbishment, if the estimated cost exceeds a pre-definedamount.”396Thegovernment,however,hasnotdisclosedthis“pre-definedamount”.

In2016,theOntariogovernmentannounced,itwillallowOPGto“pursuecontinuedoperationofthePickeringGeneratingStationbeyond2020upto2024.”397In2013,OPGappliedtotheCNSCtooperatethePickeringreactorsbeyondits initialdesignlife in2014.TheCNSCapprovedtheapplication and issued a five-year licence to OPG, but put conditions on the licenceincludingthedistributionofinformationonnuclearemergencyresponsetohouseholdsinthePickeringareaandadetailedriskimprovementplanforthestation.398

OPG estimates the cost of continuing to operate Pickering to 2024 at approximatelyCAD$300million(UD$235million),butthatthereis“ariskthestation’sextendedoperationto2024maybedeterminedtobeuneconomicaltopursue.”399OPG’slicenseforthePickeringnuclearstationexpiresin2018.

Thelaunchofanuclearnew-buildprogramhasnotgotbeyondinitialstages.InMay2012,theGovernmentacceptedtheEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentreportfortheconstructionbyOPGofuptofourunitsattheDarlingtonsite.On17August2012,theCNSCissueda“SitePreparationLicense”fortheDarlingtonproject,“afirstinoveraquartercentury”.400Butbeforetheprojectproceeded, in October 2013, the Ontario Government pulled the plug and “decided againstspendingupwardsofCAD10billion[US$7.8billion]tobuytwonewnuclearreactors”.401Ontario’s

395OPG,“OPGinvesting$122millionintounit4DarlingtonNuclear”,PressRelease,12April2016,seehttp://www.opg.com/news-and-media/news-releases/Documents/20160412_Unit4DarlingtonInvestment.pdf,accessed9July2016. 396GovernmentofOntario,“OntarioCommitstoFutureinNuclearEnergy”,PressRelease,3December2015,seehttps://news.ontario.ca/mei/en/2015/12/ontario-commits-to-future-in-nuclear-energy.html,accessed16June2016.397GovernmentofOntario,“OntarioMovingForwardwithNuclearRefurbishmentatDarlingtonandPursuingContinuedOperationsatPickeringto2024”,PressRelease,11January2016,seehttps://news.ontario.ca/mei/en/2016/01/ontario-moving-forward-with-nuclear-refurbishment-at-darlington-and-pursuing-continued-operations-at.html,accessed9June2016.398CNSC,“RecordofDecision,ApplicationtoRequestaRemovaloftheHoldPointforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation”,2015,seehttps://www.cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca/eng/the-commission/pdf/2014-05-07-DecisionSummary-OPG-PickeringHoldPoint-e-Final-Edocs4448178.pdf,accessed9June2016.399QPBriefing,“Pickeringnukeplantextensiontocost$307M,mayprove‘uneconomical’:OPG”,Queen’sParkBriefing,20May2016,see.http://www.qpbriefing.com/2016/05/20/pickering-nuke-plant-extension-to-cost-307m-may-prove-uneconomical-opg/,accessed16June2016.400OPG,“JointReviewPanelissuesLicencetoPrepareSite”,17August2012.401GlobeandMail,“Ontariobacksawayfromplanstobuynewnuclearreactors”,10October2013,seehttp://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ontario-backs-away-from-plans-to-buy-new-nuclear-reactors/article14793803/;andWNISR,“TheEndofNewBuildinCanada?”,11October2013,seehttp://www.worldnuclearreport.org/The-End-of-New-Build-in-Canada.html;bothaccessed16June2016.


LTEP,releasedinDecember2013,confirmedthedecision:“OntariowillnotproceedatthistimewiththeconstructionoftwonewnuclearreactorsattheDarlingtonGeneratingStation.”402

InMexico, two General Electric (GE) reactors operate at the Laguna Verde power plant, locatedinAltoLucero,Veracruz.Thefirstunitwasconnectedtothegridin1989andthesecondunitin1994.In2015,nuclearpowerproduced11.2TWh(up20percent),providingarecord6.8percentofthecountry’selectricity,exceedingthe20-yearoldrecordof6.5percentin1995.Anupratingprojectboosted thenameplatecapacityofbothunitsby20percent to765MWeach.The power plant is owned and operated by the Federal Electricity Commission (ComisiónFederaldeElectricidad).

InSeptember2015,CesarHernandez,deputy energyminister for electricity, said in aReutersinterviewthathisministrywasreviewing“thepotentialtoaddapairofreactors”totheLagunaVerde site. “It is a decision that is being considered.Ourplanning shows it is efficient for thecountry.”403However,hedidnotindicateanythingontimelines,technologiesorcostsinvolved.

EnergyMinisterPedroJoaquínColdwellhadconfirmedinMay2014thecountry’saimtodoubletheshareofrenewableenergyintheelectricitygeneratingcapacityfrom17percentto33percentby 2018.404 In March 2016, the Ministry organized the first power auction—inviting 15-year“clean energy” supply contracts and 20-year “clean energy” certificates—which had anunexpectedlylargeturnoutwith103preselectedparticipantsandmorethan460technicaloffers,ofwhich69 companies finally introduced227offers.Projectsweremainly in the10-100MWrange.SolarPVrepresentedalmostthreequartersoftheproposals.405

402MinistryofEnergy,“AchievingBalance—Ontario’sLong-TermEnergyPlan”,December2013,seehttp://www.energy.gov.on.ca/en/ltep/achieving-balance-ontarios-long-term-energy-plan/,accessed16June2016.403Reuters,“UPDATE1-Mexicoeyesconstructionoftwonewnuclearreactors-official”,24September2015,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/mexico-nuclear-idUSL1N11U2WA20150924,accessed20June2016.404SolarServer,“Mexicosetsgoalforrenewablestogrowto33%ofinstalledcapacity”,21May2014,seehttp://www.solarserver.com/solar-magazine/solar-news/archive-2014/2014/kw21/mexico-sets-goal-for-renewables-to-grow-to-33-of-installed-capacity.html,accessed16June2016.405Argus,“SolarloomslargeinMexico'sdebutpowerauction”,29March2016,seehttps://www.argusmedia.com/news/article/?id=1212773,accessed6June2016.


v

United States Focus

U.S. nuclear power plant operators are fighting a war on two fronts: Crashing prices for natural gas and accelerating market penetration of renewable energy have both contributed to dramatic drops in wholesale power price levels—in some states, they’ve fallen by more than two-thirds over the past decade. This has left nucle ar power, whose operating costs are pretty much fixed, with few options other than surrender.

Peter Fairley, IEEE Spectrum, March 2016406

Withahundredcommercialreactorsofficiallycurrentlyoperating,theUnitedStatespossessesthelargestnuclearfleetintheworld.Fourmorereactorsareunderconstruction,butanumberofreactorsareduetobeshutdown.TheNuclearEnergyInstitute,theadvocacyorganizationfortheU.S. nuclear industry, projects “15-to-20 plants at risk of shutdown over the next five-to-10years”.407 Independent analysts think many more plants are at risk of being shut down.408Therefore,thesizeoftheU.S.nuclearfleetwilldeclineintheforeseeablefuture.

Figure41:AgeofU.S.NuclearFleet


406PeterFairley,“HasU.S.NuclearPower’sDeathSpiralBegun?”IEEESpectrum,26March2016,seehttp://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/has-us-nuclear-powers-death-spiral-begun,accessed16June2016.407WayneBarber,“NEIwarnsmorenuclearpowerplantretirementsontheway”,ElectricLight&Power,23May2016,seehttp://www.elp.com/articles/2016/05/nei-warns-more-nuclear-power-plant-retirements-on-the-way.html,accessed16June2016.408MarkCooper,“RenaissanceInReverse:CompetitionPushesAgingU.S.NuclearReactorsToTheBrinkOfEconomicAbandonment”,InstituteforEnergyandtheEnvironment,VermontLawSchool,18July2013,seehttp://will.illinois.edu/nfs/RenaissanceinReverse7.18.2013.pdf,accessed16June2016.


TheU.S.reactorfleetprovided798TWhin2015,essentiallythesameasin2014,409butstillbelowrecord year 2010when it generated807.1TWh.Nuclear plants provided19.5 percent ofU.S.electricityin2015,thesameas2014and3percentagepointsbelowthehighestnuclearshareof22.5percentthatwasreachedin1995.

Withonlyfourreactorsunderconstructionandonlyonenewreactorstartedupin20years,theU.S.reactorfleetcontinuestoage,withamid-2016averageof36.2years,amongsttheoldestintheworld:37unitshaveoperatedformorethan40years(seeFigure41).

Inthepastyear,onenewnuclearreactorwasconnectedtotheelectricgrid:TennesseeValleyAuthority's(TVA)1150MWWattsBar-2.Thereactorwentcriticalon23May2016,410andwasconnectedtotheelectricgridon3June2016(seeboxhereunder).411But justacoupleofdaysafter,on5June,theunitshutdownbecauseofproblemswithitsturbinesystem.412On21June,theunitshutdownasecondtimebecauseofproblemsinitsauxiliaryfeedwatersystem.413

WattsBar-2:GridConnection43YearsAfterConstructionStart—Shutdown2DaysLater

More than fourdecadesafterconstructionbegan, theWattsBar-2reactorwas finallyconnected to thegridon3June2016414.However,twodayslater,whileoperatingat12.5percentpower,thereactorautomaticallyshutdown.According to theU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission (NRC), the reactor trippedwhenahighpressureturbinevalvefailedtoopen.OngridconnectionTVAreportedthat“itisrewardingtoseeTVAtakingtheleadondeliveringthefirstnewnuclearunitofthe21stcenturyandprovidingsafe,affordableandreliableelectricitytothoseweserve.”415

TVAfiledtheconstructionlicenseapplicationforWattsBaron18May1971.On18September1972,TVAappliedfor theexceptional authorization of certain sitepreparationactivities, although ithadnot transmitted the finalenvironmental impact statementand theconstruction licensewasstillpending.416TVAargued that startupofunit1byMay1977“isvitalinordertopermit-TVAtomeetitssummer1977peakloads”andbeyond:

409IAEA,“NuclearPowerReactorsintheWorld—2016Edition”,Vienna,May2016,seewww-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/RDS_2-36_web.pdf,accessed16June2016.410NashvillePublicRadio,“AfterDecadesUnderConstruction,WattsBarUnit2FinallyFiresUpItsNuclearReactor”,23May2016,seehttp://nashvillepublicradio.org/post/after-decades-under-construction-watts-bar-unit-2-finally-fires-its-nuclear-reactor,accessed16June2016.411IAEA,“PowerReactorInformationSystem(PRIS)Database”,2016,seehttp://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/,accessed18June2016.412WilliamFreebairn,“TVA’sWattsBar-2nuclearunitshutssoonafterconnectingtogrid”,Platts,6June2016,seehttp://www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/washington/tvas-watts-bar-2-nuclear-unit-shuts-soon-after-21634906,accessed16June2016.413TimesFreePress,“WattsBarnuclearplantshutsdownforsecondtimeinthreeweeks”,21June2016,seehttp://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/story/2016/jun/21/watts-bar-nuclear-plant-shuts-down-second-time-three-weeks/372227/,accessed22June2016.414TVA,“WattsBarUnit2ProducesElectricityfortheFirstTime”,3June2016,seehttps://www.tva.gov/Newsroom/Press-Releases/Watts-Bar-Unit-2-Produces-Electricity-for-the-First-Time,accessed22June2016.415TVA,“WattsBarUnit2ProducesElectricityfortheFirstTime”,3June2016,seehttps://www.tva.gov/Newsroom/Press-Releases/Watts-Bar-Unit-2-Produces-Electricity-for-the-First-Time,accessed22June2016.416TVA,“Units1and2,WattsBarNuclearPlant,RheaCounty,Tennessee”,18September1972,seehttp://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0734/ML073440321.pdf,accessed22June2016.


The present schedule for constructing the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant is predicated on beginning construction in October 1972. This schedule is extremely tight and failure to begin construction in OctobercastsseriousdoubtsonTVA’sabilitytomeetitsloadcommitmentsinthe1977-78period.

TVAalsoinsistedoncoststotheratepayerandenvironmentalpollutionofanydelay:

6-monthDelay:ThetotalestimatedmonetarycosttotheconsumersofTVApowerwouldbeabout $58millionfora6-monthdelayinoperationoftheWattsBarNuclearPlant.Inadditiontothe monetary effects,TVAwouldberequiredtoburnabout3.4millionadditionaltonsofcoaland about 36 million gallons offueloilinitsplantswithattendantatmosphericemissionswhichwould nototherwiseberequired.

Theconstructionlicenseforthetwo1,150-MWPressurizedWaterReactors(PWR)wasissuedinJanuary1973.Theexactdateofthepouringofthebaseslabsandthustheofficialconstructionsstartsremainsunclear.TVAdoesnotprovideaspecificdateonitswebsite.TheIAEArecentlymodifiedinitsonlinePowerReactorInformationSystem(PRIS)417theconstruction-startdateforWattsBar-2from1December1972to1September1973.

TheWatts Bar site is located in Rhea County, southeastern Tennessee approximately 50 miles northeast ofChattanooga. Construction delays and cost overruns plagued the reactor from the start. Construction wassuspendedin1985inpartduetoadecreaseinelectricitydemandforTVA.In2007,andbaseduponitsprojectedincreasedenergydemand,theTVAboardapproveda5-yearplantocompletethereactor.ThecompletioncostalsoescalatedfromUS$2.5billionin2007toUS$4.5billionin2013,tothefinalcostoftheUS$4.7billionassignedbyTVA’sboard inFebruary2016.TVA isa corporateagencyof theUnitedStates thatprovideselectricity forbusiness customers and local power distributors serving more than nine million people in parts of sevensoutheasternstates.

Watts Bar units 1 and 2 are ice condenser designs, whichmakes them vulnerable to hydrogen buildup andcontainment failure. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Near-Term Task Force on the FukushimaDaiichi March 2011 accident included requests for assessment of flood risk at U.S. nuclear power plants. InFebruary2013,theNRCcensuredTVAforusingoutdatedandinaccuratecalculationsinestimatingthemaximumpotentialfloodthreatshouldupriverdamsbebreached,theendresultofwhichcouldbelossofcoolingfunctionandreactormeltdown.InFebruary2016,theTVAboardannouncedthatfloodpreventionmeasuresbuiltattheplant to meet post Fukushima requirements, had risen to US$300 million, compared to the US$120 millionestimatedfouryearsago.418

WattsBar-2isthefirstcommercialreactortobeconnectedtothegridintheUnitedStatessince1996,whenWattsBar-1startedup,23yearsafteritsconstructionstarted.

Four nuclear plants were issued license renewals by the NRC in 2015: Sequoyah 1 & 2 (on24September2015),Byron1&2(on19November2015),Davis-Besse1(on8December2015),andBraidwood1&2(on27January2016).419Onlyonenuclearpowerplantappliedforalicenserenewal(Waterford3,on23March2016).AttheendofApril2016,81ofthe100operatingU.S.

417IAEA,PowerReactorInformationSystem(PRIS),seehttps://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/ReactorDetails.aspx?current=700,accessed22June2016.418TimesFreePress,“CostofWattsBarnuclearreactorrisesby$200millionto$4.7billion”,3February2016,seehttp://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/story/2016/feb/03/cost-watts-bar-reactor-rises-200-million-47-billion/348218/,accessed1July2016.419NRC,“StatusofLicenseRenewalApplicationsandIndustryActivities”,Updated14April2016,seehttp://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html,accessed16June2016.


units had received a license extension with a further eight applications under review. InDecember2015,theNRCputoutadraftdocumententitled“GenericAgingLessonsLearnedforSubsequent License Renewal and Standard Review Plan for Subsequent License RenewalApplications for Nuclear Power Plants”, which describes “aging management programs” thatmightallowtheNRCtoallowoldnuclearpowerplantstooperateto“upto80years”.420

Struggling Reactors TheNRC’sexplorationofapathtokeepingnuclearreactorsoperatingtill80yearsandthelicenserenewalsforoperationsupto60yearsareindirectcontradictiontothesignalsthattheelectricitymarketissendingtonuclearreactoroperators,whichhasbeentoaccelerateshuttingdownoldreactors.Foralongtimenow,thenuclearindustryhasarguedthatreactorsmightbeexpensive,but oncebuilt andpaid for, the operating costs are lowand thusnuclearplantswill generateelectricity cheaply. Thus, for example, U.S. Secretary of Energy, ErnestMoniz, wrote in 2011:“Nuclearpowerenjoys lowoperatingcosts,whichcanmake it competitiveon thebasisof theelectricity price needed to recover the capital investment over a plant's lifetime”.421 In recentyears, that claimhasbeen continuouslyunderminedas electricutility after electricutilityhasdecided to close operational nuclear reactors even though their licenseswould allow them tooperate foradecadeormorebeyond thenewlyplannedshutdowndate. Inessence, the costsassociatedwithmaintainingagedreactorsandgeneratingelectricityhavebeenrising.Inaddition,falling gas prices from hydraulic fracturing (fracking) have resulted in gas-fired generatingstationsproducingcheaperelectricity.Theresultisclear:nuclearpowerhasgreatdifficultiestocompeteinthecurrentU.S.electricitymarketplace.

Inits“AnnualBriefingfortheFinancialCommunity”deliveredon11February2016,theNuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI),themostimportantlobbyingorganizationfornuclearpowerintheU.S.,reportedthatin2014,evidentlythelastyearforwhichithaddata,annualexpendituresattheaveragenuclearreactor(i.e.,thevariousannualexpendituresassociatedwithrunninganuclearreactorintheUnitedStates,averagedforthewholefleet)cametoUS$36.27/MWh,withsingleunitplantsaveragingUS$44.14.422Notethattheseareforreactorswhoseconstructioncostshavebeen paid off. These figures should also be seen in the context of recent bids for new solarphotovoltaicprojects (i.e., including thecostof recouping initial constructionexpenditures)ofaroundUS$50/MWh,andevenUS$40/MWhinsomepartsofthecountry.423

420WNN,“NRCdraftsguidancefor80-yearlives”,21December2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-NRC-drafts-guidance-for-80-year-lives-2112157.html,accessed16June2016.421ErnestMoniz,“WhyWeStillNeedNuclearPower”,EnergyInitiative,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,ForeignAffairs,November-December2011Issue,pp.83–94,seehttps://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-10-17/why-we-still-need-nuclear-power,accessed16June2016. 422NEI,“NuclearEnergy2016:StatusandOutlook”,aspresentedattheAnnualBriefingfortheFinancialCommunity,2016,Slide4,seehttp://www.nei.org/Master-Document-Folder/Backgrounders/Presentations/Wall-Street-Briefing-2016-Slides,accessed10June2016.423StephenLacey,“CheapestSolarEver:AustinEnergyGets1.2GigawattsofSolarBidsforLessThan4Cents”,GreentechMedia,30June2015,seehttp://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/cheapest-solar-ever-austin-energy-gets-1.2-gigawatts-of-solar-bids-for-less;andMarkBolinger,SamanthaWeaver,JarettZuboy,“Is$50/MWhsolarforreal?Fallingprojectpricesandrisingcapacityfactorsdriveutility-scalePV


NEIreportsthat“averagegeneratingcostshavedecreasedfrompeakofUS$39.70/MWhin2012toUS$36.27/MWhin2014”,424butitisuncertain,ifthisslightdeclineisgoingtocontinueintothefuture.Thedeclinesofarislargelyduetotworeasons.Thefirstisthatfuelcostshavedeclined,inturnduetothefallinnaturaluraniumandenrichmentprices.AsreportedinNuclearIntelligenceWeekly, the spotmarket price of uranium in June 2012was about US$51 per pound of U3O8,whereas in June 2014, it was around US$28 per pound of U3O8. Likewise, the spot price foruraniumenrichment fell fromaroundUS$140/SWU425 inearly2012toaroundUS$95/SWUinearly2014.Theotherreasonforthedecreaseinoperationalcostsisthatutilitieshavecutdownoncapitalexpenditures,butthiscannotcontinueforlong,astheageofthefleetisincreasing.Inthefuture,theremaybeaslightdownwardtrendintheaverageoperatingcostbecausesomeoftheolderreactors,withhighestoperatingcosts,havebeenshutdownorwillbeshutdownsoon.Butthiswillbe,partlyorfully,counteractedbytheincreaseinoperatingcostsduetoage.

Theresponsefromthenuclearindustryandnuclearutilitieshasbeentoeithershutdownseveralnuclearreactorsand/ortocallforgovernmentinterventionintothemarketinsomefashiontosupportcontinuedoperationsofnuclearplants.IndeedinFebruary2016,theAmericanNuclearSociety(ANS)feltcompelledtopublishatoolkitofvariouswaysbywhichstatescanintervenetoensurethatutilitiescankeepstrugglingnuclearplantsoperatingwithoutlosingmoney.426

ThebestexampleofhowutilitieshavetriedtoobtainextrarevenuestomaintainprofitabilityoftheirnuclearfleethasbeeninthestateofIllinois.AsfarbackasinNovember2013,theutilityExelon,thelargestnuclearoperatorintheU.S.,hadrevealedthatitwasconsideringshuttingdownitstwin-reactorQuadCitiespowerplantandsingleunitClintonplantinIllinoisbecauseelectricitypriceshadfallensolowthatthesereactorswereprovingunprofitable.427Bothoftheseunitshadbeenidentifiedbyindependentanalystsasbeing“atrisk”evenearlier.428

Inthepastfewyears,someofExelon’splantshavefailedtoclearthecapacitymarketauctions,especiallyinthePJMinterconnection,aregionaltransmissionorganizationthatcoordinatesthemovementofwholesaleelectricityin13StatesontheEastcoast,SouthEastandMidwestplustheDistrictofColumbia.OthernuclearplantswithinthePJMControlAreahavealsofailedtoclearthecapacitymarketauctions.ThestoryissimilarintheMidcontinentIndependentSystemOperator(MISO)interconnection,whichcoversapartofIllinoisand14otherstates.

Thecapacitymarketinvolvespowerplantscommittingtohavingacertainamountofgeneratingcapacityreadyfordeliveringpowerupondemandandreceivingapaymentforthatcapacity.In

towardeconomiccompetitiveness”,ProgressinPhotovoltaics:ResearchandApplications,seehttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pip.2630/abstract,bothaccessed16June2016.424NEI,“NuclearEnergy2016:StatusandOutlook”op.cit.425SWU=SeparativeWorkUnit426SpecialCommitteeonNuclearintheStates,“NuclearintheStatesToolkitVersion1.0:PolicyOptionsforStatesConsideringtheRoleofNuclearPowerinTheirEnergyMix”,ANS,February2016,seehttp://nuclearconnect.org/issues-policy/nuclear-policy-in-the-states,accessed18June2016.427SteveDaniels,“What’sstrongerthannuclearpower?Fallingelectricityprices”,Crain’sChicagoBusiness,16November2013,seehttp://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20131116/ISSUE01/311169983/whats-stronger-than-nuclear-power-falling-electricity-prices,accessed16June2016.428MarkCooper,“RenaissanceInReverse:CompetitionPushesAgingU.S.NuclearReactorsToTheBrinkOfEconomicAbandonment”,InstituteforEnergyandtheEnvironment,VermontLawSchool,18July2013,seehttp://will.illinois.edu/nfs/RenaissanceinReverse7.18.2013.pdf,accessed16June2016.


thecapacitymarketauctions,theplantsthatarereadytocommitreliablepoweratthelowestcostare chosen first. Once the projected demand for the future has beenmet, the plants that areofferingtosupplypowerathighercostsaresaidtohavenotclearedthemarket.Thestructureofcapacitymarketshasoftenbeenmanipulatedbyutilitiestoensuregreaterprofits.429

Theresponseofutilitieswithnuclearplantstotheirinabilitytoclearauctionshasbeentoblamethestructureofthemarketsratherthantheirownhighcosts.JosephDominguez,Exelon’sseniorvicepresidentforgovernmentalandregulatoryaffairsandpublicpolicy,toldtheNEIthat“themarketdoesnotsufficientlyrecognizethesignificantvaluethatnuclearplantsprovideintermsof reliability andenvironmentalbenefits”.430 Subsequently,Exelon, alongwithPSE&G, anotherutilitythatoperatesnuclearplants,submittedcommentstoPJMarguingthatthecapacitymarketshouldbe“redesignedtovaluehigh-availabilitycapacity”andthefailureof“over4GWofhighlyreliablenuclearcapacity”toclearthemarketsonlymeansthatthe“marketsignal(…)isclearlywrongandfurtherdemonstratesaneedforchangestoPJM’smarketdesign”.431Likewise,ExelonalsoputforwardproposalstoMISOtoallowittogethigherpricesfortheirnuclearplants.432

In July2015, theFederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC)approvedPJM’srestructuringproposals thatwould allow it to increase payments to utilities that canmore reliably deliverpower. The nuclear industry commended these changes, and NEI’s Vice President for PolicyDevelopment and Planning Richard Myers announced: “This proposal should improve theeconomicadvantageforthe33nuclearpowerplantsinPJM’soperatingarea”.433Theresultofthechangeswasthattherewere“higherauctionclearingprices”andthecapacitycostwas“almost40percenthigher”thanin2014.434Despitethehigherprices,inAugust2015,Exelonannouncedthatthreeofitsnuclearplants,“OysterCreek,QuadCitiesandThreeMileIsland(…)didnotclearinthePJMcapacityauctionforthe2018-19planningyear”.435Thecompanyalsoannouncedthat“aportionoftheByronnuclearplant’scapacitydidnotcleartheauction”.436

429DavidCayJohnston,“Howelectricityauctionsareriggedtofavorindustry”,AlJazeeraAmerica,29May2014,seehttp://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/5/electricity-auctionpricespowerbillsconsumers.html,accessed12June2016.430NEI,“Exelononthe2014PJMCapacityMarketAuction”,12June2014,seehttp://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/News-Archives/Exelon-on-the-2014-PJM-Capacity-Market-Auction,accessed16June2016.431PJM,“SupportingCommentsofCalpine,Exelon,AndPSEGRegardingPJM’sCapacityPerformanceProposal”,11December2014,seehttp://www.pjm.com/~/media/committees-groups/committees/elc/coalition-briefing-papers/coalition-paper-generation-coalition-3.ashx,accessed16June2016.432EnergyWire,“Dynegy,ExelonproposecapacityauctionreformsinIllinois”,MidwestEnergyNews,24February2016,seehttp://midwestenergynews.com/2016/02/24/dynegy-exelon-propose-capacity-auction-reforms-in-illinois/,accessed16June2016.433NEI,“FERCApprovesPJMPlantoKeepPowerOnWhenElectricityDemandPeaks”,18June2015,seehttp://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/News-Archives/FERC-Approves-PJM-Plan-to-Keep-Power-On-When-Elect,accessed16June2016.434JeffreyTomich,“PJMauctionseespowerpricessoarundernewreliabilityrules”,Environment&EnergyPublishing,24August2015,seehttp://www.eenews.net/stories/1060023802,accessed16June2016.435ExelonCorporation,“ExelonAnnouncesOutcomeof2018-19PJMCapacityAuction”,BusinessWire,24August2015,seehttp://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150824005330/en/Exelon-Announces-Outcome-2018-19-PJM-Capacity-Auction,accessed1July2016.436SonalPatel,“TwoExelonNuclearPlantsFailtoClearPJMAuction”,POWERMagazine,25May2016,seehttp://www.powermag.com/two-exelon-nuclear-plants-fail-to-clear-pjm-auction/,accessed1July2016.


On2June2016,ExelonannouncedthatitwouldbegintakingstepstopermanentlyshutdownitsQuadCitiesandClintonnuclearpowerplants.Clintonistocloseon1June2017,andQuadCitiesistofollowexactlyoneyearlater.437Twoweekslater,thecompanyformallynotifiedtheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)ofplanstoretiretheClintonandQuadCitiesnuclearstationsin2017and2018,respectively.438ThetwostationsaresaidtohavelostacombinedUS$800millionduringthepastsevenyears,despitebeingtwoofExelon’sbest-performingplants.

Over the past two years, as Exelon’s nuclear plants failed to clear capacity markets, theCorporationhasbeenengagedinanefforttogetthestateofIllinoistoofferitsubsidiestocontinueoperatingitsreactors.439OneapproachwastopushforabillintheIllinoislegislaturethatwouldhaveestablishedarequirementthatretailelectricutilitiesprocure70percentoftheirelectricityfromsourcesthatdonotemitcarbondioxide,specificallyincludingnuclearpower.440Thetwistthatwouldhaveallowednuclearutilitiestocornermostoftheprofitwasthatrenewableswereallowedtoparticipateonlyiftheywerenotalreadyparticipatinginearlierstateprogramsthatoffered incentives. The bill effectivelywould have funneled close to US$300million a year toExelon’snuclearplantsbyimposingasurchargeonelectricbillsstatewide.441Butthebilldidnotclearthelegislature.

In2016,ExelonteamedupwithsubsidiaryComEdandproposed“alargerbillthatwouldmakesweepingchangestothestate'senergysystem”andadd“asurchargeontoelectricitybillsthatwouldmakethenuclearplantsprofitable”.442Analystsestimatethattheproposed“changeswouldamounttoa totalratehikeofUS$7.7billionover10years thatwouldbepaidbygovernment,businessesandconsumers…[and]thatExelonandComEdwouldreapUS$1billioninguaranteedprofitsfromtheplanoveradecade”,including“asubsidyofasmuchasUS$2.6billionoverthattime”.443

OneofthecriticsoftheExelonbill,IllinoisAttorneyGeneralLisaMadigan,explainedclearlywhatisinvolvedintheproposal:“Exelon’snuclearplantshavebenefittedfromtworoundsofIllinois

437AaronLarson,“ExelonMakesGoodonThreat—QuadCitiesandClintonNuclearPlantstoClose”,POWERMagazine,2June2016,seehttp://www.powermag.com/exelon-makes-good-on-threat-quad-cities-and-clinton-nuclear-plants-to-close/,accessed1July2016.438ExelonCorporation,“ExelonNotifiesNuclearEnergyRegulatorofPlanstoCloseClintonandQuadCities,”22June2016,seehttp://www.exeloncorp.com/newsroom/nrc-retirement-notification-of-quad-cities-and-clinton,accessed1July2016.439SteveDaniels,“HowExelonlostitsspark”,Crain’sChicagoBusiness,21June2014,seehttp://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140621/ISSUE01/306219983/how-exelon-lost-its-spark;andSteveDaniels,“ExelonseeslittlehopeofsavingQuadCitiesnuke”,Crain’sChicagoBusiness,29July2015,seehttp://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150729/NEWS11/150729783/exelon-sees-little-hope-of-saving-quad-cities-nuke;bothaccessed1July2016.440SpecialCommitteeonNuclearintheStates,“NuclearintheStatesToolkitVersion2.0—PolicyOptionsforStatesConsideringtheRoleofNuclearPowerinTheirEnergyMix”,AmericanNuclearSociety,June2016,seewww.nuclearconnect.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ANS-NIS-Toolkit-V2.pdf,accessed22June2016.441SteveDaniels,“ExelonSeesLittleHopeofSavingQuadCitiesNuke”,Crain’sChicagoBusiness,29July2015,seehttp://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150729/NEWS11/150729783/exelon-sees-little-hope-of-saving-quad-cities-nuke,accessed1July2016.442KimGeiger,“Exelonmakesanothertryforenergychangesthatcriticscallbailout”,ChicagoTribune,27May2016,seehttp://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-illinois-com-ed-exelon-bill-20160527-story.html,accessed16June2016.443Ibidem.


subsidies already. First, Illinois electricity ratepayerspaid all of the construction costs for theIllinois nuclear plants. Illinois consumers then paid againwhen Exelon and others convincedIllinoislawmakerstocreateacompetitivemarketforelectricityandconsumerswerechargedforadditionalcostsassociatedwiththetransitiontoaderegulatedsupplymarket.Exelon’scurrentbailoutdemandwouldamounttoathirdroundofsubsidiesfortheseplants”.444Thusfar,ExelonhasbeendeniedthefurthersubsidiesitisseekingfromIllinois.Oneoftheironiesinvolvedisthatwhile on the one hand, Exelon has been seeking subsidies from the government and the ratepayers,ontheotherhand,ithasbeenpresentingitselfasprofitabletoWallStreetcompanies.445

One statewhere the legislative approach seems to have nearlyworked is Connecticut,whereDominionEnergy instigatedaspecialhearingbythestate legislature’sEnergyandTechnologyCommittee.446At thehearing,officials fromDominion, aswell as former IndianaSenatorEvanBayh,whohasnowbecomeanactiveadvocatefornuclearenergy(partlythroughhispositionasthe co-chairman of the nuclear lobby group Nuclear Matters), informed listeners that “thecompany’sMillstoneplantfacesfinancialchallengesandurgedthestatetoconsidermeasurestohelp avoid additional nuclear unit retirements”.447 As a result, the Connecticut Senate passedlegislationthatchangedthemarketstructureinthestateandwouldprotectDominion’sMillstoneplant.Thelegislationwaswidelycriticizedbecauseitdidnotgothroughapublichearing,norwasitavailableforreviewuntilshortlybeforedebate.448However,thebillnevercametothevoteinConnecticut's House of Representatives.449 The nature of the Connecticut legislation washighlightedbythestate’sConsumerCounselElinKatz,whorepresentsutilitycustomersinthestate,whonotedthat“inaderegulatedmarket,theindustryretainsthebenefitsoftheupswingsandtherisksofmarketdownturns.IfConnecticutconsumersaregoingtobeaskedtobackstopsomeofthatrisk,thereshouldbeacorrespondingconsiderationofsharedbenefits”.450

InOctober2015,EntergyCorporationannouncedthatitwouldclosedownthePilgrimnuclearplant inMassachusettsbecausethe43-year-oldplantwas“simplyno longerfinanciallyviable”andthatithadalreadyinformedISONewEngland,theregionaltransmissionorganizationthat

444RichMiller,“EnvironmentalgrouprailsatAGMadigan,environmentalists”,CapitolFax,10June2016,seehttp://capitolfax.com/2016/06/10/environmental-group-rails-at-ag-madigan-environmentalists/,accessed16June2016.445SteveDaniels,“ExelontellsWallSt.onethingaboutprofitswhilepeddlingadifferenttaleinSpringfield”,Crain’sChicagoBusiness,30April2016,seehttp://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20160430/ISSUE01/304309995/exelon-tells-wall-st-one-thing-about-profits-while-peddling-a-different-tale-in-springfield,accessed16June2016.446MarkPazniokas,“Nuclearpower’sfutureinConnecticutisonthetable”,TheCTMirror,23March2016,seehttp://ctmirror.org/2016/03/23/nuclear-powers-future-in-connecticut-is-on-the-table/,accessed16June2016.447NW,“DominionurgesConnecticuttosupportMillstone”,Platts,Volume57,Number13,31March2016448MarkPazniokas,“CTSenatepassesbilltostabilizerevenuesinnuclearindustry”,TheCTMirror,30April2016,seehttp://ctmirror.org/2016/04/30/ct-senate-passes-bill-to-stabilize-revenues-in-nuclear-industry/,accessed16June2016.449JudyBenson,“BillthatwouldhaveprotectedMillstonefromenergymarketdipsdiesinHouse”,TheDay,5May2016,seehttp://www.theday.com/article/20160505/NWS01/160509539,accessed16June2016.450HousleyCarr,“DominionUrgesConnecticuttoSupportMillstone”,NW,Volume57—Number13,31March2016.


Pilgrimwouldnotbepartofthenextelectricityauction.451Subsequently,inApril2016,Entergyannouncedtheclosingdateoftheplantas31May2019.452

TheinabilityofnuclearpowertocompeteontheelectricitymarketplacewasapparentinNewYorkstatetoo,whereEntergyannouncedinNovember2015that“marketconditionsrequireusto…close theFitzPatricknuclearplant.453EvenNewYorkGovernorAndrewCuomo’sorder inDecember2015callingon“theStateDepartmentofPublicServicetodesignandenactanewCleanEnergyStandardmandatingthat50percentofallelectricityconsumedinNewYorkby2030resultfromcleanandrenewableenergysources”,whichalsoincludedanorder“todevelopaprocesstopreventtheprematureretirementofsafe,upstatenuclearpowerplantsduringthistransition”,454didnotchangeEntergy’sdecision. InFebruary2016,Entergyannouncedthattheplantwillbeclosedon27January2017.455Exelon,whichalsooperatesnuclearplantsinNewYork,hastakenapageoutofEntergy’sbookand threatened toshut theGinnaandNineMilePoint-1reactorsunlessthestateapproves“acompensationplanfornucleargenerators”thatwould“requireallcompaniesthatsellelectricityinthestatetobuypowerfromupstatenuclearplantsatpotentiallyabove-marketrates”.456

Entergy’sothernuclearplantinNewYorkStateistheIndianPointnuclearpowerplant,whichhasbeenmoreprofitablebecauseofthehigherpowercostsinnearbyNewYorkCity.However,operationsat IndianPointarebeingchallengedon twocrucialenvironmental requirements,acoastal zone management certification and a water permit application.457 While Entergy hasdeclaredthatitisexemptfromneedingthecoastalzonemanagementcertification,NewYorkstatehasassertedthatitdoesandthetwoarebattlingitoutintheCourtofAppeals.458Onthecleanwaterpermit,Entergy isappealing“adecisionbytheNewYorkDepartmentofEnvironmental

451DavidAbel,“PilgrimNuclearPowerStationinPlymouthtoshutdownby2019”,BostonGlobe,13October2015,seehttps://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/10/13/entergy-close-pilgrim-nuclear-power-station-nuclear-power-plant-that-opened/fNeR4RT1BowMrFApb7DqQO/story.html,accessed16June2016.452DavidAbel,JohnR.Ellement,“Pilgrimnuclearpowerplantnowhasaclosingdate”,BostonGlobe,14April2016,seehttps://www.bostonglobe.com/2016/04/14/pilgrim-nuclear-power-plant-close-may/FRXGHcfMrk3nSngdYueMML/story.html,accessed16June2016.453Entergy,“EntergytoCloseJamesA.FitzPatrickNuclearPowerPlantinCentralNewYork”,PressRelease,2November2015,seehttp://www.entergynewsroom.com/latest-news/entergy-close-jamesfitzpatrick-nuclear-power-plant-central-new-york/,accessed16June2016.454AndrewCuomo,“GovernorCuomoDirectsDepartmentofPublicServicetoBeginProcesstoEnactCleanEnergyStandard”,NewYorkStateGovernor,2December2015,seehttps://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-directs-department-public-service-begin-process-enact-clean-energy-standard,accessed16June2016.455TimKnauss,“EntergyannouncesdatewhenFitzPatricknuclearplantwillclose”,syracuse.com,18February2016,seehttp://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2016/02/entergy_announces_date_when_fitzpatrick_nuclear_plant_will_close.html,accessed16June2016.456JimOstroff,“ExelontoshutNineMilePoint-1,GinnareactorsifNewYorkfailstoOKcompensationplan,”Platts,14June2016,seehttp://www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/washington/exelon-to-shut-nine-mile-point-1-ginna-reactors-21708658,accessed15June2016.457FransKoster,“CouldIndianPointFallVictimtoEconomics?”,NIW,10June2016.458MichaelRandall,“EntergyfacesnewobstacletorenewinglicensesatIndianPointnuclearplant”,TimesHerald-Record,12November2015,seehttp://www.recordonline.com/article/20151112/NEWS/151119779,accessed16June2016.


Conservation(DEC)todenytheplantacleanwaterpermit”andadecisionisexpectedinthefallof2016.459 Theseenvironmentalproblemsaddtotheoutagesoftheplant, likelyduetoaging,makingIndianPointlessprofitabletoEntergy.Indeed,Moody’svicepresidentandsenioranalyst,RyanWobbrockarguedthat“IndianPointisbecomingincreasinglyexpensivetooperate;notonlyaretheredecliningpricesforpowerbutthecostsoftheactualfacilityareincreasingbecauseofthe extendedoutages andvariousproblems theplanthadover thepast years,” leading to thepossibility that the reactor might ultimately be shut down for economic rather thanenvironmentalorlegalreasons.

InneighboringNewJersey,thestateDepartmentofEnvironmentalProtectionhasallowedPSE&GPower,theoperatorand,alongwithExelon,ownerofthetwounitsatSalem,tocontinueoperatingthereactorswithoutbuildingcoolingtowers,astepenvironmentalistshadlongadvocatedasawaytoavoiddecimatingtheestuary’s fishpopulation,by issuingpermitsallowingtheunitstowithdrawbillionsofgallonsofwaterfromtheDelawareBay.460

AnothernuclearplantthatjustbecamethelatestvictimoferodedcompetitivenessisFortCalhounStation. Fort Calhoun had struggled since the 2014 debut of the day-ahead market in theSouthwest Power Pool (SPP) and inMay 2016 the President of Omaha Public Power District(OPPD)—the plant’s owner—told its Board that its continued operation was not financiallysustainable.461 The reason offered for its shutdown reveal the problems confronting nuclearpower plants in the United States. In April 2016, the Chairman of Board of OPPD called forpotential scenarios regarding future power resources; it turned out that in all scenarios, FortCalhoundidnotmeettherequirementsofthelowestcostportfolioandthat“othercarbon-freeoptionsaremoreeconomic”.462Separately,Moody'sInvestorsService’sevaluationsuggestedthatthe price for electricity in the SPP has been “well below the operating cost of Fort Calhoun”becauseoflownaturalgaspricesandexpandingwindgenerationinSPP;Moody'scalculatedFortCalhoun's2015operatingandmaintenanceexpensesatUS$32.39/MWh,65percentaboveSPPSouth'saveragepriceofUS$19.59/MWh.463On17June2016,theOPPDBoardvotedunanimouslytoshutdown thereactorby theendof theyear; thedecisionwas, in thewordsononeboardmember,“simplyaneconomicdecision”.464

459FrankKoster,“CouldIndianPointFallVictimtoEconomics?”,NIW,10June2016.460TomJohnson,“DEPSaysSalemNuclearGoodtoGoWithoutCoolingTowers”,NJSpotlight,13June2016,seehttp://www.njspotlight.com/stories/16/06/12/dep-says-salem-nuclear-good-to-go-without-cooling-towers/,accessed13June2016.461Argus,“FortCalhounreactormayshutbyyear-end”,31May2016,seehttp://www.argusmedia.com/pages/NewsBody.aspx?id=1249396&menu=yes,accessed16June2016.462AaronLarson,“FortCalhounMayClosebyYearEnd,JoiningListofPrematureNuclearPowerPlantRetirements”,POWERMagazine,12May2016,seehttp://www.powermag.com/fort-calhoun-may-close-by-year-end-joining-list-of-premature-nuclear-power-plant-retirements/,accessed16June2016.463Argus,“FortCalhounreactormayshutbyyear-end”,31May2016,seehttp://www.argusmedia.com/pages/NewsBody.aspx?id=1249396&menu=yes,accessed16June2016.464ColeEpley,“‘SimplyanEconomicDecision’:OPPDtoCloseFortCalhounNuclearPlantbyEndof2016,”Omaha.com,17June2016,seehttp://www.omaha.com/money/simply-an-economic-decision-oppd-to-close-fort-calhoun-nuclear/article_3fe6ce02-3352-11e6-a426-a7596287dd59.html,accessed1July2016.


AnotherplantthatisreportedlyunderfinancialstressistheDavisBessenuclearplantinOhio.Ithad been identified as being at risk of shutdown due to economic factors.465 Its operatorFirstEnergyproposedapower-purchaseagreementwiththePublicUtilitiesCommissionofOhio,whichapprovedaspecialeight-yeararrangementinMarch2016.466ThearrangementwouldhaverequiredFirstEnergy'sOhiocustomerstosubsidizethecontinuedoperationsofDavis-Besseandthe Sammis coal-based thermal plant.However, in April 2016, the Federal EnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC)blockedthepowerpurchaseagreement.467FirstEnergyisnowtryingtoputtogether a revised power purchase plan.468 In the meanwhile, FirstEnergy has not publiclyannounced what happened to Davis Besse and the coal power plants in the Pacific Gas &ElectricCo(PG&E)capacityauction.469

PerhapsthemostdramaticdecisiontoshutdownanuclearpowerplanthasbeenthatofPG&EinJune2016toclosethetwounitsofDiabloCanyon,thelastnuclearpowerplantinCalifornia,by2024and2025,andreplacethelostelectricalcapacitywith“investmentinagreenhouse-gas-freeportfolioofenergyefficiency,renewablesandenergystorage”.470Thedeliberateandwell-plannedwayinwhichtheplantisbeingreplacedisduetoextensivenegotiationsbetweenPG&EandtheInternational Brotherhood of ElectricalWorkers Local 1245, the Coalition of CaliforniaUtilityEmployees,theNaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,EnvironmentCalifornia,FriendsoftheEarthandtheAllianceforNuclearResponsibility.WhatisalsonoteworthyisPG&EChiefExecutiveTonyEarley’sacknowledgmentthatasCaliforniamakesthetransitiontowardsagridbasedonenergyefficiency,renewablesandstorage,“DiabloCanyon’sfulloutputwillnolongerberequired”andthatwouldeventuallymakethenuclearplanttooexpensivetooperate.AsotherU.S.states,andindeed other countries, move to electrical power systems that use renewables and energyefficiencymoreextensively,itisquitelikelythattheywillcometothesamerealization.

Inall,therefore,overthelastthreeyears,electricalutilitieshavedecidedtoshutdown14nuclearreactorsbecauseoftheirlackofeconomiccompetitiveness.Asofnow,thelistofreactorsincludesCrystalRiver3 inFlorida, SanOnofre2 and3 inCalifornia,Kewaunee inWisconsin,VermontYankeeinVermont,FortCalhouninNebraska,FitzpatrickinNewYork,ClintonandQuadCities1

465MarkCooper,“PowerShift:TheDeploymentofa21stCenturyElectricitySectorandtheNuclearWarToStopIt”,InstituteforEnergyandtheEnvironment,VermontLawSchool,seehttp://www-assets.vermontlaw.edu/Assets/iee/Power_Shift_Mark_Cooper_June_2015.PDF,accessed16June2016. 466JohnFunk,“FirstEnergy’sDavis-Besse,Sammispowerplantsmakemoneyafterall:FirstEnergyprofitsshow”,Cleveland.com,27April2016,seehttp://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2016/04/firstenergys_davis-besse_sammi.html,accessed16June2016.467GavinBade,“FERCblocksOhiopowerplantsubsidiesforAEPandFirstEnergy”,UtilityDive,28April2016,seehttp://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-blocks-ohio-power-plant-subsidies-for-aep-and-firstenergy/418297/,accessed16June2016.468JonChavez,“FirstEnergyrateplangetsretooled”,TheBlade,22May2016,seehttp://www.toledoblade.com/Energy/2016/05/22/Controversial-rate-plan-gets-retooled.html,accessed16June2016.469JohnFunk,“FirstEnergymumonfateoftwooldOhiopowerplantsinregionalauction”,Cleveland.com,25May2016seehttp://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2016/05/firstenergy_mum_on_fate_of_two.html,accessed13June2016.470IvanPenn,SamanthaMasunaga,“PG&EtoCloseDiabloCanyon,California’sLastNuclearPowerPlant”,LosAngelesTimes,21June2016,seehttp://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-diablo-canyon-nuclear-20160621-snap-story.html,accessed24June2016.


