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ReviewpaperUDC177(045)Young,I.doi:10.21464/sp32109
Received:November19th,2015
Marita Brčić KuljišUniversityofSplit,FacultyofHumanitiesandSocialSciences,Sinjska2,HR–21000Split
Civil Society, Public Sphere, and Justice in the Philosophy of Iris Marion Young
AbstractIris Marion Young accepts the concepts of the private and the public, but denies the social division between public and private spheres, each with different kinds of institutions, activities, and human attributes. Young defines “private” as that aspect of a person’s life and activity that he or she has a right to exclude others from. The private in this sense is not what public institutions exclude, but what the individual chooses to withdraw from public view.According to Young the public in a democratic society is heterogeneous. “Indeed, in open and accessible public spaces and forums, they should expect to encounter and hear from those who are different, whose social perspectives, experience, and affiliations are different.” An important characteristic of a developed democratic society is a developed civil society. Civil society is voluntary associational life that is distinguished from the state and economy, and helps with the transfer of private problems to the public agenda. They are voluntary, in the sense that they are neither mandated nor run by state institutions, but spring from the everyday lives and activities of the communities of interest. Distinguishing voluntary associational life from economy as well as state helps refine the role of civil society in promoting social justice.
KeywordsIrisMarionYoung,civilsociety,democracy,private,publicsphere,justice,voluntarism
“For anorm tobe just, everyonewho follows itmustinprinciplehaveaneffectivevoiceinitsconsiderationandbeabletoagreetoitwithoutcoercion.Forasocialconditiontobejustitmustenablealltomeettheirneedsandexercisetheirfreedom;thusjusticerequiresthatallbeabletoexpresstheirneeds.”
IrisMarionYoung,Justice and the Politics of Difference
1. Introduction
Inanattempttodiscusstherelationshipbetweencivilsociety,publicsphere,andjusticeinthephilosophyofIrisMarionYoung,itisnecessary,attheverybeginning,toindicatetherelationshipbetweenpublicsphereandcivilsoci-
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M.BrčićKuljiš,CivilSociety,PublicSphere,andJusticeinthePhilosophy…122
ety.Although there arenounambiguousdefinitionsof the aforesaid socialphenomena, thehypothesiscanbepostulated thatpublicsphere isa socialphenomenon that refers to ‘events’ inpublicspace.However,civilsociety,evenifitreferstothepublicsphere,isapartiallyinstitutionalizedandstand-ardizedsocialphenomenon.Publicsphereandcivilsocietyaremostlyassociatedwiththeliberaldemoc-racyasapoliticalsystemensuringalltheformsofpoliticalfreedomandrightsthatguaranteedevelopmentinthepublicsphereaswellasinthecivilsociety.Itcannotbeignoredthatcivilsocietyorganizations,intheirmostelementalorperhapsmostradicalformappearinnon-democraticpoliticalregimesaswell,forthepurposeoftheprocessofdemocratization.However,itisamuchbroadertopicnottobediscussedhere.Inthispaperthefocusisontheanaly-sisoftheroleofcivilsocietyandpublicsphereinliberaldemocracy,inthetermsofsecuringgroundfordemocracywithindemocracyitself.Historicallyspeaking,thepublicspherewasrelatedtothesphereofpolisbe-ingconsideredasthesphereoffreedomandthepublic.Butalso,oikoswasrelatedtotheprivatesphereincludingalsothesphereoflabour(slaves)andeverythingelseassociatedwiththehousehold.
“Thereproductionoflife,thelabouroftheslaves,andtheserviceofthewomenwentonundertheaegisofthemaster’sdomination;birthanddeathtookplaceinitsshadow;andtherealmofnecessityandtransitorinessremainedimmersedintheobscurityoftheprivatesphere.”1
Suchadistinctionbetweenthepublicandtheprivatewastakenoverbytheliberal-democraticpoliticaltradition.Theideaofthepublicisconnected,asshowninthephilosophyofImmanuelKant,withtheideaoftheEnlighten-ment.BydefiningtheideaofEnlightenmentI.Kantdemandsfromeachin-dividualtoeducatetheirmind,andfindthecouragetouseit.Enlightenmentstandsforabandoningself-inducedimmaturity.Immaturityistheinabilitytouseone’sownmindwithout theguidanceofanother.2Thusconceived, theideaofEnlightenmentholdstheviewthateachindividualshouldbeprovidedtheopportunitytoexpresstheirownandfreeopinion.Thiswastheverybe-ginningofpostulatingthefundamentalliberalfreedoms.Theideaofthepublic,asdevelopedbyImmanuelKantandimpliedinthemoral law,3 actually becomes the backbone of the universalism present inliberal thought.4Togetherwith contract theories, the public reason,whichis combinedwith the universalistic principles, becomes themain criterionforlegitimizationtheliberal-democraticpoliticalorder.Consideringnumer-ouscriticismsofsuchanotionofthepublicsphere,especiallythefeministcriticismincludingMarionYoung’s,contemporaryauthors(post-modernau-thors),5havebeentryingtothematisethepublicspherefromthebeginning.Tryingtodefendthepublicsphereagainstcritics,JürgenHabermasdevelopsdiscursivetheory.
“Publicopinionisnotrepresentativeinthestatisticalsense.Itisnotanaggregateofindividuallygathered,privatelyexpressedopinionsheldbyisolatedpersons.”6
AccordingtoJ.Habermas,communicativestructure(communicationstruc-ture) is the essential part of the public sphere, but unlike other aspects ofcommunicativeaction itdoesnot refer to thefunctioningor thecontentofeverydaycommunication.Itcoverssocialspacethatisgeneratedinacom-municativeaction.However,withinthelimitsofthepublicsphere,oratleasttheliberalpublicsphere,protagonistscanonlyachieve(public)influence,butnorealpoliticalpower.
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M.BrčićKuljiš,CivilSociety,PublicSphere,andJusticeinthePhilosophy…123
“Theinfluenceofapublicopiniongeneratedmoreorlessdiscursivelyinopencontroversiesiscertainlyanempiricalvariablethatcanmakeadifference.Butpublicinfluenceistransformedintocommunicativepoweronlyafteritpassesthroughthefiltersoftheinstitutionalizedproce-duresofdemocraticopinion–andwill-formationandentersthroughparliamentarydebatesintolegitimatelawmaking.”7
Therefore,NancyFraserclaimsthatthepublicsphereisnotapoliticalsphereintermsofstatebutthe informally mobilized body of nongovernmental discursive opinion that can serve as a counterweight to the state.8
Givenalltheheterogeneityofthedemocraticpublic,thefluidityofthepub-licspherehasincreasinglybegunturningtotheassociationswithinthecivilsocietylookingfortheirownspaceinthepublicsphereinamoreorlessin-stitutionalizedway.JeanL.CohenandAndrewArato,theoreticianswhohavepreparedamajorstudyonthetopicofcivilsociety,Civil Society and Political Theory,statethatcivilsocietyisnottheoppositiontoeconomyandstate,butaspherethatprovidestheinteractionbetweenthem.Itconsistsofanintimatesphere(privatesphere–families),socialassociations,socialmovements,andtheformsofpubliccommunication.9Itisaboutvoluntaryassociations,mean-ing that these are neither organized normanaged by state institutions, butcreatedasaresultofeverydaylifeandinterestsofcommunitymembers.Thecivilsocietyisfocusedonexternalactivitiesthatbringbenefitstowiderso-cialcircles,theentirecountry,andtheentireworld.Inhiswork,Facts and Norms, J.Habermasdefinescivil society asacompositionofmoreor lessspontaneouslycreatedassociations,organizationsandmovements.Thesearedirectedtowardstheanalysisoftheimpactofsocialissuesinanindividual’spublicsphere,anddealwiththetransferofreactionsfromtheprivatetothepublicsphere.
