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Strategic Network Design for Parcel Delivery withDrones under Competition
Gohram Baloch, Fatma GzaraDepartment of Management Sciences, University of Waterloo, ON Canada N2L 3G1
This paper studies the economic desirability of UAV parcel delivery and its effect on e-retailer distribution
network while taking into account technological limitations, government regulations, and customer behavior.
We consider an e-retailer offering multiple same day delivery services including a fast UAV service and
develop a distribution network design formulation under service based competition where the services offered
by the e-retailer not only compete with the stores (convenience, grocery, etc.), but also with each other.
Competition is incorporated using the Multinomial Logit market share model. To solve the resulting nonlinear
mathematical formulation, we develop a novel logic-based Benders decomposition approach. We build a case
based on NYC, carry out extensive numerical testing, and perform sensitivity analyses over delivery charge,
delivery time, government regulations, technological limitations, customer behavior, and market size. The
results show that government regulations, technological limitations, and service charge decisions play a vital
role in the future of UAV delivery.
Key words : UAV; drone; market share models; facility location; logic-based benders decomposition
1. Introduction
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones have been used in military applications as early as 1916
(Cook 2007). As the technology improved, their applications extended to surveillance and moni-
toring (Maza et al. 2010, Krishnamoorthy et al. 2012), weather research (Darack 2012), delivery of
medical supplies (Wang 2016, Thiels et al. 2015), and emergency response (Adams and Friedland
2011). Yet, when in 2013 Amazon revealed its plan for “Prime Air” service to deliver packages
using UAVs within 30 minutes, it was faced with significant skepticism. The idea that our skies
1
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition2
would be crowded with UAVs sounded like science fiction. While being confident that UAVs will
be as common as delivery trucks in a few years, Amazon’s CEO Jeff Bezos admitted in a 2014
interview with The Telegraph (Quinn 2015) that regulations lag behind and pose a serious obstacle.
Logistics practitioners also stated technology limitations, safety, privacy, and public perception as
major issues that may hinder the use of UAV technology for parcel delivery (Lewis 2014a, Keeney
2016, Wang 2016). Despite these hurdles, Amazon’s announcement started a race among compa-
nies like Google, Walmart, DHL, and Zookal to develop the technology and the logistics strategies
to enable the use of UAVs not only in last mile parcel delivery but also in first mile delivery,
inter- and intra-facility distribution, and delivery to remote and difficult to access regions (Butter
2015, Hovrtek 2018). A remarkable application is that by DHL’s “Parcelcopter 3.0” making 130
successful parcel deliveries in remote areas of Bavaria, Germany in 2017 (Burgess 2017). Recently,
Amazon has successfully delivered its first Prime Air package containing a TV streaming stick and
a bag of popcorn to a customer in UK (Hern 2016). Other successful applications include hybrid
truck-UAV delivery by UPS in Florida, USA (Stewart 2017), and UAV package delivery to islands
by Chinese e-commerce giant, Alibaba (Xinhua 2017). Despite these promising applications, UAV
parcel delivery is not yet a full scale reality. Whether the attractiveness of the technology will
overcome the regulatory and social obstacles is yet to be determined.
Unlike trucks, autonomous UAVs fly without a human pilot, are fast as they do not use congested
road networks (Lewis 2014b, Wang 2016), and are significantly cheaper (Welch 2015, D’Andrea
2014, Hickey 2014, Keeney 2016). Hence they provide a perfect solution for the e-retail industry.
The latter captured 11.7% of the total U.S retail sales in 2016 with a growth rate of 8-12% (Statista
2016, Intelligence 2017). Similar growth is observed globally. For example, in 2016, the Chinese e-
retail market captured 15.5% of the total retail sales with a growth rate of 26.2% (ECN 2017). This
growth is largely due to millennials who embrace online shopping but are ever more sensitive to
delivery time and delivery charge (Hsu 2016). Yet, it is not clear how customer preferences and their
sensitivity to delivery charge and delivery time affects their choice of a fast UAV delivery service
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition3
versus traditional in-person shopping. On the other hand, UAVs are limited by package weight,
travel range, and landing area. For example Amazon Prime Air can carry a package weighing up
to 2.5 kg and travels up to 24 km (Keeney 2016). DHL’s Parcelcopter carries a package of up to
2 kg with a travel range of 16 km (Franco 2016). Regulations require that an UAV is monitored
by a certified operator even though UAVs like Prime Air and Parcelcopter are autonomous and
can operate without human intervention. These limitations together with customer preferences are
expected to play a crucial role in determining the future of UAV parcel delivery.
In this paper, we study the economic feasibility of UAV parcel delivery in terms of its impact
on an e-retailer’s distribution network while taking into account customer preferences, locational
decisions, and regulatory and technological limitations. These research questions are of most inter-
est to an e-retailer like Amazon, that already offers a set of delivery services such as Same day
and Prime Now delivery services, and that plans to introduce a new and expedited UAV delivery
service: Prime Air. While UAVs may be integrated in a hybrid truck-UAV delivery system, the
distinctive feature of instant delivery is compromised and a hybrid system may not yield as fast a
delivery as direct drone delivery from the warehouse to the customer location. In order to achieve
short delivery times, direct UAV delivery from the e-retailer facilities is required, which may in turn
require the redesign of the distribution network partly due to the limited flight range of UAVs. On
the other hand, analysis of the top ordered products by Prime Now service reveals that these are
mostly consumer products bought for immediate use and are otherwise available at convenience
and grocery stores (Chronicle 2015). As such, an expedited UAV delivery service does not only
compete with other services offered by the e-retailer but also with physical stores in close proximity
to the customer.
We investigate the questions that an e-retailer faces when deciding whether or not to offer a UAV
parcel delivery service. The decision depends on social, regulatory, and technological challenges
facing UAVs. We incorporate social challenges by modelling the market share captured by UAV
service as a function of customer preferences for the different online services and in-person shopping,
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition4
as well as their sensitivity to delivery time and delivery cost. We use the Multinomial Logit (MNL)
market share model (Cooper, Nakanishi, and Eliashberg 1988) where the market share captured by
a service is probabilistic and a function of the utility derived from that service relative to the other
services available in the market. We model utility with five attributes: inherent attractiveness of
the service, travel time, travel cost, delivery charge, and delivery time. If regulation requires human
monitoring of UAVs, their operating cost, and consequently the corresponding delivery charge,
would increase. Furthermore, we incorporate technological limitations through allowing different
types of packages: those that may be delivered by UAVs and those that may not. Landing area
requirements like building type are incorporated in estimating the maximum market share that
UAV service may attract. Finally, the flying range is factored into the design of the distribution
network to determine whether a customer may be offered a UAV service. Ultimately, we model the
following key decisions (1) how many facilities to open and where, (2) which services to offer at an
open facility, and (3) which services to be made available to each customer zone.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
attempt to pose the above research questions in relation to UAV parcel delivery and its impact on
the e-retail industry, and to develop a quantitative model to answer these questions. The model
is also generic in nature and several possible extensions are proposed in Section 4. We develop a
logic-based Benders decomposition (LBBD) approach to solve the nonlinear mixed integer model
to optimality and within very short time, a few seconds in most cases. The proposed algorithm
is also applicable to existing models in competitive facility location (CFL) literature. Also, our
work is the first to use a multionominal logit market share model in CFLP to locate multiple
facilities with a profit maximization objective, and present an exact solution approach for such
a model. Finally, we construct a new case study based in New York City and perform extensive
numerical testing to analyze the economic feasibility and added value of UAV delivery under
varying levels of technological limitations, regulatory requirements, and customer preferences. The
modelling and analysis presented in this paper may be used not only by e-retailers but by any
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition5
retail business to assess the added value of offering UAV delivery. For example, a business concept
under development is to offer a UAV leasing service to local businesses such as pizza restaurants,
pharmacies, convenience stores, etc., who would independently operate UAVs to deliver customer
orders (Luci 2017). It may also be used by regulating bodies to assess the impact of regulations
before putting them in effect. We would like to note that we do not exclude the possibility of
using hybrid UAV-truck delivery as that may still be used for existing e-retailer services and would
only impact the delivery cost and/or delivery charge of these services, which are parameters in our
modelling.
The outline for the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the problem statement, develop
the nonlinear mixed integer formulation and the market share model. Section 3 presents a novel
logic-based Benders decomposition approach, derives strong Benders cuts, and details the solution
of the subproblems. Section 4 details several model extensions that could be solved using the
proposed solution approach. In Section 5, we carry out extensive numerical testing using a new
case study based in New York City (NYC), and perform sensitivity analyses over delivery charges,
delivery time, government regulations, technological limitations, customer behavior, and market
size. In Section 6, we show the effectiveness of the proposed Benders algorithm by comparing it to
an equivalent mixed integer formulation that we develop. Finally, concluding remarks and future
research directions are presented in Section 7.
1.1. Related Work
The industry interest in UAVs sparked a similar interest in the research community and led to a
significant increase in research output. Substantial research is ongoing to address technical issues
associated with commercial UAVs such as safety issues including hijacking threats and collision
with nearby obstacles, limited endurance, and payload capacity (Mahony, Kumar, and Corke 2012,
Kahn et al. 2017, Pounds, Bersak, and Dollar 2012, Allen 2005). Studies on the economics of
UAVs are mostly limited to industry reports (Hickey 2014, Keeney 2016, Wang 2016). An excellent
economic analysis is presented by ARK Invest (Keeney 2016) and attempts to determine unit UAV
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition6
delivery cost by taking into account facility upgrade costs, operator salary, fuel cost, and UAV
and battery purchase costs. D’Andrea (2014) models UAV fuel cost using energy consumption
functions. In the Management Science/Operations Research literature, Campbell, Sweeney II, and
Zhang (2017) and Carlsson and Song (2017) analyze the economic feasibility of a hybrid truck-
UAV delivery system using continuous approximation models. Murray and Chu (2015) are the first
to address operational challenges associated with truck-UAV delivery and introduce two delivery
systems that are modelled as extensions of the traveling salesman problem (TSP). In one system,
truck deliveries form a tour and UAVs depart from and land on the truck as it makes delivery
stops. In the second system, UAVs make direct deliveries from a distribution center while the truck
makes deliveries to customers that are not within UAV maximum range. Subsequent works by Ha
et al. (2015), Agatz, Bouman, and Schmidt (2018), Poikonen, Wasil, and Golden (2018) consider a
similar problem and propose efficient heuristic approaches for TSP with drones (TSP-D). Ferrandez
et al. (2016) use k-means clustering to find the optimal location of drone launch sites from the
truck and present a genetic algorithm to solve the TSP-D. The overall delivery time and cost for
a hybrid truck-drone network are compared against stand-alone truck and drone systems. Other
researchers extended TSP-D to vehicle routing problem with multiple trucks and drones (Ulmer
and Thomas 2017, Wang, Poikonen, and Golden 2016, Gambella, Naoum-Sawaya, and Ghaddar
2018).
Other than Hong, Kuby, and Murray (2017), researchers are more focused on the operational
challenges associated with drones without addressing key network design questions. Hong, Kuby,
and Murray (2017) develop a maximal coverage location model with a given number of warehouses
and charging stations. The objective is to maximize drone coverage while minimizing the aver-
age network distance between the warehouse and charging stations. However, the location of the
warehouses is fixed and the model only decides on locating charging stations. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the research addresses the economic feasibility of UAV parcel delivery in terms
of its impact on an e-retailer’s distribution network while taking into account customer preferences,
locational decisions, and regulatory and technological limitations.