&2inIllinois,PilgriminMassachusetts,OysterCreekinNewJersey,andDiabloCanyon1&2inCalifornia.Thenumberislikelytogrowfurther.AJune2016reportfromUBSSecuritieswarnsthat evennuclearplantswith long-termpowerpurchaseagreementsmightbeat riskof earlyclosure, and listed Xcel Energy Inc.'s Prairie Island plant in Minnesota and Entergy Corp.'sPalisadesplantinMichiganastwoexamplesofnuclearfacilitiesthatcouldcloseearly.471

New Reactor Projects—Delayed, Suspended, Cancelled Constructionof fourAP1000 reactors,Vogtle-3and -4 inGeorgia andVCSummer-2and -3 inSouth Carolina has continued. In an effort to speed up construction of these already delayedreactors,WestinghousesettledongoinglegalcaseswiththeownersoftheseplantsandpurchasedthenuclearconstructionunitStone&WebsterfromChicagoBridge&Iron.472WestinghouseChiefExecutiveDannyRoderickwasconfidentthattheacquisitionwouldleadtoshorterconstructiontimes,claiming:“We’rethelargestnuclearcompanyintheworldthat’sprivatelyowned,andwe’regoingtoshowwhythat’sagoodthing,andgettheseplantsdone”.473Sofar, therehasbeennosignificantchangeinthepaceofconstructionofthesefourunits.

AnillustrationofthecontinuingconstructionproblemsisattheVogtlesitewhereunits-3and-4are falling further behind schedule. According to-testimony before the Georgia Public ServiceCommission(GPSC)inDecember2015,effortstocatchuphaven’tbeensuccessfulanddelayshavebecomeworse.474TheVogtleunitsarenowofficiallydelayedby39months,andifaUS$1.1billiontaxbillisadded,thecurrentcostforGeorgiaPower,whichowns45.7percentoftheproject,isUS$9.5 billion, much higher than the US$6.1 billion the GPSC originally certified for GeorgiaPower;assumingthattheothershareoftheprojecthasexperiencedsimilarcostincreases,thetotal costs for the project are estimated to be approximately US$21 billion.475 A June 2016assessment by the GPSC concluded that current scheduled commercial operation dates ofJune2019forunit3andJune2020forunit4areunlikelytobemet:“Itisouropinionthatthereexistsastronglikelihoodoffurtherdelayedoperationdatesforbothunits”.476

ThelatestcostincreaseatthetimeofwritingwasSouthCaliforniaElectric&Gas(SCE&G),whichsoughtandreceivedapprovalfromstateregulatorsforaUS$852millionincreaseintheprojectedcost of VC Summer-2 and -3.477 The company terms its contract a fixed one; according to aspokesperson:“Thefixed-priceoptionprovidessubstantialvaluetoourcustomers,investorsandour company by limiting the risk of future cost increases”. Others did not agree with this

471MatthewBandyk,“UBSAnalysts:LongtermContractedNuclearPlantsAlsoatRiskofShutdown.”SNLFinancial,24June2016.472Westinghouse,“WestinghouseAcquiresCB&IStone&Webster,Inc.”,WestinghouseElectricCompany,27October2015,seehttp://www.westinghousenuclear.com/About/News/View/Westinghouse-Acquires-CB-I-Stone-Webster-Inc,accessed16June2016.473PhilChaffee,“Westinghouse’sStrategyinCB&IStone&WebsterAcquisition”,NIW,2015,3.474WalterC.Jones,“MoredelaysforPlantVogtle”,SavannahMorningNews,11December2015,seehttp://savannahnow.com/news-latest-news/2015-12-11/more-delays-plant-vogtle,accessed15June2016.475NIW,“VogtleCostsMayHaveReached$21Billion”,11Decemer2015.476SNLInteractive,“Ga.PSCstaffexpectsadditionaldelaysinVogtlenukeconstructionproject”,30June2016.477RoddieBurris,“SCE&Gaskingfor$852millionmoretofinishSummernuclearplants”,TheState,13June2016,seehttp://www.thestate.com/news/business/article83609292.html,accessed15June2016.


characterization;eventheSouthCarolinaOfficeofRegulatoryStaff,whichrepresentsthepublic’sinterestinutilityregulation,wasopenlyskeptical,withtheagency’sexecutivedirectorputtingitbluntly:“Thisisnotafixed-pricecontract(…).[Thisproposal’s]gotsomeaspectsofafixedprice,butthere’sstuffintherethat’snotfixedandwearegoingthroughthatnow”.478Includingthiscostincrease,accordingtothefilingmadebySCE&G,“thecapitalcostestimate(…)isUS$6.8billionin2007dollarsandUS$7.7billionwithescalation.”SCE&Giscurrentlya55percentowneroftheproject,withSanteeCooperowningtheother45percent(settogodownto40percent),whichmeansthattheoverallcostoftheprojectisnowaroundUS$14billion.479InJune2016,SCE&GfiledarequestwiththePublicServiceCommissionofSouthCarolinaandtheSouthCarolinaOfficeofRegulatoryStafftoincreasetoitsapprovedelectricratesunderprovisionsofastatelawknownastheBaseLoadReviewAct,whichallowsthestate’sregulatedutilitiestoadjustratesannuallyduringconstructionofnuclearpowerplantstorecoverrelatedfinancingcosts.480Atthispoint,over18percentoftheelectricitybillofresidentialconsumersisestimatedtobeattributabletotheconstructionofthetwonuclearreactors.

In February 2016, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) abandoned plans “to build two AP1000pressurizedwaterreactorsattheBellefontesiteinAlabamaandnotifiedfederalauthoritiesitiswithdrawingitsapplicationfortwocombinedconstructionpermitsandoperatinglicensesatthesite”.481 Explaining the decision, a TVA spokesperson said: “It doesn'tmake sense to keep thelicensessinceitwillbedecadesbeforeweneedthenewgeneration”.TVAalreadyhastwopartiallyconstructednuclearplantsattheBellefontesiteandithasdecidedtoleavethem“inpreservationstatusandcontinuetospendaminimumyearlyamountfortheirmaintenanceandsecurity”.482

ThepoorexperiencewiththeconstructionoftheAP1000satVogtleandVCSummerhasbeenhardforToshiba,theownerofWestinghouse.Asonecommentatorputit,the“designchangesandconstructiondelaysatbothVogtleandSummeraddedhundredsofmillionsofdollarsinadditionalcosts, turning thepromiseof newbuild into somethingof a nightmare forToshiba”.483Nooneexpects any new AP1000s to be ordered in the United States—a significant drop from theexpectationinthemid-2000swhenToshibaacquiredWestinghouseintheexpectationthattherewouldbeatleast14AP1000sconstructedintheUnitedStates.484

478Ibidem.479TomClements,“SCE&GRequests$852MillionIncreaseinCostofVCSummerNuclearConstructionProject”,SavannahRiverSiteWatch,2June2016,seehttp://www.srswatch.org/uploads/2/7/5/8/27584045/news_srs_watch_on_sceg_nuclear_cost_increase_june_2_2016.pdf,accessed16June2016. 480YahooFinance,“SCE&GFilesforRateAdjustmentUnderBaseLoadReviewAct,”,27June2016,seehttp://finance.yahoo.com/news/sce-g-files-rate-adjustment-210500545.html,accessed1July2016.481MaryPowers,“TVAputsBellefontenuclearpowerunitsonhold,whileotherutilitiesmoveforward”,Platts,16February2016,seehttp://www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/birmingham-alabama/tva-puts-bellefonte-nuclear-power-units-on-hold-21942467,accessed16June2016.482Ibidem.483DayeKim,“Toshiba-Westinghouse—ADreamDealGoneSour?”,NIW,2015,6–7.484Ibidem.


Pending Combined Operating License Applications (COLA) AsofMay2016,theNRChadreceived18CombinedOperatingLicenseApplications(COLA)foratotalof28reactors.AllweresubmittedbetweenJuly2007andJune2009.Tenofthe18COLAsweresubsequentlywithdrawnortheapplicationhasbeensuspended.

InFebruary2016,NRCissuedacombinedlicensetotheSouthTexasProjectNuclearOperatingCompanytoconstructtwoAdvancedBoilingWaterReactors.485However,atthattime,theCEOofthecompanystated:“Havingtheselicensesputsusinapositiontomovetheprojectforwardwheneconomicconditionssupportconstruction[emphasisadded](…)currentsustainedlownaturalgaspricesandTexaselectricmarketconditionsdonotsupportstartingconstructionatthistime”.486

The United States operates the world’s largest nuclear fleet. Including the most recent unitWattsBar-2,thereare100operatingreactors,butthefutureseemstobeonlydownhill.Inthelongrun,2016mightnotberememberedastheyearthatWattsBar-2cameonline,butasthelastyearthatthecountry’snuclearfleetnumberedthreedigits.Therateofdeclineinthenumberofoperatingreactorsmightbereducedthroughbailoutsorothergovernmentinterventions,butitlooks like governmental and other officials are quickly becoming aware of the unsustainablenatureofmostnuclearplants.

Asia

China Focus AlthoughChinaembarkedonnuclearpowerrelativelylateincomparisonwithothercountrieswithlargenucleargenerationcapacities,ithasbeenconstructingreactorsatarapidpace.Asofmid-2016,thereare34operatingreactorswithatotalnetcapacityof29.4GW.Eightnewunitswere connected to the grid in 2015, 80 percent of the world total of 10 startups. A further21reactors,withatotalcapacityof21.5GW,areunderconstruction.Nuclearpowercontributed161.2 TWh—a 30 percent increase over 2014—which constituted 3 percent of all electricitygenerated in China in 2015, up from 2.4 percent in 2014.487 In comparison, wind energycontributed186.3TWhin2015,anincreaseof22percent.488Solarenergy’soutputwentupevenmore,by55.6percentoverthepreviousyear,tocontribute39.2TWhin2015.489Althoughtheshare of nuclear power in overall electricity generation has increased, the average utilization

485NRC,“CombinedLicenseHoldersforNewReactors”,U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission,Updated24February2016,seehttp://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col-holder.html,accessed16June2016.486RyanWest,“NRCgreenlightsSTPlicensesforUnits3&4:Constructiononholduntilmarketconditionsimprove”,PalaciosBeacon,17February2016,seewww.palaciosbeacon.com/02-17-16.pdf,accessed16June2016. 487IAEA,“NuclearPowerReactorsintheWorld—2016Edition”,Vienna,May2016,seewww-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/RDS_2-36_web.pdf,accessed16June2016.488GWEC,“GlobalWindReport—AnnualMarketUpdate2015”,April2016,seewww.gwec.net/wp-content/uploads/vip/GWEC-Global-Wind-2015-Report_April-2016_22_04.pdf,accessed16June2016.489KimfengWong,“CoalLosesMoreMarketSharetoNuclear,Renewables”,NIW,19February2016.


factorofnuclearplants(theiroperatinghoursperyear)hasdeclined;in2015,itwas84percent,downfrom89percentin2014.490

Chinahasalsolongmadeambitiousplansfornuclearexpansion.Accordingtothe13thFiveYearPlan announced earlier this year, the target for nuclear power in 2020 remains 58 GW,withanother30GWunderconstruction.Tomeetthistarget,nuclearcapacitywouldhavetodoublewithinthenextfouryears,whichappearsnowtechnicallyimpossible,evengivenChina’srapidpaceofconstruction.Theaverageconstructiontimeofthe25unitsbroughtonlineoverthepastdecadewas5.7years,whichalsocorrespondstotheconstructiontimeofthelatestunittocomeonline,Changjiang-2,connectedtothegridon20June2016.Atthemost,the21unitscurrentlyunder construction and scheduled for startup before 2021 could be added to the operatingcapacity,whichwouldbringthetotaltoamaximumofjustunder51GWratherthan58GWby2020.

Thetargetof58GWby2020wasfirstsetin2012.491Thisconstancyisindistinctcontrasttothepre-Fukushimaperiodwhentargetsgrewrapidly.Theincreasesstartedin2002whenthedraftshort-andmedium-termplanfornuclearexpansionwasreleased,whichcalledforChinatobuild20GWnuclear power generation capacity by 2010 and 40GWby 2020.492 By the end of thedecade,thattargetfigurehadincreasedto70GWby2020.493Theexpectationthenwasthatthetargetwouldbeeasilymetandevenmoreambitioustargetscouldbeset;forexample,thedirectorofscienceandtechnologyattheChinaNationalNuclearCorporation(CNNC)—oneofthemajorstate-ownedenterprisesinvolvedinconstructingandoperatingnuclearpowerplants—statingin2009,“reaching70GWbefore2020willnotbeabigproblem”.494Thecurrenttargetof58GWby2020evidentlyrepresentsasignificantdeclineinthe2020target.

Eventheslowerexpansionplanshaveraisedwidespreadconcernsaboutnuclearsafety.495ThereissomeevidencethatthisconcernextendstoChinesepolicymakers,onereasonfortheirrefusalsofartoallowconstructionofreactorsininlandareas.PriortotheFukushimaaccident,Chinahadplans constructing nuclear power stations, not only at coastal sites where reactors had

490Ibidem.491Xinhua,“InformationOfficeoftheStateCouncil,“FullText:China’sEnergyPolicy2012”,24October2012,seehttp://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-10/24/c_131927649.htm,16June2016.492Yi-ChongXu,“NuclearenergyinChina:Contestedregimes”,Energy,Volume33,Issue8,August2008.493SonalPatel,“China:AWorldPowerhouse”,PowerMagazine,1July2010,seehttp://www.powermag.com/china-a-world-powerhouse/,accessed24August2015.494DavidStanway,“Chinastrugglestofuelitsnuclearenergyboom”,Reuters,10December2009,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/10/uranium-china-nuclear-idUSPEK20761020091210,accessed16June2016.495EmilyRauhala,“Chinahasanawfulsafetyrecord—andwantstorun110nuclearreactorsby2030”,WashingtonPost,4December2015,seehttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/12/04/china-has-an-awful-safety-record-and-wants-to-run-110-nuclear-reactors-by-2030/;andEmmaGraham-Harrison,“Chinawarnedover‘insane’plansfornewnuclearpowerplants”,TheGuardian,25May2015,seehttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/25/china-nuclear-power-plants-expansion-he-zuoxiu;andStephenChen,“Chinaadmitsnuclearemergencyresponse‘inadequate’assafetyfearsdelayconstructionoftwoGuangdongreactors”,SouthChinaMorningPost,27January2016,seehttp://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1906287/china-admits-nuclear-emergency-response-inadequate,allaccessed16June2016.


traditionallybeensited,butalsoatnewinlandsites.496ButthiswassuspendedafterFukushima.In 2014, a State Council circular discussing the State Council’s Energy Development StrategyActionPlan(2014-2020)indicatedthatinlandnuclearpowerstillrequiredfurtherresearchandproofofsafety.497Thesafetyrationalefortherestrictionofconstructionininlandareasrelatestotwodifferentaspectsofsafety:preventionofsevereaccidents,andmitigationoftheconsequencesofasevereaccident,shouldoneoccur.Thepublic,naturally,isconcernedaboutthepotentialforaccidents,especiallyintheareasclosetositesselectedforreactorconstruction.498ThereisalsoconcernaboutChina’sgrowingwaterstressandincreasingwaterdemandfromthepowersector.Theresultingdebateoverthesitingofreactorsawayfromthecoasthaspushedbackplans;thecurrentexpectationisthatinlandnuclearconstructionwillnotstartbeforeatleast2020.499

Theother significantdecisionmadebypolicymakers in theaftermathofFukushimawas thatChina would build only Generation III or III+ reactors. The initial assumption was that thisstipulationwouldleadtotheadoptionofAP1000technology.In2011,ageneralmanagerintheChinaPowerInvestmentCorporationpointedoutthatthe“reactorsintheJapanesenuclearpowerplants,whichhavebeenaffectedbythemassivequake,areGenerationIIreactorsandhavetorelyonback-upelectricitytopowertheircoolingsystemintimesofemergency”,whereasthe“AP1000nuclear power reactors, currently under construction in China’s coastal areas and set to bepromotedin itsvasthinterland,areGenerationIIIreactorsandhavebuilt insafetyfeaturestoovercomesuchaproblem”.500

However,China’sexperienceinbuildingtheimportedAP1000andEPRdesignshasbeenfairlytroubled,withsignificantdelaysandcostescalations.501TheEPRunitsbeingbuiltatTaishanwereoriginallyscheduledto“becommissionedattheendof2013andinautumn2014respectively,andFrance’sAREVAhadhoped“tohavestartedworkonmorereactors”bythen.502Noneofthat

496FengleiDu,“SiteSelectionforNuclearPowerPlantsinChina”,IAEA,aspresentedattheTechnicalMeetingonCommonChallengesOnSiteSelectionForNuclearPowerPlants,Vienna(Austria),6-9July2010.497CNEA,“Guowuyuanbangongtingguanyuyinfanengyuanfazhanzhanluexingdongjihua(2014nian-2020nian)detongzhi,StateCouncilGeneralOfficeCircularconcerningthepublicationoftheEnergyDevelopmentStrategyActionPlan(2014-2020)”,ChinaNationalEnergyAdministration,2014,seehttp://www.nea.gov.cn/2014-12/03/c_133830458.htm,accessed2March2015.498ChrisBuckley,“China’sNuclearVisionCollidesWithVillagers’Fears”,NewYorkTimes,21November2015,seehttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/world/asia/chinas-nuclear-vision-collides-with-villagers-fears.html,accessed16June2016.499C.F.Yu,“ConstructiononInlandPlantsUnlikelyBefore2020”,NIW,1April2016..500WantChinaTimes.com,“ChinatopromotenuclearpowerdespiteexplosioninJapan”,13March2011,seehttp://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20110313000104&cid=1102,accessed24March2015.501Chuin-WeiYap,BrianSpegele,“China’sFirstAdvancedNuclearReactorFacesMoreDelays”,WallStreetJournal,15January2015,seehttp://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-first-advanced-nuclear-reactor-faces-more-delays-1421297393,accessed23March2015;DavidStanway,KathyChen,“China’sdebutWestinghousereactordelayeduntilJune2017:exec”,Reuters,9March2016,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-nuclear-idUSKCN0WB09F;andWongLok-to,“SafetyFearsCauseConcernAmidDelaystoChina’sTaishanNuclearPlant”,RadioFreeAsia,7March2016,seehttp://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/safety-03072016114147.html,bothaccessed1July2016.502HaroldThibault,“ConstructionscheduleonChinesethird-generationnuclearplantsracesaheadofEuropeanmodels”,TheGuardian,28December2010,seehttps://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/dec/28/china-areva-taishan-nuclear-thibault,accessed16June2016.


hashappened.InJanuary2016,Taishan-1underwentitscoldfunctionaltest,503apre-operationalstagethatiscarriedoutbeforeanyfuelisloadedonthereactor.AsofMarchofthisyear,ChinaGeneralNuclear(CGN)officialswereprojectingthatTaishan-1willstartupnextyear.504However,there are additional uncertainties over the safety of the reactor pressure vessels, which aresubjecttothesamecarboncontentissueastheFrenchFlamanvilleEPRthatdonotmeettechnicalspecifications (see France Focus).Media reports suggest that there are differences of opinionbetweenFrenchengineersworkingontheEPRconstruction inFlamanville inFranceandCGNofficialswiththeformerarguingthattheTaishanreactorswillonlycomeonlinein2018,andthelatterpushingfora2017startdateforbothunits.CGN’schiefexecutiveofficerisquotedassayingthat“whileFrancesuspendedworkonthenucleartechnologytorenewthetechnicalstandards,itwasnotreasonabletomeasuretheoldunitsbynewstandards”.505

InthecaseofthefourAP1000reactors,themainsourceofproblems,althoughnottheonlyone,hasbeenthereactorcoolantpumps(RCPs)thatweresuppliedbyUSmanufacturerCurtiss-WrightCorporation.ProblemswithRCPscouldhaveserioussafetyconsequencesandChinesenuclearofficialshaveexpressedconcerninthepastabouttheseproblems.In2013,forexample,YulunLi,formervice-ministerfornuclearenergyandformervice-presidentofCNNCcomplainedtoSouthChinaMorningPost:“Ourstateleadershaveputahighpriorityon[nuclearsafety]butcompaniesexecutingprojectsdonotseemtohavethesamelevelofunderstanding”.506Afteralongseriesofdelays(seepreviousWNISRs),thefirsttwooffourRCPsforunit1oftheSanmenplantarrivedattheconstructionsiteon30December2015.507AccordingtoSunQin,thechairmanoftheChinaNationalNuclearCorporation,“ifeverythinggoessmoothly,thefirstunitwillgointooperationinJune2017,andthesecondunitattheendof2017”.508Thatisfouryearsafterthereactorsweresupposedtohavecomeonline.

ThepoorexperienceatSanmenandHaiyangdidnotstopWestinghouseChiefExecutiveOfficerDanielRoderickfromclaiming:“TheAP1000isgoingtobeabletocompeteagainstanybodyoranything... The next wave of AP1000s will be built between 36 and 40 months”.509 RoderickofferedthisconfidentassessmentaspartofanefforttogetChinatobuymoreAP1000units,butprospects for thisseemtobedim.Anarticlepublishedby theChineseNuclearEnergySocietywrittenbyaretiredCNNCofficialsuggested“thattheStateCouncilshouldapprovefutureAP1000

503CGN,“TaishanUnit1CFTCompletedSuccessfully”,PressRelease,28January2016,seehttp://en.cgnpc.com.cn/n1017152/n1017227/c1235676/content.html,accessed25May2016.504PhilChaffee,“EDFFacesBritishFrustrationsonHinkley”,NIW,24March2016.505CeliaChen,“CGNPowersaysTaishannuclearreactorsposenosafetyrisks,”SouthChinaMorningPost,30May2016,seehttp://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1959199/cgn-power-says-taishan-nuclear-reactors-pose-no-safety-risks,accessed16June2016.506SouthChinaMorningPost,“Chinanuclearplantdelayraisessafetyconcern”,7October2013,seehttp://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1325973/china-nuclear-plant-delay-raises-safety-concern,accessed17June2016.507WNN,“FinalmoduleinstalledatSanmen2”,4January2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Final-module-installed-at-Sanmen-2-0401165.html,accessed1July2016.508DavidStanway,KathyChen,“China’sdebutWestinghousereactordelayeduntilJune2017:exec”,Reuters,9March2016,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-nuclear-idUSKCN0WB09F,accessed1July2016.509StephenStapczynski,“WestinghouseRacesChinafor$1TrillionNuclearPowerPrize”,Bloomberg,9December2015,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-09/westinghouse-races-china-for-1-trillion-nuclear-power-prize,accessed1July2016.


projectsonlyafterSanmen-1 ‘successfullycompletesthe first fuelreload’and ishookedtothegrid.”510

Efforts byWestinghouse to paint the delays at Sanmen and Haiyang as due to first-of-a-kindchallengeshascomeunderquestionduetothepatternofcostandtimeoverrunsatthefollow-onAP1000 units being constructed in theUnited States.511 As Lin Boqiang, director at the ChinaCenterforEnergyEconomicsResearchatXiamenUniversitytoldBloombergNews:“TheonlywayWestinghousecanwincontractsinChinaistodemonstratetheycanbuildreactorsquickerandcheaper than anyone else in China’s market and win hearts with actions, notwords…Westinghousesofarhasn’tdemonstratedsuchabilities”.512

TheSanmenprojectisalsothelikelycauseoftheresignationofmorethanhalfadozenexecutivesand board members, including the CEO, from Toshiba Corporation.513 An investigation intoaccountingpracticesatthecompanyrevealedthatithadunder-bookedlossesataWestinghouseproject(whosenamewasnotrevealedbutacomparisonoftheconstructionstartandprojectedgeneration start dates matches that of Sanmen). Specifically, the budget overruns of US$385millionandUS$401millionduringthesecondandthirdquartersof2013werebookedbyToshibaatUS$69millionandUS$293millionrespectively.

The CAP1400 design, a larger capacity version of the AP1000, is still not complete and thereremainsignificantquestionsaboutitsfuture.ConstructionofthefirstreactorwiththisdesignhasbeendelayedandinMay2016,amemberoftheExpertCommitteeofChina’sStateNuclearPowerTechnology Corporation revealed that “the detailed design can only support 12 months ofcontinuousconstruction”afterfirstpourofconcrete.514Inotherwords,thedesignisnotyetreadyforconstruction.OnefactorthathasheldupthefinalizationoftheCAP1400designisthereactorcoolingpump,thesameproblemthathasafflictedtheparentAP1000design.515Reportedly,thedecisionoverwhethertheCAP1400willbeexclusivelyforexportsalso“isinflux”.516

Meanwhile, CGN and CNNC started developing their own Generation-III designs. InNovember 2011, CGN announced that it had developed and held “full intellectual propertyrights”—akeyrequirementforexports—overthenewlydesignedACPR1000,areactor,whichitstated had incorporated the lessons of Fukushima in “meeting the standards of internationalthird-generationnuclearpowertechnology”517.Afewmonthslater,atthe3rdAsiaNuclearPowerSummitinJanuary2012,CNNCunveileditsownACP1000reactor518.Subsequently,afterbeing

510C.F.Yu,“NineProjectsTopPriorityList”,NIW,6May2016.511AnyaLitvak,“ToshibadownplayedWestinghouselosses”,PittsburghPost-Gazette,28July2015,seehttp://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/companies/2015/07/28/Toshiba-downplayed-Westinghouse-cost-overruns/stories/201507280057,accessed16June2016.512StephenStapczynski,“WestinghouseRacesChinafor$1TrillionNuclearPowerPrize”,Bloomberg,9December2015,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-09/westinghouse-races-china-for-1-trillion-nuclear-power-prize,accessed1July2016.513AnyaLitvak,“ToshibadownplayedWestinghouselosses”,PittsburghPost-Gazette,28July2015.514NIW,“WeeklyRoundup”,20May2016.515C.F.Yu,“NineProjectsTopPriorityList”,NIW,6May2016.516NIW,“WeeklyRoundup”,20May2016.517People’sDailyOnline,“Chinarollsoutnewhomegrownnuclearreactor”,18November2011.518YunZhou,“China’sNuclearEnergyIndustry,OneYearAfterFukushima”,Technology&Policy,5March2012,seehttp://www.technologyandpolicy.org/2012/03/05/chinas-nuclear-energy-industry-one-year-after-fukushima/#.VRBnnSk-Dw4,accessed16June2016.


directedbygovernmentplannerstodoso,thetwoorganizationsjointlydevelopedtheHualongOne, whichwas certified by the National Nuclear Safety Administration in 2014.519 However,CNNC andCGN are apparently promoting two slightly different designs,with separate supplychains,underthesamename.InMarch2016,thetwocompaniessetupa50-50jointventuretopromotethisdesigninoverseasmarkets.520

ConstructionoftheHualongdesignstarteddomesticallyinChinawithunits5and6oftheFuqingplantinMayandDecember2015,aswellasunit3ofFangchengganginDecember2015.Thefirstoftheseunits“isexpectedtobecompletedbyaroundJune2020”.521However,astheseprojectsproceed,constructionoftheHualongattheFuqingplantmightbedelayed,againbecausetheRCPstobeusedinthedesignarealready“fallingbehindschedulefor(sic!)fivemonths”.522UnliketheAP1000projectthatsourceditsRCPsfromtheCurtiss-Wrightcompany,fortheHualongdesign,CNNCsignedasupplycontactwithChina’sHarbinElectricPowerEquipmentCorporationandtheAustrian manufacturer Andritz, who in turn have subcontracted with firms such as Italy’sForiaturatosupplykeycomponents.523OtherconstructionstartssinceJuly2015,whenthelastWNISRwaspublished,includeTianwan-5,Hongyanhe-6,andChangjiang-2.

AllthesereactorconstructionstartsandtargetsshouldbeviewedinthecontextofaslowdownofenergydemandgrowthinChina.AccordingtodatafromtheChinaElectricityCouncil,the2015power-generationlevelof5,604.5TWhwasonly0.6percentmorethanthefigurefor2014.524

Looking furtherout, in its2016EnergyOutlook, theoil andgas firmExxonMobil “lowered itsforecast for China’s annual energy demand growth to 2.2 percent through 2025. The reportpredicted that thecountry’senergydemandwouldplateauaround2030”.525Theslowdownofenergydemand,inturn,isaresultoffallingrateofincreaseoftheGrossDomesticProduct(GDP),increasedenergyefficiency,andachangeintherelativedistributionofdifferentsectorsoftheeconomy, in particular a decline in the share of industry.526 China also has a significantovercapacityofcoal-firedpowerplants,withaverageannualoperatinghoursandcapacityfactorsdecliningsteadilyoverthepastfiveyears.527Oneeffectofthisdeclineindemandandcoalplantovercapacityonthenuclearsectormightbethe10percentstakesoldtoThailand’sRatchaburiElectricityGeneratingHoldingPublicCo.byCGNforitsfirstHualongprojectatFangchenggangII,

519WNN,“China’snewnuclearbaby”,2September2014,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/E-Chinas-new-nuclear-baby-0209141.html,accessed24June2016.520WNN,“HualongOnejointventureofficiallylaunched”,17March2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Hualong-One-joint-venture-officially-launched-1703164.html,accessed1July2016.521Reuters,“China’sdebutWestinghousereactordelayeduntilJune2017:exec”,Reuters,9March2016,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-nuclear-idUSKCN0WB09F,accessed16June2016.522C.F.Yu,“RCPsPoseProblemsAgain—ThisTimeforHualong”,NIW,2016.523Ibidem.524ChinaElectricityCouncil,PressRelease,3February2016,seehttp://www.cec.org.cn/yaowenkuaidi/2016-02-03/148763.html,accessed2June2016.525ClaireGroden,“ExxonCutsChinaEnergyDemandGrowthforecast”,Fortune,26January2016,seehttp://fortune.com/2016/01/26/china-energy-demand/,accessed16June2016.526FergusGreen,NicholasStern,“China’schangingeconomy:implicationsforitscarbondioxideemissions”,ClimatePolicy,7March2016.527 FredrichKahrl,“Coal-FiredGenerationOvercapacityinChina”,RegulatoryAssistanceProject,Beijing(China),February2016,see http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/8038,accessed9July2016.


geographically the nuclear plant that is closest to Southeast Asia.528 While documents fromRatchaburilist236MWofcapacityfromFangchenggangIIcomingonin2021,itisunclear,ifthisisgoingtoresultinanactualdeliveryofelectricityorthisrepresentsmerelyafinancialasset.529

Indiaoperates20nuclearpowerreactors,witha totalcapacityof5.2GW. In2015,nuclearpowerprovidedarecord34.6TWh,butthatonlyconstituted3.5percent(downfrom3.7percentin2011)ofthetotalelectricitygeneratedinthecountry.Thenuclearsharehasremainedstablesince 2013,while nuclear power generation increased by 15.4 percent over the same period.Although theRajasthan-1 reactor is still listed asoperationalby the IAEAand countedby theIndiannuclearestablishmentinitslistofreactors,ithasnotgeneratedanypowersince2004and,accordingtotheWNISRcriteria,wasmovedtotheLTOcategoryin2014.InSeptember2014,thechairmanof theAtomicEnergyCommissionstatedthatRajasthan-1(orRAPS-1)wouldnotberestarted530andWNISRmoveditfromLTOtoclosure.

Sixreactorsareunderconstructionwithatotalcapacityof3.9GW.TheseincludethesecondVVERfromRussiaatKudankulamthathasbeenunderconstructionsinceJuly2002,thePrototypeFastBreederReactor (PFBR)whose construction started inOctober2004, and fourPHWRswhoseconstructionstartedin2010and2011.Allofthesearedelayed.Kudankulam-2wastohavebeencommissionedinDecember2008.531However,itscommissioninghasbeenrepeatedlypostponedduetovariouscauses.Thelatestproblemtobepubliclyrevealedhasbeenwiththereactorcoolantpump,whosedesignhadtobemodifiedandcomponentsreplacedafteraroundoftestscarriedoutpriortocommissioningthereactor.532AsofMay2016,thereactorhadbeenloadedwithfuelandwasexpectedtobecomecriticalby“mid-2016”.533ThecostofthetwoKudankulamunitshasgone up by over 70 percent.534 The PFBR was supposed to be commissioned in 2010.535 InDecember2015, theChairman andManagingDirector of the StateOwnedCorporation that isconstructing the PFBR pronounced that the project “shall generate power by September next

528PhilChaffee,“Thailand:BeyondtheFangchenggangStake”,NIW,8January2016.529RatchaburiElectricityGeneratingHoldingPublicCo,“AnalystMeeting,2015YearEndResults”,26February2016,seehttp://ratch.listedcompany.com/misc/PRESN/20160302-ratch-analystmeeting-4q2015-01.pdf,accessed31May2016.530DeccanHerald,“EndoftheroadforRAPS1”,6September2014,seehttp://www.deccanherald.com/content/429550/end-road-raps-1.html,accessed16June2016.531Infrastructure&ProjectMonitoringDivision,“ProjectImplementationStatusReportonCentralSectorProjects(CostingRs.20Crores&Above)—January-March2004”,MinistryofStatistics&ProgrammeImplementation(MoSPI),NewDelhi,2004,seehttp://mospi.nic.in/pi_status_report_csp.pdf,accessed2July2016. 532Department-relatedParliamentaryStandingCommitteeonScience&Technology,Environment&Forests,“TwoHundredEightySecondReporton—DemandsforGrants(2016-2017)oftheDepartmentofAtomicEnergy(DemandNo.4)”,May2016,NewDelhi.533IANS,“Kudankulamunit2reactorfuelloadingcomplete”,BusinessStandard,19May2016,seehttp://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/kudankulam-unit-2-reactor-fuel-loading-complete-116051900856_1.html,accessed17June2016.534MoSPI,“78thReportOnMegaProjects(Rs.1000CroreandAbove)”,November2015.535T.S.Subramanian,“AmilestoneatKalpakkam”,Frontline,Volume21,Issue23,6-19November2004,seehttp://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2123/stories/20041119003210200.htm,accessed2July2016.


year”.536 But by April 2016, scientists involvedwith the project told Indian Express that “it isunlikelythattheprojectcouldbecompletedbytheendofthisyear”.537ThePFBR’scostestimatehasgoneupbyover62percent.538Andfinally,thestartdateprojectedforthefirstofthePHWRstostartgeneratingpowerbythedirectoroftheprojectisend-2016orearly-2017,whichwouldbeabouttwoyearspasttheinitialprojections.539However,otherofficialreportssuggestthatthefourPHWRswillonlybecommissionedin2018/19.540

The experiencewith recently commissioned reactors has been poor. Although Kudankulam-1reached criticality in July 2013, it took over 17months to being declared commercial on 31December 2014. Since commercial operation started, Kudankulam-1 has only operated for4,212hoursin2014and3,993hoursin2015;541inotherwords,inbothyears,ithasbeenshutdownforlongerthanithasbeenonline.Agoodfractionofthoseoperationsevidentlyinvolvedthereactorgeneratinglessthanitsratedpowercapacitybecauseitsreportedloadfactorin2015wasonly40percent.TheIndianDepartmentofAtomicEnergydescribesthisdismalperformanceas“teethingproblems”,542butitremainstobeseenifthereactor,willeventuallygrowoutoftheseproblems.543

Despite thispoorperformance, theNuclearPowerCorporationof IndiaLtd. (NPCIL)hasgoneaheadwiththeearlystagesofconstructionofthethirdandfourthunitsattheKudankulamsite;excavationofthesitestartedinFebruary2016.544Thefirstpourofconcreteisexpectedtotakeplace in 2017. A General Framework Agreement to construct the two units was signed inApril2014.545CostestimatesforthesetwounitshavebeenreportedtobeashighasRs.398billion

536DennisS.Jesudasan,“‘IndustrysuppliesdelayPFBRcommissioning’”,TheHindu,13December2015,seehttp://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/chennai/industry-supplies-delay-pfbr-commissioning/article7982156.ece,accessed2July2016.537C.Shivakumar,“AERBRulesSlowingReactorProject?”,IndianExpress,30April2016.538MoSPI,“78thReportOnMegaProjects(Rs.1000CroreandAbove)”,November2015.539IANS,“ThirdatomicreactoratKakraparreachesamilestone”,BusinessStandard,30October2015,seehttp://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/third-atomic-reactor-at-kakrapar-reaches-a-milestone-115103001777_1.html,accessed17June2016.540Department-relatedParliamentaryStandingCommitteeonScience&Technology,Environment&Forests,“TwoHundredEightySecondReport—DemandsforGrants(2016-2017)oftheDepartmentofAtomicEnergy(DemandNo.4)”,May2016.541IAEA,“PowerReactorInformationSystem(PRIS)Database”.542MeeraMohanty,“Kudankulamdelaysareon‘teethingproblems’,saysAECchairman”,TheEconomicTimes,15November2015,seehttp://economictimes.indiatimes.com//articleshow/49793357.cms,accessed2July2016.543M.V.Ramana,“‘TeethingTroubles’atKudankulam:IndiaBitingMoreNuclearThanitCanChew”,TheWire,8March2016,seehttp://thewire.in/2016/03/08/the-nuclear-powers-persistence-with-kudankulam-barely-masks-a-crumbling-project-24114/,accessed17June2016.544TheHindu,“Siteexcavationfor3rd,4threactorsbeginsatKKNPP”,18February2016,seehttp://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/site-excavation-for-3rd-4th-reactors-begins-at-kknpp/article8250518.ece,accessed2July2016.545TheTimesofIndia,“India,RussiafinallysignagreementonKudankulam3,4units”,11April2014,seehttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Russia-finally-sign-agreement-on-Kudankulam-3-4-units/articleshow/33623262.cms,accessed2July2016.


(US$6.6 billion),546 to as low as Rs. 330 billion (US$5.5 billion).547 However, in light of theexperiencesofar,thesecostsarelikelytogoupsignificantly.Evenwithoutaccountingforsuchescalations,theseestimatesarealreadymuchhigherthantheRs.225billioncurrentlyestimatedforthefirsttwounitsatKudankulam.548

ThereasonforthecostincreaseissaidtobetheIndiannuclearliabilitylaw.549AsectioninthatlawoffersNPCILthe“rightofrecourse”,i.e.,therighttoclaimcompensationfromsuppliersuptoamaximumof Rs. 15 billion (US$240million) in the event of an accident involving a nuclearreactorsuppliedbyamultinationalsupplier.Theamountunderquestionistinyincomparisonwiththecostof,say,theFukushimaaccidentorthetotalcostofanuclearreactor.Thelatterrathercreatesa“moralhazard”forreactorsuppliers.550DespitethesmallsizeofthepotentialamounttobepaidtoNPCILintheeventofanaccident,reactorvendors,especiallyU.S.basedcompanieslikeGeneral Electric andWestinghouse, have been opposed to taking on any liability. SuccessiveadministrationsinIndiahavebeenunderpressuretofindawaytoletthesevendorsavoidliabilityandhavemodified the rules for implementationof the legislation invariousways.551Over thecourseof2015,thegovernmentsetupadomesticinsurancepoolthatwouldprovidecoverageinthe event of a nuclear accident.552 In February 2016, the Indian government ratified theConventiononSupplementaryCompensation forNuclearDamage, alsoknownas theCSC,buteventhathasnotsatisfiedcompanieslikeWestinghouseandGE.553

The liabilityconcernhasbeenone factor thathassloweddownplans to import reactors fromAREVA&EDFfortheJaitapursite,andfromWestinghouseandGEfortheMithiVirdiandKovvadasitesrespectively.GE,inparticular,hadearlierruledoutsellinganuclearreactortoIndiaaslongastheliabilitylegislationremains.554However,ontheIndianside,theprospectsforhighcostsofpowerfromimportedreactorshavealsobeenasignificantconcern.

546TheHindu,“Kudankulamunits3,4costmorethandoublesoverliabilityissues”,3December2014,seehttp://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kudankulam-units-3-4-cost-more-than-doubles-over-liability-issues/article6658451.ece,accessed2July2016.547TheTimesofIndia,“India,RussiaFinallySignAgreementonKudankulam3,4Units”,11April2014.548MoSPI,“78thReportOnMegaProjects(Rs.1000CroreandAbove)”,November2015.549TheHindu,“Kudankulamunits3,4costmorethandoublesoverliabilityissues”,3December2014,seehttp://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kudankulam-units-3-4-cost-more-than-doubles-over-liability-issues/article6658451.ece,accessed2July2016.550SuvratRaju,M.V.Ramana,“Moralhazardofindemnifyingsuppliers”,TheHindu,20August2010.551SuvratRaju,M.V.Ramana,“StrangeLove”,OPENMagazine,14May2011,seehttp://www.openthemagazine.com/article/india/strange-love;andM.V.Ramana,SuvratRaju,“Thestrangelovefornuclearenergy”,TheHindu,17December2015,seehttp://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/on-the-indiajapan-civil-nuclear-deal/article7996972.ece?homepage=true,bothaccessed2July2016.552BusinessStandard,“Indiannuclearinsurancepoolstillinunclearwaters(NewsAnalysis)”,15December2015,seehttp://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/indian-nuclear-insurance-pool-still-in-unclear-waters-news-analysis-115121500415_1.html,accessed2July2016.553StephenStapczynski,RajeshKumarSingh,NatalieObikoPearson,“NuclearLiabilityConcernLingersDespiteIndiaSigningTreaty”,Bloomberg,25February2016,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-25/nuclear-liability-concern-lingers-despite-india-signing-treaty,accessed17June2016.554FrankJackDaniel,“GE’sImmeltrulesoutIndianuclearinvestmentundercurrentlaw”,Reuters,21September2015,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-ge-exim-idUSKCN0RL0X220150921,accessed17June2016.


TheJaitapursitewaspromisedin2007toFranceaspartofnegotiationsoverIndiareceivingawaiver from theNuclear SuppliersGroup (the so-calledU.S.-India nuclear deal).555NPCIL andAREVAthensignedaformalMemorandumofUnderstandingtoworkonthesettingupoftwotosixEPRunitsinFebruary2009.556Fromthatpoint,ittookoversixyearsforAREVAtosignaPre-engineeringAgreement(PEA)contractwithNPCILandaMemorandumofUnderstandingwithLarsen&Toubro,anengineeringconglomeratebasedinIndia,topotentiallycarryoutsomeoftheproductionlocally.557TheninJanuary2016,followingastatevisitbyFrance’sPresidentHollandetoIndia,allthatPrimeMinisterModiandPresidentHollandecouldsayintheirjointstatementwas that they wanted to “encourage” their nuclear firms to conclude techno-commercialnegotiationsbytheendof theyear.558ThusprogressontheprojecthasbeenslowatbestandtherearestillmajordifferencesinthepriceexpectationsofAREVA/EDFandNPCIL.559

The Mithi Virdi site, whereWestinghouse’s AP1000 reactors are proposed, was approved in2008,560 although there was a period after the Fukushima accidents, when the local stategovernmentwasunsureofproceedingwiththereactor.561India’ssettingupofaninsurancepoolin combination with a paucity of reactor sales elsewhere appears to have persuadedWestinghouse to continue pursuing the deal. Although initially Westinghouse CEO DanielRoderickhadnotbeenoptimisticandwasstilllookingfor“abreak”,562byJanuary2016hewashoping to make a “commercially significant announcement” by March 2016.563 In June 2016,following ameetingbetween IndianPrimeMinisterNarendraModi andU.S. PresidentBarackObama,thejointstatementreleasedsaidthatthetwo“leaderswelcomedthestartofpreparatory

555TheSundayGuardian,“JaitapurwillgototheFrench,Kakodkardisclosed”,11September2011,seehttp://www.sunday-guardian.com/investigation/jaitapur-will-go-to-the-french-kakodkar-disclosed,accessed27May2016.556Areva,“ArevapursuesitsdevelopmentinIndia”,PressRelease,10July2009,seehttp://www.areva.com/EN/news-6874/areva-pursues-its-development-in-india.html,accessed17June2016.557Areva,“India:AREVAsignsagreementsforthedevelopmentoftheJaitapurnuclearpowerplantproject”,10April2015,seehttp://www.areva.com/EN/news-10497/india-areva-signs-agreements-for-the-development-of-the-jaitapur-nuclear-power-plant-project.html,accessed17June2016.558CharuSudanKasturi,“Rafaleandnukedealsinpricetangle”,TheTelegraph,26January2016,seehttp://www.telegraphindia.com/1160126/jsp/nation/story_65959.jsp,accessed17June2016.559SanjayJog,“SanjayJog:Jaitapur’snucleardiscontent”,BusinessStandard,10October2015,seehttp://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/sanjay-jog-jaitapur-s-nuclear-discontent-115101000884_1.html;andAnilSasi,“Jaitapurnuclearproject:Renewedpush,amidlingeringconcerns”,TheIndianExpress,27January2016,seehttp://indianexpress.com/article/business/business-others/jaitapur-nuclear-project-renewed-push-amid-lingering-concerns/,bothaccessed17June2016.560RajivShah,“N-plantsiteinGujaratapproved”,TimesofIndia,23August2008,seehttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/N-plant-site-in-Gujarat-approved/articleshow/3395046.cms,accessed17June2016.561TheTimesofIndia,“StatedoesarethinkonMithivirdiN-plant”,3May2011,seehttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/State-does-a-rethink-on-Mithivirdi-N-plant/articleshow/8147498.cms,accessed17June2016.562AnyaLitvak,“WestinghouseneedsbreakinIndianuclearstalemate”,PittsburghPost-Gazette,25January2015,seehttp://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/policy-powersource/2015/01/25/Westinghouse-waiting-for-progress-in-India-nuclear-stalemate/stories/201501250086,accessed17June2016.563Reuters,“WestinghouseeyesIndiareactordealbyMarch-end”,BusinessStandardIndia,16January2016,seehttp://www.business-standard.com/article/printer-friendly-version?article_id=116011600016_1,accessed18January2016.


workonsiteinIndiaforsixAP1000reactorstobebuiltbyWestinghouseandnotedtheintentionofIndiaandtheU.S.Export-ImportBanktoworktogethertowardacompetitivefinancingpackagefortheproject(…).BothsideswelcomedtheannouncementbytheNuclearPowerCorporationofIndiaLtd,andWestinghousethatengineeringandsitedesignworkwillbeginimmediatelyandthetwosideswillworktowardfinalizingthecontractualarrangementsbyJune2017”.564

Therelativelyvaguestatementdidnotexcitemostfinancialanalysts.ChrisGadomski,aleadingnuclearanalystatBloombergNewEnergyFinanceinNewYork,forexamplewasblunt:“Tobefrank,I'llbelieveitwhenthecheckclears(…).There'ssomanyofthesedealsthat,youhavetowaituntil thepie iscompletelycooked”.565 In India,questionshavebeenraisedabout thecostcompetitivenessofthesereactors.566ArecentassessmentoftheeconomicsofAP1000reactorsbythe Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis found that the costs of generatingelectricityat theproposedAP1000reactorswouldbeat least threeandpossiblysix times thecorrespondingcostofsettingupsolarphotovoltaicplants.567

Japan Focus For the first time in nearly two years, commercial nuclear reactors began operation in Japanduring 2015. The Sendai-1 reactor restarted on 14 August568 with Sendai-2 restarting21October.569Inthefollowingmonths,bothreactorsgeneratedatotal3TWhofelectricity,or0.5percentofthenation’sannualoutput.Thiscompareswithanuclearshareof1.7percentoftotalelectricityin2013,2percentin2012,18percentin2011,29percentin2010,andthehistoricmaximumof36percentin1998.TherestartsofSendaiwerethefirstreactoroperationssince15September2013,whenOhiUnit-4wasshutdown.570Efforts to followrestartof theSendaiplant,withoperationoftheTakahama-3reactor571inJanuary2016,provedshort-livedduetoan

564TheWhiteHouse,“JointStatement:TheUnitedStatesandIndia:EnduringGlobalPartnersinthe21stCentury”,PressRelease,7June2016,seehttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/07/joint-statement-united-states-and-india-enduring-global-partners-21st,accessed2July2016.565Tribune-Review,“WestinghousetoBuild6NuclearReactorsinIndia”,7June2016,seehttp://triblive.com/business/headlines/10595279-74/deal-india-westinghouse,accessed2July2016.566SuvratRaju,“TheCostofNuclearDiplomacy,”TheHindu,20June2016,seehttp://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-cost-of-nuclear-diplomacy/article8748864.ece,accessed22June2016.567DavidA.Schlissel,“BadChoice:TheRisks,CostsandViabilityofProposedU.S.NuclearReactorsinIndia”,InstituteforEnergyEconomicsandFinancialAnalysis,March2016,seehttp://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Bad-Choice_The-Risks-Costs-and-Viability-of-Proposed-US-Nuclear-Reactors-in-India_-March-2016.pdf,accessed2July2016. 568WNISR,“32-Year-OldReactorFirsttoGeneratePowerinJapaninNearlyTwoYears”,14August2015,seehttp://www.worldnuclearreport.org/32-Year-Old-Reactor-First-to-Generate-Power-in-Japan-in-Nearly-Two-Years.html,accessed17June2016.569WNISR,“SecondReactorRestartsinJapan”,22October2015,seehttp://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Second-Reactor-Restarts-in-Japan.html,accessed17June2016.570WNISR,“JapanNuclearFree,LastOperatingReactorShutDown”,16September2013,seehttp://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Japan-Nuclear-Free-Last-Operating.html,accessed2July2016.571JAIF,“KansaiEPStartsUpTakahama-3NPP”,29January2016,seehttp://www.jaif.or.jp/en/kansai-ep-starts-up-takahama-3-npp/,accessed17June2016.


unprecedentedcourtrulingon9March2016forcingtheimmediateclosureofthereactor.572TheOtsuDistrictCourtrulingalsorequiredthecontinuedshutdownofTakahama-4whichhadearliersufferedatechnicalfailureon29FebruarywhenplantoperatorKansaiElectricPowerCompanywasattemptinggridconnection.573

AsaresultoftheOtsucourtrulingthetwoSendaireactors,ownedbyKyushuElectricandlocatedin Kagoshima prefecture in southern Japan, is the only nuclear power plant operating as of1July2016,highlightingthefailureoftheindustrytorecoverfromtheprogressiveshutdownofallreactorsintheperiodafter11March2011.Asaresult,allbutthreeofJapan’snuclearreactorsareintheWNISRcategoryofLongTermOutage(LTO).574(SeeAnnex2foradetailedoverviewoftheJapaneseReactorProgram.)