“Moreorlessemergingfromtheprivatesphere,thispublicismadeofcitizenswhoseekaccept-ableinterpretationsfortheirsocialinterestsandexperiencesandwhowanttohaveaninfluenceoninstitutionalizedopinion-andwill-formation.”10
1
Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society,translatedbyThomasBurger,TheMITPress,Cambridge(MA)1991,p.3.
2
See: Immanuel Kant, “Odgovor na pitanje:Što je toprosvjetiteljstvo?”[“Answer to theQuestion:WhatisEnlightenment?”],Pravnopolitički spisi[Writings on Law and Politics],translated by Zlatko Posavec, Politička kul-tura,Zagreb2000,pp.33–41,p.35.
3
See:JohnRawls,A Theory of Justice,TheBel-knapPress(MA),London1971,p.133,fn.8.
4
See:JohnGray,Liberalism. Concepts in Social Thought,UniversityofMinnesotaPress,Minneapolis(MN)1995.
5
For example: Michel Foucault, Jean-FrançoisLyotard, Seyla Benhabib. See: Dana R.Villa,“PostmodernismandthePublicSphere”,Ame
rican Political Science Review86(3/1992),pp.712–721.doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/1964133.
6
JürgenHabermas,Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,translatedbyWilliamRehg,The MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 1996, p.362.
7
Ibid.,p.371.
8
NancyFraser,“RethinkingthePublicSphere:A Contribution to the Critique of Actu-allyExistingDemocracy”,Social Text25/26(1990), pp. 56–80, p. 75. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/466240.
9
JeanL.Cohen,AndrewArato,Civil Society and Political Theory,MITPress,Cambridge(MA)1994,p.20.
10
J. Habermas,Between Facts and Norms, p.367.
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Forthisreason,itcouldbesaidthatcivilsocietyensuresfortheprivatespheretopicstobeplacedonthepublicsphereagenda.
“Thecoreofcivilsocietycomprisesanetworkofassociationsthatinstitutionalizesproblem-solvingdiscoursesonquestionsofgeneral interest inside theframeworkoforganizedpublicspheres.”11
Thebasicfunctionofcivilassociationsandcivilsocietyasawholeconsistspreciselyintheefforttoexpresstheaspirationsanddesiresofmarginalizedindividuals.Civilsocietyactivistsareusuallyspokespersonsforexcludedandmarginalizedindividualsandsocialgroups.ThecrucialthingforJ.Habermasisthatthesemovementsgaininfluence,butnotdirectpower.Thatinfluenceisfilteredbygoingthroughinstitutionalizedproceduresofdemocraticforma-tionofopinionandwill.Onlyforthatreasonitbecomesakindofcommuni-cativepowerwhichisatthesametimelimitedbythesefilters.Unlikeprivateassociations,civilassociationstendtobe‘inclusive’intermsofbeingopentoeveryone.Civilsocietyanditsassociationsarenotpublicinthesenseofal-waysallowinguniversalaccesstoall,buttheyarepublicinthesenseofbeingapartofthatanonymouspublicconversationinademocracy.12However,notalltheoreticiansofliberalorientationsharethesamevisionofcivilsociety.Inhistheoryknownaspoliticalliberalism,JohnRawlsperceivescivilsocietyasabackgroundculture.13AccordingtoRawls,itisthecultureofsocial,ratherthanpoliticallife–thecultureofeverydaylifeandmanyofitsassociationssuch as churches, universities, scholar and scientific clubs, groups andor-ganisations.Italsoincludesallmattersthataretakenoffthepoliticalagenda.Whenspeakingaboutbackgroundculture,J.Rawlsalsousesthetermnonpublic reason,ofwhichtherearemany.Forsure,thosereasonsaresocialandnotprivate.14Infact,J.Rawlsnotesthatthedistinctionbetweenthepublicandthenon-publicisnotthesameasthedistinctionbetweenthepublicandtheprivate.Whenhespeaksabouttheconceptofthepublichealsospeaksaboutthepublicmind.
“Thepointoftheidealofpublicreasonisthatcitizensaretoconducttheirfundamentaldiscus-sionswithintheframeworkofwhateachregardsasapoliticalconceptionofjusticebasedonvaluesthattheotherscanreasonablybeexpectedtoendorseandeachis,ingoodfaith,preparedtodefendthatconceptionsounderstood.”15
RawlsalsoarguesthathisconceptofpublicmindisnottobeconfusedwithHabermas’spublicsphere.WhatHabermasmeantbypublicsphereisactuallywhatJ.Rawlsdefinesasbackgroundculture.SeylaBenhabibsaysRawls’spublicsphereisnotreallylocatedincivilsociety,butinthestateanditsor-ganizationsincludingthelegislativesphereanditsinstitutions.16
Civilsocietycanbesaidtohavetheinstitutionalandqualitativedimension.Institutionaldimensionincludesallsocialgroupsandsocialrelationsthatweare involved in: family, community, religious organizations, social move-ments,tradeunions,ethnicgroupsandsoon.Whenspeakingaboutthequali-tativedimension, it implies thequalityof social life that includes security,companionship,respectfordiversity,andsocialorder.17BycomparingcivilsocietyandthepublicsphereJ.Habermasstatesthatthepublicsphereisac-tuallyacommunicationstructurethatisrootedinthelifeworldthroughtheassociationalnetworkofcivilsociety.Thisextended introductioncontains remarksaboutcivil societyandpublicsphereas essential characteristicsof ademocratic societycharacterizedbyliberalideology.Thefundamentalroleofcivilsocietyandthepublicsphereconsistsinmonitoringwhetherdemocracyfunctionsproperlyandpreventing
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itfrombecomingatyrannyofthemajority.Unlikecivilsociety,beingcleavedintogroupsthatcanbepickyfromonereasonoranother,thepublicsphere,asafactorofademocraticsocietylegitimization,requiresequalityofaccess.Thepremise in liberaldemocracy is that thepublicsphereshouldbeblindtoallthedifferencesandparticularitiesexistinginasocietyandensuretheequalityinparticipationtoall,accordingtothemodelofimpartiality.That,itisassumed,isthewaytoensurejusticeinasociety.On the other hand, some theoreticians disagreewith the above-mentionedideaof equality and impartiality anddonot believe suchpractice leads tojusticeinasociety.OneoftheauthorswhocriticisestheidealofimpartialityisanAmericanphilosopherIrisMarionYoung.Sheclaimsthattheabstractionofhumanspecificities(humanbody,feelings)representsahugeprobleminsociety,becauseitpassesthecriteriaofjusticeonlyattheformallevel.ThefollowingpartofthispaperisconcernedwiththephilosophyofIrisMarionYoungandherviewofthepublicsphere,civilsociety,andjustice.
