(Steve Nodine Case) Motion to Dismiss - Interests of Justice

8/3/2019 (Steve Nodine Case) Motion to Dismiss - Interests of Justice

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BALDWIN COUNTY, ALABAMA

STATE OF ALABAMA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)vs. ) CC-10-1745

)Stephen Nodine ) Judge Partin

)

Defendant )

MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, VIOLATIONOF DUE PROCESS, AND LACK OF GOOD FAITH

Comes now the Defendant and does hereby move this Honorable Court to dismiss

the Indictment in this case in the interests of justice pursuant to the 5 th Amendment and the

14th

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section Six of the Alabama

Constitution. In support thereof the defense offers the following:

1. Count One of this indictment charging the Defendant with Intentional Murder wasinitiated by a Baldwin County Grand Jury and returned on October 12

th, 2010.

2. As this court is well aware, the State of Alabama pursued this matter under thetheories of intentional murder and felony murder. The State of Alabama consistently

posited that Mr. Nodine shot Angel Downs and that Ms. Downs had not committed

suicide.

3. It is presumed as a matter of law and as a matter of fundamental fairness that theprosecutions theory accurately reflected the theory of the Baldwin County Grand

Jury and accurately reflected the evidence that was presented to the Grand Jury. See

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962).


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4. At no time during the previous trial did the State attempt to claim that Mr. Nodinewas---or could be---criminally responsible for the death of Angel Downs as a result

of a suicide.

5. On the 8th day of August, 2011, Mr. Nodine was indicted by a third Baldwin CountyGrand Jury in CC-11-1745. Count One of the indictment charged Mr. Nodine with

the offense of Criminally Negligent Homicide. Based on recently supplied

additional evidence and conversations with several members of the District

Attorneys Office (including the District Attorney), the State of Alabama had

changed their theory of the case and were operating under a completely different

theory of criminal liability as opposed to the previous prosecution.

6. These two theories are clearly mutually exclusive. The States new theory positsthat Angel Downs committed suicide and that Mr. Nodine was criminally

responsible for her taking her own life; the States former theory accused Mr.

Nodine of pulling the trigger and murdering Ms. Downs.

7. Based on several conversations with the current District Attorney and members ofher office, it was the clear and unequivocal position of the State of Alabama that

they would seek dismissal of the indictment returned in the instant case and operate

under the superseding indictment returned in CC-11-1745 (see Motion to Compel

and Enforce Agreement).

8. It is additionally clear that the most recent Grand Jury considered and no billed thecharges of Murder, Stalking, and Manslaughter.


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9. The following statement was recently released by the District Attorney:


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10.On October 19, 2011 a press conference was held where it was announced that theAlabama Attorney Generals office had taken over the prosecution of this case.

Former District Attorney Whetstone announced that he had been specially appointed

by the Attorney General to prosecute this case and CC-11-1745.

11.According to the Press Register:Whetstone said the judge in the case, Charles Partin, would decide whetherone or both of the indictments would be the basis of the trial, but he was

ready to seek a verdict for murder.

The states position at this moment is to pursue the murder case, the lesserincluded (charges) of the murder case, which could include negligent

homicide,

Furthermore:

Whetstone said he had some theories on the case that he declined todescribe. But he suggested the trial may be markedly different than the first

one, which centered on a dispute over whether Nodine shot Downs or she

shot herself.

And most significantly:

I think there is a theory of the case that Mr. Nodine could be responsible nomatter who pulled the trigger.

12.It is clear that the most recent Grand Jury that was convened to consider this casefound that the Murder charge was inappropriate. Upon information and belief, the

Grand Jury considered all of the evidence after four days of testimony. Presumably

this evidence also included the findings of a new state expert, Stuart James. Mr.

James is a highly regarded forensic scientist who examined this case and made the

following findings:

In my opinion, based on the spatter stains on the decedents right hand, the

cadaveric spasm in the right toe, the decedents posture on the ground at thetime the shot was fired, it is not probable that anyone but Angel Downs

fired the weapon.


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13.It is equally clear that the State of Alabama has now adopted a posture where theyanticipate ignoring the findings of Dr. Eugene Hart (who initially found this to be a

suicide and later changed his opinion to undetermined), Dr, James Lauritson (an

expert with strong historical ties to law enforcement, who also found this to be a

suicide), Jan Johnson (a universally highly regarded forensic scientist who found this

to be a suicide), and the most recent expert, Mr. James.

14.Such conduct on the part of the State of Alabama prosecutors violates all knownconcepts of due process and fair play.