Figure42:AgeDistributionoftheJapaneseNuclearFleet


Figure6showsthecollapseofnuclearelectricitygenerationinJapanfrom287TWhto9.7TWhin2015.Whilethemostdramaticdeclinehasbeensincethe2011FukushimaDaiichiaccident,infactithasbeen17yearssinceJapan’snuclearoutputpeakedat313TWhin1998.Thenoticeablysharpdeclineduring2002-2003,amountingtoareductionofalmost30percent,wasduetothetemporaryshutdownofall17ofTokyoElectricPowerCompany’s(TEPCO)reactors—sevenatKashiwazakiKariwaandsixatFukushimaDaiichiandfouratFukushimaDaini.575TheshutdownwasfollowinganadmissionfromTEPCOthatitsstaffhaddeliberatelyfalsifieddataforinclusion

572NikkeiAsianReview,“Japancourtordersshutdownofnuclearreactors”,10March2016,seehttp://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Japan-court-orders-shutdown-of-nuclear-reactors,accessed2July2016.573WNISR,“Takahama-4ReactorFailsGridConnectioninJapan”,2March2016,seehttp://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Takahama-4-Reactor-Fails-Grid-Connection-in-Japan.html,accessed17June2016.574M.Schneider,A.Froggatt,et.al.,“WNISR2014”,18August2014,seehttp://www.worldnuclearreport.org/WNISR2014.html,accessed17June2016.575Daiichimeans“NumberOne”andDainimeans“NumberTwo”,eachreferringtoamulti-reactorgeneratingcomplex.


inregulatorysafetyinspectionsreports.576During2003,TEPCOmanagedtoresumeoperationsoffiveofitsreactors.Thefurthernoticeabledeclineinelectricaloutputin2007wastheresultoftheextendedshutdownofthesevenKashiwazakiKariwareactors,withatotalinstalledcapacityof 8 GWe, following the Niigata Chuetsu-oki earthquake in 2007.577 TEPCOwas struggling torestarttheKashiwazakiKariwaunits,whentheFukushimaearthquakeoccurred.

TheFukushima-Daiichiaccident,whichbeganon11March2011(seeFukushimaStatusReport),ledtotheshutdownofall50nuclearreactorsinadditiontothedestructionoffourofthesixunitsattheFukushima-Daiichisite.Fiveyearson,theconsequencesoftheaccidentcontinuetodefinethefutureprospectsfornuclearenergyinJapan.Thenumberofreactorstheoreticallyavailableto resume operation declined further with five reactors declared for permanent closure inMarch2015578andtheconfirmationofthepermanentclosureofthe39-year-oldIkata-1reactoron25March2016.579WNISRconsidersthedayof the lastelectricitygenerationastheclosuredateandaccordinglymodifiesthestatisticsretroactively.

Table15:JapaneseReactorsOfficiallyClosed

Owner Unit Capacity GridConnection LastProduction Age580

KansaiElectricPWRMihamaUnit1 340MW 1970 2010 40years

PWRMihamaUnit2 500MW 1972 2011 40years

KyushuElectric PWRGenkaiUnit1 559MW 1975 2011 37years

Shikoku PWRIkataUnit1 538MW 1977 2011 35years

JAPC BWRTsurugaUnit1 357MW 1969 2011 41years

ChugokuElectric PWRShimaneUnit1 460MW 1974 2010 37years


Whilethenuclearindustryhasfailedtoresumeoperationofnuclearpowerplants,aconsistentmajorityofJapanesecitizens,whenpolled,continuetoopposethecontinuedrelianceonnuclear

576HiroyukiKuroda,“LessonLearnedfromTEPCONuclearPowerScandal”,ManagerCorporate,CommunicationsDepartment,TEPCO,24March2004,seehttp://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/presen/pdf-1/040325-s-e.pdf,accessed17June2016.577TEPCO,“ImpactoftheNiigataChuetsu-okiearthquakeontheTokyoElectricPowerCompany(TEPCO)KashiwazakiKariwaNuclearPowerStationandCountermeasures”,September2007,seewww.tepco.co.jp/en/news/presen/pdf-1/0709-e.pdf,accessed2July2016.578WNISR,“JapaneseUtilitiesConfirmClosureofFiveReactors”,21March2015,seehttp://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Japanese-Utilities-Confirm-Closure.html,accessed2July2016.579WNISR,“PermanentClosureofJapaneseReactorIkata-1”,26March2016,seehttp://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Permanent-Closure-of-Japanese-Reactor-Ikata-1.html,accessed2July2016.580NotethatWNISRconsiderstheagefromfirstgridconnectiontolastproduction.


power,support itsearlyphase-out,andremainopposedtotherestartofreactors—with latestpollinginFebruary2016indicatingabout60percentopposedtoreactoroperations.581

ThepollingcamepriortoJapan’slargestearthquakesince2011,whichstrucktheislandofKyushuinmid-April2016.582Thetwomajorearthquakeson14and16AprilandhundredsofaftershocksdidnotcausedamagetotheSendainuclearplant,locatedaround150kmfromtheepicentres,orattheGenkaiandIkatanuclearplants,whicharealsoinrelativeproximitytotheseismicevents.583However,thefactthatthelargestearthquaketohitKyushusince1889tookplaceintheregionofJapan’sonlyoperatingnuclearplantraised furtherwidespreadpublicandpoliticalopposition,including criticism of the seismic risk assessments of Japan’s Nuclear RegulationAuthority (NRA).584TheKumamoto seismic eventswereunique in that, for the first time, tworegistered level 7 earthquakes on the Japanese seismic intensity scale occurred in separatemunicipalities,theyarealsothefirsttwinearthquakestoregisterintensity7,sincetheadoptionoftheJapanesescalein1949,accordingtotheJapanMeteorologicalAgency(JMA).585TheeffectofthishasbeentofurthersensitizeJapanesepublicopiniontotheearthquakeriskstonuclearpowerinJapan.

The government of PrimeMinister Abe, elected inDecember 2012, confirmed in 2014 a newStrategic Energy Plan. It reversed the previous government’s position, announced inSeptember2012,thatcalledforazeronuclearpowerfuturebythe2030s.586InApril2015,theLong-termEnergySupplyandDemandOutlookwasproposed,whichsetthepercentageofenergythenationaimstogeneratefromdifferentsourcesbytheyear2030.587AdoptedinJuly2015,itwasdecidedthatanuclearshareof20-22percent,renewableenergyof22-24percent,andfossilfuels56percentwouldbeachievedby2030.588Theproposednuclear share isbelow thepre-Fukushima projection within the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry’s (METI)

581Nikkei,“Oppositiontonuclearpowerplantre-running60percentheadquarterspoll”,29February2016,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXKASFS28H1F_Y6A220C1PE8001/,accessed12May2016.582Bloomberg,“Japan'sWorstQuakeSince2011SeenDelayingNuclearStarts”,26April2016,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-26/japan-s-worst-quake-since-fukushima-seen-delaying-nuclear-starts,accessed2July2016.583NRA,“SituationofNuclearFacilitiesfollowingthe2016KumamotoEarthquake”,NewsRelease,18April2016,seehttps://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000147663.pdf,accessed17June2016.584SouthChinaMorningPost,“Activists,residentsinJapanprotestagainstrestartoftwoSendainuclearreactorslocatedlessthan150kmfromrecentquakes’epicentre”,18April2016,seehttp://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/1936923/activists-residents-japan-protest-against-restart-two-sendai,accessed2July2016.585TheMainichi,“Kumamototemblorsarefirsttwinlevel-7quakesonrecord:JMA”,21April2016,seehttp://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160421/p2a/00m/0na/007000c,accessed2July2016.586TheEnergyandEnvironmentCouncil,“InnovativeStrategyforEnergyandtheEnvironment”,GovernmentofJapan,14September2012.587METI,“Long-termEnergySupplyandDemandOutlook”,(ProvisionalTranslation),July2015,seehttp://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2015/pdf/0716_01a.pdf,accessed17June2016.588KenjiKaneko,“JapanAnnouncesEnergyMixPlanfor2030”,CleanTechInstitute,SolarPowerPlantBusiness,1May2015,seehttp://techon.nikkeibp.co.jp/english/NEWS_EN/20150501/416800/?ST=msbe,accessed17June2016.


2010StrategicEnergyPlan,whichhadplanned for50percentby2030,589 andalsobelow theactualpre-FukushimaDaiichiaccidentlevelof29percentinMarch2011.

Challengestotheproposednuclearsharewereevident insidethedraftingsubcommittee,withdissentingexpertopinionsthatthenuclearsharedidnotreflecta2014-commitmenttoreducenuclearpowertotheextentpossible.590Inresponse,thethenIndustryMinister,YoichiMiyazawa,stated that high energy costs from renewables would require a nuclear share of at least 20-22percent.591Toattainthatnuclearshare,all26reactorsthathaveappliedforNRAreviewwouldhave to be operating, plus most of those yet to be reviewed, a prospect that in reality isunattainable. Miyazawa stated that achieving this percentage would require the operation of35reactorsby2030,atargetthatdoesnotreflecttherealityofthemanychallengesfacingJapan’sagingnuclearreactorfleet592(seealsoFigure42).

Ifanything,theprospectsforattainingthecurrent2030nuclearsharehaveworsenedduringthepast year. The Otsu District Court in Shiga prefecture, in issuing the injunction sought by29citizens livingwithin30-70kmoftheTakahamareactors593,signaledtoJapan’sutilitiesandgovernmentthatevenwithreactorsapprovedforrestartandoperating,thereisapossibilityoffuture injunctions forcing the shutdown of reactors. As with the Otsu judgement, this couldincludeacourtlocatedinneighboringprefecturesoutsidetheimmediateareaofthelocationofthenuclearpowerplant.ItremainsunclearwhatthefinallegaloutcomewillbeintheTakahama-3and-4dispute,however,KansaiElectricisclearlydeterminedtousealllegalmeanstotrytooverturnthespecificjudgement594.ThesignificanceandmediumtolongtermimpactoftheOtsujudgementisdifficulttooverstate,giventheuncertaintyastowhichreactorcouldbenext.Thefact thatKansaiElectricwerenotpreparedfor therulingand itsshock impact(itssharepricedroppedby15percent,thelargestplungesinceOctober1987)washighlightedbythereactionofthevicechairoftheKansaiEconomicFederation:“Whyisasingledistrictcourtjudgeallowedtotripupthegovernment’senergypolicy?”595

Withintheutilityindustry,itisacknowledgedthatitwillbeachallengetoreachthegovernmenttarget and that 15 percent by 2030 is more realistic. And even attaining this figure looks

589METI,“TheStrategicEnergyPlanofJapan—Meetingglobalchallengesandsecuringenergyfutures”,RevisedJune2010.590AsahiShimbun,“Nuclearpowercrucialasrenewableenergytoocostly,ministrysays”,27May2015.591Ibidem.592AsahiShimbun,“Japanneeds35nuclearreactorsoperatingby2030,saysindustryminister”,11June2015.593KansaiElectricPowerCompany,“DecisionofaprovisionaldispositionpreventingtheoperationofUnits3and4ofTakahamaNuclearPowerStation”,9March2016,seehttp://www.kepco.co.jp/english/corporate/pr/2016/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2016/03/09/2016_mar9_2.pdf,accessed17June2016.594KansaiElectricPowerCompany,“AppealofanObjectiontotheProvisionalDispositiontoSuspendOperationofTakahamaUnits3and4”,14March2016,seehttp://www.kepco.co.jp/english/corporate/pr/2016/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2016/03/14/2016_mar14_1.pdf,accessed17June2016.595AsahiShimbun,“Editorial:nuclearpowerproponentsstillscoffingatpublicsafetyconcerns”,28March2016,seehttp://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/aj201603280014.html,accessed12May2016.


uncertain.596WidercorporateJapanisincreasinglyskepticaloftheprospectsforattainingahighshare.597 Several scenarios indicating a share of less than 10 percent were published during2015.598 InMay2016, indicationsemerged that this lower targetmaybeadopted ina revisedenergy plan. Reflecting the unrealistic prospects for nuclear reactor restarts and continuingstrongpublicopposition,unnamedsourcessuggestedthatanupdatedenergyplantobereleasedin2017wouldrevisedownwardsthenuclearsharetobetween10and15percent.599

Figure43:ElectricityGenerationinJapanbySource2006-2015

Source:FEPC,2016600

596ShigeruMuraki,“PlenaryDiscussion:ManagingGlobalRisks—Markets,GeopoliticsandClimate”,TokyoGas,ColumbiaGlobalEnergySummit,28April2015,seehttp://energypolicy.columbia.edu/events-calendar/2015-columbia-global-energy-summit,accessed2July2016.597Reuters,“JapanIncnotaskeenasAbegovernmentonnuclearpower—Reuterspoll”,24May2015,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/24/japan-companies-nuclear-idUSL3N0YB2PR20150524?feedType=RSS&feedName=utilitiesSector,accessed2July2016.598ShaunBurnie,“RealityCheck:EnergyMix2030andJapan’sCollapseinNuclearPowerGeneration”,GreenpeaceGermany,Published24April2015,UpdatedJune2015,seehttp://www.greenpeace.org/japan/Global/japan/pdf/20150428-briefing-energy-mix.pdf,accessed2July2016;andBNEF,“Japan’slikely2030energymix:moregasandsolar”,2June2015,seehttp://about.bnef.com/white-papers/japans-likely-2030-energy-mix-gas-solar/,accessed12May2016.599Reuters,“Japantocutemphasisonnuclearinnextenergyplan:sources”,26May2016,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-nuclear-idUSKCN0YI06Z,accessed25June2016.600FEPC,“SummaryofPressConferenceCommentsMadebyMakotoYagi,FEPCChairman”,20May2016,seehttps://www.fepc.or.jp/english/news/conference/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2016/05/24/kaiken_e_20160520.pdf,accessed5July2016.

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The options for how such targets would be attained are of course dependent upon multiplefactors,inparticularinstalledcapacityperreactor.Takingintoaccountthemajoruncertainties,onescenariofora10percenttargetwouldrequiretheoperationof13ofthereactorscurrentlyunderNRAreview,includingstartupandoperationofthetwoAdvancedBoilingWaterReactors(ABWR)underconstructionatShimaneandOhma.A15percenttargetwouldrequireeithertheoperationofall26reactorsthathaveappliedtotheNRAforreview,andthereforeincludetheoperationof reactorsbeyond their40-year lifetime;oracombinationof40-yearplusreactorstogetherwithadditionalreactorsthathaveyettoapplyforreview.Specifically,theuncertaintiesin the prospects for reactor restart mean that, no matter what target percentage is set, theJapanese Government and utilities simply do not know, how many of Japan’s 36 remainingreactorswillberestarted,norwhen.

Peopleoftenwonder,how Japancouldhandle the lossof close to30percentof theelectricitygenerating capacity following the 3/11 events without any major blackouts. As Figure 43illustrates,thereweretwokeycomponents,savings/energyefficiencyandincreasedfossil fueluse.Comparedto2010,consumptiondroppednationwideby5percentin2011.Oneremarkableaspect is that consumption did not pick up again, on the contrary, continued to fall: In 2015,nationalpowerconsumptionwas12percentbelowthe2010level.Thefuelshiftbetween2010and2015showsanincreaseof5percentagepointsforboth,naturalgasandcoal,whiletheoilconsumption,afterabriefsurge,fellbacktoitspre-3/11levels.Renewablespickuponlyslowlyandcontributenowabout5percenttothemixcomparedto1percentin2010.

The2014StrategicEnergyPlanmaintainedthe long-standinggovernmentpolicyofpromotingspent nuclear fuel reprocessing and plutonium mixed oxide fuel (MOX) use in commercialreactors. In a further signal of tensions and challenges within Japan’s nuclear industry, theFederationofElectricPowerCompanies(FEPC),whichrepresentsthenation’stennuclearpowerutilities, announced on 20 November 2016 the indefinite postponement of a target date forloadingplutoniumMixedOxide(MOX)fuel into16-18lightwaterreactors.601TheplanstouseMOXfuelhaveforthepasttwodecadesbeenthejustificationusedforJapan’saccumulationofplutonium through reprocessing. The Takahama-3 reactor, operated between 29 January and10MarchwithMOXfuel,andtheMOX-fueledreactorTakahama-4,arenowshutdown.ThefirstreactortoresumeoperationwithMOXfuelwilllikelybeIkata-3scheduledforsummer2016.The22nd delay in beginning the commercial operation of the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant,intended to produce plutonium for use in MOX fuel, was announced in November 2015.602Originallyscheduledtobeginoperationin1997,constructionoftheplantbeganin1993.603

601NW,“JapanpostponesplanstouseMOXfuel”,26November2015.602JNFL,“ExtraordinaryPressConference—ScheduleChangeofCompletionofRokkashoReprocessingPlantandMOXFuelFabricationPlant”,16November2015,seehttp://www.jnfl.co.jp/en/release/president-talk/2015/20151116.html,accessed17June2016.603ShaunBurnie,FrankBarnaby,etal.,“NuclearProliferationinPlainSight:Japan’sPlutoniumFuelCycle–ATechnicalandEconomicFailureButaStrategicSuccess”,TheAsia-PacificJournal,Volume14,Issue5,1March2016,seehttp://apjjf.org/-Shaun-Burnie--Frank-Barnaby--Tom-Clements--Aileen-Mioko-Smith--Kendra-Ulrich/4860/article.pdf,accessed17June2016.


NRA Nuclear Safety Review Asof1 July2016, elevenpower companies thatownnuclear reactorshaveapplied to Japan’sregulatorNRAforsafetyassessmentsofatotalof26nuclearreactors(seeAnnex2fordetails),withsevenreactorshavingcompletedallstagesofthereview(Sendai-1and-2,Takahama-3and-4604,Ikata-3605),aswellasTakahama-1and-2that,on20June2016,becamethefirstunitstobegranted a lifetime extension to 60 years under the new regulations. The NRA is expected tocomplete pre-operational inspections for Ikata-3 in July 2016. Compliance with the NRAguidelines,whichcameintoforceinJuly2013606,isarequirementforutilitiesintheirplansforreactor restart, along with “securing local public understanding” and approval from theprefecturalgovernmentandlocaltownmayors.Thenewguidelinescoverarangeofissuesrelatedto the safety risks of nuclear power plants, including seismic and tsunami assessments andprotectivemeasuresundertakenbyutilities;607fireprotection;themanagementofthereactorinthe event of a loss of offsite electrical power, cooling function, and accident management,608including prevention of hydrogen explosion; and the containment or filtered venting ofradioactivematerialsintotheenvironment.Inthecaseofseismicassessments,reactorsthatarelocatedaboveactivefaultswouldnotbepermittedtoresumeoperations.Reactorownersarealsorequired to assess their vulnerability to volcanic eruptions,which depending on scale of riskwouldnot bepermitted to operate orwouldbe required tohave specific countermeasures inplace.Emergencyevacuationplansarealsorequiredtobeagreedwithlocalcommunitieswithina30kmradiusofthenuclearplant.Uponcompletionofthepreliminaryapprovalofthesafetycase, the NRA holds a series of local public informationmeetings—an issue that has createdcontroversyastowhethercommunitiesnotimmediatelywithinthevicinityofaplant—butatriskintheeventofasevereaccident,wouldparticipate.

TodatetheNRAhasonlycompletedthereviewofPressurizedWaterReactors(PWR)basedontheregulator’sanalysisthatitiseasiertosecurethemagainstseismiceventsthanitisforBoilingWaterReactors(BWR).Inaddition,onlyoneBWRreviewteamofabout20staffisinplaceatNRA,comparedtothreeteamsofabout60peoplethatareworkingonPWRinspections.

TheJapanAtomicPowerCompany(JAPCO)submittedanapplicationtotheNRAreviewforitsTsuruga-2 reactoron5November2015,becoming the26th reactorunder review.609However,therehasbeenanongoingdisputesince2012betweentheNRAandJAPCOoverthenatureofa

604NRA,“Completionofthe3-stepconformityreviewontheNewRegulatoryRequirementsforTakahamaNPSUnits3and4”,NewsRelease,9October2015,seehttps://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000125853.pdf,accessed17June2016.605NRA,“Completionofthe3-stepconformityreviewontheNewRegulatoryRequirementsforIkataPowerStationUnit3”NewsRelease,20April2016,seehttps://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000147907.pdf,accessed17June2016.606NRA,“NewRegulatoryRequirementsforLight-WaterNuclearPowerPlants—Outline—August2013”,seehttps://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/requirements160913.pdf,accessed17June2016.607NRA,“OutlineofNewRegulatoryRequirementsForLightWaterNuclearPowerPlants(EarthquakesandTsunamis)”,3April2013.608NRA,“OutlineofNewRegulatoryRequirementsForLightWaterNuclearPowerPlants(SevereAccidentMeasures)”,3April2013.609JAIF,“JAPCFilesApplicationforCompatibilityExaminationforTsuruga-2”,9November2015,seehttp://www.jaif.or.jp/en/japc-files-application-for-compatibility-examination-for-tsuruga-2/,accessed17June2016.


seismicfaultlineatthesite.Thedefinitionofanactivefaultisonewithhavingthe“possibilityofslippinginthefuture”andthathasbeenactivesincetheLatePleistoceneera,orsome120,000and130,000yearsago.AnexpertpaneloftheNRAindicatedinDecember2012thatthefaultlinewaspossiblyactive,610andinMay2013theevaluationreportoftheNRAdeterminedthattheD-1 fracture zone lying directly under Tsuruga-2 was active.611 The JAPCO, and a team ofinternationalexpertshaveclaimedeversincethatthefaultlineisnotactive.612DespitecounterargumentsfromJAPCO,inMarch2015,theNRACommissionersagreedwiththefinalevaluationthatthefaultwasactive.613ThedecisioniscriticalforJAPCO,withonlytworeactorsinitsfleet,theotherbeingTokai-2wheretheprospects forrestartingareclosetozero.ThuswithoutthepossibilityofoperatingTsuruga-2itwouldmeantheendofJAPCOasanuclearplantoperator,havingtomovetheunitsfromassetstoliabilitiesinthebalancesheetandtriggeringtheweightyfinancial issue of decommissioning. JAPCO, a company established and owned by nine othernuclearpowercompanies,hasnotacceptedtheNRA’sjudgement,hencethefilinginNovember2015forreviewofTsuruga-2forcompliancewiththe2013guidelines.UnlesstheNRAoverturnsitsowndecision,thereisnoprospectofTsuruga-2beingapprovedforrestart.

AnothernuclearpowerplantandutilitythatisindisputewiththeNRAisHokurikuElectricPowerCompanyanditsShika-2plant,whichisunderreview.On3March2016,apanelofexpertsoftheNRA issuedareportconcluding thatoneof the faultzonesrunningdirectlyunder theShika-1reactorbuilding“couldpossiblybecomeanactivefaultinthefuture.”Hokurikuobjectedtothereport.614TheolderShikaunit isnotunderNRAreviewand it isalmostcertain that itwillbedecommissioned.However,theNRAalsoconcludedthattwofaultlinesrunningundertheturbinebuildingofbothunit-1andunit-2couldalsobeactive.615TheNRAcommissionershaveyet tomakeafinaldeterminationonthisissue,requestingmoreinformationfromtheutility.Shika-2isan1100MWAdvancedBoilingWaterReactor(ABWR),whichonlybeganoperationin2005.ArulingbytheNRAthatthefaultunderShika-2isactive,wouldleaveHokuriku,likeJAPCO,withnooperablereactors.

InAugust2015,theNRAannouncedthatitwasputtingtheTEPCOreactorsKashiwazakiKariwa-6and-7onaprioritylistforscreening,suggestingthatthesewillbethefirstBWRsoutofatotal

610JapanTimes,“DetectingActiveFaultsNearReactors”,Editorial,14December2012,seehttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/12/14/editorials/detecting-active-faults-near-reactors/,accessed17June2016.611JAIF,“ThinReasoninginNRA’sArgumentforActiveFaultunderTsuruga-2”,25November2014,seehttp://www.jaif.or.jp/en/thin-reasoning-in-nras-argument-for-active-fault-under-tsuruga-2/,accessed17June2016.612JAPCO,“EvaluationofshatterzonesatTsurugaNPPsite—InterimReportoftheJointInternationalExperts’Meeting(TRM/IRG)”,21May2013,seehttp://www.japc.co.jp/english/shatter_zones/pdf/130521/250521_2.pdf,accessed2July2016.613JAIF,“NRAAcceptsFinalizationofPanelReportRecognizingtheFaultDirectlyUnderTsuruga-2asActive”,25March2015,seehttp://www.jaif.or.jp/en/nra-accepts-finalization-of-panel-report-recognizing-the-fault-directly-under-tsuruga-2-as-active/,accessed2July2016.614JAIF,“HokurikuElectricPowerVoicesObjectionstoReportonCrushedRockFaultZonesatShikaNPPs”,4March2016,seehttp://www.jaif.or.jp/en/hokuriku-electric-power-voices-objections-to-report-on-crushed-rock-fault-zones-at-shika-npps/,accessed2July2016.615JapanTimes,“ShikaNuclearPowerPlantClosertoBeingScrappedasNRAUpholdsFaultsRuling”,27April2016,seehttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/27/national/science-health/shika-nuclear-plant-closer-scrapped-nra-upholds-fault-ruling/#.Vz5HMiMrK2w,accessed19May2016.


often,toadvancethroughthereviewprocess.616However,therearenoprospectsforrestartofthereactors in thecomingyear,not leastdue tomultipleoutstanding issues includingseismicrisks, and the opposition to restart from the Niigata prefectural governor.617 On30 November 2015, TEPCO admitted to the NRA multiple safety failures at the KashiwazakiKariwaplant—thisfollowedawarningfromtheNRAthatsafetystandardsundertheActontheRegulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors had been brokenduringsafety-relatedconstructionattheplant.TEPCOconfirmedthatatallsevenKashiwazaki-Kariwareactorstheyhadidentified1,745electriccablesfoundtohaveproblems, includingnoseparationbetweensafetyandnon-safetycabling.618 TEPCOalsoadmitted that inhundredsofconstructionprojectsattheKashiwazakiKariwaplanttherehadbeeninadequatesupervision.

ThedecisionoftheNRAtofocusontheABWRsatKashiwazakialsomeansthatthereviewofthreeotherBWRs—ChugokuElectricPowerCompany’sShimane-2,TohokuElectricPowerCompany’sOnagawa-2andChubuElectricPowerCompany’sHamaoka-4—willbepushedback.619

ThecredibilityandeffectivenessoftheNRAduringthepastyearhasbeensignificantlychallenged.

IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)

In addition to court rulings that have questioned in particular the effectiveness of seismicassessments of theNRA, in January2016, the regulatorwas reviewedby the IAEA IntegratedRegulatoryReviewService(IRRS).Inthefinalreport,presentedtotheNRAon23April2016620,theIAEApraisedtheestablishmentoftheNRAandacknowledgedthatithassoughttoimproveindependenceandtransparencysinceitwassetupin2012,italsonotedhoweversignificantareasof weakness. These included that the NRA is currently conducting its work outside therecommendations and guidelines of the IAEA General Safety Requirements (REV 1) and theinadequacyofNRAinspectionsofnuclearfacilitiesincludingnuclearplants—thisincludespoortraining,limitedinspectionsrights,andextendedperiodsbetweeninspections.InitsreporttheIAEAconcluded:

TheunnecessarycomplexityofthelegalframeworkwithrespecttoinspectionswasalsorecognizedduringtheIRRSmissiontoJapanin2007.However,theIRRSteamnotedthattheapproachremainsessentially the same 9 years later. During the preparations for the IRRS mission the NRA alsorecognizedtheunnecessarycomplexityofthelegalframeworkforperforminginspectionsandhasalready foreshadowed improvements towards simplification. Such improvements will requirechangesinthelaws,whichwilllikelytakeconsiderabletime(...).

616Reuters,“JapanputsTepcoreactorsonprioritylistforrestartscreening”,6August2015,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/japan-nuclear-restarts-idUSL3N10H32R20150806,accessed2July2016.617Bloomberg,“TepcoNiigataAtomicPlantSafetoRestartin2016,AdviserSays”,20November2015,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-20/tepco-niigata-atomic-plant-safe-to-restart-in-2016-adviser-says,accessed2July2016.618TheMainichi,“TEPCOreports2,000incorrectlyinstalledcablesat2nuclearcomplexes”,1December2015,seehttp://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20151201/p2a/00m/0na/013000c,accessed2July2016.619NW,“Japan’sNRAprioritizingKashiwazaki-Kariwareview:commissioner”,20August2015.620DepartmentofNuclearSafetyandSecurity,“IntegratedRegulatoryReviewService(IRRS)MissiontoJapan”,IAEA,Tokyo(Japan),10-22January2016,seehttps://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000148261.pdf,accessed17June2016.


The IRRS team concluded that theNRA inspectionprogramneeds significant improvement incertainareas(...):

In particular the legal framework for inspection is prescriptive in nature and allows very littlefreedomtoNRAtodecideonthescope,frequencyandcontentofinspectionstakingintoaccountrisksignificanceofissues.621

TheweaknessofNRAinspectionswashighlightedinDecember2015,whenitwasconfirmedthattheNRAhadfailedtoconducton-site inspections for firerelatedcable installationatreactors,whereithadcompletedandapprovedpreoperationalinspection.622

EvenbeforethereleaseoftheIAEAIRRSreporttheNRACommissionersunanimouslyapprovedon16March2016aproposaltotrytoimplementrecommendationsfromtheIRRSreport.623TheNRAwillalsoseekanamendmentoftheActontheRegulationofNuclearSourceMaterial,NuclearFuelMaterialandReactors,tospecificallyreviseinspectionprocedurestotheDietatsomepointin2016.624TheIAEAreportontheNRAisunusuallyforthrightandcriticalandisatvariancewiththerepeatedclaimsoftheNRAChair,ShunichiTanaka,thatJapaneseregulatorystandardsare“internationallyrecognizedasbeingthestrictestintheworld.”625

Critical Ageing and Life Extensions

A major determinant in the eventual number of reactors operated in Japan will be ageing,permanent decommissioning, and life extension decisions of nuclear power plants. As of1July2016,atotalofsixreactors(seeTable15)havebeendeclaredtobedecommissioned,notincluding Fukushima. This is a significant departure from the position of utilities prior to theFukushimaDaiichinuclearaccident,whentheyandMETIwereproposingoperationofnuclearreactorsbeyond60years.626ThedecisiontopermanentlyshutdownthesereactorshighlightstheageingissuesconfrontingJapan’snuclearpowerutilities.

BeforetheMarch2011nuclearaccidentatFukushimaDaiichi,Japanhad54commercialnuclearreactors. As a result of the accident, all six reactor units at Fukushima Daiichi are to bedecommissionedoverthecomingdecades,whichreducesthetotalnumberofreactorsofficially“inoperation” to42.TEPCOhasyet toannounce thepermanentclosureof its fourFukushima

621Ibidem.622JapanTimes,“NRAfailstoconducton-sitechecksfornuclear-plantcables”,6December2015,seehttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/06/national/nra-fails-to-conduct-on-site-checks-for-nuclear-plant-cables/#.Vz7j-yMrK2w,accessed17June2016.623Platts,“Japan’sregulatorsetsMarch2020targettoimplementIAEArecommendations”NuclearNewsFlashes,20March2016.624Platts,“Japan'sNRAformsteamtoimplementIAEAinspectionrecommendations”,11May2016.625JAIF,“KansaiEPAppealsCourtDecisionProhibitingRestartsofTakahamaNPPs”,22April2015,seehttp://www.jaif.or.jp/en/kansai-ep-appeals-court-decision-prohibiting-restarts-of-takahama-npps/,accessed17June2016.626T.Tsukada,Y.Nishiyama,et.al.,“ResearchProgramsOnAgingOfReactorStructuralMaterialsAtJapanAtomicEnergyResearchInstitute”,JapanAtomicEnergyResearchInstitute,Japan,2002,aspublishedintheProceedingsofasymposiumheldinBudapestonNuclearPowerPlantLifeManagementbytheIAEA,4-8November2002,seehttp://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/csp_021c/pdf/contents.pdf;andT.Noda,K.Tajima,etal.,“CurrentApproachesToNuclearPowerPlantLifeManagementInJapan”,NuclearAndIndustrialSafetyAgency(NISA),METI,JapanNuclearPowerPlantLifeEngineeringCenter(PLEC),JapanPowerEngineeringAndInspectionCorporation(JAPEIC),Japan,2002,seehttp://wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/csp_021c/PDF/contents.pdf,accessed19May2016.


Dainireactorslocated12kmsouthoftheFukushimaDaiichisite.However,giventhedevastationoftheaccidenttoFukushimaPrefecture,andresultantoppositiontoTEPCOandnuclearpowerinthatPrefectureandwiderJapan,thereisnoprospectthatthesereactorswillrestart.627WNISRhastakenthemoffthelistofoperatingreactorsinthefirsteditionfollowing3/11.

ThedecisiontopermanentlyshutdownIkata-1,mirrorsthedecision-makingofotherutilitiesinhaving to assess the financial implications of retrofitting the reactor tomeet post-Fukushimasafety standards, which, in the case of Ikata, Shikoku Electric estimated at ¥200 billion($1.77billion).628Theconclusionreachedwasthatwitharelativelysmalloutputcapacityanduptofouryearsrequiredtocompletethework,theremainingoperationallifeofthereactorwouldnotgeneratesufficientincometojustifytheinvestment.ThedecisionreversesShikoku’searlierpositionofplanningfortherestartofIkata-1.

Thesixreactorstobedecommissionedhadatotalinstalledgeneratingcapacityof2.7GW,equalto5.6percentofJapan’snuclearcapacityasofMarch2011.TogetherwiththetenFukushima,thetotalrisesto16nuclearreactorsand,attheveryleast,11.4GWor24percentofinstallednuclearcapacitypriorto3/11thathasbeenremovedfromoperations.

ThelikelyfuturenucleargeneratingcapacityofJapan,andinparticulartheoperationofreactorsbeyond40years,willinpartbedeterminedduring2016withdecisionsmadebyKansaiElectriconreactorsTakahama-1and2andMihama-3.The780MWPWRMihama-3is40yearsold,whileTakahamaunits1and2are42and41yearsoldrespectively.On14November2014,theNRAhadgrantedaten-yearlifeextensionforTakahama-1,andon8April2015forTakahama-2.629Undertherevisedlawonnuclearpowerplantregulations,thetimelimitforrunninganuclearreactoris40years.This canbeextendedonlyonce,byup to20years, if certainconditionsaremet.On30 April 2015, Kansai Electric applied for a 20-year life extension for the two Takahamareactors,630whichwasgrantedon20June2016631.

NRArequirementsset7July2016asadeadlineforapprovaloflifeextensionfortheTakahamaunits, and November 2016 for Mihama. The NRA on 24 February 2016 announced that theTakahamaunitswerecompatiblewiththe2013safetyguidelines;632andon20June2016, theNRA,and for the first time,approved the20-yearextension for the twoTakahamareactorsas

627MitsuruObe,“TepcoMayScrapSecondNuclearPlant”,WSJ,4July2012,seehttp://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304141204577506531300365556,accessed17June2015.628WNISR,“PermanentClosureofJapaneseReactorIkata-1”,26March2016,seehttp://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Permanent-Closure-of-Japanese-Reactor-Ikata-1.html,accessed17June2016.629JapanTimes,“Kepcoasksforpermissiontorun40-year-oldreactorsfor20moreyears”,1May2015,seehttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/01/national/kepco-applies-extend-operating-life-two-aging-reactors-fukui-20-years/#.VWthYyiaH6h,accessed18June2016.630Ibidem.631WNN,“Takahamaunitsclearedforextendedoperation”,20June2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Takahama-units-cleared-for-extended-operation-2006165.html,accessed2July2016.632JAIF,“NRAApprovesTakahama-1and-2NPPsasCompatiblewithNewRegulatoryStandards”,25February2016,seehttp://www.jaif.or.jp/en/nra-approves-takahama-1-and-2-npps-as-compatible-with-new-regulatory-standards/,accessed7July2016.


meeting the new regulatory guidelines.633 On 14 April 2016 citizens filed an administrativelawsuit in Nagoya District Court, against the NRA approval of extending operation of theTakahama reactors.634 Kansai Electric does not expect the two Takahama units to resumeoperations beforeNovember 2019, at the earliest, because extensive retrofitswill need to beimplementedbeforerestartingthem.

KansaiElectricalreadyoptedtodecommissiontheMihama-1and-2reactorsin2015,andtherearedoubtsthatitwillproceedwithplanstooperateMihama-3.InMarch2016,KansaiElectricdisclosedthatthecurrentestimateforretrofitofMihama-3tobringitintocompliancewithNRAregulations is ¥270 billion (US$2.4 billion).635 A significant part of this cost relates to seismicresistancemeasuresrequiredtomeetthehigherDesignBasisGroundMotion.WhiletheNRAisexpectedtoapproveMihama-3asincompliancewiththerevisedguidelines,itremainsunclearwhether Kansai Electricwillmeet the 30November 2016 deadline for approval of a 20-yearextension,whichrequiresassessingtheagingplant.AswiththedecisiontoshutdowntheIkata-1reactor,thereiseverylikelihoodthatKansaiElectricwilldeterminethatitmakesnoeconomicsensetoattemptarestartofMihama-3giventheinvestmentcostsrequired.

Restart Prospects Asof1July2016,36commercialreactorsinJapanremaininLongTermOutage,with19reactorsunderreviewforrestartbytheNRA.RestartoftheIkata-3reactorisplannedforsummer2016,followingcompletionofNRApre-operatinginspections.ThatwillbringtothreethenumberofoperatingreactorsinJapan.WhetherornottheTakahama-3and4reactorsarerestartedbeforetheendof2016isdependentupontheappealproceedingsinitiatedbyKansaiElectricagainsttheOtsucourtruling.ThenextinlineforpossiblerestartaretheGenkai-3and4reactorsownedbyKyushuElectric,andTomari-3ownedbyHokkaidoElectricPowerCompany.Itisunlikelythatanyof these will resume operation before 2017, and failure to overturn the legal decision onTakahama-3and4,willmeanasfewasthreereactorswillbeoperatingbyDecember2016.

At the same time, pressure to resumeoperations to generate electricity and income is clearlymounting.Despitethesetbacks,theAbegovernmentremainscommittedtotheearliestpossiblerestartofreactors.However,outsidetheNRAprocess,thereareimportantexternalfactorsthatwillcontinuetodeterminehowmanynuclearreactorswilleventuallyresumeoperations.Theseinclude:

• Continuationofcitizen-ledlawsuits,includinginjunctionsagainstrestart;

• Economicfactors,includingacost-benefitanalysisbytheutilitiesontheimplicationsofrestartordecommissioning;

633JAIF,“NRAApprovesExtensionsofOperatingPeriodsto60YearsforTakahama-1and-2,theFirstforAgingReactors”,22June2016,seehttp://www.jaif.or.jp/en/nra-approves-extensions-of-operating-periods-to-60-years-for-takahama-1-and-2-the-first-for-aging-reactors/,accessed24June2016.634JAIF,“Anti-nuclearGroupsSueinNagoyaDistrictCourttoBlockExtendedLifetimeforTakahamaUnits1&2”,18April2016,seehttp://www.jaif.or.jp/en/nuclear-opponents-sue-in-nagoya-district-court-to-block-extended-lifetime-for-takahama-units-12/,accessed20May2016.635NikkeiOnline,“KEPCO:NuclearRestartPlansUpset,MihamaNo.3ClosureaPossibility”,19March2016,(inJapanese),seehttp://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLZO98651920Y6A310C1TI1000/,accessed20May2016.


• Localpoliticalandpublicopposition;

• Impactofelectricityderegulationandintensifiedmarketcompetition.

Atthesametime,however,Japaneseutilitiesareinsistingon,andthegovernmenthasgrantedandreinforced,therighttorefusecheaperrenewablepower,supposedlyduetoconcernsaboutgridstability—hardlyplausible inviewoftheir farsmallerrenewablefractionsthaninseveralEuropean countries—but apparently to suppress competition. The utilities also continuestrenuous efforts to ensure that the imminent liberalizationof themonopoly-based, verticallyintegrated Japanese power system should not actually expose utilities’ legacy plants to realcompetition.TheabilityofexistingJapanesenuclearplants,ifrestarted,tooperatecompetitivelyagainstmodernrenewables(asmanyintheU.S.andEuropecannolongerdo)isunclearbecausenuclearoperatingcostsarenottransparent.However,theutilities’almostcompletesuppressionofJapanesewindpowersuggeststheyareconcernedonthisscore.Andasrenewablescontinueto become cheaper and more ubiquitous, customers will be increasingly tempted by Japan’sextremelyhighelectricitypricestomakeandstoretheirownelectricityandtodropoffthegridaltogether,asisalreadyhappening,forexample,inHawaiiandAustralia.

Ofthe19reactorscurrentlywithapplicationsoutstandingbeforetheNRA,notallwillrestart,withmanyquestionsanddisagreementsoverseismicissues(includingactivefaultstatus),andmanyplantsfarbackinthereviewandscreeningqueue.Atthepresentrateofreview,restartof3-4reactorseachyearfrom2016onwardsremainsapossibilitybutalsoachallenge,withthemajoruncertaintythatevenrestartedreactorswillbeshutdownthroughthecourts.

New-build Projects Thesituationofnew-buildprojectsisanotherillustrationoftheleveluncertaintysurroundingthefutureofnuclearpowerinJapan.Afterthe3/11events,JapanhaltedworkattwoABWRunits,Shimane-3andOhma,whichhadbeenunderconstructionsince2007and2010respectively.InSeptember2012,METIapprovedtherestartofconstructioninShimane-3andOhma-1plants,buttherewas little sign of any resumptionofwork.Officially, construction “partially resumed” atOhma inOctober2012636 andShimane-3has remained “under construction”, according to theJapan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF)637 and IAEA statistics. In the case of Shimane-3, it was94percentcompletebyMarch2011638.Sincethen,ChugokuElectric,theplantowner,completeda15m-highseawallaroundShimane-3inJanuary2012,andthenextendedtheseawalltoalengthof 1.5km.639 The utility began work to install filtered vents during 2014-2015, and othermodifications “pursuant to the new regulatory requirements”.640 No startup date has been

636J-Power,“2014AnnualReport”,August2014,seehttp://www.jpower.co.jp/english/ir/pdf/2014.pdf,accessed11June2015.637JAIF,“NuclearPowerPlantsinJapan”,22May2013.638Sang-BaikKim,Jan-HorstKeppler,“CaseStudiesOnProjectAndLogisticsManagementInNuclearNewBuiltTheABWRProjectatShimane-3”,NEAOECD,NuclearDevelopmentDivision,aspresentedattheOECDNEAWorkshoponProjectandLogisticsManagement,Paris(France),11March2014,seehttp://docplayer.net/13785016-The-abwr-project-at-shimane-3-japan.html,accessed2July2016.639NEI,“New-buildnow.Part2:Asia”,9July2014,seehttp://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurenew-build-now-part-2-asia-4313945/,accessed2July2016.640ChugokuElectricPowerCompany,“AnnualReport2015—Yearended31March2015”,seehttp://www.energia.co.jp/e/ir/report/pdf/ar15/ar15.pdf,accessed2July2016.


declared for the reactor and while the utility is drawing up an application to the NRA forpermissionforchangeinreactorinstallationlicense,asof1July2016,noapplicationhadbeensubmitted.

