Stevenson, L., 1993, Why Believe What People Say

8/13/2019 Stevenson, L., 1993, Why Believe What People Say

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LESLIE STEVENSON

W H Y B E L I E V E W H A T P E O P L E S A Y ? *

ABSTRACT. The basic alternatives seem to be either a Humean reductionist view thatany particular assertion needs backing with inductive evidence for its reliability before itcan rationally be believed, or a Reidian criterial view that testimony is intrinsically,though defeasibly, credible, in the absence of evidence against its reliability.Some recent arguments from the constraints on interpreting any linguistic performancesas assertions with propositional content have some force against the rednctionist view.We thus have reason to accept the criterial view, at least as applied to eyewitness reports.But these considerations do not establish that any rational enquirer must have the conceptof other minds or testimony. The logical possibility of the lone enquirer, who uses symbolsand thereby expresses some knowledge of his world, remains open - but it is a questionwe have no need to pronounce upon.The practice of accepting observation-statements is in fact extended to chains of testi-monies believed to start in perception or in some other kind of justification, but thearguments for doing this are not so clear.

.Very often, the only answer one can give to the quest ion How do youknow ? is Some one to ld me so . (Let us throu ghout th is paper use thewords te l l ing say ing and t e s t i m o n y in a sense wide enough to includethe use of writing, print, tel eph one , radio, television, etc. - no t justface-to-face conversat ion.) If we were not ent i t led thus to rely ontest imony, each of us would know very much less than we th ink wedo - only what one has seen for oneself, or what one ca n inductivelysupport or deductively prove with one s una ide d resources. With someclaims one might , i f one took e nough tr ouble, check the matte r out foroneself , and just ify one s judge men t by percept ion or proof. But inmany other cases - such as assert ions about the past , about presentevents too far away to be perceived, or ab out matter s b eyon d one sscientif ic or mat hemat ical c ompe tenc e - verif icat ion by the heare r isout of the quest ion.

Our ac tual depend ence on tes t i mony is enormous , then . But when(if ever) is it reasonabl e to accept somet hing because some one says so?I will concentrate on the first-person form of this question, looking notso muc h for conditio ns for the tran smis sion of knowl edge f rom A to B

Synthese 94: 429-451, t993. 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.


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430 L S L I S T V N S O N(formulated from the point of view of a third person, C), but askingfrom B s point of view what, if anything, can justify B in believing whatA says. I first essay a brief history of the topic, and then I formulatesome rival principles about the epistemology of testimony. I present anargument for the a priori but defeasible acceptability of testimony basedon percept ion; I consider a limitation of this argument, and finally somepossible extensions of it.

.One standard view of testimony is that no proposition can be justifiedmerely by the fact that someone has asserted it, i.e., that testimonyhas no intrinsic or primary evidential force (unlike perception, memory,and induction, according to most theories of knowledge). But thiscannot exclude the assembling of evidence that some kinds of testimo-nies are reliable and hence, justifiably believable on inductive grounds.If one finds that reports on certain kinds of topics or made in certainsorts of circumstances or by certain kinds of people tend to correlatewell with the facts of the relevant matters whenever one investigatesthem for oneself, one might reasonably come to rely on those kinds oftestimonies thereafter. This is what has been called the reductionistview of test imony - that it can earn justifying force only by inductivesuccess.There is an alternative account which we can label criterial by whichbelief on the basis of testimony is reasonable, i.e., prima facie justified,by definition. According to an unrestricted version of this, whateveranyone says about anything is, in the absence of contra-indications,worthy of belief. It has been argued that if a speaker knows that P andsays that P, then (under certain typical conditions) his hearer comes toknow that P too.1 According to a more restricted version, it is only incertain appropriate circumstances that A s asserting that P gives agood reason for believing it. For example, if it is known (or, at least,reasonably believed) that someone is or has been in a position to seesomething, this tends (unless overriden by other factors) to make theirtestimony about it credible. Eyewitness reports are treated in the courts,in historical enquiry, and in everyday life as having just such epistemicstatus, defeasibly justifying belief.In the late medieval and renaissance periods there prevailed an epis-temology which strongly emphasized the author ity of testimony - at


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W H Y B E L I E V E W H A T P E O P L E S A Y 431l e a s t f r o m r e c o g n i z e d s o u rc e s - b u t s e e m e d t o fi nd no p r o p e r p l a ce f o ri n d u c t i v e a rg u me n t . W e h a v e l o n g s i n c e l e a rn e d t o r i d i c u l e t h e c a s t o fmin d fo r wh ich wh a t Ar i s to t l e sa id , o r wha t i s wr i t t en in the Sc r ip tu res ,ca r r i e s mo r e w e i g h t t h a n w h a t c a n b e o b s e r v e d . T h e r e h a s b e e n s u c ha ma j o r c h a n g e i n w o r l d -v i e w t h a t i t i s h a rd fo r u s t o u n d e r s t a n d h o ws u c h a n e p i s t e mo l o g y c o u l d b e fo l l o w e d b y r a t i o n a l p e o p l e . A s H a c k i n gh a s s h o w n i n t h e e a r l y c h a p t e r s o f hi s b o o k The Emergence of Probabi l-ity (1 97 5 ), t h e v e ry w o rd probable o n c e m e a n t a p p r o ve d o f o r atteswdto b e fo re o u r mo d e r n c o n c e p t o f p ro b a b i l i t y a s b e l i ev a b i l it y b a s e d o ns t a t i s t i c a l e v i d e n c e w a s d e v e l o p e d . T h e re w a s e v e n a t e n d e n c y t o t r e a twha t we now ca l l i nduc t ive ev idence a s a spec ia l k ind o f t e s t imony -'w h a t N a t u re h e r s e l f t e l l s u s ' o r 'w h a t i s w r i t t e n i n t h e g r e a t b o o k o ft h e W o r l d ' - w h i c h s ug g e st s t h e id e a o f a r e v e r s e r e d u c t i o n , n a m e l y ,o f i n d u c t i o n t o te s t i mo n y . R e mn a n t s o f t h is a n c i e n t c o n c e p t i o n p e rh a p ssu rv ive in those uses o f the w ords sign a n d me a n which ana ly t i c ph i lo so -p h e r s t e n d t o fi nd c o n c e p t u a l l y p ro m i s c u o u s - e . g . , 'R e d s p o t s a r e as ig n o f me a s l e s ' o r 'T h o s e d a rk c l o u d s m e a n r a i n '. O u r d i a g n o s is o fsuch usages a s i nvo lv ing a p r imi t ive o r ' na tu ra l ' sense o f ' s i gn ' o r'me a n i n g ' , q u i t e d i s t i n c t f r o m t h a t r e l e v a n t t o l a n g u a g e p ro p e r , s h o w show the o lde r v i ew i s no t a se r ious cand ida te fo r u s now: we l i ve fa r ont hi s s id e o f t h e e p i s t e mo l o g i c a l i n n o v a t i o n s o f t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u ry ,e p i t o m i z e d b y B a c o n a n d D e s c a r t e s.