15.The sanctity of the Grand Jury and their duty to return an indictment that issupported by certain facts and the prosecutors duty to present a theory based on

these same facts is one of the cornerstones of due process. As the United States

Supreme Court warned:

A grand jury, in order to make that ultimate determination, must necessarily

determine what the question under inquiry was. To allow the prosecutor, or

the court, to make a subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of thegrand jury at the time they returned the indictment would deprive the

defendant of a basic protection which the guarantee of the intervention of a

grand jury was designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted

on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the

grand jury which indicted him.

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962) (emphasis added).

16.Allowing a prosecutor to ignore the will and intent of a grand jury frustrates the endsof justice and allows this prosecutor to set sail on the prevailing winds of politics

instead of following the definitive course charted by a competent grand jury. As

stated by the United States Supreme Court:

Far from informing (the Defendant) of the nature of the accusation against

him, the indictment instead left the prosecution free to roam at large---to shift


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its theory of criminality so as to take advantage of each passing vicissitude of

the trial and appeal.

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962).

17.This course of conduct does not display good faith. The resulting prejudice to these

defendants affected their substantial rights and denied them due process of law. U.S.

v. Atkinson 135 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 1998).

18.The 11th Circuit has also issued a recent opinion concerning the dangers of this typeof conduct:

This danger is compounded when the grand jury indicts on one theory of the

illegal conduct, but the government prosecutes the case on an entirelydifferent theory. This roaming theory of the prosecution can produce trialerror of constitutional proportions.

US v. Chandler, 388 F. 3d 796 (11th

Cir. 2004)

19.Case law is equally clear concerning the duty of the government to refrain fromprosecuting mutually exclusive theories of guilt. This situation has come up

typically in the context of the government prosecuting two codefendants in the same

case with divergent and mutually exclusive theories.

20. While this issue has not been reached in the State of Alabama, other courts ofcompetent jurisdiction have considered this disturbing situation. The 9th Circuit has

held:

From these bedrock principles, it is well established that when no new

significant evidence comes to light a prosecutor cannot, in order to convicttwo defendants at separate trials, offer inconsistent theories and facts

regarding the same crime. Then-judge Kennedy wrote for our court that when

there are 1059*1059 claims of inconsistent prosecutorial conduct, reversal isnot required where the underlying theory "remains consistent." Haynes v.

Cupp, 827 F.2d 435, 439 (9th Cir.1987). Here, little about the trials remained

consistent other than the prosecutor's desire to win at any cost.

Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F. 3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1997).
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21. The 8th Circuit:

Smith contends that this manipulation of the evidence deprived him of due

process and rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. We agree. The State'suse of factually contradictory theories in this case constituted "foul blows,"

error that fatally infected Smith's conviction. Even if our adversary system is"in many ways, a gamble," Payne v. United States, 78 F.3d 343, 345 (8th

Cir.1996), that system is poorly served when a prosecutor, the state's own

instrument of justice, stacks the deck in his favor. The State's duty to itscitizens does not allow it to pursue as many convictions as possible without

regard to fairness and the search for truth.

Suppose, for example, that the prosecutor had argued a murder theory based

on Lytle's December 2, 1983, statement to convict Smith in Courtroom A in

the morning, then walked upstairs to Courtroom B and argued a contradictorymurder theory based on Lytle's November 30, 1983, statement to convict

Cunningham in the afternoon? Again, suppose that Smith and Cunningham

had been tried jointly. Would the prosecutor have been entitled to ask the

jury to accept as true both of Lytle's accounts of who had murdered theChamberses in an attempt to secure convictions of both Smith and

Cunningham?

We do not hold that prosecutors must present precisely the same evidence

and theories in trials for different defendants. Rather, we hold only that the

use of inherently factually contradictory theories violates the principles of

due process. For example, the passage of time between trials, such as the fourmonths' time between Smith's trial and Cunningham's, may be a legitimate

excuse for minor variations in testimony or defects in memory, as seems to

have occurred in Albanese. See 195 F.3d at 393. In Smith's case, however,the relevant variation was neither minor nor found in the testimony at trial.

Smith v. Groose, 205 F. 3d 1045 (8th

Cir. 2000).

22.And exhaustively by the California Supreme Court:The appellate court concluded, "the use of inconsistent, irreconcilable

theories to convict two defendants for the same crime is a due processviolation." (Stumpf, supra, 367 F.3d at p. 611.)The vice rests in the fact thatof two inconsistent and irreconcilable theories, one must be false: "Because

inconsistent theories render convictions unreliable, they constitute a violation

of the due process rights of any defendant in whose trial they are used."