InthecaseofOhma,whichwas40percentcompletebyMarch2011,theplantowner,theElectricPowerDevelopmentCompany (EPDC), alsoknownas J-Power,declared that reinforced safetymeasuresaretobeimplementedthattakeintoaccountthelessonslearnedfromtheFukushimaaccident, which include tsunami countermeasures, ensuring power supplies, ensuring heatremoval functions,andsevereaccident responses.Theconstructionworks for thesemeasureswasscheduledtobegininNovember2015andtobecompletedinDecember2020.641Thebudgetforconstructionof theadditionalsafety features issome JPY130billion($1.1billion). J-PowerappliedtotheNRAon16December2014forreviewoftheOhmareactor.642Ohmaisplannedtooperatewitha100percentplutoniumMOXcore.643Prospectsforcompletionofconstructionandoperationaredirectlylinkedtoongoinglawsuits,onebylocalcitizensandanotherfromthecityofHakodate,bothofwhichareseekingcancellationoftheproject.HakodateischallengingboththecentralgovernmentandJ-PowerinthefirstsuchlawsuitinJapan.644

Although there remainmajorobstacles forboth reactors,with littlepublic informationon theexactstatusandadvancementofconstruction,eventhoughnoplannedgridconnectiondatehasbeencommunicated,consideringthatsomeconstructionworkisreportedlyongoing,forthetimebeing,WNISRreintegratesShimane-3andOhmainitslistingofreactorsunderconstruction.

Pakistan operates three reactors (two Pressurized Water Reactors from China and onePressurizedHeavyWaterReactorfromCanada)thathaveanetcapacityof690MWandprovided4.3TWhin2015,downfrom4.58TWhin2014;645nuclearpowercontributed4.4percentofthecountry’selectricityin2015,0.9percentbelowthehistoricmaximumof5.3percentin2012.

InthecityofKarachi,constructionofthefirstoftworeactorunitspurchasedfromChinastartedinAugust2015,withPrimeMinisterNawazSharifpresidingovertheevent.646Reportedly,thisislikely to beChina’s first export ofHualong reactordesign.647Therehas beenwidespread civil

641WNN,“CompletionofOhma1expectedin2020”,14November2014,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Completion-of-Ohma-1-expected-in-2020-1411144.html,accessed2July2016.642JAIF,“EPDCSubmitsApplicationforCompatibilityReviewforOhmaNPP”,18December2014,seehttp://www.jaif.or.jp/en/epdc-submits-application-for-compatibility-review-for-ohma-npp/,accessed2July2016.643ShaunBurnie,FrankBarnaby,etal.,“NuclearProliferationinPlainSight:Japan’sPlutoniumFuelCycle–ATechnicalandEconomicFailureButaStrategicSuccess”,TheAsia-PacificJournal,Volume14,Issue5,Number2,1March2016,seehttp://apjjf.org/2016/05/Burnie.html,accessed2July2016.644TheJapanTimes,“Hakodate'sValidNuclearConcern”,Editorial,9April2014,seehttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/04/09/editorials/hakodates-valid-nuclear-concern/accessed2July2016.645IAEA,“NuclearPowerReactorsintheWorld—2016Edition”,seewww-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/RDS_2-36_web.pdf,accessed17June2016.646ImtiazAli,ShahidGhazali,“PMNawazinauguratesK-2powerplantatKanupp”,Dawn,Updated21August2015,seehttp://www.dawn.com/news/1201662,accessed18June2016.647WNN,“HualongOneJointVentureOfficiallyLaunched”,17March2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Hualong-One-joint-venture-officially-launched-1703164.html,accessed18June2016.


societyoppositiontotheconstructionofthesereactorsnexttothecrowdedcityofKarachi,withtheenvironmentalimpactassessmentbeingaparticulartargetofcriticism.648

PakistanhasbeenseekingpermissionfromtheNuclearSuppliersGroup(NSG)toimportnucleartechnology,justasIndiahasbeenpermittedsince2008,buthassofarnotsucceeded.Inthiseffort,ithasbeenaidedbyChina,whichhaspusheda“criteria-basedapproach”tomembershiptotheNSGasawayofallowingPakistanalsotobeconsideredforthesame.649ThisisbeingconsideredbydiplomatsattheNSG,butitisnotlikelytobeadoptedsoon.Pakistanalsocontinuestoproducehighlyenricheduraniumandplutoniumfornuclearweapons.650

OntheKoreanPeninsula,theSouthKorea(RepublicofKorea)operates25reactors,onemore thanbymid-2015.Nuclearpowerprovideda record157.23TWhor31.7percentof thecountry’selectricitysharein2015,upfrom30.4percentin2014,anddownfromamaximumof53.3percentin1987.Threeadditionalreactorsareunderconstruction.

In2014,fivereactorswerelistedasunderconstruction,ofwhichthreewerescheduledforstartupthat year, but none achieved it. Shin-Wolsong-2 was finally connected to the grid inFebruary2015.ConstructionbeganonShin-Wolsong-2in2008andwascompletedin2013,butplanned operation was suspended following disclosure of falsified quality-control certificates(seebelow).651InafirstforthenuclearprogramofSouthKorea,on12June2015,theMinistryofTrade,IndustryandEnergyannouncedthatitwouldrequesttheclosureoftheKoriunit1reactorby18June2017,whenthereactorwillbe40yearsold.652Fourdayslatertheplantoperator,KoreaHydro and Nuclear Power Co (KHNP) part of the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO)group,announceditwouldnotapplyforalifeextensionandthereactorwouldbeshutdown.653Thereactorhasbeenatthecenterofcivicresistancetoitscontinuedoperation,includingfromthenearbycityofBusan,andisscheduledtoendoperationsinJune2017.654

Lessthanamonthafter3/11,theKEPCOpresentedplanstodoubleinstallednuclearcapacitytonearly 43GWby2030 andbring the nuclear share in the power generation to 59percent.655

648TheNewsInternational,Pakistan,“AnuclearKarachi?”,25August2015,seehttp://www.thenews.com.pk/print/58443-a-nuclear-karachi,accessed18June2016.649RakeshSharma,StephanieCooke,“NSGWeighsCriteria-BasedApproachforMembership”,NIW,2016.650IPFM,“GlobalFissileMaterialReport2015—NuclearWeaponandFissileMaterialStockpilesandproduction”,PrincetonUniversity,December2015,seefissilematerials.org/library/gfmr15.pdf,accessed18June2016.651WNISR,“SouthKorea:Shin-Wolsong-2GridConnected/Wolsong-1LifetimeExtension”,1March2015,seehttp://www.worldnuclearreport.org/South-Korea-Shin-Wolsong-2-Grid.html,accessed18June2016.652KoreaHerald,“SouthKoreatoshutdownoldestnukereactor:Kori-1willbecomethenation’s1stnuclearreactortopermanentlyclosedown”,Updated13June2015,seehttp://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150612000846,accessed18June2016.653Yonhap,“S.Koreatoshutdownoldestreactorin2017”,16June2015,seehttp://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2015/06/16/0501000000AEN20150616008100320.html,accessed18June2016.654NSSC,“TheNSSCLaunchedSafetyExaminationinPreparationofPermanentShutdownofKoriUnit1”,24June2016,seehttp://www.nssc.go.kr/nssc/english/release/list.jsp?mode=view&article_no=36875&pager.offset=0&board_no=501,accessed4July2016.655KiHakKim,“FuelingtheSustainableFuture”,6April2011.


However, observers saw a “dramatic political shift against nuclear power in the year sinceFukushima”.656In2012,forexample,ParkWonSoon,MayorofSeoul,initiatedaprogramentitled“OneLessNuclearPowerPlant”withtheofficialtargetbytheendof2014to“saveaway”throughenergyefficiencyandrenewableenergyroll-outtheequivalentamountofenergygeneratedbyanuclearreactor.Thetargetwasachievedsixmonthsearlyand“Phase2”ofthePlanstipulatesthesaving/substitutionoftheequivalentofanothertworeactorsby2020.Afterhisoverwhelmingre-electioninJune2014,MayorParkisalsoaprimecandidateforthenextpresidentialelectionin2018. In2013, the SeoulMetropolitanGovernment appointed a high-level Seoul InternationalEnergyAdvisoryCouncil(SIEAC),comprisingleadinginternationalenergyexperts,toassistinthedesignofinnovativecleanenergypolicy.657

Inthepastthreeyears,theKoreannuclearindustryhasmovedtorecoverfrommajorequipmentfalsificationscandalsandresultantforcedshutdownofmultiplereactorunits.658ThedisclosuresbeginninginDecember2012andsubsequentinvestigationsbytheNuclearSafetyandSecurityCommission(NSSC),togetherwiththeimpactoftheFukushimaDaiichiaccident,severelyerodedpublicsupportfornuclearpower.Theten-year-longfalsificationofthousandsofqualitycontrolcertificates for equipment installed in KHNP reactors widened in May 2013, when the NSSC,followinginformationfromananonymouswhistleblower,confirmedthattestreportshadbeenforgedandthatthetestinfactfailedunderLoss-Of-Coolant-Accident(LOCA)conditions.TheNSSCinvestigationfoundthatsafety-relatedcontrol-commandcablingwithforgeddocumentationhadbeen installed at four of KHNP’s reactors: Shin-Kori units 1 and 2 and Shin-Wolsongunits1and2.659InMay2013,thefourreactorswereorderedtobeshutdownasaresultofthefalsificationand,accordingtotheNSCC,theirfailuretopasstheLOCAtest.660Shin-Wolsong-2wasauthorizedforrestarton25June2013,661whiletheotherthreeremainedshutdownformostof2013 (reflecting the reduced electricity share) and were approved for restart in earlyJanuary2014.662Shin-Kori-3and-4,aswellasShin-Wolsong-2,thenallunderconstruction,alsohad falsified quality-control documents and needed to replace the affected cables.663 InOctober2013, thegovernment confirmed that100people, includinga top former stateutilityofficial,hadbeenindictedoncorruptionchargesinrelationtothefalsificationscandal.Relativelylightpenaltiesforfalsifyingnuclearsafetydocumentsorforcorruptrevolving-doorhiringwere

656NIW,“SouthKorea:GrowingNuclearSkepticism”,23March2012.657ForalistofSIEACMembersandbackgroundseehttp://www.ieac.info/Seoul-International-Energy-Advisory-Council,accessed18June2016.SIEACiscoordinatedbyMycleSchneider.658KINS,“CFSI(Counterfeit,Fraudulent,SuspectItem)Investigation”,KoreanInstituteofNuclearSafety,seehttp://www.kins.re.kr/en/ourwork/cfsi.jsp,accessed18June2016.659WNN,“ReactorrestartallaysKoreanpowerconcerns”,10June2013,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Reactor_restart_allays_Korean_power_concerns-1006134.html,accessed18June2016.660NSCC,“NSSCApprovedTheResumptionofShinkoriUnit1.2andShinwolsongUnit1”,2January2014.661WNN,“AnotherKoreanreactorclearedforrestart”,WNA,27June2013,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Another_Korean_reactor_cleared_for_restart-2706135.html,accessed18June2016.662Reuters,“SouthKoreacutsfuturerelianceonnuclearpower,butnewplantslikely”,13January2014,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/14/us-nuclear-korea-idUSBREA0D06G20140114,accessed18June2016.663NSSC,“NSSCConfirmsFakeTestReportsofSafety-ClassControlCables”,29May2013.


strengthenedfrom1July2015—thoughwithasix-monthphase-inperiod,whenfirstoffenderswillgetjustawarning.664

On15January2016,theShinKori-3,locatedatGoriinthecitydistrictofBusaninthesoutheastoftheRepublicofKorea,wasconnectedtothegrid,twoyearslaterthanplanned.665TheKHNPownedreactor is the firstAPR1400(AdvancedPressurizedReactor)designtobeginoperationandthenation's25thcommercialreactor.KHNPappliedforanoperationallicenseforShinKori-3in2011,withconstructioncompletedin2013.However,theplantwascaughtupinthesafetyscandalsatthattime.InApril2015,theNSSCpostponedadecisionongrantingalicense,followingnotificationbyGeneralElectricthatitwouldrecallvalvecomponentsinstalledinShinKori-3and-4.NSSCfoundthatninevalveswereinstalledinbothShinKori-3and-4,whichdidnotcomplywith the technical specifications.Theoperational licensewasonlygrantedby theNSSCon29October2015.ShinKori-4isplannedforoperationin2017.On23June2016,theNSSCapprovedbymajoritytheconstructionpermitsfortheAP1400reactorsShinkori-5and-6.666Constructionisscheduledtocommenceforunit5inSeptember2016andoneyearlaterforunit6.Operationisplannedfor2021and2022respectively.

On27February2015,theNSSCvotedinfavorofplantlifeextensionforthe32-year-oldWolsung-1pressurizedheavywaterreactor.667Twooftheninecommissionersabstainedfromvoting.Intwo previous meetings, the NSSC had failed to reach agreement on granting approval. TheoperatoroftheCANDU-6reactor,KHNP,replacedallpressuretubesandcalandriatubesduringextended shutdown between 2009 and 2011. The reactor has been shut down sinceNovember2012whenitsoperatinglicenseexpired.TheKoreaInstituteofNuclearSafety(KINS)concludedinOctober2014thatthereactorcouldoperateuntil2022,andthatitcompliedwiththe revised Nuclear Safety Act, including against major natural disasters. KHNP has invested560billionwon(US$59million)inupgrades.668ThereactorrestartedinJune2015.

OperationofWolsung-1hasbeenamajorcontroversyoverrecentyears,inparticularfollowingtheFukushimaDaiichiaccident,withuncertaintyastowhetheritwouldhaveitslicenseextended.Overthe30yearssincethereactorstartedoperatingin1983,thenuclearplantwasshutdown39times due to malfunctions.669 The main political opposition party New Politics Alliance forDemocracy(NPAD)statedthedecisionwasunacceptableintermsofpublicsafety,withpollinginGyeongjushowing60percentofthosesurveyedwantedthereactorpermanentlyclosed.670

664NIW,“SouthKorea”,3July2015.665WNISR,“ShinKori-3ConnectedtotheSouthKoreanGrid”,20January2016,seehttp://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Shin-Kori-3-Connected-to-the-South-Korean-Grid.html,accessed10July2016.666NSSC,“The57thMeetingGrantsConstructionPermitforShinkoriUnits5and6,23June2016”,seehttp://www.nssc.go.kr/nssc/english/release/list.jsp?mode=view&article_no=36864,accessed1July2016.667NSSC,“TheCommissionersDecidedtoApproveContinuedOperationofWolsongUnit1inthe35thMeeting”,27February2015,seehttp://www.nssc.go.kr/nssc/english/release/list.jsp?mode=view&article_no=17977&pager.offset=10&board_no=501,accessed18June2016.668KoreaHerald,“Restartofagingnuclearreactorsparkscontroversy”,27February2015,seehttp://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150227000740,accessed4June2015.669Ibidem.670YonhapNewAgency,“(3rdLD)Nuclearwatchdogextendsoperationof32-year-oldreactor”,27February2015,see


Despitethegovernment’scommitmenttocontinuingnuclearpowergrowth,publicandpoliticaloppositionhascontinuedtochallengenuclearoperations.Forexample,allpoliticalcandidatesintheJune2014electionsinBusan,theclosestmajorcitytotheKorinuclearplant,calledfortheclosureofunit1,whichhasbeenplaguedwithsafetyissues,andwhoselicenseexpiresin2017.671Theoperatinglicenseofunit2expiresin2023.672TheKoriplantremainscontroversial.

The political consequences of the multiple scandals surrounding the nuclear sector led to agovernment-appointedstudygroup’s recommending inOctober2013a reduction inprojectednuclearelectricityshareto22–29percentby2035.673Theheadofthestudygroupreportedthat“the implementationofenergypolicydoesn’t just involve thegovernmentnow, it’sbecomeanincreasinglyimportantandextremelysensitiveissueforeachandeverycitizen.Oursuggestionistosetthedirectioninthepolicyforsocialconsent,astherearehugesocialconflicts.”674

Intheend,thegovernment’sdraftenergypaperreleasedinDecember2013optedforthehigher29percentoptionby2035,belowboththe30percentachievedin2012andthe41percentlong-termgoalsetinthepreviouslong-termplanof2008.675InJuly2015thegovernment’sreleasedSeventhBasicLong-termPowerDevelopmentPlanofelectricitysupplyanddemandcoveringtheperiodof2015to2029,withanucleargenerationtargetof28.5percent—basedontheoperationoftennuclearreactors.676Thenuclearplansarepremisedonanannualelectricitydemandgrowthof2.2percentthrough2029,whendemandincreased0.5percentin2014.TheGovernmentplanfornuclearexpansionwascriticizedbybothcivilsocietygroupsandpoliticaloppositionparties.ThedefeatoftherulingSaenuripartyinparliamentaryelectionsinApril2015,677andpresidentialelections in 2017, there is a prospect that implementation of the energywill prove less thanstraightforward.

Afterfiveyearsofnegotiation,inApril2015,itwasannouncedthattheUnitedStatesandSouthKoreahad reached a provisional agreement for the extensionof peaceful nuclear cooperation

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2015/02/27/52/0302000000AEN20150227000453315F.html,accessed18June2016.671ShanghaiDaily,“S.Koreanactivistswarnofnucleardisasterfromoldestreactor”,2June2014,seehttp://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=221967,accessed18June2016.672Hankyoreh,“SmokeatKorireactorthelatestcaseofdangeratanuclearplant”,30May2015,seehttp://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/693529.html,accessed18June2016.673BloombergNewsandReuters,“SouthKoreapourscoldwateronnuclearfuel”,13October2013,seehttp://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/south-korea-pours-cold-water-on-nuclear-fuel,accessed18June2016.674Ibidem.675Reuters,“SouthKoreacutsfuturerelianceonnuclearpower,butnewplantslikely”,13January2014,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/14/us-nuclear-korea-idUSBREA0D06G20140114,accessed5June2015.676KoreaHerald,“Koreatobuildtwonewnuclearreactorsby2029”,8June2015,seehttp://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150608000946,accessed1July2016.677Yonhap,“(6thLD)Rulingpartyfailstowinparliamentarymajority”,14April2016,seehttp://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/04/13/2/0301000000AEN20160413005457315F.html,accessed1July2016.


betweenthetwonations.678Thenewpact,signedon25June2015,679calledthe“123Agreement”after Section 123 of theU.S. Atomic Energy Act (AEA), replaces the existing 1974 agreement,whichwasduetoexpirein2014,butwasextended,whilenegotiationscontinued.MajorobstaclestoreachingagreementrelatedtoSouthKoreaneffortstosecuretherighttodeveloptheentirefuelchain,inparticularuraniumenrichmentandspentfuelreprocessing,bothexcludedfromtheprevious agreement. The agreement, does not include the right of South Korea to indigenousdevelopmentofenrichmentorreprocessing,however,inamajorconcession,itdoesgivetherighttoexport spent fuel for reprocessing, and specifically toFrance,underadvanceprogrammaticapproval.680ThereturnofplutoniumMixedOxideFuel (MOX)wouldrequirecasebycaseU.S.approval.681Suchaconcessionbringstheagreementbetweenthetwonationsontoalevelwiththe U.S. agreement with Japan prior to 1988. The new agreement, entered into force on25November2015.682

Taiwan operates three twin units at Chinshan (also spelled Jinshan), Kuosheng andMaanshan,allownedbyTaipower, thestate-ownedutilitymonopoly.Only fiveof thereactorswere connected to the grid in 2015 and generated 35.1 TWh, providing 16.3 percent of thecountry’selectricity(comparedwithitsmaximumshareof41percentin1988).

TheChinshan-1reactorfailedtooperateduringtheentireyear2015,andhasthereforeenteredtheWNISRcategoryofLTO.Originallyshutdownforrefuelingon10December2014,inspectionsofChinshan-1revealedabreakinaconnectingboltinanAREVA-madeAtrium-10fuelassembly.AsafetyevaluationreportconductedbyTaipowerandAREVAwaspostedinJune2015bytheAtomicEnergyCouncil(AEC),whichapprovedthereactorforrestart,butlawmakersrequiredtheissuetobeaddressedbythenationalparliamentpriortorestart.683Asof1 July2016,theunitremainsoffline.

TwoGeneral Electric 1300MWAdvancedBoilingWater Reactors (ABWR) had been listed as“under construction” at Lungmen, near Taipei, since 1998 and 1999 respectively. Theirconstructionhadbeendelayedmultipletimes.AccordingtotheAtomicEnergyCouncil,asofthe

678WSJ,“U.S.,SouthKoreaReachRevisedNuclearDealTheagreementstopsshortofallowingSeoultoenrichuraniumorreprocessspentnuclearfuel”,22April2015,seehttp://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-south-korea-reach-revised-nuclear-deal-1429705290,accessed4June2015.679KoreaHerald,“S.Korea,U.S.formallysigncivilnuclearenergycooperationpact”,16June2015,seehttp://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/06/116_180943.html,accessed30June2015680MarkFitzpatrick,“SouthKoreanuclearcooperationdealnotassimpleas123”,InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies(IISS),23April2015,seehttps://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2015-932e/april-ea11/south-korea-nuclear-cooperation-deal-not-as-simple-as-123-a371,accessed7July2016.681InternationalPanelonFissileMaterials(IPFM),“UnitedStatesgrantsadvanceconsentsrightstoKoreaforoverseasreprocessing”,25June2015,seehttp://fissilematerials.org/blog/2015/06/united_states_grants_adva.html,accessed9July2015.682PaulK.Kerr,MaryBethD.Nikitin,“NuclearCooperationwithOtherCountries:APrimer”,CongressionalResearchService,3December2015seehttps://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS22937.pdf,accessed1July2016.683NW,“Chinshan-1mightnotrestartuntilafterSeptember:lawmakers”,2July2015.


endofMarch2014,unit1ofLungmenconstructionwas97.7percentcomplete,684whileunit2was91percent complete. Theplant is estimated to have costUS$9–9.9 billion so far.685Aftermultipledelays, rising costs, and large-scalepublic andpolitical opposition, on28April 2014,Premier Jiang Yi-huah announced that Lungmen-1will bemothballed after the completion ofsafetychecks,whileworkonunit2atthesitewastostop.Withtheofficialfreezeofconstruction,WNISRtooktheunitsoffthelistingin2014.

As a result of failure to negotiate payment for work completed on the Lungmen plant, inDecember2015TaipowerannouncedthatGeneralElectric(GE)hadfiledforarbitrationwiththeHongKongbranchoftheInternationalChamberofCommerce(ICC)CourtofArbitration.686Nofinancialdetailshavebeendisclosed.

ThePresidentialelectionvictoryofTsaiIng-wenon12March2016couldbedecisiveinleadingTaiwan to phase out nuclear power. The victory of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)candidate, over the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), was in part linked to the former'senvironmental agenda including a commitment to end nuclear power, which, alwayscontroversialinTaiwan,hasledtomasscitizenprotestssincetheFukushimaaccident.TheDPPis committed to phasing out nuclear power by 2025 through four policy directions: haltingconstructionofthetworeactorsatLungmen;noplantlifeextensionforChinshan,KuoshengandMaanshanreactorunits—alloperatinglicensesofTaiwan'sexistingsixnuclearreactorsareduetoexpirebetween2018and2025, as they reach their fortyyear lifetimes; increased focusonnuclear safety and a requirement by Taipower to prepare a decommissioning plan; anddeterminationofanuclearwastepolicy,inparticularforspent-fuelmanagement.InthelasttwoyearstheDPPhadcommittedtobreakingupTaipower’smonopoly,puttingpriorityonrenewableenergies and establishing regional power grid companies, fostering community-based powercompaniesandallowing independentpowerproducersandrenewableenergysupplierstosellpowerdirectlytoindividualconsumersandnotonlytolarge-scaleindustrialorcommercialusers.

The nuclear policy is to be detailed during summer 2016, following the appointment on20May2016ofthenewPresident.InitialstatementsbythenewlyappointedEconomicsMinisterLeeShih-guangareclear:“Thereisnoroomfordiscussion.When2025comes,nuclearpowerwillbeabandoned.”687Onedaylater,itwasreportedthatTaipowerconsidersrestartingChinshan-1and operating Chinshan reactors only during four summer months in 2016 and extend itsoperational life, which is threatened by acute shortage of spent fuel storage capacity.688 On5June2016,PremierLinChuanstatedthatthereactorsshutdowndatewouldnotbeextended

684PlanningDepartment,“StatusandChallengesofNuclearPowerinTaiwan”,AtomicEnergyCouncil,April2014,seehttp://www.aec.gov.tw/english/whatsnew/files/20140506-5.pdf,accessed22May2016.685WNN,“PoliticaldiscordplacesLungmenonhold”,28April2014,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Political-discord-places-Lungmen-on-hold-2804144.html,accessed22May2016.686TaipeiTimes,“GEfilesforarbitrationinnuclearpaymentdispute”,12December2015,seehttp://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/12/12/2003634631,accessed2July2016.687ChinaPost,“Gov'ttoendnuclearpowerin2025:MOEA”,26May2016,seehttp://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2016/05/26/467321/Govt-to.htm,accessed2July2016.688FocusTaiwan,“Economicsministerreaffirmsgoalofnuclear-freeTaiwanby2025”,27May2016,seehttp://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201605270025.aspx,accessed2July2016.


beyondDecember2018,689and the followingday,EconomicsMinisterLeeChih-kungsaid thatrestartingthefirstreactorofTaiwan'sfirstnuclearpowerplantwouldonlybealastresorttodealwithpotentialpowershortages690.EnvironmentalgroupshavelaunchedacourtcaseagainstthepotentialrestartofChinshan-1,callingitthe“mostdangerousreactorintheworld”.691

European Union (EU28) and Switzerland

AsshowninFigure44theEuropeanUnion28memberstates(EU28)havegonethroughthreenuclearconstructionwaves—twosmallonesinthe1960sandthe1970sandalargeroneinthe1980s(mainlyinFrance).

Figure44:NuclearReactorsStartupsandShutdownsintheEU28,1956–2016

Sources:IAEA-PRIS,MSC,July2016

Theregionhasnothadanysignificantbuildingactivitysincethe1990s.Onlytworeactorswereconnected to the EU-grid since 2000. Two reactors were closed in 2015, Grafenrheinfeld inGermanyandWylfa-1intheUnitedKingdom.Doel-1inBelgiumwasshutdowninFebruary2015,

689FocusTaiwan,Premierconsidersreactivatinglong-closednuclearreactor,5June2016,seehttp://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201606050006.aspx,accessed2July2016.690FocusTaiwan,“Restartofreactoralastresort:economicsminister”,6June2016,seehttp://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201606060019.aspx,accessed2July2016.691TaipeiTimes,“ActivistsfilesuitoverJinshanreactor”,31May2016,seehttp://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/05/31/2003647555,accessed2July2016.

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after its licensehadexpired,but in June2015, theBelgianParliamentvoteda10-year lifetimeextensionandthereactorwasrestartedon30December2015.692

Figure45:NuclearReactorsandNetOperatingCapacityintheEU28,1956–2016


Figure46:AgePyramidofthe127NuclearReactorsOperatedintheEU28


692On18June2015,theBelgianParliamentvotedlegislationtoextendthelifetimeofDoel-1and-2bytenyears.AstheDoel-2licensehadnotyetexpired,itsoperationwasnotinterrupted.SeealsosectiononBelgiuminAnnex1.

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InJuly2016,the28countriesintheenlargedEUoperated127reactors—aboutone-thirdoftheworldtotal—16fewerthanbeforetheFukushimaeventsand50lessthanthehistoricmaximumof177unitsin1989(seeFigure45).Onereactor,Ringhals-2inSwedenenteredtheLTOcategory,asithasnotbeengeneratingpowersince2014.

Thevastmajorityoftheoperatingfacilities,108unitsorover80percent,arelocatedineightofthewesterncountries,andonly19areinthesixnewermemberstateswithnuclearpower.

Intheabsenceofanysuccessfulnew-buildprogram,theaverageageofnuclearpowerplantsisincreasing continuously in the EU and at mid-2016 stands at 31.4 years (see Figure 46 andFigure47).Theagedistributionshowsthatnow59percent—75of127—oftheEU’soperatingnuclearreactorshavebeeninoperationforover30years.

Figure47:AgeDistributionoftheEU28ReactorFleet


Western Europe AsofJuly2016,108nuclearpowerreactorsoperatedintheEU15,49unitsfewerthaninthepeakyearsof1988/89.Tworeactorswereshutdownin2015,Wylfa-1intheU.K.andGrafenrheinfeldinGermany,whileDoel-1wasrestartedattheendoftheyear,afteritslicensewasrenewed(seeFocusBelgium).Asstatedabove,Ringhals-2inSwedenenteredtheLTOcategory.

Two reactors are currently under construction in the older member states, one in Finland(Olkiluoto-3)andoneinFrance(Flamanville-3).Bothprojectsaremanyyearsbehindscheduleandbillionsoverbudget(detailsarediscussedelsewhereinthereport).ApartfromtheFrenchprojects and the Sizewell-B reactor in the U.K. (ordered in 1987), until the reactor project inFinland,nonewreactororderhadbeenplacedinWesternEuropesince1980.Despitenumerousdeadlines,the“FinalInvestmentDecision”forEDFEnergy'sHinkleyPointCprojectinU.K.,asofearlyJuly2016,hasstillnotbeentaken.


Thefollowingsectionprovidesashortoverviewbycountry(inalphabeticalorder).

Belgium Focus Belgiumoperatessevenpressurized-waterreactorsand,formanyyears,hadtheworld’ssecondhighestshareofnuclearinitspowermix,behindFrance.Duetotechnicalissuesdescribedbelow,itdroppedto47.5percentin2014—lessthan50percentforthefirsttimesince1983693—andto37.5percent in2015 (themaximumwas67.2percent in1986).Thenuclearplantsgenerated24.8TWhin2015,anotherdropof22.6percentover2014,andalmosthalfoftheirhighestoutputof46.7TWhin1999.Loadfactorsofindividualreactorswereobviouslyparticularlylowforthetwounitsplaguedbypressurevesselissues(seehereunder)andrestartsonlytowardstheendoftheyear,Doel-3with0.7percentandTihange-2with4.4percent(seeFigure48).

Figure48:LoadFactorsofBelgianNuclearReactors


Legally,thedecisiondoesnotputintoquestionthenuclearphase-outtargetof2025:InJanuary2003,nuclearphase-outlegislationrequiredtheshutdownofallBelgium’snuclearplantsafter40years,sobasedontheirstart-updates,plantswouldbeshutdownbetween2015and2025(seeFigure49).Practically,however,thenewshutdowndatesmeanthatfiveofthesevenreactorswouldgoofflineinthesingleyearof2025.

Following Fukushima, the phase-out legislationwas left in place even thoughGDF-Suez (nowEngie),thatoperatesallsevenPWRsinBelgiumthroughitssubsidiaryElectrabel,waslobbyingto postpone it via an extension of “at least 10 years”.694 In December 2013, the phase-out

693WorldBank,quotedinPerspectiveMonde,seehttp://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMTendanceStatPays?langue=fr&codePays=BEL&codeStat=EG.ELC.NUCL.ZS&codeStat2=x,accessed25May2015.694GérardMestrallet,etal.,“NuclearinBelgium:recentdevelopments”,GDFSuez,4November2011.

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legislationwasfinallyamendedforthefirsttime,695grantinga10-yearextensionfortheTihange-1reactor,whileimposinganadditionaloperatingtaxthatremovedabout70percentofitsprofitinexcessofaguaranteedreturnof9.3percentoninvestmentnecessaryforthelifetimeextension.696Theothershutdowndateswereconfirmed(seeTable16)andthelaw’sArticle9,whichenabledcontinuedoperationincaseofsecurity-of-supplyconcerns,wasdeleted.

Figure49:AgeDistributionofBelgianNuclearFleet


Insummer2012,theoperatoridentifiedanunprecedentednumbersofhydrogen-inducedcrackindications in the pressure vessels ofDoel-3 andTihange-2,with respectively over 8,000 and2,000 previously undetected defects. After several months of analysis, the Belgian safetyauthority, the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC), asked the operator to carry out aspecifictestprogrampriortoanyrestartdecision.However,inlateJanuary2013,AIB-Vinçotte,aninternationalquality-controlcompanybasedinBelgiumworkingonbehalfoftheFANC,statedthat “some uncertainty about the representativity of the test program for the actual reactorpressurevesselshellscannotbeexcluded”.697

An independent assessment concluded that “the restart of the two power plants has to beconsideredashazardous”.698However,inMay2013,FANClicensedrestart699inspiteofseriousconcerns by several scientists. Then, on 25March 2014, Electrabel announced the immediateshutdown of the Doel-3 and Tihange-2 reactors, declared as “anticipating planned outages”,

695Moniteurbelge,“18Décembre2013—Loimodifiantlaloidu31janvier2003surlasortieprogressivedel’énergienucléaireàdesfinsdeproductionindustrielled’électricitéetmodifiantlaloidu11avril2003surlesprovisionsconstituéespourledémantèlementdescentralesnucléairesetpourlagestiondesmatièresfissilesirradiéesdanscescentrales”,24December2013.696MelchiorWathelet,“Aveclaréservestratégique,MelchiorWatheletfinalisel’exécutiondesonplan”,EnergyMinister,16December2013.697AIB-Vinçotte,“SynthesisReportDoel165”,28January2013.698IlseTweer,“FlawedReactorPressureVesselsinBelgianNuclearPlantsDoel-3andTihange-2”,MaterialsScientistandConsultant,ReportcommissionedbytheGreens/EFAGroupintheEuropeanParliament,March2013,seehttp://www.greens-efa.eu/fileadmin/dam/Documents/Studies/Flawed%20Reactor%20Pressure%20Vessels.pdf,accessed18June2016.699FANC,“FANCexpertsgivepositiveopiniononrestartofDoel3&Tihange2reactorunits”,17May2013,seehttp://www.fanc.fgov.be/GED/00000000/3400/3430.pdf,accessed18June2016.


respectivelyoveronemonthandtwomonthsaheadofschedule.700Thedecisionwastakenafteroneofthetests“relatedtothemechanicalstrengthofasampleanaloguetothecompositionoftheconcerned vessels did not deliver results in line with experts expectations”. FANC issued astatement:

Theresultsofthesetestsindicatethatamechanicalproperty(fracturetoughness)ofthematerialismorestronglyinfluencedbyirradiationthanexpertshadexpected.Additionaltestingandresearcharenecessarytointerpretandassesstheseunexpectedresults.701

Table16:ClosureDatesforBelgianNuclearReactors2022–2025

Reactor(NetCapacity)

FirstGridConnection

EndofLicense(LatestClosureDate)

Doel-1(433MW) 1974 10-yearlifetimeextensionto15February2025

Doel-2(433MW) 1975 10-yearlifetimeextensionto1December2025

Doel-3(1006MW) 1982 1October2022

Tihange-2(1008MW) 1982 1February2023

Doel-4(1039MW) 1985 1July2025

Tihange-3(1046MW) 1985 1September2025

Tihange-1(962MW) 1975 10-yearlifetimeextensionto1October2025

Sources:BelgianLawof28June2015;Electrabel/GDF-Suez,2014702

Additionalinspectionshaveraisedthenumberofidentifieddefectstoover13,000intheDoel-3pressurevessel(upto40perdm3,upto18cmlong,downtoadepthof12cminthevesselwall)andtoover3,000atTihange-2.703 InApril2015,under theauspicesofFANC,an InternationalReviewBoardassessedtheresultsofadditionalinspectionsandtestscarriedoutbyElectrabel.Some scientists involved in the research on the issue concluded that “meticulous inspections[are]needed,worldwide”(underlinedintheoriginal).704

700Electrabel/GDF-Suez,“AnticipatingplannedoutagesofDoel3andTihange2reactors”,25March2014,seehttp://corporate.engie-electrabel.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/anticipation-scheduled-stops-reactors-doel3-tihange2_en.pdf,accessed18June2016. 701FANC,“Doel3andTihange2stilltemporallyshutdownuntilfurthernotice”,1July2014,seehttp://www.fanc.fgov.be/GED/00000000/3600/3657.pdf,accessed2July2016.702MoniteurBelge,“Loimodifiantlaloidu31janvier2003surlasortieprogressivedel'énergienucléaireàdesfinsdeproductionindustrielled'électricitéafindegarantirlasécuritéd'approvisionnementsurleplanénergétique”,6July2015,seehttp://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/mopdf/2015/07/06_2.pdf,accessed2July2016;andElectrabel/GDF-Suez,“Newsfromthenuclearplants”,accessed3July2014.703FANC,“Doel3/Tihange2:clarificationsregardingthedetection,thepositionandthesizeoftheflawindications”,25February2015,seehttp://www.fanc.fgov.be/fr/news/doel-3/tihange-2-clarifications-regarding-the-detection-the-position-and-the-size-of-the-flaw-indications/753.aspx,accessed2July2016.704WalterF.Bogaerts,op.cit.


In spite ofwidespread concerns, and althoughno accountable explanation about the negativeinitial fracture toughness test results couldbegiven,on17November2015,FANCauthorizedrestartofDoel-3andTihange-2,consideredbyElectrabel“totallysafe”.705Tihange-2restartedon14December2015.Doel-3willneedtopermanentlypre-heatalargeamount(around1,800m3)ofwaterforthecaseofemergencycore-coolingwaterinjection,inordertoeasethestressofthethermalshockonthepressurevessel.706

InJanuary2016,independentmaterialscientistIlseTweerconcluded:

KeepinginmindthatgrowthoftheflawsintheRPV[ReactorPressureVessel]shellsduringoperationcannotbeexcludedtheauthorizedrestartofthetwonuclearpowerplantsisnotunderstandable.707

In an unprecedented move, on 20 April 2016, Germany's Environment Minister BarbaraHendricks called—invain—for theprovisional shutdownofDoel-3 andTihange-2 “until opensafetyquestionsareclearedup”.708Doel-3restartedfourdayslater.

TheBelgiangovernmentdidnotwaitfortheoutcomeoftheDoel-3/Tihange-2issueanddecidedinMarch2015 todraft legislation to extend the lifetimeofDoel-1 andDoel-2 by ten years to2025.709Thelawwaspromulgatedon28June2015,andwentintoeffecton6July2015.710ThegovernmentsignedanagreementwithElectrabelon30November2015thatstipulatesthattheoperatorwill invest€700million(US$741.2million) intoupgradingofthetwounits711andanannualfeeof€20million(US$21.2million),whichwillbepaidintothenationalEnergyTransitionFund,setupbythelawof28June2015.However,thelistofworkstobecarriedoutisstillunderdiscussion,while the tax has been defined on the basis of the sole operator's estimate of theupgradingcost.TheBelgianConseild'EtathadconsideredinanOpiniondated16November2015that the Electrabel-Government agreement contained indirect compensation insurances thatcouldviolateEUlawandthatinanycase,theEuropeanCommissionwouldhavetobenotifiedbeforehand.712 The law has been amended on 2 June 2016, clarifying the conditions of therelationshipbetweenstateandoperatorintheimplementationofthelegislation.

705Engie-Electrabel,“TheFederalAgencyforNuclearControlapprovessaferestartofDoel3andTihange2”,PressRelease,17November2015,seehttp://corporate.engie-electrabel.be/news/press-releases/the-federal-agency-for-nuclear-control-approves-safe-restart-of-doel-3-and-tihange-2/,accessed2July2016.706ChamberofRepresentativesofBelgium,“CompteRenduAnalytique–Sous-CommissiondelaSécuritéNucléaire”,2December2015.707IlseTweer,“FlawedReactorPressureVesselsintheBelgianNPPSDoel3andTihange2—CommentsontheFANCFinalEvaluationReport2015”,MaterialsScientistandConsultant,ReportcommissionedbytheGreens/EFAGroupintheEuropeanParliament,January2016.708BMUB,“Reaktorsicherheits-ExpertensehenweiterenUntersuchungsbedarffürTihange2undDoel3—Hendricks:SolangeUntersuchungläuft,solltenAKWvorübergehendvomNetz”,GermanFederalMinistryfortheEnvironment,NatureConservation,BuildingandNuclearSafety,PressRelease,20April2016.709Marie-ChristineMarghem,“MeasureswhichintendtoassurethesecurityofsupplyinBelgium”,MinisterofEnergy,EnvironmentandSustainableDevelopment(Belgium),PressRelease,5March2015,seehttp://www.marghem.belgium.be/en/measures-which-intend-assure-security-supply-belgium,accessed2July2016.710MoniteurBelge,op.cit.711Electrabel,“Sécuritéd’approvisionnementettransitionénergétique–AccordsurlaprolongationdeDoel1etDoel2”,PressRelease,1December2015.712ChamberofRepresentativesofBelgium,“ProjetdeLoimodifiantlaloidu31Janvier2003surlasortieprogressivedel'énergienucléaireàdesfinsdeproductionindustrielled'électricité–AvisduConseild'Etat”,9December2015.


On22December2015,FANCauthorizedthelifetimeextensionandrestartofDoel-1and-2.

Beyondtheissuesoflifetimeextensionsandrestarts,FANCandhisdirectorJanBensmadesomeheadlinesinBelgiumoverthepastyear.713Anexternal,interview-basedauditofFANCwascarriedoutandthe70-pagereportleakedtothepressinApril2016.TheconclusionsbytheauditorsofWhyteCorporateAffairsseriouslyunderminethecredibilityoftheBelgianSafetyAuthority,astheyidentifieda“toxicinternalclimate”,“lackofleadership”,“powerstruggles”andmore.714

Finlandoperatesfourunitsthatsuppliedarecord22.3TWhor33.7percentofitselectricityin 2015 (with a maximum of 38.4 percent in 1986). Finland has adopted different nucleartechnologiesandsuppliers,astwoofitsoperatingreactorsarePWRsbuiltbyRussiancontractorsatLoviisa,whiletwoareBWRsbuiltbyABB(AseaBrownBoveri)atOlkiluoto.

InDecember2003,FinlandbecamethefirstcountrytoorderanewnuclearreactorinWesternEuropein15years.AREVANP,thenajointventureowned66percentbyAREVAand34percentbySiemens715,isbuildinga1.6GWEPRatOlkiluoto(OL3)underafixed-priceturn-keycontractwith the utility TVO. After the 2015 technical bankruptcy of AREVA Group, the majorityshareholder, the French government, decided to integrate the reactor-building division into asubsidiarymajority-ownedbystateutilityEDFandopentothird-partyinvestment.However,EDFhasmadeitclearrepeatedlythatitwillnottakeoverthebillionsofeuros’liabilitieslinkedtothecostly Finnish AREVA adventure.716 Responsibility for those liabilities remains unclear. Anattempt by French Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron to accelerate the resolution of thependinginternationalconflictopposingAREVAandTVOendedwithoutapparentprogress.

TheOL3projectwasfinancedessentiallyonthebalancesheetsoftheFinland'sleadingfirmsandmunicipalities under a unique arrangement that makes them liable for the plant’s indefinitecapitalcostsforanindefiniteperiod,whetherornottheygettheelectricity—acapex“take-or-paycontract”.

ConstructionstartedinAugust2005atOlkiluotoonthewestcoast.Theprojectisatleastnineyearsbehindscheduleandisatleastaboutthreetimesoverbudget.Inits2015AnnualReport,TVOnotes:

AccordingtoanannouncementoftheOL3turnkeysupplier,thedeliverywillbedelayedfromtheoriginalscheduleaccordingtowhichthepowerplantunitshouldhavebeeninproductionasof30April2009.Incompliancewiththesupplycontractthecompanyisentitledtocompensationincasethedelayisduetothesupplier.Additionally,becauseofthedelaythecompanyhasincurredandwill

713SeeforexampleaseriesofpapersinLeSoir,“ProlongationduNucléaire”,(inFrench),seehttp://www.lesoir.be/tag/prolongation-du-nucleaire?page=3,accessed18June2016.714LeSoir,25April2016,extractquotedbyJean-MarcNollet,“Unauditsèmeledoutesurlacrédibilitédel'agencenucléaire”,PressRelease,25April2016,(inFrench),seehttp://www.nollet.info/actualites/un-audit-same-le-doute-sur-la-cradibilita-de-laagence-nuclaaire,accessed18June2016.715SiemensquittheconsortiuminMarch2011andannouncedinSeptember2011thatitwasabandoningthenuclearsectorentirely.716LeMonde,“EDFposesesconditionsaurachatdesréacteursd’Areva”,19May2015,seehttp://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2015/05/19/edf-pose-ses-conditions-au-rachat-des-reacteurs-d-areva_4636164_3234.html,accessed2July2016.


incurdirectand indirectexpenses forwhichthecompanyonthebasisof thesupplycontracthasclaimedforcompensation.717

TheTVOreport states: “According to the scheduleupdatedby theSupplier, regularelectricityproductionatOL3willcommenceattheendof2018”and:

In July [2015], TVO and the Supplier, Areva Siemens Consortium, updated their claims in theInternationalChamberofCommerce(ICC)arbitrationproceedingsconcerningthedelayintheOL3Project. The quantification estimate updated by TVO of its costs and losses is approximatelyEUR2.6billionuntilDecember2018. (...) InFebruary2016, the Supplierupdated its claim in thearbitrationproceedingsconcerningthedelayintheOL3Project.TheSupplier'smonetaryclaimisnowapproximatelyEUR3.52billionintotal.

Thelatestofficialcostestimatefromearly2014—nodoubtanunderestimatebynow,butithasnotbeenofficiallyraisedsince—hadbeengivenas€8.5billion(US$11.6billion)foranoriginal“fixprice”estimateof“around€3billion”(US$3.6billion).Itremainsunclearwhowillcovertheadditionalcost:thevendorsandTVOblameeachotherandareinlitigation.AREVAhascumulated€5.5billioninlossesontheproject, increasingprovisionsby€905million(US$988million)in2015. InFebruary2016,AREVAupdated itsclaimagainstTVOto€3.4billion(US$3.7billion),while TVO had increased its own compensation claim against AREVA to €2.6 billion(US$2.85billion)inAugust2015.718

InMay2015,credit-ratingagencyStandard&Poor’sdowngradedTVOtoBBB-, justonenotchabove “junk”,withanegativeoutlook, “owing tocontinueddeterioration inmarketpricesandincreasedriskofhigherproductioncostsrelatedtoTVO’sthirdnuclearpowerplant,Olkiluoto-3”.719

Fromthebeginning,theOL3projectwasplaguedwithcountlessmanagementandquality-controlissues. Not only did it prove difficult to carry out concreting and welding to technicalspecifications, but the use of sub-contractors and workers from 55 nationalities madecommunicationandoversightextremelycomplex(seepreviousWNISReditions).