2. The politics of difference
InMarionYoung’sworkRethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,N.Fraserasksthequestion:“Istheideaofpublicsphereaninstrumentofdominationorautopianideal?”18
I. M.Youngreplieswithcertaintythattheuniversallyformulatedliberalpub-licsphereisafundamentalinstrumentofdomination.
“Policiesthatareuniversallyformulatedandthusblindtodifferencesofrace,culture,gender,age,ordisabilityoftenperpetuateratherthanundermineoppression.”19
Startingfromthisassumption,I.M.Youngdevelopsherownpoliticsofdif-ference.TheanalystsofthisconceptrefertoYoung’scriticalandnormativeprojectasassociatedwithtwocentralfeaturesofherunderstandingofsociety:theaccountofsocialgroupsandthenotionofmediatedsocialrelations.20
Fromherfeministpointofview,I.M.Youngstatesthatitisauniversalnor-mativesystemthatleadstotheunderlyingsourceofinjusticeinsociety,since
11
Ibid.,p.367.
12
Seyla Benhabib, “Toward a DeliberativeModelofDemocraticLegitimacy”,in:SeylaBenhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political,Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996,pp.67–94,p.76.
13
MarthaC.Nussbaum,“RawlsandFeminism”,in: Samuel Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls,CambridgeUniversityPress,2003,pp.488–520,p.495.doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol0521651670.015.
14
JohnRawls,Political Liberalism, ColumbiaUniversityPress,NewYork1993,p.54.
15
Ibid.,p.203.
16
See: S. Benhabib, “Toward a DeliberativeModelofDemocraticLegitimacy”.
17
CarolineHodges Persell, “The Interdepend-ence of Social Justice and Civil Society”,Sociological Forum 12 (2/1997), pp. 149–172, p. 150. doi: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1024693631382.
18
N.Fraser,“RethinkingthePublicSphere”,p.62.
19
IrisMarionYoung,Justice and the Politics of Difference,PrincetonUniversityPress,Princ-eton1990,p.173.
20
AdamJamesTebble,“WhatIsthePoliticsofDifference?”, Political Theory 30 (2/2002),pp. 259–281, p. 260. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591702030002004.
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every formofdenialof theexistenceofdifferences,contributes to theop-pressionandmarginalizationofdifferentsocialgroups.Socialgroupsdifferamongthemselvesbytheirculture,practicesorlifestyle.Assuch,theydonotexistapartfromindividuals,butareprior to individuals insociety,andtheidentityofanindividualispartlydevelopedundertheinfluenceofthegrouptowhichonebelongs.Groupslikethesearisebutareneverestablished,andtheir fundamental feature is definedby the sense of identity, rather than anumberofcommoncharacteristics.Thepersonfirstdiscoverstheidentityofthegroupbydefault,andthentakesitoverinacertainway.“Groupoppressionsareenactedinthissociety,notprimarilyinofficiallawsandpolicies,butininformal,oftenunnoticedandunreflectivespeech,bodilyreactionstoothers,conventionalpracticesofeverydayinteractionandevaluation,aesthetic judgments,and the jokes, images,andstereotypespervadingthemassmedia.”21
Why is there oppression?According to I.M.Young, the public sphere ofliberaldemocracyrecognizesonlyoneidentity–thecivilonei.e.theonecor-respondingtotheEnlightenment.“TheidealofimpartialmoralreasoncorrespondstotheEnlightenmentidealofthepublicrealmofpoliticsasattainingtheuniversalityofageneralwillthatleavesdifference,particularity,andthebodybehindintheprivaterealmsoffamilyandcivilsociety.”22
Thebasicidealofthemajorityofcontemporarymoralconceptionsandcon-ceptionsofjusticeistheveryidealofimpartiality.AccordingtoI.M.Young,impartialityhasitspoliticalequivalentintheidealofcivilpublic.Incompli-ancewith that ideal, allmoral situations shouldbe judgedaccording to thesamerulesandinthesamewayforall.Inmoraltheory,theidealofimpartial-ity is reduced to the logicof identity that tries tobringdifferencesdowntouniqueness,andatthesametimetoseparatetheuniversalandtheparticular,thepublicandtheprivate,themindandthefeelings.Youngsaysthatthe veil of ignoranceputseverythinginthehandsofanimpartialintellectualthinker,whoacceptsthetranscendental“viewfromnowhere”.Theideaofanobjectivepointofviewstemsfromavoidingobviousparticularitiesofapersoninarealsituation.Withtheattemptofreducingpluralitytounity,impartialityrequiresatranscendentalmoralsubjectivity.Sincetheimpartialsubjecttakesintoaccountallperspectives,itshouldnotrecognizeanyentitiesotherthanthemselvesandtheirowninterests,opinions,andwishes.23However,ithappensthatthepro-jectionoftheviewpointbelongingtothedominantgroupinsocietyisuniversalandimpartial.Whensuchaviewpointisproclaimeduniversal,itoffersscopeforjustificationofthehierarchicalstructureofdecision-making.Whencriti-cisingliberalimpartiality,YoungusesthesamecriticismasMichaelJ.Sandelstatingthatliberalimpartialityistheimpersonalviewofthesituation,sinceitadvocatesmoralreasoning.Forthisreason,liberalimpartialityisnotabletorecognisethefoundationsofgroupdifferences;therefore,itisnotinapositiontoputtheminpractice.24M.Sandelconcludesthatthepraisedindependenceofthedeontologicalsubjectistheillusionofliberalismthatdoesnotacceptordoesnotunderstandthe“sociability”asafundamentalhumannature.25
Theidealofimpartialdecisionwhicheverybodyinvolvedcouldagreewith,ifwetakeintoaccounttheirrelationshipofmutualrespectandequalpower,hasbeenastickingpointinliberalthought.“Impartialitydesignatesapointofviewthatanyrationalpersoncanadopt,adetachedanduni-versalpointofviewthattakesallparticularpointsofviewequallyintoaccount.”26
I.M.Youngsaysthatgovernment,whichimpartiallyoverseesanyspecificinterests, is actually above society.The latter ismost clearly explained in
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Hegel’spoliticalphilosophy.Hegelmakesadistinctionbetweenanindividualaspartofcivilsociety(withthespecificinterestsatwork,buttheirexchangeleadstoharmonyandsatisfaction),andasamemberofastate(whenanindi-vidualisnotthecarrierofspecificdesiresandinterests,buttheholderofuni-versallyexpressedrightsandresponsibilities).Thepositionofthestateandlawtranscendsallspecificinterestsandexpressestheuniversalandrationalspiritofhumanity.Theeffectuationofgeneralinterestsisincompatiblewiththeeffectuationofspecificinterestsinthesameperson.Therefore,G.W.F.Hegeladvocates thered tape that iscompletelyautonomousand impartial,thusbeingasocialexampleofthemorallawidea.I.M.Youngsaysthattheideaofaneutralstate,whichgoesbeyondparticularinterestsandconflictsofcivilsociety,isamythifamongclasses,groupsorinterestsexistssignificantdifferencesinpower,resources,accesstothepublicandmediaexposure.Insuchacase,thedecision-makingproceduresthatshouldbeimpartial,intermsof allowingequal formal conditions for all topromote theirown interests,produceresultsforthesakeofthemorepowerful.
