Upload
pratik-sharma
View
216
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
1/45
STRATEGY FOR COMBATING
TERRORISM
Joseph E. Goldberg
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
National Defense University
Presented to RCNS
July 20, 2009
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
2/45
The Frustration of Defining
Terrorism
We have cause to regret that a legal
concept of terrorism was ever inflicted
upon us. The term is imprecise, it is
ambiguous; and above all, it serves no
operative legal purpose.Richard Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7
Akron Law Review380 (1974)
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
3/45
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
4/45
The Importance of a Definition
The importance of the existing, and proposed,
terrorism conventions lies in the provision of a
framework for the obligations regarding
international cooperation, ensuring, for example,that states are obliged to extradite or prosecute
persons suspected of the offences covered by
them.
Helen Duffy, The War on Terror and theFramework of International Law, (2005)
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
5/45
Department of Defense Definition
of Terrorism
The calculated use of unlawful violence to
inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to
intimidate governments or societies in the
pursuit of goals that are generally political,religious, or ideological.
US Department of Defense, office of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
6/45
U.S. Department of State
Definition of Terrorism
premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against
noncombatant* targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents, usuallyintended to influence an audience
*noncombatant is interpreted to include, in addition to
civilians, military personnel who at the time of the
incident are unarmed and/or not on duty.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
7/45
Al-QaedaThe Organization and the
Movement
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
8/45
Explanations For the Rise of
Terrorism in the Name of Islam Religious Explanations
Islam itself
Reactions to the West
Contention that foreign and economic
policies of Western countries
especially the West-have harmed Islam
Group Reactions
Terrorists are like youthful gang members
operating in an Islamic context.
Root Causes of Terrorism
Poverty and ignorancecoupled with globalization
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
9/45
The Threat of Al-Qaida
al-Qaida has suffered serious setbacks, but itremains a determined, adaptive enemy, unlikeany our nation has ever faced.
al-Qaida today is both resilent and vulnerable. al-Qaida operating from its safe haven in
Pakistans tribal areas remains the most clearand present danger to the safety of the United
States. Former CIA Director Michael Hayden
Address at the Atlantic Council, November 13,2008
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
10/45
Al-Qaidah in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP)
On January 20, 2009 a message was posted ona jihadist forum, Islamic Al-Fallujah,announcedthe formation of a new coalition under a newamir in Yemen, Abu-Basir al-Wahishi
The Abu-Abdullah Usama Bin Ladin Brigade issaid to be the sole Al-Qaida representative inthe Arabian Peninsula.
It is to be based in the Yemen highlandsgeographical conditions which are conducive tosuccessful recruitment and training of jihadists.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
11/45
AQAP2
The Al-Qaidah in the Arabian Peninsula issueda video showing the unity between the twomerged coalition members:from Yemen andSaudi Arabia.
The video was the first appearance of theYemeni leader of the group, Nasir al-Wuhayshi,with his Saudi deputy, Abu-Sufyan al-Azadi al-Shihri (aka Abu-Sayyaf al-Shiri).
Al-Shihri had been a former Guantanomo inmateas was another Saudi member of the leadership.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
12/45
Al-Qaida in Yemen
On January 24, 2009, Abu Osama, a
member of the military council of al-Qaeda
and the commander of the Yemen
Brigades claimed that over 300 youngYemeni men affiliated with al-Qaeda
traveled to Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia
for Jihad in 2008.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
13/45
Al-Qaeda the base
Al-Qaeda was formed in 1988
Among its founders were:
Osama bin Ladin
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
14/45
Osama Bin Laden
Born in Riyadh, Saudia Arabia in 1957
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
15/45
Bin Ladens Background
Son of Muhammad Awad bin Laden, whofounded Saudi Construction andcontracting companies
One of 53 children Mother, Muhammads fourth wife, was a
Syrian.
Educated in Jedda schools before enteringKing Abdul Aziz University where hestudied management and economics.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
16/45
Bin Laden
In 1979, Bin Laden left Saudi Arabia forAfghanistan where he participated in the Jihadagainst the Soviets.
He primarily raised funds In 1984, Bin Laden moved to Peshawar,Pakistan.
