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8/18/2019 Structuralism, Hermenuetics and Contextual Meaning
1/25
Oxford University Press and American Academy of Religion are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extendaccess to Journal of the American Academy of Religion.
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merican cademy of Religion
Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Contextual MeaningAuthor(s): Elizabeth Struthers MalbonSource: Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 207-230Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1463635Accessed: 07-08-2015 07:14 UTC
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8/18/2019 Structuralism, Hermenuetics and Contextual Meaning
2/25
Journal
of
the
American
Academy
of
Religion,
LI/2
Structuralism,Hermeneutics,
and
Contextual
Meaning
Elizabeth Struthers
Malbon
erhaps
one should
begin
by
defining
one's terms.
But,
were I to
attempt
to
define structuralism and
hermeneutics
carefully,
completely,
and in a
way
that would
satisfy
all-or even
most-
structuralists
or
hermeneuticists,
I fear
I
would never move
beyond
this
beginning.
Thus,
although
I
shall not
begin entirely
in mediis
rebus,
I
must assume some
experience
of
the
workings
of
structuralism and of
hermeneutics.
I
regard
structuralism and hermeneutics as
approaches
to
meaning,
as
ways
of
investigating
the
significance
of
things -from
individual texts to whole cultures-and the significance of significance.
My
present
task is
to
compare
and contrast these two
approaches
to
meaning-structuralism
and
hermeneutics-by
considering especially
their
goals,
or end
points,
and their
presuppositions,
or
beginning
points.
Although
my
references will be
chiefly
to
approaches
to
meaning
in
biblical
studies,
I
wish to understand
in
a more
general way
the contexts
in
which structuralism and
hermeneutics
seek
meaning
and seek to
make
meaning.
Relations between structuralism and hermeneutics are often implied
in
the characterization of either
structuralism
or
hermeneutics. For
example,
Robert
Culley,
in
characterizing
structuralism,
presents
a
model of the three focal
points
of
scholarly
approaches
to
biblical
texts:
author,
text,
reader./1/
According
to
this
model,
the author is the
shared
focal
point
of
source
criticism;
the
text
is the focus of
rhetorical
criticism
and structural
analysis;
the
reader is the
focus of biblical
hermeneutics
(167-69).
Thus
Culley's
model
indicates a
fundamental
difference
between structuralism
and hermeneutics. A
model
presented by
Robert
Polzin,
on the other
hand,
suggests
a
fundamental
similarity
between
structuralism and hermeneutics:
self-conscious awareness of the
role of
Elizabeth StruthersMalbon
(Ph.D.,
Florida
State
University)
s
AssistantProfes-
sor of
Religion
at
Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and
State
University.
She
is
the
author
of
articles
in
Semeia,
Catholic Biblical
Quarterly,
and
New
Testament
Studies. This
paper
was
first
presented
to the
American
Academy
of
Religion
at
its
annual
meeting
in
1981.
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8/18/2019 Structuralism, Hermenuetics and Contextual Meaning
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208
Journal
of the American
Academy
of
Religion
the
subject,
the
analyst,
in
the
analysis./2/
Since
Polzin's
subject
is
related to
Culley's
reader,
Polzin's stress on this
aspect
of structuralism
that is shared with hermeneutics undercuts Culley's suggestion that
structuralism
is
distinguished by
its focus on the text from
hermeneutics
with
its
focus on the reader.
Perhaps
Culley's
model
overemphasizes
the
distinction between
structuralism
and
hermeneutics,
whereas
Polzin's
argument
overemphasizes
their
commonality.
What
is needed is a
way
both to
compare
and to contrast structural-
ism and hermeneutics as
approaches
to
meaning.
Toward that
end,
the
first
step
of
my investigation
involves
an examination and classification
of the
respective-and various-goals
of
structuralists and of hermeneu-
ticists. Goals are the
projected
end
points
of
investigators,
the
why
of
investigations.
Thus,
a
comparison
of
structuralist and hermeneutical
goals
should
help
us
establish
the
scope
of
each
of
these two
approaches
to
meaning.
After a brief look at the
basis
of
structuralism,
we
will turn
to
a
systematization
of several
important
goals
of
structuralists. Then we
will
repeat
this
procedure
with
regard
to
hermeneutics
and
the
goals
of
hermeneuticists.
Structuralism, Structuralists,
and
Goals
Historically,
structuralism,
particularly literary
structuralism,
is
rooted in
Saussurean
linguistics. Conceptually,
structuralism is
centered
in
concern for
relations,
or
networks of
relations,
rather
than isolated
elements.
Ferdinand de
Saussure,
Swiss
linguist
of
the late nineteenth
and
early
twentieth
century,
is acclaimed
the
grandfather
of
structur-
alism
(Bovon:8),
its
founding
father
(Lane:27);
and
Saussure's
Course
in General Linguistics, first published in 1915 on the basis of the lecture
notes
of
his
students,
is
proclaimed
the
magna
carta of
modern struc-
tural
linguistics
(Polzin:17).
The crux of
de
Saussure's
theory
... is
the
role of
relations
in
a
system
.
.
. ;
for
signs,
as
for
phonemes,
to be is to
be
related
(Wells:97).
A
linguistic
sign
itself is a
relation-between a
signifier,
or
sound-image,
and
a
signified,
or
concept.
Language
is a
system
of
signs.
Before
Saussure,
traditional
linguistics
focused on
dia-
chronic
analysis,
the
study
of
changes
in
language
over
time. Saussure's
insistence
on
the
priority
of
synchronic analysis,
the
investigation
of
the
structure of
language,
revolutionized
linguistics.
Also
seminal for the
history
and the
concepts
of
structuralism was
Vladimir
Propp,
Russian
folklorist,
whose
Morphology
of
the Folktale
has
quite
rightly
been
termed the
exemplar par
excellence of
syntag-
matic
structural
exegesis
(Dundes:xi).
In his
study
of
Russian
fairy
tales,
Propp
isolated
thirty-one
functions
(or
types
of
actions)
and seven
spheres
of
action
(or
character
types)
that
remain
constant
amid
the
varying
details of the
stories.
Although
Propp
did not
discover
every
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8/18/2019 Structuralism, Hermenuetics and Contextual Meaning
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Malbon: Structuralism
209
function manifest
in
every
tale,
he did
find the order
(syntagm)
of the
functions
in the narratives
to be invariable.
Propp's
important
contribu-
tion was, in the words of Susan Wittig, his typically Formalist proposal
that the
description
of
a
tale's
invariant
structural features is a
more
appropriate
mode of
analysis
than
the
description
of the variable
content
which
manifests the structure
(152).
Whereas
Propp
serves as a
representative
of
syntagmatic
structural
analysis,
the
champion
of
paradigmatic
structural
analysis
is
Claude
Levi-Strauss
(Dundes:xii).