B u t i n r e j e c t i n g t h e me d i e v a l v i e w , D e s c a r t e s w e n t t o t h e o p p o s i t ee x t r e m e ; fo r in h is Discourse on Metho d a n d Meditations h e r e p u d i a t e sall r e l i a n c e o n t h e t e s t i mo n y o f o t h e r s a n d r e s o l v e s t o a c c e p t o n l y w h a th e c a n j u s ti f y w i t h h is o w n u n a i d e d m e n t a l r e s o u rc e s . [A ] s s o o n a smy a g e a l l o w e d me t o p a ss f ro m u n d e r t h e c o n t ro l o f my i n s t ru c t o r s ,h e te ll s u s, I e n t i r e l y a b a n d o n e d t h e s t u d y o f l e t te r s , a n d r e s o l v e d n o tt o s e e k a f t e r a n y s c i e n ce b u t w h a t mi g h t b e fo u n d w i t h in my s e l f o r i nt h e g r e a t b o o k o f t h e w o r l d ( [16 3 7 ]/ 19 5 4 , P a r t O n e ) . L e t t e r s h e r eseems to mean a l l t he wr i t i ngs rega rded as au tho r i t a t ive in t he schoo l s ,a n d t a lk o f t h e g r e at b o o k o f t h e w o r l d m u s t f o r h i m h a v e b e c o m ea d e a d me t a p h o r . O n D e s c a r t e s ' s n e w i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c a p p ro a c h , t e s t i -m o n y c a n h a v e e v i d e n t i a l f o r c e o n l y i n a v e ry s e c o n d a ry w a y , i f a t a ll.

H u m e p ro v i d e s t h e c la s si c e x a m p l e o f th is r e d u c t i o n i s t a p p ro a c h . A tthe beg inn ing o f t he fam ous d i scussion o f mi rac l e s i n h is f ir s t Enquiryh e c la i ms t h a t o u r a s s u ra n c e i n a n y p ie c e o f t e s t i mo n y i s d e r i v e df r o m n o o t h e r p r i n ci p le t h a n o u r o b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e v e r a c it y o f h u m a nt e s t i mo n y , a n d o f th e u s u a l c o n fo rm i t y o f fa c ts t o t h e r e p o r t s o f w it n e s-


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434 L S L I S T V N S O Nproach. They have assumed that in a rational reconstruction of ourknowledge, the subject must first justify belief in the external world byhis own unaided resources before he can even begin to justify belief inother (rational) minds, or to argue (inductively?) that certain soundsor marks made by other bodies express assertions, or that the contentof these assertions are (in some circumstances) likely to be true (see,for example, Ayer 1973, pp. 104-05). More recently, however, therehas been a reaction towards a Reidian, criterial view of testimony. Suchan approach is strongly suggested in many of Wittgenstein's remarks,posthumously published in On ertainty (1969): for example: Thechild learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief (sec.160); also I believe what people transmit to me in a certain manner.In this way I believe geographical, chemical, historical facts etc . . . .And can it now be said: we accord credence in this way because it hasproved to pay? (sec. 170). A negative answer seems to be invited tothis last question, rejecting the reductionist approach; but it is difficultto discern argumentative structure in these jottings of Wittgenstein'slast days. Coady (1973) is a rare example of explicit argument againstreductionism. Evans (1982, Ch. 5.2) suggests that a reorientation oftraditional views of testimony is necessary both for a sound epistemol-ogy and a sound philosophy of language; but he, too, was not giventhe time to develop his thoughts on the topic.

.So much by way of preliminary identification of the options and theirhistory: we must now address the substantive question of how good arethe arguments on either side. But we must first try to formulate moreprecisely the rival a priori principles about when the acceptance oftestimony is defeasibly justified. How should the criterial view be bestformulated? I f it were suggested that:

If B hears and understands A say that p,then B is justified in believing that p;

the obvious objection would be that if I have reason to suspect myinformant may be lying, then I would not be justified in believing him.But if I think him sincere in his assertion, or at least have no reasonto suspect his insincerity, is that enough? Could we accept:


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436 L S L I S T V N S O NCo n s id e r t h e n

o f t e s t im o n y :(TC) If ( i)

(ii)(iii)(iv)

then B

the fo l lowing fo rm ula t io n o f a cr i te r ia l ep is temology

B hea rs and unde rs tand s A say tha t p ,B has no reas on to dou b t A s s incer i ty ,B has no ev idence aga ins t p ,B has no reason to th ink tha t A s be l ie f abou t p i snot jus t i f ied ,is jus t i f ied in be l ieving tha t p .

This represents a cr i te r ia l v iew which is unres tr ic ted as to subjec t mat-t e r: w h a t e v e r a n y o n e a s s e rt s a b o u t a n y th in g m a y b e a c c e p t e d , p r o v id e done know s o f no th in g cou n t ing aga ins t i t, the i r s ince r ity in say ing i t, o rthe re l iab i l i ty of th is perso n s be l iefs on th is topic . T he ju s t i f ica t ion isem inen t ly de feas ib le , o f course - fo r example , the ve ry nex t pe rsonone m ee ts m ay te l l one the exac t oppos i te - bu t tha t is no su rp r ise : weare on ly in the marke t fo r de feas ib le gu idance he re .

Th e r e d u c t io n i s t v i e w , i n c o n t r a s t , d e m a n d s m o r e t h a n t h e m e r eabsence o f doub t abou t the re l iab i l ity o f the speaker : i t r equ i res tha tone have pos i t ive ev idence in favour . The c r i te r ia l approach t rea t ste s t im ony as inno cen t ( i . e . , tru s two r thy) un less show n gu i l ty ; the re -duc t ion is t t r ea t s i t a s gu i l ty ( i . e . , no t wor thy o f be l ie f ) un t i l a goodt rack- record i s shown. Here i s a f i r s t sho t a t fo rmula t ing the p r inc ip leb e h in d t h e r e d u c t io n i s t a p p r o a ch :(Tr ) I f ( i) B hea rs and unde rs tand s A say tha t p ,

( ii ) B has no reas on to do ub t A s s ince r i ty ,( i i i ) B has no o ther evidence for or agains t p ,

then B is jus t i f ied in be l ieving tha t p if nd only if B hasreason to th in k tha t A s be l ie f abou t p i s ju s t if i ed .

The on ly i f i s nee ded to d i st ingu ish the reduc t ion is t approach f romthe c r i t e r ia l , fo r the la t te r can happ i ly accep t tha t ev idence fo r thespeaker s re l iab il i ty can be su f fic ien t to ju s t i fy accep tance ; wh a t i s ind ispu te i s wh e the r i t i s necessa ry . The in t ro duc t io n o f on ly i f in to theconclu s ion require s the inc lus ion of for in to ( ii i ).