TheproblemsproducedbytheOL3projecthavenotpreventedTVOfromfilinganapplication,inApril2008,foradecision-in-principletodevelop“OL4”,a1.0–1.8GWreactortostartconstructionin 2012 and enter operation “in the late 2010s”.720 The decision was ratified by the FinnishParliamenton1July2010.InMay2014,TVOrequestedafive-yearextensiononthetimeallowedto submit the construction license,with a subsequent revisionof the estimated startupof thereactortothe“latterhalfofthe2020’s”.721TheGovernmentrefusedtogranttheextension,andinMay2015,TVOannouncedthatithaddecidednottoapplyforaconstructionlicenseduringthevalidityofthedecision-in-principlemadein2010.722

717TVO,“ReportoftheBoardofDirectorsandFinancialStatements2015”,February2016.718NW,“TalkswithTVOonOlkiluoto-3‘positive’and‘fastpaced,’ArevaCEOsays”,3March2016.719S&P,“FinnishNuclearPowerProducerTVODowngradedT'BBB-/A3';OutlookNegative”,28May2015.720TVO,“ConstructionofaNuclearPowerPlantUnitatOlkiluoto—GeneralDescription—OL4”,August2008.721TVO,“TVOappliesforanextensiontosubmitconstructionlicenseapplicationofOlkiluoto4plantunit”,PressRelease,20May2014.722TVO,“TVO'sBoardofDirectorsproposesthatOL4constructionlicensewillnotbeappliednow”,PressRelease,13May2015,seehttp://www.tvo.fi/news/1596,accessed25May2015.


In parallel, Fortum Power has been planning a similar project, known as Loviisa-3. InJanuary 2009, the company Fennovoima Oy submitted an application to the Ministry ofEmployment and the Economy for a decision-in-principle on a new plant at one of threelocations—Ruotsinpyhtää,Simo,orPyhäjoki.ThiswasnarroweddowntothelattersiteandtobeinganEPRorABWR.Startupwasplannedfor2020.Bidswerereceivedon31January2012from AREVA and Toshiba.723 In April 2013, to the general surprise of AREVA and Toshiba,Fennovoima invitedRosatom todirectnegotiationsover its1200MWAES-2006. Fennovoimastatedthatitwillselecttheplantsupplier“during2013”.724InMarch2014Rosatom,throughasubsidiarycompanyROASVoimaOy,completedthepurchaseof34percentofFennovoima,thepriceofwhichwasnotdisclosed725,andtheninApril2014a“bindingdecisiontoconstruct”anAES-2006reactorwasannounced.InDecember2014,theFinnishParliamentvotedinfavorofasupplement to the decision-in-principle to include Rosatom’s reactor design. A constructionlicense application had to be submitted by the end of June 2015726. It was—but withoutFennovoima’s being able to demonstrate clearly that itmet the requirement of being at least60 percent owned by EU companies. In August 2015, Fortum announced that it taking a6.6percentshareinthePyhäjokiproject,bringingtheEU-companyheldsharesto65.1percent.InSeptember2015,theFinnishSafetyAuthoritySTUKbeganassessingtheproject,whichitstatedwouldtakeuntiltheendof2017.Noconstructionlicensecouldbeissuedpriortothatdate.727However,sitepreparationworkandrockblastingreportedlyalreadybeganinJanuary2016.728

France Focus France’snuclearindustryisseentobeaworldleaderanditisexceptionalinmanyways.Butafterfour decades of continual public support for nuclear power, the Government under PresidentFrançois Hollande has initiated a significant shift in energy policy. On 17 August 2015, theNationalAssembly,theFrenchlowerhouse,adoptedtheLawRelativetotheEnergyTransitionforGreenGrowth,acomprehensive98-pagedocument,thatstipulatesinparticularthereductionof thenuclear share inFrance’s electricitygenerationmix from three-quarters tohalf and thecappingofthecurrentlyinstallednuclearcapacityof63.2GW.729However,unliketheGermanorBelgiannuclearphase-outplans,atthispoint,therearenoprecisedatesforreactorshutdownsand,withtheexceptionofthetwooldestFrenchreactorsatFessenheimthatareunderdebate,noother reactor has been singled out. It is the Pluriannual Energy Program that will define theplanning framework for the coming years to 2023. A recent draft, suggests not to decide onshutdowns before 2018—the Presidential elections are in 2017—but to rather prepare forlifetimeextensionsbeyond40yearsfora“firstbatch”of25GW,inpriorityfortheunitsthatare

723Fennovoima,“Fennovoimareceivedbidsfornuclearpowerplant”,PressRelease,31January2012.724Rosatom,“FennovoimainvitesROSATOMtodirectnegotiations”,PressRelease,5April2013.725Fennovoima,“Rosatomacquired34%ofFennovoima”,PressRelease,27March2014.726WNN,“ParliamentapprovesFennovoima’samendment”,5December2014,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-parliament-approves-Fennovoimas-amendment-5121401.html,accessed18June2015.727STUK,“STUKwillstarttheConstructionLicensesafetyreviewandassessmentofFennovoima'sproject”,PressRelease,8September2015,seehttp://www.stuk.fi/web/en/-/stuk-will-start-the-construction-license-safety-review-and-assessment-of-fennovoima-s-project,accessed9June2016.728PIE,“PIE'sNewPowerPlantProjectTracker”February2016.729JournalOfficieldelaRépubliqueFrançaise,“Loin°2015-002du17août2015relativeàlatransitionénergétiquepourlacroissanceverte”,18August2015.


operatingwithplutonium-uranium(MOX)fuels.However,theFrenchNuclearSafetyAuthorityhasmadeitveryclearthatthereisnoguaranteethatlifetimeextensionswillbegranted.Ageneraldecision is indeed expected for 2018 and individual decisions starting in 2019. The Frenchgovernmentandthenuclearenergyestablishmentseemtobedecidedtogaintime,ratherthanaddressingtheissuesintheshortterm.

In2015,France’s58reactors730produced419TWhor76.3percentofthecountry’selectricity.Inthepeakyear2005,431.2TWhofnuclearelectricitywasproduced,providing78.5percentofthetotal.

FranceisEurope’slargestelectricityexporterwith61.7TWhexportednetin2015,731followedcloselybyGermanywith60.9TWh.Francehasprofitedinparticularfromthecontinuedoutageof twonuclear reactors inBelgium(seesectiononBelgium).Thecreationof theCentralWestEurope (CWE) region (France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, theNetherlands and Luxembourg),replacing the Net Transfer Capacities model previously used, cumulates exchanges with thenationalentitiesinvolved.Inotherwords:“Insum,it isnolongerpossibletoconsiderbordersseparately,andindicatorspreviouslyusedfortheFrance-BelgiumandFrance-GermanybordershavebeenreplacedbyFrance-CWEregionindicators.”732

Thisisunfortunateas,contrarytothegeneralperception,FranceremainsanetimporterofpowerfromGermany,by9.3TWhin2015,a58percentincreaseover2014,andhasbeenforanumberofyears,becauseGermanwholesaleelectricitygenerallyundercutsFrenchwholesaleprices.733

Figure50:AgeDistributionofFrenchNuclearFleet(byDecade)


The average age of France’s power reactors is 31.4 years inmid-2016 (see Figure 50). In theabsence of new reactor commissioning, the fleet is simply aging by one year every year.Simultaneously, questions are being raised about the investment needed to enable them tocontinueoperating,asagingreactorsincreasinglyneedpartstobereplaced.Operatingcostshaveincreased substantially over the past years. Investments for life extensions will need to bebalanced against the already excessive nuclear share in the power mix, the stagnating ordecreasing electricity consumption, the shrinking client base, ferocious competitors, and theenergyefficiencyandrenewableenergyproduction targetssetatboth, theEUand theFrench

730Allpressurizedwaterreactors,34x900MW,20x1300MW,and4x1400MW.731RéseaudeTransportd’Electricité(RTE),“2015AnnualElectricityReport”,March2016.732Ibidem.733RTE,“2015–AnnualElectricityReport”,March2016.


levels.ItnowlooksplausiblethatEDFwillattempttoextendlifetimesofsomeunits,whileothersmightbeclosedpriortoreachingthe40-yearagelimit.Butthereisstillnoplan.

IftheFrenchGovernmentandstatecontrolledutilityÉlectricitédeFrance(EDF)in2005optedtoproceedwiththeconstructionofanewunit,EDFwouldbemotivatednotbylackofgeneratingcapacitybutbytheindustry’sseriousproblemofmaintainingnuclearcompetence.InDecember2007, EDF started construction of Flamanville-3 (FL3). The FL3 site has encountered quality-control problems including basic concrete andwelding similar to those at the OL3 project inFinland,whichstartedtwo-and-a-halfyearsearlier.

TheFlamanville-3projectisnowatleastsixyearslate—oneyearmoresinceWNISR2015—andnowexpectedto“loadfuelandstartup”untilthefourthtrimester2018.734

InApril2015theFrenchNuclearSafetyAuthority(ASN)revealedthatthebottompieceandthelid of the FL3 pressure vessel had “very serious” defects.735 Chemical and mechanical tests“revealedthepresenceofazoneinwhichtherewasahighcarbonconcentration,leadingtolowerthanexpectedmechanical toughnessvalues”.736Bothpieceswere fabricatedandassembledbyAREVAinFrance,whilethecenterpiecewasforgedbyJapanSteelWorks(JSW)inJapan.ASNstatedthenthatthesamefabricationprocedurebyAREVA'sCreusotForgewasappliedto“certaincalottes”(alsocalledbottomheadsandclosureheads)ofthetwopressurevesselsmadeforthetwoEPRsunderconstructionatTaishaninChina,whiletheEPRunderconstructioninFinlandwasentirelymanufacturedinJapan.Itisunclear,whichofthefourbottomsandlidshavebeenmanufacturedbyCreusot Forge, but likely at least theones forTaishan-1,while, according toAREVA737 andmedia reports738, the pressure vessel for Taishan-2 has beenmanufactured byChinesecompanyDongfangElectricCorporation(DEC).However,nospecificmentionismadeofthevesselbottomsandlids.

AREVA'schallengeisnowtoprovethat,althoughclearlybelowtechnicalspecifications,theEPRpressurevesselscouldwithstandanymajortransientandsubmittedaproposalforamajortestprogramtoASNinlate2015.InDecember2015,ASNapprovedtheprogram,consideringthatthe“testprogramproposedontwoscale-onereplicadomesshouldbeabletoassessthescaleanddepthofthesegregatedzoneaswellasitsinfluenceonthemechanicalproperties”.Inotherwords,AREVA will sacrifice two vessel heads that had already been manufactured for a never-builtreactorprojectintheU.S.(CalvertCliffs)andamaybe-builtEPRatHinkleyPointintheU.K.

ASNadded:

IwouldhoweverremindyouthatrejectionoftheRPVclosureheadandbottomheadfurthertotheinvestigationcannotberuledout.ThisiswhyIconsideritnecessaryforyoutostudyallalternative

734EDF,“RapportAnnuel2015”,February2016.735UsineNouvelle,“Lecrid'alarmedel'ASNsurlenucléairefrançais”,20January2016,seehttp://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/le-cri-d-alarme-de-l-asn-sur-le-nucleaire-francais.N374729,accessed11June2016.736ASN,“FlamanvilleEPRreactorvesselmanufacturinganomalies”,PressRelease,7April2015,seehttp://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Information/News-releases/Flamanville-EPR-reactor-vessel-manufacturing-anomalies,accessed11June2016.737AREVA,“Taishan1&2-China—AREVASupplyChain”,undated,seehttp://www.areva.com/EN/operations-2404/china-taishan-12.html#tab=tab5,accessed2July2016.738Factwire,“MadeinChina:criticalcomponentofTaishannuclearplantmanufacturedinGuangzhou”,27May2016,seehttps://www.factwire.news/en/Taishan-nuclear-tech.html,accessed2July2016.


technicalscenarios,suchasreplacementoftheRPVbottomheadandmanufactureofanewclosurehead.739

Atthispoint,thepossibilitythatallthreeEPRpressurevesselscontainingpartsforgedinFrancewillberejectedbytherespectivesafetyauthoritiesandwillhavetobere-manufacturedcannotbeexcluded.Thisthenraisesthequestionoftheviabilityoftheentireprojects,sincereplacingtheendsofthehugesteelpressurevesselsalreadyinstalledinsidethecontainmentbuildingappearsnotfeasible.740

ASN inspections at the Creusot Forge plant in January 2016 revealed that high carbonconcentrationsalsohadbeenfoundinthecalottesfortheFL3pressurizer,followingarequestforadditionaltestsbyAREVANPdatingasearlyasDecember2008.NeithertherequestforthesetestsnortheirresultshadbeencommunicatedtoASN.741

Following the detection of the manufacturing problems with the EPR pressure vessel, ASNrequested an audit of the Creusot Forge plant. On 25 April 2016, AREVA informed ASN that“irregularities in themanufacturing checks”, the quality-control procedures, were detected atabout 400 pieces fabricated since 1969, about 50 of which would be installed in the Frenchcurrentlyoperatingreactorfleet.The“irregularities”included“inconsistencies,modificationsoromissionsintheproductionfiles,concerningmanufacturingparametersortestresults”.742Thefulllistofpiecesconcernedhasnotbeenpublished.Apparently,abouthalfofthetotalnumberhasbeenmanufacturedforclientsoutsidethenuclearindustry.

The official cost estimate for Flamanville-3 stood at €8.5 billion (US$11.6 billion) as ofDecember 2012.743 In its annual report 2015, EDF updates the figure to €10.5 billion(US$11.4billion)744,equivalenttothecurrentestimatefortheOlkiluoto-3EPRprojectinFinland,and2.6timestheestimateatconstructionstart.

Inaddition, therehavebeenmajordifficultieswith large investmentprojects—inparticular inItaly, theUnitedKingdom,and theUnitedStates—allofwhichare takinga tollon thebalancesheet and credit rating of France’s major nuclear companies. EDF has a €37.4 billion(US$40.9billion)debt,asoftheendof2015,andsteadilyrisingoperationalcosts.

739ASN,LettertothePresidentofAREVA,14December2016,(inEnglish).740Fora4-pagebriefingontheissueseeYvesMarignac,“FabricationFlawsinthePressureVesseloftheEPRFlamanville-3”,WISE-Paris,12April2015,seehttps://www.dropbox.com/s/njavhw7ihvkbyeu/WISE-Paris-Fabrication-Flaws-EPR-Flamanville-Latest.pdf,accessed18June2016.741ASN,LettertotheDirectorGeneralofAREVANP,9May2016.742ASN,“AREVAhasinformedASNofirregularitiesconcerningcomponentsmanufacturedinitsCreusotForgeplant”,4May2016,seehttp://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Information/News-releases/Irregularities-concerning-components-manufactured-in-its-Creusot-Forge-plant,accessed11June2016.743UsineNouvelle,“EDFaévitélepiresurl’EPRdeFlamanville”,7December2012,seehttp://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/edf-a-evite-le-pire-sur-l-epr-de-flamanville.N187560,accessed18June2016.744EDF,“2015ManagementReport—GroupResults”,13May2016.


TheHinkleyPointCSaga–AFrenchPerspective

WNISRhasreportedregularlyaboutthedevelopmentsaroundEDFEnergy's(U.K.subsidiaryofEDFGroup)projecttobuildtwoEPRsatHinkleyPoint intheU.K..SincethepublicationofthepreviousWNISRinJuly2015,theissuemadefrontpagenewsonbothsidesofthechannel.AstheFinalInvestmentDecision(FID)hasbeenannouncedformanymonths,oppositioninsideandoutside the nuclear establishment in France has reached unprecedented proportions. Thetraditionallyultra-pro-nuclearFrenchtradeunionsinparticularhavecomeoutstronglyagainsttheproject.Alittlechronology:

•On21October2015,EDFandChinaGeneralNuclearPowerCorporation (CGN)signa“non-binding” Strategic Investment Agreement for a joint investment in the construction of tworeactorsatHinkleyPointC(HPC)Undertheagreement,EDF’sshareinHPCshouldbe66.5percentandCGN’sshouldbe33.5percent.

•On10December2015,thetradeunionrepresentativesatEDF'sCentralWorksCommitteeofEDF—unanimously and for the first time—launch an official “economic alert procedure”consideringthe“seriousnessofthesituation”.TheeconomiccircumstancesoftheHPCprojectareamongstthe“mostpreoccupyingfacts”.745

• On 12 November 2015, the EDF employee shareholder association EAS calls on the EDFmanagement“tostopthistooriskyproject(...)thatcouldwellendangerEDF'sexistence”.746

•On20January2016,theEDFbranchoftradeunionCFE-CGCunderlinesthattheentiredebtof€25 billion (excluding financial costs) associated with HPC “will be fully consolidated in theaccountsofEDF”and“solelyontheEDFbalancesheet”.Theunionalsonotes“thisamount ishigherthantheGroup'sstockmarketvaluation”.Amongst15questionstotheEDFBoard:“How,precisely,willEDFfinancethisproject?”747

•On1February2016,tradeunionFOstatesinapressreleasethatHPCisaprojectthat“alargemajorityofEDFstaff,mid-anddirectorlevelsincluded,considerriskyasis,endangeringtheveryexistenceofEDF”.TheCFDTunionwouldsharealltheseconcerns.748

•On12February2016,CFE-CGCclaimsthat“Macronisallwrong:HinkleyPointmightwellkillEDF”,andthatthealternativeofsubmarinecablestosupplytheU.K.withpowerwouldbetentimescheaper749

•On27February2016,theBritishmagazineTheEconomistasks“What'sthe(Hinkley)point?”,suggesting“itwouldbebestifBritain'sFrenchnuclearpartnerthrewinthetowel”,statingthat

745CCE-EDFS.A,“Droitd'alertedesélusducomitécentrald'entreprised'EDFsurlasituationéconomiqueetsocialepréoccupanted'EDFSA”,10December2015.746EAS,“HinkleyPoint?Rienàgagner,toutàperdre”,12November2015.747CFE-CGC,“EDFEmployeeInformation–HinkleyPointCProject–15QuestionstotheBoardofEDF”,20January2016.748ForceOuvrièreÉnergieetMines,“Projetnucléaired'EDFauRoyaume-Uni:Ilesturgentd'attendre!”,1February2016,(inFrench),seehttp://www.force-ouvriere.fr/projet-nucleaire-d-edf-au-royaume-uni-il-est-urgent-d-attendre,accessed2July2016.749CFE-CGC,“Macronatoutfaux:HinkleyPointrisquedetuerEDF”,12February2016,(inFrench),seewww.miroirsocial.com/uploads/documents/CP_CFE_Energies_Hinkley_Point_EDF.pdf,accessed2July2016.


“theprojectedcostsarecomparabletothoseoftheThreeGorges[hydro]powerstationinChina,whichhasaboutseventimestheplannedgeneratingcapacity—albeitnon-nuclear”.750

•On14March2016,RBCCapitalMarkets,oneoftheworld'slargestinvestmentbank,declaresEDF“uninvestible”.AnalystMartinYoungstates:“EDF’smanagementshouldnotriskbringingthecompanytoitsknees,andshouldnotproceedwithHinkleyPoint.”751

• On 4 May 2016, Thomas Piquemal, EDF's former Chief Financial Officer who quit on1March2016,isgivingevidencetotheFrenchNationalAssembly.Heleavesnodoubtthathisdecisionwas intrinsically linked to theHPCproject, as hedidnotwish to “caution a decisionsusceptible, in case of problems, to lead EDF to a situation close to that of AREVA”, that istechnicalbankruptcy.752

• On 9May 2016, the four trade unions represented at the EDF's CentralWorks Committee(FNME-CGT, CFE-CGC, FCE-CFDT, FO-Energie et Mines) unanimously vote to commission anexternalexpertiseontheHPCproject.753

•On12May2016,EDFGroupannouncesthattheChairmanhasengagedinaninformationandconsultationprocesswiththeCentralWorksCommittee.ThesamepressstatementindicatesthatThe equity commitment contains a contingencymargin and could raise the total cost of theprojectby15percentor£2.7billion (US$3.9billion).Construction timewouldbe115months(9.6years)afterFIDuntilstartupofthefirstreactor.754

•On23May2016,theFrenchMinisterofEconomics,EmmanuelMacron,writesalettertoU.K.“MembersofParliament”reaffirming:“IhaveeveryconfidencethatafinalinvestmentdecisioncanbemaderapidlyaftertheendoftheconsultationoftheCentralWorksCommittee(...)”.

•On24May2016,VincentdeRivaz,CEOofEDFEnergy,toldtheU.K.HouseofCommons'EnergyandClimateChangeCommitteethat“attheendoftheconsultation,theWorksCouncilwillbeinvitedtogiveitsadvisoryopinion,afterwhichthechairmanwillpresentHPCtotheboard,andtheboardwillmake itsdecision.Last time Iwashere, I couldnotgiveaprecisedate for thatdecision, and that remains the case (...).”DeRivaz also told theCommittee that theplannedstartupdate2025“iscertainlythedatewewouldliketobeabletoconfirmatthemomentoftheFID”.ACommitteMemberrecalledthat“MrdeRivazoriginallysaidthatwewouldbecookingour turkeyswith French energy in 2017”. EnergyMinister Andrea Leadsom confirmed to theCommitteethatthegovernmenthadnotgivenanydeadlinetoEDFfortheFID.755

Powerpriceincreases,whichshouldreacharound30percentbetween2012and2017inordertocovertheoperatingcosts—alegalrequirement—wouldpreventEDFfromsellingatlossandhelpfundingnecessaryinvestments.ButthesetariffincreasescouldalsonegativelyaffectEDFby

750TheEconomist,“What'sthe(Hinkley)point?”,27February2016.751Bloomberg,“EDFSeenas'uninvestable'asFranceWeighsFinancialHelp”,14March2016.752LeMonde,“EDF:le'désespoir'del'ex-directeurfinancier”,5May2016.753CCE-EDFS.A.,“LeCCEEDFSAvoteuneexpertisesurleprojetHPC”,9May2016.754EDF,“ConsultationoftheEDFCentralWorksCouncil(ComitéCentrald'Entreprise)ontheHinkleyPointCProject”,PressRelease,12May2016.755HouseofCommons,EnergyandClimateChangeCommittee,“Oralevidence;UKNewNuclear:StatusUpdate”,24May2016.


resulting in a loss ofmarket share, as alternative energy suppliers and resources, alongwithenergy efficiency, will thereby become more competitive. With the completion of marketliberalizationandtheendofregulatedtariffsfornon-residentialcustomersasof1January2016,EDFisrapidlylosingbigchunksofitsclientbase.Thenumberofnon-residentialclientsthatquitEDFexceeded1.4million (of a totalof4.9million)by theendof the firstquarterof2016, anincreaseof over45percent in just threemonths.Residential clients also continue tomove toanotherproviderandtheirnumber increasedby157,000(+4.2percent) inthefirstquartertoreachover3.8million,about12percentofthetotal.Bytheendofthefirstquarterof2016,EDF'scompetitors sold 47 percent (up over 15 percentage points in three months) of the powerconsumedbynon-residentialclientsand30percentbyhouseholds.756TheeconomicimpactonEDF'sresultsisyettocome,butitwillbeharsh.InApril2016,theFrenchgovernmentdecidedtoraiseAREVA'scapital(worth€1.2billionasof28June2016)by€4billionbyFebruary2017.Thestateistoinject€3billionand€1billionaresoughtfromotherinvestors.

EDFshareslostupto89percentoftheirpeakvalueinlate2007.Credit-ratingagencieshadEDFontheirwatchlistsforacoupleofyears.InMay2016,Moody'sdowngradedEDFtoA2fromA1withanegativeoutlook,citingprolongedlowpowerpricesandhighexposuretomarket-exposedgenerationattimesofhighinvestmentneedsfornuclearupgrades,renewablesandsmart-meterrollout.757FitchRatingsdowngradedEDFtoA–(fromA)on7June2016withastableoutlook,reflecting“theimpactofthefallinpowerpricesonanundiversifiedfuelmix,coincidingwiththeerosionofdomesticbusinessvolumes”.758

Thelargestnuclearoperatorintheworldisalsostrugglingwitharapidlywideningskillsgap,asabouthalfofitsnuclearstaffareeligibleforretirementduring2012–17.EDFadmittedthatitwillbefacedwithanextremelydifficultperiodwitha“forecasteddoublingofexpendituresbetween2010 and 2020 (operation and investment)” and with “a peak of departures for retirementcoincidingwithapeakinactivities.”759

AREVA,theself-proclaimed“globalleaderinnuclearenergy”760,filedlossesforthefifthyearinarow—€2.8billion(US$3billion)addedin2015—raisingitscumulativelossesoverfiveyearstoabout €10 billion (US$10.9 billion). Debt reached €6.3 billion (US$6.9 billion) for an annualturnoverof€4.2billion(US$4.6billion).Attemptstoraisesignificantadditionalcapitalhavefailedinthepast.Inanultimatesalvationattempt,theFrenchgovernmentdecidedtoinject€5billionintothebankuptcompany,bythefirstquarterof2017.However,theEuropeanCommissionisyettodeterminewhetherthisinjectionisinaccordwithEuropeanUnioncompetitionrules.

756CommissiondeRégulationdel'Energie(CRE),“Marchésdedétail–Observatoiredesmarchésdel'électricitéetdugaznaturel—1ertrimestre2016”,18June2016,seehttp://www.cre.fr/content/download/14533/172964/version/1/file/Observatoire-detail-T12016.pdf,accessed11June2016.757Moody's,“Moody'sdowngradesEDF'sratingstoA2;outlooknegative”,12May2016,seehttps://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-EDFs-ratings-to-A2-outlook-negative--PR_348764,accessed18June2016.758FitchRatings,“FitchDowngradesEdFto'A–';StableOutlook”,7June2016,seehttps://www.fitchratings.com/site/pressrelease?id=1005684,accessed11June2016.759EDF,“Lesgrandschantiersdunucléairecivil—Le‘grandcarénage’duparcnucléairedeproductiond’EDF”,14January2014.760AREVA,seehomepagewww.areva.com,accessed25May2015.


CreditagencyStandard&Poor’s(S&P)downgradedAREVAto“junk”(BB+)inNovember2014761,andbyanothertwonotchestoBB-,deepintothespeculativedomaininMarch2015.762Then,inDecember 2015, following further revelations on the extent of its financial problems, S&P’sdowngradedthestockfurthertoB+,aninvestmentclassdescribedas“highlyspeculative”.763Bytheendof-June2016,AREVA’ssharepricehadplungedtobelow€3.30(US$3.75)andhadlost95percentofitspeak2007value.

Beyond the capital injection, AREVA will have some income, estimated at €2.5 billion(US$2.8 billion), from the sale of its reactor division AREVA NP to a holding that would bemajority-owned by EDF. The scenario is not without risks as the takeover could turn out toexacerbateEDF’sowndifficulties:thetwolargelystate-ownedfirmshavelongbeenintimatelylinked by transactions and dependencies, and the French state itself does not have infinitecapacitytosupportlong-termlosses.

ASN Chief Pierre-Franck Chevet, in his presentation of the Annual Report 2015 to themedia,stated that “the nuclear safety and radiation protection situation is of major concern” andrequested“asignificantincreaseinitsresources”.764Acallthat,asofmid-2016,hasnotyetbeenheard. ASN wishes to increase the combined workforce of ASN and its technical backup, theInstituteforRadiologicalProtectionandNuclearSafety(IRSN),by140to150people,whilethegovernmentgrantedonlyanincreaseof30staffoverthecomingthreeyears.

Renewable energy development has been slow in France and the biggest share remains largehydropower,butforthefirsttimein2014,newrenewables(otherthanhydropower)generatedmorepowerthanfossilfuels.WindpowercapacityadditionshaveacceleratedwithanotherGWin2015after1.1GWin2014,toreachatotalof10.3GW.Lessthan1GWofsolarwasinstalledin2014and2015,andcumulatedcapacityreached6.2GWattheendof2015.Overthepastyear,windcovered4.5percentofnationalelectricityconsumptionversusa1.6percentcontributionofsolarphotovoltaics.765

Germany’spost-3/11decisiontoshutdownimmediatelyeightofits17operatingreactorsandphaseouttheremainingnineuntil2022triggeredcommentsaroundtheworld,fromdisbeliefto certitudeof failure. That this choicewas ledby a conservative, pro-business, and, until theFukushimadisaster, verypro-nuclearGovernment, led byphysicist ChancellorAngelaMerkel,withnopoliticalpartydissenting,makesitvirtuallyirreversibleunderanypoliticalconstellation.This decisionwas based on a decades-long debate in German societywith nuclear phase-outlegislationinplacesince2001,thathadbeenamendedonlyinSeptember2010inordertoallow

761S&P,“FrenchNuclearGroupAREVADowngradedTo‘BB+/B’OnExpectedMoreNegativeCashFlows;OutlookNegative”,20November2014.762S&P,“FrenchNuclearGroupAREVADowngradedto‘BB-’onFurtherProfitChallengesandCashBurn;OutlookDeveloping”,5March2015.763Reuters,“S&PsaysArevadowngradedto'B+'–RTRS”,22December2015,seehttp://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/AREVA.PAp/key-developments/article/3314652,accessed26May2016.764ASN,“Thenuclearsafetyandradiationprotectionsituationisofmajorconcern.ASNisremainingvigilant”,PressRelease,22January2016,seehttp://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Information/News-releases/The-nuclear-safety-and-radiation-protection-situation-is-of-major-concern,accessed11June2016.765RTE,“2015AnnualElectricityReport”,March2016.


forlifetimeextensions,before3/11triggeredthedecisiontogobacktothephase-outplan(seeearlierWNISReditionsfordetails).

Nuclearpowerplantsstillgenerated86.8TWhnetin2015—46percentlessthanintheirrecordyear2001—andprovided14.1percentofGermany’sgrosselectricitygeneration,lessthanhalfoftherenewablescontributionandlessthanhalfofthehistoricmaximumof30.8percentin1997.

Thenuclearsectorwasshakenbyaninspection-protocolfalsificationscandal,apparentlythefirstofitskindinGermany,whenitcametolightthatthreeemployeesofasubcontractorcompanyofoperatorEnBWhad,inatleastnineinstancesinlate2015,fakeddocumentationforinspectionsof incidentmonitoring equipment at Philippsburg unit 2 that had not been carried out. In 15further cases, dating irregularities were identified. The Environment Ministry of Bade-Wurttemberg, the nuclear safety authority in charge, ordered to keep the plant down until athoroughinvestigationhadbeencarriedoutandprocedureschangedforsuchincidentsnottooccur again.766 The annual inspection period was extended to nearly two months until1June2016,whenthereactorcamebackonline.

Germanypowerexportsincreasedby71.5percenttoarecord60.9TWhnetin2015767,thatisabout10percentof theGermanelectricitygenerationand justbelow theFrenchpower tradebalance.Themaindriver for exports arebulkpowerprices,whichwere the second lowest inEuropebehindScandinavia.Nuclearoperators inGermany, the traditional virtually integratedutilities, are strugglingwith lowpricesas their counterparts inother countries (fordetailsonshare-price developments and credit-rating see the Nuclear Finances Chapter). E.ON lost€6.4billionand36percentof itsmarketvaluein2015,butstartedin-depthrestructuringandreduceditsdebtby€5.7billion(17percent).768RWEmadeaprofitof€1.1billioninadifficultmarketenvironmentandreduceditsdebtloadbyalmost19percentto€25.1billion,butrecordeddramaticallyreducedfreecashflow(by81percent)andrestrainedfrompayinganydividends.Consequently,RWEshareslost54percentoftheirvalueovertheyear.769EnBWfiledapositive2015result,significantlysupportedbyaboostofover50percentofrenewablepowersales.Netdebt decreased by 15.6 percent to €6.7 billion. The EnBW strategy focuses clearly on thecontinuedSolarphotovoltaicsystemscumulateabout40GWinstalledcapacity,whichgenerated38.4TWh in2015.Total installedwind capacity is nowabout45GW.Onshorewind turbinesincreasedgeneration inanexcellentwind-yearby42percent to reach79.3TWhandoffshorewindpowergenerationtookoff,supplying8.7TWhthatissixtimesmorethanin2014.770

Theuseofrenewablesintheprimaryenergymixalsocontinuestogrow.Whiletheconsumptionof all fossil fuels—with the exception of natural gas,which increasedby 5 percent—declined,renewablescontributionincreasedbyalmost10percentandcontributesnow12.5percenttothe

766MinisteriumfürUmwelt,KlimaundEnergiewirtschaftBadenWürttemberg,“VorgetäuschteSicherheitsprüfungenimKernkraftwerkPhilippsburg2(KKP2)”,27May2016,(inGerman),seehttp://um.baden-wuerttemberg.de/de/umwelt-natur/kernenergie-und-radioaktivitaet/aktuelle-informationen/aktuelle-meldungen/vorgetaeuschte-sicherheitspruefungen-kkp-2/,accessed13June2016.767Agora,“DieEnergiewendeimStromsector:StandderDinge2015”,7January2016.768E.ON,“2015AnnualReport”,March2016,seewww.eon.com/content/dam/eon-com/ueber-uns/publications/EON_Annual_Report_2015_EN.pdf,accessed2July2016.769RWE,“AnnualReport2015”,March2016,seewww.eon.com/content/dam/eon-com/ueber-uns/publications/EON_Annual_Report_2015_EN.pdf,accessed2July2016.770EnergibilanzenAG,“EnergyConsumptioninGermany2015”,April2015.


primaryenergymix,morethanligniteandaboutthesamelevelashardcoalwith12.7percent.Biomasscontributeswith57percentbyfarthelargestportiontotherenewablesshare,followedbywindwith19percentandsolarwithabout10percent.771increaseoftherenewablecapacitybasethatincreasedfrom19.1percentto23.6percentin2015.772VattenfallGermanyresultsaredifficulttoassessastheyare incorporatedintotheSwedishgovernmentownedGroupresults.Vattenfallisnotlisted.Overall,VattenfallGrouplost€2.1billioninspiteofincreasingsales.

Renewableswereagain the largestcontributor to thepowermixandsupplied30.1percentofgross national electricity consumption—more than lignite with 23.8 percent, hard coal18.1percent,andnaturalgas9.1percent.Whilethecontributionfromallfossilfuelsourcesandnuclearenergydeclined,renewablesincreasedby20.5percentto195.9TWh.

On6June2011,theGovernmentpassedfar-reachingenergytransitionlegislationthatpassedtheBundestagon31July2011almostbyconsensusandcameintoforceon6August2011.

Theseven-partnewlawsaddressedmanyaspectsofenergyconsumptionandproduction.Keyelementsincluded:

• NuclearoperatinglicenseswillexpireoncetheproductioncreditisusedupandatthelatestaccordingtoTable17.Thismeantthattheeightunitsthathadbeenshutdownafter3/11losttheiroperatinglicensewiththecomingintoforceofthelegislation.

• Theproductioncreditcanbetransferredfromoldertonewerplants.

Inadditiontothesedecisions,theGermanGovernmentdecidedon12June2014toruleoutforthefutureanyloanguaranteesfortheexportofnuclearfacilities,neworexisting.

On27June2015,sixmonthsearlierthanrequiredbylaw,E.ONshutdowntheGrafenrheinfeldreactor.Refuelingturnedoutuneconomicfortheremaininglicenseperiod.773

Germanyalsomadenotableprogressinenergyefficiency,andgrosselectricityconsumptionin2014wasthelowestin15years.Whilethemildwinter2014-15softenedenergyconsumptioninallEuropeancountries,thetemperaturesensitivityinFrance,774forexample,was4.5timeshigherthan inGermany. In2014,Germany’s fossil-fueledpowergenerationreacheda35-year low775,

771Ibidem.772EnBW,“EnBWremainsoncoursedespitedifficultconditions-renewableenergiesexperiencelargeboostinearning”,PressRelease,21March2016,seehttps://www.enbw.com/company/press/press-releases/press-release-details_127552.html,accessed13June2016.773E.ON,“SicherbiszumletztenTag:Nach33JahrenerfolgreichemBetriebstelltdasKernkraftwerkGrafenrheinfelddieStromproduktionein”,28June2015,(inGerman),seehttp://www.eon.com/de/presse/pressemitteilungen/pressemitteilungen/2015/6/28/sicher-bis-zum-letzten-tag-nach-33-jahren-erfolgreichem-betrieb-stellt-das-kernkraftwerk-grafenrheinfeld-die-stromproduktion-ein.html,accessed18June2016.774Francehasahighlevelofelectricspaceheatinginthehousingsector,causingthehighesttemperaturesensitivityinEurope.Whenthethermometerdrops1°Cinwinter,thecapacityneedincreasesby2.4GW.SeeRTE,“2014AnnualElectricityReport”,29January2015.775RenewablesInternational,“Plummetingdemand,renewablesslightlyupandfossilpowergenerationata35yearlow”,22December2014,seehttp://www.renewablesinternational.net/plummeting-demand-renewables-slightly-up-and-fossil-power-generation-at-a-35-year-low/150/407/84355/,accessed18June2016.


andcoal-firedgenerationfellbacktothe2010–11leveldespitetherecordpowerexports.776In2015,thetrendpersisted:whilepowergenerationincreasedby3.8percent—entirelycoveredbyrenewables—fossilfuelconsumptioninthepowersectorcontinuedtodeclineforallsources—lignite,hardcoal,naturalgasandoil—whileelectricityexportssoared.

Table17:LegalClosureDatesforGermanNuclearReactors2011-2022ReactorName

(Type,NetCapacity) Owner/Operator FirstGridConnection

EndofLicense(latestclosuredate)

Biblis-A(PWR,1167MW)

Biblis-B(PWR,1240MW)

Brunsbüttel(BWR,771MW)

Isar-1(BWR,878MW)

Krümmel(BWR,1346MW)

Neckarwestheim-1(PWR,785MW)

Philippsburg-1(BWR,890MW)

Unterweser(BWR,1345MW)

RWE

RWE

KKWBrunsbüttel777

E.ON

KKWKrümmel778

EnBW

EnBW

E.ON

1974

1976

1976

1977

1983

1976

1979

1978

6August2011

Grafenrheinfeld(PWR,1275MW) E.ON 198131December2015

(closed27June2015)

Gundremmingen-B(BWR,1284MW) KKWGundremmingen779 1984 31December2017

Philippsburg-2(PWR,1402MW) EnBW 1984 31December2019

Brokdorf(PWR,1410MW)

Grohnde(PWR,1360MW)

Gundremmingen-C(BWR,1288MW)

E.ON/Vattenfall780

E.ON

KKWGundremmingen

1986

1984

1984

31December2021

Isar-2(PWR,1410MW)

Emsland(PWR,1329MW)

Neckarwestheim-2(PWR,1310MW)

E.ON

KKWLippe-Ems781

EnBW

1988

1988

1989

31December2022

Notes:PWR=PressurizedWaterReactor;BWR=BoilingWaterReactor;RWE=Rheinisch-WestfälischesElektrizitätswerk

Sources:Atomgesetz,31July2011,AtomforumKernenergieMay2011;IAEA-PRIS2012

776CraigMorris,“Coalpowerdown,renewablesupinGermany”,RenewablesInternational,2July2015,seehttp://www.renewablesinternational.net/coal-power-down-renewables-up-in-germany/150/537/88583/,accessed3July2015.777Vattenfall66,67%,E.ON33,33%.778Vattenfall50%,E.ON50%.779RWE75%,E.ON25%.780E.ON80%,Vattenfall20%.781RWE87,5%,E.ON12,5%.


TheNetherlandsoperatesasingle,43-year-old480MWPWRthatprovided3.9TWhor3.7percentofthecountry’spowerin2015,downfromamaximumof6.2percentin1986.782InJune2006, theoperator and theGovernment reachedan agreement to allowoperationof thereactoruntil2033.783GreenpeaceNetherlandshasvoicedconcernsaboutthesafetyofBorssele,inparticularsinceanear-bycoalpowerstationwasshutdowninlate2015andpowersupplywouldlackredundancy.“Ifthepoweronthegridisunavailableforsomereason,allpowermustcomefromthere[theemergencydieselgenerators]”,JoeriendeLegeofGreenpeacestated.784

InJanuary2012,theutilityDELTAannounceditwasputtingoffthedecisiononnuclearnew-build“for a few years” and that there would be “no second nuclear plant at Borssele for the timebeing”.785Noutilityiscurrentlyshowinganyinterestinpursuingnewbuild.Onthecontrary,thenuclearutilitiesarestrugglingwithshrinkingincomeandincreasingcosts.GermanutilityRWEthatholds30percentofBorsseleoperatorEPZ,reportsfor2015a29percentdropinequityvalueof itsEPZholdingandpracticallyawipe-outof its income(–95percent)comparedto2013.786DutchutilityDeltathatholdsthemajority70percentofEPZisloosingmoneyandisundergoingfundamentalrestructuring.787

In June 2014, EPZ started the use of plutonium Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel at Borssele. EPZ iscurrentlytheonlyremainingforeigncustomerforcommercialspentfuelofAREVA’sLaHaguereprocessingplant.Theplanistoconsumealloftheplutoniumthatisseparatedinasmuchas40percentMOXinthecore.788

TheNetherlands illustrates thesignificanceof theEuropeanpowermarket for theoperationalmodeofnationalelectricitygeneratingcapacities.ThedramaticdropinwholesalepowerpricesinGermanyduetotheriseinrenewables,combinedwithlowcoalandrelativelyhighnaturalgasprices,hasledGermanutilitiestoshutdowntheirgas-firedpowerplantsintheNetherlandsandimportpowerfromGermany.TheNetherlandsimported16TWhnetfromGermanyin2015.789

Spain operates seven reactors. Nuclear plants provided 54.8 TWh or 20.3 percent of thecountry’s electricity in 2015 (with amaximumof 38.4 percent in 1989). Beyond the de-factomoratorium that has been in place for decades, the previous Premier Jose Luis Zapatero

782BP,“StatisticalReviewofWorldEnergy”,June2014.783WNA,“NuclearPowerintheNetherlands”,Updated27November2014,seewww.world-nuclear.org/info/inf107.html,accessed2June2013.784NLTimes,“GreepeaceconcernedaboutBorsselenuclearplant”,18May2016,seehttp://www.nltimes.nl/2016/05/18/greenpeace-concerned-about-borssele-nuclear-plant-safety/,accessed2July2016.785DELTA,“DELTAputsoffdecisionforafewyears,nosecondnuclearplantatBorsseleforthetimebeing”,PressRelease,23January2012.786RWE,“AnnualReport2015”,March2016.787Delta,“AnnualReport2015”,2016.788NEI,“BorsselemovestoMOX”,11March2015,seewww.neimagazine.com/features/featureborssele-moves-to-mox-4530062/,accessed18June2016.789AgoraEnergiewende,“DieEnergiewendeimStromsektor:StandderDinge2015”,7January2016,(inGerman)seehttps://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2016/Jahresauswertung_2016/Agora_Jahresauswertung_2015_web.pdf ,accessed2July2016.


announcedinApril2004thathisgovernmentwould“graduallyabandon”nuclearenergy,whileincreasingfundingforrenewableenergy.Thefirstunit(JoséCabrera)wasshutdownattheendof2006.Zapateroconfirmedthenuclearphase-outgoalfollowinghisreelectionin2008,andthenIndustryMinisterMiguelSebastianhasstatedthat“therewillbenonewnuclearplants”.790Asofmid-June2016, intheabsenceofanestablishednewgovernment,thereisnoclearvisibilityofnationalenergypolicyinSpain.

Spanishnuclearoperatorshavebeenimplementingbothupratingsandlifeextensionsforexistingfacilities that increased nominal capacity by around 10 percent. Furtherminor upratings areplanned.791ThenuclearlobbyorganizationForoNuclearclaimsthatover80percentunderthepost-Fukushima National Action Plan scheduled safety measures had been implemented byMarch2016.792InFebruary2011,theSpanishparliamentamendedtheSustainableEnergyLaw,deletingfromthetextareferencetoa40-yearlifetimelimitationandleavingnuclearshareandlifetimetobedeterminedbythegovernment.793Nevertheless,on16December2012,Garoñawasshut down permanently. The operator Nuclenor had calculated that further operation of the446MWplantwouldnotbeeconomic.TheCabinetoftheGovernmentelectedinNovember2011approvedinFebruary2014aRoyalDecreethatwouldenableanyrecentlyshutreactors,inthiscaseGaroña, to re-apply for theiroperatingreactorswithin thenext12months. InMay2014,Nuclenorappliedforanewlicensetooperateuntil2031.794However,thereisstillnoofficialtimescheduleforrestart.TheSpanishparliament,withthesupportofmostoftherepresentedparties,includingPSOEandPodemos,passedamotionagainstGaroñarestart.795Elevenmayorsoftownsinthevicinityoftheplanthaveprotestedagainsttheproposedrestartandcalledfortheclosureoftheunittobeconfirmed.796

More recently, oppositionhas also been voiced in neighboringPortugal against the continuedoperationofthetwoaging35-and33-year-oldreactorsatAlmaraz.AccordingtotwoMembersofthe European Parliament (MEP), in a written question to the European Commission, on29 April 2016, the Portuguese Parliament adopted a resolution “recommending that thegovernmenttakeallthenecessaryinitiativesvis-à-vistheSpanishStateandEuropeaninstitutionswith the aim of ensuring that the Almaraz power plant is closed down”.797 The Portuguese

790Reuters,“SpainInsistsonEnergySaving,NotNuclearPlants”,21January2009.791IEA,“EnergyPoliciesofIEACountries—Spain2015Review”,2015.792ForoNuclear,“Spanishnuclearplants5yearsafterFukushima”,4March2016,seehttp://www.foronuclear.org/en/news/latest-news/122104-spanish-nuclear-power-plants-5-years-after-fukushima,accessed2July2016.793WNN,“NoLimitsforSpanishReactors”,17February2011,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-No_limits_for_Spanish_reactors-1702117.html,accessed2July2016.794Nuclenor,“NuclenorsubmitsapplicationtorenewtheoperatinglicenceoftheplantGaroña”,PressRelease,27May2014.795SpanishNewsToday,“GreenpeaceactivistsprotestatBurgosnuclearpowerplantreopeningplans”,17February2016,seehttp://spanishnewstoday.com/greenpeace-activists-protest-at-burgos-nuclear-power-plant-reopening-plans_62450-a.html,accessed2July2016.796EITB,“MayorsurgeEUtomonitorthepossiblere-openingofGaroña”,17June2014.797AnaGomes(S&D),MarisaMatias(GUE/NGL),“Subject:Almaraznuclearpowerplant”,ParliamentaryQuestions,QuestionforwrittenanswertotheCommission,Rule130,EuropeanParliament,12May2016,Updated24May2016,seehttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2016-003944+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN,accessed2July2016.


Environment Protection Agency Quercus has joined the calls for an Almaraz shutdown, as itconstitutes“apotentialdangertotheborderarea”.798

Sweden operates eight reactors that provided54.5TWh—a12.5 percent plunge over thepreviousyear—or34.3percentofthecountry’selectricityin2015,7.2percentagepointsdownfrom2014and18percentpointsdownfromamaximumof52.4percentin1996.Ringhals-2didnot generate anypower in 2015 and entered the LTO category.Hydropowerwas the largestelectricity source in2015,providing47percent.Windpowergenerateda record16.6TWh—almost 45 percentmore than in 2014—and contributed 10 percent to the national electricityproduction.