It is
the
contemporary
French cultural
anthropologist
Claude Levi-Strauss
who is
generally
regarded
as
the
father of structuralism
(Bovon:8; Pettit:68),
the
archetypal high priest
of
structuralism
(Polzin:41).
To Levi-Strauss
goes
as
well
the dubious
honor of
being
perhaps
the best-known and least understood structural-
ist
(Polzin:17).
His
work is heralded as the most extended and
system-
atic
application
of structuralist methods and the structuralist vision to
human
phenomena
(Lane:12).
Levi-Strauss's
work
may
be
interpreted
as
both
an
extension
of
Saussure and a correction of
Propp.
Following
Saussure,
Levi-Strauss insists
upon
the
primacy
of relations
between
terms
(Culler:23).
These
relations are
underlying
or
implicit
relations
through
which
things
can function as
signs
or as
language
and which the
structuralist aims
to
make
explicit
(Culler:25).
Yet
the
language
to
which
Levi-Strauss
applies
this central
concept
is not
natural
language
(the
linguistic
phenomenon
of
langue)
but the
language
of
kinship
(Le vi-Strauss, 969)
or the
language
of
myth
(1969-81).
These cultural
languages,
like
langue
itself,
have two dimensions: the
syntagmatic
and
the
paradigmatic. Against
Propp,
Levi-Strauss
argues
for
(1)
the
greater
significance
of the
paradigmatic
dimension of narratives
(tales,
myths)
over their syntagmatic dimension and (2) the importance of the ethno-
graphic
context
of narratives to their overall
significance
and
clarity
(see
Wittig:153-58).
We
turn
now
from
this
briefest of looks
at structuralism's
foundation
on
the concern
for
relations,
or
networks of
relations,
to a
systematization
of
several
important
goals
of structuralism's
adherents or
practition-
ers. /3/
I
employ
the two terms
adherents
and
practitioners
advisedly,
for
structuralism in
its broadest sense
may
aim
toward
either
ideology
or
methodology. These two basic directions are not unique to structuralism,
but
common to intellectual
movements
generally;
they
represent
what
Michael Lane
(13)
refers
to,
although
with
somewhat different
labels,
as
the two
categories
of
the means
that men
employ
to
order
their
universe. /4/
By ideology-or
philosophy
if
its
connotations are less
abrasive/5/-is
meant
any
more or less
consistent
system
of beliefs and
values which
describes and accounts for
the relations of
men to one
another,
and
to
the
material,
and not
infrequently
the
immaterial,
uni-
verse
(13)./6/
Structuralism as an
ideology
or
philosophy
is,
in
the
words
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8/18/2019 Structuralism, Hermenuetics and Contextual Meaning
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210
Journal
of the American
Academy
of
Religion
of Robert
Scholes,
a
way
of
looking
for
reality
not in individual
things
but
in
relationships
among
them
(4).
By way
of an
example,
Levi-
Strauss's desire to understand the structure of the human mind from an
examination of
its cultural
products,
his
discovery
of vast
homologies
(Bovon:11),
represents
an
ideological
(or
philosophical)
goal
of
structuralism.
By methodology
is meant
any
set of rules or
regulations
which describes and
prescribes
the
operations
to
be
performed upon
any
matter
.
.
.
with
the
purpose
of
ordering
it and
understanding
its
working
(Lane:13).
Most
structuralists view structuralism as a
methodol-
ogy, although
they may
recognize
that
its
basic
presuppositions
are
philosophical (Lane:13,17;
Patte, 1976:14,19; Bovon:6-7; Ehrmann:ix;
Via:1;
Gardner:10).
I
offer this distinction between
ideology
and method-
ology
as a
descriptive
one,/7/
not as an evaluative
one,
although
ideol-
ogy,
or
its
equivalent,
generally
serves as the
negatively
valued
pole
among
commentators on
structuralism./8/
In
fact,
neither
ideology
nor
methodology
is manifest
concretely
in
total isolation-in structuralism or
in
any
intellectual
movement
(Lane:13).
But,
speaking
abstractly,
structuralism
as
a
methodology may
be said
to focus
upon
either
theory
or
analysis./9/
Structuralism as
theory may
be directed to various issues: a
theory
of Russian
fairy
tales
(Propp),
a
theory
of
kinship
or of
myth
(Levi-Strauss),
a
theory
of
narrativity
(Grei-
mas).
In
the field of
literature,
theoretical
structuralism
approaches
not
so much
the
meaning
of
individual works of
literature
as
the
meaning
of
meaning,
that
is,
the
presuppositions
that enable
literature
to
be
written
and to be
read;
theoretical structuralism seeks
not so much
to
tell
the
meaning
as to
recreate
the
process
of
meaning
(cf.
Spivey:185;
Culler:
30-85).
From
this
description,
the
reverberations between
theory
and
ideology should be loud and clear; in somewhat simplistic terms, ideol-
ogy may
be understood
as
theory
(or theories)
further
abstracted and
further
generalized.
In
the other
direction,
theory
is resonant with
analysis,
for
analysis
is
applied
theory.
In
the field of
literature,
structuralism as
analysis
focuses
upon
the
meaning
of individual
works,
although
this
meaning
must be
con-
sidered
(theoretically)
as a subset of the
meaning
of
meaning.
Structural-
ism as
analysis
is
concerned not
just
with the
what
of
individual
meaning,
but
with the how of individual
meaning.
Observers
have
noted that
struc-
turalism as
theory
appears
dominant
over structuralism as
analysis
(e.g.,
Lane:38; Culler:34;
Jacobson:157;
Detweiler:118);
some
commentators
have even
identified structuralism
as
theory
with structuralism
per
se./10/
Since theoretical
hypotheses
offer
starting
points
for
analysis,
theoretical
dcminance
may
be a mark of
structuralism's
youth;
if
so,
signs
of
matura-
tion
(or
aging, depending
upon
the
point
of
view)
may
be
discerned in
an
increasing
number of
analytical
studies.
However,
theory
and
analysis,
like
ideology
and
methodology,
are
separable
only
in
the
abstract./11/
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Malbon:
Structuralism
211
Just
as structuralism
as
methodology
bifurcates into
theory
and
anal-
ysis,
so
structuralism
as
analysis
subdivides
into
structural
exegesis
and
narrative hermeneutics. In relation to philosophy (or ideology), both
theory
and
analysis
are forms
of
methodology./12/
In
relation
to
theory,
both
structural
exegesis
and
narrative hermeneutics
are
forms
of
analysis.
