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SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL STATE. SUBMISSION OF

EVIDENCE. SUBMISSION OF STATEMENTS.

YOUR HONOR, MR. FEDERAL JUDGE:

Angelina María Esther ABBONA, in my capacity as

Treasury Attorney-General of the Argentine Republic

[Procuradora del Tesoro de la Nación], appointed as such by

Executive Order No. 21 dated December 10, 2011 (published

in the Argentine Official Gazette on December 12 of said

month and year), copies of which are attached hereto,

domiciled at Posadas No. 1641, 1st floor, City of Buenos

Aires, herein represented by Deputies Treasury Attorney-

General of the Argentine Republic, Dr. Horacio Pedro DIEZ

and Dr. Javier PARGAMENT MARIASCH, appointed as such by

Executive Order No. 83/11 and 1723/13, respectively, both

published in the Argentine Official Gazettes dated December

12, 2011 and November 6, 2013, copies of which are attached

hereto, in case No. 777/2015 entitled ―Cristina Fernandez

de Kirchner s/ encubrimiento - Denuncia Fiscalía AMIA‖

pending before Clerk’s Office No. 5 of your Court, I hereby

appear before Your Honor and state:

- I –

SUBJECT MATTER

I hereby submit this complaint on behalf of the

Federal State before Your Honor, in accordance with the

organic laws that define and establish the powers of the

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Federal State Highest Administrative Law Body [Cuerpo de

Abogados del Estado Nacional] and, in particular, of the

Argentine Treasury Attorney-General’s Office (Laws No.

12954, 17516, 18777, 24946 –Title III- and 24667; Executive

Orders No. 34952/47, 411/80 – wording as per Executive

Order No. 1265/87 as amended).

In this sense, I hereby highlight that this submission

is made for strictly institutional purposes; and the goal

of it- I would like to note from the very beginning- is to

submit elements that I believe will be legally relevant to

shed light on the facts under which the criminal complaint

was made on January 14 of this year by the head of the

Special Investigation Unit for the Prosecutor´s Office

[Unidad Fiscal de Investigación] for the ―AMIA‖ case.

The purpose of this submission filed on behalf of the

Federal State is to support the legitimacy of the different

actions adopted by the National Executive and the bodies

depending on it, with respect to the Memorandum of

Understanding signed with the Islamic Republic of Iran; and

this complies with an official duty that requires the

submission of reports and documentation aimed at

investigating the facts that are the object of the

complaint; all this in strict compliance with the public

official duties that I have to observe.

Such duties, within the general framework regulating

the public official functions, are stated in the

obligations set forth in the Law of Ethics in the Exercise

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of the Public Official role [Ley de Ética en el Ejercicio

de la Función Pública] No. 25188 -v. art. 2º paragraph c)-

and, with respect to the functions of the Argentine

Treasury Attorney-General’s Office, they relate to the

powers related to the representation and sponsoring of the

Federal State in those cases of substantial importance.

The complaint to which I refer to was submitted by Dr.

Nisman within the framework of Case No. 3446/2012,

captioned ―Velazco, Carlos Alfredo y otros por abuso de

autoridad y violación de los deberes de funcionario

público‖, before the Federal Criminal and Correctional

Court No. 4 in and for the City of Buenos Aires, Clerk´s

Office No. 8 [Juzgado Nacional en lo Criminal y

Correccional Federal Nº 4, Secretaría Nº 8].

Given that the head of such Court declared himself

incompetent to hear the case based on such complaint, on

February 4, 2015 the Appellate Court decided that the

investigation be submitted before this Court No. 3 presided

by your Honor.

Referring again to the subject matter of this

submission, I hereby highlight that due to its

institutional nature, it shall not be considered, of

course, as a submission that represents, strictly speaking,

none of those have been included in such complaint.

The purpose of this submission is, however, to provide

elements of judgment and documentary background which will

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undoubtedly serve for an expedited investigation of the

facts under investigation by this Court; thus the Executive

complies with the duty to cooperate with the work carried

out by the Judiciary in pursuit of the investigation of the

facts complained of.

In this regard, I state at the outset that, together

with this submission, we will provide Your Honor evidence

that I believe is of upmost legal importance in order to

show the unfounded nature of the complaint presented by Dr.

Nisman.

I refer to the reports and documentary background

received, produced and/or submitted by the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and Worship, Ministry of Federal Planning,

Public Investment and Services, Ministry of Economy and

Public Finance, by the Intelligence Secretariat of the

Presidency’s Office and by the Federal Administration of

Public Revenue (AFIP, in Spanish), which content will be

detailed later on but, it is worth mentioning here that,

they will shed light on crucial facts and circumstances

within the context of the complaint, thereby removing

support to the main aspects of the latter.

- II –

SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT SUBMITTED BY DOCTOR NISMAN

I must point out here that the assessments made in

some parts of this submission, based on the attached

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elements of proof that contradict central aspects of the

complainant´s version, will be presented with due respect

to who was the head of the Special Investigation Unit for

the Prosecutor´s Office [Unidad Fiscal de Investigación]

for the ―AMIA‖ case. This last point in no way rules out

neither the submission of elements that may clarify the

facts in a completely different way from that set forth in

the complaint nor condition the discussion on the theories

advanced by the complainant.

Having clarified this, it is worth mentioning that it

is in fact not an easy task to summarize the submission of

the head of the Special Investigation Unit for the

Prosecutor´s Office [Unidad Fiscal de Investigación] for

the ―AMIA‖ case, for in a submission consisting of 289

pages, he reported a complex network of events-some of

which were real, many of them hypothetical, and others

clearly false in light of the evidence provided here-, as

well as developed an intricate scheme of subjective

interpretations with respect to the scope of these events.

Notwithstanding such complexity, resorting to the

―Conclusions‖ that the complainant himself made in Chapter

VII, at 265 et seq of his submission, we can observe that

the Argentine President, Doctora Cristina Elisabet

Fernández de Kirchner, was accused of having allegedly

designed and performed a criminal plan intended to remove

the accused Iranian nationals off the Case on the attack

against AMIA´s headquarters with the intention to secure

their impunity.

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Such scheme, according to the complaint, derived from

the decision to improve the geopolitical association and

restore business relations with the Islamic Republic of

Iran, in particular with the purpose of mitigating the

energetic crises of our country by resorting to the

exchange of Argentine grains for Iranian oil.

According to Dr. Nisman´s submission, the

implementation of such plan was in charge, mainly, of the

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Mr. Héctor Marcos

Timerman, who allegedly initiated negotiations both

secretly and publicly with authorities of the Government of

Iran in order to secure the impunity of the Iranian

nationals accused in the ―AMIA‖ case.

The complaint highlights that obtaining the

cancellation of the red notices of Interpol, which involve

five Iranian accused, was the nub of the criminal scheme.

It adds that the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding

dated January 27, 2013 by Ministers of Foreign Affairs of

the Argentine Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran,

was the most visible means for achieving said purpose, for

that instrument was created as an instrument to grant

impunity to those involved within the context of a

concealment maneuver.

Moreover, the complaint adds that the referred to

Memorandum involves the creation of a so-called ―Truth

Commission‖, created with the purpose of arriving at

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predetermined conclusions to avoid the incrimination of the

accused Iranian nationals; this also being supplemented by

the fictitious creation of a new lead or hypothesis

regarding the author of the AMIA attack on July 18, 1994

with the purpose of avoiding the investigations made in the

pertaining judicial case.

The complaint also mentions that Mr. Luis Ángel

D’Elía, Jorge Alejandro ―Yussuf‖ Khalil, Fernando Esteche,

Andrés Larroque (Member of the Argentine National House of

Representatives), Héctor Luis Yrimia and an Intelligence

agent known as ―Allan‖, nickname of whom may allegedly be

Ramón Allan Héctor Bogado, have been participants of this

alleged criminal conspiracy.

The latter ones, as spokesmen of the parties involved

o as parties representing the interests at stake, would

have developed different actions to achieve the purpose of

concealing those allegedly responsible for the attack

against AMIA.

Based on the facts briefly referred to in Chapter VIII

of the complaint (under Title ―Breves consideraciones

normativas‖, and in barely less than three pages starting

at page 280), Doctor Nisman framed the alleged conduct

within the criminal descriptions mentioned in articles 277

–subsections 1º and 3º-, 241 –subsection 2º- and 248 of the

Argentine Criminal Code: concealment, impairment or

obstruction to the compliance of functional acts inherent

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to a public official and violation of the public official

duties.

- III –

THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN

THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

OF IRAN.

ITS SCOPE AND PURPOSE.

1. General considerations.

As already explained, the complaint argues that,

although it has not been the only instrument intended to

accomplish its ends, signing the Memorandum of

Understanding was the ―most visible‖ way, that ―had a main

role in the concealment maneuver‖ developed by ―the

associates of the criminal plan to obtain the cancellation

of the red notices issued by Interpol‖ (Doctor Nisman’s

Complaint, at 266).

A detailed reading of Doctor Nisman´s complaint

reveals that, effectively, the abovementioned Memorandum

has a main role, decisive in the report developed by the

complainant regarding the criminal framework that,

according to him, was established.

The Memorandum is so important to the complaint under

consideration, that it could be easily argued that once

every doubt surrounding the misleading interpretations of

the complainant regarding the content and purpose of that

international instrument are cleared, it will also be clear

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that neither its signing nor its preparatory or

ratification acts can constitute a crime.