“Theachievementofformalequalitydoesnoteliminatesocialdifferences,andrhetoricalcom-mitmenttothesamenessofpersonsmakesitimpossibleeventonamehowthosedifferencespresentlystructureprivilegeandoppression.”27
Inherbook,Inclusion and Democracy,Youngrespondstocriticismsofthepoliticsofdifferences.
“Theyeachconstructgroup-specificjusticeclaimsasanassertionofgroupidentity,andarguethat theclaimsendangerdemocraticcommunicationbecausetheyonlydividethepolityintoselfishinterestgroups.”28
Youngsaysthatthepoliticsofdifferencescannotbereducedto‘identitypoli-tics’assomecriticsclaim.Itmayreferto‘identitypolitics’inoneway,whendescribingcertain aspectsof socialmovements,butbringing it completelydowntoitisentirelywrong.
“Thosewhoreduceapoliticsofdifferenceto‘identitypolitics’,andthencriticizethatpolitics,implicitlyusealogicofsubstance,oralogicofidentity,toconceptualizegroups.Inthislogic,anentityiswhatitisbyvirtueoftheattributesthatinhereinit,someofwhichareessentialattributes.Wesawabovethattheattempttoconceptualizeanysocialgroup–whetheraculturalgrouplikeJews,orstructuralgroupslikeworkersorwomen–becomeconfusedwhentheytreatgroups as substantiallydistinct entitieswhosemembers all share some specific attributesorintereststhatdonotoverlapwithanyoutsiders.Sucharigidconceptualizationofgroupdiffer-entiationbothdeniesthesimilaritiesthatmanygroupmembershavewiththosenotconsideredinthegroup,anddeniesthemanyshadingsanddifferentiationswithinthegroup.”29
21
I.M.Young,Justice and the Politics of Difference,p.148.
22
Ibid.,p.97.
23
Ibid.,p.101.
24
A.J.Tebble,“WhatIsthePoliticsofDiffer-ence?”,p.262.
25
See:Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge UniversityPress,Cambridge(MA)2007.
26
I.M.Young,Justice and the Politics of Difference,p.112.
27
Ibid.,p.164.
28
IrisMarionYoung, Inclusion and Democracy,OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork2000,p.83.
29
Ibid.,p.89.
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M.BrčićKuljiš,CivilSociety,PublicSphere,andJusticeinthePhilosophy…12�
Differencesamonggroupsarenot“natural”factsbutareconstantlybeingcre-atedandcontinuouslyprocessedinsocialinteractionsinwhichpeopleiden-tifythemselvesandothers.Differencesamonggroupsareimportantfortheidentificationofoneselfandothers,andtheycannotbeignoredineverydayinteractionsas theyare inour society.TheLiberal requirement thatdiffer-encesarenotimportant,actuallyapprovesthesilenceaboutwhatpeople,atthe level of practical consciousness, know about the importance of differ-encesbetweengroups.Youngclearlypointsoutthatherapproachisdirected‘among and outside’ the alternatives that advocate atomistic individualismandcollectivisticcommunitarianism.Sheapproachestheexistingdifferencesinamuchmoreseriouswaythanbothtraditions, liberalismandcommuni-tarianism,do.Liberalismcallsfortheabstractionofculturalparticularities,whilecommunitarianismintegratesthemintoasingleorcollectiveviewoftheworld.30The contemporarydemocratic societies are not homogeneous,andeachattempttocreatehomogenizationactuallyleadstomarginalizationandoppression.Thepoliticsofdifference,advocatedbyYoung,requiretheidentificationandtheinclusionofalldifferencesinapoliticaldiscourse.
“Indeed,inanopenandaccessiblepublicspacesandforums,theyshouldexpecttoencounterandhearfromthosewhoaredifferent,whosesocialperspectives,experience,andaffiliationsaredifferent.”31
Unliketheassimilationmodel,thepoliticsofdifferencesupportandadvocate‘thedemocraticculturalpluralism’.AccordingtoYoung,fromthisperspective,agoodsociety
“…doesnoteliminateortranscendgroupdifference”;rather,itentails“equalityamongsociallyandculturallydifferentiatedgroupswhomutuallyrespectandaffirmoneanotherintheirdiffer-ences.”32
3. The relationship between the public sphere and civil society in the philosophy of Iris Marion Young
AnalysingthepublicinherbookJustice and the Politics of DifferenceIrisMarionYoungclaims that thepublic isnotexclusivebut indicateswhat ispublicandavailable.Although,inthisrespect,thepublicisseenasgeneral,andassuchitcannotbehomogenousanduniversalist.33ThisiswhatYoung’scriticismoftheuniversalistidealofthepublicisbasedon.Themodernviewofthepublicactuallyseemstobeexclusionary,sinceitchallengesthepublictoignoreaspectslikegender,age,race,etc.Italsorequiresthatallthepeopleshouldparticipateinasocietyonequalterms.Youngexplainsthiswiththefactthatthisapproachexcludesthespecificaspectsofapersonfromthepublic.Insteadofdefiningtheprivateassomethingthatthepublicexcludes,Youngsuggeststhatthetermisdefinedastheaspectoflifeoractivityofanindivid-ualthatheorshehastherighttohidefromothers.Inthiscase,theprivateisnotwhatpublicinstitutionsexclude,butwhatanindividualdecidestooptoutofthepublic.34Generallyspeaking,Youngcitesthreecharacteristicsofthepublic.Firstly,publicityreferstotheconstitutionofasiteforcommunicativeengagementandcontest.Secondly,itreferstoarelationshipamongcitizenswithin this site. Finally, publicity refers to the form that speech and otherformsofexpressiontake.35NancyFraser’sapproachtothepublicissimilar.Thepublicspherecannotalwaysbetheorizedasaspaceofconsensuswhereidentities, interests,andneedsarenon-problematicandwhere theconflictsaroundsuchissuescanbenullifiedthroughrationaldebateanddeliberation
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aboutthecommongood.Publicsphereis,morethananythingelse,aspaceofdifferenceandaspaceofpower,whereconsensusisalwaysboundtohegem-onicpracticesaswellasculturalandmaterialdominance.Bothauthorsagreethatinapluralisticdemocraticsociety,thepublicneedstobeunderstoodasheterogeneous.I.M.Youngstatesthattheconceptofheterogeneouspublicimpliestwopoliticalprinciples.Thefirstprinciplereferstotheassumptionthatnoperson,noperson’sactoraspectoflifeshouldbeforcedtoprivacy.Thesecondprinciplerelatestotheinstitutionsandpracticesanditreadsasfollows:nosocialinstitutionorpracticeshouldbeaprioriexcludedasanap-propriatetopicforapublicdiscussionandexpression.36UnlikeYoung,whospeaksaboutasingularpublicsphere,Frasergoesastepfurtheranddevelopstheideaofmultiplepublicspheres,asshethinksthatevenaperfectlyegalitar-iansociety,inwhichthereisnostructuralinequality,willnotbeabletocreateculturalhomogeneitybyensuringthefreedomofassociationandthefreedomofexpression.Eveninsuchanidealsociety,accordingtoFraser,thereisapossibilityofoppressionifthereisasinglepublicsphere.37
IrisMarionYoungdoesnotadvocatetherejectionoftheidealofthepublicsphere,withtheexceptionofitsEnlightenmentalternative.Youngproposes,asS.Benhabibstates,thetermcivil public,whichincludestheheterogene-ouspublic,tobeusedinsteadofthepublicsphere.38Itistheheterogeneouspublic that enables the articulation of demands coming from civil society,becausethroughtheheterogeneouspublicthespaceisgivenforthecivilso-cietydevelopment.Youngstatesthatcivilsociety–orcivilassociation–iscompletelyindependentofthestateandtheeconomy.Italsohasnopoliticalaspirations,butitisprimarilytheresultoftheassociationofindividualswhodonothavethepossibilitytoexpresstheirownattitudeinthepublicsphere.Thus,bymergingtheycreateacriticalmassthatputspressureonthepublictoupdatecertain(untilthen)marginalizedtopics(e.g.suffragettes,thesuffragemovement,Greenpeace,etc.).Thefunctionofcivilassociations,i.e.civilso-cietyasawhole,liesinthefactthatitgivesspacetoallthoseindividualswhoare,forvariousreasons,politicallyandsociallymarginalized,i.e.individualswhoseexperiences, interests,andneedsaremarginalized.Inthisway,civilsociety puts the topics that promote communicative democracy and socialchangesonthepublicsphereagenda.