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition7
Studies within the marketing literature primarily focus on investigating customer behaviour. In
this regard, the work by Hsiao (2009) and Schmid, Schmutz, and Axhausen (2016) are relevant in
our context as they attempt to estimate customer sensitivity to travel time, travel cost, delivery
time, and delivery charges based on market surveys. Schmid, Schmutz, and Axhausen (2016) focus
on grocery and electronic goods while Hsiao (2009) focuses on books. Both use market survey
results in MNL models to determine the utility derived by customers from online shopping and
in-store shopping. We use similar market share modelling but within an optimization modelling
framework. The market share model parameters allow an analysis of different customer segments
and how the e-retailer decision to offer UAV delivery changes as a result.
Our work closely relates to competitive facility location (CFL) literature where locational deci-
sions are based on competition in the market. We present a new variant of CFL problem where
there is no competition between an e-retailer’s own facilities but rather the services offered by
an e-retailer are competing against each other and nearby stores. Farahani et al. (2014) provide
a comprehensive review of the existing literature on facility location problems under three main
types of competition: static, dynamic, and foresight. Static competition is when the new entrant
assumes that the attributes of existing competitors do not change following its entrance into the
market. Dynamic competition is when the new entrant makes decisions assuming that competitive
characteristics of existing rivals may change following its entrance into the market. Competition
with foresight is when the rivals (follower) soon join the market once the new entrant (leader)
enters the market. Table 1 classifies/lists papers on CFL according to each type of competition and
compared to our work based on model assumptions, competitive characteristics, strategic decisions,
objective function, and solution approach.
In static competition, nearly all the papers use utility based attraction models (multionomial
logit or multiplicative competitive interaction market share models), also referred to as gravity
models, to capture probabilistic customer behavior. These works consider same service being offered
and players (facilities) in the market compete on facility characteristics such as travel distance,
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition8
Table
1:R
evie
wof
com
pet
itiv
elo
cati
onpro
ble
mlite
ratu
re
Com
peti
tive
chara
cte
rist
ics
Str
ate
gic
decis
ion
s
Com
peti
on
typ
eP
ap
er
Ela
stic
Dem
an
dC
ust
om
er
beh
avio
r(1)
Dem
an
dM
od
el(
2)
Pri
ce/
cost
Tim
ed
ista
nce
weig
ht
#fa
cilit
ies
toop
en
(3)
Locati
on
Serv
ices
Cu
stom
er
alloca-
tion
Cap
acit
yO
bje
cti
ve
(4)
Solu
tion
Ap
pro
ach
(5)
Sta
tic
Ou
rp
ap
er
XU
AX
XX
XU
XX
XM
ax.
PL
BB
DB
erm
an
an
dK
rass
(1998
)U
AX
FX
Max.
MS
HA
boolian
,B
erm
an,
and
Kra
ss(2
007a
)X
UA
XU
XM
ax.
MS
TL
A+
HA
boolian
,B
erm
an,
and
Kra
ss(2
007b
)X
UA
XU
XM
ax.
MS
TL
A+
HR
eVel
le,
Mu
rray
,an
dS
erra
(200
7)
CX
FX
Min
.D
LM
IPZ
han
gan
dR
ush
ton
(200
8)U
AX
XU
XX
Max.
TU
GA
Fer
nan
dez
etal.
(200
7b)
CX
XF
XM
ax.
PM
IPW
uan
dL
in(2
003
)U
AX
FX
Max.
FC
MIP
+H
Dre
zner
,D
rezn
er,
an
dS
alh
i(2
002)
UA
XF
XM
ax.
MS
SA
+A
AF
ern
an
dez
etal.
(200
7a)
UA
X1
XM
ax.
PH
+E
Fore
sight
Ab
oolian
,S
un
,an
dK
oeh
ler
(200
9)C
XU
XX
XM
ax.
PE
Pla
stri
aan
dV
an
hav
erb
eke
(200
8)
XC
XF
XM
ax.
TD
MIP
Sh
iod
ean
dD
rezn
er(2
003)
CX
UX
Max
.C
BP
EC
haw
laet
al.
(200
6)C
XF
XM
inm
ax
PO
GT
Dre
zner
an
dD
rezn
er(1
998)
UA
X1
XM
ax.
MS
HR
ezap
our
and
Far
ah
an
i(2
014)
XU
LF
XU
XX
Max
.P
MIP
Nas
iri
etal.
(201
8)C
XU
XX
Max
.P
GA
Dyn
amic
Rh
im,
Ho,
an
dK
arm
arka
r(2
003
)X
UL
FX
XF
XX
Max
.P
EM
eng,
Hu
ang,
and
Ch
eu(2
009)
XU
LF
XU
XX
Max
.P
GA
Acro
nym
s:(1
):U
-u
nce
rtain
,C
-ce
rtai
n(2
):A
-att
ract
ion
mod
el,
LF
-li
nea
rfu
nct
ion
(3):
F-
fixed
,U
-u
nkn
own
(mod
eld
ecid
es)
(4):
MS
-m
ark
etsh
are,
DL
-dem
and
lost
,P
-p
rofi
ts,
TU
-to
tal
uti
lity
,T
D-
tota
ld
eman
d,
CB
P-
cap
ture
db
uyin
gp
ower
,P
O-
pay
off
,F
C-
flow
cap
ture
d(5
):L
BB
D-
Log
icb
ased
Ben
der
sd
ecom
posi
tion
LA
-li
nea
rap
pro
xim
atio
n,
MIP
-m
ixed
inte
ger
pro
gram
,G
A-
gen
etic
algo
rith
m,
(5):
E-
exact
solu
tion
met
hod
olgy
,G
T-
gam
eth
eory
,S
A-
sim
ula
ted
ann
eali
ng,
AA
-as
cent
algor
ith
m,
H-
oth
erh
euri
stic
app
roac
hes
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition9
travel time, etc. In such cases, the profit maximization objective is equivalent to the market share
maximization objective when facility costs are constrained by a budget. This is because profit
margins are the same for all competing players. Under market share maximization, the objective
function is a non-decreasing concave function, and easy to deal with. However, since we consider
multiple services with different profit margins, profit maximization makes more sense. A profit
maximization objective function is more difficult to deal with because it yields a non-concave
objective function and piece-wise linear approximation techniques (Aboolian, Berman, and Krass
2007a,b) used to solve conventional CFL problems do not apply. We are not aware of any work
other than Fernandez et al. (2007a) that considers a profit maximization objective function with
attraction models. Fernandez et al. (2007a) present exact and heuristic solution approaches to solve
the CFLP for profit maximization. However, the model decides only on locating a single facility
which greatly limits the applicability of the solution methodology in general context of locating
multiple facilities. On the other hand, the literature dealing with competition with foresight and
dynamic competition consider linear demand models for profit maximization problems (Rezapour
and Farahani (2014), Rhim, Ho, and Karmarkar (2003), Meng, Huang, and Cheu (2009), Nasiri
et al. (2018)). In linear models, the market share captured by a player (e.g. facility, firm, or service)
is a linear function of the attributes of all competing players. However, Cooper, Nakanishi, and
Eliashberg (1988) correctly point out that such models do not meet logical consistency requirements.
To the best of our knowledge, this makes our work the first to use a multionominal logit (MNL)
market share model in a competitive facility location problem to locate multiple facilities with a
profit maximization objective. The proposed demand model in this paper is different from the ones
used in the CFL literature in terms of the competitive characteristics. Although, some of these
characteristics are frequently studied in the marketing literature, we are not aware of any work
that incorporates delivery price, delivery time, travel time, travel cost, and package weight in the
demand model.
To solve the challenging nonlinear nonconcave optimization models, we develop an efficient logic-
based Benders decomposition (LBBD) approach and show that it is equally applicable to market
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition10
share maximization problems under budget constraint. Logic-based Benders decomposition gener-
alizes the classical Benders decomposition approach by relaxing the linear subproblem requirement
(Hooker 2000, Hooker and Ottosson 2003). In this approach, the original problem is divided into a
master problem and subproblem(s). In the master problem, some decision variables and constraints
are fixed/removed. Optimal solutions of the master problem are used in the subproblem(s) to gener-
ate Benders cuts that are added back to the master problem. This iterative process continues until
an optimal solution is found. Unlike classical Benders decomposition where standardized cuts are
added using dual information of the subproblem, the cuts in LBBD are problem-specific (Hooker
2007). Therefore, while deriving optimality or feasibility cuts, the modeler needs to ensure that the
cuts are strong and may be computed with little computational effort. Logic-based Benders decom-
position has been used in a variety of applications including scheduling (Jain and Grossmann 2001),
network design (Garg and Smith 2008), and location (Fazel-Zarandi and Beck 2012, Fazel-Zarandi,
Berman, and Beck 2013, Wheatley, Gzara, and Jewkes 2015). Within location problems, LBBD
is applied to facility location and vehicle assignment problems Fazel-Zarandi and Beck (2012),
Fazel-Zarandi, Berman, and Beck (2013), and location-inventory problems Wheatley, Gzara, and
Jewkes (2015). Unlike the literature on location problems using logic-based Benders, we define
LBBD cuts using location decision variables as opposed to assignment variables which significantly
improves the computational efficiency by reducing the number of binary decision variables in the
master problem. A novel approach is also proposed to compute stronger cut coefficients with little
computational effort using the properties of MNL model. To the best of our knowledge, our work
is the first to use LBBD in a competitive facility location (CFL) problem.
2. Problem Definition
Consider an e-retailer that offers a set of same day delivery services {1, ..., n−1} and plans to offer
a new UAV service n. Let S = {1, ..., n} be the set of all e-retailer services. Amazon, for example
has 2-hour and 12-hour same day delivery services and plans on offering 30-minute UAV delivery
service. The e-retailer competes with existing stores e.g., retail, convenience, and department,
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition11
that offer in-person shopping service n + 1. The e-retailer wants to decide on optimal network
configuration by opening facilities from a set of discrete candidate locations J offering same services
in S = {1, ..., n}. We assume that the network is designed from scratch which allows us to present
a comparative study between networks with and without UAVs to investigate how offering a UAV
service affects the network design. Later in Section 4.3, we show how a UAV service could be added
to an existing network. Opening a facility at location j ∈ J incurs a fixed cost Lj. An additional
fixed service cost Fs is incurred for offering service s ∈ S. We assume that facilities have ample
capacity to service all assigned demand regions. The capacity limitation is dealt with through
stocking and replenishment decisions.
Customer demand originates from a set of finite customer zones I with two types of packages P =
{0,1} where p= 0 denotes packages that are not deliverable by UAV and p= 1 refers to packages
that may be delivered by UAVs. A package is defined as a bundle of products a customer buys in
one order. A package cannot be delivered by a UAV due to two reasons: its weight exceeds UAV
weight limit or landing at the customer location is not possible. A binary parameter asp is calculated
apriori which indicates whether service s ∈ S can deliver package p ∈ P . As per FAA regulations,
UAV weight including the package must not exceed 55 lbs. This regulation is incorporated within
parameter asp which equals zero for the packages that exceeds the weight limit. Another binary
parameter, rijs, indicates whether delivery to customer zone i∈ I from facility j ∈ J using service
s ∈ S is possible, and is calculated based on the distance metric (Euclidean or Manhattan) being
used. The parameter rijs takes into account maximum delivery range of services as well as other
regulatory limitations such as airspace restrictions and dedicated paths. Current FAA regulations
prohibit UAVs to fly over people and require the flight path to be limited within class G airspace.
As such, UAVs are required to fly in dedicated airspace, for instance, flying over the road network.
In our modelling approach, these restrictions only impact the reachibility which is captured by rijs.