As previously advanced, and developed in further

detail below, the documents attached to the present

submission are important as to the purposes indicated in

the previous paragraph.

In this vein, it is necessary to make some general

considerations regarding the Memorandum of Understanding

executed by the Argentine Republic and the Islamic Republic

of Iran, approved by our country through Law No. 26.843.

Now; the following considerations require a

preliminary clarification.

It is not the purpose of this submission –

particularly, of the following remarks- to open a debate

regarding the constitutionality of Law No. 26.843 and the

bilateral international agreement approved by that law.

That question is the subject matter of the Case

captioned ―Amparo Ley 16.986 Damnificado: Asociación Mutual

Israelita Argentina – Dr. Brofman Miguel (AMIA) y otros‖

(Record No. 3184/2013), currently under consideration by

the Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation [Cámara Federal

de Casación Penal].

That process for the protection of constitutional

rights [Amparo] was submitted by Asociación Mutual

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Israelita Argentina (AMIA) and Delegación de Asociaciones

Israelitas Argentinas (DAIA). In that process the judge was

requested to declare the unconstitutionality of Law No.

26.843 and the Memorandum of Understanding.

It is worth mentioning that the Judge of the Federal

Criminal and Correctional Court in and for the City of

Buenos Aires No. 6 [Juzgado Nacional en lo Criminal y

Correccional Federal Nº 6] dismissed such requests, in the

context of the referred action for the protection of

constitutional rights [Amparo] on December 4, 2013.

Afterwards, the aforementioned entities and the head

of the Investigation Unit of the Prosecutor’s Office in the

―AMIA‖ Case appealed that judgment and, on May 15, 2014,

Panel I of the Federal Criminal and Correctional Appeals

Court upheld the claims of the appellants, and declared the

unconstitutionality of both the Memorandum of Understanding

and the law that approved this Memorandum.

The Federal State submitted a Cassation Appeal against

that judgment, which was granted and is still under

consideration of the Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation.

Hence, there is no final or binding decision on this

regard.

In any case, it is clear that because of an evident

procedural principle this case cannot become the scenario

of a debate already initiated in another proceeding.

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However, it is crystal clear that whatever final

decision is adopted by the Federal Chamber of Criminal

Cassation or, eventually, the Argentine Supreme Court of

Justice –even if it follows the judgment of the Appeals

Chamber- the alleged crimes pointed in the complaint in no

way would be constituted.

In effect, the Memorandum of Understanding may deserve

diverse political considerations, even conflicting views in

the context of what can be considered legally debatable;

that is evident in light of the different conclusions

reached by the judge of the trial court and the two judges

of the appellate court.

But even from the point of view of the judgment –which

is not final- delivered on May 15, 2014 by the Federal

Criminal and Correctional Appellate Court, the Memorandum

of Understanding could be objected –position that, I

clarify, the Federal State has not agreed with- because of

a potential adverse effect on the constitutional powers of

the Judiciary and the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

However, that in no way could involve a crime by

itself. And, something important to the present case, it

would not reflect under any point of view the existence of

intent. And, even less, the existence of an act that may

imply the beginning of the execution of a crime with the

purpose of the alleged avoidance of incrimination of the

Iranian nationals included in the red notices of Interpol.

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That issue will be considered again later; so far,

however, it is enough to mention that in the judgment

delivered on December 4, 2013, the Judge of the Federal

Criminal and Correctional Court in and for the City of

Buenos Aires No. 6 [Juzgado Nacional en lo Criminal y

Correccional Federal Nº 6] assessed with extreme clarity

that:

―… it is not proved in the record of the case the existence

of the alleged injury –current or imminent- regarding the

cancellation of the red notices because of the alleged

interference and obstruction that was allegedly verified in

this case because of the notice sent to INTERPol, as

established in article 7, as agreed” (pursuant article 7 of

the Memorandum, that established the notification to the

Secretary General of Interpol of the signing of the

agreement; emphasis added).

In that vein, it must be highlighted that although the

Appellate Court adopted a different decision than that of

the Trial Court, such decision was grounded, essentially,

on a different appreciation of the incidence that the Truth

Commission [Comisión de la Verdad] –foreseen in the

Memorandum- would have regarding the constitutional powers

of the Judiciary and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. But

the Appellate Court never considered that the Memorandum

approved by Law No. 26.843 would endanger the full force of

the red notices issued by Interpol.

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There we must focus because, undoubtedly, it

constitutes the very core of the criminal hypothesis

developed by Doctor Nisman in his complaint.

Because of that, and as anticipated, the content,

scope and purpose of the Memorandum must be detailed, since

–as developed below- its text clearly contradicts the

criminal maneuver alleged in the complaint, which is based

in a groundless and arbitrary hypothesis that disregards

the content of the mentioned agreement, to accord –through

a groundless construction- a different sense than the

literal meaning of the text, as signed by the Ministers of

Foreign Affairs of both countries.

2. The efforts of the National Executive at the local

and international level in connection with the “AMIA” Case.

In Message No. 173/2013 sent by Argentina’s President

to the Honorable Congress, together with the bill for the

approval of the Memorandum of Understanding between the

Argentine Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran,

mention was made of the different collaborative efforts by

the National Executive since Dr. Néstor C. Kirchner took

office as President of the country, both at the domestic

and the international level, aimed at contributing to and

facilitating the investigation of the AMIA attack, and

finding the responsible parties.

Indeed, at the domestic level and within the scope of

its authority, the National Executive issued different

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decrees with a view to lending as much collaboration as

possible to the task of the courts.

On 5 June 2003 Decree No. 146 was issued "... with a

view to accomplishing full investigation of the attack

perpetrated against the ASOCIACION MUTUAL ISRAELITA

ARGENTINA (A.M.I.A.) on 18 July 1994" (first paragraph of

the Recitals; emphasis added). By means of Article 1,

Federal Oral Court in Criminal Matters No. 3 in and for the

City of Buenos Aires was empowered to give access to the

parties in Case No. 487/00 of all the records in the

summary proceedings commenced by means of Resolution No.

540/00 issued by the former Intelligence Secretariat of the

State.

In addition, by means of Decrees No. 249 of 24 June

2003 and 291 of 30 June 2003, the former officials of the

Intelligence Secretariat were released of their obligation

to keep secrecy so that they might testify in the Case, and

it was reaffirmed that " … the Federal Government is

committed to and firmly intent upon contributing to the

investigation of the events, cooperating with the judicial

investigation being conducted in connection with the attack

perpetrated against the ASOCIACION MUTUAL ISRAELITA

ARGENTINA (A.M.I.A.) on 18 July 1994" (paragraph 10 of the

Recitals, Decree No. 291/03; emphasis added).

Likewise, by means of Decree No. 398 of 21 July 2003,

the Federal Government reiterated its intent to give

maximum cooperation to the courts’ task (paragraph 2 of the

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Recitals) and, by means of Article 1, the Ministry of

Justice, Security and Human Rights was instructed to adopt

all necessary measures for the judge in charge of Federal

Criminal and Correctional Court No. 9 in and for the City

of Buenos Aires to have access to the ―classified‖

information in the possession of the Argentina Federal

Police, the National Gendarmerie and the Argentine Naval

Prefecture, "in order to investigate the attack perpetrated

against the ASOCIACION MUTUAL ISRAELITA ARGENTINA

(A.M.I.A.)" (Art. 1; emphasis added).

As a supplement thereto, by means of Decrees No. 785,

786 and 787, all of them issued on September 17, 2003,

access was authorized to the database of the Argentine

Federal Police, the National Gendarmerie and the Naval

Prefecture, as well as to any instrumentality, agency or

force of the Federal Administration; and access was

authorized to the documentation and database in the

Intelligence Secretariat concerning the attack perpetrated

against the AMIA headquarters and the Embassy of Israel.

In particular, and sharing the statements of the

Special Joint Legislative Committee on the Follow-up of the

Investigation of the Attacks against the Embassy of Israel

and AMIA, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Recital of Decree No.

787/2003 stated: "...that the issue goes beyond the

singular approach given to a case whereby a crime is

investigated, in order to become an issue of institutional

gravity where the capabilities of the Federal State to

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achieve justice are put to the test, as well as the intent

of the governmental authorities to investigate the event”.

"Therefore, the issue concerns the whole of the

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, and involves not only the JUDICIARY in

charge of trying the case, but also the LEGISLATIVE AND

EXECUTIVE BRANCHES, given that it must be the will of the

Nation supported as a State policy the one that must foster

the capabilities of all and everybody which is part

thereof, in order to investigate the criminal actions which

are the most serious of all that have affected the national

community since the restauration of democracy" (emphasis

added).

Further, at the international level the Executive has

demanded international cooperation on an uninterrupted

basis in order to ascertain the truth within the framework

of the investigation of the attack against AMIA.

In this connection, mention must be made of the

messages to the International Community, since the 58th

General Assembly of the United Nations in 2003. As from

2008, Argentina’s President acting for the first time in

such capacity before the General Assembly of the United

Nations, renewed, year after year, the complaint and the

demand for solidarity and commitment of the whole

international community to ―Truth and Justice‖ in the

―AMIA‖ case.