(Tr ) i s s ti ll im por ta n t ly ambigu ous , howe ver . On an ex t rem e reduc-t ion is t v iew, the requ i red ev idence shou ld be comple te ly v il ble toB, cons i s ting on ly in co r re la t ions be t we en B s he a r ing o f a sse rt ions byA (an d /o r o the rs ) an d B s own obse rva t ions o f the re levan t fac ts ; the reshou ld be no re l iance on te s t imony in a ssembl ing th i s pu re ly induc t ive


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W H Y B E L I E V E W H A T P E O P L E S A Y 9 437evidence . But , on a less st r ingent v iew, B wo uld be a l lowed, in assess ingA s re l iab il ity , to depend on the t e s t imony o f C , and pe rhaps man yothers . F or exa mple , i f l it tle Johnny cr ies W olf , I might be able tojus t i fy bel ieving him b y appeal to a num ber of cases in which, pro m ptedby jus t such a cry f rom him, I have se en a wolf myself: I would thusme et the s t rong er requirem ent . Bu t i t might be tha t I could only sa t is fythe w eaker one , fo r example , b y rely ing on the word o f Johnny s o lde rs is ter Jane y that in her exper ience he has been a re liable wolf-detec tor .Of course , I migh t have checked ou t Janey s wolf-recognit ional skil lsfor myself , but , there again , I could take her m other s wo rd for i t; orI might b e conf ident abou t Janey s wo lf- repor ts on the grounds of herpe rcep tua l compe tence wi th other animals, or other things generally(whe ther d em onstra ted or repor ted) . In the l ight of such poss ib i li t ies ,the ve ry s t rong requ i rement mooted above does no t seem very a t t r ac t -ive.

But the spi r it of the reduct ionis t approa ch remains tha t a ll jus t if iedre l iance on tes t im ony is a t bot to m a com plex kind of induct ion - oneis not to bel ieve what someone says just because they say i t , but onlywhen one can assemble an empir ica l argument tha t what they say isl ike ly to be t rue . One may appeal to o ther tes t imony to suppor t be l iefin these correlat ions, but only in so far as i t is i tself supportable ins imilar fashion. The re can thus be a regress of depen den ce, jus t i fy ingA s tes t imon y, o r tha t of people l ike A, or tes t imo ny ab out topics likeP, by appeal to the tes t imony of B, or of people of a k ind which Bexempli f ies , or about topics l ike Q. But the reduct ionis t idea is tha tthis regress mu st b e f inite: to iustify accepting ano ther s assert ion, i tmust te rminate in corre la t ions between sayings and fac ts , both of whichone has oneself observed. Thus in build ing up know ledge o f the world ,or in rat ionally reconstructing justif ication for the beliefs one alreadyhas , one m ay p roceed th rough a numbe r o f laye rs o f depend ence ontes t imony; but a t no s tage can one jus t i fy a bel ief merely becausesom eon e has to ld one so , even i f one has no evidence agains t it oragainst the inform ant s rel iabil i ty. To express this reductionist view weneed to s t rengthen (Tr) somewhat as fo l lows:

TR) If ( i) B hears and und ersta nds A say that p,( ii) B has no reaso n to do ub t A s sinceri ty,

( ii i) B has no oth er ev idenc e for or against p,then B is just if ied in believing that p if and only if B has


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438 L E S L I E S T E V E N S O Nevidence that A s beliefs on matters such as p are likely tobe true; and if that evidence involves appeal to other testi-mony, B must have evidence for the reliability of thoseinformants beliefs, and any such regress of evidence mustend in inductive correlations involving only what B has him-self observed. 2

Reid s analogy between testimony and perception can now be ex-pressed by comparing (TC) with the following principle for the defeas-ible acceptability of perceptual experience:(P) If B seems to perceive that p,B has no evidence against p,

B has no reason to doubt the reliability of her perceptualfaculties,then B is justified in believing p.And while we are about it, we can formulate similar defeasible prin-ciples governing memory and induction:

(M) If B seems to remember that p,B has no evidence against p,B has no reason to doubt the reliability of his own mem-ory,then B is justified in believing p.

(I) If every time B has observed an event of type F, she hassoon thereafter observed an event of type G,and B observes another F,and B has no reason not to expect a G this time,

then B is justified in believing that another G will soono c c u r

But to formulate epistemic principles is not to accept them, let aloneto argue for them. Scepticism about perception, memory , and inductioncan take precisely the form of questioning whether we should accepteven the defeasible principles (P), (M), and (I). And there are interest-ing questions whether these three have to be accepted together as aconceptually interdependent package, or whether one might accept (P)without the others, or (P) and (M) without (I). (There does seem tobe an undeniable presupposition of (P) by (M), and of (M) by (I).) Ourtopic here, however, is not these well-worked issues of epistemology but


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W H Y B E L I E V E W H A T P E O P L E S A Y ? 439the less-discussed one of the epistemic status of testimony. Let usassume, then, for the sake of argument in this paper, that (P), (M),and (I) are not only generally accepted (as they surely are, implicitlyat least), but can be rationally defended against sceptical attacks. Ourquestion now is: What is their relation to testimony? Does the accept-ance of (P), (M), and (I) somehow involve accepting the analogous(TC), or is the way left open for the rival (TR) - or need one accepteither?Should we accept (TC) merely on the strength of this analogy with(P), (M), and (I)? Or is there an rgument that shows the reductionistapproach (TR) to be wrong? Welbourne (1986, Ch. 5.4) argues for theincoherence of the idea of an articulate Crusoe who holds that knowl-edge is not transmissible by testimony. He says: [I]n denying appli-cation for the concept of commonable knowledge, our self-sufficientknower denies application for a concept of knowledge which he requiresfor his own conception of himself as a being enduring though time(1986, p. 62). The argument seems to be that if one accepts (M) - asone surely must if one is not to be reduced to a solipsism of thepresent moment - one ought to accept (TC) as well. But why, exactly?Welbourne writes:T h i s i s n o t j u s t a p o in t a b o u t p a r i t y o f r e a s o n in g a s a p p l i e d t o t e s t im o n y a n d m e m o ry ,imp or tan t as tha t i s. I t goes deepe r . I t i s a po in t about th e concep t o f knowledg e whichunder l ies bo th our no t ion o f memory and our p rac t ice o f te l l ing the fac ts , and exposesthe m to para l le l t rea tm ent . Th is is a conce p t o f some th ing which is no t bo und to ap a r t i cu l a r t im e o r t o a p a r t i c u l a r m in d . O th e r p e o p le s k n o w le d g e a n d k n o w le d g e f ro mpas t t imes may be ava i lab le to me now. (1986 , p . 63)

This sounds plausible. Certainly, it is part of our actual conceptionof knowledge that any item of knowledge can be retained through time(in memory, and also in writing, tape-recordings, etc.), and can betransmitted from one person to another by appropriate say-so. ButWelbourne is looking for something rather stronger than this: he wantsa transcendental deduction of the concept of commonable knowledge,an argument that will establish it de jure not merely de facto, byshowing that any conception of knowledge must involve its transmis-sibility across time and between people. However, it is not clear thatthis aim is achieved by the remarks just quoted. We may (unless weare believers in the possibility of a private language in the Wittgenstein-ian sense) accept that any one item of knowledge must in principlebe possessible at different times, and by different people. But our


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440 L S L I S T V N S O Nindividualist enquirer need not deny that. He can just say that whateverother minds there are must go through the same sorts of self-sufficientknowledge-gathering processes as he himself, if they are to gain theknowledge that he has. They cannot just get it second-hand from him,nor can he get it via them. If knowledge is possessible by more thanone person, that does not imply that it is transmissible by testimony.Crusoe stories are not essential to show this: someone brought upnormally, believing most of what his parents and teachers tell him,may nevertheless claim, like Descartes, that proper epistemic standardsshould forgo reliance on testimony (except in a secondary, inductiveway). Admitt ing the facts about his own intellectual biography, he maysay that a rational reconstruction of whatever he is really justified inbelieving must take a systematically individualistic form. There mightstill be something deeply incoherent about this, but we have yet to seeit shown. We do not yet have anything like a proof that (TC) is impliedby (P), (M), and (I); but neither do we have any argument that it isinconsistent with them.