“Some social change does come about, however, because people act in civil society itselfthroughthemediationofpubliccriticismanddiscussion.”39
30
FredDallmayr,“DemocracyandMulticultur-alism”,in:S.Benhabib(ed.),Democracy and Difference,pp.278–294,p.281.
31
I.M.Young,Justice and the Politics of Difference,p.119.
32
F.Dallmayr,“DemocracyandMulticultural-ism”,p.283.
33
I.M.Young,Justice and the Politics of Difference,p.119.
34
Ibid.,p.120.
35
I. M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p.168.
36
Ibid.,p.147.
37
N.Fraser,“RethinkingthePublicSphere”,p.69.
38
S.Benhabib,“TowardaDeliberativeModelofDemocraticLegitimacy”,p.82.
39
I. M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p.174.
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InherbookDemocracy and Inclusion,Youngsaysthatthepublicsphereisperceived as heterogeneous.Therefore, as the sphere that reflects all phe-nomenaincivilsociety,ithasthreemainfunctions.Thefirstfunction,whichYoungcallsopposition and accountability,actuallytriestorestorethepowerinthehandsofthepeople–whateverthatmeans.Today’sdemocracyseemsmerelyformal,astherehasbeentheseparationbetweenpowerandpeople,andthepowerisplacedinthehandsofindividuals,groupsandinstitutions.It iscivilsocietythatindicatestheexistenceofillegitimatepowerwithinasocietywithitsmovements,organizationsandcommunitygroups.Throughits activities, criticismandbeingexposed topublichumiliation, civil soci-etyactuallyexposestheillegitimateauthorityofthe‘dangerous’sourcesofpower.Inachievingthegoalofexposure,thefinalwordisgivenbythepub-licspherethattakesoverthepubliccriticism,andthusputspressureonthecompetentauthoritiestoactagainsttheillegitimatesourcesofpower.Thisispublicsphere’simportantmechanismthatensuresthatsocialandeconomicinequalitiesdonotbecomepoliticalinequalitiesaswell.Thesecondfunctionofpublicsphererefersto influence over policy.Ithasbecomehardertogaininfluenceonthepoliticaleventsbyvoting.Votingisanextremelyweakformofinfluence.Civilsocietyplaysakeyrolethere.Asanon-politicalbody,ithasnopoliticalaspirations,butdemandssocialchangesthatareachievedthroughpolitics.Civilsocietyidentifiesproblems,interestsandneedswithinasociety,andbringsthemtothepublicsphereagenda.Thepublic sphereprovidespublic supportandholdsup the requirements tobepoliticallyresolvedassoonaspossible.Therearenumeroushistoricalexam-plesofhowsocialmovementsofcivilsocietyhaveactuallyledtopoliticalchanges by placing a problem into the public sphere.The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990intheUnitedStatesisoneexampleofthesuccessofcitizenswithserioussocialandpolicyconcernscapturingaplaceinthepublicagendaandwinningamajorlegislativereform.Thethirdfunctionofthepublicsphere,accordingtoI.M.Young,referstochanging society through society,whichmeansthatpoliticaldecisionsarenotalwaysnecessarytobringaboutasocialchange.Sometimesitisnecessarytopromoteadifferentwayofsociallifepubliclyinordertoachieveasocialchange.Civilsocietyprovidesarelativelytransparentandsafespace,sothatpeoplecanexperimentwithdifferentwaysandstylesofliving.Sometimesthepracticedalternativesareentirelydesirableforthewidercommunityandsocietyasawhole.Thepublicsphereprovidestheexpansionofsuchideasandpracticesinasociety.Oneofthemostimportantexamplesofthiskindofchangeisthegenderdivisionofhouseholdchores.Assuch,thereisnolegislationthatdefinesthedivisionofhouseholdchoreswithinafamily,butthepublicdiscussionandpublicpresentationofmenandwomenasequalhas led to thefact thathousework isnotsomethingnaturallyattributed towomen.
4. The role of civil society and public sphere in the promotion of justice
AccordingtoIrisMarionYoung,thepublicandthepublicspherearetheverybasic‘places’wherejusticeisdiscussed.However,thecontemporarytheoriesofjusticeanddemocracy,althoughtakingintoaccountthefactofheterogene-ity,havestillnotadequatelymanagedtorespondtothekeyconclusionsofthepost-moderntheories.I.M.Youngbelievesthattherearetworeasonsforthis.
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Thefirstrelatestotherelianceofmoderntheoriesofjusticeanddemocracyonarestrictivewayof thinkingabout thepublicspherebyreferringto theparadigmof‘distributivejustice’.Distributivelogicdefinedbyliberalindi-vidualist theories,suchasJohnRawls’stheory, isbasedontheassumptionthathumanbeingsareprimarilyconsumers.Forthisreasonpoliticaldebatesarefocusedon“whatindividualpersonshave,howmuchtheyhave,andhowthatamountcomparedwithwhatotherindividualshave”.40Youngfindsthatthesecondreasonliesinthefactthattheofferedmodelsofdemocracy(e.g.deliberative democracy) are still based on universalistic assumptions thatcomeintoconflictwiththeheterogeneouspublic.