Swedenisalargepowerexporter.In2015,netexportsgrewtohistoricmaximumof22.6TWhorrepresented17percentoftheelectricityconsumedinthecountryor41.5percentofthenucleargeneration.799

Swedendecidedina1980referendumtophaseoutnuclearpowerby2010.Thereferendumtookplaceatatimewhenonlysixoutofaplanned12reactorswereoperating,withtheothersixstillunderconstruction.Itwasthereforeeffectivelya“programlimitation”ratherthana“phase-out”referendum.Swedenretainedthe2010phase-outdateuntilthemiddleofthe1990s,butanactivedebateonthecountry’snuclearfuturecontinuedandledtoanewinter-partydealtostartthephase-outearlierbutabandonthe2010deadline.Thefirstreactor(Barsebäck-1)wasshutdownin1999andthesecondone(Barsebäck-2)in2005.

On 5 February 2009, the parties of Sweden’s conservative coalition government signed anagreementonenergyandclimatepolicythatproposedambitiousrenewableenergyandenergyefficiency targets and called for the scrappingof theNuclearPhase-OutAct. In June2010, theparliamentvotedbyatightmargin(174–172)toabandonthephase-outlegislation.800Asaresult,newplants could again be built—but only if an existing plant is shut down, so themaximumnumber of operating units will not exceed the current ten. In January 2014, the state utilityVattenfallstarteda“decade-longpublicconsultation”ontheconstructionofnewnuclearpowerplants.801 The latest “traditional Swedish compromise”, according to EnergyMinister IbrahimBaylan802,betweentheRed-GreenGovernmentandthreeoppositionpartiesconfirmsthebaselineofthe2010agreement,andfixesa2040targetfora100percentrenewableelectricitymix.Italsoallowsforthebuildingofnewreactors,but,asinthepreviousagreement,onlyinreplacementandnotinadditiontoexistingones.Inaddition,theagreementstipulates:“Governmentsupportfor

798PortugalNewsOnline,“PortugaljoinscallstoshutdownAlmaraznuclearpowerplant”,28April2016,seehttp://www.theportugalnews.com/news/portugal-joins-calls-to-shut-down-almaraz-nuclear-power-plant/38075,accessed15June2016.799SwedishEnergyAgency,“2015varettårmedstorelproduktionochrekordstorexportavel”,11February2016,(inSwedish),seehttp://www.energimyndigheten.se/nyhetsarkiv/2016/2015-var-ett-ar-med-stor-elproduktion-och-rekordstor-export-av-el/,accessed15June2016.800NEI,“SwedishGovernmentOverturnsNuclearBan”,21June2010.801WNA,“NuclearPowerinSweden”,UpdatedApril2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Sweden/,accessed29May2015.802FinancialTimes,“BoosttonuclearenergyasSwedenagreestobuildmorereactors”,10June2016,seehttps://next.ft.com/content/b44e3214-2f13-11e6-bf8d-26294ad519fc,accessed2July2016.


nuclearenergy,intheformofdirectorindirectsubsidies,cannotbecountedupon”.803However,it removes the capacity tax on nuclear powerwithin two years. Vattenfall's CEOMagnusHallcommented:“Theabolishmentofthenuclearcapacitytaxisanimportantpreconditionforustobe able to consider the investments needed to secure the long-term operation of our nuclearreactorsfromthe1980s”,butadded:“Evenwiththeabolishmentofthecapacitytax,profitabilitywillbeachallenge.”804Intheweekspriortotheenergycompromise,Vattenfallhad“threatened”thatallremainingninereactorswouldbeclosedintheearly2020s if thecapacitytaxwasnotremoved.805

Vattenfall envisagedextending lifetimesof fiveof its sevenunits at ForsmarkandRinghals to60 years. The previous objective for Ringhals-1 and -2was a 50-year lifetime.806However, inApril2015,Vattenfalldecided“tochangedirectionforoperationallifetimesofRinghals-1and-2”807andbyOctober2015,itwasdecidedthatRinghals-1wouldshutdownin2020andRinghals-2 in2019.The reasonsgivenwere continued lowelectricityprices and increasingproductioncosts.AsforVattenfall’sfiveotherreactors(Ringhals-3and4,Forsmark-1to-3),thepreviouslyplanned “at least 60 years of operational lifetime, until the beginning of 2040s, remains”.Following the energy agreement, theVattenfall Board ofDirectors decided to engage into theinvestmentsinindependentcore-coolingsystemsforthethreeForsmarkreactors,aprerequisiteforcontinuedoperationsbeyond2020thatwasimposedbythesafetyauthorities.808

Swedishoperatorshavepushedupratingprojectstoover30percent.OKG,thesecondSwedishoperator, implemented a 33 percent uprate at Oskarshamn-3 with a two-year delay. AtOskarshamn-2,shutdownsinceJune2013,a38percentcapacityincreasewasunderway,buthasbeen “indefinitely postponed” in June 2015.809 In March 2015, OKG had estimated that themodernization will be completed “before the turn of the year”, adding that “this is clearly amiscalculationcomparedwiththeoriginaltimeestimatefortheseworks,whichwerestartedinJune 2013”.810 Vattenfall had cancelled its planned 14 percent uprate for Forsmark-3 inNovember2014,statingthatthe“profitabilitycalculationforthepowerincreaseatForsmark-3hasdeterioratedsincetheissuewaslastdiscussedbytheboardaboutayearago”.811Indeed,in

803SwedishNuclearSociety/Analysgruppen,“TheSwedishenergypolicyagreementof10June2016”,unofficialtranslation,undated.804WNN,“Swedenabolishesnucleartax”,10June2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Sweden-abolishes-nuclear-tax-1006169.html,accessed15June2016.805PiE,“Swedennuclearexit‘infiveyears’,23May2016.806Vattenfall,“Vattenfallplanstoprovidenuclearpowerforupto60years”,PressRelease,22May2013,seehttps://corporate.vattenfall.com/press-and-media/press-releases/press-releases-import/vattenfall-plans-to-provide-nuclear-power-for-up-to-60-years/,accessed18June2016.807Vattenfall,“VattenfallchangesdirectionforoperationallifetimesofRinghals1and2”,PressRelease,28April2016,seehttp://corporate.vattenfall.com/news-and-media/press-releases/2015/vattenfall-changes-direction-for-operational-lifetimes-of-ringhals-1-and-2/,accessed18June2016.808Vattenfall,“VattenfallwillinvestinForsmark”,15June2016,seehttps://corporate.vattenfall.com/press-and-media/press-releases/2016/vattenfall-will-invest-in-forsmark/,accessed18June2016.809WNN,“Oskarshamn2uprateputonhold”,17June2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Oskarshamn-2-uprate-put-on-hold-1706155.html,accessed18June2016.810OKG,“TotalsafetymodernisationofOskarshamn2completedbeforetheturnoftheyear”,13March2015,seehttp://www.okg.se/en/Media/Archive-2015/Total-safety-modernisation-of-Oskarshamn-2-completed-before-the-turn-of-the-year/,accessed18June2016.811WNN,“Forsmark3powerupratecancelled”,24November2014,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Forsmark-3-power-uprate-cancelled-2411145.html,accessed2July2016.


June 2015, E.ON, themajority owner of Oskarshamn-2, said it wanted to shut down the unitbecause it was unprofitable to operate, even though minority owner Fortum disagreed.812Oskarshamn-1isnowscheduledtogoofflineasearlyas2017.

In 2015, theUnited Kingdom operated 16 reactors, which provided 63.9 TWh or18.9percentofthecountry’selectricity,downfromamaximumof26.9percentin1997.TheU.K.nuclearpowerplantoperatorsEDFEnergyandMagnoxLtd.donottransmitloadfactordatatoNuclearEngineeringInternational(NEI).DatapublishedintheIAEA-PRISdatabaseindicatethattheaverageloadfactorfortheU.K.reactorsin2015was76.3percent813,upfrom69.4percentin2014,butstillwellbelowitsEuropeancounterparts.

The11first-generationMagnoxplants,ninewithtwinreactorsandtwowithfourreactors,hadallbeenretiredbythestartof2015,exceptforWylfa-1,whichwasclosedattheendof2015.TheU.K.’s seven second-generationnuclear stations, eachwith twoAdvancedGas-cooledReactors(AGR),arealsoatorneartheendoftheirdesignlives.However,ownerEDFEnergyisplanningtoextendthelifeofalltheAGRs,andannouncedinJanuary2015thatitplannedtoseeka5-yearextensionto2024foritsHeysham-1andHartlepoolplantsanda10-yearextensionto2030foritsHeysham-2andTornessplants.814Thenewestplant,Sizewell-B,istheonlyPWRintheU.K.andwascompletedin1995.

In2006,theLabourGovernmentofTonyBlairstartedtoorganizetheframeworkofanew-buildprogram.InJuly2011,theGovernmentreleasedtheNationalPolicyStatement(NPS)forNuclearPower Generation.815 The eight “potentially suitable” sites considered in the document fordeployment“beforetheendof2025”areexclusivelycurrentorpastnuclearpowerplantsitesinEngland or Wales, except for one new site, Moorside, adjacent to the fuel chain facilities atSellafield.816NorthernIrelandandScotland817arenotincluded.

EDFEnergy,majority-ownedbyFrenchstateutilityEDF,wasgivenplanningpermissiontobuildtworeactorsatHinkleyPoint inApril2013. InOctober2015,EDFandtheU.K.Government818announcedupdatestotheOctober2013provisionalagreementofcommercialtermsofthedeal

812WNA,“NuclearpowerinSweden”,Updated17June2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Sweden/,accessed2July2016.813TheIAEAcalculatesitsloadfactorsonthecurrentratherthanthedesignratingoftheplant.MostoftheU.K.reactorsareunabletooperateatdesignratingandactualcapacityis10percentbelowdesigncapacity.Calculatingloadfactoronthebasisofdesignrating,aswouldbemoreappropriate,wouldreducetheaveragetoabout70percent.814WNN,“EDFEnergyextendslivesofUKAGRplants”,16February2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-EDF-Energy-extends-lives-of-UK-AGR-plants-1602164.html,accessed18June2016.815DECC,“NationalPolicyStatementforNuclearPowerGeneration”,July2011.816Bradwell,Hartlepool,Heysham,HinkleyPoint,Oldbury,Sizewell,Sellafield,andWylfa.817TheScottishgovernmentisopposedtonew-buildandsaiditwouldnotallowreplacementoftheTornessandHunterstonplantsoncetheyareshutdown(probablyin2016and2023,respectively).Only18percentoftheScottishpeoplesupportednew-buildinapre-Fukushimapoll;seeTheScotsman,“Only18%ofScotsSay‘Yes’toNewNuclearPowerStations”,27September2010.818DepartmentofEnergyandClimateChange,“HinkleyPointCtopowersixmillionUKhomes”,U.K.Government,21October2015,seehttps://www.gov.uk/government/news/hinkley-point-c-to-power-six-million-uk-homes,accessed18June2016.


forthe£16billion(US$30billion)overnightcostofconstructionofHinkleyC.819Sincethen,EDFhasrepeatedlyannounceditsintentiontomakeaFinalInvestmentDecisionbutbymid-2016,nosuchdecisionhadbeentaken,norisoneexpectedbeforeSeptember2016.ThekeypointsofthedealwereaContractForDifference(CFD),effectivelyaguaranteedrealelectricitypricefor35years,whichdependingon thenumberofunitsultimatelybuilt,wouldbebetween£89.5 and£92.5/MWh(US$152.6–157.7/MWh),withannualincreaseslinkedtotheretailpriceindex.Thecompletiondatewasputbackfrom2023to2025withfirstconcreteexpectedin2019.Therewasanexpectationthatconstructionwouldbeprimarilyfundedbydebt(borrowing)backedbyU.K.sovereign loan guarantees, expected to be about £17 billion (US$26.9 billion). However, inOctober EDF claimed it expected to finance its part of the finance from equity (own funds),suggestingitwouldbe“moreefficient”.820EDFannouncedinNovember2015itsintentiontosellnon-coreassetsworthupto€10billiontohelpfinanceHinkleybutbyMay2016,noprogresshadbeenmadewiththesesales.821ByMay2016,itwasnotclear,whetherthiswasachoiceorwhetheritwasforcedonitbyconditionsimposedbytheU.K.governmentitcouldnotmeet.TheEDFCEO,Bernard Levy, wrote to EDF employees inMarch 2016 saying EDFwould not go aheadwithHinkley “unless it getsmore financial support from the French state.”822 The type of financialsupportrequiredwasnotspecified,leavingtheoptionthatFrenchloanguaranteesweresoughtopen.

TheexpectedcompositionoftheconsortiumowningtheplanthadchangedfromOctober2013toOctober 2015. In 2013, it was expected to comprise EDF (up to 50 percent), two Chinesecompanies, CGN and CNNC (up to 40 percent), and AREVA (up to 10 percent), with up to15percentstilltobedetermined.InOctober2015,theeffectivebankruptcyofAREVAmadetheircontributionimpossible,theChinesestakehadfallento33.5percentandtheotherinvestorshadnotmaterializedleavingEDFwith66.5percent.TheOctoberannouncementmentionedonlyCGNleavingtheimpressionCNNChaddroppedout,butinMay2016,CNNCmadeitcleartheyexpectedtoparticipateinthe33.5percentChinesestake.823

OneothernewelementwasthattheChinesestakeinthefollow-onSizewellCprojectwouldbereducedto20percentleavingEDFwith80percent.GiventheproblemsEDFishavingfinancingHinkley,thismakestheSizewellprojectappearimplausible.However,EDFisallowingCGNtousetheBradwellsiteithadboughtasback-up,ifeithertheHinkleyorSizewellsitesprovednottobeviable.CGNplanstobuilditsowntechnology,HualongOne(orHPR-1000)atthissite.824ItexpectstosubmitthedesigntotheU.K.’sOfficeforNuclearRegulation(ONR)in2016forreviewunder

819The2013and2015figuresareallin2012moneyunlessotherwisespecified.820TheTelegraph,“NewnuclearplantatHinkleyPointtobeginconstruction'withinweeks'”,21October2015,seehttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/energy/nuclearpower/11945485/Nuclear-go-ahead-construction-of-new-plant-to-begin-within-weeks.html,accessed2July2016.821FinancialTimes,“EDFlookstosell€10bnofassetstoboostbalancesheet”,seehttp://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fcd6a462-7578-11e5-a95a-27d368e1ddf7.html,accessed4July2016.822Reuters,“UPDATE2-EDFsaysnonewHinkleyPointreactorswithoutmoreFrenchstatehelp”,11March2016,seehttp://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL5N16J4TT,accessed18June2016.823TheTimes,“ChinesegiveHinkleyPointnuclearprojectaboost”,9May2016.824CGN,“AgreementsinplaceforconstructionofHinkleyPointCnuclearpowerstation”,PressRelease,21October2016,seehttp://en.cgnpc.com.cn/n1017152/n1017227/c1141640/content.html,accessed18June2016.


theGenericDesignAssessmentprogram,aprocessexpectedtotakeabout4years.825PlansareatanearlystageandbyMay2016,notimescalesoreventhenumberofreactorsproposedhadbeenannounced.

The October 2013 announcement led to formal State Aid notification of the proposal to theEuropean Commission, and on 18 December 2013, the Commission announced it wasinvestigatingthedeal.On8October2014,onlydaysbeforeheleftoffice,CommissionerJoaquinAlmuniaannouncedtheCommission'sauthorizationof thestateaidscheme.826Thedecision isbeing challenged by the Austrian and Luxembourg governments and some renewable energyutilities.However,byMay2016,hearingsonthechallengehadnotstarted.

OthernewdelaysweretriggeredbyEPRbuilderAREVA's2015technicalbankruptcy,whichnotonlymakesitvirtuallyimpossibleforAREVAtocontribute10percenttotheinvestmentbutisthrowing the entire nuclear sector in France into great difficulty (see France Focus). Furtheruncertainties arose inApril 2015, after “very serious”material defectswere identified on theFlamanville EPR pressure vessel bottom and lid.827 According to the French regulator, theassessmentof thesafety implicationswill takeat leastuntilDecember2016.Asaresultof theissuesraisedbythedefectiveparts,theFrenchsafetyauthoritiesrequiredAREVAtocarryoutanaudit of quality control procedures. ASN reported that: “They revealed irregularities in themanufacturingchecksonabout400partsproducedsince1965,aboutfiftyofwhichwouldappeartobeinserviceintheFrenchNPPs.Theseirregularitiescompriseinconsistencies,modificationsoromissionsintheproductionfiles,concerningmanufacturingparametersortestresults.”828ByearlyJuly2016,theimplicationsofthesefailingswerenotclearbuttheycouldseriouslyaffecttheviabilityoftherescueofAREVAandofcourse,theHinkleyPointproject(seealsoFranceFocus).

ThedelayswiththeHinkleyprojectmeanthatthetwootherconsortiaconsideringinvestmentinnewnuclearintheU.K.arenow,ontheirownprojections,closetoovertakingtheHinkleyproject.

NuGen, in June 2014, finalized a new ownership structure with Toshiba-Westinghouse(60percent)andGDF-Suez(40percent),asIberdrolasoldtheirshares.ThegroupplanstobuildthreeToshiba-Westinghouse-designedAP1000reactorsattheMoorsidesite,withunitsproposed

825ONR,“Assessingnewnuclearreactordesigns—GenericDesignAssessmentQuarterlyReport(July-October2015)”,OfficeforNuclearRegulation,seehttp://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/reports/gda-quarterly-report-jul-oct15.pdf,accessed18June2016.826EuropeanCommission,“CommissionDecisionof08.10.2014ontheaidmeasureSA.34947(2013/C)(ex2013/N)whichtheUnitedKingdomisplanningtoimplementforSupporttotheHinkleyPointCPowerStation”,8October2014.827Fora4-pagebriefingontheissueseeYvesMarignac,“FabricationFlawsinthePressureVesseloftheEPRFlamanville-3”,WISE-Paris,12April2015,seehttps://www.dropbox.com/s/njavhw7ihvkbyeu/WISE-Paris-Fabrication-Flaws-EPR-Flamanville-Latest.pdf,accessed4July2015.828ASN,“AREVAhasinformedASNofirregularitiesconcerningcomponentsmanufacturedinitsCreusotForgeplant”,NewsRelease,4May2016,seehttp://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Information/News-releases/Irregularities-concerning-components-manufactured-in-its-Creusot-Forge-plant,accessed18June2016.


tobeginoperatingin2024.829However,theAP1000designisnotexpectedtobelicensedbeforeJanuary2017.830

HorizonNuclearwasboughtbyHitachifromE.ONandRWEforanestimatedpriceof£700million(US$1.2billion).ThecompanyhassubmitteditsABWRfortechnicalreview,whilstmakingitclearthatitscontinuationintheprojectwilldependontheoutcomeoftheEDFnegotiationswiththeGovernment.831TheABWR,plannedfortheWylfasite,haspassedthejustificationprocedureatbothHousesofParliament in January2015, theGenericDesignAssessment(GDA) iseven lessadvancedthanthatoftheAP1000andexpectedtobecompletedsometimebyDecember2017.832Ifeverythingdidgoaccordingtoplan,thereactorwouldstartupin2025.833

TheconstantdeclineinenergyandelectricityconsumptionintheU.K.doesnotfavortheeconomiccasefornuclearnew-build.Annualfinalelectricityconsumptionin2015waslittledifferenttothatin 2014 (0.2 percent higher), the lowest consumption level in 17 years. How the U.K. Brexitdecision will influence the prospects for nuclear new-build is highly uncertain, even ifrepresentativesofallU.K.projectswerequicktoascertainthattherewouldbenoimpactontheirplans.

Meanwhile,renewables’shareofelectricitygeneration increasedfrom19.1percent in2014to24.7percentin2015,834overtakingnucleargeneration,andBritishrenewableprojectscontinuetodemonstraterobustlylowermarketpricesthanthepriceguaranteedfor35yearstothelargelyFrench-state-ownedownersofHinkleyPointC—adisparityboundtocreateincreasingpoliticaltensionsintheU.K.

Switzerland is theonlynon-EUWesternEuropeancountry thatoperatesnuclearpowerplants.Itoperatesfivereactorsthat,in2015,generated22.1TWh—adropof16.3percentoverthe previous year—or 33.5 percent of the country’s electricity, down from a maximum of44.4 percent in 1996. The decline of the power generation is due to increased outage times,

829NucNet,“ToshibaFinalisesControllingStakeinUKNuclearCompanyNuGen”,30June2014,seehttp://www.nucnet.org/all-the-news/2014/06/30/toshiba-finalises-controlling-stake-in-uk-nuclear-company-nugen,accessed18June2016.830ONR,“Assessingnewnuclearreactordesigns—GenericDesignAssessmentQuarterlyReport(November2015-January2016)”,undated,seehttp://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/reports/gda-quarterly-report-nov15-jan16.pdf,accessed11May2016.831Telegraph,“HitachireluctantaboutUKnuclearreactorplan”,14April2013,seehttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/9993564/Hitachi-reluctant-about-UK-nuclear-reactor-plan.html,accessed2July2016.832ONR,“Assessingnewnuclearreactordesigns—GenericDesignAssessmentProgressReport,November2015toJanuary2016”,seehttp://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/reports/gda-quarterly-report-nov15-jan16.pdf,accessed2July2016.833WNN,“Horizonclearsjustificationhurdle”,28January2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Horizon-clears-justification-hurdle-2801151.html,accessed2July2016.834DECC,“Statistics–Energytrends—Section5–Electricity”,June2016,seehttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/511931/Electricity.pdf,accessed2July2016.


especially for inspections and vessel head replacements at the twoBeznau reactors, and loadreductionsduetohighairandwatertemperaturesduringthesummer2015.835

With an average age of 41.2 years, Switzerland operates the oldest nuclear fleet and—withBeznau-1,age46andturning47inJuly2016—theoldestreactorintheworld.Inacompelling2014 report, DieterMajer, former Director for Nuclear Facility Safety of the German NuclearRegulator, recommended that especially the reactors Mühleberg and Beznau “should be shutdownimmediately”.836

Figure51:AgeoftheSwissNuclearFleet


Following the reactor pressure vessel problems identified at the Belgian Doel-3/Tihange-2reactors(seeFocusBelgium),inspectionshavebeencarriedoutatthetwoBeznauunits.AtthepressurevesselofBeznau-1,atotalof925crackindications,upto7.5x7.5mminsizeand60mmindepthhavebeen identified.According tooperatorAXPO, thedefaults,withahighdegreeofconfidence, would not be hydrogen flakes, as in the Belgian cases. At the pressure vessel ofBeznau-2, 77 indications have been found with a maximum size of 20 x 50 mm.837 InNovember 2015, the Swiss Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) established an InternationalReviewPaneltore-assesstheintegrityoftheunit1pressurevessel.Theunitremainsshutdown,whilethePanelisworking.Afterevaluationoftheidentifieddefectsinunit2,inDecember2015,ENSIgrantsrestartpermissionforthereactor.

InOctober2013,operatorBKWannouncedthatitwouldcloseitsMühlebergreactorin2019,dueto“indefinableandunquantifiable…technical,economicandpoliticaluncertainties[that]couldincrease the economic risks of long-termoperation.”838 In January2015, the federal regulatoracceptedtheupgradesproposedbytheoperatorinordertocontinueoperatingMühleberguntil

835Swissnuclear,“En2015,lescentralesnucléairessuissesontfournienvironuntiersdenotreélectricité”,PressRelease,26February2016.836DieterMajer,“RisikoAltreaktorenSchweiz”,commissionedbySchweizerischeEnergie-Stiftung(SES),February2014,seehttp://www.energiestiftung.ch/energiethemen/atomenergie/risiken/risiko-altreaktoren/,accessed18June2016.837ChristophPistner,“Beznau:FindingontheRPV”,PresentationatINRAG,27February2016.838NIW,“Switzerland—NewsBriefs”,1November2013.


2019.839 InDecember2015,BKWofficially began the closureprocedure.According to currentplanning,theFederalEnergyDepartmentwilltaketheformalshutdowndecisionbythemiddleof 2018840 and in March 2016, BKW communicated the date, when Mühleberg will bedisconnectedfromthegridasthe20December2019.841

ThenuclearoperatorsinSwitzerland,liketheircolleaguesinothercountries,arestrugglingwithincreasingproductioncostsatagingfacilities,decreasingbulkpowerpricesandstiffcompetition.BeznauoperatorAXPOfiledalossofCHF1billionin2015.Theleakofaninternalstrategypaperof Alpiq, besides AXPO the largest shareholder of the two reactors at Leibstadt and Gösgen,revealedtheutilities'ambitionsforanationalizationoftheloss-makingreactors.842HansWanner,Director of ENSI, started his presentation at the Swiss Energy Foundation'sNuclear PhaseoutCongressinMarch2016withthefollowingstatementoverafullslide:“WemustnotallowpoliticalandeconomicconsiderationstohaveanegativeimpactonthesafetyoftheSwissNPP.”843

Until3/11,thenuclearphase-outoptionnevergainedasufficientmajority,butthe“Swiss-style”referendahavemaintainedaneffectivemoratoriumonanynewprojectoverlongperiodsoftime.Fukushimahadaverysignificant impact inSwitzerland.On8June2011, theSwissparliamentvotedinfavorofthephase-outofnuclearpowerinthecountryattheendoftheprojectedlifetimeofthelastoperatingreactorin2034.

Since then, a number of initiatives have attempted to modify the schedule, seeking either toaccelerate or to slow down the process.While there seems to be a durable consensus in thecountrythatanynew-buildinitiativeisoffthetable,theGovernmenthasinitiatedaprocesscalledEnergyStrategy2050thatdoesnotfixanypreciseshutdowndatesandaimstokeeptheexistingreactorsoperating“aslongastheyaresafe”.On26January2016,theEnergyCommissionoftheFederalAssemblyvotedontheissue,inorderto“eliminatedivergences”.AmajorityvotedinfavorofnotlimitingreactorlifetimesintheframeworkoftheEnergyStrategy2050.844Anewnuclearphase-out initiativehasbeen launchedbyvariousorganizationsandwillbe lead toanationalreferendumon27November2016.Theinitiativeaimsattheultimateconstitutionalprohibitionoftheoperationofnuclearpowerplantsandalifetimelimitationof45yearsfortheoperatingunits,exceptforBeznau-1,thatshouldbeclosedatthelatestoneyearaftertheadoptionoftheconstitutionalchange.845

839ENSI,“ForderungendesENSIfürdenWeiterbetriebdesKernkraftwerksMühlebergbiszurendgültigenAusserbetriebnahmeimJahr2019”,23January2015.840OfficeFédéraldel'Énergie(OFEN),“Calendrieretexplications—1erProcédurededésaffectationdelacentralenucléairedeMühleberg”,4April2016.841BKW,“KernkraftwerkMühleberggehtam20.Dezember2019definitivvomNetz”,2March2016,seehttp://www.bkw.ch/en/about-us/press-releases/detail/news/detail/News/kernkraftwerk-muehleberg-geht-am-20-dezember-2019-definitiv-vom-netz,accessed15June2016.842AlpiqPublicAffairsKonzept2016,FirstDraft,seehttp://www.pdf-archive.com/2016/03/19/alpiq-konzept/preview/page/1/,accessed21June2016.843HansWanner,“UmgangmitälterwerdendenReaktoren”,ENSI,21March2016,seewww.energiestiftung.ch/files/pdf/20160321_npc_hans_wanner.pdf,accessed18June2016. 844SwissFederalAssembly,“Pasdeduréed'exploitationlimitéepourlescentralesnucléairessuisses”,PressRelease,26January2016,(inFrench),seehttps://www.parlament.ch/press-releases/Pages/2016/mm-urek-n-2016-01-26.aspx,accessed2July2016.845SES-MagazinEnergie&Umwelt,“DieBevölkerungmusssichvordenaltenAKWselberschützen”,April2016,seehttp://www.energiestiftung.ch/files/pdf/e-u_2_2016_web.pdf,accessed15June2016.


Central and Eastern Europe

InBulgaria,nuclearpowerprovided15TWhor31.1percentofthecountry’selectricityin2015,downfromamaximumof47.3percentin2002.Atthecountry’sonlynuclearpowerplant,Kozloduy,therearejusttworeactorsoperating,whereoriginallythereweresix;theotherfourreactorswere closedaspart of the agreement forBulgaria to join theEU.The two remainingVVER1000reactorsarecurrentlylicensedtooperateuntil2017and2021,846buttheoperatorhasbegunarelicensingprogramandplanstoextendtheiroperatinglifetimesforupto60years.InOctober 2014, a Franco-Russian consortium consisting of EDF, Rosenergoatom and Rosatomsubsidiary Rusatom Service was awarded a lifetime extension contract for Kozloduy-5. InOctober2015,Rosatomsignedacontractforturbinegeneratorupgradingtobeimplementedonunit 5 by May 2018. In January 2016, Rusatom Service and the Bulgarian company RiskEngineeringsignedanagreementfortheassessmentofthe“technicalconditionandjustificationoftheresidualservicelife”ofKozloduy6.847InMay2016,itwasreportedthatthetechnicalworkonthecompletionofthelife-extensiononunit5hasbeencompleted.848

Therehavebeenongoingattemptssincethemid-1980stobuildanothernuclearpowerplantatBelene inNorthernBulgaria including firms fromBulgaria, France, Germany, andRussia. Thelatest came to a halt in February2013when theParliament finally confirmed the thenPrimeMinister’sdecisiontoabandontheplant.TheGovernmentandindustryhavenowrefocusedtheireffortsonbuildinganotherreactoratKozloduy.InApril2012,theGovernmentannouncedthatanadditionalunitwouldbebuilt“onmarketprinciples, that is,withoutgovernmentmoneyorstateguarantees.”849InDecember2013,theGovernmentapprovedareportfromtheMinistryofEconomyandEnergytoauthorizetheBulgarianEnergyHoldingcompany—whichwouldoperatea new unit—to negotiate with Toshiba (owning 87 percent ofWestinghouse) to become thestrategicinvestorintheconstructionofanAP1000reactor.VendorToshibawastobeaskedtoinvest30percentofthefinalcostsandhelpsecuretheremaining70percentfromforeignlenders,specifically the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the Export-Import Bank of theUnitedStates.Thedeadlineforsigningtheagreementwas30September2014.850Thepotentialinvolvementofnationalexport-importbanksfromtheU.S.andJapanhighlightsthedifficultiesinbuildingareactorwithoutstatesupport.InearlyJune2014,ToshibawithdrewfromtheprojectandwasreplacedbyWestinghouseasthestrategicinvestor,andinAugust2014,Westinghousesigned a “shareholder agreement” committing it to take a 30 percent stake in the project.Furthermore,USVice-PresidentKerryofferedthatWashingtoncouldstudywaysinwhichitcould

846RepublicofBulgaria,“SixthNationalReportundertheConventiononNuclearSafety”,2013(althoughmorerecentpressreportsstatethatthelicenseforunit6expiresin2019.See:NEI,“LifeextensionforBulgaria’sKozloduy6”,1February2016,seehttp://www.neimagazine.com/news/newslife-extension-for-bulgarias-kozloduy-6-4798509,accessed2July2016.847NEI,“LifeextensionforBulgaria'sKozloduy6”,1February2016,seehttp://www.neimagazine.com/news/newslife-extension-for-bulgarias-kozloduy-6-4798509,accessed2July2016.848Reuters,“Russia'sRosatomcompletesupgradeofBulgariannuclearreactor”,31May2016,seehttp://uk.reuters.com/article/rosatom-bulgaria-idUKL8N18S28W,accessed2July2016.849AFP,“Bulgariaapprovesnewreactoratnuclearplant”,AgenceFrancePresse,11April2012.850SofiaGlobe,“BulgariatobegintalkswithWestinghouseonnewKozloduynuclearreactor”,11December2013,seehttp://sofiaglobe.com/2013/12/11/bulgaria-to-begin-talks-with-westinghouse-on-new-kozloduy-nuclear-reactor/,accessed2July2016.


assistinfinancing.851WestinghousewasaskedbytheBulgariangovernmenttotakea49percentstake in the project,852 but it was reported in the Bulgarian press that Westinghouse hadrefused.853InApril2015,theBulgarianGovernmentthenannounceditwasdroppingthedealwithWestinghouseforfinancialreasons.854

InJune2016theInternationalCourtofArbitrationruledinfavorofAtomstroyexport(ASE)overitsclaimforcompensationafterBulgariacancelledtheBelenenuclearpowerplant. ThepresssuggestthattheRussianconstructorwasawardedabouthalfofwhatithadaskedfor,receivingapproximatelyUS$600million.855

InNovember2015,theBulgarianPrimeMinister,BoykoBorisov,duringavisittoChinaheldtalksonpotentialnuclearcooperation,whichwasfollowedbyaChinesedelegationvisitingKozloduyinDecember2015.ItissuggestedthatWestinghousemayteamupwithStatePowerInvestmentCorporation (SPIC) to construct further units at Kozloduy.856 SPIC was recently establishedthroughthemergerofChinaPowerInvestmentCorporationandStateNuclearPowerTechnologyCorporation, and is therefore a large state-owned enterprise under the administration of theChinesecentralGovernment.

The Czech Republic has six Russian-designed reactors in operation at two sites,DukovanyandTemelín.TheformerhousesfourVVER440-213reactors,thelattertwoVVER1000-320units. In2015,nuclearplantsgenerated25.3TWhor32.5percentof theelectricity intheCzechRepublic,thatisover3percentagepointsdownfromrecordyears2013and2014.Atthesametime,thecountrywasanetexporterof12.5TWhofelectricity,equivalentto57percentofthenuclearoutput.

ThreeofthefourDukovanyunitswereshutdowninSeptember2015,followingthedetectionbytheStateNuclearSafetyOffice(SUJB)offaultsinpipeweldingandirregularitiesintheinspectionpracticebya subcontractor.Unit3 restarted inDecember2015,butwashaltedagain inApril2016.Prolongedshutdownsarenowexpectedatleastforunits2and3.Unit3isnotexpectedtobe restarted before 19 October 2016. An extended outage of Unit 2 is planned to start on16September2016andlastinto2017.InMarch2016,thestateregulatorextendedtheoperatinglicenseofDukovany-1indefinitely.857

851NIW,“Bulgaria,EnergyDependenceonRussiaLooksMoreThreatening”,16January2015.852EurActiv.com,“BulgariaoffersWestinghousestakeinnewnuclearunit”,27March2015,seehttp://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/bulgaria-offers-westinghouse-stake-in-new-nuclear-unit/,accessed2July2016.853Mediapool,“‘Westinghouse’refusedtoinvestinblockVII—ExtendTalkstorenegotiatethecurrentpriceofU.S?‘MaritsaEast’1and3”,31March2015,seehttp://www.mediapool.bg/uestinghaus-otkazva-da-investira-v-v-blok-news232408.html,accessed2July2016.854AFP,“Bulgariadrops$4billionWestinghousenucleardeal”,2April2015.855WNN,“Russiawins'half'ofcompensationclaimedinBelenelawsuit”,16June2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Russia-wins-half-of-compensation-claimed-in-Belene-lawsuit-16061601.html,accessed21June2016.856NIW,“WillSPITeamUpwithWestinghouseinBulgaria?”,2February2016.857NucNet,“Dukovany-2And-3ToUndergoExtendedChecksOnPipeWelds”,13May2016,seehttp://www.nucnet.org/all-the-news/2016/05/13/dukovany-2-and-3-to-undergo-extended-checks-on-pipe-welds,accessed2July2016.


The Dukovany units were started during 1985–87 and have undergone a lifetime extensionengineeringprogramunder theexpectation theywouldoperateuntil2025,although it isnowexpected thatoperatorCEZwill ask the regulator toextend theoperating life fora further10years,until2035–37.TheTemelínreactorseventuallystartedin2000and2002withfinancialassistancefromtheU.S.Export-ImportBanklinkedtothesupplyofinstrumentationandcontroltechnologybyWestinghouse.

In2004,Governmentplansproposed theconstructionofat least twomorereactors.By2010,three consortia were being considered, led byWestinghouse, AREVA, and Skoda-Rosatom. InNovember2012,theAREVAbidwasexcluded,sinceithad“notfulfilledsomeothercrucialcriteriadefinedinthetender”.858However,ittranspiredthatthetenderwasirrelevant,asakeyissuefornew-buildwasthe levelofstatesupport,and inFebruary2014, thenPrimeMinisterBohuslavSobotkastated:“Thenewgovernmentisnotwillingtoprovideguaranteesforpurchasingpricesofelectricitythatcouldbeabigfinancialburdenforhouseholdsandfirmsinthenextdecades.”859CEZChiefExecutiveDanielBenessubsequentlysaid:“Ifthereisnocertaintyandaguaranteeinlegislation,itisimpossibletodecideabouttheconstructionatTemelínunderthecurrentmarketconditions.”860TheninApril2014,CEZsimplycancelleditscallfortendersforthetwonewunitsatTemelín,citingthelowelectricitymarketpriceandthelackofgovernmentguarantees.

Despitethis,theCzechIndustryandFinanceministriescontinuetopromotenuclearpower,butthereislittleincentiveorrationaleforpushingfornewconstructionintheshortterm.Rather,itissuggestedthatthegovernmentremainscommittedtobuildingnewcapacity“sometimewithinthe next 20 years”.861 Czech news agency České Noviny said an investment of betweenCZK250billion(US$10.4billion)andCZK300billion(US$12.4billion)wouldbeneededbeforethestatecouldconsiderwhetherornottoprovideguaranteesfornewnuclearpowerprojects.862Inthese plans, new capacity is foreseen for both locations, Dukovany and Temelín, to maintainemploymentaftertheclosureofexistingreactors.InJanuary2016,theGovernmentannouncedthatitwouldmakeanewpositionofCommissionerforNuclearEnergytoenablenuclearnew-build.TheGovernmenthassaidthattheyarelookingforastrategicpartnerfornuclearpowerinthe Czech Republic, with interest in co-operation seen from Russia and South Korea.863 InMarch2016,CEZsignedandMoUwithChinaGeneralNuclearPowerCorporation(CGN)onthedevelopmentofnuclearpowerandrenewables,includingontheassistanceofCEZinthelicensinginEuropeoftheHualongdesign.864

858CEZ,“ArevaFailedtoComplywithPublicContractRequirementsDefinedforBuildingTemelinNPPUnits3and4:CEZhadtoDisqualifythisBidder”,5October2012,seehttp://www.cez.cz/en/investors/inside-information/1499.html,accessed2July2016.859Ceskenoviny,“Governmentwon’tguaranteeelectricitypricesforTemelin—PMSobotka”,6February2014.860Reuters,“CzechCEZbosssaysprefersdividendpredictability”,31March2014.861NIW,“Prague’sVagueNewBuildPlans”,23February2015.862WNN,“CEZshouldfundnewreactorprojects,saysgovernmentreport”,20January2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-CEZ-should-fund-new-reactor-projects-says-government-report-20011501.html,accessed29March2016.863NIW,“CzechRepublic”,29January2016.864CGN,“CGNandCEZCollaborateonRenewableandNuclearEnergyintheCzechRepublic”,31March2016,seehttp://en.cgnpc.com.cn/n1017152/n1017227/c1295759/content.html,accessed21April2016.


Hungary has only one nuclear power plant, at Paks, where four VVER 440-213 reactorsprovidedabout15TWhor52.7percentofthecountry’selectricityin2015.Thereactorsstartedoperation in the early 1980s and have been the subject of engineeringworks to enable theiroperationforupto50years,untilthe2030s,accompaniedbya20percentincreaseincapacity.Thefirstunitreceivedpermissiontooperateforanother10yearsafteraperiodicsafetyreviewin2013,thesecondunitin2014.865

InMarch2009,theParliamentapprovedagovernmentdecision-in-principletobuildadditionalreactorsatPaks.866Evenatthistime,Russianassistanceseemedtobethepreferredoption,andtheForeignMinisterindicatedthatexpansionofthePaksplantwouldbepartofa“packagedeal”onoutstandingeconomicissueswithRussia.867Butitwasstillashocktonuclearvendors868wheninJanuary2014,aninternationalfinancingagreementwasreachedbetweenHungaryandRussiathroughdirectnegotiationbetweentheirheadsofgovernmentfor80percentofthevalueoftheconstructioncontactworth€12.5billion(US$13.2billion).Thiswasfollowedbyanengineering,procurement,andconstructionandfuelcontract inDecember2014. It issaidthatwastobea“turn-key”contract,includinga20-yearfuelcontractandspentfuelreturn.869TheEU’sEURATOMdidnotinitiallygiveitsapprovalanditwasonlysignedbyallpartiesinApril2015afterchangesonthediversificationoffuelsupply.

Theloandealhasbeencriticized,870becauseitwasagreedjustfivedaysbeforeageneralelection,andonlyafewofthecrucialtermsandconditionsofthedealweremadepublic.871AccordingtoaversionoftheloancontractleakedbytheRussianside,theloanratewillbesignificantlybelowthemarketnormforsuchaproject,withreportssuggestingvariableratesof3.95-4.95percentinteresttocover80percentoftheproject’scosts.Theloanmustbeusedby2025andbepaidbackwithin21yearsofthecommissioningoftheplant,startingin2026.However,penaltyconditionsaresaidtohavethepossibilitytobankrupttheHungarianState,andoppositionparliamentariansat the time called for the Government to cancel the project. The Government is nonethelessdetermined to proceed andhas evenmodified proposed legislation to increase the period forwhichcontracttermswouldremainsecretfrom15yearsto30.Thescopeoftheconfidentialityisthatit“maydenypublishinganydataconnectedtotheproject,iftheirpublicationwouldengageeitherthenationalsecurityinterestsofHungary,orintellectualpropertyrights.”872Thesecrecyoftheprojecthasraisedsignificantnationalandinternationalprotestasbykeepingeverythingconfidential,therewillbelittleopportunitytokeeptrackofcosts.TheprojectrepresentsaU-turnfor the rulingparty,whichhad fiercely criticizedprevious socialist governments for failing to

865WNN,“Paksunit2gets20-yearlifeextension”,27November2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Paks-unit-2-gets-20-year-life-extension-27111401.html,accessed29March2016.866JohnShepherd,“Hungary’sParliamentPavesWaytoBuildNewReactorUnit”,NucNet,31March2009.867Realdeal.hu,“Hungary,RussiaSeektoResolveAllOutstandingIssuesinOnePackage,SaysFM”,21January2011.868NIW,“Newbuild:HungaryDitchesTenderinFavorofRosatomDeal”,17January2014.869NIW,“Newbuild,EPCContractSignedforRussianVVER1200satPaks”,12December2014.870NIW,“Hungary:Secrecy,PoliticalRiskCloudProspectsforPaksExpansion”,20February2015.871Politics.hu,“HungarysignsEUR10billionPaksagreementwithRussia”,1April2014.872NIW,“EUHungarydoublesdownonPaks2secrecy”,27February2015.


diversifyawayfromrelianceonRussianenergy.Russiaalreadyprovidesaboutthree-quartersofthecountry’soilandgassupplies.873

InSeptember2015theEuropeanCommissionnotifiedtheHungarianauthoritiesthattheprojectmeetstheobjectivesofArticle41oftheEURATOMTreaty.874However,on23November2015,theEuropeanCommissionopenedaninvestigationintothePaksIIproject,withparticularfocusisthenon-tenderingoftheprojectandthequestion,whetheraprivateinvestorwouldhavefinancedtheprojectonsimilarterms,orifHungary’sinvestmentsconstitutesStateAid.875Thegovernmentsaid, it takes “the view that the decision of the European Commissioner for Competition of23November2015andthesummarypublishedintoday’seditionof theOfficial Journalof theEuropean Union contain a number of inaccuracies, misunderstandings, and unfounded andmisleadingclaims”.876TheAustriangovernmentispressingtheEuropeanCommissiontoconsiderHungary’ssupportstateaid.“Westandagainstanykindofsupportfortheconstructionofnuclearpowerplantsortheproductionofnuclearenergy”,saidEconomyandEnergyMinisterReinholdMitterlehner.877However,thereisalsogrowingdoubtoverthewisdomoftheproject,bothfromtheperspectivethatRussiamaybeunabletodeliveronthefinancingandthat,as JanosLazar,headoftheprimeminister'soffice,toldparliamentthat“Hungary’smoneymarketpositionhasgreatlyimprovedlatelyandthereforeHungaryisreadyandableinthenearfuturetoreplacetheloan[fromRussia]withcapitalobtainedontheopenfinancialmarket.”878

Theenvironmentalimpactassessmentfortheprojectiscurrentlyunderwayandissupposedtobefinalizedinthesummerof2016.Constructionisplannedtostartin2018andcommissioninginlate2023orearly2024.879

The Presidents of Hungary and Russia re-confirmed their commitment to the project inFebruary2016,includingPresidentPutinsayingRussiawouldmakeavailableupto80percentofthe total cost, starting in2016.880However,aswithotherproposedRussian-financedprojects,doubtshavebeenraisedabouttheabilityofthevendorcountrytoprovidethenecessaryfunds.

FallingpowerpricesacrossEuropehaveraisedseriousquestionsontheeconomicviabilityoftheproject and various studies have been undertaken to assess this. One report, undertaken byRothchild&CieforthePrimeMinister’sOfficeoftheHungarianGovernmentinSeptember2015,

873FinancialTimes,“RussiabuildscloutineasternEuropewith€10bnloantoHungary”,14January2014.874WNN,“HungarymeetsEuratomTreatyobjectivesforPaksII”,15September2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Hungary-meets-Euratom-Treaty-objectives-for-Paks-II-15091501.html,accessed2July2016.875EuropeanCommission,“StateAidSA.38454(2015/C)(ex2015/N)–Hungary,PossibleaidtothePaksnuclearpowerstation”,23November2016.876PrimeMinister’sOffice,“InaccuraciesandmisunderstandingsinEuropeanCommission’snotification”,HungarianGovernment,12January2016,seehttp://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/inaccuracies-and-misunderstandings-in-european-commission-s-notification,accessed18June2016.877NIW,“Briefs”,12February2016.878Intellinews,“HungaryeyesnuclearoptionsasdoubtsgrowoverPaksdeal”,20June2016,seehttp://www.intellinews.com/hungary-eyes-nuclear-options-as-doubts-grow-over-paks-deal-100206/,accessed21June2016.879WNN,“Hungaryrepeats2018targetdateforPaksIIproject”,18November2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Hungary-repeats-2018-target-date-for-Paks-II-project-18111501.html,accessed2July2016.880NIW,“Briefs”,19February2016.


concludedthatwhenmakingassumptionsonthemarketpriceofpowerintheorderof€65/MWh(whichtheydescribeasinthe“lowend”),

theoperationalrevenuesgeneratedfromthesaleofthepoweroutputenvisagedonbenchmarkedloadfactorassumptionscanbeexpectedtogeneratesufficientcashflowstocovertheoperationalcostsofrunningthenuclearplant,aswellascontributionstowardsreturningtheinvestedcapital.881

This raises serious questions for the economics of the project as the operational costs arerelatively low fornuclearpowerplantsand thereportstates that investmentcostcanonlybepartially covered in their scenario, which make up a significant share of the cost of nuclearelectricity.Furthermore,thereporthasbeencriticizedfortaking“outdatedandoverstatedpriceexpectations”andthatundermorerealisticassumptionstheprojectis“uneconomicineachtestedscenarioandwouldhavetobesignificantlysubsidizedbyHungariantaxpayers”.882Thecurrentmarketpriceforpower(baseloadfuturemarkets2017)inHungaryisaround€30-40/MWh.883

Credit-rating agency Standard & Poor’s, March 2016 confirmed Hungary’s BB+ (“junk”)commenting:

Downside risks to our base-case fiscal forecast could arise from further state acquisitions, anexpansion of fiscal programs to support a slowing economy, electoral considerations, budgetaryspendingonlargeprojectssuchasthePAKSnuclearpowerproject(...).884

RomaniahasonenuclearpowerplantatCernavoda,wheretwoCanadian-designedCANDUreactorsbeganoperatingin1996and2007.In2015,theyprovided10.7TWhor17.3percentofthecountry’selectricity,comparedto20.6percentin2009.