However, the regulation to keep UAV within visual line-of-sight must be relaxed by the government
for commercial use of UAVs. Until then, UAVs cannot operate. FAA regulations also require that
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition12
an UAV is monitored by a certified operator and must fly under 100 mph. Hiring certified operators
increases operator cost while flying speed affects the number of UAVs an e-retailer has to purchase.
As such, these regulations impact UAV delivery cost and are incorporated within the unit delivery
cost parameter cijs. Refer to Section 5.1 for detailed calculations.
Three sets of binary decision variables (wj, xjs, and yijs) are defined where wj takes value 1
when facility j ∈ J is open and xjs takes value 1 when service s ∈ S is offered at location j ∈ J
while yijs equals 1 if customer zone i ∈ I is assigned facility j for service s ∈ S. We also define
two sets of continuous decision variables Disp and dijsp, where Disp denotes the demand captured
by service s ∈ S for package p ∈ P in zone i ∈ I and dijsp is the portion serviced by facility j ∈ J .
The demand Disp, captured by a service depends on the other competing services available to the
customers. The competition between the services is modelled using a multinominal logit (MNL)
model detailed next.
2.1. Market share model
We use a multinomial logit (MNL) model to predict the demand captured by each service in a
competitive environment. Customer zone i ∈ I has a maximum market size Nip for package p ∈ P
which is distributed between the services in S0 = S∪{n+ 1} which compete on five distinct factors:
(1) inherent attractiveness, β0s (2) travel time, TTi, (3) travel cost, TCi, (4) delivery charge, qs, and
(5) delivery time DTs. To incorporate social resistance against UAVs, we may set β0n <β0s, ∀s ∈
S0\{n}, i.e., the inherent attractiveness of UAV service is, possibly significantly, less than that of
other services.
We assume that there is no competition between the stores and customers visit their nearest
store. It is further assumed that there is static competition between services offered by the e-retailer
and stores, i.e., the characteristics of the services offered will not change once delivery by UAV
service is made available.
The utility function of customer zone i∈ I for package p∈ P is:
Uip =∑s∈S
((∑j∈J
aspyijs
)exp(β0s−βdtDTs−βdcqs)
)+ exp(β0,n+1−βttTTi−βtcTCi) (2.1)
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition13
where βtt, βtc, βdt, and βdc are sensitivity parameters to travel time, travel cost, delivery time, and
delivery charges, respectively. The first expression on the left of (2.1) is the utility captured by
the services offered by the e-retailer. The second expression is the utility captured by stores where
customer i ∈ I visits the nearest store. The market share captured by service s ∈ S in customer
zone i∈ I for package p∈ P is:
MSisp =
(∑j∈J
aspyijs
)exp(β0s−βdtDTs−βdcqs)
Uip(2.2)
The standard market share model assumes that market size is perfectly inelastic which limits
the applicability of the model to capture market expansion or shrinkage. When more services are
available to the customers, the probability of lost sales decreases. As a result, the overall market
size increases. Similarly, a proportion of the market is lost since not all competing services in the
market are included in the model. Hence, we use an exponential expenditure function (Berman
and Krass 2002) to determine the proportion of the maximum market size Nip that is captured by
all services offered by the e-retailer and the store. The expenditure function is
g(Uip) = 1− exp(−λUip) (2.3)
and market size is Nip×g(Uip). Parameter λ represents the elasticity of market size with respect to
total utility Uip. When elasticity λ→∞, g(Uip)→ 1, and the maximum market size is fully captured.
When λ is low, the market size is small. Basuroy and Nguyen (1998) suggest a conceptually similar
expenditure function to estimate market size as MSZ0(Uip)θ, where MSZ0 is the base market size
and 0 ≤ θ < 1 reflects the size of market expansion with respect to utility. This function is also
applicable to our modelling approach and solution methodology. The demand captured by service
s∈ S in customer zone i for package p is Disp =Nip× g(Uip)×MSisp, or
Disp =
Nip (1− exp(1−λUip))
(∑j∈J
aspyijs
)exp(β0s−βdtDTs−βdcqs)
∑s∈S
((∑j∈J
aspyijs
)exp(β0s−βdtDTs−βdcqs)
)+ exp(β0,n+1−βttTTi−βtcTCi)
. (2.4)
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition14
Network RepresentationS set of e-retailer services S = {1, . . . , n} where n is the new UAV serviceS0 set of services offered in the market, S0 = S ∪{n+ 1} where n+ 1 is instore serviceJ set of candidate LocationsI set of customer zonesP set of Packages, P = {0,1}asp equals 1 if service s∈ S can deliver package p∈ Prijs equals 1 if zone i∈ I is within the maximum range of service s∈ S from facility j ∈ J
Cost ParametersLj cost of opening facility j ∈ JFs cost of offering service s∈ S at a facilityα profit margin (in percentage)πp package valuecijs delivery cost per unit to zone i∈ I from facility j ∈ J using service s∈ Sqs delivery charge for service s∈ S
Market share model ParametersNip maximum market size (in units) in zone i∈ I for package p∈ PDTs delivery time for service s∈ Sqs delivery charge for service s∈ STTi travel time for customers in zone i∈ I to the nearest storeTCi travel Cost for customers in zone i∈ I to the nearest storeβ0s inherent attractiveness of service s∈ Sβdt delivery time (in hours) senstivity parameterβdc delivery charge (in dollars) senstivity parameterβtt travel time (in hours) senstivity parameterβtc travel cost (in dollars) senstivity parameterg(Uip) expenditure functionλ elasticity of market size w.r.t to Uip
Decision variableswj equals 1 if facility j ∈ J is open.xjs equals 1 if service s∈ S is offered at facility j ∈ J .yijs equals 1 if zone i∈ I is assigned to facility j ∈ J for service s∈ SUip utility function of zone i∈ I for package p∈ PDisp Demand captured by service s∈ S for package p∈ P in zone i∈ Idijsp Portion of Disp serviced by facility j ∈ J
Table 2 Model parameters and decision variables
The expressions of Disp = f(yi11, ..., yijn+1) and Uip = u(yi11, ..., yijn+1) are functions of the deci-
sion variable yijs. In fact, Disp and Uip are decision variables, and equations (2.1) and (2.4) are
constraints to e-retailer’s problem detailed next.
2.2. Mathematical formulation
In this section, we formally define the complete mathematical formulation for e-retailer’s problem
[NP] using the modelling parameters and decision variables listed in Table 2. Model [NP] is
[NP]: max∑i∈I
∑j∈J
∑s∈S
∑p∈P
(απp + qs− cijs)dijsp−∑j∈J
∑s∈S
Fsxjs−∑j∈J
Ljwj (2.5)
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition15
s.t.∑j∈J
yijs ≤ 1 i∈ I, s∈ S, (2.6)
yijs ≤ rijsxjs i∈ I, j ∈ J, s∈ S, (2.7)
xjs ≤wj j ∈ J, s∈ S (2.8)
dijsp ≤Myijs i∈ I, j ∈ J, s∈ S,p∈ P, (2.9)∑j∈J
dijsp ≤Disp i∈ I, s∈ S,p∈ P, (2.10)
(2.1), (2.4)
yijs ∈ {0,1} i∈ I, j ∈ J, s∈ S, (2.11)
wj ∈ {0,1} j ∈ J, (2.12)
xjs ∈ {0,1} j ∈ J, s∈ S, (2.13)
dijsp, Disp, Uip ≥ 0 i∈ I, j ∈ J, s∈ S,p∈ P. (2.14)
The objective function (2.5) maximizes the overall profitability of the e-retailer expressed as the
difference between revenues, delivery costs, fixed facility costs, and fixed service costs. Constraint
(2.6) ensures that customer zone i∈ I is served using service s∈ S by only one facility. Service s∈ S
may be offered from facility j ∈ J if delivery to the customer zone i ∈ I is possible i.e., rijs = 1,
and it is available i.e., xjs = 1, as indicated by constraint (2.10). Constraint (2.8) ensures that a
facility j ∈ J can offer services only if it is open. Constraint (2.9) ensures that demand serviced
dijsp for package p ∈ P using service s ∈ S can only be satisfied by facility j ∈ J if the customer
zone i∈ I is assigned to it, where M is a large number to ensure that the constraint is nonbinding
for yijs=1. Constraint (2.10) limits the demand serviced by all facilities∑j∈J
dijsp to customer zone
i∈ I for package p∈ P using service s∈ S to the demand captured by that service Disp. The latter
depends on the utility that the customer zone i∈ I derives from that service relative to the utility
derived from other services and is completely defined when equations (2.1), and (2.4) of the market
share model equations are added as constraints. Constraints (2.11), (2.12), and (2.13) are binary
requirements for variables wj, xjs, and yijs respectively. Constraints (2.14) are the nonnegativity
requirements for variables dijsp,Disp,Uip.
Note that the capacity for UAV deliveries in a given time period is factored in delivery costs, see
Table B3 for detailed calculations of unit UAV delivery cost. At facility j, the yearly demand for
UAV service n is Y Dj =∑i∈I
∑p∈P
dijnp, where dijnp is the solution to model [NP]. The average hourly
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition16
demand Hj for UAV service at facility j is calculated as Hj =Y Dj
365×14. Based on average hourly
demand, the number of UAVs required at facility j ∈ J is calculated as NFj =Hj×ss
Φ, where ss is a
safety factor set by the e-retailer to have sufficient additional UAVs, and Φ is the minimum number
of deliveries a UAV can make within one hour. Safety factor ss takes into account fluctuations in
hourly demand and the time associated with different overhead activities such as battery charging,
battery swap, and delivery time under different weather conditions.
Although the safety factor takes into account fluctuations in hourly demand, the demand during
certain days may be much higher. To consider this variability in demand, Hjt is defined as the
demand at facility j on day t ∈ Y. Let Πt be the proportion of the demand on day t ∈ Y. The
average hourly demand Hjt for UAV service at facility j on day t is then calculated as Hjt =Y Dj×Πt
14.
Similarly, the number of UAVs required at facility j ∈ J on day t is calculated as NFjt =Hjt×ss
Φ.
As such, the total number of UAVs required at facility j equals maxt∈Y{NFjt}.
3. A Logic-Based Benders Decomposition Approach
When the services offered at the facilities are known, the problem reduces to assigning each cus-
tomer zone to the nearest open facility offering a given service s ∈ S, and to decide whether this
service s is offered or not. We exploit this feature to decompose [NP] into a location-service mas-
ter problem (LSMP) that makes locational decisions, and a set of |I| customer service-assignment
subproblems [SPi] where the assignment decisions are made. We develop a Location-Assignment
Benders (LAB) algorithm that iterates between the master problem and subproblems to solve the
nonlinear formulation to optimality. First, the master problem LSMP is solved to make locational
decisions:
[LSMP]: max∑i∈I
Zi−∑j∈J
∑s∈S
Fsxjs−∑j∈J
Ljwj (3.1)
s.t.∑j∈J
∑s∈S
∑p∈P
(απp + qs− cijs)dijsp−Zi = 0 i∈ I, (3.2)∑j∈J
dijsp ≤Dmaxisp i∈ I, s∈ S,p∈ P, (3.3)
dijsp ≤ rijsDmaxisp xjs i∈ I, j ∈ J, s∈ S,p∈ P, (3.4)
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition17∑
j∈J
∑s∈S
dijsp ≤ TDmaxip i∈ I, p∈ P, (3.5)
cuts, (3.6)
(2.8), (2.13), (2.12), (2.14),
Zi ≥ 0 i∈ I (3.7)
where decision variable Zi captures the total revenue minus the delivery cost associated with
serving customer zone i ∈ I, as defined by constraint (3.2). The objective function maximizes
the total profit, which is the same as (2.5). Constraints (3.6) are Benders optimality cuts that
are generated each time the subproblem is solved. Deriving optimality cuts from the subproblem
solution is explained in detail in Section 3.2. Constraints (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) are valid constraints,
and are added to tighten the relaxation. Constraint (3.3) ensures that the demand serviced by all
facilities,∑j∈J
dijsp, does not exceed the maximum demand that can be captured by service s ∈ S,
Dmaxisp . Constraint (3.5) ensures that for package p ∈ P in customer zone i ∈ I, demand serviced∑
j∈J
∑s∈S
dijsp, must not exceed the maximum total demand TDmaxip that e-retailer can capture. By
Lemma 1, Dmaxisp is achieved when only that service is made available to the customer zone i∈ I for
package p∈ P and TDmaxip is achieved when all services in S are offered. These results are proven in
Appendix A and follows from properties of the MNL models (Cooper, Nakanishi, and Eliashberg
1988).