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Particularly, during the 68th United Nations General

Assembly of September 24, 2013, the President stated the

following: ―…10 years have passed since, for the first

time, who was the President of Argentina since May 25,

2003, the President Néstor Kirchner, requested to the

Islamic Republic of Iran, in this very room, cooperation in

the judicial investigation‖.1

3. The “AMIA” Case: the ineffectiveness of the

previous means of international cooperation.

Since the attack to the AMIA Headquarters, both the

Federal Criminal and Correctional Courts in and for the

City of Buenos Aires No. 6 and No. 9 and the Special

Investigation Unit for the Prosecutor’s Office [Unidad

Fiscal para la Investigación] for the attack against the

AMIA headquarters, issued about twenty (20) requests of

legal assistance to the Iranian authorities, as the record

of the ―AMIA‖ Case shows.

The record also shows that information regarding

Iranian nationals (such as official passports issued,

background, immigration movements, bank accounts, real

state, telephone accounts, lists of calls from specific

numbers and pre-judgment attachments, among others) was

repeatedly requested through the international legal

cooperation mechanism. Additionally, the preventive custody

of the persons for whom an arrest warrant has been issued

was requested.

1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D8Ez1BlfkAg&noredirect=1

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The Islamic Republic of Iran, as an answer, voiced

extensive criticisms and attacks against the Argentine

investigation, and pointed that since there is no

cooperation agreement on legal issues, it was not obliged

to comply with such requests.

The Islamic Republic of Iran literally asserted the

following: ―Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the

Argentine Republic there is no cooperation agreement on

judicial issues (official letters) and according to

applicable international treaties, none of the two

countries is consequently obliged to process such requests‖

(letter dated October 4, 2008, signed by Prosecutor of the

Public Tribunal of Teheran Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscal del

Tribunal Público de la Fiscalía de Teherán], delivered by

the Embassy of the Argentine Republic in the Islamic

Republic of Iran through Note No. 164/2008, dated October

8, 2008; emphasis added).

Nevertheless, as the record of the ―AMIA‖ Case shows,

the requests of cooperation sent to Iran included an offer

of reciprocity by the Judiciary of the Argentine Republic.

Regarding particularly the preventive custodies

requested through diplomatic letters, the Iranian

authorities held that ―The Law of Extradition of the

Islamic Republic of Iran forbids the extradition of Iranian

nationals to other governments‖ (Note No. 641/7128, dated

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April 13, 2008, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

Islamic Republic of Iran).

One of the circumstances that, no doubt, shows the

difficulties for the progress of the ―AMIA‖ Case through

international legal cooperation, was the rejection of the

request for extradition of the Iranian national Hadi

Soleimanpour that took place in the framework of the

Extradition Treaty between the Argentine Republic and the

United Kingdom.

Such request was denied by the British authorities,

which considered that the request did not comply with the

prima facie requirements of evidence established by the

United Kingdom, regardless of the voluminous material that

had been provided; on that regard, it is herein attached

the pertinent pieces of evidence.

The difficulties that existed in the scenario prior to

the execution of the Memorandum of Understanding for the

implementation of effective resources within the framework

of legal cooperation between the Argentine Republic and the

Islamic Republic of Iran are shown in different Interpol

press release.

Thus, on September 14, 2009, Interpol noted the

stagnation of the cooperation between the two States, and

expressed its concern for the search of a way to obtain

evidence so that the investigation on the attack against

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the ―AMIA‖ and the prosecution of its authors could go

forward.2

The pertaining communication indicated that both the

Prosecutor in charge of the Investigation Unit of the AMIA

case and the Iranian authorities had encouraged the General

Secretary of Interpol to act as a diplomatic mediator in an

intent to ―help both parties to cooperate in this matter‖.

Shortly after, a Communication dated November 3,

20093, also issued by the Press Centre of Interpol,

mentions that by virtue of a proposal made by the General

Secretary of Interpol, Ronald K. Noble, such international

organization was to invite the Argentine and Iranian

authorities to a meeting to be held in the Office of

Interpol in Lyon, France, with the purpose of considering

the possibility that the trial for the AMIA case would be

held in a third State.

The referred to communication points out that the

General Secretary was invited both by the Prosecutor in the

AMIA case and the Iranian authorities to develop a

―Kissinger- style diplomacy‖, in an attempt for the parties

to cooperate in this matter. However, the communication

clarifies that at that time Interpol still did not intend

2 September 14, 2009, the Head of INTERPOL will meet with Iranian and

Argentinean officials to encourage the cooperation on the

investigation of the terrorist attack against AMIA,

http://www.interpol.int/es/Centro-de-prensa/Noticias/2009/PR084 3 November 3, 2009, The head of INTERPOL proposes a path to unblock the

investigation on the terrorist attack against AMIA,

http://www.interpol.int/es/Centro-de-prensa/Noticias/2009/PR101/

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to request the help of a third State to unblock the

situation. The communication adds that any proposal of this

kind would require official consultations with both parties

and their agreement.

A latter communication issued by the cited

organization dated March 12, 20104, described the continued

state of stagnation, i.e., of the ―quagmire‖ in which the

relationship between both States was placed as refers legal

cooperation.

Taking into account that the several requests

delivered to the Islamic Republic of Iran since the

beginning of the investigation were unsuccessful, such

failure to comply with international obligations created a

dispute between the two States. Such dispute must be

settled peacefully, as required under international law.

4. Obligations of States regarding International Legal

Cooperation.

International Legal Cooperation regarding criminal

matters is the mechanism through which the international

community faces crime in general and, especially,

transnational organized crime.

4 March 12, 2010, INTERPOL hosts a meeting between Argentina and Iran in order

to easy the dialogue on the terrorist attack against AMIA occurred 15 years

ago, http://www.interpol.int/es/layout/set/print/Centro-de-

prensa/Noticias/2010/PR018

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That tool, essential for the peaceful international

coexistence, is an obligation among States, as established

in both international treaties and binding decisions of

competent international organizations.

It could be argued that there are different kinds of

Treaties that establish the legal basis to request

international cooperation in criminal and extradition

matters. In a first group, specific conventions on

extradition among two States may be mentioned. In other

words, bilateral treaties on criminal5 and extradition

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assistance, entered into by States to cooperate in the

context of criminal investigations.

In another group we find regional Treaties7 that

regulate the cooperation dynamics among States.

Multilateral conventions of action against specific crimes8

could also be mentioned. These treaties, among other

5 The Argentine Republic has entered into Treaties on judicial assistance

regarding criminal matters with Australia, Canada, Colombia, Korea, El

Salvador, Spain, United States, France, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Portugal and

Switzerland. 6 The Argentine Republic has entered into Treaties on judicial assistance

regarding extradition with Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Korea, Spain, United

States, Mexico, the Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru, United Kingdom, Switzerland

and Uruguay. 7 Regarding judicial assistance, Argentina is bound by the Protocol on

Reciprocal Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters of Mercosur, the Agreement

on Reciprocal Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters of Mercosur, Bolivia and

Chile, the Inter-American Convention on Reciprocal Assistance regarding

Criminal Matters.

Regarding extradition, the Treaty of International Criminal Law (Montevideo,

1889) and the Inter-American Treaty regarding Extradition (Montevideo, 1933)

are in force. 8 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances, United Nations Convention against Transnational

Organized Crime and its Protocols, UN Convention against Corruption, Inter-

American Convention against Corruption, OECD Convention on combating Bribery

of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, among

others.

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obligations, usually include the obligation to cooperate in

judicial investigations.

At the beginning of the 90’s, the United Nations

Security Council considered international terrorism as a

―threat to international peace and security‖ (Resolution

No. 731(1992)9, second paragraph, preamble). Since then, by

virtue of its ―primary‖ power as established in article 24,

paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter,10 the Security

Council has issued specific decisions regarding acts of

terrorism, including the attack against the AMIA

headquarters, and has also issued resolutions that

establish general obligations to all States regarding the

fight against terrorism.11

On July 29, 1994, the members of the United Nations

Security Council, through a statement of its President

(S/PRST/1994/40), stated that they: ―strongly condemn the

terrorist attack which took place in Buenos Aires,

Argentina on 18 July 1994, which resulted in great loss of

human life‖, ―express their sympathy and condolences to the

victims and their families and to the people and Government

of Argentina, who have suffered the consequences of this

terrorist act‖, and ―stress the need to strengthen

international cooperation in order to take full and

9 http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=S/RES/731%20(1992)

10 Article 24, paragraph 1, United Nations Charter: ―In order to ensure prompt

and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security

Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and

security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility

the Security Council acts on their behalf.‖ 11 Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, ―The Members of the United Nations

agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in

accordance with the present Charter.‖.

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effective measures to prevent, combat and eliminate all

forms of terrorism, which affect the international

community as a whole.‖12 (emphasis added).

Moreover, through Resolution 1373 (2001) the Security

Council decided to create a Committee against Terrorism and

established obligations for all State Parties to the United

Nations. Among these obligations, it was established that:

―all States shall: f) Afford one another the greatest

measure of assistance in connection with criminal

investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the

financing or support of terrorist acts, including

assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession

necessary for the proceedings”. In that sense, through that

very same decision, the Security Council called upon all

States to ―Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and

multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and

suppress terrorist attacks and take action against

perpetrators of such acts‖13 (emphasis added).