As
theory
is,
in
a
sense,
applied
philosophy,
so structural
exegesis
is the-
ory
applied
to an
object
(a
text)
and
narrative hermeneutics is
struc-
tural
exegesis
applied
to a
subject
(a reader). /13/
Edgar McKnight's
book on the
interrelationships
of hermeneutics
and
structuralism,
from
which I
have
borrowed the term narrative
hermeneutics,
well
repre-
sents this goal of structuralism. Structural exegesis as a goal
of
structural-
ism has been the aim of much of
my
research
(Malbon,
1979;
1980;
1982;
198?).
structuralist
goals
philosophy methodology
(or ideology)
theory analysis
structural
narrative
exegesis
hermeneutics
These
four-philosophy
(or
ideology), theory,
structural
exegesis,
narrative
hermeneutics-may
be considered terminal
goals
of
structural-
ism;/14/
a
structuralist
may
choose
any
one of them as
her
or his ulti-
mate
goal, though
she or he
may
reach it
via another
goal
(or
goals)
as
penultimate./15/
Thus,
in the
Mythologiques
(1969-81),
Levi-Strauss
moves from
an
analysis
of individual
myths
(structural
exegesis)
to a
theory
of
myth
to an
ideological
(or
philosophical)
understanding
of
what makes
humanity
human. In Structural
Exegesis:
From
Theory
to
Practice, Daniel Patte and Aline Patte move from a semiotic
theory
to a
structural
exegesis
of Mark
15 and
16
toward
a narrative
hermeneutic.
In
actuality,
both
Levi-Strauss
and Patte and Patte move
back and
forth
between
goals,
or
forms,
of
structuralism
in the
process
of
discovering
meaning.
However,
their
respective
directions and ultimate
goals
are clear:
Levi-Strauss
moves
toward
ideology,
Patte and
Patte toward
hermeneutics.
Yet
ideology
and
narrative hermeneutics are not
as
unrelated as
they
might
appear
from
the
diagram
above.
The
desire to
philosophize
on
the basis of
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212
Journal
of the
American
Academy
of
Religion
ethnography
is not unlike
the desire to
theologize
on the basis
of
narratology. Ideology,
in
its
philosophical aspects,
and
narrative herme-
neutics, in its theological aspects, share a concern for the breadth of
humanity
and the
depth
of human
beings./16/
It is true that the
contin-
uum
might
be
represented
as a
line,
running
from
ideology
to narrative
hermeneutics. But
it
might
better be
represented
as a
circle,
in which
ideol-
ogy
and narrative hermeneutics would not
be
poles apart
but
only
ninety
degrees
apart.
Furthermore,
such a circle
might
better
depict
the
move-
ment
among goals
that often characterizes
interpreters.
Thus,
my
typology
of structuralist
goals
is not meant to
pigeonhole
scholars or to
portray
as
static the
dynamism
of
scholarship,
but to clar-
ify
the basic
thrust
of various
approaches.
We
turn now
from this consid-
eration
of structuralist
goals
to a
parallel
consideration of
hermeneutical
goals,
in
our
attempt
to interrelate these
two
fundamental
approaches
to
meaning.
Hermeneutics,
Hermeneuticists,
and
Goals
Richard
Palmer,
James
Robinson,
and others
open
their discussions of
hermeneutics with considerations of the various meanings of the Greek
verb hermeneuein and its noun
form hermaneia
(Palmer:12-32;
Robin-
son:1-7;
Achtemeier:13-14).
The words share a
linguistic
root with the
name of the
Greek
god
Hermes,
the
messenger
of
the
gods
and
the inventor
or
discoverer of
language
and
writing.
The three basic
meanings
of
hermp-
neuein are:
(1)
to
speak
(or
express
or
say),
(2)
to
explain
(or
interpret
or
comment
upon),
(3)
to translate. As
Palmer
notes,
all three
meanings
may
be
expressed
by
the
English
verb 'to
interpret,'
yet
each
constitutes
an
independent and significant meaning of interpretation (13-14). Since the
ancient
Greeks,
each of these
three
meanings
has
found its
applications
by
various
hermeneuticists.
Hermeneutics
as
speaking
has included not
only
the oral recitation of
Homer's
epics
but also
the
proclamation
demanded
by
the new
hermeneutic.
Hermeneutics as
commentary
has a
long
and
varied
history
in
biblical
exegesis,
from
third-century
Alexandrian
allegor-
ization to
nineteenth-century
historical-critical method.
Hermeneutics
as
translation
may
be seen
not
only
literally
in
traditional
philology
but also
metaphorically
in
Bultmannian
demythologizing.
Yet
one
may note,
with
Palmer,
that
in
all
three cases
the
foundational 'Hermes
process'
is
at
work: in
all
three
cases,
something foreign,
strange,
separated
in
time,
space,
or
experience
is
made
familiar,
present,
comprehensible;
something
requiring
representation,
explanation,
or
translation
is
somehow
'brought
to
understanding'-is
'interpreted'
(14).
It is
the new
hermeneutic,
claims
Robinson,
that has
regained
and
reexpressed
the
profound
implication
that
these three
functions
belong together
as
interrelated
aspects
of a
single
hermeneutic
(16).
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Malbon:
Structuralism
213
From these
three definitions-and
implications-of
the ancient
Greek
hermaneuein,
Palmer
moves to six modern
definitions
of hermeneutics
(33-45). From the beginning, comments Palmer, the word has denoted
the science
of
interpretation, especially
the
principles
of
proper
textual
exegesis,
but,
Palmer
adds,
the field
of hermeneutics has been
inter-
preted
(in
roughly chronological
order)
as:
(1)
the
theory
of biblical
exege-
sis;
(2)
general
philological methodology;
(3)
the
science
of all
linguistic
understanding
[Schleiermacher]; (4)
the
methodological
foundation
of
Geisteswissenschaften
[or
human
studies ;
Dilthey];
(5)
phenomenology
of existence
and of existential
understanding
[Heidegger
and
Gadamer];
and
(6)
the
systems
of
interpretation,
both
recollective and
iconoclastic,
used
by
man to reach the
meaning
behind
myths
and
symbols
[Ricoeur]
(Palmer:33).
Furthermore,
Palmer draws the
important
conclusion that
each
of these definitions
is
more than an historical
stage;
each
points
to
an
important
'moment' or
approach
to the
problems
of
interpretation
(33).
Thus the six modern
definitions,
in
conjunction
with
the three ancient
ones,
seem to
suggest
various
goals
toward which
particular
hermeneuti-
cists
may
aim. The basic
shape
of the
typology
of structuralist
goals
appears
to serve also for
outlining
hermeneutical
goals,
thus
facilitating
our
comparison
of these two basic
approaches
to
meaning.
Hermeneutics
as
speaking
(or
proclamation)
moves
toward
philosophy
(or
theology).
Hermeneutics as
commentary
(or
explanation)
aims at
methodology,
either
in
a
general
sense as
theory,
or
in
a
specific,
analytical
(applied)
sense as
biblical
exegesis.
Hermeneutics as
translation-and
this
is
particularly
clear with
the
new
hermeneutic-sets its
sights
on
existential
understanding.
hermeneutical
goals
philosophy
methodology
(or
theology)
theory
analysis
biblical
existential
exegesis
understanding
In
relation to
philosophy,
both
theory
and
analysis
are
forms
of
methodology.