Lemma 1 For customer zone i∈ I and package p∈ P ,
1. the maximum demand that service s ∈ S may capture, denoted by Dmaxisp , is achieved when
only that service is made available; and
2. the maximum total demand that the e-retailer may capture, denoted by TDmaxip , is achieved
when all services s∈ S are made available.
3.1. Customer Service-Assignment Subproblems
One of the advantages of logic-based Benders decomposition approach is that the subproblem can
take any form including an optimization problem or a feasibility problem (Jain and Grossmann
2001, Hooker 2005, Fazel-Zarandi and Beck 2012, Fazel-Zarandi, Berman, and Beck 2013, Wheatley,
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition18
Gzara, and Jewkes 2015, Roshanaei et al. 2017). In contrast to the methodologies in literature,
the subproblem in our case is a nonlinear optimization problem. When the location and service
decisions are known, [NP] reduces to |I| customer-service assignment subproblems [SPi]:
[SPi] : max∑j∈J
∑s∈S
(απp + qs− cijs)dijsp (3.8)
s.t. yijs ≤ rijsxjs, j ∈ J, s∈ S, (3.9)
(2.7)− (2.9), (2.11), (2.14), (2.1), (2.4)
where xjs is [LSMP] solution. Subproblem [SPi] finds an optimal assignment of customer zone i∈ I
to offered services at open facilities. Such an assignment depends on the demand values determined
by constraints (2.1), and (2.4). Since the latter are nonlinear, [SPi] remains challenging to solve.
We explain two main characteristics of [SPi] and develop a fast enumeration based algorithm
to solve industry-scale instances. We also present special cases where the resulting optimization
problem has a non-decreasing concave objective function that can be solved without enumerating
over all scenarios. When xjs and wj are known, customer zone i ∈ I is assigned to the nearest
open facility offering that service to minimize delivery costs, cijs. If rijsxjs = 0 ∀j ∈ J , customer
zone i ∈ I is assigned to a dummy facility with sufficiently large penalty to ensure that service
s ∈ S is not offered. When all customer zones are assigned, we need to decide on the optimal set
of services to be made available to each zone which is a binary non-convex nonlinear optimization
problem. We use an enumeration based approach to solve the problem. Note that the decomposition
reduces the original problem to a point where only service decisions need to be optimized for each
customer zone separately. Moreover, the services offered by an e-retailer are limited in practice.
For instance, Amazon offers a total of six main delivery services (Prime Now (2-hour), Same-Day
Delivery, One-Day Delivery, Release-Date Delivery, Free Shipping, and Amazon Locker) and not
all of these services are offered at all customer locations (Amazon 2018). As such, the enumeration
based approach performs extremely well for industry-scale instances.
Let P(S) be the power set of S. For zone i ∈ I and package p ∈ P , the demand captured by
service s∈ S when the set of services e∈P(S) is offered is precalculated as
Dispe =Nip(1− exp(−λpU ipe))MSispe ∀ i∈ I, s∈ S,p∈ P,e∈P(S) (3.10)
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition19
where U ipe is the utility of customer zone i∈ I for package p∈ P when the set of services e∈P(S)
is available. MSispe calculates the market share of package p∈ P from customer zone i∈ I captured
by service s∈ S when the set of services available is e∈P(S). The optimal solution of [SPi] is then
SP i = maxe∈P(S)
{∑s∈S
∑p∈P
(απp + qs−MCis)Dispe} ∀i∈ I (3.11)
where MCis denotes minimum cost to deliver a package to zone i ∈ I using service s ∈ S. Note
that Dispe is computed only once at the start of the LAB algorithm and the resulting subproblem
(3.11) is solved in |P(S)| iterations to find the set of services e ∈P(S) to be offered to customer
zone i∈ I which maximizes operating profits SP i.
Under a special case, when the objective function coefficients (απp + qs−MCis) are same for all
services in S and products in P , the resulting subproblem objective is a non-decreasing concave
function and is therefore solvable in polynominal time. If ∃j ∈ J, s∈ S: rijs×xjs = 1, then by Lemma
1∑
j∈J yijs = 1 i.e., service s must be offered to customer zone i by some facility to maximize the
total demand captured. As such, enumerating over all possible set of services is not required and
the optimal solution is to offer each service when ∃j ∈ J, s∈ S: rijs×xjs = 1.
3.2. Logic-based Benders cuts
This paper presents a novel way to define cuts using location-service decision variables and inde-
pendent of the assignment variables. This allows to remove assignment variables from the master
problem, making it extremely efficient to solve repeatedly. The number of binary decision variables
in the master problem reduces from |J |(|S|(|I|+ 1)) to |J |(|S|+ 1) when location-service based
Benders cuts are used instead of assignment-based cuts. The cut coefficients are also tailored to
the location-service decisions variables and are calculated with little computational effort. Previous
work in the facility location literature (Fazel-Zarandi and Beck 2012, Fazel-Zarandi, Berman, and
Beck 2013, Wheatley, Gzara, and Jewkes 2015), however, use assignment variables in defining the
cuts.
Consider a solution (xjs,wj,Zi) obtained from [LSMP]. [LSMP] provides an upper bound to
the original problem, and a lower bound is calculated as∑i∈I
SP i−∑j∈J
∑s∈S
Fsxjs−∑j∈J
Ljwj. Since
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition20
market share constraints are dropped in the master problem [LSMP] and are replaced by an upper
bound on Disp, at any given iteration, Zi ≥ SP i. When the operating profits Zi, in [LSMP] equal
the operating profits calculated in subproblem SP i, ∀ i ∈ I, an optimal solution is reached. At a
given iteration k, let Ok = {j ∈ J, s ∈ S : xjs = 1}. If ∃i ∈ I : Zi > SP i, we add Benders optimality
cuts to the master problem [LSMP]. A valid Benders cut is defined by Chu and Xia (2004) as any
logical expression that eliminates the current master solution (x,w,Z) if it is not feasible to the
original problem [NP], and it must not eliminate any solution that is feasible to the original problem
[NP]. At each iteration, either optimality or feasibility cuts are added to the master problem. When
the subproblem is feasible, optimality cuts are added to improve the lower bound (Roshanaei et al.
2017). If the subproblem is infeasible, feasibility cuts are added to the master problem (Jain and
Grossmann 2001, Hooker 2005, Fazel-Zarandi and Beck 2012, Wheatley, Gzara, and Jewkes 2015,
Fazel-Zarandi, Berman, and Beck 2013). In our problem, the subproblem is always feasible and
feasibility cuts are therefore not required. We define optimality cut
Zi ≤ SP i +∑j∈Ok
∑s∈Ok
γijs(1−xjs) +∑j /∈Ok
∑s/∈Ok
δijsxjs i∈ I (3.12)
where γijs and δijs are cut coefficients. The effectiveness of cut (3.12) depends on the cut coefficients.
A large value is likely to result in total enumeration. A significant contribution of the paper is in
calculating effective cut coefficients with little computational effort. We present a novel approach
that calculates right cut coefficients in (3.12) without eliminating any solution that is feasible to
the original problem and is computationally efficient.
The cut coefficients are designed to capture the change in operating profits where γijs captures
the minimum possible decrease in SP i when an available service s∈ S at facility j ∈ J (i.e. xjs = 1)
is closed. For a given service s at a facility j, minimum decrease in SP i is achieved when only
xjs = 0. We define γijs =Mmaxijs −Mmax
i where Mmaxijs = SP i when only xjs = 0, and Mmax
i = SP i
when xjs = 1 ∀ j ∈ J, s∈ S. Similarly, δijs captures the maximum possible increase in SP i when a
service s ∈ S that is not offered at facility j ∈ J (i.e. xjs = 0) is opened. δijs =Mijs−Mmini where
Mijs = SP i when only xjs = 1, and Mmini = 0 when xjs = 0 ∀ j ∈ J, s ∈ S. As such, γijs is the
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition21
minimum decrease in SP i when only service s at facility j is closed and δijs is the maximum increase
in SP i when only service s at facility j is open. In the same fashion, valid Benders optimality cuts
can also be computed for the market share maximization problem.
If the same set of services are offered in subsequent iterations,∑j∈Ok
∑s∈Ok
(1−xjs) and∑j /∈Ok
∑s/∈Ok
xjs
equal 0, reducing the cut to Zi ≤ SP i which is violated if Zi takes a value greater than SP i. As
such, cut (3.12) ensures that either the current solution is changed or the operating profit is reduced
to SP i, i ∈ I, i.e., it eliminates the current solution if it is infeasible. This proves that the cut
satisfies the first condition. Since the maximum change is considered to calculate cut coefficients,
(3.12) does not remove any feasible solution and is a valid Benders cut.
LAB algorithm is an iterative process that alternates between [LSMP] and [SPi]. At a given
iteration k, an optimal solution (x,w,Z) to [LSMP] is used to solve subproblems [SPi]. If ∀i ∈ I :
Zi = SP i, the solution (w,x,Z) is optimal. This rarely happens in early iterations since Disp in
[LSMP] is overestimated. If ∃i ∈ I :Zi 6= SP i, |I| optimality cuts (3.12), are calculated and added
to [LSMP]. The algorithm stops when Zi = SP i, i ∈ I. The overall iterative algorithm (LAB) is
shown in Figure 1.
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition22
Initialize k= 1
Compute
Dispe, γijs, δijs
Solve LSMP
[SP1] [SP2] [SP|I|]
xjs optimal
∀ i∈ I :Zi = SP i?
SP i
Zi
Stop, optimal
solution found
yes
Add Opti-
mality cuts to
LSMP, k++
no
Figure 1 Location-Assignment Benders Algorithm (LAB)
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition23
Algorithm 1 Pseudo code for LAB Algorithm
Require: Benders cut coefficients γijs, δijs and demand values Dispe
Initialization1: k ← 02: Z ← ∞3: SP ← 0
Main Loop4: while
∑i∈I
Zi 6=∑i∈I
SP i do
5: Solve [LSMP] . obtain solution (x,Z)6: Z ← Z7: x ← x8: for customer zone i∈ I do9: for service s∈ S do
10: MCis ← ∞11: for facility j ∈ J do12: if rijs×xjs = 1 & cijs <MCis then13: MCis ← cijs . Assigns zone to the nearest open facility offering service s14: end if15: end for16: end for17: Solve [SPi], . obtain (SP)18: SP i ← SPi19: Derive the optimality cut and add to [LSMP]20: end for21: k ← k+ 122: end while
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition24
4. Model Extensions
In this section, we discuss extensions to account for market share maximization objective, facility
costs with economies of scale, and redesign of an existing network to add UAV service. We spec-
ify the changes in the modelling and explain when and how the solution method is modified to
accommodate the extensions.