In conclusion, international judicial cooperation

entails a duty to all States, and its legal source are

both: international treaties and decisions adopted by

competent international organs.

The Argentine Supreme Court of Justice also recognized

that disregarding the obligations on international judicial

cooperation, as established in the mentioned treaties, may

12 http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=S/PRST/1994/40

13 http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=S/RES/1373%20(2001)

25

entail the international responsibility of the Argentina

Republic.14

In consequence, non-compliance by the Islamic Republic

of Iran with the international judicial cooperation rules

as detailed above, results in an international dispute

between the Argentine Republic and that country.

That dispute has legal effects in international law.

One of its fundamental rules, as codified in the Principles

of the United Nations Charter, is the obligation to settle

international disputes peacefully. In that regard, article

2, paragraph 3 of the United Nations Charter establishes:

―The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of

the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in

accordance with the following Principles: (…) 3.

All Members shall settle their international

disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that

international peace and security, and justice, are

not endangered.‖

In the judgment delivered in the case Mavrommatis

Palestine Concessions (1924), the Permanent Court of

International Justice, predecessor to the International

Court of Justice, set a precedent that was later confirmed

by subsequent international judgments, affirming that ―A

dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a

14 CSJN ―Ralph, Nelson Eliseo s/ extradición en Causa "Jefe de Operaciones

Dpto. Interpol s/ captura.‖ Fallos 323:3055.

26

conflict of legal views or of interests between two

persons.‖ (emphasis added).

Most International Tribunals have confirmed such

definition of the term ―Dispute‖, as established in the

Mavrommatis case by the Permanent Court of International

Justice. Among many others, judgments and decisions

delivered by the International Court of Justice; ICSID

Tribunals; the International Tribunal for the Law of the

Sea; the Permanent Review Court of Mercosur; and the Iran-

US Claims Tribunal, confirm the above mentioned concept.15

Verified the existence of an international dispute, it

must be stated that the States parties to the dispute are

obliged to settle it pacifically.

5. The goal of the Memorandum as an instrument for

international legal cooperation.

15 International Tribunals that applied that concept of Dispute:

International Court of Justice – Examples: Ethiopia and Liberia v. South

Africa (1962); Congo v. Belgium (2002); Nicaragua v. Honduras (2007);

Liechtenstein v. Germany, Preliminary Objections (2011), among many

others.

ICSID – Examples: Teinver v. Argentina (ARB/09/1), decision on

jurisdiction, ¶119 (2012); Pan American Energy v. Argentina (ARB/03/13),

decision on preliminary objections, ¶80 (2006); Vieira v. Chile

(ARB/04/7), award, ¶ 245 (2007); among many others.

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea – Examples: New Zealand

and Australia v. Japan, decision on interim measures, ¶44 (1999).

Iran-US Claims Tribunal: Case A-18, Award 32-A18-FT, §2.2.a; Iran v.

United States, (A-15), partial award 306-A15(I:G)-FT; among others.

Permanent Review Court of Mercosur: Argentina v. Brazil, Award III

(2000); Uruguay v. Brazil, Award X (2005).

27

As regards the Memorandum of Understanding entered

into by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the

Islamic Republic of Iran and the Argentine Republic on

January 27, 2013, it is worth mentioning as a

preliminary matter that its very name entails the

recognition of the existence of the ―terrorist attack‖

perpetrated against the ―AMIA‖ headquarters in 1994

and the admission of a ―dispute‖ between both States,

as already noted above, given that the name of the

agreement contains the term ―Understanding‖, which

presupposes the pre-existence of a disagreement

between such States.

The content of the Memorandum of Understanding shows,

from the Executive Branch point of view, the best

equilibrium reached between the positions of one and

another country in order to accomplish the fulfillment of

obligations on international legal cooperation and the

international dispute settlements, a goal that had been

frustrated until the execution of the agreement.

The National Congress shared this point of view and

gave its approval to the Memorandum through Law Nº 26,843.

In the mentioned Message Nº 173/13 sent by the

President of Argentina to the Honorable Congress, she

highlighted the following extract: ―Regardless of these

attacks to the agreement, a person who sincerely analyses

the topic will be able to see that the option to it was the

continuance of the claim while accepting the truth of never

28

having any development through such mean. That was the easy

way. It was about not trying anything new to evade any

risk. For that reason, the case was destined to be frozen.

It was about faking developments and knowing that nothing

would be achieved. From the very moment in which we were

claiming for a dialogue and cooperation with Iran, we

thought that we could be able to make some progress or, at

least, to obtain more support for our cause for justice of

the claim until it became irresistible. It was never about

empty claims. It was perseverance in order to obtain

justice. This Memorandum means a step in order to improve

the situation and to reach some development that allows us

to find the truth and punish the perpetrators”; and,

finally, the Message states: ―[The Memorandum of

Understanding] respects and preserves the judicial

authority, and provides it with assurances to obtain

results…” (emphasis added).

In this sense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

Worship emphasized this point during the plenary meeting of

the Commission of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Commission

of Constitutional Affairs and Commission of Justice of the

Honorable Federal House of Representatives on February 26,

2013: ―The Agreement that we just executed with the Islamic

Republic of Iran refers precisely to this matter

(international legal cooperation), in which Argentina is a

particularly active country, and is specifically aimed at

making up for the need of Argentine justice, which had

obstacles due to the lack of willingness to cooperate on

the Iranian side. It is a tool that the Argentinean

29

Judicial Branch did not have in order to be able to

continue to comply with the mandate provided for in our

National Constitution in connection with the AMIA Case‖

(Emphasis added).

The mechanisms for the international settlement of

disputes are implemented through agreements negotiated and

executed by the national Executive in accordance with the

power distribution between the different State branches-

article 99, paragraph 11 of the Argentine Constitution-.

This is what the National Executive did on January 27, 2013

when, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship,

it signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the Iranian

Government.

Likewise, when approving this instrument, the

Honorable Congress, did so based on its power given by

article 75 paragraph 22 of our National Constitution.

This Memorandum sets forth a path to peacefully

resolve the international dispute that separates the

Argentine Republic from that country. All this, in

compliance with an obligation imposed by international law.

As can be observed, the intent of the Argentine State

when signing the Memorandum of Understanding and its

legislative approval, was to grant to the Argentine

Judiciary an adequate, appropriate and proportionate tool

of international legal cooperation in order to allow the

Judiciary to make progress in the investigation of the

30

events and the subsequent conviction of those rendered

guilty for the crimes investigated in the ―AMIA‖ case.

In this sense, the informant member of the majority in

the session of the House of Representatives dated February

27, 2013, Representative Carmona, stated: ―As to the

interests, we want the accused Iranian citizens to be

interrogated [presten declaración indagatoria]. This is the

main objective of this agreement‖.16

There are numerous examples of judges in our country

that performed and continue to perform different measures,

procedural acts and conduct interrogations, outside the

territory of our Nation, for the purposes of making

progress in the investigation of all types of cases.

The Memorandum has in no manner replaced or altered

the work of the courts, but it was one more tool intended

to make the conduct of judicial acts possible in order to

make progress in the investigation.

In sum, positions were sought to be balanced taking

into account the objective of our country and the responses

that all the authorities, executive, judicial and

legislative, owe to the victims and the community as a

whole.

- IV –

THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE CRIMES COMPLAINED OF

16 Available at http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/sesionesxml/provisorias/130-24.htm.

31

1. In a very brief legal analysis (Chapter VIII, at

280 -282 of the respective writing), the submission of the

General Prosecutor charges the accused parties with the

commission of the crimes set forth in Articles 277,

paragraphs 1 and 3, sub-paragraph d); 241, paragraph 2; and

248, of the Criminal Code of the Argentine Republic; as

pointed out earlier.

The criminal complaint then presupposes the existence

of conduct that amounts to the commission of the crimes of

concealment, with the respective aggravating circumstance

in the case of the public officials involved; impediment or

hindrance of public official acts inherent to the

administration of justice; and violation of the public

official duties inherent to the offices of the public

officials charged with such crimes.

It was also noted that, according to the complainant,

the crime of concealment was reflected in a ―plan‖ aimed to

obtain the cancellation of the Interpol red notices with

respect to the accused Iranians, as a step necessary to

unlink such accused persons from further investigation; all

of this with a view to other objectives, which were

essentially commercial in nature.

2. Prior to further considerations of the criminal

framing of the events referred to in the complaint, it must

be noted that, in different passages of the complaint, it

is acknowledged that the execution of the Memorandum of

32

Understanding and its subsequent approval by means of Law

No. 26843 were effected under the framework of the

constitutional powers of the National Executive and the

Honorable Argentine Congress; and that such actions took

place in the exercise of powers of a political nature,

related to the conduct of the Argentine Republic’s foreign

affairs, the assessment of which is outside the

jurisdiction of the Judiciary (e.g., at 59 of the

complaint, last paragraph of Chapter III; at 83, second

paragraph of item b); at 101, second to last paragraph).

It should also be noted that the complaint indicates

that the case involves a network of actions which, examined

in isolation, would not result in the commission of crimes,

but that constitute crimes when analyzed as a whole (at 71

of the complaint, item a.3).

This means that we would be in the presence of a chain

of actions whose lawfulness would not be objectionable if

analyzed in isolation, but they would be criminal in nature

when they are considered together.