.Could we then accept (P), (M), and (I), but with (TR) rather than(TC)? This would yield the radical first-person epistemology justmooted, according to which one would have to start making obser-vations about the world without any help from others. But note that itis a striking consequence of this that one would have to learn the verymeanings of the terms in which one is to make observation-statements(or acquire the concepts with which to formulate perceptual judgments)without any teaching. For if, at the stage of learning meanings orconcepts, one were to accept another s s tatement that something isgreen (or circular, or bitter-tasting, or an interval of an octave) asnormatively guiding what one ought to say oneself, one would therebybe assuming that they can correctly recognize green things, etc. (or arereasonably reliable in doing so, in favourable circumstances at least).One would thus be taking it for granted that their assertions aboutcolour, etc., are true (or likely to be so). But at such a stage one couldof course be in no position to verify the t ruth of others assertions,since one does not yet know the meaning of the crucial terms.To avoid all reliance on what other people say, one wotfld thus haveto come to use words meaningfully without benefit of teaching. One


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W H Y B E L IE V E W H A T P E O PL E S A Y 441n e e d n o t b e p h y s i c a ll y i s o l a te d - o n e mi g h t g ro w u p i n t h e c o m p a n yo f o t h e r s , d e p e n d i n g o n t h e m ma t e r i a l l y a n d e mo t i o n a l l y , b u t o n ew o u l d h a v e t o b e linguistically se l f - su f f i c i en t . No te tha t t h i s does no tinvo lve a p r iva t e l anguage in Wi t tgens t e in ' s sense - he had in mindt e rms w h i c h n o b o d y e l s e could u n d e r s t a n d , b e c a u s e t h e y su p p o s e d lyre f e r r e d t o me n t a l s t a t e s w h i c h n o b o d y e l s e c o u l d k n o w a b o u t ( 1 9 5 3 ,sec . 243) , whereas wha t we a re env i sag ing he re a re words fo r publiclyperceptible states of affairs, w h o s e me a n i n g s s o me o n e t e a c h e s h i ms e l f ,b u t w h i ch mi g h t c o me t o b e s h a re d b y o t h e r s . O u r n o rm a l , s h a r e dl a n g u a g e w o u l d b e s e e n a s ma d e u p o f a h u g e n u m b e r o f i n p r i n ci p l e,i so la tab le id io lec ts .

B u t c a n a n i n d i v id u a l s o me h o w s e t u p fo r h i ms e l f a s t a n d a rd o fc o r r e c t n e s s ? W i t h o u t a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n c o r r e c t a n d i n c o r r e c t u s e sthe r e can b e no me an in g - t ha t i s ag re ed on a ll sides : so i f a ll suchn o rma t i v i t y mu s t i n v o l v e a p p e a l t o t h e p r a c t i c e o f a c o mmu n i t y , i ts e e ms w e w o u l d h a v e a p ro o f t h a t r e l i a n c e o n t e s t i mo n y i s j u st if i ed i nsometh ing l i ke the way (TC) says . Bu t i s i t so obv ious , on re f l ec t ion ,tha t a wo l f -ch i ld , i so l a t ed f rom b i r th , cou ld no t g ive mean ings to sym-b o l s? M a n y fo l l o w e r s o f W i t t g e n s t e i n t h i n k h e d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e s o ci alna tu re o f a l l l anguage use . Bu t i n t he Investigations h e s e e ms t o h a v es u b tl y s t e e r e d a w a y f ro m o f f e r i n g a n y d i r e c t a n s w e r t o o u r q u e s t i o n . 3H e w ro t e : I t is n o t p os s ib l e th a t t h e r e s h o u l d h a v e b e e n o n l y o n eoccas ion on wh ich som eo ne ob ey ed a ru l e (1953 , sec. 199) ; bu t he didno t i n t ha t t ex t exp l i c it l y exc lud e the poss ib il i ty o f one person engag ingin a ru l e - fo l lowing p rac t i ce . In unpub l i s hed no tes , he d id a l low tha t ana r t i cu l a t e Cru soe , i so l a t ed f rom b i r th , is conce ivab le . 4 I f t he re i s anyd e e p - l y i n g i n c o h e re n c e i n t h e s u p p o s i t i o n o f a c o m p l e t e l y s e l f- t a u g hti d i o l e c t , i t h a s n o t y e t b e e n d e mo n s t r a t e d .

T h e p ro b l e m fo r (T R ) , i f t h e r e is o n e , s e e ms t o l ie e ls e w h e re . I f o u rl o n e e n q u i r e r i s t o b e g i n t o a ma s s t h e i n d u c t i v e e v i d e n c e w h i c h (T R )s a ys h e n e e d s b e fo r e h e ma y b e g i n t o a c c e p t e v e n o n e p i e c e o f te s ti -mo n y , h e h a s t o e s t a b l i s h c o r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n others assertions t h a tp , a nd the fac t o f p a s obs e rv ed by h imse l f . B u t t o do th i s , he has tok n o w w h i c h n o i s e s o r ma rk s ma d e b y o t h e r s c o n s t i t u t e a s s e r t i o n s t h a tp , a n d s o h e h a s t o b e a b l e t o k n o w t h a t s o me o t h e r mi n d s a r e u s i n gs y mb o l s w i t h c e r t a i n me a n i n g s . W e a r e p r i ma r i l y c o n c e rn e d h e re w i t ho b s e rv a t i o n s e n t e n c e s o f t h e s i mp l es t t y p e , w h i c h e x p re s s r e c o g n i t io nof pe rc ep t ib l e s t a t es o f a f fa i r s , wh ere the c ruc i a l wo rd (e .g . , ' b i t t e r ' )c a n o n l y b e e x p l a i n e d w i t h t h e a id o f p e r c e p t i o n o f t y pi c al s a mp l es (o r


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442 L S L I S T V N S O Ni f a ve rba l de f in i t ion i s poss ib le , i t u ses te rms which mus t themse lvesb e e x p l a in e d o s t e n s iv e ly ) . H o w c o u ld o u r l o n e e n q u i r e r k n o w th a ts o m e o n e m e a n s Th a t is b i t t e r b y a p a t t e r n o f s o u n d s th e y so m e t im e semi t? On ly , su re ly , by f ind ing tha t tha t no ise i s ( fa i r ly re l iab ly ) madeon ly whe n ta s t ing samples wh ich the en qu i re r h im se l f recogn izes a sb i t te r . Th u s o n e c a n n o t j us t if y i n t e r p r e t i n g c e r ta in p e r f o r m a n c e s a so b s e r v a t i o n - s t a t e m e n t s , i . e . , a s t e s t im o n y a b o u t w h a t s o m e o n e p e r -c e iv e s, w i th o u t a l r e a d y c o m m i t t i n g o n e s e l f t o t h e a s s u m p t io n t h a t s u c hs ta tem en ts a re re l iab le , l ike ly to be t rue . 5