4.1. Market Share Maximization Problem
In competitive facility location problems (CFLP), the problem is often modelled as market share
maximization under budget constraint. The e-retailer’s market share maximization problem [MS]
can easily be modelled as
[MS]: max∑i∈I
∑j∈J
∑s∈S
∑p∈P
dijsp (4.1)
s.t. (2.1), (2.4), (2.6)− (2.14),∑j∈J
∑s∈S
Fsxjs +∑j∈J
Ljwj ≤B, (4.2)
where (4.2) is the budget constraint ensuring that total fixed facility and service costs do not
exceed the available budget B. Model [LSMP] is modified by defining Zi =∑j∈J
∑s∈S
∑p∈P
dijsp as the
total demand captured from customer zone i and the objective is to maximize∑i∈I
Zi under budget
constraint (4.2). For the market share maximization problem [MS], if ∃j ∈ J, s ∈ S: rijs × xjs =
1, then by Lemma 1∑
j∈J yijs = 1 i.e., service s must be offered to customer zone i by some
facility to maximize the total demand captured. Disp is then simply calculated using Equation
(2.4) and subproblem solution is SP i =∑s∈S
∑p∈P
Disp. Note that under market share maximization,
the subproblem is solvable in polynomial time without a need for enumeration.
4.2. Facility costs with economies of scale
Model [NP] assumes a fixed cost Lj for opening a facility, and a fixed cost Fs for offering service s.
This assumes that the fixed costs are independent of the number of services offered. Often times,
substantial cost savings might be achieved through economies of scale by offering multiple services
at the same location. Economies of scale may be captured by defining fixed facility cost as a piece-
wise linear function of the number of services offered. We define a new decision variable ηj that
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition25
counts the number of services offered at facility j. The facility fixed cost Lj = fj(ηj) is then a
nonlinear concave function. Let T = {0,1, ..., |S|} be the set of possible values that ηj can take. The
nonlinear function may be linearized by defining SOS1 variables σtj ∀ t ∈ T, j ∈ J . A parameter
btj = t ∀t ∈ T , is also defined representing breakpoints of the number of services. The modified
model with economies of scale [NPE] is as follows.
[NPE]: max∑i∈I
∑j∈J
∑s∈S
∑p∈P
(απp + qs− cijs)dijsp−∑j∈J
∑s∈S
Fsxjs−∑j∈J
∑t∈T
fj(btj)σtj (4.3)
s.t. (2.1), (2.4), (2.5)− (2.7), (2.9)− (2.13), (2.14),
ηj =∑s∈S
xjs j ∈ J, (4.4)
ηj =∑t∈T
btjσtj j ∈ J, (4.5)∑t∈T
σtj = 1 j ∈ J, (4.6)
σtj ≥ 0, σtj→ SOS1 t∈ T, j ∈ J, (4.7)
where Constraint (4.4) counts the number of services offered at facility j ∈ J . Constraints (4.5)
and (4.6) defines ηj as convex combination of two consecutive breakpoints of the number of services
and∑
t∈T fj(btj)σkj is a convex combination of two breakpoint service costs.
4.3. Facility location and relocation Problem
So far, we consider the design of a network from scratch. However, when a network already exists
the question may be whether a redesign is necessary. We now show how to modify model [NP]
to allow for possibly closing existing facilities and opening new ones. We partition the candidate
locations into two sets J = JE ∪JN , where JE be the set of existing facilities, JN be the set of new
candidate facilities. Let Sj be the set of services that are already offered at the existing facility
j ∈ JE. The objective function is then modified as
max∑i∈I
∑j∈J
∑s∈S
∑p∈P
(απp + qs− cijs)dijsp−∑j∈JN
∑s∈S
FNs xjs−
∑j∈JN
LNj wj (4.8)
−∑j∈JE
LEj wj −∑j∈JE
CLj (1−wj)−∑j∈JE
∑s∈S
FEjsxjs−
∑j∈JE
∑s∈Sj
CSEs (1−xjs)
where FNs is the fixed cost of offering service s ∈ S at a new facility, LNj cost of opening the new
facility j ∈ JN , LEj is the fixed cost of operating an existing facility, CLj is the cost of closing an
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition26
existing facility j ∈ JE, FEjs is the fixed service cost (could be a new or an existing service) at the
existing facility j ∈ JE, and CSEs are the costs associated with closing service s∈ Sj at an existing
facility. The above objective function takes into account two important factors while deciding on
relocation of the facilities, first, it considers the cost of closing a facility or a service, and secondly,
if the facility is not closed, it would incur fixed cost of LEj to operate it and is expected to be less
than LNj since there are no initial setup costs. Note that fixed service costs FEjs depends on whether
the service is already being offered at the facility j ∈ JE or it has to be added.
5. The case of NYC
An actual network, shown in Figure 2, is constructed for New York City (NYC), the most populated
city in the USA with a population of around 8.5 million, and is spread over a land area of 789
km2 (NYC 2016). There are several reasons that motivate selecting NYC for the case study. First,
the world’s largest e-retail company, Amazon.com, first started its 2-hour delivery operations in
NYC. UAV service shares similar characteristics with 2-hour delivery service to make instantaneous
deliveries. Selecting a city where such a service is already offered allows for investigating the effects
of introducing UAV delivery service. Second, NYC’s land area allows the possibility of multiple
facilities to open. NYC also poses challenges because of high rises. There is ongoing research as
how apartment buildings should be designed or updated to accommodate UAV deliveries. One
such concept is “DragonFly” by UK-based industrial design studio where packages are dropped on
landing pads installed on the sides of buildings allowing direct delivery to customer apartments
(PriestmanGoode 2018). Our study helps answer the question of whether advancing the technology
to allow delivery to tall buildings is worth it and how this impacts the overall design of the network.
Finally, availability of data online was a major reason in using NYC and Amazon in the case study.
Data available on Amazon.com is used to estimate market share model parameters and other cost
figures. Section 5.1 details the data used.
5.1. Data used
Physical network and facility costs NYC consists of five boroughs that are divided into
Neighborhood Tabulation Areas (NTAs) as shown in Figure 2 (NTA 2015). The centroid of each
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition27
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Bronx
Stat
en Is
land
Quee
ns
Brooklyn
Legend
●
Facility
Stores
25000
50000
75000
100000
125000Population
Figure 2 New York City Network
NTA is used as a customer zone. To locate competitive stores (retail, grocery and departmental),
we use Google Earth software to find their exact locations. Moreover, 20 candidate facility locations
are selected such that they are evenly distributed over the network. In practice, there already exists
a network with open facilities. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the network is designed
from scratch and no such facilities are open. However, we can easily design a UAV network given
an existing network by forcing wj = 1 for already open facilities in the model. Each facility is
assumed to be 50,000 sq.ft based on the fact that Amazon has 50,000 sq.ft distribution center
in Manhattan to offer same day delivery services in NYC. To estimate yearly facility cost Lj,
we consider warehouse lease rates, labor and miscellaneous costs. Yearly labor and miscellaneous
costs for a 50,000 sq.ft facility are estimated to be $1.5 million based on the study conducted
by Boyd Company (Boyd 2014). To calculate the lease rate of a facility j ∈ J located in a given
borough b, we use Jll (2015) report and online leasing website LoopNet (LoopNet 2017) to estimate
minimum (minb) and maximum (maxb) lease rates ($/sq.ft) in each borough b. Yearly facility cost
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition28
Lj = 50,000 ∗U(minb,maxb) + 1,500,000, where U(minb,maxb) randomly generates a lease rate
for a facility in a given borough b. Each facility can offer three types of services S = {1,2,3}. The
maximum range of 2-hour (s= 1), 12-hour (s= 2), and UAV (s= 3) services are assumed to be
20 km, 40 km, and 10 km, respectively. Amazon’s Prime Air travels up to 24 km while DHL’s
Parcelcopter has a maximum flying range of 16 km which averages to 20 km. Since the UAV must
return back to the facility, its maximum range is set to 202
= 10 km. For UAV service, we set rij3 = 0
for all customer zones that are within short distance to the airport and is shaded in grey in Figure
2. For 2-hour and 12-hour services, the maximum ranges are estimated by calculating the distance
between Amazon’s current distribution center in Manhattan and the farthest location (based on zip
code) where each service is available. It turns out that 12-hour service is available to all boroughs
in New York City while 2-hour service is not offered in Staten Island. The distances between the
nodes are calculated using geosphere package in R (Hijmans 2017). The yearly additional cost of
offering service s= 1 or s= 2 at a facility, Fs = $250,000. Yearly cost of offering UAV service s= 3
is estimated to be $1,000,000 based on the ARK Invest industry report (Keeney 2016).
Package delivery costs and service charges Unit delivery costs cijs for each service s ∈ S
are presented in Table 3. To estimate UAV delivery cost cij3, we use a similar methodology as
presented by ARK Invest (Keeney 2016). Detailed calculations are shown in Table C3, where the
amortized UAV and battery costs are used along with operator salary cost to estimate cost per
delivery. To do so, we estimate the number of UAVs and batteries an e-retailer has to purchase to
meet its yearly demand YD. The maximum hourly demand Hmax is the average hourly demand
multiplied by a safety factor ss. The latter accounts for fluctuations in hourly demand, the time
associated with overhead activities such as battery charging and battery swap, and fluctuations in
delivery time because of weather conditions. The value of the safety factor is estimated based on
two industry reports. In a market survey by Statista (2015), out of four time windows, 48% of the
respondents shop online during the peak-time window. Based on these figures, the ratio of peak
time demand to average demand is estimated as ss = 48%14
= 1.92. Using the data from Albright
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition29
(2015) who reports the percentage of hourly online retail sales, we estimate ss= 1.6. We round up
the estimated values and set the safety factor to ss= 2.0 to take into account other operational
fluctuations.
Assuming that a UAV flies at a speed of 40 km/h and has a range of 10 km, it can make atleast
two deliveries per hour and as such, we set the number of UAVs required to Hmax2
. We further
assume that the number of extra batteries required equals the number of UAVs to ensure zero
charging time. Using the number of UAVs and batteries, the purchasing cost PC, is calculated
and amortized over a period of five years (rate, r = 20%) to estimate yearly amortized cost, AC =
r × PC. Several reports suggest that FAA new regulations for delivery by UAVs would require
certified operators to monitor the UAV activity (Wang 2016, Keeney 2016). However, the number
of UAVs ND, an operator can manage simultaneously are highly speculated ranging from 1 to 30.
For the base case scenario, we assume that ND = 10, i.e., 10 UAVs per operator are allowed. To
calculate the number of UAV operators required, we assume that the delivery process is automated
and operators’ role is to monitor flight operations from a central control room in the city. In case of
an emergency, however, an operator flies the UAV manually. An operator can make two deliveries
per hour and as such, the number of operators required per hour then equals Hmax2×ND and is used to
estimate yearly operator salary cost, OC. The total yearly cost, TC =AC+OC, and unit delivery
cost, cij0 = TCYD
+ 0.10 = $2.62, where $0.10 is the battery charging cost per delivery.
For 2-hour service s= 1, Amazon uses its Flex Program where independent drivers are paid $20
per hour to make deliveries (Chuang 2016). We estimate cij1 = $10 if a driver makes 4 deliveries in
a two hour window. For 12-hour service s= 2, cij2 = $6 based on the analysis presented by Wohlsen
(2013). These cost figures are well aligned with Amazon’s delivery charges. For each service s∈ S,
delivery charges qs are assumed to be equal to the unit delivery cost cijs as e-retailers usually do
not earn profits from delivery charges. In fact, Amazon reports revenue earned from delivery to be
less than delivery costs incurred (Statista 2018).