This improper interpretation contained in the

complaint, which would render criminal the sum of a set of

actions which are, in themselves, unobjectionable—some of

which are even characterized as non-justiciable political

acts given that they concern the execution of an

international treaty (possibly on the basis of the doctrine

of Argentina’s Supreme Court of Justice in Fallos [Supreme

Court Decisions] 306:1125: 311:2580 and others) is based

33

on, according to the account provided in the complaint, the

existence of an allegedly concealed goal, with the object–

as noted above-to avoid incrimination of the Iranian

citizens accused in connection with the ―AMIA‖ Case.

3. The question then arises as to which were the

elements on which the claimant based his judgment, that is,

the evidence that, at least prima facie, could lead to the

presumption that a crime has been committed.

The complaint repeatedly states that a secret

agreement was in place to cancel the Interpol red notices;

and that, by means of previously reached conclusions, the

Truth Commission [Comisión de la Verdad] set forth under

the Memorandum of Agreement, would secure the impunity of

all the accused Iranian nationals.

According to the complainant, such meeting of the

minds between the representatives of both States was

decided upon, as far as the Argentine Government is

concerned, by the President of the Argentine Republic; and

implemented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship,

who is alleged to have secretly met with his Iranian

counterpart in January 2011 in the city of Alepo, Syria,

where they agreed on the basis of the criminal ―plan‖.

The alleged evidence for the complaint is, in all

cases, of an indirect nature, and is based on statements

made by third parties, most of them obtained by means of

wiretapped conversations.

34

However, it is self-evident that such ―indicia‖,

considered by the complainant from a subjective assessment

of the facts with the aim of preparing the complaint, are

not even sufficient to amount to a mere hint of criminal

activity.

More importantly, such interpretation openly collides

with objective elements of proof, which Your Honor will no

doubt properly assess.

The referred to evidence includes the pieces detailed

below, coupled with the elements of judgment attached to

this submission and which constitute the basis therefor.

In this connection, it should be noted that, when it

comes to assessing the intent of the public officials of

the Argentine Government that executed the Memorandum of

Understanding, the first interpretative source of the

Memorandum is the very language of such bilateral

instrument.

There are virtually no legal issues that are not

subject to opinion. Needless to say, the Memorandum is no

exception. However, it can be stated, with no hesitation,

that the express language of the Memorandum does not

contain any provisions that limit the powers of the judge

hearing the ―AMIA‖ case in order to decide the course of

the proceedings; nor does it contemplate the cancellation

35

of Interpol red notices that arise simply because of the

execution of the referred to bilateral agreement.

In this latter sense, it should be noted that Article

7 of the Memorandum only provided for the communication of

the document to Interpol’s General Secretariat so as to

make such international organization aware of the

agreement; however, such communication did not modify in

any manner the status of the red notices, this being an

issue that obviously was completely outside the powers of

the National Executive. Any decision in that regard had to

be made by the Judge hearing the case, to be then put to

Interpol’s consideration.

In this connection, in informing Interpol of the execution

of the Memorandum- as set forth in article 7- the parties

complied with a reasonably implicit commitment to such

international organization, given Interpol´s efforts to

even achieve a legal cooperation agreement between both

States. Reference has already been made in Chapter III,

item 3 hereof to said efforts, of which the then head of

the Investigation Unit of the Prosecutor´s Office in the

―AMIA‖ case was aware.

The fact is that, as already noted in Chapter III,

item 1 hereof, the judge hearing the ―AMIA― case, in

rendering a decision in the case entitled ―Amparo Ley

16.986 Damnificado: Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina –

Dr. Brofman Miguel (AMIA) y otros‖ (File No. 3184/2013),

held that ―…no proof has been furnished in the record of

36

the case concerning the existence of the—current and

imminent—harm invoked in connection with the cancellation

of the red notices by reason of the alleged interference

and obstruction purportedly verified in this case due to

the notice given to INTERPol in compliance with Article

7º‖.

It is self-evident that not only did the very Judge

hearing in the “AMIA” Case consider that his powers were

not constrained for defining the position of the Iranian

citizens, but he also held that the execution of the

Memorandum had no bearing on the red notices, the

effectiveness of which was not adversely affected in any

manner.

For the purposes hereof, it must be stressed that

almost immediately after the execution of the Memorandum of

Understanding (signed on January 27, 2013), more precisely

on February, 15 of that year, the Minister of Foreign

Affairs and Worship sent a communication to Interpol’s

Secretary General, Mr. Ronald K. Noble, to advise him of

the execution of the Memorandum.

In the second paragraph of such communication (a copy

of which is attached hereto), the Minister made the

following statements:

―In addition, pursuant to the applicable rules, any

change in the requirements for international arrest

duly put forward to INTERPOL from Argentina in

37

connection with the serious crimes investigated in

the AMIA case, may only be made by the Argentine

judge hearing such case, Dr. Rodolfo Canicoba

Corral, in the care of Federal Criminal and

Correctional Court No. 6 in and for the City of

Buenos Aires [Juzgado Nacional en lo Criminal y

Correccional Federal Nº 6]. That means that the

execution of the Memorandum of Understanding, its

potential approval by the relevant bodies of both

States and its prospective effectiveness do not

result in any changes for the applicable criminal

proceedings, or in the status of the requirements

for the referred to international arrests…‖ (the

signature of Héctor Timerman, Minister of Foreign

Affairs and Worship, is attached thereafter;

emphasis added).

The question then arises as to what is the basis for

attributing the party signing the Memorandum on behalf of

the Argentine Government a criminal intent, which is

completely at odds with the intent that arises not only

from the language of the agreement, but also from the

letter transmitted by the Argentine Minister of Foreign

Affairs and Worship to advise Interpol of its execution?

(it clearly arising from this letter what was the

interpretation under which the Argentine authorities

reached an agreement with their Iranian counterparts).

It should also be mentioned that Interpol interpreted

the provisions of the Memorandum in the same manner. This

38

is evinced by the letter dated March 15, 2013 (a copy of

which is also attached hereto), signed by the Legal Counsel

of the referred to international organization, Joël

Sellier, who on behalf of the Office of Legal Affairs of

Interpol’s General Secretariat stated that ―… said

agreement does not imply any changes in the status of the

red notices published in connection with the crimes

investigated in the AMIA case…‖; and that ―… the referred

to agreement is a positive development for the

investigation of the case…” (emphasis added).

Considering the referred communication of the

Legal Counsel of Interpol, the Argentine Minister of

Foreign Affairs sent a communication again to the Secretary

General of such international organization dated March 21,

2013 (a copy of which is attached hereto) stating that: ―…

As explained on different occasions, the red notices in the

“AMIA” Case were issued at the request of the Argentine

Justice and approved by the General Assembly of Interpol.

Its effectiveness has been essential to the recent progress

achieved. The agreement reached with Iran, if approved by

the Parliament of that country, as has been approved by the

Argentine Congress, will allow, for the first time, the

interrogation of the suspects by the Argentine judicial

authorities that conduct the judicial proceedings …‖

(emphasis added).

In sum, the exchange of letters between the Argentine

Foreign Affairs Ministry and Interpol following the

execution of the Memorandum of Understanding shows that

39

both the authorities of the Argentine Government and the

international organization were fully aware of the fact

that the status of the red notices would remain unchanged

and that in the opinion of Interpol a cooperation agreement

with such characteristics was beneficial to the

investigation in the ―AMIA‖ case.

To clear any and all doubts, should any remain, it is

to be noted that the letter sent by the then Secretary

General of Interpol, Ronald K. Noble, to the Minister of

Foreign Affairs and Worship on January 16, 2015 became

publicly available; that is, shortly after Prosecutor

Nisman filed the complaint subject-matter of this

submission.

The letter from Mr. Noble, attached hereto in English

and Spanish, states as follows:

―… While I was INTERPOL Secretary General, on each

occasion that you and I spoke with and saw one

another in relation to the INTERPOL Red Notices

issued in connection to the AMIA case, you stated

that INTERPOL should keep the Red Notices in

force. Your position and that of the Argentinean

government was consistent and unwavering.

I specifically recall when we spoke on the

telephone following the media reports in Argentina

and Iran that falsely implied that the Memorandum

of Understanding entered into between Argentina and

Iran in January 2013 affected the validity of the

40

INTERPOL Red Notices. I made clear to you orally

and later in writing that INTERPOL welcomed any

efforts by Argentina and Iran to cooperate on the

AMIA case. You asked that INTERPOL state in writing

whether the Red Notices remained unchanged, valid

and in effect. On 13 March 2013, INTERPOL’s

General Counsel stated unequivocally in writing

that the validity and status of the Red Notices

remained unaffected.

In May 2013, you visited INTERPOL Headquarters to

identify ways in which INTERPOL and Argentina could

reinforce their cooperation on police

matters. Once again, the issue of AMIA and the

INTERPOL Red Notices were raised by you. You asked

that INTERPOL make clear that any efforts on the

part of Argentina and Iran to cooperate on the AMIA

case in concrete ways should not affect the

validity of the INTERPOL Red Notices. You

expressly stated that Argentina’s President,

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, you as Minister of

Foreign Affairs and the entire government of

Argentina remained 100% committed to the INTERPOL

Red Notices remaining in effect.