“Itstendencytorestrictdemocraticdiscussiontoargumentcarriesimplicitculturalbiasesthatcanleadtoexclusionsinpractice.Itsassumptionthatunityiseitherastartingpointorgoalofdemocraticdiscussion,moreover,mayalsohaveexclusionaryconsequences.”41
According toYoung’swords,deliberative theorists tend toshow, inanen-tirelyinappropriateway,thattheprocessofdiscussionthatshouldresultinunderstandingbeginswithsharedunderstandingortakesacommongoodasitsgoal.
“Deliberativetheorists,moreover,tendinappropriatelytoassumethatprocessesofdiscussionthataimtoreachunderstandingmusteitherbeginwithsharedunderstandingsortakeacommongoodastheirgoal.”42
Therefore,Youngsuggeststhatthedifferencesinculture,socialperspectivesor individual needs should be taken as ameans to reach understanding indemocraticdebates,andnotasthedifferencesthatneedtobeovercome.Ac-cordingly,thepublicshouldnotonlybeunderstood,butalsoacceptedashet-erogeneousandplural,includingalltheformsofcivilsocietythatmayoccurwithin it. InherworkDiversity and Democracy: Representing DifferencesCarolC.Gouldsaysthatjusticerequirestheretrievalofnegativefreedomintermsoftheequalpoliticalrights,aswellastheretrievalofpositivefreedomintermsofinsuringtheconditionsfortheimplementationofvariousformsofself-development.Ifthisistrue,thenjusticeentailsnotequalconditionsforall,butequivalentconditionsdeterminedbydifferentiatedneeds.
“Justicethenentailsarecognitionofandconsiderationforrelevantdifferences.Itseesequaltreatmentasinherentlyresponsivetoanddefinedbydifference.”43
Tryingtoproposeamoreadequatemodelofdemocracy,I.M.Youngdevel-opstheideaofso-calledcommunicativedemocracy.Communicativedemoc-racyassumesthatwhenenteringapublicspace,wecanneverknowwhomwewillmeetandwhatattitudethatpersonwillhave.Therefore,itisnecessarytoarticulatetheassumptionthatourattitudesmaychangedependingonwhomyoumeetinapublicspace.Itisabouttakingresponsibilityforstructuralin-justiceandreadinesstocooperatewithothersinordertoorganizeacollective
40
Christy Friend, “From the Contact Zone totheCity:IrisMarionYoungandCompositionTheory”, JAC 19 (4/1999), pp. 657–676, p.658.
41
IrisMarionYoung,“CommunicationandtheOther:BeyondDeliberativeDemocracy”,in:S.Benhabib(ed.),Democracy and Difference,pp.120–135,p.122.
42
Ibid.,p.120.
43
CarolC.Gould,“DiversityandDemocracy:Representing Differences”, in: S. Benhabib(ed.),Democracy and Difference, pp. 171–186,p.180.
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actiontochangethesestructures.44However,pointingoutstructuralinjusticeistheactthatpresupposespeople’sreadinesstochangethemselves.“Inthisprocesspeoplesowninitialpreferencesaretransformedfromsubjectivedesirestoob-jectiveclaimsandthecontentofthesepreferencesmustalsooftenchangetomakethempub-liclyspeakable,asclaimsofentitlementorwhat isright.Peoplesideasaboutthesolutiontocollectiveproblemsarealsosometimestransformedbylisteningtoandlearningaboutthepointofviewofothers.”45
Communicativedemocracyholdsthatdemocraticlegitimationrequiresthatalltowhomdemocraticdecisionsrelationsrefertoshouldbeincludedinthediscussionaboutthesedecisions.Theinitialsituationconsistsofthe‘recogni-tion’ofothersasequalandasdifferent.Ifpeoplehadthesameopinionsabouteverything,therewouldbenoneedforpolity.Polityappearswhenthereisaconflict.“Apolityconsistsofpeoplewholivetogether,whoarestuckwithoneanother.”46
However, in amodern societywe cannot assume that therewill be sharedunderstandingthatwecancalluponinconflictsituations.Thatwhichcommu-nitymembersneedtoagreeonaretheproceduralrulesoffairhearingandde-cision-making.AccordingtoYoung,thisisactuallythebasicprerequisitefortheestablishmentofcommunicativedemocracy.Otherconditionsare:signifi-cantinterdependenceandformallyequalrespect.47Whenspeakingabouttheassumptionofthecommongood,itisabouttheweakerconditionsthanthoseassumed.CriticshoweverclaimthatYoung’spolicyofdifferencesdestroystheideaofthecommongood.IntheopinionofJeanElshtain,viabledemocra-cypresupposesactivecitizensandactivecivilsocietyworkingtogetherinthepublicspiritthatseeksthecommongood.Citizenswhoadvocatedemocracyshouldaccepttheresponsibilityforandcommitmenttothecommunity,andthereforeleavebehindallwhatsetsthemapart.However,Elshtainarguesthatithasbeenincreasinglynoticedthatsocialmovementsandcivilsocietyac-tionsdonotadvocatethiskindofpublic-spiritedness.Quitetheopposite,thepoliticsofdifferencedestroysthepubliccommitmenttothecommongood.“Thesemovementshaveturnedpolitics intoacacophonyofself-interesteddemandsforrec-ognition and redress,wheregroupswithin their private identities areunwillingorunable tocommunicateandco-operate.”48
Youngrepliesthatsocialstructuresarethetruecauseofinjusticeinsocietysincetheseplaceindividualsinunequalpowerrelations,whichleadstounfairallocationofresourcesanddiscursivehegemony.Therequirementsofsocialgroupstoredefinethesocialstructuresactuallystandforthestruggleforequalstatusinsociety.Non-recognitionofdifferencesbysocialstructurescreatesandproducesinjusticeinsociety,whichthenleadstoconflictandinstabil-ityinademocraticorder.Democratic communicationisthebestresponsetotheseproblemsandconflictsbecauseitdoesnotcalluponthecommongood,buttakesintoaccountallthediversitiesthatexistinsociety.49Peoplewhoun-derstandthemeaningofsharingresponsibilitiesrealizewhyitissoimportanttoincludediversitiesinapublicdiscourse.Communicativedemocracydoesnotrequirereachingthecommonidentityanduniqueposition,butadvocatestherecognitionandacceptanceofaheterogeneouspublicwherediscussiontakesplacefromindividualpositions.“Different socialpositionsencounteroneanotherwith theawarenessof theirdifference.Thisdoesnotmeanthatwebelievewehavenosimilarities;differenceisnottotalotherness.Butitmeansthateachpositionisawarethatitdoesnotcomprehendtheperspectiveoftheothersdiffer-entlylocated,inthesensethatitcannotbeassimilatedintoone’sown.Thereisthussomethingto
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belearnedfromtheotherperspectivesastheycommunicatetheirmeaningsandperspectives,pre-ciselybecausetheperspectivesarebeyondoneanotherandnotreducibletoacommongood.”50
Seriouslyacceptingdifferencesinthepublicsphererequiresmuchmorethansimplyreformulatingtheprinciplesofequity.AccordingtoCarolC.Gould,itrequiresaradicalincreaseinopportunitiesforparticipationinthecontextofjointactivities.Thisdoesnotonlyrefertoparticipationinthepublicsphere,butalsotoinvolvementintheworkandactivitiesofalleconomic,socialandpoliticalspheres.“Thisincludesparticipationindecision-makingintheinstitutionsofwork,thatis,inthefirm,insocialandculturalinstitutions,aswellasincontextsofpoliticsandgovernment.Thiswouldalsoincludethevoluntaryassociations,socialmovements,andinformalgroupingsofthepublicsphere.ThustheconceptionhereofwhatIwouldcallthepublicdomainrepresentsabroaderarenaforactivitythanthatincludedonthediscursivemodel.”51