In
relation to
theory,
both
biblical
exegesis
and
existential
understanding
are forms
of
analysis.
As
theory
is,
in
a
sense,
applied
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214
Journal
of
the American
Academy
of
Religion
philosophy,
so
biblical
exegesis
is
theory applied
to
a
so-called
object
(a text)
and existential
understanding
is
biblical
exegesis
applied
to a
so-
called subject (a reader). These four-philosophy (or theology), theory,
biblical
exegesis,
existential
understanding-may
be considered terminal
goals
of
hermeneutics;
a hermeneuticist
may
choose
any
one of them
as
her
or
his ultimate
goal, though
she or he
may
reach
it via
another
goal
(or
goals)
as
penultimate.
As a check
on
the
valididty
and usefulness of this
typology,
let
us
consider the
place
within it of several
important
hermeneuticists. It
would seem that
the
contrast
between the work of
Heidegger
and Gada-
mer on the one hand and of
Schleiermacher, Dilthey,
and Betti on
the
other
represents
a
contrast
between
philosophy
and
methodology
as her-
meneutical
goals.
Palmer
notes
a
clear
polarization
in
contemporary
hermeneutical
thinking:
There
is
the tradition of
Schleiermacher
and
Dilthey,
whose adherents
look to
hermeneutics
as
a
general
body
of
methodological
principles
which underlie
interpretation.
And there are
the followers of
Heidegger,
who
see hermeneutics as
a
philosophical
exploration
of the
character
and
requisite
conditions
for all
understand-
ing
(46,
my
emphasis).
As a
comparison
of the
thought
of
Hans-Georg
Gadamer and Emilio Betti makes
plain,
however,
having
or not
having
philosophy
as
a
goal
of
hermeneutics does not deliver a hermeneuticist
from
philosophical presuppositions;
the
conflict
of
Betti's realist
pre-
suppositions
and Gadamer's
phenomenological
ones
is
in addition to
the contrast of their
methodological
or
philosophical
goals
(see
Palmer:
46-65)./17/
The hermeneutical
goals
of
archetypical
new
hermeneuticists Ger-
hard
Ebeling
and Ernst Fuchs
might
be
expressed
as either
philosophy
or theology. The proponents of the new hermeneutic, as Achtemeier
notes,
in
some
instances,
are
quite prepared
to invade the
precincts
of
philosophy,
so broad
is
their
understanding
of
the
implications
of their
approach.
The
new
hermeneutic is
therefore not limited to
exegesis;
it is
a
way
of
doing theology,
and
it
will
be better
understood
if
that is
kept
in
mind
(86-87;
cf.
Robinson:6,63,67).
Both
Ebeling
and
Fuchs,
Palmer
observes,
have made the
word event the center of their
theolog-
ical
thinking,
which has been
labeled 'word-event
theology'
(53).
The
effect of the word
event emphasis in theology, Palmer continues, is to
bring
philosophy
of
language
to the
very
center of hermeneutics
(54).
Philosophy
(or
theology)
and
methodology
comprise
the first branches
of the
tree
of
hermeneutical
goals;
the second
branches are
theory
and
analysis
as forms
of
methodology.
The
theory/analysis
option
of
my
typology
of
hermeneutical
goals
appears
to
parallel
what
Palmer terms
the
double focus of hermeneutics.
According
to
Palmer,
the historical
development
of
hermeneutics as an
independent
field seems to hold within
itself two
separate
foci: one on the
theory
of
understanding
in a
general
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Malbon:Structuralism
215
sense,
and the
other
on what
is
involved
in the
exegesis
of
linguistic
texts,
the
hermeneutical
problem.
These
two foci
need
not be either self-
canceling or absolutely independent, yet they are best held in sufficient
separateness
for
one
to
instruct
the other
(67).
By way
of
an
example,
we
noted above
that Schleiermacher
and
Dilthey
are to be associated
with
the
hermeneutical
goal
of
methodology
rather
than
philosophy;
methodology,
however,
is not a terminal
goal
within
the
typology;
and both Schleier-
macher and
Dilthey
are
to be associated with the
theory
option
of
methodology
rather than the
analysis
option.
In Palmer's
words,
herme-
neutics is true
to
its
great
past
in
Schleiermacher and
Dilthey
when
it takes
its
bearings
from a
general theory
of
linguistic understanding (68, my
emphasis).
Theory,
however,
as
a
goal
of
hermeneutics,
might
be
concentrated
on a
number
of
areas:
a
theory
of
language
(Schleiermacher
and
Dilthey),
a
theory
of
approaches
unique
to the human sciences
(Dilthey),
a
theory
of
literary
interpretation
(Palmer:220-53).
The direct alternative to
theory
as
a hermeneutical
goal
is
analysis.
Analysis,
however,
does not
represent
a
terminal
goal
in
my typology
of
hermeneutical
goals
but
suggests
in
turn the final
option
of biblical exe-
gesis
or
existential
understanding. Again my
distinction
is
paralleled-in
overall
significance
if not in
specific
terminology-by
a distinction
pointed
out
by
Palmer. The
distinction
I
see between
biblical
exegesis
and existential
understanding
is
comparable
to
the
distinction Palmer
observes
between the moment of
understanding
an
object
in
terms of
itself and
the moment of
seeing
the
existential
meaning
of the
object
for
one's own life
and future
(56).
While
the most
traditional definition
of
hermeneutics is
probably
the
theory
of
interpretation,
the most tradi-
tional
goal
of
hermeneuticists
in
the field of
religion
throughout
the
long
history of hermeneutics is probably biblical exegesis. By the opening of
the
nineteenth
century,
as Achtemeier
notes,
the terms
hermeneutics
and
exegesis
were
often
used
interchangeably
(Achtemeier:14).
How-
ever,
in
the twentieth
century-to
a certain
extent with
Bultmann and
more
fully
with the new
hermeneutic-the
goal
of
biblical
exegesis
has
been
overwhelmed
by
the
insistent
emphasis
on
existential
understand-
ing,
on
biblical
exegesis pro
nobis,
pro
me. As
John
Cobb notes:
In
the
new
hermeneutic
what is
interpreted
is
ultimately
and
decisively
the
existence of the hearer of the proclamation. The text, rather than being
the
object
of
interpretation,
as
with
Bultmann,
becomes
an
aid
in
the
interpretation
of
present
existence
(Cobb:229-80;
cf.
Robinson:52 and
McKnight:77-78).
Bultmann serves
as a
good
reminder,
however,
that
the
typology
of
hermeneutical
goals
is
not to be
viewed as static.
Certainly
Bultmann
shares much with
the
philosophical
hermeneutics
of
Heidegger
(see
Palmer:48-52;
Achtemeier:53-70;
Thiselton:
especially
227-84;
McKnight:
65-71)
and with
the
methodological
or theoretical
hermeneutics of
Dilthey
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11/25
216
Journal
of
the
American
Academy
of
Religion
(see
Thiselton:234-40;
McKnight:65-71).