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition30
Lj : 50000×U(minb,maxb) + 1,500,000 yearly facility costs
π0 = π1 = 20, α= 0.30 package price and profit margin
f1 = $250,000 2-hour delivery - yearly facility costs
f2 = $250,000 same-day delivery - yearly facility costs
f3 = $1,000,000 30-minute delivery by UAV - yearly facility costs
cij1 = q2 = $10 delivery cost and charges per package using 2-hour service
cij2 = q3 = $6 delivery cost and charges per package using same-day service
cij3 = q1 = $2.62 delivery cost and charges per package using UAV service
r1 : 20km Range of two-hour delivery at a facility
r2 : 40km Range of same day delivery at a facility
r3 : 10km Range of delivery-by-UAV
β04 = 0.00, β01 =−2.00, β02 =−2.00, β03 =−2.22, Inherent attractiveness of the services available.
βtt = 1.4 Travel time (in hours) sensitivity parameter.
βtc = 0.035 Travel cost sensitivity parameter.
βdt = 0.092 Delivery time (in hours) sensitivity parameter.
βdc = 0.34 Delivery charges (in dollars) sensitivity parameter.
λ= 0.5 Demand elasticity parameter, elastic.
Table 3 NYC example input parameters
Market share model parameters As pointed out earlier, for same day delivery, products that
are readily available at convenience and retail stores are frequently ordered. We therefore use US
grocery sales 2015 (Bender 2016) to estimate maximum market size Nip in customer zone i∈ I for
package p∈ P . Grocery sales (in dollars) are converted into units by assuming that average package
value πp = 20, p = {0,1}. The total grocery sales (in units) in a given customer zone are then
estimated based on its population relative to US population. We assume that UAV delivery is not
possible to apartment buildings (i.e., the number of units in the building µ≤ 9, for UAV delivery),
and only 86% of the packages meet UAV weight capacity based on an interview of Amazon’s CEO
Jeff Bezos in 2014 (Quinn 2015). Building size data is retrieved from American Community survey
data (ACS 2015) which presents housing characteristics for all customer zones (NTAs). As such,
in a customer zone i ∈ I, total grocery demand is divided between packages p = 0 and p = 1 to
estimate maximum market size Nip.
Sensitivity parameters of the market share model are usually estimated based on market surveys
or POS data (refer to Cooper, Nakanishi, and Eliashberg (1988)) which does not fall within the
scope of this work. We therefore use the sensitivity parameters as estimated in (Schmid, Schmutz,
and Axhausen 2016). Schmid, Schmutz, and Axhausen (2016) study consumer choice behavior
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition31
[1,2]
Man
hatta
n
Bronx
Staten Is
land
Que
ens
Brooklyn
Legend
Facility
Stores
250005000075000100000125000
Population
(a) Without UAVs
[3]
[1,3]
[1,2,3]Man
hatta
n
Bronx
Staten Is
land
Que
ens
Brooklyn
(b) With UAVs
Figure 3 NYC optimal network configuration
for online grocery shopping versus in-store. The inherent attractiveness for online shopping β0s =
−2.00 relative to in-store shopping (β04 = 0.0). β0s < 0 indicates negative attraction towards online
shopping. For UAV service, we assume β03 =−2.2 to account for social resistance. Schmid, Schmutz,
and Axhausen (2016) calculate average value of the travel time V OTT = βttβtc
= 40.0$/hr and travel
cost sensitivity βtc = 0.035. As such, travel time sensitivity βtt = V OTT ×βtc = 40.0× 0.035 = 1.4.
The study estimates the value of delivery time V ODT = βdtβdc
= $6.5/day = $0.27/hr. We set βdt =
0.27βdc in the utility function (2.1) and calculate βdc such that the percentage of the grocery market
that is captured by e-retailers equals US online grocery market share. Based on our calculations,
βdc = 0.34 and βdt = 0.092. We use demand elasticity λ= 0.5 so that on average, the expenditure
function (2.3) equals Amazon’s online grocery market share (41%). When estimating βdc and λ
from utility and expenditure functions, we do not include UAV service. This is because the market
share figures and the study conducted by Schmid, Schmutz, and Axhausen (2016) are based on
same day delivery without UAVs.
5.2. Analysis of the base case
To study the effect of UAVs on network design, we solve the NYC instance under two scenarios. In
scenario 1, UAV service is dropped from the model and the resulting optimal network is shown in
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition32
●
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10
20
30
40
50
0 2 4 6Nb. of UAV facilities
Rev
enue/
Cos
ts (
in m
illion
s)
●
Net Profits
Operating Profits
Facility costs
(a) Operating Profits vs facility costs
●
●
●●
●● ● ●
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
0 2 4 6Nb. of UAV facilities
UA
V c
over
age
(%)
●
Area coverage
Population coverage
(b) UAV coverage
Figure 4 Trade-offs between net revenue, costs and coverage
Figure 3a. A single facility is open and it offers both 2-hour and 12-hour services. While 12-hour
service is available to all customer zones, only 95% of the customer zones can use the 2-hour service
as shown by the region in the red circle in Figure 3a. In scenario 2, the model is solved with all three
services. In the optimal design, three facilities are open, each offering UAV service to the customers
within its 10 km radius as depicted by the blue circles in Figure 3b. The facility opened in scenario
1 is no longer optimal for scenario 2. This shows that incorporating a UAV service may require
the relocation of existing facilities. We also observe that under scenario 2, 2-hour service (s= 1) is
made available at two facilities which improves its coverage from 95% to 98%. UAV service may
also improve the coverage of other services. In this example, the coverage of 2-hour service s= 1
improves from 95% to 98%. Offering UAV service increases facility costs by $11.2 million while it
increases operating profit by $27.7 million from $18 million to $45.7 million. Higher facility costs
are compensated by increased operating profits due to the increase in market share captured by
the e-retailer from 3.0 million to 7.6 million packages.
To further investigate the effect of the number of facilities open on the operating profits and
costs and on UAV coverage, we add a constraint to the model to fix the number of UAV facilities
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition33
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0%
25%
50%
75%
µ ≤ 2 µ ≤ 4 µ ≤ 9 µ ≤ 20 µ ≤ ∞
UAV building size µ constraint
UA
V p
opula
tion c
over
age
Figure 5 UAV population coverage vs building size µ constraint
open to a specific number and vary it between 0 and 7. Figure 4a plots the operating profits and
costs in function of the number of UAV facilities open and Figure 4b shows UAV coverage. “Area
coverage” denotes the percentage of customer zones that are within 10 km radius of an opened
facility offering UAV service. However, not all customers within 10 km can be served by UAVs due
to technological limitations including building size and package weight. Population coverage takes
these limitations into account and gives the percentage of the population for which UAV delivery is
possible. As expected, facility cost increases linearly with the number of open facilities. Operating
profits, on the other hand, increase at a decreasing rate. The net profit is maximized with three
open UAV facilities covering 75% of the NYC area and 34% of the population. Opening a fourth
facility increases area and population coverage to 84% and 38% respectively, but the increase in
operating profit is not sufficient to cover additional facility costs.
5.3. Technological limitations and network design
Currently, UAV technology is in the development phase and it is hard to predict technological
constraints associated with it. In this paper, we take into account two types of technological
limitations that a UAV delivery will face: parcel weight limit, and building size. Many reports
suggest that a UAV cannot deliver parcels weighing more than 5 lbs (Wang 2016, Rezapour and
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition34
Farahani 2014). Consequently, population coverage cannot exceed 86% due to the weight limit.
However, the type of buildings where UAV delivery would be possible is not clear yet. In our
analysis, we assumed that UAV delivery is only possible to buildings with units µ ≤ 9. In this
section, we relax the assumption. Figure 5 is a box-plot of UAV population coverage in all customer
zones under different building size requirements and shows that as the building requirement is
relaxed, the coverage increases. Coverage is maximized when delivery is possible to all building
types and reaches 86%. As the building requirement is relaxed, more facilities are open as illustrated
in Figure 6. When building requirement is µ≤ 4, a densely populated area like Manhattan is not
offered UAV service because 95% of the population live in buildings with 5 or more units. In Staten
Island, 100% of the population live in buildings with 4 units or less. However, Staten Island is not
offered UAV service due to low demand. Brooklyn and Queens are the most favorable boroughs
for UAV delivery due to high population living in buildings with fewer number of units. The above
analysis shows that advancement in technology will play a vital role in shaping the future of UAV
delivery.
5.4. Government regulations
Government regulations are expected to play a vital role in determining the future of UAVs in
last-mile delivery. These regulations may require firms to hire certified operators to monitor UAV
activity leading to higher delivery costs and delivery charges which would in turn reduce customer
attraction towards the UAV service.
5.4.1. Analysis of UAV’s target market The number of operators a firm needs to hire
depends on the number of UAVs, ND, an operator is allowed to monitor simultaneously. In the
base case scenario in Section 5.2, we set ND= 10. However, this value is highly speculative as some
reports suggest only 1 to 2 UAVs per operator (Lewis 2014a) will be allowed while others believe
this value may be as high as 30 (Keeney 2016). To determine the effect of government regulations
on UAV delivery, we solve the model under different values of ND.
Based on our calculations in Table C3, Figure 7a illustrates the relationship between ND and
UAV delivery cost cij3 which decreases at a decreasing rate as ND increases and varies significantly
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition35
[1,2]
Man
hatta
n
Bronx
Staten Is
landQ
ueen
sBrooklyn
25000
50000
75000
100000
125000Population
(a) Without UAVs
[1,3]
[1,2,3]
Man
hatta
n
Bronx
Staten Is
land
Que
ens
Brooklyn
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
UAVCoverage
(b) µ≤ 2
[1,3]
[1,2,3]
Man
hatta
n
Bronx
Staten Is
land
Que
ens
Brooklyn
20000
40000
60000
UAVCoverage
(c) µ≤ 4
[3]
[1,3]
[1,2,3]Man
hatta
n
Bronx
Staten Is
land
Que
ens
Brooklyn
20000
40000
60000
UAVCoverage
(d) µ≤ 9
[3]
[1,3]
[1,2,3]Man
hatta
n
Bronx
Staten Is
landQ
ueen
s
Brooklyn
20000
40000
60000
UAVCoverage
(e) µ≤ 20
[3]
[1,3]
[1,2,3]
[3]
Man
hatta
n
Bronx
Staten Is
land
Que
ens
Brooklyn
30000
60000
90000
UAVCoverage
(f) µ≤∞Figure 6 UAV building size µ constraint
from $24 for ND = 1 to $1 for ND = 30. Since UAV delivery charge q3 is determined by the
delivery cost, ND would impact the demand captured by the UAV service. As such, government
regulations will have significant impact on value-added by UAVs. To study this, we solve the model
by varying market size using elasticity parameter λ between 0.01 to 1.3. under four different values
of ND: 2, 5, 10, and 30. Currently, FAA regulations allow only one UAV per operator which is
too restrictive to make UAVs economically feasible. For ND= 1, UAV service is not offered by the
e-retailer due to low demand and high service costs. However, these regulations are expected to
be relaxed in the future and we therefore vary ND between 2 to 30. Figure 7b plots e-retailer’s
profits against the market size under different government regulations where “No UAV” denotes
e-retailer’s profit in the absence of UAV service. As the market size increases, profits increase due to
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition36
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28Nb. of UAVs per operator, ND
Unit
del
iver
y c
ost
, c
ij3
(a) UAV delivery cost as a function of Nb. of
UAVs per operator
●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
●●●●●●
● ●● ●
● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
0
30
60
90
120
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4Market size, λ
Pro
fits
(in
million
s)
●
No UAV
ND = 2
ND = 5
ND = 10
ND = 30
(b) UAVs per operator effect under different
market sizes
Figure 7 Effect of regulations for UAVs on same day delivery market βtt
●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4Market size, λ
PV
AD
(%)
(a) ND=2
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●●●●●
●●●●●●●●●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
35.0
37.5
40.0
42.5
45.0
47.5
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
Market size, λ
(b) ND=5
●
●
●
●●●●●●●●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
100
200
300
400
500
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
Market size, λ
(c) ND=10
●
●
●
●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
200
400
600
800
1000
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
Market size, λ
(d) ND=30
Figure 8 Effect of government regulations on PVAD
higher demand captured and profit curve shifts upwards as ND increases. To investigate the value-
added by UAVs, we plot the percentage value-added (PVAD) against market size under different
government regulations as shown in Figure 8. PVAD is calculated as the percentage increase in
profits between scenarios 1(without UAVs) and 2(with UAV).