Th e m o r a l i s t h a t o n e c a n n o t b e i n th e p o s i t i o n w h ic h ( TR) r e q u i r e s ,n a m e ly , t h a t o n e c o u ld f ir st i d e n t i f y t h e c o n t e n t o f o th e r p e o p le sasse r t ions , and on ly then beg in to a ssemble ev ide nce to dec ide whicho f t h e m i s l i k ely t o b e t r u e . Bu t o f c o u r se t h i s le a v e s a m p le r o o m f o rth e d e t e c t i o n o f er r o r s a n d l ie s. A n d w e h a d b e t t e r n o t b e t o o s a n g u in etha t these mus t be mere ly occas iona l : i t seems conce ivab le (con t ra ryto wh a t s om e ph i losophers have a rgue d 6) tha t even a ma jo r i ty o f ac e r t a in k in d o f o b s e r v a t i o n - s t a t e m e n t m a d e i n a c o m m u n i ty c o u ld b efa l se , i f the re i s an exp lana t ion o f th i s in te rms o f a widesp read bu tsub t le cause o f pe rcep tua l i l lu s ion ( foo l s go ld migh t be m ore f reque n t lym e t t h a n t h e r e a l t h in g ) , o r a v e r y c o m m o n m o t iv e f o r l y in g ( f e a r o fthe ru l ing pa r ty migh t make peop le swear tha t snow i s b lack - desp i teTarsk i ) . Bu t to mak e sense o f such mass ive e r ro rs we have to supposetha t the speakers would correc t them, g iven cer ta in changes in sc ient i f icknowledge o r po l i t i ca l power - and we su re ly have to suppor t suchc o u n te r f a c tu a l s w i th f a c tu a l e v id e n c e a b o u t w h a t t h e y have said in ava r ie ty o f ac tua l cases . Of course , on non observational mat te r s (o fsc ient i f ic theory , cosmology, h is tor ica l legend, re l ig ious or pol i t ica ldogm as) no th ing we have sa id exc ludes the poss ib i l ity tha t the t e s t im onyof a who le soc ie ty , even over a l eng thy epoch , migh t be la rge ly o ren t i re ly fa l se . Al l we have c la imed i s tha t in observable mat te r s , t e s t i -mony i s be l ievab le in the a p r io r i bu t de feas ib le way tha t (TC) ex -p resses . W e have in e f fec t a rgued fo r the fo l lowing p r incip le :

( TCP ) I f ( i) B hea rs and und ers ta nds A say tha t p ,( ii ) B has no rea son to d oub t A s s ince r i ty ,( i i i ) B has no evidence agains t p ,( iv ) B has reason to be l ieve tha t A has pe rce ived the s ta te

o f a f fa i rs w h ic h w o u ld m a k e p t r u e o r f a l s e,


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W H Y B E L I E V E W H A T PE O P L E S A Y ? 443then B i s jus t i f ied in be l iev ing tha t p .

I f s u c ce s s fu l , o u r a rg u m e n t s h ow s t h a t a n y o n e w h o h a s t h e c o n c e p t o ft e s t i mo n y mu s t a c c e p t p r i n c i p le (T C P ) . T h e re i s a n o b v i o u s c o n n e c t i o nb e t w e e n t e s t i m o n y a n d o t h e r mi n d s - o r , a t le a s t, o t h e r rational mi n d s ,o n e s c a p a b l e o f ma k i n g a n d e x p re s s i n g j u d g m e n t s a b o u t t h e w o r ld . W ea r e n o t c o n c e r n e d h e r e w i th s u b - h u m a n m e n t a l it y , w h e r e t h e r e a r es e n s a ti o n s a n d p e rc e p t i o n s b u t n o c a p a c i t y fo r j u d g me n t ( s e n s ib i li t yw i t h o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a s K a n t w o u l d p u t it ). A n y o n e w h o h a s t h ec o n c e p t o f o t h e r r a t i o n a l m i n d s t h e r e f o re h a s t h e c o n c e p t o f t e s t i mo n y .C o n v e r s e l y , a n y o n e w h o h a s t h e i d e a o f te s t i mo n y o b v i o u s l y h a s t h ei d e a o f a s u b je c t o r a u t h o r o f it , i .e . , o f a r a t io n a l m i n d o t h e r t h a nh imse l f . H e i s su re ly com m i t t ed to the fo l lowing p r inc ip l e fo r t he a t t r i-bu t ion o f be l i e f s t o o the rs :

(OM ) I f ( i ) B hea rs and und ers t a nds A say tha t p ,( ii ) B has no reas on to do ub t A s s ince r i ty ,

the n B i s jus t i f ied in be l iev ing tha t A bel ieve s tha t p .As wi th the o the r p r inc ip l e s above , t he de feas ib i l i t y bu i l t i n to th i s oneis obv iou s ly necess a ry - fo r i f A is a p l aus ib l e rogu e , he m ay no t be l i evew h a t h e s a y s , d e s p i te e v e ry a p p e a ra n c e o f si n c er i ty . B u t i t s e e ms t h a taccep t ing such a p r inc ip l e i s pa r t o f wh a t i t i s t o have the c once p t s o fa s s e r t i o n , b e l i e f , a n d o t h e r r a t i o n a l m i n d s . W e t h u s h a v e a n a rg u me n tt h a t a n y o n e w h o h a s t h e c o n c e p t o f t e s t i mo n y mu s t a c c e p t a t l e a s t(T C P ) a n d (O M ) . T h e re i s a p a c k a g e o f c o n c e p t s a n d p r i n ci p le s h e r ew h i c h mu s t b e p u rc h a s e d t o g e t h e r , i f a c c e p t e d a t a ll.

T h e p r e c e d i n g a rg u me n t d o e s n o t , h o w e v e r , s h o w t h a t a n y r a t i o n a lb e i n g mu s t h a v e t h e c o n c e p t s o f t e s t i mo n y a n d o f o t h e r mi n d s. C o u l dthe re no t be a wo l f -ch i ld , i so l a t ed s ince b i r th f rom a l l human con tac t ,w h o d e v e l o p s a p r a c t i c e o f us i ng s y mb o l s t o r e f e r t o f e a t u r e s o f h ise n v i ro n me n t , t h u s r e c o rd i n g k n o w l e d g e fo r h i s o w n u s e w i t h o u t e v e nc o n c e i v i n g o f o t h e r mi n d s ? S o m e p h i l o s o p h e r s t h i n k t h is i mp o s s ib l e .W e l b o u r n e , f o r o n e , h a s a r g u e d t h a t t h e v e r y c o n c e p t o f k n o w l e d g ei n v o l v e s a n e s s e n t i a l l y c o mmu n a l e l e me n t :[T]here is no state o f ercywhich we cou ld isolate and which, whe n it is the case thatp, is his knowing that p, different from and superior to his merely believing that p.