Clearly,
Bultmann the
preacher
and New Testament
scholar
is concerned with biblical
exegesis
(see
Palmer:50), but, equally clearly, Bultmann the demythologizer and New
Testament
theologian
aims at existential
understanding
of the biblical text
(see
Palmer:56).
Thus,
while
theology
(or
philosophy),
theory,
and biblical
exegesis
are for Bultmann
penultimate
goals
of
hermeneutics,
the ultimate
goal
is existential
understanding./18/
Yet,
as we observed
analogously
of
the
typology
of structuralist
goals,
the continuum from
theology
(or
philosophy)
to
theory
to biblical
exegesis
to existential
understanding
might
well
be
represented
as a
circle,
with existential
understanding
moving
toward
theology. Certainly
this movement is
descriptive
of
Bultmann's
exegesis
of
Paul and
John
for twentieth-century persons
as
part
of a
comprehensive
theology.
The
sketching
out of
parallel
typologies
of
structuralist and
hermeneu-
tical
goals
suggests
that,
in terms
of
their end
points,
certain
structuralists
may
have more
in
common
with
certain hermeneuticists than with
other
structuralists,
and vice versa. For
example,
those structuralists most
interested
in narrative
hermeneutics and those hermeneuticists most
con-
cerned
with
existential
understanding might
view
each other as
colleagues
in a common endeavor as
against
their more theoretical associates on
either
side.
Those
very
associates,
however,
whether structuralist
or
hermeneutical
theorists,
may
welcome closer association as
they
aim at
theoretical clarification rather than
simply
applied
analysis.
To
remind
us of what structural
theorists have
in
common with structural
exegetes,
and
hermeneuticists of one
emphasis
with
those of
another,
we
turn from a
consideration of end
points,
or
goals,
to a brief
consideration of
beginning
points,
or
presuppositions.
We will
concentrate on structuralist
and
hermeneutical presuppositions in two key areas:history and language.
The
Historical,
the
Historic,
and
Historicity
Norman
Perrin,
in an aside to his
discussion of the
New Testament
as
myth
and
history,
suggests
three
centers of
meaning
of the term his-
tory
(27-29): (1)
history
as
the
historical,
or
factual
history
of
the
type
that
would
satisfy
a court of
law ;
(2)
history
as the
historic,
or
the
sig-
nificance of
factual
history
in
the broader
context of the
totality
of
human
experience ;
and
(3)
history
as
the
historicity
of human
existence
in
the
world,
or
all those
things,
from
historical
circumstances
and events
to
ideas and
interpretations,
that can
change
one's life. To
borrow,
and
extend,
Perrin's
example:
all
the
authentic
speeches
of all
the U.S.
presi-
dents are
historical;
Lincoln's
Gettysburg
Address
is
historic;
and
the
Gettysburg
Address
has had an
impact
on
the
historicity
of
all Ameri-
cans,
changing
the lives of
both
northerners
and
southerners,
both
whites
and
blacks.
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Malbon:
Structuralism
217
The
distinctions
among
the
historical,
the
historic,
and
historicity
may,
I
believe,
help
to
clarify
and
distinguish
the
presuppositions
of
structuralism and of hermeneutics regarding history. Traditional biblical
criticism,
based
on the historical-critical
method,
has focused on
history
as the historical.
This is
clearly
seen in form criticism's concern to
estab-
lish the Sitz im Leben
of
the
text
and in
redaction
criticism's
concern to
illuminate
the situation of
each
community by
examining
the
theology
of each
synoptic gospel.
Structuralism
has
not
infrequently
been criticized
by
biblical
schol-
ars
(and others)
as
being
ahistorical
if not
antihistorical.
But,
as Dan Via
more
realistically observes, any adoption and adaptation
of structuralism
by
biblical
studies
will
entail,
not a
rejection
of the
historical
method,
but
a
relegating
of it
to
a
more
marginal
position
than it
has been
enjoy-
ing
(2;
cf.
McKnight:239,242).
Structuralism reacts
against
concentra-
tion on the diachronic
by
focusing
on the
synchronic.
Structuralism
responds
primarily
not to
history
as
the
historical but to
history
as
the
historic. For
example,
Lincoln's
Gettysburg
Address
is
recognized
as
historic,
structuralists would
point
out,
not
primarily
because of its
place
in
the
chronological
syntagm
of
presidential
addresses
from
George
Washington
to Ronald
Reagan
but because of its
place
in the
paradigm
of all
presidential
addresses,
no
matter
when
they
were
given.
Likewise,
the
significance
of
a
text,
that
which
interests
structuralists,
is
to be
determined
by
its intertextual and intratextual
relationships,
not
merely
from its historical
context.
Oversimplifying
in
order to
clarify
our
schema,
we
might
say
that fact is to
significance
as the
historical
is to the
historic and as
historical criticism is to
structuralism.
Hermeneutics
focuses on
neither
the
historical
nor
the
historic but on
history as the historicity of human existence in the world. For herme-
neutic
itself,
states
Robinson,
is
rooted
in man's
historicness,
namely,
the
call
placed upon
him
to encounter the
history
of
the
past
in
such a
way
as not
to
deny
his
own
existential future
and
present
responsibility
(9).
In
fact,
Heidegger's
ontology,
on which much
of
recent hermeneuti-
cal
thinking
rests,
suggests
that the
historical
is
founded
upon historicity.
Paraphrasing Heidegger,
Achtemeier
states,
Time itself is
grounded
in
the
structure of
the
self,
so that
the
possibility
of
temporal
existence, i.e.,
history, is itself grounded in the structure of the self (39-40). Or, as
paraphrased
by
Thiselton
(184),
history
is
what it is
by
virtue
of
the
historicality
(Geschichtlichkeit)
of
Dasein,
rather than because of the
mere
pastness
of historical events
and
objects.
Hence
the focus of
history
lies not
in
the
past
but
in
the
present. /19/
Paul
Ricoeur,
in
speaking
for
hermeneutics as over
against
structuralism,
states
explicitly,
I
will
reserve the
term
'historicity'-historicity
of
tradition and
historicity
of
interpretation-for
any
understanding
which
implicitly
or
explicitly
knows itself
to be on
the road
of
the
philosophic
understanding
of self
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8/18/2019 Structuralism, Hermenuetics and Contextual Meaning
13/25
218
Journal
of the American
Academy
of
Religion
and of
being
(55).