Founded the Services Office )Maktab al-
Khidamat) with Dr. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam tofunnel money to the resistance, to recruitfighters, and to train them.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
17/45
Bin Laden
In the late 1980s, Bin Laden broke off from
Azzam and formed Al-Qaeda in 1988.
Dispute with Azzam was over Bin Ladens
desire to export jihad to other areas while
Azzam believed they should concentrate
on supporting Muslims in Afghanistan.
Azzam was murdered in late 1989 by a car
bomb.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
18/45
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam
Spiritual Mentor of Bin Laden
Born in the province of Jenin in the WestBank in 1941
Graduated from Khadorri College, an
agricultural School, and later enrolled inSharia College at Damascus Universitywhere he obtained a B.A. in Islamic Law in1966.
In 1967 he immigrated to Jordan where hefought against Israel
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
19/45
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam
In 1971 Azzam entered Al-Azhar
University in Cairo where he received his
Ph.D. in Principles of Islamic
Jurisprudence in 1973.
Accepted a university position in Saudi
Arabia.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
20/45
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam
Leaves Saudi Arabia for Islamabad,
Pakistan where he is appointed a lecturer
at the International Islamic University.
Resigns to devote himself to jihad and
moves to Peshawar where he founds the
Bait-ul-Ansar(Mujahideen Services
Bureau)
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
21/45
Azzams Theoretical Legacy
Only by means of organized military force would
the Ummah(Islamic Nation) emerge victorious.
Jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no
conferences and no dialogues. Creation of a kind of Islamic internationale
through the recruitment of volunteers throughout
the Muslim world to export the Islamic revolution
to the world at large.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
22/45
Intellectual Fathers of al-Qaeda
Sayyid Qutb
Sayyid Qutb born in Mush, Egypt in 1906
Hanged on August 29, 1966
Major Works: Fi Zalal al-Koran(In theShadow of the Koran); Milestones.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
23/45
Philosophic Roots of Al Qaeda
Sayyid Qutb Early Christianity imported from Greek philosophy
the belief in a spiritual existence completelyseparate from physical life, a zone of pure spirit.
Christianity lost touch with the physical worldits
division of the world into Caesars and Gods put thephysical world in one corner and the spiritual worldin another.
Through revelation, the Prophet Muhammadestablished the correct, nondistorted relation to
human nature. He dictated a new strict legal code which put religion
at ease with the physical world.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
24/45
Sayyid Qutb
The Koran instructed man to take charge of thephysical world.
Through science Islam seized the leadership ofmankind.
The Muslims, however, came under attack fromCrusaders, Mongols, and other enemies. Andbecause the Muslims proved unfaithful toMuhammads revelations, they could not fend offthese attacks.
The Muslim discoveries of science were imported toEurope where modern science emerged in the 16thCentury and Europe dominated the world.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
25/45
Sayyid Qutb
The European way of life brought a sense of drift,purposelessness, and a craving for false pleasures.
Treacherous Muslims inflicted Christianitysschizophrenia on the world of Islam.
The recognition of more than one authorityGodsin the spiritual realm and mans in the physical realmwas a step back into paganism.
European imperialism was a continuation of theMedieval Crusades against Islam.
The conflict between the Western liberal countriesand the world of Islam remains in essence of theideologyreligion was the issue.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
26/45
Sayyid Qutb
The first step is to open peoples eyesMuslims hadto recognize the nature of the danger.
ISLAM HAD COME UNDER ASSAULT FROMOUTSIDE THE MUSLIM WORLD AND ALSO FROM
INSIDE THE MUSLIM WORLD.
THE ASSAULT FROMTHE OUTSIDE WAS LED BYCRUSADERS AND WORLD ZIONISM.
THE ASSAULT FROM THE INSIDE WAS FROMMUSLIMS WHO POLLUTED THE MUSLIM WORLDWITH INCOMPATIBLE IDEAS DERIVED FROMELSEWHERE.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
27/45
Sayyid Qutb
THE VANGUARD OF TRUE MUSLIMS WAS GOINGTO UNDERTAKE THE RENNOVATION OF ISLAMAND OF CIVILIZATION ALL OVER THE WORLD.
SHARIAHWOULD BE REINSTATED AS THE LEGALCODE FOR ALL OF SOCIETY.