For ND = 2, PVAD is maximized when the market size is very large as shown in Figure 8a.
For λ ≤ 1.2, PVAD = 0% i.e., UAV service is not even offered due to low demand and high
delivery costs. At λ= 1.3, PVAD is only 0.10%. However, as government regulations are relaxed
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition37
0
1
2
3
4
5
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
Market size, λ
Nb. of
open
faci
liti
es Without UAV serviceNb. UAV facilities
(a) ND=2
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
Market size, λ
(b) ND=5
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
Market size, λ
(c) ND=10
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
Market size, λ
(d) ND=30
Figure 9 Effect of government regulations on the number of UAVs facilities
i.e., ND = 5,10,30, PVAD increases significantly for all markets as shown in Figures 8b, 8c, 8d.
PVAD is maximized when the market size is small. At λ= 0.08, PVAD = 47%, 504%, and 1094%
for ND= 5, 10, and 30, respectively. To understand this phenomenon, we compare the number of
UAV facilities opened with the number of facilities without UAV service at different market sizes
as shown in Figure 9. Without UAV service, only one facility is open when λ≥ 0.08. With UAV
service, the number of facilities depend on ND, the number of UAVs per operator and on market
size. For ND = 2, UAV service is offered only for large market size at a single facility offering
other services. As ND increases to 5, 10, and 30, more facilities are open to offer UAV service for
smaller market sizes. Hence, PVAD is maximized when the market size is small as UAV service
allows e-retailers to enter these markets which would otherwise not have been possible due to small
market size. The analysis shows that UAV service may allow e-retailers to extend same day delivery
services and offer UAV service in regions with small market size when the regulations are less
restrictive. On the other hand, if regulations are more restrictive, UAV service might be restricted
to densely populated areas where technological limitations and high delivery charges may limit the
added value of UAVs.
5.4.2. Analysis of UAV delivery charges In the base case scenario, we assume that delivery
cost cijs equals service charge qs. However, service charge plays a crucial role in optimizing e-
retailer’s profits and may not always be equal to delivery cost. We vary q3 between −$5 to $18,
customer delivery charge sensitivity βdc from 0.05 to 1.00, and set ND = 2, 5, 10, and 30. Negative
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition38
0
100
200
300
−6 −3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18UAV delivery charge, q3
Pro
fits
(in
mil
lion
s)
(a) ND=2
−6 −3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18
UAV delivery charge, q3
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
βdc
(b) ND=5
0
100
200
300
−6 −3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18UAV delivery charge, q3
Pro
fits
(in
mil
lion
s)
(c) ND=10
−6 −3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18
UAV delivery charge, q3
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
βdc
(d) ND=30
Figure 10 UAV delivery charge analysis under government regulations and customer delivery charge sensitivity
delivery charge, q3 < 0 may be interpreted as a discount offered by the e-retailer for using UAV
service. Figure 10 plots profits against UAV delivery charge q3 at different levels of delivery charge
sensitivity βdc. As βdc increases, the optimal delivery charge q∗3 decreases. When βdc = 0.05, q∗3 =
$18, irrespective of government regulations. On the other hand, if customers are more sensitive,
for instance when βdc = 1.00, government regulations play a crucial role in pricing decision and
UAV’s added value. Recall the profit margin per unit = απp = 0.30× 20.0 = $6.0. When ND = 2,
cij3 = $12.2. For profits to be positive, q∗3 > 12.2− 6.0 = $6.2. Since customers are highly sensitive
to delivery charge (βdc = 1.00), even at lowest possible q3 = $7, demand is not sufficient to cover
fixed costs and as such, e-retailers do not offer UAV service as shown in Figure 10a. Similarly, for
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition39
●
●
●
●
●●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●0
100
200
300
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00βdc
Pro
fits
(in m
illion
s) ● Without UAVsWith UAVs
(a) ND=2
●
●
●
●
●●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
βdc
(b) ND=5
●
●
●
●
●●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
βdc
(c) ND=10
●
●
●
●
●●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
βdc
(d) ND=30
Figure 11 Profits under optimal UAV delivery charge q∗3
●
●
●
●
●
● ● ● ● ● ●0
5
10
15
20
25
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5βdc
PV
AD
(%)
(a) ND=2
●● ● ● ● ● ●
●
●
●
●
200
400
600
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
βdc
(b) ND=5
● ● ● ● ● ● ●●
●
●
●
0
1000
2000
3000
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
βdc
(c) ND=10
● ● ● ● ● ● ●●
●
●
●
0
3000
6000
9000
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
βdc
(d) ND=30
Figure 12 Customer price sensitvity βdc and PVAD
ND= 5, cij3 = $5.0, and q∗3 >−$1.0. In this case, q∗3 = $0.0 and profits equal $1.9 million as shown
in Figure 10b. For ND = 10 and 30, the optimal delivery charge q∗3 = -$2.0 and -$3.0 respectively.
This shows that government regulations may allow an e-retailer to either offer discounts or force
it to set high UAV delivery charges.
Figure 11 plots e-retailer’s profits at optimal UAV delivery charge q∗3 against βdc for different
values of ND. It is interesting to note that when the e-retailer cannot offer discount over the
retail price (i.e., negative delivery charge), its profits decrease as βdc increases as shown in Figures
11a and 11b. However, for ND = 10 and 30, the profit function is U-curved as shown in Figures
11c and 11d. In fact, e-retailer’s profits are maximized when ND = 30 and customers are most
sensitive to delivery charge. Figure 12a plots PVAD against βdc for ND= 2 and shows that under
strict government regulations, PVAD is maximized when customers are less sensitive to delivery
charges allowing the e-retailer to charge higher prices. UAV service is therefore considered as a
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition40
●
●●
●●
● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ●
10
20
30
40
0 25 50 75 100Travel time sensitivity, βtt
Pro
fits
(in
million
s)
●
Without UAV service
With UAV service
(a) Profits
110%
115%
120%
0 25 50 75 100Travel time sensitivity, βtt
PV
AD
(b) PVAD
Figure 13 Effect of Travel time sensitivity βtt
premium service available to customers who are willing to pay higher delivery charges for a 30-
minute delivery. On the other hand, when government regulations are relaxed, PVAD is maximized
when customers are most sensitive to delivery charges as shown in Figures 12b, 12c, 12d. Relaxed
regulations allow the e-retailer to set lower delivery charges or offer discounts over the retail price
to maximize its profits. As such, UAV service will be accessible to a wide variety of customers.
5.5. Effects of competitive stores
We vary customer utility for in-store shopping by varying travel time sensitivity βtt between 0.0
to 100.0. Figure 13a plots the profits in function of βtt. As βtt increases, the e-retailer’s profit
increases at a decreasing rate. Recall the utility function (2.1), as βtt increases, customer utility
for in-store shopping decreases and the store loses market share. A proportion of the store’s lost
market share is captured by the competing services offered by the e-retailer and the rest is lost
due to the expenditure function (2.3) that allows market shrinkage when overall customer utility
decreases. As βtt increases, the store’s lost sales increase leading to increased market share captured
by the e-retailer which translates into an increase in profits. But as βtt increases, its marginal effect
on the e-retailer’s profits decreases. This is further shown in Figure 13b which plots the percentage
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition41
●
●
●
●●
● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8Delivery time sensitivity, βdt
Pro
fits
(in
million
s) ●
Without UAV service
With UAV service
(a) Profits
0
500
1000
1500
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8Delivery time sensitivity, βdt
PV
AD
(%)
(b) PVAD
Figure 14 Effect of customer delivery time sensitivity βdt
value added by UAVs, PVAD, in function of βtt. Figure 13 suggests that the competitive advantage
of UAV delivery is maximized in regions where customers do not have access to stores at a close
proximity and to time sensitive customers.
5.6. Effects of customer delivery time sensitivity
Since UAVs fly over congested road networks and a single delivery per trip is made, delivery time
is expected to reduce significantly. To study this attractive feature of UAVs, we vary customer
sensitivity to delivery time, βdt and analyze its effects on value-added by UAVs. βdt is varied from
0.0 to 1.9 and the model is solved under scenarios 1 and 2. Figure 14a illustrates the effect of βdt on
e-retailer’s profits under each scenario. As βdt increases, customer utility towards online shopping
decreases exponentially which leads to reduced profits as shown in Figure 14a. Under scenario 1,
when βdt > 0.4, profits equal $0. This is because delivery time sensitive customers prefer in-store
shopping where there is zero delivery time and as such, the e-retailer does not have enough demand
to cover its facility costs. Under scenario 2, the e-retailer is able to earn profits even when βdt = 1.8.
Due to the instant delivery feature of UAVs (30-minutes), time sensitive customers place order
online and opt for UAV service. As shown in Figure 14b, PVAD is maximized when customers are
most sensitive to delivery time. When βdt = 0.0, PVAD is 46% and increases to 1686% at βdt = 0.4.
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition42
This shows that UAV service captures demand from time sensitive customers, which in turn leads
to increased e-retailer profits. It may also allow the e-retailer to enter new markets where demand
was previously low due to time sensitive customers.
6. Analysis of solution algorithm: LAB
We conducted several experiments to study the efficiency of LAB algorithm in solving profit maxi-
mization problems [NP ] by randomly generating nodes over a 1600 km2 square region. The number
of customer demand points |I|= {50,100,150,200,250}. The number of candidate facility locations
|J | = {10,20,30,40,50}. To compute the maximum demand (Nip), each customer zone i ∈ I and
package p∈ P is assigned a weight from a uniform distribution [0,1]. Randomly generated weights
are then used to proportion NYC grocery sales into different customer zones and packages to cal-
culate Nip. We assume λ= 10.0. The facility costs are randomly generated between $1 million to $2
million. High λ and low facility costs are selected to challenge the algorithm with higher demand
values and allow multiple facilities to open. Each instance is solved over two different values of
the number of stores: 10 and 100. All other parameters are the same as used for the base case in
Section 5.1. For a given |I|, |J |, and stores, 10 random instances are generated resulting in a total
of 500 instances.