For this
reason,
biblical
exegesis
in the
Bultmannian
tradition
is
primarily
concerned not with
the historical
past
but with
the
present and future historicity of human existence; it is not historical
exegesis
but
exegesis
pro
nobis;
it
is,
in
the
words of
Ebeling,
a
process
from
text
to
sermon ;
it is
proclamation
(Ebeling:107;
cf. Fuchs:
141)./20/
At least as
applied
in
the field of biblical
studies,
both structuralism's
focus on
the
historic and
hermeneutics'
focus on
historicity
may
be
seen
as reactions
against
the
excesses
of
the nineteenth and twentieth
centu-
ries' concern for
the
historical./21/
Structuralism has
challenged
tradi-
tional historical
criticism to
respect
the
integrity
of
the
text
and
to
appreciate
the
presuppositions
that enable texts to be
written
and
to be
read
(e.g.,
Via).
Hermeneutics has
challenged
traditional
historical criti-
cism to
bridge
the
distance
between the two
horizons,
the horizon of
the
ancient text and
the horizon of
the
contemporary
reader
(e.g.,
Palmer).
Structuralism has
sometimes
accused
hermeneutics
of
ignoring
the
interrelations
and
the
constraints of
the text as a
linguistic
product
(e.g.,
Kovacs).
Hermeneutics has
sometimes
accused
structuralism
of
ana-
lyzing
the text
in
isolation
from
the
living
process
of
communication
(e.g.,
Ricoeur).
Evidently,
in
the
responses
of
structuralism
and
hermeneutics to
historical
criticism and
in
the
responses
of
structuralism
and hermeneu-
tics to each
other,
we are
sometimes
dealing
with
overreactions to over-
reactions.
In
order
to defuse
this
situation,
it is
helpful
to
remember
Perrin's
presentation
of the
historical,
the
historic,
and
historicity
as
three dimensions of
history,
three
interrelated-not
independent-ways
of
conceiving
of
history.
Analogously,
various
approaches
to textual
meaning are to be viewed as interrelated; the focus of traditional biblical
criticism
on
the
historical is
better
supplemented
than
supplanted
by
the
concern of
stucturalism for
the historic
and that
of hermeneutics for
historicity./22/
For
structuralism,
the
historic
is
determined
by
syntagmatic
and
especially
paradigmatic
inter-
and
intrarelationships
of
cultural
phenom-
ena,
and
syntagmatic
and
paradigmatic
are the
two
dimensions of lan-
guage.
For
hermeneutics,
the
bridge
between an
historical
text and the
historicity
of a
reader is
formed
by language. Yet structuralism and
hermeneutics
approach
language,
as
they
approach
history,
with differ-
ent
concerns and
different
presuppositions.
Langue,
Parole,
and
Sprachereignis
In
somewhat
oversimplified
terms,
we
may
say
that
structuralism
regards
language
as a
system
of
signs
and
hermeneutics
regards
language
as an
event
of
disclosure.
While
these
assumptions
are
not
necessarily
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Malbon:
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contradictory
or
exclusive,
they
do
represent opposing
points
of view on
the
appropriate
starting
point
of a discussion
of
language.
The foundations of structuralism's presuppositions about language
were set
by
Saussure.
As we
noted
above,
the
crux of de Saussure's
theory
.
. . is the role
of relations
in a
system
.
.
.
(Wells:97).
A
linguistic
sign
itself
(a word)
is
a
relation,
a
relation
between
a
signifier
and a
signi-
fied;
and
language
is a
system
of
signs.
In three
key
dichotomies,
Saussure
presented
his answers to three
questions
concerning
this
language
system:
(1)
what are the
components
of
languages?
(2)
how
should
language
be
studied?
(3)
what are the dimensions
of
language?
First,
language
in
the
broad
sense
(French langage)
is
comprised
of the
language-system
(langue)
and
language-behavior
or
speech
(parole)./23/
Langage
is a
social
phenomenon;
langue
is
its inherited or
institutional
element,
parole
its innovational element.
Langue, language,
is
communal and
passive;
parole, speech,
is individual and active.
Second,
according
to
Saussure,
it
is
the task
of
the
linguist
to
study
langue
and,
primarily,
to
study
it
synchronically
rather than
diachronically,
that
is,
as a
system
of relations
across a moment in
time,
rather than
through
time
(Lane:16-17).
Diachronic
analysis
of
language
is the
study
of
changes
in
language
over
time;
synchronic analysis
is the
investigation
of the structure of
language.
Third,
in
focusing
on
langue
synchronically,
Saussure
distinguished
two dimensions
of
langue,
two kinds
of
relationships
that exist between the
signs
of the
language-system:
syntagmatic
and
paradigmatic./24/
Rela-
tions of
contiguity
are
syntagmatic;
relations of
similarity
are
paradigma-
tic.
Principles
of
selection are
paradigmatic;
principles
of
combination
are
syntagmatic.
Consider,
for
example,
the sentence: She wrote
an
essay.
Here wrote
is
related
syntagmatically
to She
by
following
it
and to an
essay by preceding it, while, paradigmatically, She is related to He
and
essay
to
poem.
While the
syntagm
concerns the actual
sentence,
the
paradigm
concerns
the
potential
sentences over
against
which
the
meaning
of
the
actual sentence
is made clear.
Both the
paradigmatic
dimension,
the axis of
simultaneity,
and the
syntagmatic
dimension,
the
axis
of
succession,
are essential
if
language
is
to mean
(signify)
anything.
Language
as a
system
of
signs,
language
as the
interrelation
of
syn-
tagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions, is a basic presupposition of struc-
turalism.
Thus,
without reference to
Saussure,
Propp
focused
on the
syntagmatic
aspects
of the
Russian
fairy
tale.
In a
conscious
application
of
Saussure's
linguistic
model,/25/
Levi-Strauss focused on the
paradig-
matic
aspects
of the
language
of
kinship
and the
language
of
myth.
Levi-Strauss's work has
been heralded as the model
for
all
subsequent
attempts
at the
extension of
linguistic
theory beyond
the borders of its
own
discipline
(Robey:3),
and
with
this
extension has
come the exten-
sion of
the
syntagmatic/paradigmatic
distinction.
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220
Journal
of
the American
Academy
of
Religion
Whereas
structuralism
focuses
upon
the
syntagmatic
and
paradig-
matic dimensions
of
language
(French
langue)
as
opposed
to
speech
(French parole), hermeneutics, and especially the new hermeneutic, con-
centrates
on
language
as
language-event
(German
Sprachereignis).
And
whereas
Saussurean
linguistics
is foundational for structuralism's view
of
language, Heideggerian
philosophy
is foundational for hermeneutic's
view of
language.
For
Heidegger, language
is
the
house
of
being ;
words
and
language
are not
wrappings
in which
things
are
packed
for
the commerce of those who write
and
speak.
It is
in
words and
language
that
things
first
come
into
being
and
are
(as
quoted by
Palmer:135).
Language, then,
is
insufficiently
accounted
for
as
a
system
of
arbitrary
signs. Language
originates
not with
human
beings
but
with
Being
itself.