IT IS THE ABOLITION OF MAN MADE LAWS.
Paul Berman, The Philosopher of Islamic Terror,The New York Times Magazine( March 23, 2003 )
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
28/45
Bin Ladens May 1998 Fatwa(Published in Al-Quds al-Arabi)
February 23, 1998
The primary reason for the declaration of Jihadagainst Americans is that for over seven years theUnited States has been occupying the lands of Islamin the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula,
plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers,humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, andturning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearheadthrough which to fight the neighboring Muslimpeoples.
The devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people. The American role in serving the Jews petty state
and its occupation of Jeruslaem.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
29/45
Islams Challenge
Source: U.S. Military Academy, Combatting Terrorism Center
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
30/45
Muslims-Islamists-Salafis-Jihadis
Muslimsthe 1.4 billion members of the Islamic faith throughout theworld irrespective of their observance of Islam.
Islamiststhose adherents of Islam who are committed to living theirlives in accordance with sharia, islamic law
.Salafis-derived from as-salaf as-saliheen, the pious predecessors ofthe early Muslim community. They believe that observance of Islamrequires direct access to the Koran and Hadith and the inspirationprovided by the actions and experiences of the Prophet and hisfollowers (salaf al-salih, the righteous ancestors). Most salafists arepietistic who wish to reform society through the reform of individualmores and patterns of behavior. Their emphasis is on teachingondawa, the call to Islam. They preach the strict and literal imitation of
the Prophet and his companions as the model of Islamic society. Jihads-believe that Islam must be defended through armed struggle
and are a minority of Salafists.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
31/45
Jihadists
The links between salafism and jihadism lie in salafi sectarian
hostility to Christians, Jews and Shia and a literalist reading of
the Quran, which contains a scattering of verses that valorizewarfare against unbelievers.
Steven Simon, Haib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow at CFR
Salafi jihad: Those who identify present day Muslim societiesas Jahilyya(the barbaric state of ignorance existing before theProphets revelations) because their leaders refuse to impose
Sharia and true Islamic way of life. Such leaders are viewed as
apostates, deserving death. These salafis advocate the violentoverthrow of these regimes (THE NEAR ENEMY) and to restoreIslam at home before venturing to defeat Israel and the West(THE FAR ENEMY). As advocated by Qutb.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
32/45
Jihadists(Continued)
Global Salafi Jihad: Those salafists who place theirpriority on fighting the far enemy, the West and
specifically the U.S. and Israel, before turningagainst the near enemy. This view is expressed in
bin Ladens 1996 fatwa.
[The distinction between the Salafi jihadists and the GlobalSalafi Jihadists is that of Marc Sageman in his Statement to
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the UnitedStates, July 9,2003.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
33/45
Marc Sagemans Profile of Global Salafi Jihadists(Based on Data from more than 130 members)
Country of Origin
60% come from core Arab countries
Mostly Saudi Arabia and Egypt
30% come from the Maghreb Arab countries
10% come from Indonesia
Socio-Economic Status
Two-thirds from solid upper or middle class backgrounds.
Most of the rest came from the excluded Maghreb immigrants
or second generation in France, as well as Western Christianconverts.
They came from caring intact families.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
34/45
Profile of Global Salafi Jihadists(2)
Religious Background
Indonesians were uniformly religious as children
60% of the Core Arab children were religious
None of the Maghreb Arab children were religious.
Education Backgound
As a group, the terrorists were relatively well educatedwith 60%having some college education.
Only the Indonesian group was almost exclusively educated inreligious schools.
Most had occupational training and only a quarter wereconsidered unskilled with few prospects.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
35/45
Profile of Global Salafi Jihadists(3)
Marital Status
Three quarters were married and the majority had children.
Mental Status
No mental illness was detected in this group or any common
psychological predisposition to terror.
Age of Jihadists
Average age for joining the jihad was 26 years.
The Indonesians joined at a later age (30)
Core Arabs at a younger age (23)
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
36/45
Profile of Global Salafi Jihadists(4)
Context of Joining the Jihad The prospective terrorists joined the jihad through pre-existing social bonds
with people who were already terrorists or had decided to join the group.