Inordertoachievethissituationinsocietyitisessentialtotransformsocialrelations,whichcantakeplaceinthreeways.Thefirstmethodassumesthatbyconfrontingdifferentperspectives, interestsandculturalmeanings,Igetnewknowledgeandnewexperiencesaboutmyownperspectives.Inthesitua-tionthatrequiressolvingsomecommonproblems,newchallengesappearthatputmyopinionsandargumentsatrisk.ThesechallengescreatetheneedinmethatI,withaviewtotherealizationofamorejustsociety,changemyownat-titudesandtheperceptionofself-interest.Thethirdwayisthetransformationofsocialrelationsinawaythattheexaminationandtheexpressionbecomethesocialknowledgeofallparticipants.Youngstatesthatparticipantsdonotabandontheirownperspectives,butbylisteningtoanddiscussingwithothersexpandthemwithnewknowledgeandexperiences.Wheninternalizingthemediatingunderstandingofapluralposition,participantsgetabroadpictureofsocialprocessesinwhichtheirpartialexperienceisbuiltin.52
Youngseesthepossibilityofachievingamorejustsocietyonlyifpubliclifeceasestobeblindtotherealdifferencesamongpeople.Justicekeepsvarioustheorieswithin the limitsofformalanduniversalprinciples thatdefine thecontext inwhich eachperson can achieve their personalgoalsbynotpre-ventingothersfromdoingthesame.AccordingtoM.J.Sandel,thisimpliesnotonlytoonarrowaconceptionofsociallife,buttoonarrowaconceptionofjusticeaswell.Asavirtue,justicecannotbeopposedtopersonalneeds,feelingsanddesires,butitratherstandsfortheinstitutionalconditionsthatallowpeopletomeettheirneedsandexpresstheirwishes.Thespecificneedsofeachpersoncanbeexpressedinaheterogeneouspublic.Letussuppose
44
IrisMarionYoung,Responsibility for Justice,OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork2011,p.112. doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195392388.001.0001.
45
I.M.Young,“CommunicationandtheOther”,p. 125.
46
Ibid.,p.126.
47
Ibid.
48
Jean Bethke Elshtain,Democracy on Trial,BasicBooks,NewYork1995,p.74.
49
I. M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p.87.
50
I.M.Young,“CommunicationandtheOther”,p. 127.
51
C. C.Gould,“DiversityandDemocracy”,p.181.
52
I. M.Young, “Communication and theOth-er”,p.18.
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thatsocialequalityisthegoalofsocialjustice.Equalityrefersnotonlytothedistributionofsocialgoods,butalsothefullparticipationandinvolvementofallgroupsandindividualsinthemajorinstitutionsofsociety.Thosewhoseeksocialequalitybelieve that thepolicy that isneutral towardsgroupsor thepolicythatdoesnottakeintoaccountthedifferencesamongthegroupsdoesnotcontributetotheircause.53
“Thecallto‘bejust’isalwayssituatedinconcretesocialandpoliticalpracticesthatprecedeandexceedthephilosopher.Thetraditionalefforttotranscendthatfinitudetowardauniversaltheory yields only finite constructswhich escape the appearance of contingency usually byrecastingthegivenasnecessary.”54
Iffairdemocraticdecision-makingisunderstoodasapolicyofinterpretingneeds, democratic institutions must facilitate the public expression of theneedsconcerningthosewhoaresociallymarginalizedorsubjectedtoculturalimperialism.Suchanexpressionisfacilitatedbytherepresentationofvariousgroupsinthepublicthroughcivilsociety’sactivities.AccordingtoYoung,democraticpublicshouldprovide:a)self-organizationofgroupmemberssothattheyachievecollectiveempowermentandareflec-tiveunderstandingoftheircollectiveexperienceandinterestsinthecontextof the society;b)groupanalysis andgroupgenerationofpolicyproposalsininstitutionalizedcontextswheredecisionmakersareobligedtoshowthattheirdeliberationshavetakengroupperspectivesintoconsideration;c)groupvetopowerregardingspecificpoliciesthataffectagroupdirectly.55
“Foranormtobejust,everyonewhofollowsitmustinprinciplehaveaneffectivevoiceinitsconsiderationandbeabletoagreetoitwithoutcoercion.Forasocialconditiontobejustitmustenablealltomeettheirneedsandexercisetheirfreedom;thusjusticerequiresthatallbeabletoexpresstheirneeds.”56
AccordingtoYoung,civilsocietyisthecentralareaforthefightagainstin-justice.NancyFraseronlypartiallyagreeswiththisidea.Shesaysthateventhebestorganizedcivilsocietyisnotanadequatetoolofrepresentationordemocraticlegitimizationforthereformofjustice.Theproblemisthatthesesocialformsdonothaveanadequatecapacitytoconverttheirowndemandsintopoliticaldecisions.Consequently,eventhoughtheyareabletointroducenewrequirementsinthepublicdebate,theyactuallyneedpoliticalsupportfortheirimplementation.57
I.M.Youngisindeedawareoftheproblem,butshebelievesthatinclusivedemocracycannotexistwithoutastronganddevelopedcivilsociety.Stateinstitutionsneedtobeinaconstantdialoguewiththecivilsociety.58
Conclusion
“Idon’tthinkthereisanyotherconceptthathelpsdescribethephenomenonofsocialmove-mentthatexistsacrossalargesegmentofamasssociety,raisingissuesandbeingabletocallpowerstructurestoaccount,andshiftingpublicopinion.Ithinkthat’swhattheconceptisabout.Everydaypoliticsisn’tusuallylikethat,buttherearemoments,notinfrequentmoments,whenyouseethepublicsphere.Anditdoesdependoncivilsocietyasaphenomenonandthefreedomthatthecivilsocietymakespossible.”59
IrisMarionYoungwasanactivistwholivedasshewrote:radicallyandwithemancipatory fervour, in every respect. In accordance with post-modernthinking,theauthorreveals,intermsoftime,apost-modernpoliticalthoughtthatissubstantiallystuckintheuniversalisticideologizationofthemodern.Suchapoliticalthoughtacceptsheterogeneityasanundeniablefact,butin
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itsattitudesitdoesnotmove,notevenastepfurther,fromthehomogeneityofopinions,viewsandexperiences.ThatispreciselywhatYoungcallsintoquestioninherphilosophy.Ifwewantafairersociety,thenwemustnotcloseoureyestotheinjusticeweencountereveryday.Formalisticapproachto justicedeceivesallofus,andLadyJustice,coveringhereyeswithherhandinthenameofimpartiality,actuallyparticipatesininjustice.AccordingtoYoung,justicedemandsmasks–thehandcoveringtheeyes–thebandage–toberemovedanddiversitytobeconfrontedeyetoeyewiththeidealofequality.Citizensarethosewhodecidewhatbelongstotheprivatesphereandwhatdoesnot.Domesticviolence,foralongtimedefinedasamatteroftheprivatesphere,becomes the topicof thepublic sphereonlyafter thevictimshavejoinedtogether,andthroughcivicassociationsappealedtopoliticiansviathepublicsphere.Thesamehappenedwithdisabledpeople,homosexualsandallmembersofsocialgroupswhohavebeenputasidebytheuniversalisticap-proachandmarginalizedbecauseoftheirdifferences.True,theyhavealwayshadtheirpoliticalrightsandfreedomsguaranteed,butcouldnotpracticethemfortheywerelabelledasdifferent.Young’sphilosophicalthoughtadvocatesthattheprivatesphere,civilsociety,thepublicsphereandthestateshouldbecloselyintertwined.Onlyinthiswaycandemocracyinademocracybereachedandthetyrannyofthepowerful,whetherminorityormajority,prevented.