(Id. at p. 613.) In Stumpf, the state had clearly used such irreconcilabletheories, for each proceeding, the prosecutor argued that the defendant had
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been the one to pull the trigger, resulting in the fatal shots to [Mrs.] Stout."

(Ibid.)

These courts and judges have found a prosecutor's 180-degree change in

theory "deeply troubling" (Jacobs v. Scott, supra, 513 U.S. at p. 1069, 115

S.Ct. 711), in part because by taking a formal position inconsistent with theguilt or culpability of at least one convicted defendant, the government,

through the prosecutor, has cast doubt on the factual basis for the conviction."If the prosecutor's statements at the Hogan trial were correct, then Jacobs is

innocent of capital murder." (Ibid.) "The conclusion seems inescapable that

the prosecutor obtained Henry Drake's conviction through the use oftestimony he did not believe ...." (Drake v. Kemp, supra, 762 F.2d at p.

1479.) "The prosecutor ... at Leitch's trial essentially ridiculed the theory he

had used to obtain a conviction and death sentence at Thompson's trial."

(Thompson, supra, 120 F.3d at p. 1057.) As both of two irreconcilabletheories of guilt cannot be true, "inconsistent theories render convictions

unreliable." (Stumpf, supra, 367 F.3d at p. 613.)

Because it undermines the reliability of the convictions or sentences, the

prosecutions use of inconsistent and irreconcilable theories has also been

criticized as inconsistent with the principles of public prosecution and theintegrity of the criminal trial system. A criminal prosecutor's function "is not

merely to prosecute crimes, but also to make certain that the truth is honored

to the fullest extent possible during the course of the criminal prosecution

and trial." (United States v. Kattar (1st Cir.1988) 840 F.2d 118, 127.) His orher goal must be "not simply to obtain a conviction, but to obtain a fair

conviction." (Brown v. Borg (9th Cir.1991) 951 F.2d 1011, 1015.) "Although

the prosecutor must prosecute with earnestness and vigor and `may strikehard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.'" (Smith, supra, 205 F.3d at

p. 1049,quoting Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629,

79 L.Ed. 1314; see also ABA Model Code Prof. Responsibility, EC 7-13["The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual

advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict"].)

For the government's representative, in the grave matter of a criminal trial, to

"chang[e] his theory of what happened to suit the state" is unseemly at best.(Drake v. Kemp, supra, 762 F.2d at p. 1479.) "The state cannot divide and

conquer in this manner. Such actions reduce criminal trials to mere

gamesmanship and rob them of their supposed purpose of a search for truth."(Ibid.) Thus, even a court that did not believe inconsistent positions, by

themselves, to be constitutional error found it "disturbing to see the Justice

Department change the color of its stripes to such a significant degree ...depending on the strategic necessities of the separate litigations." (United

States v. Kattar, supra, 840 F.2d at p. 127; see also Thompson, supra, 120

F.3d at p. 1072 (dis. opn. of Kozinski, J.) [prosecutor's use of inconsistentfactual theories "surely does not inspire public confidence in our criminal

justice system"].)
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In re Sakarias, 106 P. 3d 931(Cal. 2005).

23.The conduct of the State of Alabama has threatened to undermine the integrity ofthese proceedings.

"Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials

are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accusedis treated unfairly."

Brady v. Maryland,373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests this court to dismiss the indictment in

this case.

DONE: October 26, 2011

/s/ John W. BeckJOHN W. BECK

Attorney for Defendant

(BEC021)

BECKDEFENSE.COM, INC.Post Office Box 931

Fairhope, Alabama 36533

(251) 990-5454 Office(251) 990-5410 Facsimile

Email: [email protected]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that on October 26, 2011 a copy of the foregoing pleading was

automatically served on opposing counsel for the State of Alabama through the Alafilesystem.

/s/ John W. BeckJOHN W. BECK

Attorney at Law
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BALDWIN COUNTY, ALABAMA

STATE OF ALABAMA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)vs. ) CC-11-1635

)Stephen Nodine ) Judge Partin

)

Defendant )

ORDER

The court having considered the Defendants Motion to Dismiss in the Interests of

Justice, it is hereby ORDERED that this matter shall be heard on the ______ day of

_____________________, 2011.

Done this the _____ day of __________________, 2011.

________________________________Hon. Charles C. Partin

Circuit Court Judge

Documents

(Steve Nodine Case) Motion to Dismiss - Interests of Justice