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W H Y B E L I E V E W H A T P E O P L E S A Y ? 445d i f f e r e n c e b e tw e e n t r u th a n d e r r o r c a n e m e r g e o n ly i n t h e c o n t e x t o fin t e r p r e t a t i o n ( i . e. , i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s p e e c h o f o th e r s ) . We lb o u r n e a l s oa r g u e s t h a t i n d iv id u a l b el i e f p r e s u p p o s e s t h e c o n c e p t o f ' c o m m o n a b leknowledge , because be l ie f a sp i res to objective t ru th , wh ich i s t rue no ton ly fo r the be l ieve r , bu t fo r anyone. 7Objec t iv i ty and comm unicab i l i ty a re rea l ly two faces o f one co in . . . . I t i s on ly in so fa ras we can g rasp the idea o f ge t t ing in format ion f rom o thers tha t we can have the idea o fob jec t ive t ru th which insp ires the Car tes ian enqu i re r . 1986 , p . 81)But he re aga in the re i s a gap which the s tubborn Car te s ian can re fuseto c r o s s w i th o u t f u r th e r i n d u c e m e n t . Ca n th e r e n o t b e r o o m f o r o b -jec t iv i ty by app ea l to poss ib le ch anges o f v iew over time giving cr i te r iafo r a seems/ i s d i s t inc t ion , wi thou t go ing ou ts ide the s ing le enqu i re r?Ca n ' t th i s give the requ is i te d imen s ion o f ob jec t iv i ty fo r h i s p rac t ice tocoun t a s fo rming and jus t i fy ing be l ie fs?

I t m ig h t b e s u g g e s t e d t h a t t o m e a n o r k n o w a n y th in g o u r l o n e i nd ivid -u a l m u s t think of himself as do ing so , and tha t he cou ld no t do tha twi thou t be ing ab le to th ink o f another m in d a s m e a n in g o r k n o w in gwha t he does . Bu t once aga in , i t i s no t obv ious tha t the p remise he rei s t r u e . A c h i ld m a y m e a n a n d k n o w q u i t e a N t , w i th o u t - i t m a yseem - ye t hav ing the concepts o f m e a n in g a n d k n o w le d g e , o r a p p ly in gthem to h imse l f . Pe t t i t has recen t ly a rgued tha t th ink ing invo lves no tjus t hav ing be lie f s and des i re s bu t a l so in ten t iona l ly shap ing the m toconfo rm to va r ious norms . Ru le - fo l lowing i s thus sa id to invo lve moreth a n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l c o n t e n t . A c c o r d in g t o P e t t i t , it m u s t b e i n ace r ta in sense in te rac t ive . I t r equ i res tha t the ru le - fo l lowing sub jec t bein a pos i t ion to in te rac t wi th o the r bea re rs o f the inc l ina t ion - o r ac o u n te r p a r t - a t w o r k i n h er : h e r s e l f a t la t e r t im e s o r o th e r p e r s o n s(1990, p. 17). B ut t ha t dis jun ction sti ll allows the pos sibili ty of a rule-f o l lo w in g w o l f -c h i ld , w h o c o u ld i n t e r a c t o n ly w ith h e r e a r l ie r s e l f( t h a t c u r io u s p h r a s e p r e s u m a b ly m e a n s t h a t s h e c a n a m e n d h e r p r e -v ious ly reco rded judgements in the l igh t o f subsequen t exper ience ) .

Pe t t i t c la ims , however , tha t one can on ly k n o w t h a t s o m e o n e i sfo l lowing a ru le o r no rm i f one in te rac t s wi th the pe rson in the appropr i -a te way , nam ely , seek ing exp la na t ion o f d ive rgen t app l ica t ions in te rmso f s o m e th in g a b n o r m a l a b o u t t h e c o n d i t i on s . I f s o, i f w e a r e t o b ejus t i fi ed in say ing tha t a ch ild mean s a nd know s va r ious th ings , we wou ldh a v e t o h a v e d o n e m o r e t h a n o b s e r v e h e r t h r o u g h a p sy c h o log i s t' s o n e -w a y s c r e e n , w e m u s t h a v e i n t e r a c t e d w i th h e r a n d f o u n d h e r l a n g u a g e


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446 L S L I S T V N S O Nuse to be in c ruc i a l ways re spons ive to ou rs . These in t e rac t ions wi l lp r e s u ma b l y i n v o l ve h e r t r e a ti n g s o me o f w h a t w e s a y ( e . g ., a b o u t w h a tw e c a n s e e ) a s b e l i e v a b l e , s o s h e w o u l d b e a c c e p t i n g t e s t i mo n y , a n dw o u l d h a v e a c o n c e p t o f o t h e r m i n d s. 8

Bu t , ye t again , w her e exac t ly is t he a rgu me n t fo r t h is? Pe t t i t c l a imstha t i f a pu ta t iv e ru l e - fo l low er iden t i f i e s t he ru l e on the basi s o fa n i n c l in a t i o n t h a t is o n l y i n t e r t e m p o ra l l y s t a n d a rd i z e d a n d h a s n oe x p e c t a t i o n t h a t o t h e r s w i l l d i s p l a y c o n v e rg e n t r e s p o n s e s , t h e n I c a n -n o t k n o w t h a t h e i s r e a l ly fo l lo w i n g a ru l e , b e c a u s e I c a n n o t r e li a b l yt el l t h a t h e is fo l lo w i n g o n e r u le r a t h e r t h a n a n o t h e r . . . . W e r e o u rr e s p o n s e s t o c o me a p a r t , h e mi g h t r e ma i n q u i t e c o n t e n t w i t h h i s o w nrespo nses to the ex am ple (1990 , p . 19) . Cer t a in ly , I can no t inf l l iblyt e l l wha t ru l e he i s fo l lowing by no t ing h i s re sponse to any f in i t enumber o f examples . Bu t i n fa l l i b i l i t y i s su re ly too s t r i c t a s t andard fo rk n o w l e d g e . C o u l d I n o t reli bly t e l l , i n t ha t obse rv ing the lone ind iv id -u a l ' s r e s p o n s e s t o a f a i r n u mb e r a n d v a r i e t y o f c a s e s c o u l d g i v e g o o di n d u c t iv e r e a s o n t o t h i n k h e i s f o l lo w i n g t h e s a m e ru l e a s me , e v e nt h o u g h I h a v e n o t a t t e m p t e d a n y in t e r a c ti o n ? A n d i f w e d o c o m e t oi n t e r a c t a n d ' s t a n d a rd i z e ' o u r r e s p o n s e s o v e r a n u m b e r o f c a se s , h o wd o e s t h a t g i v e me a n y g re a t e r a s s u ra n c e , a n y mo re t h a n i n d u c t i v ewarr an t , fo r be l i ev ing tha t o u r re spon ses wi ll no t i nexp l i cab ly d ive rgei n s o me n e w c a s e ?

W e h a v e n o t f o u n d a n y c o n c l u s i v e a rg u me n t t o ru l e o u t t h e i d e a o fa fo r e v e r i so l a t e d ru l e - fo l lo w e r a n d k n o w l e d g e - s e e k e r . B u t s o w h a t ?W h y s h o u ld w e e x p e n d s o m u c h m e n t a l e f f o r t p u r s u in g t h e q u e s t io n o ft h e m e re l o gi c al p os s ib i li ty o f th e s e s h a d o w y c r e a t u r e s o f my t h a n dp h i l o s o p h ic a l f a n ta s y - A d a m b e fo r e th e c r e a t i o n o f E v e , a C ru s o ei so la t ed f rom b i r th , t he a r t i cu l a t e wo l f -ch i ld , t he so l ip s i s t w i th no con-c e p t o f o t h e r mi n d s ? A l l t h e e v i d e n c e g o e s to s h o w n o t me re l y th enon-ex i s t ence o f such be ings bu t a l so the i r p sycho log ica l imposs ib i l i t y ;e v e ry t h i n g w e k n o w a b o u t h u m a n me n t a l a n d li ng u is ti c d e v e l o p me n tpo in t s t o t he e ssen t i a l ly soc i al , t ho ro ugh ly in t e rac t ive na tu re o f t hep ro c e s s . S u c h r e a l - l i f e w o l f - c h i l d r e n a s h a v e b e e n d o c u me n t e d h a v eh a d t o b e t ught l a n g u a g e , w i t h mo re d i ff ic u lt y t h a n n o rma l .