Image 1:Relationsbetweenthespheres–interpenetrationandinterrelation
53
I.M.Young,Justice and the Politics of Difference,p.173.
54
Ibid.,p.5.
55
Ibid.,p.184.
56
Ibid.,p.34.
57
N.Fraser,“RethinkingthePublicSphere”,p.141.
58
I.M.Young,Inclusion and Democracy,p.157.
59
VlastaJalušič,MojcaPajnik,“WhenIThinkaboutMyselfasPoliticallyEngaged,IThinkof Myself as a Citizen: Interview with IrisMarionYoung”,in:AnnFerguson,MechthildNagel(ed.),Dancing with Iris: The Philosophy of Iris Marion Young,OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork2009,pp.21–32,p.32.
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Marita Brčić Kuljiš
Civilno društvo, javna sfera i pravednost u filozofiji Iris Marion Young
SažetakIris Marion Young prihvaća distinkciju na privatno i javno, ali negira društvenu podjelu na javnu i privatnu sferu, svaku s različitim vrstama institucija, aktivnosti i ljudskih osobina. Young privatno definira kao aspekt osobnog života i djelovanja iz kojeg, on ili ona, imaju pravo isključiti druge. Privatno nije ono što javno isključuje, nego ono što osoba sama odluči isključiti iz javne sfere. Prema Young, javnost je u demokratskom društvu heterogena. »Doista, u otvorenim i pristupačnim javnim mjestima i forumima, za očekivati je da ćemo susresti one koji su drugačiji, čija je društvena perspektiva, iskustvo i sklonost drugačija.« Važno obilježje razvijenog demokratskog društva razvijeno je civilno društvo. Civilno društvo odnosi se na dobrovoljna udruženja javnog života koji se razlikuje od države i gospodarstva, a koji omogućava prijenos problema privatnog života na dnevni red javnosti. Oni dobrovoljno – u smislu da nisu ovlašteni, ali ni vođeni od strane državnih institucija – već proizlaze iz svakodnevnog života i aktivnosti zajedničkih interesa. Razlikovanje dobrovoljnog udruženja od ekonomije i države omogućava još jasnije objasniti ulogu civilnog društva u promicanju društvene pravednosti.
Ključne riječiIrisMarionYoung,civilnodruštvo,demokracija,privatno,javnasfera,pravednost,voluntarizam
Marita Brčić Kuljiš
Zivilgesellschaft, öffentliche Sphäre und Gerechtigkeit in der Philosophie Iris Marion Youngs
ZusammenfassungIris Marion Young akzeptiert die Distinktion zwischen privat und öffentlich, verneint jedoch die gesellschaftliche Einteilung in öffentliche und private Sphäre mit jeweils unterschiedlichen Arten von Institutionen, Aktivitäten und menschlichen Eigenschaften. Young definiert „dasPrivate“ als den Aspekt des persönlichen Lebens und Handelns, wobei er oder sie das Recht haben, andere daraus auszuschließen. Privat ist nicht jenes, was das Öffentliche exkludiert, sondern jenes, was eine Person selbst von der öffentlichen Sphäre abzusondern beschließt. Young zufolge ist die Öffentlichkeit in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft heterogen. „Tatsächlich ist es in offenen und zugänglichen öffentlichen Plätzen und Foren zu erwarten, dass wir diejenigen treffen, die anders sind, deren soziale Perspektiven, Erfahrungen und Vorlieben unterschiedlich sind.“ Ein bedeutendes Merkmal einer entwickelten demokratischen Gesellschaft ist eine ausgebaute Zivilgesellschaft. Die Zivilgesellschaft bezieht sich auf freiwillige Vereinigungen des öffentlichen Lebens, das sich vom Staat und der Wirtschaft unterscheidet und die Übertragung von Problemen des Privatlebens auf die öffentliche Agenda ermöglicht. Sie gehen freiwillig – im Sinne, dass sie von staatlichen Institutionen weder bevollmächtigt noch geleitet werden – aus dem alltäglichen Leben und den Aktivitäten von gemeinsamen Interessen hervor. Die Unterscheidung zwischen einer freiwilligen Vereinigung und Wirtschaft sowie Staat bietet die Gelegenheit, die Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft bei der Förderung der SocialJusticenoch deutlicher zu erläutern.
SchlüsselwörterIrisMarionYoung,Zivilgesellschaft,Demokratie,Privates,öffentlicheSphäre,Gerechtigkeit,Volun-tarismus
SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA63(1/2017)pp.(121–137)
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Marita Brčić Kuljiš
La société civile, la sphère publique et la justice dans la philosophie d’Iris Marion Young
RésuméIris Marion Young accepte la distinction entre le privé et le public, mais refuse une division de la société en sphère publique et privée, chaque sphère étant caractérisée par des institutions, des activités et des propriétés humaines différentes. Young définit leprivé comme un aspect de la vie et de l’activité personnels à partir desquels, il ou elle, a le droit d’exclure les autres. Le privé n’est pas ce que le public exclut, mais ce que la personne ellemême décide d’exclure de la sphère publique. Selon Young, la sphère publique est hétérogène dans la société démocratique. « En effet, au sein des lieux et des forums publics ouverts et accessibles, nous nous attendons à rencontrer ceux qui sont différents, qui ont une perspective de la société, une expérience et des penchants différents ». La caractéristique importante d’une société démocratique avancée est la société civile avancée. La société civile se rapporte à des associations volontaires de la vie publique, et se distingue de l’État ou de l’économie, mais permet d’amener les problèmes de la vie privé à l’ordre du jour dans la sphère publique. Ces associations émergent spontanément – au sens où elles n’ont pas les pleins pouvoirs, et où elles ne sont pas dirigées par des institutions étatiques – de la vie quotidienne et des activités communes. Distinguer les associations volontaires de l’économie et de l’État permet d’expliquer plus clairement le rôle de la société civile dans l’acte de promouvoir la justice sociale.
Mots-clésIrisMarionYoung,sociétécivile,démocratie,privé,sphèrepublique,justice,volontarisme