Language
is,
in
Achtemeier's
paraphrase
of
Heidegger,
the
response
to
Being,
it
is
the act
of
being-open-to Being,
of
letting-be-manifest
in
response
to
the call of
Being
(Achtemeier:48;
cf.
Robinson:48-49).
Thus,
for the
new
hermeneuticist Ernst
Fuchs,
Language
is
not
necessarily
talk.
Language
is rather
primarily
a
showing
or
letting
be
seen,
an
indi-
cation in the active sense
(as
quoted by
Robinson:54).
Language
and
reality,
word and
event,
are
inseparable,
and it is
their
unity
that is indi-
cated
by
the term
language-event.
To
approach
language
as
language-
event is to
presuppose
that,
quoting
Achtemeier,
event and
word
are
born
together,
that
an
event needs
the
words,
the
language,
it
calls
forth in
order
to
be
itself,
and that the
language
thus
given
birth
illumines the
reality
that summoned it forth
(Achtemeier:90-91;
cf.
Robinson:46-48,57-58)./26/
Thus
language
as
language-event
is
a
living
process
of
communication-or
better,
of
illumination,
since the
saving
event
(Bultmann's
Heilsgeschehen
or
Heilsereignis)
is a
language
event (Ebeling's Wortgeschehen or Fuch's Sprachereignis) (Robinson:
57;
see also
61-62).
By
contrast,
language
as a
system
of
signs
is
a
human
product-though
more an
unconscious
than a conscious
one./27/
Structuralism's
insistence on
the
importance
of
synchronic study
of
language,
including
cultural
languages,
correlates
with its
concern
for
history
as the historic.
Hermeneutics'
understanding
of
language
as
language-event
correlates with its
concern for
history
as the
historicity
of
human
existence in
the
world.
For
the
new
hermeneutic,
language
is
the
bridge
between the
historical
and
historicity. Central to Fuchs's hermeneu-
tical
program
is the
task of
exhibiting
the
historicness of
existence
as
the
linguisticality
of
existence
(as
quoted
by
Robinson:55).
Language,
explains
Achtemeier
(91),
contains the
possibilities
of
self-understanding,
and
therefore of human
existence,
as
they
have found
expression
in
the
past.
Language,
summarizes Palmer
(207),
is
the
medium
in
which
the
tradition
conceals
itself
and
is
transmitted.
Experience
is
not so much
something
that
comes
prior
to
language,
but rather
experience
itself
occurs
in and
through language.
Linguisticality
is
something
that
permeates
the
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way
of
being-in-the-world
of
historical
man.
Thus,
and
not so
surprisingly,
presuppositions
concerning language
are intertwined with presuppositions concerning history for both herme-
neutics
and structuralism.
Furthermore,
these
presuppositions
influence
the
goals
generally
pursued by
structuralists
and
hermeneuticists.
Although
both structuralism and
hermeneutics,
as
we
suggested
above,
are
open
to four
analogous
goals,
structuralism's
approach
to
language
as
a
system
of
signs
predisposes
structuralism
to
aim
toward
exegesis,
while
hermeneutics'
approach
to
language
as
language-event
predisposes
her-
meneutics
to seek
existential
understanding
and to
develop
a
philosophy
and/or theology.
This would
seem
to
be
the reason
why
Ricoeur
(27-61;
see also
62-78),
for
example,
recommends
structuralism
as
a
method
(or
science )
of
exegesis
and hermeneutics as a
philosophy.
This
tendency
of
particular presuppositions
to
favor
particular
goals
seems
also to
be
behind
Culley's
observation that structuralism focuses
on
the text and
hermeneutics
on
the
reader,
for
structuralism's
approach
to
history
as the
historic
predisposes
structuralism
to
focus
on
the text
in
its
literary
or
linguistic
context,
whereas hermeneutics'
approach
to
history
as the
his-
toricity
of human
existence
in
the world
predisposes
hermeneutics to
focus on the reader in the context of his or her lived
experience./28/
For
both
structuralism and
hermeneutics as
approaches
to
meaning,
the
con-
text is crucial.
Structuralism,
Hermeneutics,
and
Contextual
Meaning
Structuralism,
as a
way
of
concentrating
on
the
text,
may
be
distin-
guished
from
hermeneutics,
as
a
way
of
concentrating
on
the
reader;
this is
the simple but powerful suggestion of Culley's model. Yet structuralism
shares with
hermeneutics an
awareness of the
relation of the
reader
to
the
text,
of
the
interpreter
to
the
interpreted;
this is
the recurrent
theme
of
Polzin's
argument.
Thus,
as we
noted at the
beginning,
Culley
emphasizes
a
fundamental
difference
between
structuralism and
hermeneutics,
whereas Polzin
emphasizes
a
fundamental
similarity
between them. It
has
been
my
aim
to
consider
both
differences and
similarities,
both distinctions
and
commonalities,
between
these
two
approaches
to
meaning.
I
have
suggested
that
structuralism and hermeneutics share a similar range of
goals:
that
four
terminal
goals
of
structuralism-ideology
(or
philosophy),
theory,
structural
exegesis,
and
narrative hermeneutics-are
analogous
to
four
terminal
goals
of
hermeneutics-theology
(or
philosophy), theory,
biblical
exegesis,
and
existential
understanding.
I
have
suggested
that
structuralism
and
hermeneutics
differ,
however,
in
their
presuppositions
concerning
history
and
language:
that
structuralism
approaches
history
as
the
historic
and
language
as a
system
of
signs,
and
hermeneutics
approaches
history
as
historicity
and
language
as
language-event.
Because
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222
Journal
of the
American
Academy
of
Religion
of
these
presuppositions,
literary
or
biblical
structuralism focuses
on
intertextual
and intratextual
relationships
and
literary
or
biblical
hermeneutics focuses on the text-reader relationship.
But,
to
borrow the
terminology
of
Michael
Polanyi,
what is
of
focal
awareness
for
the
one is of
subsidiary
awareness
for
the
other.
Structural-
ists
know,
sometimes more
tacitly
than
explicitly,
that
to
remove
the text
from its
author-text-reader
context
is
an
abstraction;
they
insist, however,
that this
procedure
is
not
arbitrary
but
essential,
for
it enables
the reader
to listen
openly
and
fully
to
the text itself. Hermeneuticists
know,
some-
times more
tacitly
than
explicitly,
that,
if the reader
is to
hear
and
respond
to
the
text,
the text
itself-in detail
and as a
whole
and as
a
system
of
relationships
forming
of
details
a whole-this text must be
allowed to
speak
in
its
own
voice.
In
their
most
thoughtful
moments,
both structuralists and
hermeneuticists
realize,
with Robert
Funk,
that
the text cannot
speak
for itself if it is
not
painstakingly exegeted
in
its
own
context,
and it
cannot be
interpreted
if it
cannot
be
brought
into
intimate relation with
contemporary
modes
of
thought
and
experience
(Funk,
1964:181;
see also
Foust;
Scholes:9-10).