S i n c e a c t u a l c a s e s o f a r t i c u l a t e C ru s o e s h a v e n o t c o me u p , w e h a v en o t h a d t o d e c i d e w h a t t o s a y a b o u t t h e m. A n d , o n r e f l e c t i o n , w e c a ns e e t h a t t h e r e i s n o r e a s o n w h y o u r c o n c e p t s o f me a n i n g , k n o w l e d g e ,ru l e - fo ll o w i n g , e tc . , s h o u l d s o me h o w h a v e b u i l t- i n g u id a n c e fo r h o w t oa p p l y t h e m t o c a s e s n e v e r b e fo re e n c o u n t e r e d . (T h e p o i n t i s a q u i t e


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W H Y BELI EV E W H A T PE O PLE SA Y 9 447general one about concepts, of course.) If so, it would be foolish toexpect there to be some decisive answer waiting to be revealed bysufficiently clever and diligent philosophical analysis. 9 But this essen-tialist sort of methodology, however hallowed by philosophical traditionsince Plato, seems by no means compulsory, especially since the possi-bility of family resemblance concepts has been brought to philosoph-ical consciousness.

Our actual conceptions of meaning and knowledge involve not onlythe principles (P), (M), and (I), but also (TCP) and (OM). If persistentcriticism of the arguments so far on offer appears to leave open thelogical possibility of a kind of mentali ty involving only the first three,that suggests there may be a fault-line running down the middle of ouractual conceptions of meaning and knowledge - and we thereby learnsomething of theoretical interest at least. But if the pressures of realitynever pull the blocks apart, we have no need to change the conceptualstructures we have built on them, or to formulate plans for contingen-cies which will almost certainly never happen.

.Returning closer to our actual conceptions, it will be noticed that theone principle about testimony which we have so far argued for, namely(TCP), is very restricted in scope, applying only to what can reasonablybe believed to be first-hand , eyewitness reports. In practice we acceptmuch other testimony: even on perceptible matters we believe claims,for example about the distant past, which may be based on a lengthychain of oral transmission. In an uncontroversial sort of case, C willaccept what B says, because B says that A saw it happen and told Babout it. Can we find a principle which justifies this, without beingover-liberal? The problem is how much each member of a chain issupposed to know (or reasonably believe) about the nature of the links,for the chain to count as transmitting knowledge (or justification). Torequire knowledge of the members of any such chain, or memory ofthe occ sions on which they did their transmission, would be hopelesslyunrealistic. Most of us quickly forget from whom, and when, we learntmost of what we (think we) know. Let us therefore try generalizing(TCP) as follows:


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448 L S L I S T V N S O N(TCP G) I f ( i)

(ii)(iii)(iv)

B hea rs and und ers tand s A say tha t p ,B has no reason to dou b t A s s ince r i ty ,B has no ev idence aga ins t p ,B has reason to be l ieve tha t the re i s a cha in o f t e s t i -m o n y b e h in d A s b e l i e f t h a t p , t h e f ir st m e m b e r o fw h ic h h a s p e r c e iv e d t h e s t a t e o f a f f a ir s w h ic h w o u ldmake p t rue o r fa l se ,

then B is jus t i f ied in be l ieving tha t p .W e a r e h e r e u s in g t h e n o t io n o f a c h a in o f t e s t im o n y in a n o b v io u sway ( whe n A i s h ims e l f the wi tness, th i s can be cou n ted as a spec ia lc a s e o f t h e g e n e r a l f o r m u la , i n w h ic h t he c h a in h a s o n ly o n e m e m b e r ) .Th e r e w i ll f r e q u e n t ly b e s i t u at i o n s w h e r e t h e r e is m o r e t h a n o n e c h a inbeh ind an asse r t ion , bu t c lause ( iv ) a l lows fo r th i s by requ i r ing on ly thereason ab le be l ie f tha t a t l east one such cha in be pe rcep tua l ly g rou nded .( TCP G ) l e a v e s t h e n o t io n o f g o o d r e a s o n d e l i b e r at e ly v a g u e , b u t intha t re spec t i s no worse o f f than a l l the o the r fo rmula t ions we havebeen cons ide r ing .

P e r c e p t io n i s o n e m a in s o u r c e o f e p i s t e m ic a u th o r i t y , o n e g e n e r a to ro f k n o w le d g e t o b e t r a n s m i t t e d d o w n th e l i n e s o f m e m o r y a n d t e s t i -m on y - bu t the re a re o the rs , such as ma them at ica l p roof , o r sc ien ti f ictheor iz ing in the ligh t o f obse rva t iona l ev idence . (A nd som e ep is temol -og is t s may , con t rovers ia l ly , wan t to add more , such as e th ica l o r aes -the t ic in tu i t ion o r in fo r me d jud gm ent , pe rhap s even re l ig ious experi -ence . ) M ay we the re fo re genera l ize fu r the r , to a l low any jus t i fi ed be l ie fto s tar t a chain , as fo l lows?

(TC G) I f ( i) B hea rs and unde rs tan ds A say tha t p ,( ii ) B has no rea son to do ub t A s s ince r ity ,

( i i i ) B has no evidence agains t p ,( iv) B has rea son to b el ieve tha t the re is a chain of tes t i-

m o n y b e h in d A s b e l i e f t h a t p , t h e f ir st m e m b e r o fwhich was jus t i f ied in be l ieving tha t p ,

the n B is jus t i f ied in be l ieving th a t p .Bu t i f we do th i s, have we s ti ll go t any t h ing tha t dese rves the n am e o fa c r i t e r ia l v iew? (TCG) migh t be sa id to be somewha t reduc t ion is t insp i r i t , in requ i r ing ev idence in favour o f the re l iab i l i ty o f the re levan tcha in o f t e s t im ony . Con s ide r , f inal ly , the fo l lowing more c r i t e ria l p rin -c ip le wh ich requ i res on ly the absence o f nega t ive ev idence :


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W H Y B E L I E V E W H A T P E O P L E S A Y .9 449T) i)ii)iii)iv)

B h e a r s a n d u n d e r s t a n d s A s a y t h a t p ,B h a s n o r e a s o n t o d o u b t A s s i n ce r i ty ,B has no ev idence aga ins t p ,B has no reason to doub t tha t the re i s a cha in o ft e s t im o n y b e h in d A s b e l i e f t h a t p , t h e f ir st m e m b e rof wh ich w as jus t if i ed in be l iev ing th a t p ,

then B is jus t i f ied in be l ieving tha t p .Th e r e m a y n o t , i n f a c t , b e v e r y m u c h d i f f e r e n c e i n p r a c t i c e b e tw e e n(TC G) and (T) - c lause ( iv ) o f each , i f sa t is f ied at a ll , may com ed o w n to n o t m u c h m o r e t h a n a v a g u e im p r e s s io n o f t h e g e n e r a l , q u i t eunspec i f ic l ike l ihood o f the re be ing an appropr ia te cha in beh ind mos thu m an asse r t ions . (T) bea rs a c lose ana log y to ou r p r inc ip le (M) govern -in g m e m o r y : w h ic h i s s u r e ly a p p r o p r i a t e , s in c e m e m o r y a n d t e s t im o n ya r e b o th w a y s o f t ra n s m i t t i n g k n o w le d g e ( o r j u s ti f ie d b e l i e f ) , n o t w a y sof genera t ing i t in the f i rs t p lace. (T) wou ld a ppear to be some th ingl ike the p r inc ip le wh ich mos t o f us unconsc ious ly fo l low mos t o f thet ime ; bu t tha t i s ha rd ly a ju s t i f i ca tion fo r it . W he the r an y be t te r suppor tcan be found i s a top ic fo r fu r the r enqu i ry .