Constructionstartedinthe1980s,withtheinitial intentionofbuildingfiveunits.ThefirsttwounitswerepartlyfundedbytheCanadianExportDevelopmentCorporation,thesecondalsopartlybyEuratom.Overthepastdecade,numerousforeignfirmshavebeenlinkedtothecompletionofthe remaining Cernavoda units, including AECL and SNC-Lavalin (Canada), Ansaldo (Italy),AtomTechnoProm(Russia),CEZ(CzechRepublic),Electrabel(Belgium),ENEL(Italy),GDFSuez—nowEngie—(France),Iberdrola(Spain),KHNP(SouthKorea),RWE(Germany),andArcelorMittal(Luxembourg).885InDecember2013,ArcelorMittalandENELsoldbacktheirsharesintheprojecttotheRomanianstate.

ThelatestattemptinvolvesChinaGeneralNuclearPowerGroup(CGN),whichsignedaletterofintentinNovember2013withtheSocietateaNationalaNuclearelectrica(SNN)tocompletetheprojectsin2019and2020.InMarch2014,itwasannouncedthatanextensionwouldbegrantedtotheletterofintent,whichwassettoexpireon25May2014.886InOctober2014,SNNandCGNsignedabinding agreement thatmade the latter the “selected investor”.Thiswas followed in

881Rothschild&Cie,“EconomicanalysisforthePaksIInuclearpowerproject,ArationalinvestmentcaseforHungarianStateresources”,PreparedfortheOfficeoftheHungarianPrimeMinister,September2015.882CandolePartners,“NPPPaksII:Economicfeasibility,impactoncompetitionandsubsidycosts”,PreparedforGreenpeace,May2016.883PXE,“PriceinformationfromthePowerExchangeCentralEurope”,seehttp://www.pxe.cz/,accessed8June2016.884S&P,“Hungary'BB+/B'RatingsAffirmed;OutlookStable”,18March2016.885WNA,“NuclearPowerinRomania”,UpdatedDecember2013.886Telgraf,“ConstructionofNPPunits3and4,thepettycash”,22March2014.


November 2015, with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) betweenNuclearelectricaandCGNfortheconstruction,operationanddecommissioningofunits3and4.The MoU, also included agreements on investments, the articles of incorporation of the newproject company, the structuring of the project’s financing and remarkably, CGN is to be themajorityshareowneroftheproject,withatleast51percentoftheshares.887InJanuary2016,theRomaniaGovernmentformallyexpressedsupport fortheprojectandoutlinedthepoliciesandmeasuresthatitwouldintroducetosupportit,thisincludedenergymarketreform,changestotheelectricitytariff,commitmentsonstateguaranteesandfinancialincentivepolicies.888

InSlovakia,thestateutilitySlovenskéElektrárne(SE)operatestwonuclearsites,JaslovskéBohunice,whichhouses twoVVER440units,andMochovce,whichhas twosimilarreactors inoperation.In2015,theseproduced14TWhor55.9percentofthecountry’selectricity—thethirdhighestshareintheworldbehindFranceandUkraine.InOctober2004,theItaliannationalutilityENELacquireda66percentstakeinSEand,aspartofitsbid,proposedtoinvestnearly€2billion(US$2.7billion)innewnucleargeneratingcapacity,includingcompletionofthethirdandfourthblocksofMochovce.However,towardstheendof2014,ENELannouncedthatitwasseekingtosellitsshareinSEandhadreceivedanumberofnonbindingbids,includingfromCEZ,Finland’sFortum, EPH—a Czech-Slovak energy investment group—and a Hungarian consortium of theutilityMVMandMol.889In2015,itemergedthatCNNCwasalsointerestedinbidding.TheSlovakStatehasalsoexpressedinterestinincreasingitsshare890,butithasdemandedfromENELthatMochovce-3 and -4 be finished before a sale, in order to prevent further delays or even thecancellationoftheproject.891InDecember2015,itwasannouncedthatEPHwasthewinnerofthebid,withapreliminarypriceof€750million($812million).Underthedeal,ENELwillget€150million in the first stage,whichwillgiveEPH33percent in thecompany, theremainingshareandfinalpricewillbeagreedayearafterMochovceiscompleted.892

InFebruary2007,SEannouncedthatitwasproceedingwiththeconstructionofMochovce-3and-4 and that ENEL had agreed to invest €1.8 billion (US$2.6 billion). According to IAEA-PRIS,constructionrestartedinJune2009,and,atthetime,theunitswereexpectedtostartoperation

887WNN,“RomaniaandChinasealCernavodaagreement”,10November2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Romania-and-China-seal-Cernavoda-agreement-10111501.html,accessed2July2016.888WNN,“RomaniaexpressessupportforChina’sroleatCernavoda”,25January2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Romania-expresses-support-for-China-role-at-Cernavoda-25011601.html,accessed2July2016.889Reuters,“ENELexpectsfourbidsforSlovakutilitystake-sources”,3March2015,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/03/enel-ma-slovakia-idUSI6N0OZ01620150303,accessed2July2016.890SlovakSpectator,“FinnishfirmeyesSlovenskéElekrarneshares”,20February2015,seehttp://spectator.sme.sk/c/20056311/finnish-firm-eyes-slovenske-elektrarne-shares.html,accessed2July2016.891Bloomberg,“EneltoproceedwithSlovakSaleinFaceofPremier’sOpposition”,26March2015,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-26/enel-to-proceed-with-slovak-sale-in-face-of-premier-s-opposition,accessed2July2016.892Reuters,“EnelsellsstakeinSlovakpowergroup,includingnuclearplant,toEPH”,18December2015,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/slovakia-enel-eph-idUSL8N14657L20151218,accessed2July2016.


in 2012 and 2013.893However, the project was beset with problems, and in 2013 the SlovakGovernmentannouncedthatthecostofcompletionhadrisenby€250million(US$260million).Then in April 2014, at the Annual Shareholdersmeeting for SE, it was revealed that another€400million(US$424million)wouldbeneededtocompletetheunits,takingthetotalcostsofcompletion to €3.8 billion (US$4 billion), with startup rescheduled for the end of 2014 and2015.894 In June 2014, it was announced that the Russian Bank Sberbank would give SE an€800million(US$850million)loanfor7.5years;€300million(US$380million)oftheloanareto be spent on nuclear exports from Russia, including for the supply of nuclear fuel and forequipment for Mochovce.895 In May 2016, the Slovak press reported that estimated costs ofcompletionhadrisenagainanditwasnowexpectedtobe€5.1billion,withcompletionattheendof2016/early2017.896AccordingtoSE,asofJanuary2016,unit3wasover90percentcompleteandunit4over70percent.897

Inadditiontothedelaysandcostoverruns,concernshavebeenraisedaboutthestateofthepowermarket,withpowerpricescurrentlyat€30/MWhandelectricitydemandfollowingthesluggisheconomy.It isexpectedthatifandwhentheMochovceunitsarecompleted,theircapacitywillmainlybeusedforexport,sogiventhelowelectricitypricesintheEuropeanmarket,thechancethatENELandSEwillrecovertheirever-increasinginvestmentseemsslim.SlovakForeignPolicyAssociationenergyanalystKarelHirmansaid:“TheMochovceexpansionprojectisaliability.EPHisbuyinghundredsoftonnesofconcretethatmayeithergenerateprofitorlossinthefuture.”898

TheSlovakstateownedutility JAVYSandtheCzechutilityCEZstarted in2009a jointventureJadrová energetická spoločnosť Slovenska, a.s. (JESS) to construct new nuclear capacity inJaslovské Bohunice. JAVYS is currently responsible for the decommissioning at JaslovskéBohunice, the A1 reactor the two V1 reactors, as well as for Slovakia’s radioactive wastemanagement.Theso-calledBohuniceNJZ(novájadrovázdroj)1200MWprojectisproposedtobecompletedbefore2025atacostof€4-6billion(US$4.5-6.8billion).JAVYSowns51percentofthe sharesandCEZ49percent.CEZ sought in2013 to sell this stake toRussianRosatom,butnegotiationsfailedinMarch2014.899AlsolaternegotiationswithChinawerefruitless.TheSlovakministryofenvironmentapprovedtheenvironmentalimpactassessmentreportinApril2016.900Theprojectisnowlikelytotenderfortechnology.

893ENEL,“ENELStartsSiteWorksatMochovce3–4”,3November2008,seehttps://servizi.enel.it/eWCM/salastampa/comunicati_eng/1594888-1_PDF-1.pdf,accessed26March2016.894Spectator,“ShareholdersapproveadditionalfundingforMochovceplant”,9April2014.895WSJ,“Sberbanktolend$1.1billiontoSlovakia’sLargestPowerCompany”,10June2014.896SpravyPravda,“AdditionalmoneyforMochovce?Zizahasnoofficialinformation”,11May2016,seehttp://spravy.pravda.sk/ekonomika/clanok/392783-dalsie-peniaze-na-mochovce-ziga-nema-oficialnu-informaciu/,accessed2July2016.897SE,“Mochovce3&4ProjectCompletion(01/03/2016)”,3January2016,seehttps://www.seas.sk/mochovce-3-4-npp,accessed25May2016.898Reuters,“EnelsellsstakeinSlovakpowergroup,includingnuclearplant,toEPH”,18December2015,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/slovakia-enel-eph-idUSL8N14657L20151218,accessed2July2016.899RadioPraha,“ČEZleftwithproblematicSlovaknuclearjointventureafterRosatomtalksdie”,7March2014,seehttp://www.radio.cz/en/section/business/cez-left-with-problematic-slovak-nuclear-joint-venture-after-rosatom-talks-die,accessed2July2016.900Energia,“NováatómkavBohuniciachmázelenúodMŽP”,19April2016,seehttp://energia.dennikn.sk/dolezite/jadrova-energia/nova-atomka-v-bohuniciach-ma-zelenu-od-mzp/19850/,accessed23March2016.


SloveniajointlyownstheKrskonuclearpowerplantwithCroatia—a696-MWWestinghousePWR.In2015,itprovided5.3TWhor38percentofSlovenia’selectricity(downfromamaximumof 42.4 percent in 2005). The reactor was started in 1981 with an initial operational life of40years,but,theoperatorintendstoseeka20-yearlifeextension.InJuly2015,anInter-StateCommissionagreedtoextendtheplantsoperationallifeto60years,sothatwouldcontinueuntil2043,aswellastoconstructadrystoragefacilityforthespentfuel.901

InJanuary2010,anapplicationwasmadebythenuclearoperatortotheMinistryofEconomytobuildanadditionalunit,butnoadvancementoftheprojecthasbeenmadesince.

Former Soviet Union Armenia has one remaining reactor at theMedzamor (Armenian-2)nuclearpowerplant,whichissituatedwithin30kilometersofthecapitalYerevan.Theunitprovided2.5TWh—morethaninanyyearsince1988,whentwounitswereoperating—or34.6percentofthecountry’selectricityin2015,downfromamaximumof45percentin2009.

InDecember1988,Armeniasufferedamajorearthquakethatkilledsome25,000peopleandledtotherapidclosureofitstworeactorsinMarch1989.Duringtheearly1990sandfollowingthecollapse of the former Soviet Union, a territorial dispute between Armenia and AzerbaijanresultedinanenergyblockadeagainstArmeniathatledtosignificantpowershortages,resultinginthegovernment’sdecisionin1993tore-openunit2atMedzamor.ThereactorisanearlySovietdesign,aVVER440-230,andin1995,aU.S.DepartmentofEnergydocumentstated:“Intheeventofaseriousaccident…thereactor’slackofacontainmentandproximitytoYerevancouldwreakhavocwiththelivesofmillions.”902InOctober2012,theArmeniaGovernmentannouncedthatitwould operate the Medzamor unit 2026. This led to the Turkish authorities’ calling for theimmediateclosureofthepowerstation.903InMarch2014,theTurkishenergyministersaidoftheplant:“Thenuclearplant,whichwasputonlinein1980,hashadalifespanof30years.Thisplanthas expired and should be immediately closed.”904 In December 2014, an intergovernmentalagreementwassignedthatwouldseetheRussianGovernmentfinanceaprogramofupgradingtoletthereactoroperateuntil2026.905AnapplicationforthelifeextensionlicensewillbelaunchedinSeptember2016,withtheupgradeworkexpectedtobecompletedby2019.TheworkistobefundedbyaRussianstateloanofUS$270millionandagrantofUS$30million.

In March 2015, the European Commission released the “Implementation of the EuropeanNeighborhoodPolicy(ENP)inArmenia”,whichstated:“Theearlyclosureanddecommissioning

901WNN,“PartnersagreeonlifeextensionforKrsko”,21July2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Partners-agree-on-life-extension-for-Krsko-2107154.html,accessed2July2016.902OfficeonEnergyIntelligence,“MostDangerousReactors:AWorldwideCompendiumofReactorRisk”,DOE,May1995.903USAID,“Turkeyrenewsdemandsfor‘immediateclosure’ofArmeniannukeplant”,5November2012.904HurriyetDaily,“TurkeywantsnuclearplantinArmeniatobeshutdown”,22March2014.905DiarioArmenia,“ArmeniaandRussiasignedanagreementtoextendthelifeofMedzamornuclearpowerplant”,27December2014,seehttp://www.diarioarmenia.org.ar/armenia-y-rusia-firman-un-acuerdo-para-extender-la-vida-util-de-la-central-atomica-de-medzamor/,accessed2July2015.


oftheMNPP[MedzamorNuclearPowerPlant]remainakeyobjectivefortheEUandundertheENP Action Plan. Since the power plant cannot be upgraded to meet current internationallyrecognized nuclear safety standards, it should be closed as soon as possible”.906 Armenia iscurrently carryingoutapost-Fukushimastress test in cooperationwith theEuropeannuclearregulatorsgroupENSREG.907

InDecember2014,anintergovernmentalagreementwassignedfortheRussianGovernmenttofinance a program of upgrading to enable the reactor to operate until 2026.908 However, inJune 2015, the IAEA said that, following an Integrated Regulatory Review Service, it wasconcerned that no application for life extension had been received by the national regulatoryauthority,despitetheoperatinglicense’sexpiringin2016.909

Foryears,ArmeniahasbeennegotiatingwithRussiafortheconstructionofanew1000MWunit,andsignedanintergovernmentalagreementinAugust2010.TheplantwasestimatedbyaU.S.-fundedfeasibilitystudytocostUS$5billion.910InMarch2014,theenergyministeradmittedthatit was having difficulty in attracting funds to start construction.911 In July 2014, the energyministersaidthatRussiawasexpectedtoprovideplantequipmentworthUS$4.5billionoutofthetotalUS$5billion.912InSeptember2015,DeputyEnergyMinisterAregGalstyan,wasquotedassayingthatArmeniawasnowconsideringtheconstructionoftwo600MWunits,ratherthanone1,000MWunit.Thecommissioningtargetwouldmovefrom2027to2036.913Itisunclearwhattriggeredtheshift,whatthetechnologywouldbeorwherethefinancingwouldcomefrom.

InRussia,nuclearplantsprovided183TWhofelectricity,arecord,an8percentyear-on-yearincrease,primarilyduetothecommissioningoftheRostov-3reactor.Nuclearenergycontributed18.6 percent to the country’s electricitymix, an identical level to the previous year’s historicmaximum.Akey constructionquestion for2016,will be if theNovovoronezh-2unit—at leastalreadysixyearsbehindschedule—willbefinallyconnectedtothegrid.

AccordingtotheIAEA-PRISdatabase,Russiahaseightreactorsunderconstruction,secondonlyto China. Two of these are “floating reactors” (Akademik Lomonosov-1 and -2), which arenominally32MWeeach.ThesewereorderedinFebruary2009andwereexpectedtobedelivered

906HighRepresentativeoftheEuropeanUnionforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicy,“JointStaffWorkingDocument—ImplementationoftheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicyinArmenia—Progressin2014andrecommendationsforActions”,EuropeanCommission,25March2015,seehttp://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2015/armenia-enp-report-2015_en.pdf,accessed2July2016.907ENSREG,“Armenianationalstresstestreportopenforpublicconsultation”,EuropeanNuclearSafetyRegulationGroup,6April2016.908DiarioArmenia,“ArmeniaandRussiasignedanagreementtoextendthelifeofMetsamornuclearpowerplant”,27December2014,seehttp://www.diarioarmenia.org.ar/armenia-y-rusia-firman-un-acuerdo-para-extender-la-vida-util-de-la-central-atomica-de-medzamor/,accessed25March2015.909NucNet,“IAEAExpressesConcernOverLackofProgressonArmenian-2LicenceExtension”,12June2015,seehttp://www.nucnet.org/all-the-news/2015/06/12/iaea-expresses-concern-over-lack-of-progress-on-armenian-2-licence-extension,accessed2July2016.910NTI,“ArmeniaFile”,UpdatedMarch2016,seehttp://www.nti.org/learn/countries/armenia/,accessed29May2016.911BusinessNewEurope,“Armeniadeniesplanstoabandonnuclearpowerplantproject”,28March2014.912Rosatom,“RussiaandArmeniaagreetounit2lifeextension”,PressRelease,24December2014.913NIW,“Armenia”,25September2015.


to the customer at the end of 2012.914 The latest official start-up date is said to be6September2016,915ortheautumnof2016accordingtotheRussianDeputyPrimeMinister,916althoughotherreportssuggestthevesselswillbelaunchedonlyin2019.917Criticsoftheprojectpointoutthattheriskofaccidentsonafloatingnuclearplantisgreatlyincreasedbecausetheyareevenmoresusceptibletotheelements,subjecttothreatsofpiracy,andifdeployedwidelywouldincreasetherisksofnuclearmaterialproliferation.918

Construction started at the Baltic-1 unit, a 1109 MW VVER-491 reactor, in February 2012.However,constructionwassuspendedinJune2013foravarietyofreasons,includingrecognitionofthelimitedmarketfortheelectricity.Accordingly,WNISRpulledtheprojectofftheconstructionlisting. Despite no indication that construction has restarted, the project remains “underconstruction”inIAEAstatistics.However,giventheongoingproblemsinelectricitymarketswithlowmarketpricesandsluggishdemand,thereislittleincentiveforconstructiontorestart.TheLithuanian EnergyMinister, called for a boycott of power from the power plant should it becompleted.

Two VVER-1200 MW units are being built at the Leningrad nuclear power plant nearSt.Petersburg,whereconstructionstartedin2008and2010.Atthetimeofordering,thereactorswere expected to start up in 2013 and 2016 respectively. However, repeated delays haveoccurred,withreportsofthedroppingfromheightofthecontrolrodclusterassembly,crackingthe walls and floor of the cooling pond, with a resultant possible six-month delay,919 withcompletionofunit1nowexpectedin2018.920

Two VVER-1200 reactors are also under construction at Novovoronezh; one expected to becompletedin2016,andthesecond,accordingtotheWorldNuclearAssociation(WNA),in2019.921AnotherreactorisbeingconstructedattheRostovnuclearpowerplant,expectedtobecompletedin2017.

In June2016theRussianregulatorRostechnadzorgrantedaconstruction license forUnit1ofKursk II which was followed by and a construction permit from state nuclear corporationRosatom.Russianpresssuggestthatsoilremovalhasnowbegunonthesite.922Thiscouldbeaparticularlyimportantproject,asitwouldbethefirstofthelatestRussiandesign,theVVER-TOI,whichissaidtobea1.2GW,GenerationIII+design.Theproposedstart-updateofthefirstoftwo

914NEI,“KLT-40Snuclearbargeprojectstillafloat”,9March2010.915WNN,“Reactorsinstalledonfloatingplant”,1October2013.916Ok-inform-ru,“Visiticebreaker“Arktika”and“Sibir””,8December2015,seehttp://ok-inform.ru/photoarchive/osmotr-ledokolov/osmotr-ledokolov-arktika-i-sibir-i-teploelektrostantsii-akademik-lomonosov-1-12641.html,accessed28March2016.917U.S.EIA,“Russia”,12March2014,seehttp://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=RS,accessed12May2015.918NTI,“Floatingnuclearreactorscouldfallpreytoterrorist,expertssay”,GlobalSecurityNewswire,13August2010,seehttp://www.nti.org/gsn/article/floating-nuclear-reactors-could-fall-prey-to-terrorists-experts-say/,accessed2July2015.919NIW,“Briefs—Russia”,24July2015.920NIW,“Briefs—Russia”,7August2015.921WNA,“NuclearPowerinRussia”,UpdatedMarch2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Russia--Nuclear-Power/,accessed28March2016.922RussianConstruction.com,“BuildersofthesecondKursknuclearpowerstationgrantedalicense”,3June2016,seehttp://russianconstruction.com/news-1/23980-builders-of-the-second-kursk-nuclear-power-station-granted-a-license.html,accessed29June2016.


reactorsatthesitehasbeenputbackto2023—“duetoarevisionofforecastenergyconsumptionintheregion”923—andisexpectedtocostRUB225billion(US$3.57billionin2016conversion).924

AJanuary2015reportbyRussia’sAuditChamberfoundthatsevenoutofthennineunitsunderconstructionare12–38monthsbehindschedule—probablyanunderestimate.ThereportalsonotedwithconcernthefinancialsituationofRosenergoatom’sconstructionprogramwithlowerstate budgets,which fell 18 percent during 2009–2015. Furthermore, Rosenergoatom, due tolowerelectricityprices,wasforcedtotakeoutfurtherloanstoenableconstructiontoproceed,and,asaresult,hadtouse68percentofitsreservestocoverinterestcosts.925Thereportalsorefers to alarming environmental and safety implications of the current situation, withconstructiontakingplaceintheabsenceofapassingreviewbyRussia’sDirectorate-GeneralforState Environmental Reviews. And the construction at the Leningrad-2 station lacks asynchronizedscheduleofequipmentdeliveryand installation,soby the timesomeequipmentcomesonline,itwillbeoutofwarranty.926

All thesedelays, financialandtechnicalproblemshavecontinuallydowngradedtargets for thedeploymentofnewunits,ashavethefallingpowerdemandandweakerprices,duetoreducedeconomicoutput.InSeptember2006,Rosatomannouncedatargetfornuclearpowertoprovide23percentofRussia’selectricityby2020from44GWofcapacity(comparedto24GWin2014).ByJuly2012,thishadbeenscaledbacktosuggestthattherewouldbe30.5GWofnuclearin2020.Thatwouldrequirejustthecompletionoftheeightreactorscurrentlyunderconstruction,takingintoaccounttheexpectedclosureofthefirsttwoRBMKunitsatLeningrad.

Therefore,akeyissuefortheindustryishowtomanageitsagingreactors.Therearethreemajorclassesofreactorsinoperation:theRBMK(agraphite-moderatedreactoroftheChernobyltype),theVVER440,andtheVVER1000.BoththeRBMKsandVVER440havebeengranteda15-yearlifeextensiontoenablethemtooperatefor45years,whiletheVVER1000sareexpectedtoworkforupto50years.Asofthemiddleof2016,22haveoperatedforover30years,ofwhicheighthaverunforover40years.

Russiaisattemptingtobeanincreasinglyimportantplayerontheworldnuclearpowermarket,butseriousquestionshavetobeaskedabouttheabilityforRussiatofinanceitsnuclearexportplans.InSeptember2015,KirillKomarov,thedeputyheadofRosatom,saidthatthetotalorderbook over the last 10 years was worth US$100 billion and that by 2020 this would rise toUS$150billion,asinthenextfiveyearsitintendedtosignconstructionagreementsforbetween30-40reactors.927RussianfinanceiscurrentlybeingusedinreactorsbeingbuiltinBelarus,China,andIndia.However, financehasbeenpledgedor isbeingnegotiatedformanyothercountries,includingArmenia,Bangladesh,Finland,Hungary,Iran,Jordan,SouthAfrica,Turkey,Ukraine,and

923NIW,“RussiagearsupforlandmarkKurskproject”,20May2016.924Rosatom,“RostechnadzorhasgrantedRosenergoatomaconstructionlicenseforUnit1ofKurskNPPPhaseII,9June2016,seehttp://www.rosatom.ru/en/search/?q=kursk,accessed29June2016.925NIW,“AuditorReportIlluminatesRosatom’sFinancialChallenges”,23January2015.926CharlesDigges,“RussianAuditChambercitesballooningbudgetsindomesticnukeprojects”,Bellona,27January2015,seehttp://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/nuclear-russia/2015-01-russian-audit-chamber-cites-ballooning-budgets-domestic-nuke-projects,accessed18June2016.927Nucnet,“Russiaplanstosigncontractsfor30-40overseasreactors”,25September2015,seehttp://www.nucnet.org/all-the-news/2015/09/25/russia-plans-to-sign-contracts-for-30-to-40-overseas-reactors,accessed2July2016.


Vietnam.Theimportanceofforeignsaleshasincreasedanditrepresentsabouthalfofallrevenuesfor Rosatom, compared to 30 percent a decade ago,928 with the objective to increase this to50percentby2030.However,thereisdoubtsastotheviabilityofthesecontracts.SteveKidd,formerlyWNA'sheadof strategy, said: “Rosatom ispretty goodat announcing$100billionoforders in 25 countries, but not an awful lot of these are firm contracts, they are just bits ofpaper.”929

AlargepartofthefundingfortheseprojectscomesfromRussia’sNationalWealthFund.AroughestimateofthefundingRussiahaspledgedisUS$24billionforplantsnowunderconstructionandanadditionalUS$64billionforfutureagreements—atotalofUS$88billionoverthenextdecadeor two.930 However, the National Wealth Fund is also being used for stabilizing the Russianeconomy.Withfallingoilandgasprices,thefallingvalueoftheruble,andongoingsanctions,thenuclearexportprogramwillbedisruptedforpoliticalandeconomicreasons.TheRussianFinanceMinisterwasquotedassaying,“Ourreservesvolumewilldecreasebyapproximately2.6trillionrubles(US$40.85billion)—morethanhalf.Thismeansthat2016isthelastyearwhenweareable to spendour reserves thatway.After thatwewillnothavesuchresources.”931Funds foroverseasnucleardevelopmenthavealsobeensecuredfromtheRussianBankforDevelopmentand Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank or VEB), under a co-operation agreementsignedwithAtomostroyexportin2006,932andresultedinsubsequentloanstoBelarus,in2014,andproposeddealsinHungaryandIndia.However,theVEBisnowalsounderfinancialpressure,inpartduetoWesternsanctionsandhasnowstoppedlending.933Despitethis,attheAtomExpo2016,VEBandRosatomagreedtodeveloptheirco-operationto“contributetothegrowthoftheRussianeconomyandtheexpansionofRussia’spresenceintheglobalnuclearenergymarket”.934

Thecredit-ratingagenciesreflectthesedevelopments.InFebruary2015,Moody’sdowngradedAtomenergoprom—a100percentsubsidiaryofRosatom,whichasanintegratednucleargroupalso building reactors is comparable to the French AREVA—to “junk” (Ba1) and assigned anegativeoutlook.935TheninMarch2016,Moody’splaceditonafurtherreviewfordowngrade.936

928NIW,“Russia”,6November2015.929Reuters,“Rosatom'sglobalnuclearambitioncrampedbyKremlinpolitics”,26June2016,seehttp://internal.uk.mobile.reuters.com/article/idUKKCN0ZC0QZ,accessed29June2016.930CherylRofer,“CanRussiaAffordItsReactorExports?”,NuclearDinner,18February2015,seehttp://nucleardiner.com/2015/02/18/can-russia-afford-its-reactor-exports/,accessed2July2016.931MarketWatch,“WeakoilpricesdepleteRussia’ssovereign-wealthfund”,27October2015,seehttp://www.marketwatch.com/story/weak-oil-prices-deplete-russias-sovereign-wealth-fund-2015-10-27,accessed2July2016.932VEB,“VnesheconombanksignsagreementoncooperationwithCJSCAtomstroyexport”,31May2006,seehttp://www.veb.ru/en/press/news/arch_news/index.php?id_19=3524&from_19=146,accessed2July2016.933Bloomberg,“Putin'sBailoutBankNeedsaRescue;It'san$18BillionWhopper”,28December2015,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-28/putin-s-bailout-bank-needs-a-rescue-it-s-an-18-billion-whopper,accessed2July2016.934WNN,“Russia'sRosatomsigns$10billionworthofdealsatAtomExpo”,1June2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Russias-Rosatom-signs-10-billion-worth-of-deals-at-AtomExpo-01061601.html,accessed2July2016.935Moody’s,“RatingAction:Moody’stakesratingactionsonsixRussianutilityandinfrastructureGRIs;assignsnegativeoutlook”,25February2015,seehttps://www.moodys.com/research/--PR_319091,accessed2July2016.936Moody’s,“CreditOpinion:Atomenergoprom,JSC”,23March2016.


Ukrainehas15operatingreactors,twooftheVVER440designandtherestVVER1000s.Theyprovided 82.4 TWh or 56.5 percent of power in 2015, a considerable rise in both output andpercentagecontributionover thepreviousyear.Also risingwas the income fromelectricity sales,whichincreasedby41percentto39.4billionhryvnas(US$1.6billion).Whileonpaperthissuggestsapositiveeconomic situation,non-paymenthasmeant thatEnergoatom is “crippled financiallyandmustborrowfrombankstopayitsbills”,937andduringApril2016theiraccountswerefrozenbythecourts.938

Twelveoutofthecountry’s15reactorswerecompletedinthe1980sandhadanoriginaldesignlife of thirty years. The nuclear operator has proposed to extend lifetime of the reactors foranother20years.Theproposalwasacceptedandnowitisacoreelementoftheenergystrategyapprovedbythegovernment.Theprogrammeisestimatedtocost€1.45billion(US$1.62billion)in total,ofwhich theEuropeanBank forReconstructionandDevelopmentandEURATOMwillcontribute €600million ((US$670million). To date two nuclear reactors at Rivne have beengranteda lifeextensionof20yearsand twounitsatSouthUkraine for10years.TwounitsatZaporizhzhyaNPParecurrentlynotoperatingtoimplementmeasuresnecessaryforthelicenseextension with the expected decision of the nuclear regulator in first half 2016. The lifetimeextensionofRivne-1and-2 ispartofanongoingcontroversywithintheEspooConventionontransboundaryEnvironmental ImpactAssessment (EIA),whichconcluded thatUkrainewas innon-compliance for not executing an EIA before its decision to prolong the lifetime of theseVVER440reactorsaftertheirtechnicallifetimeof30years.939EnvironmentalgroupsinUkrainehave called upon European institutions to stop the support for “risk” life extensionprogrammes.940

Tworeactors,Khmelnitsky-3and-4,areofficiallyunderconstruction.Buildingworkstartedin1986 and 1987 but stopped in 1990. In February 2011, Russia and Ukraine signed anintergovernmentalagreementtocompletethereactors,and in2012, theUkrainianParliamentadopted legislation to createa framework to finance theproject,with80percentof the fundscomingfromRussia.Itisunclearhowmuchworkhasbeencompleted,withthedocumentationfortheEIAstatingtheunitswere35–40percentand5–10percentcompleterespectively,whilethe operatorNNEGC “Energoatom” stated on itswebsite that construction of units 3 and 4 isreaching75percentand28percentcompletion.941However,inSeptember2015,theUkrainian

937NIW,“Nuclearrestartjeopardizedbypoliticalcrisis”,26February2016.938NEI,“Ukrainenuclearutilityinfinancialdifficulty”,27April2016,seehttp://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsukrainian-nuclear-utility-in-financial-difficulty-4876101,accessed7May2016.939CommitteeInitiativeonUkraine,“EIA/IC/CI/4Ukraine—InformationonmattersconsideredbytheCommittee”,UNECE,seehttp://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/conventions/environmental-assessment/areas-of-work/review-of-compliance/committee-initiative/eiaicci4-ukraine.html,accessed2July2016.940IrynaHolovko,“TimeforEuropetostopsupportingUkraine’sriskynuclearpowersector”,EnergyPost,18May2016,seehttp://www.energypost.eu/time-europe-stop-supporting-ukraines-risky-nuclear-power-sector/,accessed2July2016.941OdaBecker,etal.,“KhmelnitskyNPP,ConstructionofUnits3and4—ExpertStatementtotheInformationandAnalyticalSurveyoftheFeasibilityStudyandtheEIAReportoftheFS”,Umweltbundesamt(EnvironmentAgencyAustria),FederalMinistryofAgriculture,Forestry,EnvironmentandWater


ParliamentvotedtocanceltheprojectwithDeputyEnergyMinisterAlexanderSvetelikblamingRussiafor“failingtofulfilltheobligationunderthedeal”,andsayingthatan“alternativepartner”would be sought.942 Ukrainian media reported in November 2015 that the president ofEnergoatom Yuri Nedashkivsky told a briefing in Brussels Press Club: “We have reached anagreementwiththeworld-renownedBarclaysbank,wewillobtainfundsforthecompletionoftwo units at Khmelnytsky NPP.”943 However, there is no mention of this agreement onEnergoatom’swebsite.944AsconstructionreliesontheVVER-1000reactorsthereareonlylimitedchoiceofthecompaniesabletocompletetheunits.OncethecontractwithRussiawascanceled,Energoatom and Skoda JS,which is owned by RussianOMZGroup, signed aMemorandum ofUnderstanding.945

Management,2013,seehttp://www.umweltbundesamt.at/fileadmin/site/publikationen/REP0441.pdf,accessed2July2016.942UnitedPressInternational,“UkrainescrapsnuclearreactordealwithRussia”,16September2015,seehttp://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/09/16/Ukraine-scraps-nuclear-reactor-deal-with-Russia/9811442413199/,accessed2July2016.943Ukrinform,“EnergoatomreachesagreementwithBarclaysoncompletionoftwounitsatKhmelnytskyNPP”,4November2015,seehttp://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economics/1908661-energoatom-reaches-agreement-on-completion-of-two-units-at-khmenytsky-npp-with-barklays.html,accessed2July2016.944Energoatom,”PressCentre”,seehttp://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/en/press/,accessed2July2016.945WNN,“Russia'sAtomstroyexportpullsoutofUkraine”,18June2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Russias-Atomstroyexport-pulls-out-of-Ukraine-18061501.html,accessed2July2016.


Annex 2: Japanese Nuclear Reactor Status Table 18 : Japanese Nuclear Reactor Status (as of 1 July 2016)

Operator Reactor MW

Gridyear-Startup-

Age(year)

ShutdownShutdownduration

NRAGuidelinesCompliance

Status

Application Approval

CHUBU

Hamaoka-3(BWR) 1056 1987-29,4 29/11/10 5,6 15/06/15[1]

Hamaoka-4(BWR) 1092 1993-23,4 13/5/11 5,1 14/2/14

Hamaoka-5(ABWR) 1325 2004-12,2 14/5/11 5,1 30/5/14

CHUGOKU Shimane-2(BWR) 789 1988-28 27/1/12 4,4 25/12/13

HEPCO

Tomari-1(PWR) 550 1988-27,6 22/4/11 5,2 8/7/13

Tomari-2(PWR) 550 1990-25,8 26/8/11 4,8 8/7/13

Tomari-3(PWR) 866 2009-6,6 5/5/12 4,2 8/7/13

HOKURIKU

Shika-1(BWR) 505 1993-23,5 1/3/11 5,3

Shika-2(ABWR) 1108 2005-11 11/3/11 5,3 12/8/14

JAEA Monju(FBR) 246 1995-20,8 8/12/95 20,6

JAPCO

Tokai-2(BWR) 1060 1978-38,3 21/5/11 5,1 20/5/14

Tsuruga-2(PWR) 1108 1986-30 29/8/11 4,8 5/11/15946

KEPCO

Mihama-3(PWR) 780 1976-40,4 14/5/11 5,1 17/3/15

Ohi-1(PWR) 1120 1977-38,5 10/12/10 5,6

Ohi-2(PWR) 1120 1978-37,7 16/12/11 4,5

Ohi-3(PWR) 1127 1991-25,1 2/9/13 2,8 8/7/13

Ohi-4(PWR) 1127 1992-24 15/9/13 2,8 8/7/13

Takahama-1(PWR) 780 1974-42,3 10/1/11 5,5 17/3/15 20/6/16

Takahama-2(PWR) 780 1975-41,5 25/11/11 4,6 17/3/15 20/6/16

Takahama-3(PWR) 830 1984- 20/2/12 8/7/13 9/10/15 Shutdownafterrestart

Takahama-4(PWR) 830 1984-31,7 21/7/11 4,9 8/7/13 20/6/16

946JAIF,“JAPCFilesApplicationforCompatibilityExaminationforTsuruga-2”,9November2015,seehttp://www.jaif.or.jp/en/japc-files-application-for-compatibility-examination-for-tsuruga-2/,accessed2July2016.


Operator Reactor MW

Gridyear-Startup-

Age(year)

ShutdownShutdownduration

NRAGuidelinesCompliance

Status

Application Approval

KYUSHU

Genkai-2(PWR) 529 1980-36,1 29/1/11 5,4

Genkai-3(PWR) 1127 1993-23 11/12/10 5,6 12/7/13

Genkai-4(PWR) 1127 1996-19,6 25/12/11 4,5 12/7/13

Sendai-1(PWR) 846 1983- 10/5/11 8/7/13 27/5/15 Restarted

Sendai-2(PWR) 846 1985- 1/9/11 8/7/13 27/5/15 Restarted

SHIKOKUIkata-2(PWR) 538 1981-34,9 13/1/12 4,5

Ikata-3(PWR) 846 1994-22,3 29/4/11 5,2 8/7/13 18/5/16

TEPCO

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-1(BWR)

1067 1985-31,4 6/8/11 4,9

Kashiwazaki Kariwa-2(BWR)

1067 1990-26,4 19/2/07 9,4


1067 1992-23,6 16/7/07 9


1067 1993-22,5 16/7/07 9

Kashiwazaki Kariwa-5(ABWR

1067 1989-26,8 25/1/12 4,4

Kashiwazaki Kariwa-6(ABWR

1315 1996-20,4 26/3/12 4,3 27/9/13


1315 1996-19,5 23/8/11 4,9 27/9/13

TOHOKU

Higashidori-1(BWR) 1067 2005-10,8 6/2/11 5,4 20/6/14

Onagawa-1(BWR) 498 1983-32,6 10/9/11 4,8

Onagawa-2(BWR) 796 1994-21,5 6/11/10 5,7 27/12/13

Onagawa-3(BWR) 796 2001-15,1 10/9/11 4,8

Notes: (1)Gridconnectionyear(2)TheshutdowndatesarefromJapanAtomicIndustrialForum(JAIF),“NuclearPowerPlantsinJapan-Inoperationandunderconstruction”,asof10June2014,seehttp://www.jaif.or.jp/english/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS02_1402531967P.pdf,accessed13June2014.(3)NRADraftReviewReportonSendai.


Comments

WNISR considers that the 10 Fukushima units are shut down and will never restart. All of theremaining40reactors(includingMonju)fallunderthecriteriaoftheWNISRLongTermOutage(LTO)categorysincenoneofthemhasgeneratedanyelectricityin2014norinthefirsthalfof2015.

AlltheseunitsshouldalsobeincludedintheLong-termShutdown(LTS)underthecriteriasetbytheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA).947However,theJapanesegovernmentandtheIAEAhavechosentolimittheLTSclassificationtoonlyonereactor(Monju)andconsideralloftheotherreactorsas“inoperation”.

InMarch2015,fiveunitswereofficiallyclosedandthustakenoffthelistofunitsinLTO.TheseareMihama-1and-2andTsuruga-1on17March2015andGenkai-1andShimane-1on18March2015.

In July2013, theNRAestablisheda three-step reviewprocess foranycompanyplanninga reactorrestart,designedtoensurethatfacilitiesmeetthenewregulatoryrequirements.Thethreestepsofthisprocess,aresummedupas:“Permissionforchangeinreactorinstallationlicense”,“Approvalofplanforconstructionworks”,and“Approvalofoperationalsafetyprograms”.

The NRA received Applications for Review for 25 reactors from 11 power companies. Half weresubmittedinJuly2013,immediatelyaftertheregulationwasfirstissued.Asof1July2015,onlySendai-1 and -2, on 27 May 2015, received Final Approval for Operation.948 Takahama-3 and -4, on12February2015,passedthefirstofthethreeapprovallevels.

947IAEA,PowerReactorInformationSystem,“GlossaryofTermsinPRISReports”,seehttp://www.iaea.org/pris/Glossary.aspx,accessed6June2014.948NRA,“ApprovalofOperationalSafetyProgramsforKyushuElectricPowerCompany’sSendaiNuclearPowerStationUnits1and2”,27May2015,seehttp://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000108443.pdf,accessed30June2016.


Annex 3 : Fukushima—Radioactive Contamination and Current Evacuation Zones Figure52:Fukushima:RadioactiveContaminationandCurrentEvacuationZones

Source:MinistryofEnvironment,“ProgressonOff-siteCleanupEffortsinJapan”,April2015


Notes: Top:Airdoseat1mheightabovetheground(asof18September2011)Bottomleft:AircraftmonitoringsurveybyMEXT/JapanandDOE/US

(asof29April2011)Bottom right: Diagram of the areas to which evacuation orders were issued

(asof1October2014)


Annex 4: Definition of Credit Rating by the Main Agencies Moody’s S&P Fitch

Long-term Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term Short-term

Aaa

P-1

AAA

A-1+

AAA

F1+

Prime

Aa1 AA+ AA+

High grade Aa2 AA AA

Aa3 AA- AA-

A1 A+ A-1

A+ F1

Upper medium grade A2 A A

A3 P-2

A- A-2

A- F2

Baa1 BBB+ BBB+

Lower medium grade Baa2 P-3

BBB A-3

BBB F3

Baa3 BBB- BBB-

Ba1

Not prime

BB+

B

BB+

B

Non-investment grade speculative Ba2 BB BB

Ba3 BB- BB-

B1 B+ B+

Highly speculative B2 B B

B3 B- B-

Caa1 CCC+

C CCC C

Substantial risks

Caa2 CCC Extremely speculative

Caa3 CCC-

In default with little prospect for recovery

Ca CC

C

C

D /

DDD

/ In default / DD

/ D


Annex 5: Status of Lifetime Extensions in the U.S. (asof15June2016)

Table19:SubmittedandExpectedApplicationsforLifetimeExtensionsofU.S.NuclearPowerPlants

PlantGrid

ConnectionExtensionApplication

ExtensionGranted

CalvertCliffs1,2 1/75,12/76 4/98 3/00

Oconee1,2,3 5/73,12/73,9/74 7/98 5/00

Arkansas1(Ano-1) 8/74 2/00 6/01

Hatch1,2 11/74,9/78 3/00 6/02

TurkeyPoint3,4 11/72,6/73 9/00 6/02

Surry1,2 7/72,3/73 5/01 3/03

NorthAnna1,2 4/78,8/80 5/01 3/03

McGuire1,2 9/81,5/83 6/01 12/03

Catawba1,2 1/85,5/86 6/01 12/03

PeachBottom2,3 2/74,9/74 7/01 5/03

StLucie1,2 5/76,6/83 11/01 10/03

FortCalhoun 8/73 1/02 11/03

Robinson2 9/70 6/02 4/04

Ginna 12/69 8/02 5/04

Summer 11/82 8/02 4/04

Dresden2,3 4/70,7/71 1/03 10/04

QuadCities1,2 4/72,5/72 1/03 10/04

Farley1,2 8/77,5/81 9/03 5/05

Arkansas2(Ano-2) 12/78 10/03 6/05

Cook1,2 2/75,3/78 10/03 8/05

BrownsFerry1,2,3 10/73,8/74,9/76 1/04 5/06

Millstone2,3 11/75,2/86 1/04 11/05

PointBeach1,2 11/70,8/72 2/04 12/05

NineMilePoint1,2 11/69,8/87 5/04 10/06

Brunswick1,2 12/76,4/75 10/04 6/06


Plant Grid Connection Extension Application

Extension Granted

Monticello 3/71 3/05 11/06

Palisades 12/71 3/05 1/07

OysterCreek 9/69 7/05 4/09

Pilgrim 7/72 1/06 5/12

Fitzpatrick 2/75 7/06 9/08

Susquehanna1,2 11/82,7/84 9/06 11/09

WolfCreek 6/85 10/06 11/08

[Shearon]Harris 1/87 11/06 12/08

IndianPoint2,3 6/73,4/76 4/07

Vogtle1,2 3/87,4/89 6/07 6/09

BeaverValley1,2 6/76,8/87 8/07 11/09

ThreeMileIsland1 6/74 1/08 10/09

PrairieIsland1,2 12/73,12/74 4/08 6/11

Cooper 5/74 9/08 11/10

DuaneArnold 5/74 10/08 12/10

PaloVerde1,2,3 6/85,5/86.11/87 12/08 4/11

HopeCreek 8/86 8/09 7/11

Salem1,2 12/76,6/81 8/09 6/11

DiabloCanyon1,2 11/84,10/85 11/09

Columbia 5/84 1/10 5/12

Seabrook 5/90 6/10

Davis-Besse 8/77 8/10 12/15

SouthTexas1,2 3/88,4/89 10/10

Limerick1,2 4/85,9/89 6/11 10/14

GrandGulf 10/84 11/11

Callaway 10/84 12/11 3/15

Sequoyah1,2 7/80,12/81 1/13 9/15

Braidwood1,2 7/87,5/88 5/13 1/16

Byron1,2 3/85,2/87 5/13 11/15


Plant Grid Connection Extension Application

Extension Granted

Fermi2 9/86 4/14

LaSalle1,2 9/82,4/84 12/14

Waterford3 3/85 3/16

RiverBend1 12/85 Expected1-3/17

ComanchePeak1,2 4/90,4/93 Expected7-9/18

Perry1 12/86 Expected10/19

Clinton1 4/87 Expected1-3/21

Sources:

•Forgridconnectiondates:https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=US

•Forlifeextensiondates:http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-reactor-license-renewal.html,updatedJanuary2016,accessed16June2015;andhttp://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html,reviewed/updated14April2015,accessed16June2015.

Notes:

(1)Pairsofreactorsmarked†havesignificantlydifferentdesigns.

(2)TheSTARSAllianceofnuclearpowerplantownershasinformedtheNRCitwillsubmitapplicationsforlifeextensionsfortwounnamedunitsin2016and2018.TheComanchePeakreactorsaretheonlyonesownedbySTARSmembersthathavenotalreadyappliedfor lifeextensionorhavehaditgranted,so it isassumedtheapplicationreferstothesetwounits.