But one cannot focus
on
everything
at
once./29/
In
this the
scholar,
whether a traditional historical critic, a structuralist, or a hermeneuticist,
is no
better
off
than a child
at a
three-ring
circus-and
no
worse off
either.
We
do not
regard
the circus as
primarily
a
frustrating
experience
for
the
child,
nor
need
we
regard
the
scholarly
world as
primarily
such
for
ourselves.
Yet,
like the child
whose
head
spins
at the
circus,
we
would do
well to
shift
our
focus
occasionally,
to allow
our work
to
be
refreshed
by
tacit
knowledge coming
to
explicitness.
Structuralism
focuses
on
meaning
of,
on
meaning
in the
context
of
intertextual and intratextual relationships. Hermeneutics focuses on
meaning
for,
on
meaning
in
the context of the text-reader
relationship.
Because
both structuralism
and
hermeneutics
appreciate
the
importance
of context
to
meaning,
these two
approaches
to
meaning
should manifest
a
preunderstanding
of each
other, or,
to
change
the
figure,
should
perceive
a
common
structure
between
themselves,
and thus establish
a
creative
relationship.
Structuralism
might
guide
hermeneutics
away
from
a
premature
application
of
the
text to the reader. from
an
immature
abstraction
of the
text from
the
reader.
Both structuralism and herme-
neutics affirm
that all
textual
meaning
is
contextual
meaning.
Perhaps
both
structuralists
and
hermeneuticists need
to reaffirm that all
inquiry
is
interrelated.
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223
NOTES
/1/ Compare (1) the model of a literary work (in the broadest sense of the
term)
as the interrelation
of
author, text,
reader,
world
presented
in
Malbon,
1980:321-22;
(2)
the
model of the coordinates of
art criticism
(work,
audience,
universe)
presented
by
Abrams
(especially
6);
and
(3)
the
maps
for
literary
critics
(central
point:
work;
cardinal
points:
author, reader,
information,
lan-
guage)
presented
by
Hernadi.
/2/
Polzin defines structuralism as an
approach
(1)
to
objects
as
whole,
self-
regulating
systems
of
transformations,
(2)
by
means of
hypothetical-deductive
models,
(3)
with
self-conscious awareness of the
personal, operational
structures
of the
subject
making
the
approach
(see
especially
1-2).
In
his
succeeding
evalu-
ations of what makes a
structural
analysis
structural, however,
Polzin focuses
primarily
on
the third
element,
the
relationship
of the
analyzing
subject
to the
analysis
(see
especially
38,33-34).
Polzin's
purpose
here-and
his model-is a
structural
analysis
of structural
analysis,
not
an evaluation
of
the
relationship
between
structuralism
and
hermeneutics.
/3/
An
earlier version of the
following typology
of structuralist
goals
was
presented
in
Malbon,
1980:318-21.
/4/
Lane
expresses
these
two
categories
not as
ideology
and
methodology
but
as theories and
methods ;
but note
Lane's use of
the
terms
philosophies
and
methods
(17)
and
ideology
(18).
/5/
I do
not mean
by
this to
ignore
the
possible
distinctions between
ideology
and
philosophy,
but
rather to
refer,
in
general
and with
neutrality,
to what
Robert Scholes identifies
and Robert
Polzin affirms
as structuralism
as
a
move-
ment of mind
(Scholes:1;
Polzin:iv,1).
/6/ Lane is here describing what he terms a theory as opposed to a
method.
See
note
4
above.
/7/
Cf. Scholes's
discussion of
structuralism
as
a
movement
of mind and
structuralism as a method
(1-12).
See also
Culley:169.
/8/
For
example,
Ehrmann:viii;
Lane:17-18;
Patte, 1976:19;
Spivey:144;
Wilder,
1974:11.
Among
the more
positive,
or at
least
neutral,
discussions
of
structuralism as an
ideology
are
Scholes:1-7;
Gardner:213-47;
McKnight:
295-312;
Detweiler:202-4,207.
/9/
This
distinction
between
theory
and
analysis
is
paralleled
by,
for
exam-
ple,
Patte and Patte's
distinction
between
theory
and
practice
or
fundamen-
tal research
and
applied
research
(1);
Patte's distinction
between
the search
for
universal structures and the
search for structures
which characterize
each
specific
narrative
(1980a:7);
Detweiler's distinction between
theory
and
application
(3-4,103,124);
Barthes's distinction
between
poetics
and
criti-
cism,
as discussed
by
Culler
(30-35).
/10/
This
appears
to be
the case
with
Spivey:135;
Robey:3;
Culler
(following
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8/18/2019 Structuralism, Hermenuetics and Contextual Meaning
19/25
224
Journal
of
the American
Academy
of
Religion
Barthes):30-all
of whom are
commenting
in
the context
of
literary
structural-
ism.
Cf.
also
Calinescu:5,9,16,
on
poetics
(see
note
28
below).
/11/ See Polzin:34. Patte's discussion of five
types
of structuralist research
(1980a:7-9)
may
be
understood
as a
development
of the
various
relationships
between
theory
and
analysis: analysis
in
disregard
of
theory
(Patte's
type
1),
theory
in
isolation from
analysis
(type
2),
analysis
for the
sake
of
theory,
whe-
ther
inductive
or
deductive
(types
3
and
4),
and
analysis
in
the
light
of
theory
(type
5,
structural
exegesis ).
/12/
The term
methodology
is somewhat
problematic.
Whereas
methodol-
ogy
does seem an
appropriate
term
in
opposition
to
ideology,
that which sub-
divides into theory and analysis might more appropriately be labeled
methodology/method.
/13/
Cf.
Patte,
1976:3-6,
on
exegesis
and
hermeneutic. See also
Patte
and
Patte:vii,94;
and
Patte,
1980a:22.
/14/
My diagram
of
goals, although
developed
independently
of Pettit's tree
of
options
(54),
may
be
fruitfully compared
with it.
However,
Pettit's tree of
options
serves as an
evaluative tool
(54-64):
according
to
Pettit,
theory
fails-
generative theory
more
drastically
so than
descriptive
theory,
and
straight analy-
sis is uncontrolled, thus only systematic analysis is workable; there is only one
real
option
for
structuralism.
/15/
See
Glucksmann's five levels of
the
problematic,
or
conceptual
frame-
work,
of
structuralism-or of
any
theoretical
system,
listed
according
to
descending
levels
of abstraction
rather
than
a
hierarchy
of
determinacy
(10):
(1)
epistemology
[cf.
structuralism as an
approach
to
meaning],
(2)
philosophy
[cf.
philosophy
(or
ideology)],
(3)
theory
[cf.
theory],
(4)
methodology
[cf.
analy-
sis], (5)
description
[cf.
structural
exegesis].
Glucksmann stresses that
each
coher-
ent
thought system
includes
the five
mentioned
in
some form
(10).
/16/
See