On 26 November 2013, you visited INTERPOL

Headquarters and you updated me and INTERPOL on the

developments with regard to implementation of the

Memorandum of Understanding entered into between

Iran and Argentina in January 2013. You reiterated

that the Government of Argentina’s position that

41

the INTERPOL Red Notices should remain in effect

rests unchanged; they should remain valid.

Finally, just last November 2014 during INTERPOL’s

General Assembly in Monaco, you reaffirmed your

personal and the Government of Argentina’s

commitment to the INTERPOL Red Notices remaining in

effect while at the same time trying to do

everything in your power to make sure that real

progress was made in this investigation. I recall

how passionately you spoke once again of the

victims and their loved ones who have suffered so

deeply and who deserve to see the investigation

advance…‖ (emphasis added).

Thus, the interpretation of the complaint is bizarre

when attributing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

Worship the role of the principal executor of a decision

made by the President of Argentina aimed at cancelling the

red notices and accomplishing impunity of the Iranian

nationals accused in the ―AMIA‖ Case. That is so to the

extent that the acts of the Minister of Foreign Affairs

have had a clear meaning and goal expressed by way of

relevant legal conduct, which is clearly contrary to the

criminal purpose attributed by the complaint.

The complaint on the basis of the crime of

concealment, through a criminal plan aimed at not punishing

the Iranian nationals that have been accused, losses all

sense when merely reading the documents mentioned above,

42

which are objective pieces that negate the contents of the

complaint submitted by Doctor Nisman.

I will not delve into the analysis of the complex

issue of distinguishing between preliminary acts –which are

often not punished- and acts that imply the commencement of

the execution of a crime, all of which exceeds the subject

matter of the present submission. That is one of the most

debated matters in the criminal area (Zaffaroni, Eugenio

Raúl, Tratado de Derecho Penal, Ed. EDIAR, Bs. As. 1982,

General Part, T. IV, at 444 et seq.).

In any event, what should be taken into account is

whether there has been any conduct that has had any direct

connection with the typical behavior foreseen in the

pertinent criminal description. That is, whether there is

any act performed by the author in conformity with the

criminal plan -whatever that is-, which is tightly related

to the performance of the criminal description (Zaffaroni,

op. cit., at 453).

It is clear that the person who, in the complaint, is

accused of being the principal of perpetrating the criminal

plan aimed at accomplishing impunity of the accused Iranian

nationals, i.e. the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs,

based on a supposed mandate given by the President of

Argentina, acted in a completely different manner of that

which is required by the criminal description.

43

The ―concealment with an aimed to obtain a personal

favor‖ [―encubrimiento por favorecimiento personal‖] (under

the criminal description in the complaint requires that the

author assist someone to evade the investigation or to

avoid being subject to the power of the authorities (conf.

Criminal Code, art. 277.1.a; Donna, Edgardo Alberto,

Delitos contra la Administración Pública, Ed. Rubinzal

Culzoni, Santa Fe, 2000, at 479 et seq.). For purposes of

this brief analysis, I will not address herein those

situations to which referred the other items of such rule

to the extent that they are clearly not relevant for this

case since they include hypothesis of ―concealment with an

aimed to obtain an actual benefit‖ [―encubrimiento por

favorecimiento real‖].

Then, which has been the ―assistance‖, i.e. the

behavior directly and immediately related to the criminal

description, provided by the Argentinean authorities to the

accused Iranian nationals? The answer is obvious: none. The

Argentinean authorities have repeatedly and consistently

made clear that the signature of the Memorandum did not

imply the cancellation of the red notices, and that any

future decision on the subject matter was to be taken by

the judge of the ―AMIA‖ Case.

The documental evidence annexed to the present

submission supplement without any doubt the express text of

the Memorandum, and is conclusive to the extent that it

allows to easily concluding that there has been no criminal

act since there has been no ―assistance‖ to the accused.

44

In the face of these objective elements, the complaint

builds the presumption that there has been a criminal plan

aimed at accomplishing the impunity of the accused Iranian

nationals based on indicia derived from a document that the

reporter José Eliaschev would have been accessed to had he

being alive and a few telephone calls between people with

no authority to act on behalf of the Argentine Government

in the negotiation and implementation of the Memorandum of

Understanding.

We will now move to look at these matters with more

detail.

At some point in time, Mr. Eliaschev stated that he

had accessed to a document through which a superior

official of the Iranian Government (Minister Salehi) had

informed to the Iranian authorities that supposedly the

Argentine Republic had lost interest in investigating the

AMIA headquarters attack in exchange of favoring the

economic relationship between the two countries (for

instance, Complaint, at 68 and 69).

Mr. Eliaschev’s death in November 2014 does not allow

us to have new certainty on his side. However, it is clear

that, in light of the express text of the complaint, that

Eliaschev had access to an alleged document that would have

showed the unilateral interpretation of an Iranian official

that would have been made regarding the Argentine

Government position in this matter.

45

On the contrary, the complaint does not allow to

concluding that Eliaschev would have had access to any

element of evidence that in a direct manner would have

reflected the position of the authorities of our country in

the sense expressed by Minister Salehi. That would have

obviously been impossible considering that the firm

position of the Argentine authorities has been expressed in

this submission, written on not only the documentary

evidence attached herein but also the administrative acts

and legal rules referred to in this submission.

In addition, the complaint purports to support the

thesis of an alleged concealment in a series of

conversations held by people who, as already mentioned,

were not and are not legally entitled to act on behalf of

the Argentine Republic in negotiating at the international

level, which was the case with the execution of the

Memorandum of Understanding.

The statements made by those people are also

intentionally ambiguous. They cannot even be considered as

indicia to prove the allegedly criminal facts, over which

the clear evidence attached herein brings light.

Also, the idea that the wiretapped of such

conversations has allowed to discovering in fraganti the

participants of the criminal scheme, who have been

surprised by the interception of the telephone calls

without having been provided any notice in advance, turns

46

trivial since in some of those conversations the

participants themselves expressed to have knowledge of the

fact that they had been followed. In that regard, see for

instance statement at 145 of the Complaint when Khalil, who

is introduced as a permanent and principal “spokesman” of

the Iranian interests in this plot, affirms to clearly know

that the telephone call was intercepted. This latter part,

by itself, makes the quotation of the complainant devoid of

any meaning.

Furthermore, in some of those conversations there is a

principal that is identified as an agent of intelligence of

the Argentine Government, called ―Allan‖ (supposedly Ramón

Allan Héctor Bogado).

Among the pieces of evidence attached hereto, there is

a report prepared by the Intelligence Secretariat of the

Argentine President´s Office that shows that the person

mentioned above has not been and is not an agent of that

agency; and that he has even been accused by the

Secretariat because of illegally making use of official

powers that he does not have.

It arises from the abovementioned documentation that

the criminal complaint with respect to the actions of Mr.

Bogado was ordered by the Intelligence Secretariat of the

Argentine President´s Office and filed on November 12,

2014; that is to say, before the head of the Investigation

Unit of the Prosecutor´s Office in the ―AMIA‖ case filed

the complaint subject matter of this submission, in which

47

he seeks to state that Bogado is a State Intelligence Agent

and at the same time the government´s informal

representative (operador) within the context of the alleged

criminal scheme.

It should also be mentioned that the complaint made by

the Intelligence Secretariat of the Argentine President´s

Office was filed with Federal Criminal and Correctional

Court No. 9 in and for the City of Buenos Aires, Clerk´s

Office No. 18 under Case No. 11503/14.

The evidence submitted by the abomentioned Secretariat

also shows that Mr. Héctor Yrimia has not been and is not

an agent of that Intelligence Secretariat. This also

renders ineffective the statements in the complaint filed

by the head of the Investigation Unit of the Prosecutor´s

Office in the ―AMIA‖ case, through which Yrimia was

attributed a role analogous to that of Bogado.

Some of those conversations would allow, within the

fantasy of the complaint, to prove the goal sought with the

execution of the Memorandum of Understanding and the

subsequent impunity of the accused Iranian nationals: the

exchange of Argentinean grains of production for Iranian

oil, the latter being aimed at mitigating the allegedly

energetic crises.

In that regard, the official technical reports herein

attached that have been prepared by the ministerial

authorities that are competent based on the subject matters

48

involved, provide elements of judgment that clearly and

conclusively discredit the basis of the alleged criminal

scheme described in the complaint.

In this regard, by means of a Letter dated February 9,

2015, the Minister of Federal Planning, Public Investment

and Services pointed out that there was never a power

crisis or emergency that, purportedly, led the Argentine

authorities to privilege the re-emergence of relations with

the Islamic Republic of Iran, in order to obtain Iranian

oil.

However, in addition, the report of the Minister of

that area, explains that there were technical reasons why

the Argentine Republic could not purchase Iranian oil,

given that the quality of Iranian crude oil does not comply

with the requirements of the local refineries; in this

regard, such report highlights that Iranian oil is inferior

to the quality of the oil produced in certain Argentine

basins, which even produce balances for export.

On the other hand, together with Letter No. 22 dated

February 10, 2015, the Minister of Economy and Public

Finances submitted the information and statistics related

to the trade exchange between the Argentine Republic and

the Islamic Republic of Iran for the period 2003-2014. This

was based on studies prepared by the Secretariat of

Economic Policy and Development Planning reporting to that

Ministry.