N O T E S* I am inde b ted fo r he lp fu l d iscuss ions o f ea r l ie r vers ions o f th is paper to aud ience s a tMac quar ie Univers i ty (w here I was k ind ly g iven resear ch fac il i t ie s ) , a t the con fere nce o fthe Aus t r a las ian Asso c ia t ion fo r Ph i losophy in Sydney in 1990, a t St . An drew s , an d a tsoto a re fe ree fo r th is journa l .1 See We lbo urne ( I986) , R oss (1986), an d Mc Dow el l (1980 , end of Sec. 7 ).z T o e x t e n d th e a p p l i ca t i o n o f (T C ) a n d (T R ) to t h e m a n y c a s e s w h e re s o m e e v id e n c efor o r aga ins t P has already been ga thered , one would have to s ta r t ta lk ing o f degrees o fjus t i f ica t ion , and of the ex ten t to which these may ge t a l te red by new tes t imony . Butp e rh a p s w e c a n b e s p a re d th e a t t e m p t t o g o in to t h e s e d e t a i l s u n t i l t h e fu n d a m e n ta l s o fthe top ic have been more f i rmly es tab l i shed .3 A s P e a r s h a s c a r e fu l ly d o c u m e n te d in The alse Prison (1988, Ch. 14).4 See Bak er and Ha cker (1985, Ch , IV .4) .s Coa dy (1973) makes t he po in t w i th re fe renc e to Mar t ia ns , bu t i t su re ly app l ies to at to th e r m in d s , f r o m th e p o in t o f v i e w o f o u r Io n e e n q u i r e r .6 Shoe mak er (1963, p . 230) sa id [ i ] t i s a necessary t ru th , n o t an induc t ive ly d iscover edg e n e ra l i za t i o n , t h a t t h e m e re f a c t t h a t a s t a t e m e n t h a s b e e n s in c e re ly a n d c o n f id e n t lya s s e r t e d b y s o m e o n e a s a p e r c e p tu a l o r m e m o ry s t a t e m e n t g ive s some reason fo r be l iev ingi t to be t rue , which expresse s the k ind o f a p r io r i , bu t defeas ib le , appro ach t am pu t t ingforward here . But he a lso c la imed to be ab le to es tab l i sh the s t ronger c ta im tha t suchs t a t e m e n t s a r e t r u e m o re o f t e n t h a n n o t .7 Unw in (1987) p ro pose s to qua l i fy th is by res t r ic t ing the range o f ' anyo ne ' to tho se wi th


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45 L E S L I E S T E V E N S O Nthe same kind of cognitive processing mechanism as the believer, but I have argued(1988) that we must extend it to any rational being who can understand the content ofthe belief, even if their physiology and psychology be different.8 This still leaves open the mere logical possibility that someone devoid of all interper-sonal interaction could be rule-following. Krip ke's rather mysterious talk of takin gCrusoe into our commun ity may now seem appropriate after al l , i f the underlyingthought is that interaction with him is needed before we can justifiably call him a rule-follower.9 In her study of the epistemology of test imony, Fricker conceives a philosophical accountof knowledge as taking the form of a general conception K of what i t takes for a bel iefto be knowledge, which applies to all beliefs of any individual, whatever their subjectmatter, and regardless of how they were acq uire d (1987, p. 62).

R E F E R E N C E SAyer, A. J.: 1973, The Central Questions of Philosophy, Weidenfeld, London.Baker, G. P. and P. M. S. Hacker: 1985, Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity,

Blackwell, Oxford.Coady, C. A. J . : 1973, 'Test imony and Observat ion' , American Philosophical Quarterly10, 149-55.

Coady, C. A. J . : 1992, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Clarendon Press, Oxford,Davidson, D.: 1984, 'Though t and Talk' , in his, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation,Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 155-70.Descartes, R.: [1637]11954, Discourse on Method, in Philosophical Writings, trans, and

ed. G. E. M. Ansc omb e and P. T. Geach, Nelson, Lond on [revised ed. : 1970, OpenUniversity Press, Milton Keyes].Evans, G.: 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Clarendon Press, Oxford.Fricker, E. : 1987, 'The Epistemology of Test imony', Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, Suppl. 61, 57-83.Hacking, I. : 1975, The Emergence of Probability, Cambridge Universi ty Press, Cam-bridge.Hume, D.: [1739]11888, A Treatise on Hum an N ature, ed, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ClarendonPress, Oxford.Hume, D.: [1748]/1962, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Clarendon Press, Oxford.Kripke, S.: 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Blackwell, Oxford.McDowell , J . : 1980, 'Meaning Communicat ion, and Knowledge' , in Z. van Straaten(ed.) , Philosophical Subjects, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 117-39.

Pears, D.: 1988, The False Prison, Vol. II , Clarendon Press, Oxford.Pet t i t, P. : 1990, 'Th e Reali ty of Rule-Following' , Mind 99, t -21.Reid, T.: [1764]11970, An Enquiry into the Human Mind, ed. T. Duggan, Universi ty ofChicago Press, Chicago.

Ross , A. : 1986, 'Why Do We Bel ieve What W e Are Told? ' , Ratio 28, 69-88.Shoemaker, S.: 1963, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Cornell U niversi ty Press, I thaca.Stevenson, L. : 1988, 'C an Truth be Retat ivized to Kinds of Mind?' , Mind 97, 28I-8&


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W H Y B E L I E V E W H A T P E O P L E S A Y . 4 5 1Unwin , N. : 1987, 'Beyond Tru th : Towards a New Concept ion of Knowledge and Com-

munica t ion ' , Mind 96, 299-317.Welbo urne , M . : 1979, 'The T ransmiss ion of Knowledge ' , Philosophical Quarterly 29, 1-9.

Welbourne, M.: 1986, The Community of Knowledge Abe r de e n Un ive rs i ty P r es s , Ab e r -deen .

Wittgenstein, L. : 1953, Philosophical Investigations t rans . G. E , M. Anscombe,Blackwell , Oxford.

Wittgenstein, L.: 1969, On Certainty ed . G. E . M. Anscombe and G. H. yon Wright ,t rans . D. Paul and G. E . M. Anscombe, Blackwel l , Oxford .

Dep ar tm ent of Logic Metaphys icsUnivers i ty of St . Andrew sFi fe KY16 9ALScot land

Documents

Stevenson, L., 1993, Why Believe What People Say