To validate the effectiveness of the LAB algorithm, we compare its CPU time with the mixed
integer linear reformulation given in Appendix B. LAB is coded in C++ Visual Studio 2013 and all
optimization problems are solved using CPLEX version 12.6.1 on a 64-bit Windows 10 with Intel(R)
core i7-4790 3.60GHz processors and 8.00 GB RAM. Each instance is executed to an optimality
gap of 1e-09 or up to 3600 seconds in CPU time. The results are summarized in Table 4 where
values are reported as the average of all instances for each combination of |I| and |J |. The number
of open facilities is denoted by∑j∈J
Wj. “Iter” denotes the number of iterations carried out by the
LAB algorithm. “Gap” refers to the optimality gap: (UB −LB)/LB. CPU times are reported in
seconds and the ratio of CPU time of IP model and LAB algorithm is denoted by “Time ratio”. Our
algorithm performs significantly better than direct solution of the linear reformulation. On average,
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition43
|J | |I|∑j∈J
Wj LAB algorithm IPTime ratio
Iter Gap CPU time (s) Gap CPU time (s)
10 50 4 4 0.00 0.44 0.00 39.21 8910 100 3 4 0.00 1.46 0.00 210.89 14410 150 3 3 0.00 2.90 0.00 412.82 14210 200 4 4 0.00 5.53 0.00 357.11 6510 250 3 3 0.00 8.79 0.00 673.12 7720 50 4 5 0.00 2.00 0.00 261.44 13120 100 4 5 0.00 4.87 0.00 1174.63 24120 150 4 6 0.00 11.55 0.06 2433.31 21120 200 4 4 0.00 19.37 0.27 3450.15 17820 250 4 4 0.00 27.81 0.54 3602.16 13030 50 4 6 0.00 5.06 0.00 867.75 17130 100 5 4 0.00 11.02 0.26 3467.26 31530 150 4 5 0.00 20.78 0.40 3603.50 17330 200 4 4 0.00 31.26 n/a 3600.84 11530 250 5 4 0.00 41.07 n/a 3600.35 8840 50 4 5 0.00 6.36 0.01 1735.12 27340 100 4 5 0.00 13.60 0.34 3602.16 26540 150 5 3 0.00 23.76 n/a 3600.59 15240 200 5 4 0.00 39.49 n/a 3600.21 9140 250 5 4 0.00 60.15 n/a 3600.20 6050 50 5 5 0.00 8.20 0.10 3174.78 38750 100 5 5 0.00 21.54 n/a 3603.10 16750 150 5 6 0.00 41.23 n/a 3600.14 8750 200 5 5 0.00 59.16 n/a 3600.21 6150 250 5 5 0.00 85.14 n/a 3600.25 42
Average 5 5 0.00 22.10 0.12 2458.85 154
Table 4 Summary of the computational experiments
LAB is 154 times faster than Cplex. Cplex fails to close the gap in 59% of the instances while LAB
solves all instances to optimality within 92 seconds. “n/a” denote instances where Cplex fails to
find a feasible solution in 3600s. Cplex fails to find a feasible solution in 28% of the instances. This
signifies the need for the proposed LAB algorithm to solve large scale instances.
Nb. of servicesIterations
CPU time (s) [SP ] timetotal time
Gap|S| total [MP] [SP]
3 6 50.44 50.19 0.25 0.49% 0.00%
4 4 155.33 154.93 0.40 0.25% 0.00%
5 21 805.46 802.70 2.77 0.34% 0.00%
6 102 2009.78 1990.86 18.92 0.94% 0.00%
Table 5 Effect of the number of services on subproblem’s computational efficiency
To justify the use of enumeration based approach in [SP], we solve industry scale problems by
varying the number of services offered |S|. Note that the world’s largest e-retail company, Amazon
offers a maximum of 6 different delivery services in a single city. For |I|= 200 and |J |= 50, we vary
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition44
the number of services offered |S|, by the e-retailer between 3 and 6. Ten random instances are
generated and results are summarized in Table 5 where average values for each |S| are reported.
[SP] takes less than 1% of the total CPU time as shown in [SP ]time
total timecolumn. Although the CPU
time in [SP] increases with increasing number of services, the effect is not significant. Increasing
|S| results in higher number of iterations and as such, [SP] is solved several times. We note that
it takes less than a second, to solve [SP] at each iteration. The results show that the proposed
enumeration based approach in LAB algorithm works quite well for industry scale instances where
the number of services are generally limited.
7. Conclusions
We used MNL market share model and optimization modelling to study the impact of UAV delivery
on e-retailing. A novel logic-based Benders algorithm is proposed that not only solves the non-
linear model efficiently but allows several possible extensions. We analyzed the tradeoffs between
distribution costs and revenues under varying social resistance to UAVs, customer preferences,
and regulatory and technological limitations. Our results show that these challenges significantly
impact optimal distribution network configuration and UAV target markets. For example, under
the current UAV landing capabilities, a UAV delivery service may not be possible in a densely
populated area like Manhattan where demand for such a service is expected to be high. We found
that under the right technological capabilities and regulations, e-retailers are able to reach smaller
markets and more price sensitive customers possibly by offering discounts on UAV delivered orders.
The modelling and analysis presented in this paper may be used not only by e-retailers but by any
retail business and other stakeholders including regulatory bodies. For instance, regulatory bodies
may use our modelling approach to test regulations on UAV deliveries. One of the weak points of
our work is that customer sensitivity parameters are not explicitly based on customer preference
for UAV delivery, but rather on the literature that explores customer preference for online shopping
versus in-store shopping. Estimating these parameters based on a market survey is important but
is out of the scope of this work. Another extension of our work might be to incorporate charging
stations to extend the range of UAVs at the expense of higher delivery times.
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition45
Acknowledgments
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition46
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
1. Recall equation (2.1) and (2.4). Equation (2.1) says that the utility Uip increases as the number ofservices offered increases. Taking the derivative of Disp with respect to Uip:
∂Disp
∂Uip=−
Nip(1− (exp(−λUip)(λUip + 1)))× (∑j∈J
aspyijs) exp(β0s−βdtDTs−βdcqs)
U2ip
< 0 (A.1)
as λ> 0, Uip > 0, and exp(−λUip)× (λUip+ 1)> 1. Hence, as the number of services offered increases, utilityUip increases which results in decreasing Disp. Therefore, maximum demand that may be captured by services∈ S, Dmax
isp is achieved when only service s∈ S is available i.e., yijs = 1 and yijs′ = 0 ∀ s′ 6= s.2. Using equation (2.4), total demand captured TDip, by the e-retailer is expressed as:
TDip =Nip(1− exp(−λUip))(Uip−USip)
Uip, (A.2)
where USip = exp(β0,n+1 − βttTTi − βtcTCi) and (Uip − USip) ≥ 0, is the utility derived by customer zonei∈ I for package p∈ P given the services offered by the e-retailer. Taking the derivative of TDip with respectto total utility Uip:
∂TDip
∂Uip=Nipe
−λUip(USip(eλUip − 1) +λUip(Uip−USip))
U2ip
> 0 (A.3)
as λ> 0, Uip > 0 , (eλUip−1)> 0, and λUip(Uip−USip)≥ 0. Hence, as Uip increases, TDip increases. Therefore,maximum total demand TDmax
ip , is achieved when the e-retailer offers all services in S to customer zone i∈ Ifor package p∈ P . �
Appendix B: Linear formulation of model NP
Three sets of binary decision variables and one set of continuous nonnegative decision variables are definedas:
tie =
{1, if customer zone i∈ I is offered set of services e∈P(S)
0, otherwise
wj =
{1, if candidate facility j ∈ J is opened
0, otherwise
xjs =
{1, if service s∈ S is offered at facility j ∈ J0, otherwise
dijspe =demand captured by facility j ∈ J using service s∈ S for package p∈ P incustomer zone i∈ I when set of services offered is e∈P(S)
The model NP is transformed into mixed integer program [IP] as:
[IP]: max∑i∈I
∑j∈J
∑s∈S
∑p∈P
∑e∈P(S)
(απp + qs− cijs)dijspe−∑j∈J
∑s∈S
Fsxjs−∑j∈J
Ljwj (B.1)
s.t.∑
e∈P(S)
tie = 1 i∈ I, (B.2)
xjs ≤wj j ∈ J, s∈ S (B.3)
dijspe ≤Mtie i∈ I, j ∈ J, s∈ S,p∈ P, e∈P(S) (B.4)
dijspe ≤Mrijsxijs i∈ I, j ∈ J, s∈ S,p∈ P, e∈P(S) (B.5)∑j∈J
dijspe ≤Dispe i∈ I, s∈ S,p∈ P, e∈P(S) (B.6)
tie ∈ {0,1} i∈ I, e∈P(S) (B.7)
xjs ∈ {0,1} j ∈ J, s∈ S (B.8)
wj ∈ {0,1} j ∈ J (B.9)
dijspe ≥ 0 i∈ I, j ∈ J, s∈ S,p∈ P, e∈P(S) (B.10)
Appendix C: Data used
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition47
Borough Minimum MaximumManhattan 70 100Staten Island 14 21Brooklyn 65 75Queens 14 25Bronx 30 40
Table C1 Yearly Lease Rate ($) per sq. ft in Boroughs
ID Borough Name NTA code Yearly Cost ($)1 Brooklyn BK82 5,000,0002 Queens QN49 2,450,0003 Queens QN01 3,000,0004 Queens QN18 2,700,0005 Staten Island SI11 2,750,0006 Staten Island SI24 2,600,0007 Brooklyn BK28 5,300,0008 Bronx BX13 3,600,0009 Staten Island SI45 2,650,00010 Bronx BX06 3,550,00011 Staten Island SI37 2,450,00012 Manhattan MN24 5,550,00013 Queens QN41 2,700,00014 Brooklyn BK31 5,000,00015 Queens QN53 3,000,00016 Manhattan MN11 6,100,00017 Brooklyn BK81 5,300,00018 Brooklyn BK42 5,250,00019 Brooklyn BK72 5,150,00020 Queens QN70 2,650,000
Average 3,837,500Table C2 Yearly facility Costs
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition48
Parameters Estimated ValueYearly demand of delivery by UAVs Y DAvg hourly demand, H Y D
365×14
maximum hourly demand, Hmax =H × 2.0 Y D365×14
× 2.0
Nb. Of UAVs required, NbUAV s= Hmax
2Y D
365×14× 2× 1
2
Nb.of batteries required, NbBatteries=NbUAV s Y D365×14
× 2× 12
Nb. Of UAVs per operator, ND 10Nb.of operators required per hour NbOperators= Hmax
2×NDYD
365×14× 2× 1
2× 1
10
Nb.of hours an operator works 8Total Nb. of operators required, TotalNbOperators=NbOperators× 14
8Y D
365×14× 2× 1
2× 1
10× 14
8
Costs calculationsCost per UAV 3000Cost per battery 200Total battery cost, BC = 200×NbBatteries Y D
365×14× 2× 1
2× 200
Total UAV cost, DC = 3000×NbUAV s Y D365×14
× 2× 12× 3000
Total purchasing cost,PC =BC +DC (3000 + 200)× Y D365×14
× 2× 12
Amortization rate, r 20%Yearly amortized cost of UAVs & Batteries,AC = r×PC (3000 + 200)× Y D
365×14× 2× 1
2× 0.20
Yearly operators salary 70,000Total yearly operators salary cost,OC = 70000×NbOperators Y D
365×14× 2× 1
2× 1
10× 14
8× 70000
Total yearly costs, TC =AC +OC (3000 + 200)× Y D365×14
× 2× 12× 0.20 + Y D
365×14× 2× 1
2× 1
10× 14
8× 70000
Battery charging cost per delivery(in dollars) 0.10
Cost per delivery, TCYD
((3000+200)× Y D
365×14×2× 12×0.20+ Y D
365×14×2× 12×
110×
148 ×70000
Y D
)+ 0.10
= 0.1252 + 2.397 + 0.10≈ 2.62
Table C3 Detailed calculations for UAV package delivery cost cijn
Baloch and Gzara: UAV service with competition49
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