49

This report describes that the trade exchange is made

by persons -private persons- not by the States among

themselves.

Further, the report states that in 2009 Argentine

exports to Iran had a drastic reduction, following which

they increased again in 2010, reaching a record in exports.

However, according to FAO (the source of the Reports

prepared by the Ministry of Economy) the re-emergence of

the trade relations is closely linked to the changes in

Iran’s domestic food supply –caused by climates

inconveniences and scarce harvests resulting from a

significant draught-. Iran has historically been affected

by a strong external dependence in order to cover the needs

of its population.

The report also points out that for those periods, in

which commerce with Iran has decreased –for example, as

from 2011-, this has been due to a recovery in Iran’s

domestic food production, as pointed out by the FAO

reports.

It arises from the foregoing that during the years in

which the wiretapped conversations intercepted by the

prosecutor in charge of the Investigation Unit in the

―AMIA‖ Case took place, Iran actually did not need to

purchase additional food-related products for its

population.

50

Similarly, the Letter from the Federal Administrator

of Public Revenues [―Administrador Federal de Ingresos

Públicos‖] dated February 9, 2015 includes data in

connection with definitive exports for consumption made

from the Argentine Republic to the Islamic Republic of

Iran.

The mentioned letter was submitted, in digital format,

with a full detailed list of export destinations made

during the period 1/1/99-1/15/15 as well as the pertinent

customs clearance number of each product.

That document, as explained in the Letter, shows that

during the presidential administration of Néstor C.

Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner the National

State did not made any export operation to the Islamic

Republic of Iran; which confirms the statement contained in

the report of the Ministry of Economy in the sense that

private operators, not the States, are in charge of

bilateral commerce.

It is pertinent to make a reference to the unlikely

readings that could be made of the interpretations

contained in the complaint in connection with the

statements of those who participated in the mentioned

telephone calls as well as the statements contained in the

document that Mr. Eliaschev would have had accessed to.

Instead of assuming the obvious understanding, i.e.

that certain persons who acted invoking Iranian interests

51

adopted their own interpretation of the goals sought with

the agreement –an interpretation that differs from the one

adopted by the Argentine public officials-, Prosecutor

Nisman opted for attributing to these officials a criminal

intent based on the assumption that they acted following

objectives that supposedly were being sought by the persons

referred to in the first place.

Henceforth, a fictional scheme is built and rests on

an initial premise -i.e. the cancellation of the red

notices for the execution of an impunity plan- which is

belied by the mere reading of the Memorandum of

Understanding and the letters exchanged between Interpol

and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the

Argentine Republic.

Some of the indicia considered as the alleged evidence

of the fantastical criminal plan do not withstand the

slightest scrutiny. For instance, the alleged fabrication

of a new false clue as to the responsibility in the AMIA

headquarters attack (see, for instance, Complaint, at 128,

second para.; 131 et seq.), is trivial if one considers

that the implementation of a scheme of such magnitude would

only have been possible with the acquiescence of the Judge

of the ―AMIA‖ Case and the complainant himself who, as the

head of the Special Investigation Unit for the Prosecutor’s

Office in the ―AMIA‖ Case, would have been able to

dismantle the alleged scheme.

52

Other alleged indicia, such as the reserve with which

the negotiation leading to the signature of the Memorandum

was held, or the lack of participation in such process of

entities representing victims, in no way constitute

criminal conduct. This is the practice in this type of

negotiations and, on the other hand, the debate at the

national level on the legitimacy of the Memorandum took

place in its natural scenario, which is the Federal

Congress. In that scenario, parties with an interest were

listened to as well as those people with political and

legal points of view that differ from the ones of the

National Government. Therefore, it cannot be stated that

the mentioned document was conceived in a non-transparent

context or, even less, in disregard of those proceedings

that our constitutional order foresees for the conclusion

of international agreements.

The truth is that the complaint does not provide any

objective evidence, even less indicia, on the existence of

a hypothetical secret agreement between Argentine and

Iranian authorities, through which these countries would

have agreed the implementation of a criminal plan of

concealment. It is worth mentioning once again that such

evidence was not presented and will never be presented

since such criminal collusion simply does not exist.

4. Certain observations may be made here on the

contents of the complaint as regards the crime of

impediment or hindrance of the acts of a public official,

codified in article 241, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.

53

In accordance with chapter VIII of the complaint (page

281), this crime would have taken place because there was

an attack against freedom in the exercise of the public

function, in the case the judicial activities relating to

the ―AMIA‖ case.

The complaint points out that the normal development

of such activities were at least ―… hindered by the

implementation of a plan destined to conceal … a group of

indicted persons accused of participating in the … act of

terrorism…‖ consisting in the attack against the

headquarters of AMIA.

In this regard, the complaint states that since the

Memorandum was signed –which Memorandum is supposedly vital

in the scheme of concealment–, the normal exchange of

information and evidence in the framework of the mechanisms

of international judicial cooperation was affected, which

are necessary for the investigation in the ―AMIA‖ case.

The complaint adds that, since the Memorandum provides

the submission of the documents of the case to the so

called ―Truth Commission‖, the entities and agencies of

other countries were reluctant to continue cooperating,

since they thought their contributions were destined to be

conveyed to the Iranian authorities.

54

With that reasoning, the complaint states that the

crime codified in the referred to article 241, paragraph 2

of the Penal Code, took place.

As the doctrine teaches, the core of this crime is to

impede or hinder an official act. This, through schemes,

tricks, or by misleading the public official; the provision

also includes the case of resistance in which the criminal,

instead of reacting against the execution of an official

order, hinders or fraudulently prevents the public official

from effecting the act or puts obstacles to it. On the

other hand, it is a crime of result, that requires the

criminal to succeed in impeding or hindering the public

official in effecting an official act (Donna, op. cit.,

page 107 et seq; D’Alessio, Andrés José –Director- y otros,

Código Penal de la Nación. Comentado y anotado, T. II, Ed.

FEDYE, Bs. As., 2009, page 1192 et seq).

In this regard, it goes without saying that the

complaint presents no evidence that the alleged harm took

place in the terms required by the elements of the crime,

that is the reluctance of other countries to continue

collaborating in the ―AMIA‖ case, with the ensuing

obstruction of the investigation.

It is just a speculation, fabricated on the basis of

an argument that is also legally unsustainable.

Perhaps the complaint assumes that, had the

interrogation of the indicted Iranians by the Argentine

55

judicial taken place without the intervention of the Truth

Commission, whose creation was foreseen by the Memorandum

of Understanding, the evidence in the file would not have

come to the knowledge of the Iranian authorities. This

assumption is senseless, given that the indicted persons

have been officials of the Iranian government.

Would something had prevented them from sharing with

the authorities of their government, who defended the

position of the accused throughout the years –denying their

extradition-, all the details of the ―AMIA‖ case on the

basis of which the respective requests were formulated? The

response is obviously negative.

And a further question may be added. Would it have

been possible, hypothetically, to interrogate the accused

Iranian nationals before the Argentine Judiciary without

them having access to all the evidence in the file,

including that obtained through international judicial

cooperation? Except if the complaint assumed that in our

legal system a proceeding inspired in Kakfa’s ―The Trial‖,

a negative response is also required here.

In what way did the signing of the Memorandum preclude

or hinder the flow information toward the ―AMIA‖ case? In

no way. If anything, the obstacle or hindrance could not

have been substantially different from the one that would

have been caused by the accused Iranians having access to

the file, in case they would be interrogated by the

Argentine Judiciary. And it is obvious that such access

56

would have been inevitable, lest the most basic due process

rights be violated (art. 18 of our Constitution).

In any case, it is telling that the Judge of the

―AMIA‖ case –I am referring to the Judge of the Criminal

Court Nº 6-, upon rendering his decision on 4 December 2013

in the amparo proceeding commenced by AMIA and DAIA to

obtain the declaration of unconstitutionality of the

Memorandum of Understanding and of Law Nº 26.843, did not

raise any objection based upon the fact that that

instrument –that had been signed almost a year before- had

impeded or hindered his judicial functions.

The above stated leads one to conclude that there has

been not even a shred of conduct that could be

characterized as the crime codified in article 241,

paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.

5. It remains to add certain additional observations

on what it is affirmed in the complaint about the crime of

breach of the public official’s duties.

In one paragraph of the complaint (see page 281, first

part, of the respective filing), it is stated with respect

to the accused that are public officials, that ―… one or

more of the attributed actions …‖ (sic) constitute the

crime foreseen in art. 248 of the Penal Code, ―… given the

specific functional duties that were not complied with

during the course of the criminal act …‖.

57

That is the end of the analysis contained in the

complaint with respect to this alleged crime, in respect of

which no precision is provided as to which of the

activities in question would constitute a breach of the

functional duties.

It would seem, therefore, that the complaint involves

a group of crimes, since the official duties that would

have been breached are not identified in an autonomous way,

leaving aside the conducts that are also considered other

crimes as analyzed in the preceding sections.

Once more, this aspect of the complaint is discredited

throughout this submission and the evidence attached

hereto, in the sense that what was done by the members of

the different organs of the National Government who

intervened in the negotiation and subsequent approval of

the Memorandum of Understanding was strictly in accordance

with constitutional provisions.

