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Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

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Page 1: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Streeterville GroupM. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller

Defending Against

Users Executing

Malware Code via Email

Page 2: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Case of Confounded Confections, Inc.

Introduction

• Ultra-secure network to protect their sweet secrets:1. Enterprise firewalls.2. Only necessary services with required

authentication.3. Tightly managed systems.

•Anomalies begin to appear.

•CIO wants to know…

Page 3: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Investigation

Why?!Why?!

Page 4: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Quick Review

Risk Analysis

• Risk analysis (quantitative)• Policy• Design• Prevention• Response or countermeasures• Implementation• Control• Rinse and repeat...

Page 5: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Classifications

• State of hosts: susceptible, infected, quarantined, recovered, transmitted, and healthy.

•  Size of host population: small (binomial), large (poisson).

• Diversity of hosts (mix of operating systems)

• Weight of susceptibility

• Weight of business value

Risk Analysis

Page 6: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Risk Analysis

Page 7: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

General Cost of Malware

• Paradigm shift to more indirect costs than direct costs overall.

• Largest expenses:

• Staff hours for support.• Staff hours from downtime.

• Hardware, software, vendor support and IT training.

• Legal, human resources, and training.

Risk Analysis

Page 8: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Design Solutions

• Layered schema for malware detection.

• Prevention by inspection at various points at the edge and perimeter.

• ClamAV (open source hardware solution)

• Microsoft perspective (proprietary software solution)

• Future approaches at the edge or perimeter (next sections)

Prevention at the Edge and Perimeter

Page 9: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Prevention at the Edge and Perimeter

Layered Protection Microsoft Approach

Page 10: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Exploitations

Responding to User Actions: Clicking on Links

Drive-By Downloads

o Exploit browser vulnerabilities.

JavaScript/ECMAScript

Content Parsing

o Exploit vulnerabilities in browser add-ons.

Flash

Adobe Reader

Java

Page 11: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Countermeasures

Responding to User Actions: Clicking on Links

• DNS Blacklistingo Used by spam filtering software.o Repurposed to everyday DNS.o Prevent access to sites known to host

malware.o 11.25¢ per user/year.

• SSL Proxy with malcode detectiono Prevent all malcode delivery.o Including within encrypted sessions.

Page 12: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Prevention—Human Factor

Responding to User Actions: Clicking on Links

• User Trainingo Detect Suspicious emails.o Close Browser if concerned.

• Acceptable Use Policyo Discourage promiscuous behavior.o "Scare tactic" heightens stakes.

• Ongoing Communicationo Ongoing remediation costs = foregone

benefits.o Reinforce desired behavior.

Page 13: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Mitigation—Technical Approaches

Responding to User Actions: Clicking on Links

• Application Selectiono Remove Adobe Reader: 55% of all attacks.o Remove IE6, 5% of all attacks.

• Update policieso Use Microsoft Group Policy 

Update MS products automatically.o Communicate & inform userso Perform software audits 

Not feasible in decentralized networks.

Page 14: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Mitigation—Human Factor

Responding to User Actions: Clicking on Links

• User cooperation

o Accept new updates

o Don't install unknown plugins

• Vendor support

o Push updates to all clients

o Centralized patch level monitoring

o Create vendor compliance standards

Page 15: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Antivirus Signatures

Responding to User Actions: Opening Attachments

o Typical approachBit-by-bit signatures (a.k.a. "hash")

o New approachBehavioral signature

o InfluenceScript Kiddies

o Policy and enforcementAdditional software may be requiredPerformance hitInstrumentation, Legacy systems

Page 16: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Policies and Enforcement

Responding to User Actions: Opening Attachments

• Antivirus/OS update policies and procedureso Responses to malware/vulnerabilities, a.k.a.

Patcheso Admins: greater freedom/power or computer

securityo If users choose when to update...o If admin chooses when to update...o "Managed" antivirus software

Shows who is doing what: Privacy issues• Distributed Support System

o Typical of universitieso Policies and enforcement up to non-IT personnel

Page 17: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

OS Countermeasures

Responding to User Actions: Opening Attachments

• User privilege managemento Usually centralized

Environment and staff affect leniencyResearch environment requires more user privilegesLess IT staff requires more user privileges

Requirements, Reactions & RiskUsers have different tasks, downtime, productivity requirements

• Vendor/Instrumentation/Legacy computerso Limited support, no software patching (Vendor not liable)o Various versions of antivirus softwareo User POV

Updating is confusing, lengthy, slower computer and system re-boot

Page 18: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Execution and Service Management

Responding to User Actions: Opening Attachments

• OS's require password authorization before executiono Protects against "accidentally" installing unwanted

softwareo Users can enter password and move on

• DEP & ASLRo Windows XP SP2, Mac OS Xo Effective as individual solutiono Exploits written for IE8 and Firefox (Mac & Win)o Defense-in-Depth: Makes exploits slower

Layering defenses: more obstacles, more opportunities

Page 19: Streeterville Group M. Aghajanian, M. Blackburn, T. Heller Defending Against Users Executing Malware Code via Email

Future Approaches

• Network level sandboxo Users adept to waiting for emails

• Deep-scanning email clientso Number of cores/cpu's growing & Privacy issues 

• Research: Extent of malware coders sharing/upgrading malware

• Executable signatures• Non IT Policies

o High level policies (HIPPA, SOX)Cause more IT support funding and detailForce everyone to abide (legal consequences)

• Northwestern Universityo Proactive policies, training

Responding to User Actions: Opening Attachments