Affiliation with the jihad was through FRIENDSHIP, KINSHIP,DISCIPLESHIP AND WORSHIP.
65% of the cases, pre-existing friendship bonds played an important role;homesick young men drift to familiar settings, like mosques, to findcompanionship and alleviate their loneliness. There small clusters offriendship formed spontaneously and they often moved into apartmentstogether.
15% joined the jihad through relatives already in the jihad.
Indonesians were all disciples of Abu Bakar Baasyir and had studied in one ofhis two religious boarding schools.
10% gave religious beliefs as the only reason for joining the jihad.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
37/45
Bin Ladens May 1998 Fatwa(Continued)
All of these crimes and sins committed by the
Americans are a clear declaration of war on God, hismessenger, and Muslims. And ulema havethroughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that
the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroysthe Muslim countries.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
38/45
Issue of the 1998 Fatwato all Muslims:
The ruling to kill the Americans and their alliescivilians and militaryis an individual duty for everyMuslim who can do it in any country in which it ispossible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa
Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and inorder their armies to move out of all the lands ofIslam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
39/45
Al-Qaedas Intentions
Who are the audiences that al-Qaeda
attempts to influence throught speech and
deed?
What are the messages that al-Qaeda
expects these audiences to receive?
What does al-Qaeda expect their
responses to be?
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
40/45
The Audiences
The Islamic World
Muslims, Islamists, Salafists, Jihadists
The Near Enemy
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf States, Turkey,India, Pakistan
The Far Enemy
Israel The United States
Europe and the West
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
41/45
Possible Intent of Al-Qaeda Action
Videos and interviews that are broadcast and publishedare intended: To change the policies of countries allied with the U.S. by
eroding popular support for assisting the U.S. in the war againstterrorism.
Strip allies away from the U.S. and keep it isolated. Bin Ladens November 12, 2002 Speech to American
Allies Claimed attack on the U.S. was due to the killing [of] our sons in
Iraq [through U.N. sanctions] and [because of] what Americasally Israel is doing.
Action would lead U.S. allies to distance themselves. The cost of supporting the U.S. would be al-Qaeda attacks.
Examples: attacks on German tourists in Tunisia and Australiansand Britons in Bali.
Intention of Al-Qaeda Acts
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
42/45
Intentionof Al-Qaeda Acts
Michael Scheuer, Al-Qaeda Doctrine for International Warfare,Terrorism FocusVol. 3, Issue 42 (October 31, 2006)
European populations blamed their political leaders for
Stimulating the attacks by maintaining their policies.
Media blamed P.M. Blairs support for the U.S. following theJuly 2005 metro attacks in London.
Pro U.S. Spanish government defeated after the March 2003attack, and Spain withdrew its forces from Iraq.
Summer 2006 Italian election, P.M. Berlusconis government
was defeated.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
43/45
Possible Results of Al-Qaeda attacks on potential
opponents of the group attacked
Al-Qaeda attacks of September 11thled to the Westsdefeat of the Taliban.
Many al-Qaeda leaders were arrested and killed.
Osama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are inhiding and do not appear to be in control ofoperations which have become franchised to local
groups.
In Europe, the jihadist cause was taken up by home-
grown extremists.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
44/45
Intelligence Analysis of al-Qaeda
On the March, Economist(January 18-24, 2007)
Outgoing DNI John Negroponte said in Congressionaltestimony in January 11, 2006:
Al-Qaedas core leadership was resilient. Itshiding places in Pakistan were secure and it was
cultivating stronger operational connections andrelationships with affiliated groups across theMiddle East, north Africa and Europe.
Testimony is consistent with British Intelligence Chiefs.
In November 2006, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, head of M15, said there were 200 terroristnetworks involving about 1,600 suspects, andinvestigating up to 30 high-priority plots.
7/29/2019 strategy for combating terrorism
45/45
Revitalization of al-Qaeda
EconomistAnalysis Continued
Revitalization partly due to the fact that the pressureis off in North Waziristan and the truce has providedcross-border safe havens for the Taliban.
Concern about blowbacks from Iraq, and hardened
fighters who could wage campaigns elsewhere.
Al-Qaeda has taken a beating in Somalia but theyhave been growing stronger in north Africa.