(3)NineMilePoint2appliedforandreceivedalicenseextensionbeforeits20thbirthday.

(4) Kewaunee and Vermont Yankee facilities both applied for Lifetime Extensions which were granted inFebruary 2011 and June 2011, before Kewaunee was shut down on 7 May 2013 and Vermont Yankee on29December2014.

(5)CrystalRiver’sUnit3wasfirstconnectedtothegridJanuary1977.AnapplicationforalifetimeextensionwassubmittedinDecember2008,thenwithdrawnon6February2013.CrystalRiver-3waspermanentlyshutdownon20February2013.


Annex 6: About the Authors MycleSchneider isanindependentinternationalconsultantonenergyandnuclearpolicybasedinParis.HeisafoundingboardmemberoftheInternationalEnergyAdvisoryCouncil(IEAC)andservesastheCoordinatoroftheSeoulInternationalEnergyAdvisoryCouncil(SIEAC).MycleisamemberoftheInternationalPanelonFissileMaterials(IPFM),basedatPrincetonUniversity,U.S.Hehasprovidedinformationandconsultingservices,amongstothers,totheBelgianEnergyMinister,theFrenchandGerman Environment Ministries, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency, the European Commission, the European Parliament’s Scientific andTechnologicalOptionAssessmentPanel,andtheFrenchInstituteforRadiationProtectionandNuclearSafety.MyclehasgivenevidenceandheldbriefingsatnationalParliamentsinfourteencountriesandattheEuropeanParliament.Between2004and2009,hewasinchargeoftheEnvironmentandEnergyStrategieslectureofanInternationalMScattheFrenchEcoledesMinesinNantes.Hehasgivenlecturesat 20 universities and engineering schools around the globe. He founded the Energy InformationAgencyWISE-Parisin1983anddirectedituntil2003.In1997,alongwithJapan’sJinzaburoTakagi,hereceivedtheRightLivelihoodAward,alsoknownasthe“AlternativeNobelPrize”.

AntonyFroggattworksasindependentEuropeanenergyconsultantbasedinLondon.Since1997,hehasworkedasafreelanceresearcherandwriteronenergyandnuclearpolicyissuesintheEUandneighboringstates.HehasworkedextensivelyonEUenergy issues forEuropeangovernments, theEuropeanCommissionandParliament,environmentalNGOs,commercialbodies,andmedia.HehasgivenevidencetoinquiriesandhearingsintheparliamentsofAustria,Germany,UKandtheEU.HeisaparttimeSeniorResearchFellowattheRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs—ChathamHouseinLondon.He is also anAssociateMember of the Energy Policy Group at ExeterUniversity. Prior toworking freelance, Antony served for nine years as a nuclear campaigner and coordinator forGreenpeaceInternational.

Julie Hazemann, based in Paris, France, is the director of EnerWebWatch, an internationaldocumentationmonitoringservice,specializinginenergyandclimateissues,launchedin2004.Since1992,shehasmaintainedaworldnuclearreactorsdatabaseandundertakesdatamodelingworkfortheWorldNuclear IndustryStatusReport. From1983 to2006, sheworked invariouspositionsatWISE-Paris, an independent information service on energy and environment issues that she co-founded.Startingin1989,shedevelopedthecomputerizationofthelibraryandelectronicinformationproducts. Her responsibilities covered database development, specialized translation, and projectmanagement,aswellasresearchactivitiesforspecificprojects.SheisamemberofnégaWatt(France).ShedevelopsEnerWebWatchintheframeworkoftheCoopanameCo-op.

IanFairlieisanindependentconsultantonradioactivityintheenvironmentlivinginLondonU.K.HehasstudiedradiationandradioactivitysincetheChernobylaccidentin1986.FairliehasadegreeinradiationbiologyfromBart’sHospitalinLondonandhisdoctoralstudiesatImperialCollegeinLondonand (briefly) Princeton University in the U.S. concerned the radiological hazards of nuclear fuelreprocessing.Heformerlyworkedasacivilservantontheregulationofradiationrisksfromnuclearpowerstations.From2000to2004,hewasheadoftheSecretariatoftheU.K.Government’sCERRIECommittee on internal radiation risks. Since retiring from Government service, he has been aconsultant on radiation matters to the European Parliament, local and regional governments,environmentalNGOs,andprivateindividuals.Hisareasofinterestaretheradiationdosesandrisksarisingfromtheradioactivereleasesatnuclearfacilities.


TomasKåberger has aMSc in Engineering Physics, a PhD in Physical Resource Theory, aDocentdegree in Environmental Science and has served as professor in International Sustainable EnergySystems at Lund University and currently is professor of Industrial Energy Policy at ChalmersUniversityofTechnologyinSwedenaswellasOverseasDistinguishedScientistatZhejiangUniversityinChina.HeisEditorinChiefofEnergyScienceandEngineering,aWiley,open-accessscientificjournal.

KåbergerisamemberoftheboardsofdirectorsofVattenfall,andCleanergy.Since2011,hespendsathirdofhistimeasexecutiveboardchairmanofJapanRenewableEnergyFoundation.

Previous tohis currentassignmentshe served theSwedishGovernmentasDirectorGeneralof theSwedish Energy Agency. In that capacity he headed the Swedish delegation to the InternationalRenewableEnergyAgencyinAbuDhabi,andwaselectedvicechairmanoftheCouncilofIRENA.

For18yearshewasontheboardoftheSwedishBioenergyAssociation,sixofwhichaschairman.Hehas chaired the Swedish Renewable Energy Council, serves on the Industrial Council of theInternationalSolarEnergySocietyandontheSteeringCommitteeofRen21.ProfessorKåberger iselectedmemberoftheRoyalSwedishAcademyofEngineeringSciencesandoftheSwedishAssociationofEnergyEconomists.

TadahiroKatsutaholdsaPhDinplasmaphysicsfromHiroshimaUniversity(1997).HeiscurrentlyanAssociateProfessoratMeijiUniversity,Tokyo,Japan.During2014–15heisaVisitingFellowintheProgramonScienceandGlobalSecurity(PSGS)atPrincetonUniversity,U.S.HeisresearchingJapan’sspentfuelmanagementissues.HeisalsostudyingtheFukushimaDaiichinuclearpowerplantaccidentandfollowingthenewregulationstandardswithafocusontechnicalandpoliticalaspects.HehasbeenappointedbyJapan’sNuclearRegulationAuthority(NRA)asamemberofthestudyteamsontheNewRegulatory Requirements for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors, for Nuclear Fuel Facilities,ResearchReactors,andforNuclearWasteStorage/DisposalFacilities.During2008–09,heconductedresearchonmultilateralnuclearfuelcyclesystemsasaVisitingFellowatPSGS.During2006–08,hecarriedoutresearchattheUniversityofTokyoonseparatedplutoniumissueslinkedtotheRokkashoreprocessingplant.During1999–2005,heworkedasaresearcherattheCitizensNuclearInformationCenter(CNIC)inTokyo.

FulcieriMaltini,graduatedinElectricalEngineering,andholdsaDoctorateinElectronicsEngineeringfromtheUniversityofRome, Italy, aMaster inNuclearEngineeringandseveralEuropeanandU.S.managementdiplomas.

HestartedhisindustrialcareerwithWestinghouseElectricandFramatomeinthenuclearenergyfieldand later with Gazocean and Alsthom-Atlantique in the industrial, marine and nuclear propulsionfields. In1980hemovedtoconsultingactivities inSwitzerland,wherehewasadirectorofSociétéGénérale pour l’Industrie and later with Elektrowatt Engineering mostly involved in world-wideprojectdevelopmentofconventionalandrenewableenergy,energyefficiency,environmentalimpactassessments,advancedtelecommunications,technologytransferandventurecapital.

In1994,hejoinedtheEuropeanBankforReconstructionandDevelopment(EBRD)inLondon,wherehewasresponsiblefortheNuclearSafetyAccount. In1997,hereturnedtoindependentconsultingactivities, advising Governments, International Institutions, the European Parliament and theEuropeanCommissionand industryanddevelopingand financingprojectswithina environmentalframeworkonconventionalandrenewableenergy,sustainabledevelopment,environmentalsciencesand energy efficiency.Major activities include the development and industrialization of innovativetechnologiesandtheestablishmentofspin-offcompaniesfromUniversitiesandResearchCentres.

M.V.RamanareceivedhisPh.D.intheoreticalphysicsfromBostonUniversity.HeiscurrentlywiththeNuclearFuturesLaboratoryandtheProgramonScienceandGlobalSecurityattheWoodrowWilsonSchool of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, U.S., where he has been assessing


nuclearpowerprogramsaroundtheworld.RamanaistheauthorofThePowerofPromise:ExaminingNuclearEnergyinIndia(PenguinBooks,2012)andco-editorofPrisonersoftheNuclearDream(OrientLongman, 2003). He is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) and therecipientofaGuggenheimFellowshipandaLeoSzilardAwardfromtheAmericanPhysicalSociety.

Steve Thomas is Professor of Energy Policy and Director of Research for the Business School,UniversityofGreenwich.HeholdsaBSc(honors)degreeinChemistryfromBristolUniversityandhasbeenworkinginenergypolicyanalysissince1976.Hismainresearchinterestsarereformsofenergyindustries,economicsandpolicy towardsnuclearpower,andcorporatepoliciesofenergy industrycompanies. Recent clients includePublic Services International, theEuropeanFederation of PublicService Unions, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (U.S.), Energywatch (U.K.), andGreenpeaceInternational.


Annex 7: Abbreviations ABWR AdvancedBoilingWaterReactorAEA U.S.AtomicEnergyActAECL AtomicEnergyofCanadaLimitedAES [RosatomReactorDesign]AFP AgenceFrancePresse(FrenchNewsAgency)AGR AdvancedGas-cooledReactorsALPS AdvancedLiquidProcessingSystemANS AmericanNuclearSocietyAPR AdvancedPowerReactororAdvancedPressurizedReactorASE Atomstroyexport,RussiaASN AutoritédeSûretéNucléaire(FrenchNuclearSafetyAuthority)ATMEA [AREVAReactorDesign]BATAN NationalNuclearEnergyAgency,RepublicofIndonesiaBBC BritishBroadcastingCorporationBKW BernischeKraftwerke(PowerProduction&DistributionUtility,Switzerland)BMUB

BundesministeriumfürUmwelt,Naturschutz,BauundReaktorsicherheit(FederalMinistryfortheEnvironment,NatureConservation,BuildingandNuclearSafety)

BN [RosatomReactorDesign]BNDES BrazilianNationalDevelopmentBankBNEF BloombergNewEnergyFinanceBOO Build-Own-OperateBP BeyondPetroleumBWR BoilingWaterReactorCAD CanadianDollarCANDU CANadianDeuteriumUraniumCAREM25 CentralArgentinadeElementosModularesCCE-EDFS.A

ComitéCentrald'Entreprise-ElectricitédeFranceS.A(CentralWorksCommitteeEletricitédeFranceCorporation)

CEA

Commissariatàl'énergieatomiqueetauxénergiesalternatives(AtomicEnergyCommission,France)

CEO ChiefExecutiveOfficerCEZ ČeskéEnergetickéZávody(PublicPowerUtility,CzechRepublic)CFD ContractForDifferenceCFE-CGC

ConfédérationFrançaisedel'Encadrement-ConfédérationGénéraledesCadres(TradeUnion,France)

CFE-CGC

Confédérationfrançaisedel'encadrement-Confédérationgénéraledescadres(FrenchConfederationofManagement–GeneralConfederationofExecutives)

CFSI Counterfeit,Fraudulent,SuspectItemCGN ChinaGeneralNuclearPowerCorporationCGNPC ChinaGuangdongNuclearPowerGroupChNPP ChernobylNuclearPowerPlant—ChernobylNuclearPowerComplexCNNC ChinaNationalNuclearCorporationCNSC CanadianNuclearSafetyCommissionCOLA CombinedOperatingLicenseApplicationsCRE

CommissiondeRégulationdel'Energie(RegulatoryCommissionofEnergy,France)

CSM ConcreteStorageModules


CWE CentralWestEuropeDEC

DepartmentofEnvironmentalConservation,NewYork(USA);orDongfangElectricCorporation

DECC DepartmentofEnergyandClimateChange,U.K.DOE DepartmentofEnergyDPP DemocraticProgressiveParty,TaiwanEAS EDFActionariatSalariéEBRD EuropeanBankforReconstructionandDevelopmentEC6 EnhancedCandu-6Edf ElectricitédeFrance(FrenchElectricUtilityCompany)EGAT ElectricityGeneratingAuthorityofThailandEGH ExpertGroupHealthEIA EnvironmentalImpactAssessmentEITB EuskalIrratiTelebista(BasqueRadio-Television)EnBW EnergieBaden-Württemberg,GermanyENEC EmiratesNuclearEnergyCorporationENEL Entenazionaleperl'energiaelettrica(NationalEntityforElectricity,Italy)ENP EuropeanNeighborhoodPolicyENSI EidgenössischesNuklearsicherheitsinspektorat(SwissNuclearSafetyInspectorate)ENSREG EuropeanNuclearSafetyRegulationGroupENSWDF EngineeredNear-SurfaceSolidRadioactiveWasteDisposalFacilityENTSO-E EuropeanNetworkofTransmissionSystemOperatorsforElectricityEPDC ElectricPowerDevelopmentCompany,JapanEPH Energetickýaprůmyslovýholding(EnergyGroup,CzechRepublic)EPR EuropeanPressurizedWaterReactor(EU),orEvolutionaryPressurizedWaterReactor(U.S.)EPZ

ElektriciteitsProduktiemaatschappijZuid-Nederland(ElectricityProductionCompanySouth-Netherlands)

ERD EconomicRelationsDivision(Bangladesh)EU28 EuropeanUnion28MemberStatesEÜAS State-ownedelectricitygeneratingcompany,TurkeyEVN ElectricityofVietnamEWEA EuropeanWindEnergyAssociationFANC FederalAgencyforNuclearControl,BelgiumFCE-CFDT

FédérationChimieÉnergie-Confédérationfrançaisedémocratiquedutravail(EnergyFederationoftheFrenchDemocraticConfederationofLabour)

FCM FuelContainingMaterialFEPC FederationofElectricPowerCompanies,JapanFERC FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission,U.S.FL3 Flamanville-3FNME-CGT FédérationNationaledesMinesetdel'Énergie-ConfédérationGénéraleduTravailFO ForceOuvrièreFS FeasibilityStudyFS FrankfurtSchoolFY FinancialYearGDF-Suez GazdeFranceGDA GenericDesignAssessmentGDOS GeneralDirectoratefortheEnvironment,PolandGDP GrossDomesticProductGE GeneralElectricGmbH GesellschaftmitbeschränkterHaftung(“Companywithlimitedliability”,Germany)


GPSC GeorgiaPublicServiceCommission,U.S.GUE/NGL EuropeanUnitedLeft/NordicGreenLeft,EuropeanParliamentPoliticalGroupGWEC GlobalWindEnergyCouncilIAEA InternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyIANS Indo-AsianNewsServiceIAS InformationandAnalyticalSurveyICC InternationalChamberofCommerceICSRWM IndustrialComplexonSolidRadioactiveWastesManagementIDC InterestDuringConstructionIEA InternationalEnergyAgencyIEEE InstituteofElectricalandElectronicsEngineersIESO IndependentElectricitySystemOperatorIISS InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudiesINDCs IntendedNationallyDeterminedContributionsINES InternationalNuclearEventScaleINRAG InternationalNuclearRiskAssessmentGroupINSAG InternationalNuclearSafetyAdvisoryGroupIPCC InternationalPanelonClimateChangeIPFM InternationalPanelofFissileMaterialsIRG InternationalReviewGroupIRP IntegratedResourcePlanIRRS IntegratedRegulatoryReviewServiceIRSN InstituteforRadiologicalProtectionandNuclearSafety,FranceISF-1 IntermediateSpentFuelstoragebuildingITAR/TASS

InformationTelegraphAgencyofRussia-TelegraphAgencyoftheSovietUnion,RussianNewsAgency

JAEC JapanAtomicEnergyCommissionorJordanianAtomicEnergyCommissionJAIF JapanAtomicIndustrialForum,Inc.JAPCO JapanAtomicPowerCompanyJAPEIC JapanPowerEngineeringAndInspectionCorporationJAVYS

JadrovaAVYradovaciaSpolocnost(StateownedEnergyutility,Slovakia)

JESS JadrováenergetickáspoločnosťSlovenska,a.s.JMA JapanMeteorologicalAgencyJNFL JapanNuclearFuelLimitedJSW JapanSteelWorksKA-CARE KingAbdullahCityforAtomicandRenewableEnergyKEPCO KoreanElectricPowerCorporationKGHM CopperMiningandSmeltingIndustrialComplex,PolandKHNP KoreaHydro&NuclearPowerCoKINS KoreanInstituteofNuclearSafetyKKNPP KudankulamNuclearPowerProjectKKP2 KernkraftwerkPhilippsburg2(Philippsburg2PowerUtility)KMT ChineseNationalistPartyLNG LiquefiedNaturalGasLOCA Loss-Of-Coolant-AccidentLRTP LiquidRadwasteTreatmentPlantLRWTP LiquidRadioactiveWastesTreatmentPlantLTEP LongTermEnergyPlan,Ontario,CanadaLTO LongTermOutage


LTS Long-TermShutdownMAFF MinistryofAgriculture,ForestryandFisheries,JapanMBTU millionBritishthermalunitsMEP MembersoftheEuropeanParliamentMETI MinistryofEconomics,TradeandIndustry,JapanMHLW MinistryofHealth,LabourandWelfare,JapanMISO MidcontinentIndependentSystemOperator,U.S.MoSPI MinistryofStatistics&ProgrammeImplementation,IndiaMoU MemorandumofUnderstandingMOX plutoniumMixedOxideMSCNBPower

MycleSchneiderConsultingNewBrunswickPowerCorporation,Canada

NCA NuclearCooperationAgreementND NotDetectedNEA NuclearEnergyAgency,ChinaNEI NuclearEnergyInstituteorNuclearEngineeringInternational,U.S.NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganizationNGS NuclearGeneratingStationNIAEP OpenJoint-StockCompanyNizhnyNovgorodEngineeringCompany«Atomenergoproekt»NISA NuclearAndIndustrialSafetyAgency,JapanNIW NuclearIntelligenceWeeklyNJZ novájadrovázdrojNNEGC NationalNuclearEnergyGeneratingCompany,UkraineNPAD NewPoliticsAllianceforDemocracyNPCIL NuclearPowerCorporationofIndiaLtdNPP NuclearPowerPlantNPS NationalPolicyStatementNRA NuclearRegulatoryAuthority,U.S.orJapanNRC NuclearRegulatoryCommission,U.S.NSC NewSafeConfinement(atChernobyl)NSG NuclearSuppliersGroupNTI NuclearThreatInitiativeNW NucleonicsWeekOCHA OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairsOECD OrganizationforEconomicDevelopmentandCo-operationOFEN OfficeFédéraledel'Énergie,SwitzerlandOKG OskarshamnsKraftgruppAB,SwedenOL3 Olkiluoto3,FinlandONR OfficeforNuclearRegulation,U.K.OPG OntarioPowerGeneration,CanadaOPPD OmahaPublicPowerDistrictOPR [KoreanReactorDesign]PATRAM SymposiumofthePackagingandTransportationofRadioactiveMaterialsPEA Pre-engineeringAgreementPFBR PrototypeFastBreederReactorPG&E PacificGas&ElectricCo,USAPGE PolskaGrupaEnergetyczna,PolandPHWR PressurizedHeavy-WaterReactorPIE PowerinEuropePJM Pennsylvania-NewJersey-MarylandInterconnectionLLC


PLEC JapanNuclearPowerPlantLifeEngineeringCenterPLEX PlantLifeExtensionPPA PowerPurchaseAgreementPRIS InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency’sPowerReactorInformationSystemPV PhotovoltaicPWR PressurizedWaterReactorPXE PowerExchangeCentralEurope—PragueStockExchangeRAPS-1 Rajasthan-1,IndiaRBMK ReaktorBolshoyMoshchnostyKanalnyorhigh-powerchannelreactorRCP ReactorCoolantPumpsREN21 RenewableEnergyPolicyNetworkforthe21stCenturyRTE RéseaudeTransportd’ElectricitéRWE Rheinisch-WestfälischesElektrizitätswerkS&D Socialists&DemocratsPartyS&P Standard&Poor'sSCE&G SouthCaliforniaElectric&GasSE SlovenskéElektrárneSEA StrategicEnvironmentalAssessmentSES SchweizerischeEnergie-StiftungSFPF SpentFuelProcessingFacilitySFSA SpentFuelStorageAreaSIEAC SeoulInternationalEnergyAdvisoryCouncilSIP ShelterImplementationPlanSLWS TemporarySolidandLiquidWasteStorageSNN

SocietateaNationalaNuclearelectrica(NationalNuclearElectricityCompany,Romania)

SNPTC StateNuclearPowerTechnologyCorporation,ChinaSPIC StatePowerInvestmentCorporation,ChinaSPP SouthwestPowerPoolSSE StateSpecializedEnterprise,UkraineSSU SecurityServicesofUkraineSTUK Säteilyturvakeskus(RadiationandNuclearSafetyAuthority,Finland)SUJB StateNuclearSafetyOffice,CzechRepublicSWPP SolidWasteProcessingPlantSWU SeparationWorkUnitTACIS TechnicalAidtotheCommonwealthofIndependentStatesProgramme,EUCommissionTEPCO TokyoElectricPowerCompany,JapanTMMOB

TürkMühendisveMimarOdalarıBirliği(ChamberofTurkishEngineersandArchitects)

TORCH TheOtherReportonChernobylTRM Third-partyReviewMeetingTVA TennesseeValleyAuthority,U.S.TVO TeollisuudenVoimaOyjUAE UnitedArabEmiratesU.K. UnitedKingdomUN UnitedNationsUNECE UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforEuropeUNEP UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammeUNFCCC UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChangeUNSCEAR UnitedNationsScientificCommitteeontheEffectsofAtomicRadiation


UPI UnitedPressInternationalU.S.DOE UnitedStatesDepartmentofEnergyVAESPB VisaginoAtominėElektrinėVEB Vnesheconombank(RussianBankforDevelopmentandForeignEconomicAffairs)VVER Vodo-VodianoïEnerguetitcheskiReaktorWNA WorldNuclearAssociationWNISR WorldNuclearIndustryStatusReportWNN WorldNuclearNewsWSJ WallStreetJournalWWTP WasteWaterTreatmentPlant

ElectricalandOtherUnits

kW–kilowatt(unitofinstalledelectricpowercapacity)

kWh–kilowatt-hour(unitofelectricityproductionorconsumption)

MW–megawatt(106watts)MWe–megawattelectric(asdistinguishedfrommegawattthermal,MWt)GW–gigawatt(109watts)GWe–gigawattelectricTWh–terawatthour(1012watt-hours)Bq–BecquerelBq/l–BecquerelperlitreBq/km2–BecquerelpersquarekilometerBq/m2–BecquerelpersquaremeterPBq–Petabecquerel(1015Becquerel)Gy–gray(derivedunitofionizingradiationdose;definedastheabsorptionofonejouleofradiation

energyperkilogramofmatter)Person-gray–unitofcollectivedoseforspecificorganexposuresmSv–millisievertmSv/h–millisievertperhourperson-Sv–unitofcollectivedoseforwholebodyexposuresSv–SievertSv/h–SievertperhourSv/y–Sievertperyear


Annex 8: Status of Nuclear Power in the World Table20:StatusofNuclearPowerintheWorld(asof1July2016)

NuclearReactors Power Energy

CountryOperates(Reactors)

Capacity(MWe)

AverageAge(Years)

UnderConstruction(Reactors)

ShareofElectricity949

ShareofCommercialPrimaryEnergy950

Argentina 3 1632 25.8 1 5%(=) 2%(=)

Armenia 1 375 36.5 34.5%(+) ?

Belarus 2

Belgium 7 5913 36.3 37.5%(-) 10.5%(-)

Brazil 2 1884 25.1 1 3%(=) 1%(=)

Bulgaria 2 1926 26.8 31%(-) 18.5%(-)

Canada 19 13524 33.0 16.5%(=) 7%(=)

China 34 29402 6.6 21 3%(=) 1.5%(=)

CzechRepublic 6 3930 25.0 32.5%(-) 15.5%(-)

Finland 4 2752 37.3 1 33.5%(=) 20.5%(=)

France 58 63130 31.4 1 76.5%(=) 41.5%(=)

Germany 8 10799 30.1 14%(-) 6.5%(=)

Hungary 4 1889 31.0 52.5%(=) 17.5%(=)

India 20 5215 20.3 6 3.5%(=) 1.2%(=)

Iran 1 915 4.8 1.3%(=) <1%(=)

Japan 3 2522 32.0 2 0.5% <1%

Korea 25 23073 19.4 3 31.5%(+) 13.5%(=)

949FromIAEA-Pris,asof24June2016.950BP,“StatisticalReviewofWorldEnergy”,June2016.


NuclearReactors Power Energy

CountryOperates(Reactors)

Capacity(MWe)

AverageAge(Years)

UnderConstruction(Reactors)

ShareofElectricity949

ShareofCommercialPrimaryEnergy950

Mexico 2 1440 24.4 7%(+) 1.5%(=)

Netherlands 1 482 43.0 3.5%(=) 1%(=)

Pakistan 3 690 22.0 3 4.5%(=) 1.5%(=)

Romania 2 1300 14.5 17.5%(-) 8%(=)

Russia 35 25443 30.7 7 18.5%(=) 6.5%(=)

Slovakia 4 1816 24.3 2 56%(=) 21.5%(-)

Slovenia 1 688 34.7 38%(=) ?

SouthAfrica 2 1860 31.6 4.5%(-) 2%(=)

Spain 7 7121 31.4 20.5%(=) 9.5%(=)

Sweden 8 8205 36.3 34.5%(-) 24.5%(-)

Switzerland 5 3333 41.2 33.5%(-) 19%(-)

Taïwan 5 4428 34.0 16.5%(-) 7.5%(-)

UAE 4

U.K. 15 8883 32.4 19%(+) 8.5%(=)

Ukraine 15 13107 27.4 56.5%(+) 23.5%(+)

USA 100 100353 36.2 4 19.5%(=) 8.5%(=)

EU 127 118834 31.4 4 26%951(-) 12%(=)

World 402 348030 29.0 58 10.7952(=) 4%(=)

951Eurostat,“EU-28ElectricityProductionbySource,2015”,May2016,seehttp://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:EU-28_Electricity_production_by_source,_2015_(in_%25)_update.png,accessed24June2016.952BP,“StatisticalReviewofWorldEnergy”,June2016.


Annex 9: Nuclear Reactors in the World “Under Construction”

Table21:NuclearReactorsintheWorld“UnderConstruction”(asof1July2016)

Country/Reactors Units MWe (net) Construction Start Planned Grid Connection Delayed

Argentina 1 25

Carem25 08/02/14 2018(firstpower)1 ?

Belarus 2 2218

Belarusian-1 1109 06/11/13 2018(operation)2 ?

Belarusian-2 1109 03/06/14 2020(operation)3 ?

Brazil 1 1245

Angra-3 01/06/10 5/2019(commercialoperation)4 Yes

China5 21 21500

Fangchenggang-2 1000 23/12/10 2016 Yes

Fangchenggang-3 1000 24/12/15 2019 ?

Fuqing-3 1000 31/12/10 2016 Yes

Fuqing-4 1000 01/10/12 7/2017 ?

Fuqing-5 1000 07/05/15 20206 Yes

Fuqing-6 1000 22/12/15 20207 Yes

Haiyang-1 1000 24/09/09 20178 Yes

Haiyang-2 1000 21/06/10 20179 Yes

Hongyanhe-5 1000 29/03/15 202110 ?

Hongyanhe-6 1000 24/07/15 202111 ?

Sanmen-1 1000 19/04/09 6/201712 Yes

Sanmen-2 1000 17/12/09 End201713 Yes

ShandongShidaowan 200 01/12/12 2/201714 Yes

Taishan-1 1660 28/10/09 201715 Yes

Taishan-2 1660 15/04/10 201716 Yes

Tianwan-3 990 22/12/12 2/2018 ?

Tianwan-4 990 27/09/13 11/2018 ?



Tianwan-5 1000 27/12/15 202117 ?

Yangjiang-4 1000 01/11/12 7/2017 ?

Yangjiang-5 1000 18/09/13 11/2017 ?

Yangjiang-6 1000 31/12/13 7/2019 ?

Finland 1 1600

Olkiluoto-3 12/08/05 201818 Yes

France 1 1600

Flamanville-3 03/12/07 201819 Yes

India 6 3907

Kakrapar-3 630 22/11/10 2017(completion)20 Yes

Kakrapar-4 630 22/11/10 2018(completion)21 Yes

Kudankulam-2 917 04/07/02 6/2016(firstcriticality)22 Yes

PFBR 470 23/10/04 3/2017(criticality)23 Yes

Rajasthan-7 630 18/11/11 2018(“completiondate”)24 Yes

Rajasthan-8 630 30/09/11 2019(“completiondate”)25 Yes

Japan 2 2650 Notes26

Ohma 1325 07/05/2010 ? Yes

Shimane 1325 12/10/2007 ? Yes

Pakistan 3 1644

Chasnupp-327 315 28/05/11 12/2016(commercialoperation) ?

Chasnupp-428 315 18/12/11 10/2017(commercialoperation) ?

K-2(Karachi2)29 1014 20/08/15 late2021(commercialoperation) ?

Russia30 7 5473

Leningrad-2-1 1085 25/10/08 201731 Yes

Leningrad-2-2 1085 15/04/10 201932 Yes

Novovoronezh-2-1 1114 24/06/08 201633 Yes

Novovoronezh-2-2 1114 12/07/09 201934 Yes

Rostov-4 1011 01/01/8335 06/201736 Yes



SeverodvinskLomonosov-1 32 15/04/07 31/12/19(commercialoperation)37

Yes

SeverodvinskLomonosov-2 32 15/04/07 01/12/19(commercialoperation)38

Yes

Slovakia 2 880

Mochovce-3 440 01/01/85 Early2017(firstpower)39 Yes

Mochovce-4 440 01/01/85 2018(firstpower)40 Yes

SouthKorea41 3 4020

Shin-Hanul-1 1340 10/07/12

04/2018(commercialoperation)42

Yes

Shin-Hanul-2 1340 19/06/13


Yes

Shin-Kori-4 1340 15/09/09


Yes

UnitedArabEmirates45 4 5380

Barakah-1 1345 01/07/12 2017 ?

Barakah-2 1345 30/05/13 2018 ?

Barakah-3 1345 24/09/14 2019 ?

Barakah-4 1345 30/07/15 202046 ?

USA 4 4468

VirgilC.Summer-2 1117 09/03/13 mid201947 Yes

VirgilC.Summer-3 1117 02/11/13 mid202048 Yes

Vogtle-3 1117 12/03/13 mid201949 Yes

Vogtle-4 1117 19/11/13 mid202050 Yes

TOTAL 58 56610 1983-2015 2016-2021 38

Sources:IAEA-PRIS,MSC,2016,unlessnotedotherwise


1NostartupdateinIAEA/PRIS.CNEAindicatesfuelloadinginsecondhalfof2017.StartupdatefromCNEA,“ProyectoCAREM–Cronograma”;Undated,seehttp://www.cnea.gov.ar/carem-cronograma,accessed24May2016.FirstpowerfromWNA,“NuclearPowerinArgentina”,updatedMay2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Argentina/,accessed24May2016.2NostartupdateinIAEA/PRIS.Operationstart“November2018”fromWNA,“NuclearPowerinBelarus”,UpdatedSeptember2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Belarus/,accessed24May2016;andWNN,“ReactorvesselassemblycompletedforsecondBelarusianunit”,26May2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Reactor-vessel-assembly-completed-for-second-Belarusian-unit-26051601.html,accessed26May2016.WNISRpreviouslyusedcommercialoperationdate(2019)fromWNA.3NostartupdateinIAEA/PRIS.Ibidem.4Delayednumeroustimes.Start-upestimatewas2018inWNISR2015.CommercialoperationdateofMay2019fromBrunswick,“GlobalAspectsandContractModeloftheAngra3Project”,PaperpresentedattheIAEATechnicalMeeting,10-12February2016,seehttps://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2016/2016-02-10-02-12-NPES/5_Brazil_Brunswick_R1.pdf,accessed24May2016.5Unlessnotedotherwise,datesarefromShanSun,“ChallengesduringconstructionofnewNPPS”,HuanengShandongShidaoBayNuclearPowerCompany,4February2014,seehttp://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2014/2014-02-04-02-07-TM-INIG/Presentations/37_S7_China_Sun.pdf,accessed31May2014;tabletranslatedinNIW,“China—Sanmen—TwoYearDelayPushesCostsHigher”,14March2014.6CNNCstatesthatexpectedconstructionoffirstHualongreactortobecompletedbyJune2020.Reuters,“China’sdebutWestinghousereactordelayeduntilJune2017”,9March2016,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-nuclear-idUSKCN0WB09F,accessed24June2016.7AdditionaldelayfollowsfromCNNCstatementinMarch2016,seepreviousnote.8Delayedagain.Originalstartupdate2014,one-yeardelaycomparedtoWNISR2015,seeWNA,“NuclearPowerinChina”,updatedJune2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/china-nuclear-power.aspx,accessed26June2016.9Delayedagainatleastbyseveralmonths,fromplannedstartupdate9/2016inWNISR2015.Ibidem.10WNN,“ConstructionStartsonHongyanhe5”,30March2015,seehttp://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Construction-starts-on-Hongyanhe-5-3003154.html,accessed8July2016.11Ibidem.12DelayedagainbymorethanayearsinceWNISR2015.AccordingtoSunQin,chairmanoftheChinaNationalNuclearCorporation“Weareforecastingthatifeverythinggoessmoothly,thefirstunitwillgointooperationinJune2017,andthesecondunitattheendof2017”,asquotedinReuters,“China’sdebutWestinghousereactordelayeduntilJune2017”,9March2016,seehttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-nuclear-idUSKCN0WB09F,accessed8July2016.ChiefEngineerofStatePowerInvestmentCorporationWangJunstressedinApril2016thatSanmen-1wouldbeoperationalbytheendoftheyear2016,seeNuclearStreetNews,“EngineerConfirmsSanmenAP1000StartUpIn2016”,7April2016,seehttps://nuclearstreet.com/nuclear_power_industry_news/b/nuclear_power_news/archive/2016/04/07/engineer-confirms-sanmen-ap1000-start-up-in-2016-040702,accessed8July2016;butagain,Westinghouselatersaidthatfuelloadingisexpectedbytheendof2016,seeWestinghouse,“FirstWestinghouseAP1000®completescoldHydroTestatSanmen1”,26May2016,seehttp://www.westinghousenuclear.com/About/News/View/first-westinghouse-ap1000%c2%ae-completes-cold-hydro-test-at-sanmen-1,accessed8July2016.13Delayedagain,byayearandahalfcomparedtoWNISR2015;seepreviousnote.14Delayed.Originallyplannedforstartupin2016.InMarch2013,thedatewaspushedbackbyoneyear.ThisdatefromWNA,“NuclearPowerinChina”,UpdatedJune2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/china-nuclear-power.aspx,accessed7July2016.


15Delayedagain.Afurtherdelayofabout2yearscomparedtoWNISR2015.Taishanreactorsareatleastthreeyearsbehindschedule.Taishan-1isnowexpectedtobeoperatinginthefirsthalfof2017;Bloomberg,“China’sAreva-DesignedNuclearReactorstoStartUpin2017”,15March2016,seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-15/china-s-areva-designed-nuclear-reactors-to-start-up-in-2017,accessed15March2016.SeealsoNW,“2015wasastrongyearforChinesenuclearpowerdevelopment,industrysays”,14January2016.16Delayedagain.Afurtherdelayofabout2yearscomparedtoWNISR2015.Taishanreactorsareatleastthreeyearsbehindschedule.Taishan-2isnowexpectedtobeoperatinginthesecondhalfof2017.Seepreviousnote.17WNA,“NuclearPowerinChina”,UpdatedJune2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/china-nuclear-power.aspx,accessed26June2016.18Delayed.Afternumerousrevisionsoftheoriginalplannedcommissioningin2009.thedaterefersto“commercialoperation”.In2013,TVOwaspreparingforthepossibilitythatthestartofregularelectricityproductionofOlkiluoto3maybepostponeduntilyear2016,seeTVO,“InformationAbouttheStart-upofOlkiluoto3NuclearPowerPlantUnit”,11February2013,seehttp://www.tvo.fi/news/32,accessed11February2013.In2014,TVOdecidednottoprovideanynewstartupdate;seeTVO,“TVODoesNotProvideanEstimateoftheStart-upTimeofOlkiluoto3NuclearPowerPlant”,seehttp://www.tvo.fi/news/190,accessed12February2014.AREVA,“UpdatedScheduleforOlkiluoto3”,1September2014,seehttp://www.areva.com/EN/news-10288/updated-schedule-for-olkiluoto-3.html;andTVO,“Olkiluoto3readyforelectricityproductionin2018,accordingtotheplantsupplier”,1September2014,accessed1September2014.In2016,TVOstickstothisposition:“AccordingtotheschedulesubmittedbytheOL3supplier,regularelectricitygenerationatOL3willstartattheendof2018.”,seeTVO,“TVOSubmitsOL3OperatingLicenseApplicationtotheMinistryofEmploymentandtheEconomy”,14April2016,seehttp://www.tvo.fi/news/1711,accessed5May2016.19DelayedagainbyatleastoneyearcomparedtoWNISR2015.Delayednumeroustimesfromtheoriginalplannedstartupdatein2012.EDF's“ReferenceDocument2014”,April2015,states:“InNovember2014,theprojectschedulewasrevised,withthefirstmarketableproductionscheduledfor2017”.Nowtheprojectisexpectedto“loadfuelandstartup”inthefourthtrimester2018.EDF,“RapportAnnuel2015”,February2016.20InWNISR2015,start-upwasdelayedtwoyearsfrompreviousestimates.DAE(DepartmentofAtomicEnergyofIndia)indicatedananticipatedcompletiondateof2017-2018forKakrapar3&4.DAE,inRajyaSabha,“StatementReferredtoinReplytoRajyaSabhaStarredQuestionn°14forAnsweron23.04.2015byShriK.C.TyagiRegardingGenerationofPowerbyNuclearPlants”,23April2015,seehttp://www.dae.nic.in/writereaddata/parl/budget2015/rssq14.pdf,accessed1May2015.21InWNISR2015,startupwasdelayed3yearsfrompreviousestimates.DAEindicatedananticipatedcompletiondateof2017-2018forKakrapar3&4.DAE,inRajyaSabha,“StatementReferredtoinReplytoRajyaSabhaStarredQuestionn°14forAnsweron23.04.2015byShriK.C.TyagiRegardingGenerationofPowerbyNuclearPlants”,23April2015,seehttp://www.dae.nic.in/writereaddata/parl/budget2015/rssq14.pdf,accessed1May2015.GridConnection(30September2015)andcommercialoperationdatesdeletedfromIAEA/PRISinAugust2013.Theexpectedcommercialoperationdateof“December2015”hasbeenreplacedby“underreview”inNPCIL,“PlantsUnderConstruction,Kakrapar”,Undated,seehttp://www.npcil.nic.in/main/ConstructionDetail.aspx?ReactorID=91,accessed27June2016.22Delayednumeroustimes.Constructionatleastsevenyearsbehindschedule.NoIAEA/PRISstartupdate.This“FirstCriticality”date-afurtherdelayof9monthscomparedtoWNISR2015-fromNPCIL,“PlantsUnderConstruction,Kudankulam”,UpdatedMay2016,seehttp://www.npcil.nic.in/main/ConstructionDetail.aspx?ReactorID=77,accessed12June2016.23Delayednumeroustimes.NoIAEAstart-update.Criticalityisnow“expected”byMarch2017.AfurtherdelayofoneyearcomparedtoWNISR2015.LokSabha-“UnstarredQuestionNo.1762-TobeansweredOn04-05.2016-FastBreederReactors,TheMinisterOfStateForPersonnel,PublicGrievances&PensionsAndPrimeMinister’sOffice(Dr.JitendraSingh)”seehttp://dae.nic.in/writereaddata/parl/budget2016/lsus1762.pdf,accessed29May2016.


24Delayed.Startupdate(31March2016)wasdeletedfromIAEA/PRIS.DAEindicatesananticipatedcompletiondateof2018-2019forRajasthan7&8.DAE,inRajyaSabha,“StatementReferredtoinReplytoRajyaSabhaStarredQuestionn°14forAnsweron23.04.2015byShriK.C.TyagiRegardingGenerationofPowerbyNuclearPlants”,23April2015,seehttp://www.dae.nic.in/writereaddata/parl/budget2015/rssq14.pdf,accessed1May2015.ExpecteddateofCommercialoperationstillJune2016accordingtoNPCIL,“PlantsUnderConstruction,Rajasthan”,seehttp://www.npcil.nic.in/main/ConstructionDetail.aspx?ReactorID=87,accessed12June2016.25Delayed.Startupdate(30September2016)wasdeletedfromIAEA/PRIS.DAEindicatesananticipatedcompletiondateof2018-2019forRajasthan7&8.DAE,inRajyaSabha,“StatementReferredtoinReplytoRajyaSabhaStarredQuestionn°14forAnsweron23.04.2015byShriK.C.TyagiRegardingGenerationofPowerbyNuclearPlants”,23April2015,seehttp://www.dae.nic.in/writereaddata/parl/budget2015/rssq14.pdf,accessed1May2015.ExpecteddateofCommercialOperationstill“December2016”,accordingtoNPCIL,“PlantsUnderConstruction,Rajasthan”,seehttp://www.npcil.nic.in/main/ConstructionDetail.aspx?ReactorID=87,accessed12June2016.26Althoughthereremainmajorobstaclesforbothreactors,withlittlepublicinformationontheexactstatusandadvancementofconstruction,eventhoughnoplannedgridconnectiondatehasbeencommunicated,consideringthatsomeconstructionworkisreportedlyongoing,forthetimebeing,WNISRreintegratesShimane-3andOhmainitslistingofreactorsunderconstruction.27DatesweredeletedfromIAEA/PRIS.ThesedatesfromWNA,“NuclearPowerinPakistan”,UpdatedMay2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Pakistan/,accessed12June2016.28DatesweredeletedfromIAEA/PRIS.ThesedatesfromWNA,“NuclearPowerinPakistan”,UpdatedMay2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Pakistan/,accessed12June2016.29Constructionstartof“K-2”reactoron20August2015wasretroactivelyintroducedontheIAEA-PRISwebsitein2016,IAEA-PRIS,seehttps://www.iaea.org/pris/(2015),accessed11May2016.InIAEA-PRISdatabase,gridconnectionis7/2020.ThiscommercialoperationdatefromWNA,“NuclearPowerinPakistan”,UpdatedMay2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Pakistan/,accessed12June2016.30NodatesforRussianreactorsinIAEA/PRIS.Alldates(“Start”)andotherinformationfromWNA,“NuclearPowerinRussia”,UpdatedJune2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Russia--Nuclear-Power/,accessed14June2016,unlessotherwisenoted.31DelayedmanytimesfromoriginalstartupdateinOctober2013(seeWNISR2009).Previousdateof2016startupfromNIW,“Weeklyroundup”,20February2015.WNAindicatesgridconnectionJune2017andcommercialoperationin2018.32Previousdateof2018fromNIW,“Weeklyroundup”,20February2015.WNAnowsaysgridconnection11/2019,andcommercialoperation2020.33Delayedfromoriginalstart-updateon31December2012(seeWNISR2009).34Previouslyannouncedtostartupin2016.35Rostov4-Constructiondate:IAEA-PRISconsidersconstructionstartdatetobe16June2010,buttheRostov-4reactorwasalreadylistedasunderconstructionwithaconstructionstartof1983intheIAEA,“NuclearPowerReactorsintheWorld”,April1986Edition.36Delayednumeroustimes.WNAindicatesJune2017or2019.NoupdatefromWNISR201537Delayedseveraltimes.Thisestimateof2019fromWNAReactorDatabase,“AkademikLomonosov1”,seehttp://world-nuclear.org/NuclearDatabase/reactordetails.aspx?id=27570&rid=E4152D64-0C6B-475E-86ED-BDADF73D9C19&country=Russian%20Federation,accessed8June2015.AsofJune2016,WNAindicates2017-2018,withoutprovidinganyreason.


38Delayedseveraltimes.Thisestimateof2019fromWNAReactorDatabase,“AkademikLomonosov2”,seehttp://world-nuclear.org/NuclearDatabase/reactordetails.aspx?id=27570&rid=A0D78EB7-B62A-48FF-9D78-21A8E4534D90,accessed8June2015.AsofJune2016,WNAindicates2017-2018,withoutprovidinganyreason.39Delayednumeroustimes.LatestIAEA/PRISdatewasdeleted.Thisestimate-afewmonthdelaycomparedtoWNISR2015-fromWNA,“NuclearPowerinSlovakia”,UpdatedApril2016,seehttp://world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Slovakia/,accessed29May2016.40Delayednumeroustimes.LatestIAEA/PRISdatewasdeleted.Thisestimate-afewmonthdelaycomparedtoWNISR2015-fromWNA,“NuclearPowerinSlovakia”,UpdatedApril2016,seehttp://world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Slovakia/,accessed29May2016.41NoIAEAstartupdateforanyKoreanreactor.DatesfromKHNP(KoreanHydroandNuclearPowerCo).42DelayedafurtheryearsinceWNISR2015.KHNP,“Shin-Hanul#1,2”,30April2016,seehttp://cms.khnp.co.kr/eng/content/547/main.do?mnCd=EN03020303,accessed29May2016.43DelayedafurtheryearsinceWNISR2015.KHNP,“Shin-Hanul#1,2”,30April2016,seehttp://cms.khnp.co.kr/eng/content/547/main.do?mnCd=EN03020303,accessed29May2016.44DelayedanadditionalyearsinceWNISR2015,athree-yeardelaysinceWNISR2014.KHNP,“Shin-Kori#3,4”,31March2016,seehttp://cms.khnp.co.kr/eng/content/546/main.do?mnCd=EN03020302,accessed1May2016.45NoIAEAstartupdates.DatesforthreereactorsfromEmiratesNuclearEnergyCorporation(ENEC),“ENECSubmitsOperatingLicenseApplicationtoFANRforBarakahUnits1&2”,26March2015,seehttp://www.enec.gov.ae/media-centre/news/content/enec-submits-operating-license-application-to-fanr-for-barakah-units-1,accessed23May2015.46ThisdatefromWNA,“NuclearPowerintheUnitedArabEmirates”,UpdatedApril2016,seehttp://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/united-arab-emirates.aspx,accessed7July2016.47Delayed.ThisdateisfromUSDOE,“QuarterlyNuclearPowerDeploymentSummary—April2016”,April2016,seehttp://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/04/f30/DEPLOYMENT_SCORECARD_APRIL_2016.pdf,accessed7July2016.48Ibidem.49Ibidem.50Ibidem.