- V –

EVIDENCE

In accordance with the aforesaid, I hereby submit the

following evidence:

1 – Note from the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

Worship, dated 11 February, 2015, and its attached

documents. All of them submitted in order to show the

58

legitimacy of all the acts carried out by the National

Government regarding the Memorandum of Understanding

entered into with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2 - Documents (with their respective unofficial

translations) that show the extradition request presented

by the Argentine Republic with respect to the Iranian

national Hadi Soleimanpour, which was rejected by the

British authorities.

3 – Note Nº 641/7128 of 13 April 2008 of the Iranian

Ministry of External Affairs (with a non-official

translation), in which it is indicated that the extradition

law of that nation prohibits the extradition of Iranian

nationals to other States.

4 – Note of 4 October 2008, signed by the Prosecutor of the

Public Tribunal of Tehran, sent by the Embassy of the

Argentine Republic in the Islamic Republic of Iran through

Note Nº 164/2008, of 8 October 2008; from this note it

results that between the two nations there is no

cooperation agreement in judicial matters, so that, in

accordance with the referred to Prosecutor’s criteria,

neither of the two countries is obliged to process requests

of that sort.

5 – Interpol Press Releases dated 14 September 2009, 3

November 2009, and 12 March 2010, through which Interpol

informed about the significant obstacles for the progress

of the requirements presented by the Argentine Republic to

59

the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the framework of the

mechanisms of international cooperation.

6 – Copy of Message N° 173 of 7 February 2013 with which

the National Executive Power sent to the Honorable National

Congress the bill later adopted as Law Nº 26.843.

7 – Note of 15 February 2013, through which the Minister of

Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Argentine Republic

addressed the then Interpol’s Secretary-General –Mr. Ronald

K. Noble-, informing him about the conclusion of the

Memorandum of Understanding. There it is stated that the

entry into force of said instrument will not cause any

change in the applicable criminal proceeding, nor on the

status of international arrest warrants (red notices)

issued in relation to the ―AMIA‖ Case.

8 – Note of 15 March 2013, signed by the Legal Counsel of

Interpol’s Secretary-General. There it is stated, in

relation to the communication sent to this international

organization as a result of the conclusion of the

Memorandum of Understanding, that this agreement will not

mean any change in the status of the red notices published

in relation to the crimes investigated in the ―AMIA‖ Case.

9 – Note of 21 March 2013 sent by the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and Worship to the former Secretary-General of

Interpol, Mr. Ronald K. Noble, acknowledging receipt of the

note received from the Legal Counsel of this international

organization and reminding that the fact that the red

60

notices remained in force had been vital for the progress

of the investigations.

10 – Address by Dra. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner,

President of the Argentine Republic, on 24 September 2013,

during the 68th General Assembly of the United Nations.

11 - Note of 16 January 2015 (in English and Spanish), sent

by the former Secretary General of Interpol, Mr. Ronald K.

Noble, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of

the Argentine Government. In this communication it is

indicated that always, and in a firm and consistent manner,

before and after the signing of the Memorandum of

Understanding, the Argentine government indicated that

Interpol should maintain the red notices in force. Given

that this communication was sent from an email address of

the Secretary of External Relations, Eduardo Zuain, I

request that the necessary measures are adopted so that

confidentiality is maintained with respect to the email

addresses of the sender and addressee.

12 - Note Nº 22 of 10 February 2015, signed by the Minister

of Economy and Public Finances. With it, the information

and statistics of the trade between Argentina and Iran

during the period 2003-2014 was provided, on the basis of

the studies of the Secretary of Economic Policy and

Development Planning.

From this information it can be concluded that the trade

takes place between private entities and not between the

61

governments; and that after 2010 Argentine exports to Iran

have declined.

13 – Note of the Federal Administrator of Public Revenues

of 9 February 2015, relating to the definitive exports for

consumption performed by the Argentine Republic destined to

the Islamic Republic of Iran. I attach hereto, in digital

format, a complete list, detailing the destinations, of the

exports performed between 1/1/99 and 15/1/15, as well as

the corresponding customs clearance number of the product.

From this it results that during the administrations of

Néstor C. Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner the

National Government entered into no export transaction

destined to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

14 – Note of the Ministry of Federal Planning, Public

Investment and Services dated 9 February 2015, with respect

to the energy situation during the administrations of

Néstor C. Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.

From this it results the non-existence of an energy crisis,

and that there existed technical reasons that prevented the

Argentine Republic from buying oil of Iranian origin,

because this oil does not comply with the quality required

by the local refineries; in this sense, the report

highlights that the quality of the Iranian oil is inferior

to that produced in certain Argentine basins, from which

exportable balances exist.

15 – Copy of the Note of 20 January 2015, addressed by the

Secretary of Intelligence of the National Presidency to the

62

National Criminal and Corrective Court Nº 4 of the City of

Buenos Aires, in response to the letter sent in the Case Nº

3446/12 styled ―Velasco, Carlos Alfredo y otros s/abuso de

autoridad y violación de los deberes de funcionario

público‖; and attached evidence. From them it results that

Messrs. Ramón Allan Bogado y Héctor Yrimia do not work for

the Intelligence Secretariat, and that the former has been

accused of usurping the character of state intelligence

agent.

- VI –

CONCLUSION

In light of the elements of judgment and rules and

regulations set forth in this submission, I consider that

the following has been duly proven:

- Under the administrations of Néstor C. Kirchner

and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the Government of

Argentina has maintained a clear and unwavering position in

the international arena, particularly in its addresses

before the General Assembly of the United Nations,

demanding that the Islamic Republic of Iran provide

effective cooperation for the purposes of determining who

are the parties responsible for the terrorist attack

perpetrated against the ―AMIA‖ headquarters on 18 July

1994.

- The Memorandum of Understanding executed on

January 27, 2013 between the representatives of the

Argentine Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran was

63

agreed upon and approved by means of Law No. 26843,

pursuant to the procedures set forth by the Argentina’s

National Constitution for the execution of international

instruments of such kind.

- All the acts and measures, and in general all the

actions of the Federal Government in connection with the

Memorandum of Understanding, are in compliance with the

applicable rules and regulations on the matter.

- Through the execution of the above-mentioned

agreement, the Argentine Government sought to further the

progress of the ―AMIA‖ case, the conduct of which was

seriously hindered by the impossibility to obtain a pre-

trial declaration of several Iranian citizens accused

within the framework of such case. Such impossibility was

caused by the non-existence of previous bilateral

agreements which were binding on the Islamic Republic of

Iran for the purposes of extradition of said persons.

- Neither the language of the Memorandum of

Understanding nor the actions of the authorities of the

Argentine government prior to, concomitant with, or

following the execution of the agreement allow inferring

that an agreement was in place with an objective other than

the one previously mentioned.

- In particular, no action of the authorities of

the Argentine government was aimed at preventing the judge

entitled to hear the ―AMIA‖ Case from making all the

relevant decisions in the case.

- Likewise, no action of the authorities of the

Argentine government was aimed at avoiding the

64

incrimination of the Iranian citizens, particularly those

for whom Interpol had issued red notices.

- During his contacts with Interpol on behalf of

the Argentine Republic, Argentina’s Minister of Foreign

Relations and Worship adopted in all cases a consistent and

clear conduct, in the sense that the execution of the

Memorandum of Understanding implied no change whatsoever in

the effectiveness of Interpol red notices nor did it

curtail the authority of the judge entitled to hear the

―AMIA‖ Case to adopt all relevant decisions.

- The different communications and letters from

Interpol attached hereto, in particular the one sent to the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship by the former

Secretary-General of such organization on January 16, 2015

make it clear that, at all times and in a consistent and

unwavering manner, both before and after the execution of

the agreement, the Argentine government stated that the red

notices should be kept in force.

- The technical reports prepared by the Ministry of

Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services and the

Ministry of Economy and Public Finances, and by the Federal

Administration of Public Revenues defeat the statements

contained in the complaint that the execution of the

Memorandum of Understanding had an illegitimate concealed

motive: the non-incrimination of the Iranian citizens for

whom red notices had been issued, with a view to favoring

the trade exchange of grains for oil between Argentina and

Iran.

- The allegation that Mr. Héctor Luis Yrimia and

Ramón Allan Héctor Bogado purportedly served as members of

65

the staff of the Intelligence Secretariat of the Argentine

President’s Office is hereby defeated. Dr Nisman had stated

that such persons were intelligence agents who purportedly

―operated‖ on behalf of the Federal Government within the

framework of the criminal scheme complained of. A criminal

complaint had even been previously filed against the latter

person by the above-mentioned Secretariat, since it was

proved that, usurping the position of a public official, he

attempted to engage in influence peddling.

- There is no evidence whatsoever, not even

―indicia‖, that proves the existence of a conduct

attributable to the President of the Argentine Republic or

to officials of the Federal Government that can constitute

the crimes set forth in Article 277, paragraphs 1 and 3,

Article 241, paragraph 2 and Article 248 of the Criminal

Code—these being the provisions invoked in the complaint—or

in any other provision of such Code.

-VII-

PRAYER

In light of the foregoing, I request Your Honor to:

a) Consider this submission on behalf of the Federal

State duly made.

b) Order that this submission be attached to the

Case mentioned in the introduction of this submission,

together with all the documentary evidence attached hereto,

as evidentiary support for the investigation of the events

complained of.

JUSTICE SHALL BE DONE